| Statement of Glenn M. Hackbarth, Chairman, Medicare Payment Advisory Commission Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Health of the House Committee on Ways and Means May 10, 2007
Chairman Stark,
Ranking Member Camp, distinguished Subcommittee members, I am Glenn Hackbarth, Chairman of the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC).
I appreciate the opportunity to be here with you this morning to discuss ways that
Medicare can improve its physician payment system.
Since 2000,
total Medicare spending for physician services has climbed more than 9 percent
per year (Figure 1). Slowing the increase in Medicare outlays is important;
indeed, it is becoming urgent. Medicare’s rising costs, particularly when
coupled with the projected growth in the number of beneficiaries, threaten the
sustainability of the program. The Medicare Trustees’ warn that even their unrealistically
constrained estimate of Part B spending growth (due to multiple years of fee
reductions mandated under current law) will still significantly outpace growth
in the U.S. economy. Part B and total Medicare spending growth will continue to
put pressure on the federal budget. That pressure puts other national
priorities, such as homeland security and education, at risk.
Figure 1. FFS Medicare spending for physician
services, 1996–2006
Note: FFS (fee-for-service). Dollars are
Medicare spending only and do not include beneficiary coinsurance.
Source: 2006 annual report of the Boards of
Trustees of the Medicare trust funds.
Rapid growth in expenditures also threatens
to make the program unaffordable for beneficiaries. It contributes, directly and
indirectly, to higher out-of-pocket costs through increased copayments, premiums
for Medicare Part B, and premiums for supplemental coverage. As beneficiaries
receive more services, they are required to make more copayments. Growth in
copayments, in turn, pushes up the cost of supplemental insurance. In addition,
because the monthly Part B premium is determined by average Part B spending for
aged beneficiaries, an increase in expenditures affects the premium directly.
From 1999 to 2002, the premium grew by an average of 5.8 percent per year, but
the cost-of-living increases for Social Security benefits averaged only 2.5
percent per year. Since 2002, the Part B premium has increased even faster—by
13.5 percent in 2004, 17.3 percent in 2005, and 13.2 percent in 2006 (Figure
2).
Figure 2. Monthly Part B premiums, 1999–2007
Note: Beginning in 2007, monthly Part B
premiums are income-adjusted. The standard premium for 2007 is $93.50.
Source: Congressional Research Service. 2004. Medicare:
Part B premiums. Washington, DC: CRS; CMS press release, dated September
12, 2006, Medicare premiums and deductibles for 2007; and CMS press
release, dated September 16, 2005, Medicare premiums and deductibles for
2006.
Spending for
physician services has grown largely because of increased volume—the number of
services furnished and the complexity, or intensity, of those services. Some
observers have hypothesized that new technology, demographic changes, and
shifts in site of service spur growth in the volume of physician services.
Changes in medical protocols and a rise in the prevalence of certain conditions
may also play a role. But analyses by MedPAC and others suggest that much of
the rise in volume is unexplained. A RAND study found that technological
advances and changes in medical protocols that are specific to particular
illnesses do not fully account for volume growth. Other studies suggest that,
after controlling for input prices and health status, differences in the volume
of physician services are driven in large part by practice patterns and
physician supply and specialization. As Elliott Fisher and others described in
a series of articles, in geographic areas with more health care providers and
more physician specialists, beneficiaries receive more services but do not
experience better quality of care or better outcomes, nor do they report
greater satisfaction with their care. John Wennberg identified some
discretionary services that can be overprovided as preference-sensitive care
because they involve significant trade-offs and should be selected only by
patients capable of making an informed decision. This suggests that some
services may be unnecessary, exposing some beneficiaries to needless risk and generating
unwarranted costs for beneficiaries and the program. At the same time, evidence
shows that beneficiaries do not always receive the care they need, and too
often the care they do receive is not high quality.
To help
address Medicare’s growing financial crisis, MedPAC focuses much of its work on
improving efficiency—getting more in terms of quality and outcomes for each
Medicare dollar spent. Increasing the value of the program to both
beneficiaries and taxpayers will require efforts to improve the incentives
inherent in Medicare’s fee-for-service (FFS) physician payment system.
Ideally,
payment systems will give providers incentives to furnish better quality of
care, to coordinate care (across settings, for chronic conditions), and to use
resources judiciously. However, Medicare pays its providers the same regardless
of the quality of their care, which perpetuates poor care for some
beneficiaries, misspends program resources, and is unfair to
providers
who furnish high-quality care and use resources judiciously. Medicare’s payment
system does not reward physicians for coordinating patients’ care across health
care settings and providers, and it does little to encourage the provision of
primary care services, even though such actions may improve the quality of care
and reduce costs. Further, inaccurate prices may inappropriately affect
physician decisions about whether and what services to furnish. And Medicare’s FFS
method of paying for physician services contributes to volume growth by giving
physicians a financial incentive to increase volume.
As discussed
in our March 2007 report on Assessing Alternatives to the Sustainable Growth
Rate System, Medicare needs to change the incentives of the payment system by ensuring
that its prices are accurate, furnishing information to providers about how
their practice styles compare with their peers’ practice styles, encouraging
coordination of care and provision of primary care, and bundling and packaging
services where appropriate to reduce overuse. In addition, Medicare should
promote quality by instituting pay for performance, encouraging the use of
comparative-effectiveness information, and, where appropriate, imposing
standards for providers as a condition of payment. If Medicare’s FFS program
is to function more efficiently, the Congress needs to provide CMS with the
necessary time, financial resources, and administrative flexibility. CMS will
need to invest in information systems; develop, update, and improve payment
systems and measures of quality and resource use; and contract for specialized
services.
Ensuring accurate prices
Misvalued
services can distort the price signals for physician services as well as for
other health care services that physicians order, such as hospital services.
Some overvalued services may be overprovided because they are more profitable than
other services. Conversely, some providers may opt not to furnish undervalued
services, which can threaten access to care, or they may opt to furnish other,
more profitable services instead, which can be costly to Medicare and to
beneficiaries.
A service can become overvalued for a number of
reasons. For example, when a new service is added to the physician fee
schedule, it may be assigned a relatively high value because of the time,
technical skill, and psychological stress that are required to perform it. Over
time, the time, skill, and stress involved may decline as physicians become
more familiar with the service and more efficient at providing it. The amount
of physician work needed to furnish an existing service may decrease when new
technologies are incorporated. Services can also become overvalued when
practice expenses decline. This can happen when the costs of equipment and
supplies fall, or when equipment is used more frequently, reducing its cost per
use. Likewise, services can become undervalued when physician work increases or
practice expenses rise. CMS—with the assistance of the American Medical
Association/Specialty Society Relative Value Scale Update Committee
(RUC)—reviews the relative values assigned to some physician services every five
years. But many services likely continue to be misvalued.
In recent years, per capita volume for different
types of services has grown at widely disparate rates, with volume growth in
imaging and non-major procedures (e.g., endoscopies) outpacing that for office
visits and major procedures. Volume growth differs across services for several
reasons, including variability in the extent to which demand for services is
discretionary and subject to the judgment of a physician or beneficiary, as
well as advances in technology that expand access and can improve patient
outcomes. The Commission and others have voiced concerns, however, that
differential growth in volume is due in part to differences in the
profitability of furnishing services. One reason that different services have
varying opportunities for profit is their prices. In some instances, prices
for services have been set too high relative to costs. For example, MedPAC and
CMS have raised issues about the equipment use rate assumptions for imaging services.
This rate may be set too low for some imaging services, meaning that Medicare’s
payment rate is set too high for these services.
To the extent
that the Medicare’s sustainable growth rate (SGR) system limits growth in
aggregate physician spending, differences in the rate of volume increases
across services mean that certain types of services—such as imaging—are
capturing a growing portion of Medicare physician spending at the expense of
other services. As discussed below, the Commission has expressed particular
concern about the tendency of primary care services to become undervalued relative
to procedural services over time. This creates disincentives to furnish primary
care services and over time can affect the willingness of physicians to enter
the primary care specialties. (For more discussion of this issue, see p. 13.)
Based on the
RUC’s
recommendation, CMS recently increased the work relative values of many evaluation
and management services. Because the fee schedule changes are implemented in a
budget-neutral manner, their impact is partially limited.
Given the
importance of accurate payment, the Commission concluded in the March 2006 report
to the Congress that CMS must improve its process for reviewing the work
relative values of physician services. CMS looks to the RUC to make
recommendations about which services should be revalued. But the RUC’s three
reviews—completed in 1996, 2001, and 2006—recommended substantially more
increases than decreases in the relative values of services, even though one
might expect many services to become overvalued over time. We have noted that
physician specialty societies have a financial stake in the process and
therefore have little incentive to identify overvalued services. Although we
recognize the valuable contribution the RUC makes, we concluded in our 2006
report that CMS relies too heavily on physician specialty societies, which tend
to identify undervalued services without identifying overvalued ones. We found
that CMS also relies too heavily on the societies for supporting evidence.
To maintain the integrity of the physician fee schedule, we recommended
that CMS play a lead role in identifying overvalued services so that they are
not overlooked in the process of revising the fee schedule’s relative weights;
we also recommended that CMS establish a group of experts, separate from the
RUC, to help the agency conduct these and other activities. This recommendation
was intended not to supplant the RUC but to augment it. To that end, the new
group should include members who do not directly benefit from changes to
Medicare’s payment rates, such as physicians who are salaried, retired, or
serve as carrier medical directors and experts in medical economics and
technology diffusion. The Commission has also urged CMS to update the data and some
of the assumptions it uses to estimate the practice expenses associated with
physician services.
In
addition, we recommended that the Secretary, in consultation with the expert
panel, initiate reviews of services that have experienced substantial changes
in volume, length of stay, site of service, and other factors that may indicate
changes in physician work. For example, when a service becomes easier, quicker,
or less costly to perform, physicians may be able to provide more of it. Rapid
growth in volume for a specific service may therefore signal that Medicare’s
payment for that service is too high relative to the time and effort needed to furnish
it. The Secretary could examine services that show rapid volume increases per
physician over a given period. Volume calculations would need to consider
changes in the number of physicians furnishing the service to Medicare
beneficiaries and in the hours those physicians work. CMS could use the results
from these analyses to flag services for closer examination (by CMS or by the
RUC) of their relative work values. The RUC could also conduct such volume
analyses when making its work value recommendations to CMS, but its current
process (every five years) may not be timely enough to capture services with rapid
increases in volume.
Alternatively, the Secretary could automatically correct such misvalued
services, and the RUC would review the changes during its regular five-year
review. In this scenario, CMS would identify specific service codes with
volume increases exceeding a standard, such as average historical growth. The
Secretary of Health and Human Services would then automatically adjust work
values for these codes down. The RUC would consider the changes as part of
their next five-year review.
Corrections to the practice expense values may
also be in order. MedPAC is currently studying the impact of CMS’s recent
changes to the fee schedule practice expense calculation, including the use of
newer practice cost data from some, but not all, specialties. We are also
analyzing equipment pricing assumptions that are used to derive the practice
expense values, particularly for imaging services. Ensuring that practice
expense values are accurately priced reduces market distortions that make some
services considerably more profitable than others, thus creating financial
incentives to provide some services more than others.
Finally,
revisiting the conceptual basis of the resource-based Relative Value Scale
system may be in order. Some observers suggest that the pricing of individual
services should account not just for time, complexity, and other resources but
also for the value of the service and the price needed to ensure an adequate
supply.
Measuring resource use and providing
feedback
Elliott
Fisher and others have found that Medicare beneficiaries in regions of the
country where physicians and hospitals deliver many more health care services
do not experience better quality of care or outcomes, nor do they report
greater satisfaction with their care. Thus, the nation could spend less on
health care, without sacrificing quality, if physicians whose practice styles
are more resource intensive reduced the intensity of their practice.
In the
March 2005 report to the Congress, the Commission recommended that CMS measure
physicians’ resource use over time and share the results with physicians.
Physicians would then be able to assess their practice styles, evaluate whether
they tend to use more resources than their peers or what evidence-based
research (when available) recommends, and revise their practice styles as
appropriate. Moreover, when physicians are able to use this information in
tandem with information on their quality of care, they will have a foundation
for improving the value of care beneficiaries receive.
Private
insurers increasingly measure physicians’ resource use to contain costs and
improve quality. Evidence on whether measuring resource use contains private
sector costs is mixed and varies depending on how the results are used.
Providing feedback on use patterns to physicians alone has been shown to have a
statistically significant, but small, downward effect on resource use. However,
John Eisenberg found that, when feedback is paired with additional incentives,
the effect on physician behavior can be considerably larger.
Medicare’s
feedback on resource use has the potential to be more successful than previous
experience in the private sector. As Medicare is the single largest purchaser
of health care, its reports should command greater attention. In addition,
because Medicare’s reports would be based on more patients than private plan
reports, they might have greater statistical validity and acceptance from
physicians. Confidential feedback of the results to physicians might induce
some change. Many physicians are highly motivated individuals who strive for
excellence and peer approval. If identified by CMS as having an unusually
resource-intensive style of practice, some physicians may respond by reducing
the intensity of their practice. However, confidential information alone may
not have a sustained, large-scale impact on physician behavior.
Using
results for physician education would provide CMS with experience using the
measurement tool and allow the agency to explore the need for refinements.
Similarly, physicians could review the results, make changes to their practice
as they deem appropriate, and help shape the measurement tool. Once greater
experience and confidence were gained, Medicare could use the results for payment—for
example, as a component of a pay-for-performance program (which rewards both
quality and efficiency). Alternatively, Medicare could use the results to
create other financial incentives for greater efficiency or could make the
results public to enable beneficiaries to identify physicians with high-quality
care and more conservative practice styles. Eventually, collaboration between
the program and private plans could result in the development of a standard
report card.
MedPAC has
been conducting research using episode grouping tools for the past two years
and has found that they may be a promising tool for measuring resource use
among physicians. We have found that the vast majority of Medicare claims can
be assigned to an episode, and that most episodes can be attributed to a
responsible physician. Once episodes are assigned to a responsible physician,
each physician’s spending for a given episode can be compared to that of his or
her peers and the results aggregated into an overall “score.” Episode groupers
also permit analysis of the reasons for higher or lower resource use: Each
episode can be subdivided into its component costs (e.g., hospital inpatient
admissions, diagnostic testing, physician visits, post-acute care).
Additional
research remains, however, to ensure that resource use measurement consistently
groups claims into episodes and attributes episodes to physicians in a manner
that correctly classifies physicians as high, average, or low users of resources.
We also want to integrate quality measures into our comparisons of resource
use. Adequate risk adjustment is crucial to ensure that episode grouping tools
are measuring actual variation in resource use rather than variation in the
health status of the beneficiaries being treated. Further, we and others have
found significant variations in practice patterns for some conditions across
the nation. As a first step it may be prudent to hold physicians to a local
standard (e.g., metropolitan statistical area or state) rather than a national
one and to compare physicians only to others in the same specialty. For
example, in our March 1 report to the Congress on the SGR, we
compare a
selected cardiologist in Boston to his local peers for his treatment of a
specific condition (Table 1). In this way, we control for some of the differences
in practice patterns and patient health status that can drive resource use.
Table 1. Hypertension episode resource use
and scores by type of service
Note: E&M (evaluation and management).
Stage indicates the progression of the disease, with 1 being the mildest form.
Resource use score is the ratio of the cardiologist’s resource use to the
average for cardiologists in Boston.
Source: MedPAC analysis of 100 percent sample of
2001–2003 Medicare claims using the Medstat Episode Group grouper from Thomson
Medstat.
Encouraging coordination of care and the use of care management
processes
The Commission
has explored multiple strategies to provide incentives for high-quality,
low-cost care and thus improve value in the Medicare program. However, even if
individual providers are efficient, a beneficiary may still receive
less-than-optimal care if providers do not communicate well with each other or
if they do not monitor patient progress over time. To address this problem, we
have considered ways to promote care coordination and care management by
creating incentives for providers to share clinical information with other
providers, monitor patient status between visits, and fully communicate with
patients about how they should care for themselves between physician visits.
While many patients could benefit from better
coordination of care and care management, the patients most in need are those
with multiple chronic conditions and other complex needs. Gerard Anderson found
that, in 2001, 23 percent of Medicare beneficiaries had five or more chronic
conditions and accounted for 68 percent of program spending. But according to
researchers at RAND, beneficiaries with chronic conditions do not receive
recommended care and may have hospitalizations that could have been avoided
with better primary care. Studies attribute this problem to poor monitoring of
treatment—especially between visits—for all beneficiaries and to a general lack
of communication among providers. Physician offices, on their own, struggle to
find time to provide this type of care, and few practices have invested in the
necessary tools—namely, clinical information technology (IT) systems and care
manager staff. At the same time, beneficiaries may not be educated about steps
they can take to monitor and improve their conditions. Coordinated care may
improve patients’ understanding of their conditions and compliance with medical
advice and, in turn, reduce the use of high-cost settings such as emergency
rooms and inpatient care. Ideally, better care coordination and care management
will improve communication among providers, eliminating redundancy and
improving quality.
Research
suggests that, without the support of IT and nonphysician staff, physicians can
only do so much to improve care coordination. Individual physicians may not
have the time or be well suited to provide the necessary evaluation, education,
and coordination to help beneficiaries, especially those with multiple chronic
conditions. One study found that older patients with select conditions that
require time-consuming processes, such as history taking and counseling, are at
risk for worse quality of care. Further, physicians may lack training or
resources that would allow them to educate patients about self-care or to set
up systems for monitoring between visits. Physicians’ use of basic care
management tools is low, even in group practices where building the
infrastructure for care coordination, including the use of clinical IT, may be
more feasible.
Care
coordination is difficult to accomplish in the FFS program because it requires
managing patients across settings and over time, neither of which is supported
by current payment methods or organizational structures. Further, because
patients have the freedom to go to any willing physician or other provider, it
is difficult to identify the practitioner most responsible for the patient’s
care, especially if the patient chooses to see multiple providers. The
challenge is to find ways to create incentives in the FFS system to better
coordinate and manage care.
In our June
2006 report to the Congress, the Commission outlined two illustrative care
coordination models for complex patients in the FFS program: (1) Medicare could
contract with providers in large or small groups that are capable of
integrating the IT and care manager infrastructure into patient clinical care,
and (2) CMS could contract with stand-alone care management organizations that
would work with individual physicians. In the second model, the care management
organization would have the IT and care manager capacity.
In either model, payment for services to
coordinate care would depend on negotiated levels of performance in cost
savings and quality improvements. Given that Medicare faces long-term sustainability
problems and needs to learn more about the most cost-effective interventions,
the entities furnishing the care managers and information systems should
initially be required to produce some savings as a condition of payment.
However, demonstrating continued savings may not be necessary or feasible once
strategies for coordinating care are broadly used.
To encourage
individual physicians to work with care coordination programs, Medicare might
pay a small monthly fee to a beneficiary’s personal physician or medical group
for time spent coordinating with the program. As with other fee schedule
services, these expenditures would be accommodated by reallocating dollars
among all services in the fee schedule.
In either
model, patients would volunteer to see a specific physician or care provider
(e.g., a medical group or other entity) for their care. CMS could help
beneficiaries identify the physician or physicians who provide most of their care.
Beneficiaries could then designate the practitioner they wanted to oversee most
aspects of their care to be the contact with the care management program. The
physician and the beneficiary would agree that the beneficiary would consult first
with that physician but would not be restricted to seeing only that physician.
The physician, or the medical group on behalf of the practitioner in the case
of a provider-based program, would receive the monthly fee when the beneficiary
enrolls in the care management program. This designated physician (which need
not be a primary care physician, because a specialist might be the appropriate
person for patients with certain conditions) would serve as a sort of medical
home.
These models
do not represent the only ways care coordination might work in Medicare. The
American College of Physicians recently advocated using advanced medical homes.
In addition, other strategies, such as pay for performance, complement care
coordination models by focusing on improving care. In addition, adjusting
Medicare’s compensation to physicians to reflect the longer time spent caring
for patients with complex issues may be warranted if the current fees do not
compensate for this extra time. (For example, CMS could apply a multiplier to
the relative value of certain services for identified patients with multiple
chronic conditions.) Medicare could also establish billing codes to enhance
payments for chronic care patients for services such as case management. The
Medicare Health Care Quality Demonstration, which tests the ability of
innovative payment arrangements for providers in integrated delivery systems to
improve quality, may provide further models for improving coordination of care.
Evidence shows
that care coordination programs improve quality, particularly as measured by
the provision of necessary care. Evidence on cost savings is less clear and may
depend on how well the target population is chosen. When cost savings are
shown, they are often limited to a specific type of patient, the intervention
used, or the time frame for the intervention. Indeed, researchers at
Mathematica have suggested that cost and quality improvements are more likely
to be achieved if programs are specifically targeted and the interventions are
carefully chosen to benefit the targeted patient group. If care coordination programs
work, annual spending may decrease, but beneficiaries may live longer with a
better quality of life—a positive outcome for Medicare beneficiaries, but the
Medicare program may not spend less than it otherwise would have. This
possibility argues for assessing programs on the basis of whether they provide
the interventions known to be effective or achieve certain quality improvements
rather than on the basis of cost savings.
Promoting the use of primary care
Research
shows that geographic areas with more specialist-oriented patterns of care are
not associated with improved access to care, higher quality, better outcomes,
or greater patient satisfaction. Cross-national comparisons of primary care
infrastructures and health status have demonstrated that nations with greater
reliance on primary care have lower rates of premature deaths and deaths from
treatable conditions, even after accounting for differences in demographics and
gross domestic product. Increasing the use of primary care in the United States,
therefore, and reducing reliance on specialty care, could improve the
efficiency of health care delivery without compromising quality.
But many
observers worry that the United States is not training enough primary care
physicians. Indeed, the growth in the supply of physicians in recent decades
has occurred almost solely due to growth in the supply of specialists, while
the supply of generalists—family physicians, general practitioners, general
internists, and pediatricians—has remained relatively constant. A study by
Perry Pugno and others found that the share of U.S. medical graduates choosing
family medicine fell from 14 percent in 2000 to 8 percent in 2005. A 2006 study
by Colin West and others found that 75 percent of internal medicine residents
become subspecialists or hospitalists. There are many reasons why an increasing
number of physicians choose to specialize, but one factor may be differences in
the profitability of services.
Historically, Medicare’s payment system has valued
primary care services less highly than other types of services. For example, according
to a recent Annals of Internal Medicine article by Thomas Bodenheimer
and others, the 2005 fee for a typical 30-minute physician office visit in
Chicago was $90 while the fee for an outpatient colonoscopy, also about 30
minutes, was $227. In addition, primary care services also may be more likely
than other services to become undervalued over time. While other types of
services become more productive with the development of new techniques and
technology, primary care services do not lend themselves as easily to these gains.
Primary care is largely composed of cognitive services that require that the
physician spend time with the beneficiary. In addition, many beneficiaries have
multiple chronic conditions and a compromised ability to communicate with and
understand their physician, both of which increase the time required for
visits. It is difficult to reduce the length of these visits without reducing
quality. (For that reason, physicians also find it difficult to increase the
volume of primary care services furnished in a work day.) Over time, the
specialties that perform those services may become less financially attractive.
Some
Commissioners have argued that the relative value units of the physician fee
schedule should be at least partly based on a service’s value to Medicare. Such
an approach would focus on primary care services as well as other valuable
services. For example, if analysis of clinical effectiveness for a given condition
were to show that one service were superior to an alternative service for a
given condition, then Medicare’s process of setting relative values might
reflect that. This process would be a significant departure from the
established method of setting relative values based only on the time, mental
effort, technical skill and effort, psychological stress, and risk of
performing the service.
In the
longer term, the Commission is concerned that the nation’s medical schools and
residency programs are not adequately training physicians to be leaders in
shaping and implementing needed changes in the health care system. Physician
training programs must emphasize a new set of skills and knowledge. For
example, programs need to train residents to measure their performance against
quality benchmarks, use patient registries and evidence-based care guidelines,
work in multidisciplinary teams, manage the hand-off of patients, and initiate
improvements in the process of caring for patients to reduce medication and
other costly errors. Policymakers may want to consider tying a portion of the
medical education subsidy to specific programs or curriculum characteristics
that promote such educational improvements. In addition, policymakers may want
to consider policies that promote the education of primary care providers and
geriatricians. Bear in mind that physicians’ motivations to enter certain
specialties go beyond income, including lifestyle concerns and professional
interests.
Medicare’s
cost-sharing requirements provide no encouragement for beneficiaries to seek
services, when appropriate, from primary care practitioners instead of
specialists, unlike most cost sharing in the under-65 market, where primary
care copayments are often lower than those for specialists. Medicare’s payment
policies and cost-sharing structure need to be aligned to encourage the use of
primary care. The Commission’s pay-for-performance and care coordination
recommendations could also encourage the use of primary care.
Bundling to reduce overuse
A larger
unit of payment puts physicians at greater financial risk for the services
provided and thus gives them an incentive to furnish and order services
judiciously. Medicare already bundles preoperative and follow-up physician
visits into global payments for surgical services. Candidates for further
bundling include services typically provided during the same episode of care,
particularly those episodes for conditions with clear guidelines but large
variations in actual use of services, such as diabetes treatment.
Bundled
payments could lead to fewer unnecessary services, but they could also lead to
stinting or unbundling (e.g., referring patients to other providers for
services that should be included in a bundle). Medicare should explore options
for increasing the size of the unit of payment to include bundles of services
that physicians often furnish together or during the same episode of care,
similar to the approach used in the hospital inpatient prospective payment
system.
The Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) changed the way Medicare pays
for dialysis treatments and dialysis drugs. However, the MMA did not
change the two-part structure of the outpatient dialysis payment system. One
part is a prospective payment called the composite rate that covers the bundle
of services routinely required for dialysis treatment; the other part includes separate
payments for certain dialysis drugs, such as erythropoietin, iron, and vitamin
D analogs that were not available when Medicare implemented the composite rate.
Providers receive the composite rate for each dialysis treatment provided in
dialysis facilities (in-center) or in patients’ homes.
The Commission
has recommended that the Congress broaden the payment bundle to modernize this
payment system. Medicare could provide incentives for controlling costs and
promoting quality care by broadening the payment bundle to include drugs,
laboratory services, and other commonly furnished items that providers
currently bill separately and by linking payment to quality.
A bundled rate
would create incentives for providers to furnish services more efficiently. For
example, a bundled rate would remove the financial incentive for facilities to
overuse separately billable drugs under the current payment method. In addition
to an expanded bundle, changing the unit of payment to a week or a month might
give providers more flexibility in furnishing care and better enable Medicare
to include services that patients do not receive during each dialysis
treatment.
MedPAC is
examining bundling the hospital and physician payments for a selected set of diagnosis
related groups (DRGs), which could increase efficiency and improve coordination
of care. This approach to bundling could be expanded in the future to capture
periods of time (e.g., one or two weeks) after the admission but likely to
include care (e.g., post-acute care, physician services) strongly related to
the admission, further boosting efficiency and coordination across sites of care.
Bundled payments could be adjusted to provide incentives for hospitals and
physicians to avoid unnecessary readmissions. Bundling services could be
structured so that savings go to the providers, the program, or both. The
Commission is also examining bundling physician payments with payments for
other providers, such as hospital outpatient departments and clinical
laboratories. In addition, MedPAC plans to examine the physician services
furnished to patients before, during, and after inpatient hospitalizations for
medical DRGs to assess whether a global fee should be applied to these
services, as it is for surgical DRGs.
Hospital
readmissions are sometimes indicators of poor care or missed opportunities to
better coordinate care. Research shows that specific hospital-based initiatives
to improve communication with beneficiaries and their other caregivers,
coordinate care after discharge, and improve the quality of care during the
initial admission can avert many readmissions. Medicare does not reward these efforts.
In fact, the program generally pays for readmissions, creating a disincentive
to avoid them. To encourage hospitals to adopt strategies to reduce
readmissions, policymakers could consider requiring public reporting of
hospital-specific readmission rates for a subset of conditions and adjusting
the underlying payment method to financially encourage lower readmission rates.
Episode
grouper software, which is used to measure physician resource use and was
discussed earlier, could also serve as a platform for bundling services for
selected conditions.
Linking payment to quality
Medicare,
the single largest payer in the U.S. health care system, pays all health care
providers without differentiating on the basis of quality. Those providers who
improve quality are not rewarded for their efforts. In fact, Medicare often
pays more when poor care results in complications that require additional
treatment.
To rectify this situation, MedPAC has recommended
that Medicare change the incentives of the system by basing a portion of
provider payment on performance. We recommended that CMS start by collecting
information on structural measures associated with use of IT, such as whether a
physician’s office tracks whether patients receive appropriate follow-up care,
and claims-based process measures for a broad set of conditions important to
Medicare beneficiaries. At the outset, CMS should base rewards only on the IT
structural measures, with claims-based process measures being added to the pay-for-performance
program within two to three years. Two other structural measures—certification
and education—could become part of a measure set, but the link with improved
care would need to be clear. The program should be funded initially by setting
aside a small portion of budgeted payments—for example, 1 percent to 2 percent.
The program should be budget neutral; all monies set aside would be
redistributed to those providers who perform as required.
The Institute of Medicine (IOM) and MedPAC have stated
that, ideally, pay-for-performance measures should be developed and used for
all physician service providers to create incentives to provide better quality
care. However, currently we do not have well-established measures for all
providers of physician services. Thus, initially, policymakers might consider
prioritizing the implementation of some pay-for-performance measures over
others. Focusing measures on high-cost, widespread, chronic conditions (e.g.,
congestive heart failure) might be a good short-term strategy that will maximize
benefits to the Medicare program and to beneficiaries. Further, measures that
reflect coordination between health sectors will encourage and reward
communication between providers, which may improve patient outcomes and reduce
Medicare costs. The Commission considers that pay-for-performance initiatives
would be implemented in a budget-neutral manner.
IOM and
MedPAC assessments of the current state of quality measurement are similar. The
indicators that are available now could form a starter quality measurement set.
However, the measures that are currently available are fragmented across
different users for different purposes and cannot be tied explicitly to the
overarching, national goals laid out by IOM. Composite scores that could bring
together multiple measures of different aspects of quality into a meaningful
summary are needed, but judging the relative value of competing goals that
would underpin such a summary is a challenge.
Both IOM and MedPAC have recommended
that a national entity is needed to:
·
set and prioritize the goals of the health care system;
·
monitor the nation’s progress toward these goals;
·
ensure the implementation of data collection, validation, and
aggregation;
·
coordinate public and private efforts at local, state, and
national levels;
·
establish public reporting methods;
·
identify and fund development of the measures; and
·
evaluate the impact of quality improvement initiatives.
Encouraging the use of comparative-effectiveness information
Increasing
the value of the Medicare program to beneficiaries and taxpayers requires
knowledge about the costs and health outcomes of services.
Comparative-effectiveness information, which compares the outcomes associated
with different therapies for the same condition, could help Medicare use its resources
more efficiently. Comparative effectiveness has the potential to identify
medical services that are more likely to improve patient outcomes and
discourage the use of services with fewer benefits. CMS already assesses the
clinical effectiveness of services when making decisions about national
coverage and paying for certain services. But to date FFS Medicare has not
routinely used comparative information on the costs of services, although
Medicare Part D plans and other payers and providers, such as the Veterans
Health Administration, do use comparative information (e.g., in drug formulary
decision-making processes).
Medicare could use comparative-effectiveness
information in a number of ways to improve the quality of care beneficiaries
receive. Medicare could use such information to inform providers and patients
about the value of services, since there is some evidence that both might
consider comparative-effectiveness information when weighing treatment options.
Medicare might also use the information to prioritize pay-for-performance
measures, target screening programs, or prioritize disease management
initiatives. In addition, Medicare could use comparative-effectiveness
information in its rate-setting process or in coverage decisions.
Given the potential utility of
comparative-effectiveness information to the Medicare program, an increased
role of the federal government in sponsoring the research is warranted. In our
forthcoming June report, MedPAC will recommend that the Congress should
establish an independent entity whose sole mission is to produce and provide
information about the comparative effectiveness of health care services. The
entity should set priorities and standards for new clinical- and
cost-effectiveness research, examine comparative effectiveness of interventions
over time and disseminate information to providers, patients, and federal and
private health plans. The entity could be funded jointly by the federal
government and the private sector, with an independent board of experts overseeing
the development of research agendas and ensuring that research is objective and
methodologically rigorous.
Using standards to ensure quality
CMS has set standards to ensure
minimum qualifications for various types of providers (e.g., hospitals and skilled
nursing facilities), but there are few examples of federal standards that apply
to physician offices. The Commission has recommended that such standards be
implemented for physicians who perform and interpret imaging studies. This
recommendation was motivated by rapid growth in the volume of imaging. This
growth was driven in part by imaging being increasingly provided in physician
offices rather than in facility settings. (The growth is not fully offset with a corresponding decrease in
imaging use in facilities.) The lack of quality standards for imaging
conducted in physician offices raises a number of quality concerns. Therefore,
the Commission recommended standards for physicians, facilities, and
technicians that perform imaging studies. In the future, other types of
services may be candidates for such standards.
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