Thank you, Charlie, for the introduction and the opportunity to address this Special Event.  My remarks are on behalf of U.S. Secretary of Energy Sam Bodman.  The Secretary asked that I extend his best wishes for a successful conference and commend the IAEA for taking this vital initiative.

As indicated by Secretary Bodman yesterday in his address to the General Conference, the United States recognizes the very serious challenge arising from the need to develop sources of energy that support economic expansion and sustainable development that reduce carbon emissions and that improve our security.

As a proven technology, and as the only non-fossil alternative for large-scale electricity production, nuclear power must be part of the solution. This is the conclusion reached by my government.

We recognize too, however, that to realize significant increases in nuclear power, a new framework for the utilization of nuclear energy is needed.

This new framework should encourage the growth of nuclear power as a cost-competitive alternative to other options. It should embrace the highest standards for safety.  It should provide for the responsible management of spent fuel and waste.  And it should address security and proliferation risks.

Our goal is to have energy and security.  It is to ensure that states adhering strictly to nonproliferation norms and standards can enjoy the fullest possible exchange of nuclear energy and technology.

The international nonproliferation regime has served us well to limit proliferation dangers.  But as the experience with Iran and North Korea make clear, we must go farther.

To foster the more global use of nuclear energy, actions are needed that discourage States from acquiring enrichment and reprocessing capabilities - capabilities that serve peaceful ends but are also essential for weapons.

As proposed by President Bush in 2004, a new framework for nuclear energy is needed to “create a safe, orderly system to field civilian nuclear plants without adding to the danger of weapons proliferation.”

Yesterday, Secretary Bodman described our vision for such a framework, which we call the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership or GNEP. 

The purpose of GNEP is to facilitate the safe, secure, and economic expansion of nuclear energy use by:

• developing and deploying advanced, proliferation resistant nuclear energy systems that avoid separation of pure plutonium and make it as difficult as possible to misuse or divert nuclear materials to weapons;
• promoting small and medium size proliferation-resistant reactors designed to meet the needs of developing economies; and
• providing assurances of fresh fuel and spent fuel management to states that agree not to pursue enrichment and reprocessing programs.

Of course, each state is free to make its own decisions with respect to nuclear energy policy, consistent with its international obligations.

Our intent is not to infringe on the sovereignty of states in making those decisions, but to provide alternatives that secure energy supplies and promote our shared nonproliferation goals.

Today’s technologies require further development before the United States or others will be able to fully manifest the GNEP promise.

But because the global demand for electricity-generated power will rise so significantly over the next 25 years, we must begin now to formalize provisions for suppliers and recipients and arrangements involving interim storage, processing, and management of the world’s spent nuclear fuel.

Using enrichment capacity and excess HEU available today, the United States is ready to participate in assurances of supply of fresh fuel consistent with U.S. law and our international commitments.

The Russian Federation and others have also put forward proposals, and we are ready to work cooperatively with other nations, the IAEA, and industry in developing a suitable path forward - a path that should enshrine diversity of supply as the best means to promote confidence that supply disruptions will be addressed.

A first order priority is the establishment of a mechanism for reliable access to nuclear fuel, such as the concept of the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Russia that was circulated to IAEA members, and a reserve of nuclear fuel to back it up.

Last year, Secretary of Energy Bodman announced that the United States would convert roughly 17 metric tons of highly enriched uranium removed from our defense programs to low enriched uranium for use in a reserve.

We encourage additional contributions of materials that could be held nationally or controlled and administered by the IAEA.

The proposal of the six supplier states also makes clear that we welcome and will help facilitate arrangements among commercial suppliers of enriched uranium for the purpose of creating a system, with IAEA support if appropriate, by which suppliers would substitute material for one another at fair market rates in the event of a supply disruption unrelated to nonproliferation violations.

As work proceeds to establish reliable access to nuclear fuel, we recognize that arrangements for services for the back-end of the fuel cycle require further development.

While the spent fuel would not have to be returned to the country that supplied the fuel, the supplier would retain responsibility to ensure the material is secure, safeguarded, and protected.

The creation of a comprehensive framework for fuel supply and subsequent disposition is a large, complex undertaking.   It will require a step-by-step approach that encourages international participation and support, coordination with suppliers and industry, and the further development of technology.

We should avoid attempts to develop complete solutions at once, just as we should avoid the pitfall of standing still.

Standing still is not an option if nuclear energy use is to expand globally without increasing proliferation risks, especially risks associated with the spread of sensitive nuclear technologies and the build-up of separated stocks of civil plutonium.

In thinking about the path forward, allow me to offer a few thoughts:

First, the IAEA Secretariat should begin consultations promptly with member states on implementation of the six-supplier mechanism on reliable access to nuclear fuel and President Putin’s initiative on international nuclear fuel service centers.

These complementary initiatives could be put in place immediately.  The IAEA’s consultations should be completed on an urgent basis so that the Board of Governors can take early action.

Second, in fulfillment of Secretary Bodman’s decision to set aside HEU for a nuclear fuel reserve, the Department of Energy will over the next year, begin converting the material to low enriched uranium and will establish arrangements and procedures for its release.

Third, the United States welcomes discussion on a possible international fuel bank administered by the IAEA.

We recommend that the Secretariat be tasked to present a report to the Board of Governors on the possibility of establishing a bank to serve as a fuel supply of last resort.

This report should comprehensively survey the issues associated with such a bank, including its management, structure, criteria for access to nuclear fuel, and financing. The report could also assess options for the Board to consider in defining the concept more precisely.

Fourth, the United States encourages the participation of industry, whose support is essential, particularly in response to fuel disruptions that cannot be corrected through normal commercial mechanisms.

We should identify possible supply chain concerns and steps that governments can take to address them.  Industry must also look closer at its own business practices to determine how fuel leasing - GNEP’s longer-term goal - can be employed as a standard business practice for the supply of nuclear fuel.

Finally, a more formal review of services related to the back-end of the fuel cycle is needed.  We recommend that States in a position to do so work with the IAEA Secretariat to complete such a review over the next year.

The review should consider the full range of legal, political, and technical issues relating to spent fuel storage and processing.

Looking farther head, the United States seeks to build consensus on a comprehensive framework for fuel supply and subsequent disposition based on recycling technologies that do not result in the separation of plutonium.

States receiving spent fuel would deploy advanced fast reactors that transmute spent fuel into less toxic forms while generating electricity. 

Transitioning to new technologies and fuel leasing cannot be accomplished overnight.  Time is needed for concepts to germinate and for the feasibility of these approaches to be demonstrated.

I am certain that many good ideas will be put on the table over the next two days.  Our task is to organize those ideas and consider how best to put them into practice.

The challenge we face is critical.  I commend this initiative and pledge the resources of the United States to develop a framework for the utilization of nuclear power in the 21st century, a framework that serves to expand global reliance on nuclear power by addressing the needs of the international community, fuel cycle service providers, and states ready to rely on nuclear power.

Thank you for you attention.

Location:
Vienna, Austria

Media contact(s):
Craig Stevens, (202) 586-4940