III International Confer. On Forest Fire Research
14th Confer. On Fire and Forest Meteorology
Vol. II, pp. 2209-2225, Luso, 16/20 November 1998
IMPROVING DECISION MAKING PROCESS FOR THE
FOREST SERVICE WILDLAND FIRE SITUATION ANALYSIS
Armando González-Cabán (1) and Donald G. MacGregor(2)
(1) Pacific Southwest Research Station, USDA Forest Service, Forest
Fire Laboratory, 4955 Canyon Crest Drive, Riverside, California
92507 Tel: (909) 680-1525; FAX: (909) 680-1501
Email: agonzalezcaban@fs.fed.us
(2) MacGregor-Bates, Inc., PO Box 10105, Eugene, Oregon 97440 Tel:
(541) 942-5727;
FAX: (541) 942-8041 Email: donaldm@epud.net
SUMMARY
USDA Forest Service policy mandates that a wildland Fire Situation
Analysis (WFSA) must be completed for escaped fires that extend
into the next burning period (12 hours). The current WFSA process
is manual, cumbersome, and a lengthy process to perform under the
pressure conditions of an ongoing large wildfire. Seventy-one senior
fire managers, resource managers, fire planners, and line officers
from all five Federal agencies (the Forest Service, and USDI Bureau
of Land Management, National Park Service, Bureau of Indian Affairs,
and Fish and Wildlife Service) with fire protection responsibilities,
participated in this study. Informants indicated that there was
nothing wrong with the WFSA process but expressed concerns to pulling
back from fire suppression activities to do a WFSA. Most informants
believed that the WFSA process does a moderately good job in determining
the final outcome of fire suppression strategies. Slightly over
one third of informants thought that the process could “substantially
control” large-fire suppression costs, while about one- fourth
indicated that only a “very small amount of control: was possible.
Informants noted that much of the information needed to execute
the WFSA was not available at the time of the analysis or was not
available in a readily usable form. The results of the study strongly
suggest that a great number, if not the majority, of the problems
associated with WFSA implementation are traceable (directly and
indirectly) to potential inadequacies in training and education
about alternative fire suppression strategies.
INTRODUCTION
The United States Department of Agriculture Forest Service (FS)
is one of five Federal Government agencies with fire protection
responsibilities (the others are the Bureau of Land Management,
National Park Service, Bureau of Indian Affairs, and Fish and Wildlife
Service). The Forest Service is responsible for protecting about
80 million hectares of forest lands. Protection of these lands is
very expensive. During the last decade alone over $5 billion has
been spent in fire suppression.
Forest Service policy on fire management requires that a fire situation
analysis (FSA) be prepared by the responsible line officer, evaluating
initial suppression action on each uncontrolled wildfire after the
first burning period (Forest Service Manual (FSM) 5131). The Policy
requires the FSA to be reviewed and validated daily before each
burning period (12 hours). The FSM establishes that, at a minimum,
the FSA should consider the expected suppression costs, damage,
and probability of success or failure of containing the fire within
some established boundaries. If the fire does not meet established
fire management direction, including minimization of fire suppression
costs and damage from fire, the fire should be declared an escaped
fire.
After a fire has been declared escaped, the line officer is mandated
to organize and implement an appropriate suppression response based
on a Wildland Fire Situation Analysis (WFSA). A WFSA must be completed
for all escaped fires that extend into the next burning period.
The WFSA decision making process requires the following steps: a)
identification of evaluating criteria that reflect land and resource
management objectives, potential suppression costs, potential damage
to natural rescues, safety, and other concerns; b) development of
suppression strategies in sufficient numbers to represent a reasonable
range of alternatives for the situation; and c) analysis of suppression
alternatives addressing the evaluation criteria and other significant
economic, environmental, political and social concerns.
The current WFSA process is manual, cumbersome, and a lengthy process
to perform under the pressure conditions of an ongoing large wildfire.
These problems have affected its use in the intended manner mandated
in the Manual. To develop a new WFSA process, or to improve the
existing one, a clearer understanding is needed of how the current
process is used, why it is used the way that is, what elements are
missing from the process, and why it may not be used as intended.
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the WFSA process based
on the experiences of senior fire management and natural resource
management personnel by examining how WFSA is currently being used
as a support for decision making in fire management; how well the
information needs of WFSA are being met; the causes of poor quality
WFSA’s; and potential improvements to the WFSA process (including
information, training, and expertise) based on the judgments of
experienced WFSA users.
METHODOLOGY
The study was conducted using both interview and survey research
methodologies. Structure for the interviews was provided by a set
of key questioning points based on elements of the WFSA process.
The questions were structured in the form of an interview guide.
Interviews were completed in about 1 1/2 hours to complete. The
interviews were conducted in a discussive atmosphere and informants
were encouraged to think broadly about the topics presented to them.
Interviews were taped recorded to provide a basis for analysis of
informant responses to key questioning in the interview guide. Two
to three weeks following the interview, each participant received
a follow-up survey. The follow-up survey probed key variables based
on the interview.
Informants for the study were senior fire management personnel,
resource specialists, and agency administrators from all fire management
agencies: USDA Forest Service (FS), USDI Bureau of Land Management
(BLM), National Parks Service (NPS), Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA),
and Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS). A total of 71 informants were
included in the study.
Informants Selection Process
A Regional contact person was identified and briefed on the nature
of the study for each of the six FS Western Regions (see figure
1), and asked to provide the names of 12 to 15 individuals having
the relevant expertise and background in WFSA. Potential informants
were contacted by telephone, briefed on the nature and purpose of
the study, and a meeting time was scheduled when an interview could
be conducted. This general strategy meant that some individuals
identified as potential informants could not be included in the
study because of time, availability, and distance constraints. Agencies
and number of informants from each one included:
Agency Number
Forest Service (FS) 52
Forest Service/BLM (jointly) 4
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) 5
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) 4
National Park Service (NPS) 3
Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) 3
Figure1. Western states of the study area
Fire and WFSA Frequency
To determine the prevalent use of the WFSA process, we asked the
informants to estimate the yearly average frequency of fires in
their land management units, as well as the yearly average frequency
of escaped fires requiring a WFSA. Both estimates were made as “best
guesses” based on each informant’s experience in their
respective land management unit. Because of the large area over
which the study was done, it was expected that there would be considerable
variability in fire frequency. These estimates ranged from a low
of 25 fires per forest in some FS Rocky Mountain Region (Region
2) forests, to more than 500 for some forests in the FS Southwestern
Region (Region 3). The estimates were considerably lower for the
other federal agencies. All informants noted the tremendous variability
in the number of fires from year to year.
Estimation of the yearly average number of fires requiring a WFSA
proved to be much more difficult, largely because WFSA fires occur
very infrequently and year-to-year variability is quite high. Estimates
of the actual number of WFSA fires on a yearly average basis at
the forest level ranged from a low of 0.1 (one WFSA every 10 years)
to a high of seven. The typical range was from two to three fires
per year. Again, however, informants noted the high level of variability
in WFSA fires. At the Ranger District Level, the frequency of WFSA
fires is even less. For many land management units, line officers
may conduct a WFSA on a less-than yearly basis, and frequently only
once or twice over a five- (or more) year period consequently, line
officers may get little practice or feedback and therefore, are
deficient in the WFSA process.
Perceived Value and Utility of the WFSA Process
A major determinant of the quality with which a decision making
process is implemented is the perceived value of the process by
those who use it. In both the interview and the follow-up survey
we asked the informants to indicate their perception of the value
or usefulness of the WFSA process. These included the usefulness
of WFSA as a decision making tool; the ability of WFSA to identify
the best fire suppression strategy; the ability of WFSA to consider
land management objectives and final outcomes of a wildfire action;
and the ability of the WFSA to control large fire costs.
RESULTS
Generalized Utility of WFSA
In general, the WFSA process is viewed as having utility for fire
management decision making. Over 90% of the informants indicated
that they found the WFSA process to be “somewhat” or
“very” useful as a decision making tool in fire management,
although only approximately one-third found it very useful (Table
1). None of the informants indicated that they found it not at all
useful, and only a very small number (9.3%) found it slightly useful.
The WFSA process is intended to aid in the selection of the best
fire management strategy for dealing with an escaped or wildfire
incident. However, when asked whether the WFSA generally leads to
selection of the best fire management strategy, only slightly over
52% indicated that it does so “always or most of the time.”
Although none of the informants indicated that it rarely leads to
the best strategy, a somewhat large percentage (46.3%) indicated
that it “sometimes” lead to the best strategy. We can
say that in general, informants were positive about the usefulness
of WFSA as decision making tool, but slightly less so about its
ability to aid strategy selection. The relationship of the two items
in Table 1 shows that the general perception of the usefulness of
WFSA was unrelated to its perceived ability to lead to the best
fire management strategy (x2 = 3.78 ; df = 4; p > .20).
Table 1. Perceived value of WFSA by informants as a decision making
process
In your experience, how useful have you found WFSA
as a decision making tool in fire management? Percentages
Not useful 0.0%
Slightly useful 9.3
somewhat useful 55.6
Very useful 35.2
In your experience, does WFSA generally lead to the
best fire suppression strategy?
Rarely 0.0%
Sometimes 46.3
Most of the time 51.9
Always 1.9
a Percentages for a given item may not total to 100% due to rounding.
Value of WFSA in Considering Outcomes and Controlling Wildfire Costs
The WFSA process includes a careful consideration of land management
objectives and the impact of fire on those objectives. Thus, successful
WFSA is, in part, one that selects a fire management strategy that
is consistent with land management objectives and that achieves
an outcome of the suppression effort that is consistent with the
land management plan. In addition, the WFSA policy identifies the
cost of suppression efforts as criteria against which alternative
strategies should be compared. Given the escalating costs of suppressing
wildfires, a reasonable question to ask of WFSA is the degree to
which it can, if appropriately applied, help control such costs.
When considering land management objectives and final outcomes of
fire suppression action, 65.4% indicated that the WFSA does this
“moderately” well (Table 2). Very few informants indicated
that WFSA accomplished this objective “very well” or
“not well.” A strong relationship was found between
WFSA’s ability to select the best fire management strategy
and its consideration of outcomes; those who tended to judge WFSA
as better at considering outcomes were also more likely to see WFSA
as leading to the best fire management strategy (X2 = 15.23; df
= 6; p <.01). It appears from these results that the perceived
quality of WFSA as a decision making process is related, at least
in part, to judgments about its ability consider outcomes of fire
suppression actions in light of land management objectives.
Table 2. Perceived value of WFSA in meeting land management and
controlling suppression costs
How well does WFSA consider land management
objectives and final outcomes of the wildfire action? Percentages
Not well 7.7%
Slightly 21.2
Moderately 65.4
Very well 5.8
With regard to the cost of large-fire suppression,
how much do you thing the WFSA process, if done
properly, can help control such costs?
Not at all 0.0%
Very small amount 22.2
Some control 46.3
Substantial control 31.5
a Percentages for a given item may not total to 100% due to rounding.
Control of suppression costs is a matter of critical concern in
fire management. Informants were asked to indicate how much control
the WFSA process can have over large-fire suppression costs, assuming
the WFSA process was done properly (Table 2). A wide range of responses
was exhibited in this question. Thirty-one and a half percent indicated
that “substantial” control was possible, while another
46.3% indicated only “some control” was possible. At
the very extreme, 22.2% indicated only a “very small amount”
of control was possible.
Judgments about the reliability of WFSA to control wildfire suppression
costs were not related to either general perception about the usefulness
of WFSA as a decision making tool (X2 = 4.18; df = 4; p >.20),
or to judgments about WFSA’s ability to lead to the best suppression
strategy (X2 = 2.56; df = 4; p >.20).
Availability of Information for the WFSA
The WFSA process requires a number of types of information, including
natural resource management objectives and natural resource values,
much of which comes from the land management planning process. The
availability and usability of this information for the WFSA process
was investigated (Table 3). In the interviews informants frequently
noted that much of the information needed to execute the WFSA was
not available at the time of the analysis, or was not available
in a form readily usable for the analysis. The information most
frequently found lacking were critical resource objectives from
the forest or land management plans and quantitative natural resource
values use in quantitatively assessing the impact of alternative
fire management strategies in terms of damage to the natural resource
base.
Availability of Natural Resource Values for WFSA
Only 13% of the informants indicated that the natural resource values
are “usually available” in a form that can be used directly
in a WFSA (Table 3). More than 60% of the respondents indicated
that resource values are “seldom available.” There was
a weak relationship between the availability of natural resource
values information and the general usefulness of the WFSA as a decision
making tool. Availability of natural resource information was unrelated
to judgment about the ability of the WFSA to select the best fire
management strategy. These finding suggest that resource values
are perceived to be of marginal importance in aiding actual fire
management decision making. However, this does not mean that improvements
in the availability of natural resource values are not or would
not be viewed positively.
Table 3. Responses to two items assessing quality of information
for WFSA
Are natural resource values typically available in a
form that can be used directly in a WFSA? Percentagesa
Not available 1.9%
Seldom available 60.4
Sometimes available 24.5
Usually available 13.2
Typically, how usable are land management plans
for the needs of WFSA?
Not usable 5.7%
Slightly usable 32.1
Somewhat usable 45.3
Very usable 17.0
a Percentages for a given item may not total to 100% due to rounding.
Usability of Land Management Plans by WFSA
Slightly more than 32% of respondents indicated that land management
plans are “slightly usable” for the needs of WFSA, while
45.3% indicated that they are “somewhat usable.” A strong
relationship was found between the usability of Land Management
Planning (LMP’s) and the judged ability of the WFSA to lead
to the best fire management strategy. Those who saw land management
plans as more usable by the WFSA process also tended to judge the
WFSA as leading to the best suppression strategy (X2 = 16.71; df
= 6; p <.01). Thus, it appears that better quality land management
planning is a necessary precursor to improving fire management decision
making and to improve the quality of implementation of the WFSA
process.
Assessment of Probability of Success/Failure
Assignment of probability of success/failure to each alternative
suppression strategy included in the analysis is a key assessment
in the WFSA process. From interviews results, it appears that probability
assignment is the most difficult of all the judgments required in
the WFSA. Informants tended to indicate that lack of fire experience
leads to inadequate consideration of the national or regional availability
of suppression resources and, therefore, to overly optimistic assessments
of the likelihood that a given suppression strategy will accomplish
its objectives (e.g., containment size, containment time, suppression
costs).
When asked to judge the level of precision with which probability
assessments of success/failure can be made very few informants (3.8%)
thought that probabilities could be assessed with high precision
(i.e., ± 5%). Only a slightly larger percentage (9.6%) thought
that probabilities could only be assessed with a precision of ±40%
or more. The vast majority thought that probabilities could be assessed
with moderate to limited precision (i.e., ±15% to ±30%).
Causes of Poor Quality of WFSA’s
Informants were asked to judge how often each of a number of factors
were attributable as causes of poor quality WFSA’s. The highest
rated causes of poor WFSA’s were related to inadequacies in
WFSA training and experience. For example, more than 74% indicated
that poor WFSA’s are “often” or “almost
always” caused be lack of adequate WFSA training on the part
of the line officer responsible for the WFSA. Almost the same percentage
(75.4%) indicated that poor WFSA’s are “often”
or “almost always” caused by lack of line officer WFSA
experience. It is not surprising then, that in a factor analysis
the items of training and experience were the principal factor,
explaining more than 33% of the variance. The overall factor analysis
revealed that judgments of the causes of poor WFSA’s can be
conceptualized as relating to lack of WFSA training and experience,
lack of experience (fire management experience), and lack of natural
resource and fire expertise (such as fire behavior analysis) needed
to accomplish the WFSA.
Perceived Improvement of the WFSA Process
As part of the study, we asked informants to offer suggestions or
ideas that would improve implementation of the WFSA process. A set
of the most commonly mentioned were included in the follow-up questionnaire.
Based on their experience, informants rated how much improvement
would be gained from each of the suggestions. Responses were classified
in a four-category response scale: no, slight, moderate or large
improvement. Later the categories were collapse into only two: no/slight
improvement, and moderate/large improvement. Only a subset of those
judged to be contributing the most improvement to the WFSA process
are shown in Table 4.
Table 4. Responses to follow-up survey question: “Listed below
are a number of possible
changes to WFSA. In your opinion, and based on your experience,
how much
improvement in WFSA would result from each one?” (Partial
List)
IMPROVEMENT
Potential WFSA Improvement No/Slight Moderate/Large
Better Natural resource values 13.2% 86.8%
Better training on how to analyze alternative fire
suppression strategies 25.9 74.1
Better definition of the role of fire in land management plans
25.9 74.1
More fire management experience for line officers 20.4 79.6
a Percentages for a given item may not total to 100% due to rounding.
More than 86% of the respondents to the follow-up survey indicated
that “better natural resource values would lead to a “moderate
or large” improvement in the WFSA. This appears somewhat inconsistent
with informants’ views regarding the need for economic analysis
in the initial WFSA. This inconsistency can be explained by the
informants perceived views that the WFSA process is taking on greater
importance than in the past, and that fire management decisions
today require stronger economic justification. Although the WFSA
has always had an economic analysis, this aspect of the WFSA has
been dealt with historically by using subjective ratings.
The results of a factor analysis (13 categories considered) revealed
that 70% of the variance in informants’ responses to items
relating to improvements to the WFSA process can be explained by
four factors. The four general categories of factors include better
training in analysis of wildland fire, better natural resources
values and planning, more fire experience incorporated into the
WFSA process, and better planning concerning the role of fire.
Computerized Version of the WFSA
A computerized version of the WFSA (PC-WFSA) was being introduced
in some far-western forests, particularly in the FS Pacific Northwest
Region (Region 6, Oregon and Washington), and the Pacific Southwest
Region (Region 5, northern California) while conducting this study.
We did not address any issues related to implementation of the computerized
PC-WFSA. However, it was clear to us that many informants had either
been using the PC-WFSA, or had beliefs about how it might benefit
(or not benefit) the WFSA process once it became available to them.
When asked about whether the PC-WFSA would yield much improvement
in the WFSA process more than 69% thought that it would; while almost
one-third (30.7%) thought that it would yield little or no improvement.
By and large, informants thought that the PC-WFSA would help people
“get through the process.” However, very few individuals
interviewed indicated that the PC-WFSA would lead to a better quality
analysis of fire suppression alternatives.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The results of the study provide no evidence to indicate that
the policy regarding WFSA, as identified and defined in Forest Service
Manual (FSM) 5100, is in some way flawed, broken or otherwise inapplicable
to decision making in the domain of fire management. Nor is there
any evidence to indicate that the policy as stated in FSM 5100 cannot,
in principle, be implemented. When asked of interview informants
what type of process should be applied in wildland fire situations,
assuming no process were presently in place, the answer typically
received was “a process like we have now.” None of the
informants offered any indication that an analysis of alternatives
based on decision analysis makes no sense in the context of wildland
fire management. Nor was there any indication that fire managers
should be managing fire solely on the basis of their intuitions
rather than conduct a formal analysis. However, informants frequently
note that it is difficult to suspend fire suppression and do the
analysis.
What the results of the study do indicate is that the WFSA process
is generally viewed as a useful form of analysis for decision making
in fire management, but that its utility is often compromised by
a variety of problems associated with how the process has been implemented
and with the base of fire experience among those who are charged
with conducting the WFSA. A key issue appears to be the quality
and extent of training provided in WFSA -- essentially, the WFSA
process is rooted in decision analysis. For the most part, WFSA
training appears to have focused on its procedural aspects, rather
than on a broader education in the principles of analysis. A deeper
review of current WFSA training methods and materials is required
to identify how training could be improved.
A general observation based on a large number of interviews with
senior fir management personnel is that the WFSA is a relatively
simple and robust process that entered into fire management at a
time when the vast majority of the line officers had a great deal
of fire suppression experience. Though the WFSA itself is not a
tactical document, it does call upon those responsible for its execution
to make a number of judgments that require tactical knowledge and
experience. Historically, the fire suppression knowledge and expertise
was inherent in the line officer position. However, fire suppression
experience is less a hallmark of the line officer position today
than it was historically the case. Consequently, much of the expertise
required to accomplish the WFSA must come from others on the line
officer’s staff, particularly the fire management officer’s
and, or the resource area specialists. In some situations, these
individuals are not available at the time the WFSA must be done,
particularly in forests or districts that are minimally staffed.
Thus, the WFSA process faces a number of implementation challenges
that need to be addressed if the quality of WFSA’s done in
the field is to be maintained and, or improved. It is in this spirit
that the following recommendations are made.
Leave Current WFSA Policy Unchanged
There is no evidence from the present study that the current WFSA
policy is either broken or flawed, nor is there evidence that the
policy is fundamentally unimplementable. Policy changes without
undertaking steps to improve WFSA implementation would be premature.
The current WFSA policy is rooted in principles from the decision
sciences. These same principles have been applied successfully in
many other decision making contexts. There is no reason to believe
that they cannot be applied successfully in fire management as well.
Review and Evaluate Current WFSA Training Practices
A great number, if not the majority, of the problems associated
with WFSA implementation are traceable (directly and indirectly)
to potential inadequacies in training and education surrounding
the analysis of alternative fire suppression strategies. The current
training program, including materials, for WFSA should be thoroughly
reviewed to determine the degree to which it meets the requirements
necessary to effectively implement the WFSA policy. Training and
education in decision analysis, including generation of alternatives
and assessment of uncertainties appear to be either deficient or
(in some cases) absent. The relatively low frequency of WFSA fires
(i.e., 1% or less of total fires) suggests that the skills necessary
to maintain WFSA proficiency may not be exercised with sufficient
frequency to insure good quality WFSA’s. The potential for
WFSA proficiency standards should be explores, with periodic review
and retraining if necessary.
Strengthen the Link Between Land Management Planning and the WFSA
A fundamental requirement for a high quality WFSA is a good set
of natural resource management objectives. Currently, the land management
planning process is not closely enough linked with the needs of
WFSA to meet this requirement. The potential to link the WFSA to
land management planning and documentation should be explored. For
example, management areas within forest plans could be made available
to the WFSA directly. In addition, a greater consideration of the
role of fire in land management planning needs to be incorporated
directly into land management plans and made available to the WFSA
process.
Improve the Availability and Usability of Natural Resource Values
for the WFSA
Better quality natural resource values need to be made available
for the WFSA process. Currently, the WFSA’s appear to vary
widely in the degree to which quantitative natural resource values
are used as a basis for comparing alternative strategies in terms
of impacts to the natural resource base. The potential for disseminating
a database of natural resource values through a computerized WFSA
should be explored. Additional efforts should be devoted to developing
reliable and meaningful values for noncommodity natural resources.
Evaluate the Potential of the PC-WFSA to Support Judgment and Decision
Processes Relevant to the WFSA
The potential for additional WFSA decision support through the PC-WFSA
implementation should be explored. For example, case or rule-based
systems to assist with difficult judgment situations, such as cost
estimation, should be examined as potential enhancements to the
PC-WFSA. Likewise, the potential for front-loading local WFSA information
based on land management planning areas should be studied. Some
forests have already taken steps along these lines, and their experiences
should be documented and disseminated to other forest who have not
yet implemented the PC-WFSA process to the same degree.
Identify and Evaluate Approaches for Increasing the Level of Fire
Suppression
Experience Available to Conduct the WFSA
A theme that consistently arose in the interviews and was reflected
in the follow-up survey is the need for line officers to have fire
experience in order to carry out a good WFSA. There was also a clear
perception on the part of study informants that a significant portion
of the line officer corps lacks such experience. At this time, is
difficult to make a specific recommendation concerning how to address
this problem. On the one hand, line officers routinely have available
staff personnel with fire management experience. On the other hand,
these individuals are sometimes not available at the time the WFSA
is done.
We want to emphasize that analyzing fire management decisions is
quite different from making fire management decisions. The former
(analysis) is prospective and involves structuring a decision problem,
establishing goals and objectives, assessing values and obtaining
information. The latter (decision making) involves integration,
justification and responsibility. In this latter area, the line
officer has available the results of the WFSA plus whatever other
experience and knowledge they have to make the best decision possible
at the time. As some interview informants commented, “the
WFSA can only take one so far; after that, it is a matter of experience.”
Clearly, there is a need to increase the base of fire experience
among the line office corps if the results of WFSA’s are to
bear a closer match to both expected and actual outcomes of fire
management activities. Approaches for establishing a clear delineation
and documented delegation of responsibilities of WFSA components
to land management and incident team members should be explored.
In addition, approaches for increasing the fire experience base
of line officers, relevant to conduct of the WFSA, should be examined.
These options could include applying relevant WFSA and fire experience
in nearby districts, making more use of computerized decision support
technology, use of standardized WFSA templates, and greater use
of preplanned WFSA’s.
Acknowledgments
We want to thank the dedicated fire management professionals who
participated in this study. It was their willingness, cooperation
and sincere dedication to improving fire and natural resource management
practices that made this effort possible. They are outstanding professionals,
all, and it was a pleasure working with them. This study was funded
by the USDA Forest Service under Research Joint Venture Agreement
#PSW-97-004-RJVA between the Pacific Southwest Research Station
and MacGregor-Bates, Inc.