U.S. Department of Energy
OPENNESS PRESS CONFERENCE FACT SHEETS

OPENNESS: THE WAY TO DO BUSINESS
PRESS CONFERENCE FACT SHEETS

JANUARY 15, 1997

Table of Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Three years after announcing the first Openness Initiative, the Department of Energy is announcing new measures to ensure that openness is the way to do business in the future. In addition, the Department is releasing today more newly declassified material, and issuing several reports on nuclear accountability, health, and safety. This material is described in detail in the accompanying Fact Sheets.

Maximizing openness not only benefits the public, but also enhances national security. Limiting classification to sensitive information that protects our national security allows for such information to be better protected. We are building "high fences around narrow areas."1 This goal is consistent with maximizing the public release of information that is no longer sensitive and no longer warrants classification.

In December 1993, the Secretary of Energy broke the silence at her first Openness Press Conference and announced all U.S. nuclear tests. Since then the Department of Energy has systematically opened up this once very secretive agency. In June 1994, at the second Openness Press Conference, the Department provided information on the locations and quantities of the Department's stockpile of highly enriched uranium. Finally, in February 1996, the Secretary informed the public about plutonium production, acquisition, use, disposition, and inventories in the United States over the past 50 years. This allowed the public to be better informed and involved regarding disposition of excess plutonium and uranium. The Department is now engaged in a dynamic and multifaceted Openness Program.

Improving Nuclear Accountability, Health, and Safety

The Department of Energy Declassifies Documents Concerning Plutonium Left in Vietnam: The United States, Vietnam, and International Atomic Energy Agency Are Cooperating on Plutonium Accountability.

During the review of historical documents, Department of Energy declassifiers discovered classified documents which describe a surprising incident that occurred during the last year of the Vietnam War. About 80 grams of plutonium, supplied by the U.S. to the Republic of Vietnam for civilian research purposes, were not recovered during the chaotic final days of the Republic in 1975. The quantity of plutonium (80 grams) is far short of sufficient material to make a nuclear weapon. There is no nuclear proliferation concern.

Federal volunteers made a harrowing penetration to the Dalat site of the Vietnamese research reactor and successfully arranged the recovery of the enriched uranium reactor fuel. A marking error during the confusion of withdrawal led to the inadvertent abandonment of plutonium at the site -- a fact that was only recently discovered during the declassification of documents under Executive Order 12958. The Department has reported this incident to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) so it can resume accountability and control of the plutonium. Both the IAEA and the Vietnam Government have been extremely helpful in moving to resolve the location of the plutonium.

Historical Nuclear Weapons Test Films to be Released.

About 6,500 previously unreleased films on the early days of the U.S. nuclear weapons program are being declassified or unclassified versions are being made of those films that still must remain classified. This release is a product of a joint DOE/DoD project to salvage these deteriorating but priceless films which provide a unique historic picture of the U.S. nuclear testing program. Although portions of some of these films have been released in the past, much more will be released as a result of this project. A list of the available films will be provided on the Internet via the DOE OpenNet home pages. The original films under the Department's custody will be turned over to the National Archives and Records Administration for historical purposes. Today the Department is releasing the first declassified historic films.

Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Vulnerability Assessment Report.

Secretary O'Leary today released the fourth in a series of vulnerability studies concerning hazardous materials throughout the nuclear weapons and materials production complex. Similar studies previously released addressed spent fuel (1993), hazardous chemicals (1994), and plutonium (1994). The Department is responsible for a large amount of HEU and some dangers are inherent in storage of large quantities of such material. The HEU vulnerability assessment was an evaluation of the barriers that protect workers, the public, and the environment from operations or accidents involving HEU and other types of hazardous materials collocated or commingled with HEU. The assessment involved 175 facilities at 22 DOE sites.

Nuclear Weapons Production and the Environment.

The Department is releasing a congressionally-mandated report that provides the first comprehensive analysis of sources of wastes and contamination generated by the production of nuclear weapons. The results show that historic nuclear weapons production resulted in roughly 70 percent of the environmental legacy now being cleaned up by the Department, with nuclear energy and basic scientific research generating the remainder. In addition, the report identifies specific parts of the production process that generated the majority of the waste and contamination. This analysis has already proven useful in helping to guide pollution prevention efforts and avoid problems in the future. By making this information available and acting on it, the United States can help other nations in developing and using alternative technologies to improve nuclear safety, save money, and promote nuclear nonproliferation.

More U.S. Nuclear Tests Leaked Radiological Effluents Than Were Previously Announced.

The Department of Energy's goal is to inform the public of all atmospheric releases of radiological effluents that resulted from the U.S. Underground Nuclear Testing Program. In December 1993 and June 1994 the Department declassified information related to 204 previously unannounced nuclear tests and simultaneous detonations. Of these newly declassified tests, 93 were disclosed to have on-site radiological effluent releases and DOE disclosed the total curies released from these tests at the time of the tests. Since that time, further review of the data revealed that 13 tests disclosed prior to 1993 also released radiological effluents on site. Today, the DOE completes the picture by providing in the document, "Radiological Effluents Released from U.S. Continental Tests 1961 Through 1992" (DOE/NV-317 (Rev.1), a comprehensive update of the effluents from underground tests by adding the onsite radiological effluents (such as the isotopes of Xenon) for the 93 and 13 nuclear tests. This includes both the effluents from the initial tests as well as effluents resulting from later sampling.

Russian Minister Mikhailov Responds to Secretary O'Leary's Openness Challenge.

The Department of Energy is releasing a document, "Report on U.S.S.R. Nuclear Weapons Tests and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions, 1949 through 1990," that is a concrete example of how responsible openness can lead to dismantling the walls of secrecy that existed during the Cold War. This unprecedented document presents a report received by the Department of Energy and the Department of Defense from the Ministry of the Russian Federation for Atomic Energy, its Russian counterpart. This report presents official data on all Soviet nuclear tests and peaceful nuclear explosions. It is acknowledged by Russian Minister V.N. Mikhailov as "symmetric" to the similar U.S. report, DOE/NV-209, offered earlier by Secretary O'Leary as a challenge to Minister Mikhailov to release similar Soviet data. Presented in the Fact Sheet are summary extracts drawn from both the United States and Russian reports.

Highly Enriched Uranium Report: The First 50 Years -- a Commitment.

This report will describe the history of Government production, acquisition, use, disposition, and inventories of highly enriched uranium. This report, a twin to the plutonium report, was requested by the Secretary in February 1996, but has been delayed by more than 6 months due to difficulties with identifying, accessing, and analyzing historical production and transaction data, which have proved more difficult than was the case with the earlier report on plutonium. Publication is scheduled in September 1997. This report will provide assistance to worldwide nonproliferation efforts by revealing where United States highly enriched uranium resides in the United States as well as in other nations. It will also assist regulators in environmental, health, and safety matters at domestic sites where this material is stored or buried.

Openness: The Way to Do Business

Department of Energy Beats President Clinton's Openness Goal by 25 Percent.

In Executive Order 12958, President Clinton challenged each agency to declassify 15 percent of its old classified National Security Information document collections in a year. The Department of Energy not only met this goal, but surpassed it. Specifically, the Department's goal was to declassify about 1.5 million pages, but it actually was able to declassify 1.9 million pages, thus exceeding its goal by over 25 percent. Furthermore, the Department has gone beyond the President's requirement to declassify National Security Information by also committing to declassify nuclear-related classified Restricted Data. In fact, the Department has declassified or confirmed unclassified more than 11 million pages in the past 3 years. For the third year in a row, the Department of Energy is declassifying more documents than it is classifying.

Rules of the Road for Responsible Openness.

The Department is releasing this week for public comment a proposed draft regulation, 10 CFR PART 1045, "Information Classification." This unprecedented effort formalizes and strengthens the Department of Energy's commitment to responsible openness. It provides the public with more detailed information than ever before about what is being classified and why. This is the first time that the public will participate in the formulation of basic policies and procedures concerning the classification of nuclear-related information. The Department is not trying to impose more rules on the public but rather is setting limits on itself and those other Government agencies that have classified nuclear information. It provides the framework for better classification management of nuclear-related information; it requires that such classification be justified; it spells out classification criteria; and it prohibits the misuse of authority.

Delivering the Results of Openness to the Customer.

Declassification of millions of pages is meaningless unless people who need the information know where to find it. To address this public access problem, the Department of Energy is placing a database on the Internet that will help to locate information about documents reviewed under Executive Order 12958. This new database records significant information regarding the contents of classified records collections that have been reviewed at the National Archives and Records Administration as well as at the DOE Headquarters History Division. This new database will be publicly available on Internet via the DOE Home Page and OpenNet.

Contracting for Responsible Openness.

The majority of Department of Energy classified records are generated by and are under the control of its contractors. As a result, the Department's openness goals can be fulfilled only if contractors are fully committed to its success. In the past, contractors were required only to classify correctly. In the future, contractors will be required to continue to classify truly sensitive documents, but they will now also be specifically required to declassify documents that are no longer sensitive. The Department's Acquisition Regulation is being modified to ensure that all new contracts and subcontracts dealing with classified documents contain a clause requiring that the contractor establish a systematic declassification program for its records. In addition, all existing such contracts are being amended over a 5-year phase-in period to include declassification. This step reaffirms that the Department of Energy is committed to openness for the long haul.

Nuclear Classification Policy Reinvented.

In response to stakeholders requests, in March 1995, the Secretary of Energy initiated a Fundamental Classification Policy Review to perform the most extensive analysis of its kind. This review was completed with considerable assistance from the DoD and the intelligence community. Today the final report is being provided to the Department of Defense for concurrence. In this review, the Department of Energy's classification policy was assessed to determine which information requires continued protection and which no longer warrants classification. This unprecedented study has resulted in over one hundred recommendations for changes in the Department's policies and practices. More information will be declassified. Costs will be reduced as information that is no longer sensitive is declassified. National security will be enhanced as limited security resources are focused on only that information that is truly sensitive.

Conclusion

These latest deliveries on openness demonstrate that openness is good policy because it is the right thing to do, with many demonstrable positive benefits to the public and to the Department . Of course, providing the maximum amount of nuclear-related information to the American public has been and will continue to be "subject at all times to the paramount objective of making the maximum contribution to the common defense and security" of the United States.

We have engaged the Department of Energy's stakeholders in an ongoing dialogue that has, through openness, made the Department accountable for its actions. In return, the public is beginning to place greater trust in the Department to provide accurate and complete information about its past and current activities.

Improving Nuclear Accountability, Health, and Safety

THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY DECLASSIFIES DOCUMENTS CONCERNING PLUTONIUM LEFT IN VIETNAM: THE UNITED STATES, VIETNAM, AND INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY ARE COOPERATING ON PLUTONIUM ACCOUNTABILITY

Upon recent notification by the U.S. Department of Energy, officials from the Vietnamese Atomic Energy Agency (VINATOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are taking prompt action to verify the status of a small amount of U.S. plutonium (80 grams) left in Vietnam in 1975. Until recently, the plutonium was believed to have been removed and returned to the U.S. just before the end of the Vietnam War.

The volume of plutonium and circumstances involved do not give rise to special proliferation concerns. Vietnam, which is a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and a member of the IAEA, files regular reports to the IAEA on radioactive materials in its possession. Officials from VINATOM and its research facility in Dalat, where the materials are believed to be located, have been responsive to inquiries by the U.S. on this subject. The U.S. Department of State advises that the IAEA is scheduled to conduct an inspection of the Dalat facility in February, 1997.

The Department of Energy today is releasing previously classified documents relating to the plutonium. A copy of these documents is attached. The documents were located and declassified as part of the Department's program to declassify documents under Executive Order (E.O.) 12958, "Classified National Security Information."

By today's release, the Department is revising DOE/DP-0137, "Plutonium: The First Fifty Years," issued in February 1996 to indicate that the plutonium was not retrieved and returned to the U.S. Quantities listed are based on evaluation of the original records. The quantities may be updated after re-evaluation of the records.

U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Congressional, Public
and Intergovernmental Affairs
Media Contact: Amber Jones/Chris Kielich
(202) 586-5806		 U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Nonproliferation and
National Security
Program Contact: A. Bryan Siebert
(301) 903-3521

BACKGROUND :

A small sealed radioactive source which was transferred from Vietnam to the United States a number of years ago and which was thought to contain a small quantity of plutonium proved in fact to contain polonium. It was concluded that the source, containing approximately 80 grams of plutonium, must, therefore, have remained in Vietnam.

Although such a small quantity does not present a proliferation risk, the United States Government (Department of Energy) has recently asked the IAEA whether it has a record of a plutonium source in Vietnam. The IAEA has replied affirmatively and has agreed to check whether this source is identical to that which was thought to have been transferred to the United States.

In 1962, the United States transferred approximately 80 grams of plutonium to the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) for use in a research reactor in the small village of Dalat. The plutonium was transferred under the 1959 Agreement for Cooperation between the United States and the Republic of Vietnam Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy to implement the Atoms for Peace program. The plutonium was used for research and educational purposes in a small TRIGA reactor. With the agreement of the government of the Republic of Vietnam, in 1975 the United States retrieved approximately 13 kilograms of uranium fuel enriched to approximately 19.9 percent U-235. It was previously believed that the 80 grams of plutonium were also recovered at that time.

Previously during the Tet offensive of January 1968, Dalat was occupied and the nuclear reactor at Dalat was shut down. When two U.S. volunteers, on a mission to retrieve the uranium and plutonium, reached Saigon in late March 1975, all communications were shut off from Dalat, which is approximately 180 miles North of Saigon. By this time, the village of Dalat was surrounded on three sides by Viet Cong and North Vietnamese regulars.

At the volunteers' request, the mission to retrieve the fuel was scheduled for Easter Sunday with the thought that the Viet Cong would believe any Americans in the country would be observing the holiday. The team was instructed by the American Ambassador in Saigon that if the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese regulars overran Dalat, they were on their own and the best course of escape would be to walk 50 miles to the coast. They found that the reactor and fuel sources were intact but had to make arrangements for missing tools, shipping containers, and a fork lift to be dispatched before disassembly could begin. This equipment was airlifted from Fort Belvoir, Virginia, to the reactor site within 48 hours. During the process of retrieving, packaging, and labeling the uranium fuel and plutonium, nearby combat was occurring and sniper bullets were hitting the reactor area. However, all of the fuel elements were secured in shipping containers. However, a container of Polonium-Beryllium (Po-Be) was misidentified as "Pu-Be" (Plutonium-Beryllium) and designated for return to the United States, while a container that actually contained the plutonium was left at the site. By the evening of April 1, 1975, the volunteers and material were being airlifted back to Saigon. Dalat fell to the Viet Cong that night. The containers were airlifted immediately from Tan Son Nhut Airport to Clark Air Base in the Philippines, escorted by one of the volunteers. The interim destination of the fuel was a bunker on Johnston Atoll.

In 1975, the two volunteers received commendation for valor in wartime conditions.

In February 1976 when the Hanford Engineering Development Laboratory (HEDL) at Richland, Washington, received the container marked plutonium, the technicians verified the outer container description but did not conduct a neutron dose rate measurement of the container to confirm the identity of the actual material. In 1979, when a neutron dose rate measurement was made on the material, it was discovered that it was not plutonium, but it was polonium 210 that had decayed. As a result of an extensive records search, the conclusion was reached that approximately 80 grams of plutonium had been left in Vietnam.

BENEFITS :

WHO ARE THE KEY STAKEHOLDERS:

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q. What type of a nuclear reactor was involved? What was the purpose of the reactor? Can it produce nuclear materials for weapons purposes?

A. The nuclear reactor at Dalat is a Training Research Investigation Reactor - General Atomics Mark II (TRIGA Mark II) designed by General Atomics of San Diego, California, and constructed by Kaiser Engineers of Oakland, California. The purpose of the reactor was research, training, and radioisotope production. The radioisotopes were used for research, medical diagnoses, and treatment. It is not capable of producing nuclear materials for weapons purposes. The Plutonium-Beryllium source was not produced by the reactor.

Q. Where is the Plutonium-Beryllium source today?

A. Its location is uncertain, but it is likely to be in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Vietnamese officials have been contacted by Department of State officials to confirm the location.

Q. What is the status of the reactor today at Dalat?

A. The Socialist Republic of Vietnam reactivated the reactor with assistance of the former Soviet Union which provided enriched uranium fuel. The reactor is being used for research and isotope production purposes.

Q. What is the form of the plutonium?

A. It is a metal alloy of plutonium and beryllium clad in stainless steel.

Q. Is the plutonium source hazardous to health?

A. The plutonium and beryllium alloy is clad in stainless steel so there is no contamination hazard unless it is opened. However, prolonged personal contact with the source could be hazardous since it is a neutron source. If the source was found by a member of the public and the person was exposed to it for eight hours per day for one year at an average distance of 1 meter, the person would receive a radiation dose of approximately 87 rem. The Federal limit for workers is 5 rem per year.

Q. Why were the documents classified in the first place?

A. The documents were classified to protect the fact that the plutonium was unaccounted for.

Q. Why can they be declassified now?

A. The documents can be declassified now since it has been confirmed that the plutonium was left in Vietnam. The name of the Vietnamese citizen who assisted has been deleted for privacy reasons.

Q. Why did it take so long to notify the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and why didn't the Government figure out more promptly that the plutonium was not retrieved?

A. The documents which made possible the notification of the IAEA were recently discovered and declassified as part of the document declassification efforts by DOE pursuant to the direction of the President in Executive Order (E.O.) 12958. Prior to that time, current DOE officials were unaware of the document. When the containers were brought to Hanford, it appears that Hanford Site technicians should not have relied upon the external markings of the container retrieved from Vietnam, but instead should have promptly verified the contents based on neutron emissions. When the error was discovered in 1979, it appears that adjustments were made to the Hanford site inventory records, but not to the overall DOE inventory records. On August 21, 1979, an INFCIRC/207 Change Report/207 Inventory Change Report reflecting import and export activity for U.S. facilities was sent to the IAEA noting the correlation. However, correct procedures dictate that the U.S. should have sent the correct form (Form 741) to the IAEA A.

Q. What happened to the enriched uranium?

A. The enriched uranium was retrieved from South Vietnam and is now at the Hanford site near Richland, Washington.

Undisplayed Graphic

Typical 5-curie Plutonium-Beryllium Neutron Source

HISTORICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS TEST FILMS TO BE RELEASED

The Department of Energy, in cooperation with the Department of Defense, has declassified a series of historical films on the nuclear weapons program. They are being converted to videotape format to help preserve the films and to facilitate the declassification and release process. These films document the history of the development of nuclear weapons, starting with the first bomb tested at Trinity Site in southeastern New Mexico in July 1945 through the cessation of atmospheric weapons testing in 1962. This is the first time the films have ever been edited for declassification and released. Portions of some of these films were previously released. The project is being carried out in conjunction with the Department of Energy's Albuquerque Operations Office, the Department of Energy's Office of Defense Programs, and the Department of Defense. The purpose of the project is to preserve and declassify the information contained in the large collection of films on the nuclear weapons program that are at various sites on Kirtland Air Force Base in Albuquerque.

SPECIFICALLY:

U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Congressional, Public
and Intergovernmental Affairs
Media Contact: Amber Jones/Chris Kielich
Phone: (202) 586-5806		 U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Nonproliferation and
National Security
Program Contact: A. Bryan Siebert
Phone: (301) 903-3521

BACKGROUND

BENEFITS:

WHO ARE THE STAKEHOLDERS :

Historians, film and television producers, the American public, educational institutions, researchers, authors, media organizations, public interest organizations, and local and state government agencies will gain more confidence in the Federal Government as a result of the release of these films under the Administration's policy on openness. The Government's continued release of previously classified information in formerly sensitive areas also encourages more openness in other governments, as shown by the recent Russian announcements on nuclear testing.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q. How will the public be able to get videotape copies of the films?

A. The videotapes are being provided in cooperation with the National Archives and Records Administration in Washington, D.C. Copies of the videotapes may be obtained from the Coordination and Information Center, P.O. Box 98521, Las Vegas, Nevada 89193. The telephone number is (702) 295-0748 and the facsimile is (702) 295-0877.

Q. How soon will the videos be available?

A. The Department currently has the capacity to transfer to videotape and review for classification a maximum of 20 films per month. There are 15 films available today, and we plan to release additional films each month. A listing of the films available will be posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nv.doe.gov/library/films/testfilms.aspx

Q. Why were these films classified in the first place? Why can't they be released without a classification review now?

A. The films were classified to protect information that would assist strategic adversaries and nuclear proliferants. Due to the end of the Cold War, much information is no longer of national security significance. However, many of the films will have deletions of classified information that would, even today, be harmful to our national security or nonproliferation policies if not removed before release. Also, some of the films were not marked as classified when they were produced. These films will receive only a limited examination before release.

HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM (HEU) VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT REPORT

The Secretary of Energy, honoring a commitment in the October 1995 Performance Agreement with the President, is releasing the highly enriched uranium (HEU) environmental, safety and health vulnerability assessment report.

This study completes a series of four vulnerability studies commissioned by the Secretary in 1993. It follows spent fuel (1993), hazardous chemicals (1994), and plutonium (1994). These assessments, and the openness with which they were conducted, are an important hallmark of the Department. The highly enriched uranium assessment is complex-wide and covered all highly enriched uranium except that contained in weapons, waste, or that already analyzed in the plutonium or spent fuel studies. The assessment was conducted openly and with public participation.

SPECIFICALLY:

The report includes:

The assessment concluded that the state of the HEU complex is less alarming than that of the plutonium complex. This is because, with the exception of inadvertent criticality, HEU is much less hazardous than plutonium or spent fuel. Uranium 235 is less than one-thousandth as radioactive as plutonium 239. However, DOE has much more HEU than plutonium, and HEU could present serious radiological hazards from any inadvertent nuclear criticality or a large release. Therefore, it requires prudent management and control. The study also concluded that the vulnerabilities associated with storage of uranium 233 are significant. A Management Plan for corrective actions to address the vulnerabilities is being prepared by the Department.

U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Congressional, Public
and Intergovernmental Affairs
Media Contact: Amber Jones/Chris Kielich
(202) 586-5806		 U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Environment, Safety
and Health
Program Contact: Mark H. Williams
(202) 586-2407

BACKGROUND:

Highly enriched uranium is defined as uranium at least 20 percent of which is the fissile isotope, uranium 235 (U-235). The Department and its predecessors produced HEU for nuclear weapons and some reactor fuels through the enrichment of natural uranium beginning in the mid-1940s and ending in 1992.

Facilities used for manufacturing and processing HEU, most built in the 1940s and 1950s, contain significant quantities of the material in various forms. Much of the HEU is in containers or locations not designed for extended storage. Highly enriched uranium contamination of floors and walls and HEU entrained in processing equipment are common at many facilities. Buildings and equipment that are aging, poorly maintained, or of obsolete design contribute to the problem. Current activities in these facilities include the temporary storage, shipping, receiving, and processing of HEU. Processing activities include the recovery of HEU from solutions, scraps, and residues; the manufacture and storage of HEU reactor fuel; and cleanup in preparation for decontamination and decommissioning.

The assessment featured a working group process that involved over 300 people, including Federal staff, site operating contractors, nationally recognized experts, consultants, external stakeholders representing public interest groups, and State, Federal, and international regulatory and advisory organizations.

A companion report is being prepared by the Department of Energy to present a complete picture of the Government's production, acquisition, use, disposition and inventories of highly enriched uranium from 1945 through 1996.

BENEFITS:

  • The HEU and the previous spent nuclear fuel, hazardous chemical and plutonium studies are valuable resources to line managers in the Department. The vulnerability assessments help managers target effectively the greatest risks and act to ensure that resources are available to address those risks.

  • DOE's progress in identifying these vulnerabilities is a measure of its ability to define and monitor adequate safety performance. The assessments are thoroughly documented and establish a baseline for program monitoring.

  • Data will aid regulators who oversee environmental, health and safety activities.

  • The Working Group process recommended by the Secretary that was used in the assessments combined the resources of DOE field and Headquarters staff. This process has helped in achieving thoroughness, independence, efficiency, consistency, openness, consensus, and ownership of results.

WHO ARE THE KEY STAKEHOLDERS?:

Participation of stakeholders from the very beginning was an integral part of the assessment process. They were invited to attend the assessment's major meetings to establish the plan and evaluate the results. Public meetings were held locally at the relevant sites. There has been local press coverage of the results at each major site. The key stakeholders of this assessment are the Congress; Government organizations, such as the Environmental Protection Agency and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; news media organizations; local and state government agencies; national and local public interest organizations; and international organizations, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q. What does the Highly Enriched Uranium Working Group Report contain?

A. The Highly Enriched Uranium Working Group Report consists of 3 volumes. Volume I contains a summary of the assessment process and results. Volume II contains detailed site specific assessments. There are 12 parts of this volume, one for each site (including a part for all sites with small HEU holdings. See Attachment). Volume III contains the process and protocols used in the assessment.

Q. How do I get a copy of the report?

A. Copies of the complete report or any part of it (Volume I, II, or III) can be obtained by calling: (301) 916-0193. It should be noted that Volume I contains about 110 pages, while Volume II, with its 12 parts, contains about 5500 pages and Volume III contains about 600 pages. Reports will be ready for distribution by February 15, 1997.

Q. What is an "environmental, safety and health vulnerability"?

A. Vulnerabilities can be viewed as potential breaks in barriers that protect the worker, the public, or the environment, and are of the following types:

Facility Condition Vulnerability - deficiency or degradation of facility physical barriers such as the building structure, equipment, or systems important to safety or environmental protection.

Material/Packaging Vulnerability - deficiency or degradation of the package or container for the material due to aging, corrosion, radiolytic damage, or location.

Institutional Vulnerability - breakdown in management systems or administrative controls used to ensure safety or environmental protection (e.g., radiological protection program, facility operational safety requirements, or training program).

(HEU Site Map Not Available Online)

NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION AND THE ENVIRONMENT

The Department of Energy is publicly releasing a report, entitled "Linking Legacies: Connecting the Cold War Nuclear Weapons Production Processes to Their Environmental Consequences". This report presents the first analysis that interprets historical records and institutional knowledge to link environmental impacts with specific weapons production processes. It also presents a picture of the environmental impacts of each step of the nuclear weapons production and disposition cycle. In addition, this report provides information on the missions and functions of nuclear weapons facilities, on the inventories of wastes and materials at these facilities, as well as on the extent and character of contamination on and around the sites.

SPECIFICALLY :

Linking Legacies: Connecting the Cold War Nuclear Weapons Production Processes to Their Environmental Consequences describes the wastes, contamination, surplus facilities and materials in inventory being managed by the Department of Energy. Central to the report is an analysis linking this environmental legacy to one of eight nuclear weapons production processes, the Naval nuclear propulsion program, or other DOE activities.

U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Congressional, Public
and Intergovernmental Affairs
Media Contact: Amber Jones/Chris Kielich
(202) 586-5806		 U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Environmental Management
Program Contact: James D. Werner
(202) 586-9280

BACKGROUND :

BENEFITS :

WHO ARE KEY STAKEHOLDERS? :

Among the key stakeholders are concerned citizens site-specific boards, who will now be able to obtain a comprehensive picture of the environmental results of the Cold War nuclear arms race in the United States and an understanding of the need to spend tax dollars on addressing this legacy. In addition, local residents, county and state regulators, and environmental groups will be better equipped to assess the impact of the nuclear weapons facilities.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q. How can I receive a copy of the report?

A. Copies of the report may be obtained from the DOE Environmental Management Information Center by calling 1-(800) 736-3282.

Q. What information does this report contain that is not already available?

A. The report contains the first comprehensive analysis explicitly linking wastes, contamination, surplus facilities, and materials in inventory to the nuclear weapons production processes and non-weapons activities generating them. In addition, the Department has never before published a comprehensive analysis of environmental contamination or surplus facilities. However, the data on waste and materials in inventory presented in the report are available from published DOE documents.

Q. The Congressional language mentions only "waste streams." Why does the report cover environmental contamination, surplus facilities, and materials in inventory?

A. Linking Legacies was prepared in response to section 3154 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, which required the Department to produce "a report that contains a description of all waste streams generated before 1992 during each step of the complete cycle of production and disposition of nuclear weapons components by the Department of Energy." Based on further discussions with Congressional staff, this mandate was clarified to include not only "wastes" as they are legally and technically defined (e.g., 40 CFR 261 et seq.), but also environmental contamination, surplus facilities, and materials in inventory. As such, the report, Linking Legacies, contains a comprehensive discussion of the nature and magnitude of the Department of Energy's environmental legacy.

Q. What did the Department learn from this analysis and how will it help clean up the environment or save money?

A. Linking Legacies is the Department's first comprehensive analysis of sources of wastes and contamination generated by the production of nuclear weapons; it can help identify opportunities and set priorities for preventing pollution in the future. The report is based on the most current data available, and provides information on the characteristics, location and quantity of the Department's environmental legacy resulting from its production of nuclear weapons. The results of this analysis indicate that one operation accounts for more waste and contamination than any of the other seven steps in the nuclear weapons production process: chemical separations, which involves dissolving spent nuclear fuel rods and targets in acid and separating the plutonium and uranium using a chemical process. Wastes generated by the chemical separations processes accounted for more than 85 percent of the radiological effluents generated in the nuclear weapons production process. In addition, chemical separations generated 71 percent of the contaminated groundwater and 33 percent of the contaminated solids (soil, rubble, debris, sludge, etc.). Finally, 24 percent of the contaminated surplus facilities for which the Department is responsible were attributable to chemical separation operations. Recently, these chemical separation operations have been used at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina to stabilize spent fuel and other materials. However, environmental concerns, which have now been quantified in this report, are among the reasons the Department has begun developing alternatives to traditional chemical separation technologies to stabilize spent fuel and targets for long-term safe storage and permanent disposal. Initial results indicate that substantial safety and cost benefits can result from using these alternative technologies.

By making this information available and acting on it, the United States can help lead other nations in using alternative technologies to stabilize irradiated materials, which can help improve nuclear safety, save money, and promote nuclear nonproliferation.

MORE U.S. NUCLEAR TESTS LEAKED RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS THAN WERE PREVIOUSLY ANNOUNCED

The Department of Energy is today releasing a report to provide the public with additional information on releases to the atmosphere of radiological effluents associated with the prior United States continental underground nuclear testing program. The report is titled Radiological Effluents Released from United States Continental Tests, 1961 through 1992 (DOE/NV-317 [Rev.1]). In December 1993 and June 1994, the Department declassified information related to 204 previously unannounced tests and simultaneous detonations. Of these newly declassified tests, 93 were determined to have only on-site radiological effluent releases. The Department is releasing information on 13 additional nuclear weapons tests declassified prior to 1993 which were only recently determined to have leaked radiological effluents. These latter releases were also contained within the boundaries of the test site and pose no health or safety risk to the public.

In summary, today the Department completes the picture by providing in the above referenced document a comprehensive update of the effluents from underground tests by releasing the onsite radiological effluents (such as the isotopes of Xenon) for the 93 and for the 13 nuclear tests. This includes both the effluents from the initial tests as well as effluents resulting from later samplings.

The report:

U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Congressional, Public
and Intergovernmental Affairs
Media Contact: Amber Jones/Chris Kielich
(202) 586-5806		 U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Nonproliferation and
National Security
Program Contact: A. Bryan Siebert
(301) 903-3521

BACKGROUND :

In the past, Department of Energy contractors have been required to classify those documents containing information of national security or nonproliferation concern. This revision to the Department's Acquisition Regulation recognizes that a balance is required between the Department's mission to protect the national security and prevent nuclear proliferation and its commitment to maximize the amount of information available to the public. Only when both classification and declassification reviews are performed can the Department achieve its goal of protecting the national security while providing the public with access to as much Government information as possible.

BENEFITS :

WHO ARE THE KEY STAKEHOLDERS?

Historians, researchers, and members of the general public will benefit from this change to the Department of Energy's Acquisition Regulation. The revision will allow them to have access to documents which are reviewed and declassified by the Department of Energy itself as well as those documents which are reviewed and declassified by its contractors.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q. Has the change to the Department's Acquisition Regulation been published in the Federal Register?

A. Yes, it was published in the November 20, 1996, issue of the Federal Register (Volume 61, No. 225).

Q. When are comments due and to whom should they be sent?

A. Written comments are due on January 21, 1997, and can be submitted to Richard B. Langston; Office of Policy (HR-51); Office of the Assistant Secretary for Procurement and Assistance Management; U. S. Department of Energy; 1000 Independence Avenue, SW; Washington, DC 20585.

Q. When will the regulation be finalized?

A. The regulation is expected to be finalized and issued within 90 days of the close of the comment period (around the third week of April 1997).

Q. When can I expect to see the benefits from this change in the Department's Acquisition Regulation?

A. This new requirement does not apply retroactively to existing contracts, but will require a 5-year phase-in period; i.e., it will be included in each contract which is newly issued, extended, or modified after the date the regulation is issued. For example, the requirement to review documents for declassification systematically will be included in the contracts for the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory as early as September 1997, but may not appear in the Savannah River Laboratory and Plant contract until September 2001.

NUCLEAR CLASSIFICATION POLICY REINVENTED

The Secretary of Energy today is providing the final report on the Fundamental Classification Policy Review to the Department of Defense for concurrence. The Department of Defense intent is to respond by March 1, 1997. The final report includes items proposed for declassification and other items referred to the Technical Evaluation Panel for further analysis. The purpose of this review has been to evaluate in a fundamental way the Department's classification policies, including determining which areas of classified information require continued protection for identified reasons of national security and nonproliferation and which areas may be declassified without undue risk and promptly released to the public.

In March 1995, the Secretary of Energy invited people from across the nation to attend a public meeting in Washington, D.C. This historic meeting brought together scientists, weapons experts, military officers, historians, environmentalists, and others to begin a comprehensive review of the Department of Energy's classification policy. The unprecedented challenge: to review all information classified by the Department. The clear charge: to hear all voices and to seek input from within the Department, its contractors, the national laboratories, and most importantly, from the American public. The Fundamental Classification Policy Review marked the first time that a Government agency has actively sought public input on a fundamental review of its classification policy.

The Department of Energy, the Department of Defense, and other government agencies have completed an exhaustive top-to-bottom review of the Fundamental Classification Policy Review's recommendations. As a result, the ground rules of classification are changing. These changes, currently being circulated, are expected to be approved by March 1, 1997. New and revised classification guides will be prepared based on areas of agreement.

SPECIFICALLY:

The Fundamental Classification Policy Review assessed Department of Energy classification policies to determine which information requires continued protection for national security reasons with the objective of promptly declassifying and releasing all information no longer warranting such protection. The review made over one hundred recommendations to declassify specific information. A draft report was issued for public comment in February 1996. Interagency review of the Fundamental Classification Policy Review's recommendations began last spring.

Led by Dr. Al Narath, former Director of Sandia National Laboratories and currently President, Energy and Environment Sector, Lockheed Martin Corporation, the review was staffed by 60 experts drawn from Government agencies, contractor organizations, and the national laboratories.

The review's initial output was released to the American public in February 1996. After public comments were reviewed, the final draft report of the Fundamental Classification Policy Review was delivered to the Secretary of Energy. In turn, the Secretary sought a comprehensive interagency review of the final draft report.

The Fundamental Classification Policy Review recommended changes in the Department's classification policies and practices, including:

The review also endorsed retention of current classification policy in a number of instances, but recommended stronger control in those areas which are truly sensitive and where release would contribute to nuclear proliferation or make the United States vulnerable to adversaries.

The Department of Energy and the Department of Defense co-chaired an interagency review of the Fundamental Classification Policy Review's recommendations. The interagency review assured that all Government Departments' missions and priorities were considered. Support and advice from the Department of State, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Intelligence Community were crucial to the quality of the interagency review process and a complete understanding of all the complex issues involved.

Formal interagency review is nearing completion. Agreement on the disposition of the review's original recommended changes has been reached and its final step is formal concurrence at the Department of Defense. While full implementation of some items will require changes to the Atomic Energy Act, changes to the Department's classification practices can begin immediately. The public will begin reaping the rewards of this effort soon. Changed classification policy will allow increased access to information developed over the last five decades without impacting the safety or security of the American people.

Preparation to implement the review's recommendations formally is under way in the Office of Declassification. Classification guidance is being redrafted and, after necessary coordination, will be forwarded to all classification personnel. Drafts of changes to the Atomic Energy Act are also being developed.

The guiding principles developed by the Fundamental Classification Policy Review have been accepted. Therefore:

The Office of Declassification will update its Draft Public Guidelines to Department of Energy Classification of Information (June 1994), based on the results of the Fundamental Classification Policy Review.

The next step after Department of Defense concurrence is to revise the classification guides. Revisions to the classification guides are important since it is these guides which, based upon the final results of the fundamental review, will provide the new basis for classification and declassification decisions on actual documents. Upon utilization of the revised guides, there will be less information classified either in newly originated documents or in the review of older documents to be made available to the public. Additionally, information which has been determined to justify continued classification due to its clear national security significance will be better protected.

U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Congressional, Public
and Intergovernmental Affairs
Media Contact: Amber Jones/Chris Kielich
(202) 586-5806		 U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Nonproliferation and
National Security
Program Contact: A. Bryan Siebert
(301) 903-3521

BACKGROUND :

BENEFITS :

Successful completion of the Fundamental Classification Policy Review will demonstrate that:

WHO ARE THE KEY STAKEHOLDERS?:

The Stakeholders in the Fundamental Classification Policy Review include concerned citizens who wish to investigate topics of interest and gain desired information while retaining confidence that truly sensitive information continues to be protected. In addition, many public interest groups have addressed meetings of the Fundamental Classification Policy Review and or otherwise communicated their concerns regarding Department of Energy classification policy.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q. What agencies were involved in the interagency review?

A. The Department of Energy has direct responsibility under the Atomic Energy Act for administration of the Restricted Data program and has joint responsibility with the Department of Defense for Formerly Restricted Data. Therefore, these two agencies had lead responsibility for the interagency review process. The Department of State, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Intelligence Community provided invaluable support and assistance to the interagency review process and deliberations.

Q. Why were some of the review's recommendations not accepted?

A. Primarily, these recommendations fell into two categories. First, the review of the original recommendations by the Fundamental Classification Policy Review team by other-agency experts produced useful added information which increased understanding and made declassification inadvisable. Second, there was information upon which, after extensive discussion, the agencies could not agree. This information was referred for additional study by the Technical Evaluation Panel, a group who provides technical expertise and assistance to the DOE Director of Security Affairs.

Q. What kinds of concerns caused recommendations to be rejected or deferred?

A. If information recommended for declassification was determined to be crucial to national security, or of clearly demonstrated significant value to a proliferant, declassification was rejected. If questions of national security or value to a proliferant could not be answered to the satisfaction of the interagency review, the item was referred for further study by the Technical Evaluation Panel.

Q. Why was the Intelligence Community involved in the interagency review?

A. The Intelligence Community advised the interagency review on the status of proliferant programs so that determinations of the value of specific information could be made.

Q. What is the schedule for changing the Atomic Energy Act to eliminate the born classified problem?

A. The proposed classification regulation being published in the Federal Register inviting public comment goes a long way towards eliminating the presumptive nature of the Department's classification program. Schedules for the preparation of a legislative package in accordance with the review's recommendations have not been finalized.

Q. What is happening with Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information (UCNI)?

A. The review has recommended that the future use of UCNI be restricted to Safeguards and Security information. Other information, currently protected as UCNI, will be reviewed and removed from this category on a case-by-case basis or reclassified once appropriate authority is obtained.

Q. Will the revisions to the classification guides be reviewed by DoD before their utilization?

A. Yes, significant progress has been made in reviewing the guides pending final approval of the changes to classification policies which underlie the guides. The revised classification guides will be coordinated with DoD.

Q. How can I obtain a copy of the report of the Fundamental Classification Policy Review when it is completed?

A. Please submit requests to Mr. W. Gerald Gibson, Director, Technical Guidance Division, Office of Declassification, NN-522, US Department of Energy, 19901 Germantown Road, Germantown, MD 20874, telephone (301) 903-3689, facsimile (301) 903-7444.

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