		-	_
			]USN
(b)(3)-P.L.	86-36		

(b)(1) (b)(3)-50 USC 403 (b)(3)-18 USC 798 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

## The History of Applesauce

The History	or rippiesauce
—Which was t	the nickname for our
V3)-50 USC 403	nt in civilian operation
	- / // // // / / / / / / / / / / / / /
of an intercept sta	
In the immediate post-war era (1945–48), the U.	
Navy's radio intelligence organization shrank from	
wartime position of great strength to a mere cadre. It he been decided, of course, that a principal post-war targ	
been decided, or course, that a principal post-war targ	time was Intercept and D/F Control Officer for the Naval
	Security Group; this project was additional.)
	We estimated that we would need to establish about
	intercept positions, to cover both
operating in various parts of the world. Our collection	
capability was In the Pacific we ha	
small units in	recruiting that many skilled operators would be a formidable task.
	toringapie task.
	//// all planning
	was to be done by the Navy.
	At that time, NSG had within its reserve components an
	organization known as the Reserve Listening Service
	(RLS). This consisted of civilians who had served as NSG
our mainstay in the area, was	operators during World War II and who had joined NSG reserve components throughout the U.S. These men
	performed their Navy drills by copying foreign targets in
The station was a great distance from	
principal target area Most of the targe	ets The intercepted material was mailed to NSS for processing,
-but there was very litt	
operational activity on the part of the	operators. The RLS was not a smashing success, but it did
Everyone complained about this proble	keep alive the interest of former operators and gave us a minor return on our investment.
daily and we were trying desperately to find a solution.	The RLS was a natural choice as a recruiting pool.
This was one of the problems presented to Capta	/A / /VA
Redfield Mason, when he returned to duty with the Nav	
Security Group in 1947. Captain Mason began discussio	
with newly established CIA,	amused Mr. Willis, who remarked that "that one sounds
collection. It appeared that we might be able	
	In 1949 the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) was
After a year's negotiation,	formed, and the Navy and Army operations were
,	consolidated. The Production organization was moved to
	<b>-</b>

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

**CONFIDENTIAL** 9

(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

## -CONFIDENTIAL

Arlington Hall Station, with Captain Mason as the Chief.  He reaffirmed the requirement for the station and directed that I step up the effort to establish it.	The formation of AFSA assisted Project Applesauce in some ways because it gave a wider base for planning. John McIntire, who had experience in facilities planning with ASA, designed the station, as well as the training facility at Arlington Hall Station that was a near replica of the actual station.  In addition to the RLS operators we hoped to hire, we combed the ASA Reserve records for experienced men who might be available. We also checked AFSA personnel files.
There was one difficulty in the operation of intercept stations at that time that we particularly wanted to remedy. The operators were ordinarily cleared only as high as Confidential, which prevented them from knowing about the results of T/A or C/A efforts; thus they received no feedback information and operated in a vacuum. We insisted that allbf the Project Applesauce crew receive the same Top Secret clearance, and, though we had to fight this one all the way to the top in CIA, we finally won—a victory that, I am sure, ultimately contributed to the success of the station.	We then embarked on a unique recruiting effort for cryptologic specialists by mailing a letter to approximately 300 men scattered throughout the U.S., asking if they would be interested in civilian employment with a Government Agency (unspecified) at an overseas location (unspecified) at an unspecified salary, doing work similar to that in which they had been engaged during the recent war.  Ind I applied the signature. We were highly gratified to receive a large number of replies.

The entire communications complex, with the wing which housed USF 61 in the lower right. (U. S. Navy photograph)

		(b),(3)-P.L.
	(b)(1) (c)(3)-50 USC	86- <del>3</del> 6 (b) (3) <del>,</del> 50 USC
•	/   \(\frac{400.3}{200.3}	403 (b) (3) -18 USC
	/   (%)(3) - P. L.   \$6,43,6	798 CONFIDENTIAL
	/ //	33111111
	It appeared that we could probably hire an adequate	
	number of people; however, they were scattered all over	
	the U.S. and personal interviews were required. We	
	therefore planned to have our interviewing team, consisting	
	of Major Thorsten Erickson, USA, an AFSA employee,	
	section of the country.  of CIA, visit principal cities in each	
/	Major Erickson, in mufti, and traveled about	
	10,000 miles in three weeks; they interviewed a large	
/	number of applicants and hired most of them. During the	
/	interviews, the candidates were not told for whom they	
	would be working, other than the U.S. Government; they	
/	were not told where they were going, except that it would	
	be in the area; and they were not told exactly	
are reserved.	what they would be doing. The team carried a large amount of cash and paid some men on the spot for travel	\
)(1) )(3)	and other expenses.	
A.	Major Erickson was quite pleased with the men he had	$\langle \Lambda \Lambda \rangle$
11	been able to hire and said he believed they would make a	$\backslash \backslash \backslash \backslash$
IA \	good crew with a minimum of training. Most of the hiring	
	was done at the GS 5-7 level with an occasional GS-9 as a	_
	supervisor.	$\langle     \rangle   \rangle   \rangle$
1	We also had to find a suitable person to be the civilian	$\backslash \backslash \backslash \backslash \backslash$
\	in charge and the deputy. This proved to be a monumental	
	undertaking requiring approximately six months. I had	
\	several possible candidates; however, for personal reasons,	
\	most of them declined, and one was rejected for security reasons. Fortunately we had an ace in the hole in the form	The operations room taken about 3
\	of USN (Retired) and Chief	years after the station was established. The facil-
\	Radioman USN (Retired), highly experienced	ity originally had positions, most of which are
	individuals who very reluctantly agreed to come out of	shown here. (b) (1)
X	Florida retirement and head the project at salaries of	(Photo classified CONFIDENTIAL) (b) (3) -50 USC 403
	\$10,000 per year—a lot of money in those days.	(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
)(3)-P.L.	In the meantime, had been working	
3-36	frantically to finish installation of the training facility in A	and updating of their knowledge. Those hired to man the
\	Building, AHS.	communications circuits worked in the Arlington Hall
	Finally, all of our new	Station Communications Center. The men regained their
	employees were brought to Arlington Hall to be briefed.  Fitzpatrick explained to them, for the first time, exactly	the They were also briefed on
	where they were going and what they would be doing.	personnel matters, living conditions and all of
	When was mentioned, I watched their	the other things they needed to know about their new job.
	faces and concluded that most of them had a general idea	There was an absolute minimum of complaining, sickness,
	of where they were going; however, it was obvious a few of	and absenteeism; we had a gung-ho crew.
	them did not. One man told me he had been sure he was	In the fall of 1950, the men completed training and
	going to At the end of the briefing, we asked if	
•	anyone wanted to back out: we were cheered to see not a	Post-Log
	single hand.	
	For the next two months the men worked in the training	The intercept station was a success from the
	facility: those hired as supervisors established watch lists,	beginning. The men proved to be highly motivated
	and the men copied targets that could be heard in	operators, and hearability was excellent. For the
	Washington. They also visited the Navy's section at Arlington Hall Station for on-the-job training	first time, we were able to keep up with the
	at Thington Han Station for on-the-job training	

## CONFIDENTIAL

operating an ELINT site

After a few years, it became difficult	to hire
replacements and to place the skilled men in jobs	
returned from AFSA, NSA, and CIA hi	
of the returnees, but it was eventually decided tha	t it would
be better to man the station with military	operators.
	the Navy
took over in June 1957, with the facility rec	esignated
USN-16. Thus ended the first U.S. civilian	operator
experiment.	Jana
In retrospect, I wonder why we had so muc	h trouble
finding a suitable site for this station. For ex	ample, in
1948-49, the U.S. Navy (not NSG) estab	lished an
Elint site	This site
was later turned over to NSG and became US	N-18. At
this same period the U.S. Army (not AS	

This later became USM-49 under ASA. Why could not these sites also have been used for Comint at that time? As far as were concerned, I doubt if they would have ever known the difference-or cared if they did know.

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

USN, is currently serving as Executive Officer of the National Cryptologic School. As a career cryptologic officer, he has served in Sigint activities in many parts of the world, and as Commanding Officer of five of them. He has had several tours in NSA in jobs involving virtually every cryptologic discipline. He has also contributed to the NSA Technical Journal.

(b)(1)

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b)(1)

(b)(3)OGA