

**Public Health Risk-Based  
Inspection System  
*for*  
Processing and Slaughter**

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**Technical Report**

**April 18, 2008**

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

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## **ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS**

CDC	Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CFR	<i>Code of Federal Regulations</i>
CSPI	Center for Science in the Public Interest
FDA	Food and Drug Administration
FSA	Food Safety Assessment
FSIS	Food Safety and Inspection Service
FY	fiscal year
HACCP	Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points
IVT	intensified verification testing
LOI	level(s) of inspection
NOIE	Notice of Intended Enforcement
NR	noncompliance record
NRTE	not-ready-to-eat
OIG	Office of the Inspector General
PBIS	Performance Based Inspection System
PFGE	pulsed-field gel electrophoresis
IT system	Information Technology System
PHRBIS	Public Health Risk-Based Inspection System
PR/HACCP	Pathogen Reduction/Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points
RBI	risk-based inspection
RTE	ready-to-eat
SPS	sanitary and phytosanitary
SRM	specified risk material
SSOPs	sanitation standard operating procedures
STEPS	System for Tracking <i>E. coli</i> O157:H7 Positive Suppliers
USDA	U.S. Department of Agriculture

## 1 INTRODUCTION

2 The Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) is proposing a Public Health Risk-Based  
3 Inspection System (PHRBIS) for all processing and slaughter establishments. The components  
4 of the proposed PHRBIS are science-based and have been designed with input from stakeholder  
5 groups and expert peer review. The proposed PHRBIS would be developed within the  
6 regulatory framework of current FSIS inspection activities (i.e., verification of Hazard Analysis  
7 and Critical Control Points [HACCP], sanitation standard operating procedures [SSOPs],  
8 sanitary and phytosanitary [SPS] activities and other regulatory requirements), but would provide  
9 more of a focus on process steps that are vulnerable to microbial contamination if there is a loss  
10 of process control. In addition, FSIS would use the PHRBIS to focus its flexible inspection  
11 resources, such as performance of Food Safety Assessments (FSAs) and intensified verification  
12 testing (IVT) by Enforcement, Investigations, and Analysis Officers (EIAOs) on establishments  
13 with a high risk of microbial contamination.

14 The National Academy of Sciences and the General Accounting Office have recommended that  
15 FSIS reduce its reliance on organoleptic (sensory) inspection and redeploy its resources by using  
16 inspection methods that are based on the risks inherent in processing and slaughter operations.  
17 The purpose of the PHRBIS is to focus FSIS inspection resources on the areas of greatest food  
18 safety risk and improve the Agency’s ability to protect public health while maintaining the levels  
19 of inspection (LOI) required under the Meat Inspection Act, Poultry Products Inspection Act,  
20 and Egg Products Inspection Act at all federally-inspected establishments. An important aspect  
21 of implementing the proposed PHRBIS is to ensure that the basis for decisions is clearly  
22 delineated, transparent, and scientifically-driven (including being data-driven) whenever possible  
23 and appropriate. The proposed PHRBIS, which is described in this report, evolved from earlier  
24 FSIS work on developing a Risk-Based Inspection (RBI) algorithm to rank processing  
25 establishments. As can be seen from this report, the system currently under consideration  
26 addresses many of the concerns expressed by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Office  
27 of the Inspector General (OIG) (OIG 2007), industry, and consumer groups regarding the earlier  
28 RBI algorithm.

29 As discussed further in Appendix A of this report, foodborne disease is a public health concern  
30 for the U.S. population. The most commonly recognized foodborne infections in the United  
31 States are those caused by the bacteria *Campylobacter*, *Salmonella*, and *Escherichia coli* (*E. coli*)  
32 O157:H7, and by a group of viruses known as Norwalk-like viruses. Norwalk-like viruses cause  
33 an estimated 66 percent of foodborne illness in the U.S. FSIS public health goals focus on  
34 reducing *Salmonella*, *E. coli* O157:H7, and *Listeria* (*L.*) *monocytogenes*, as discussed below.  
35 The proposed PHRBIS is being developed with the goal of decreasing foodborne pathogens and  
36 moving FSIS toward meeting its public health goals.

37 FSIS estimates that approximately 60 percent of the foodborne illnesses originating from  
38 *Salmonella* in FSIS-regulated products in 2007 are attributable to poultry products. In 2007,  
39 FSIS *Salmonella* verification testing found 8.5 percent positive samples, down from 10.5 percent  
40 in 2006 and 16.3 percent in 2005. In addition, of the 195 test sets completed in 2007 at broiler  
41 establishments, 98 percent met the *Salmonella* performance standard (192 out of 195  
42 establishments), up from 90 percent in calendar year 2006.

43 To meet the Healthy People 2010 goal of 6.8 *Salmonella* cases per 100,000 persons, the Agency  
44 has set an objective of 90 percent of broiler establishments to be in *Salmonella* Category 1 by  
45 2010. In fiscal year (FY) 2006, 45 percent of establishments were in *Salmonella* Category 1. In  
46 FY 2007, that percentage had increased to 73 percent.

47 FSIS estimates that approximately 34 percent of the foodborne illnesses originating from *E. coli*  
48 O157:H7 are attributable to ground beef. In FY 2006, *E. coli* O157:H7 FSIS verification testing  
49 found 0.17 percent positive samples (20 positives out of 11,626 samples), down from  
50 0.71 percent in FY 2000. These percent positive figures do not take into account the fact that the  
51 levels of percent positives may differ among plants that produce different volumes of product.  
52 Percent positive numbers can be adjusted to account for the volume of product each plant  
53 produces to make them more representative of potential exposure (this process is described in  
54 Appendix A). When the percent positive is volume adjusted, the FY 2007 value is 0.28 percent  
55 versus the FSIS FY 2010 volume-adjusted objective of 0.20 (see Appendix A for details). As of  
56 FY 2007, FSIS had met the volume weighted percent positive Healthy People 2010 goal for *E.*  
57 *coli* O157:H7 in ground beef.

58 FSIS estimates that approximately 60 percent of the foodborne illnesses originating from  
59 *L. monocytogenes* (*Lm*) in 2006 are attributable to ready-to-eat (RTE) products. In 2007, FSIS  
60 *L. monocytogenes* verification testing of RTE products found 0.37 percent positive samples,  
61 down from 1.45 percent in 2000. That percentage can also be calculated to adjust for volume to  
62 make it more representative of potential exposure. When volume is adjusted, the FY 2007 value  
63 is 0.29 percent versus the FSIS FY 2010 volume-adjusted objective of 0.24 (see Appendix A for  
64 details). As of FY 2007, FSIS had met the volume weighted percent positive Healthy People  
65 2010 goal for *Lm* in RTE products.

66 FSIS' current inspection system focuses on visible animal diseases and was designed before  
67 microbial contamination was recognized as a leading cause of foodborne human illness. The  
68 proposed PHRBIS will be better able to protect public health by focusing and integrating its  
69 regulatory authority on establishments and process points within slaughter and processing  
70 establishments at which control of microbial growth and contamination can have the greatest  
71 impact. The regulatory framework of current FSIS inspection activities regarding verification of  
72 Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP), Sanitation Standard Operating  
73 Procedures (SSOPs), sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) activities, and other regulatory  
74 requirements (FRN Final Rule HACCP and Pathogen Reduction, Vol. 61, p. 38806, July 25,  
75 1996) will continue in the new system.

76 The Agency has learned from its experience with HACCP and food contamination events that to  
77 better protect public health it must bolster its inspection force's ability to link and respond to  
78 instances of noncompliance within establishments. In addition, the Agency also learned that its  
79 inspectors must verify not only critical control points of an establishment's overall food system,  
80 but also the execution of the decisions made by the establishment in the hazard analysis,  
81 particularly prerequisite programs. As described in this report, the Agency is proposing  
82 data-driven and science-based methods for allocating inspection activities, both across and  
83 within establishments, to meet those needs. By working within its existing regulatory  
84 framework, the PHRBIS will focus FSIS inspection resources on those establishments and points  
85 within slaughter and processing that can have the greatest impact on the microbial growth and  
86 contamination of products. This strategic focus is essential because FSIS cannot test all finished

87 product at an establishment and must have a means of ensuring that process control is  
88 consistently maintained.

89 Analysis of FSIS recalls in recent years suggests that, with the current inspection and IT system,  
90 a critical understanding of hazards and their controls has been lacking, including assessment of  
91 the decisions associated with the design of the food safety system, and assessment of the impact  
92 of intended use of produced product. The inability to track inspection activities (both positive  
93 and negative findings) that would lead to a systematic evaluation of the food safety system has  
94 also been lacking, resulting in inspection program personnel not always detecting critical issues  
95 at the in-plant level. Additionally, linkage of all findings, including plant data, has not been fully  
96 utilized by the inspection force, particularly in detecting problems earlier in the process before  
97 product enters commerce. Finally, inspection resources are at the same level of inspection for all  
98 plants.

99 The proposed PHRBIS will be incorporated in FSIS' new Information Technology (IT) system.  
100 FSIS' new IT system will facilitate better collection of inspection data regarding establishments.  
101 The IT system is being designed to provide automated monitoring of inspection results and built  
102 in alerts for anomalies. The new IT system will help inspection to verify the execution of  
103 decisions made in the hazard analysis, including responding to plant data and pre-requisite  
104 programs. It will strengthen inspection program personnel's ability to appropriately link and  
105 respond to documented noncompliance and to verify corrective actions are fully implemented.


106 This report outlines the elements of the PHRBIS for processing and slaughter establishments and  
107 discusses the scientific basis for those elements. It begins with a discussion of the proposed  
108 approach for focusing inspection activities within an establishment, followed by the approach for  
109 allocating flexible inspection resources (i.e., EIAO inspection resources) across establishments.  
110 Each of those approaches has been designed with the goal of identifying and preventing potential  
111 public health hazards in establishments before they reach the consumer. Next, the Agency's  
112 evaluation plan for the proposed PHRBIS is discussed in the report. Appendices supporting and  
113 detailing the sections include attribution and performance measures, inspection prompt tables,  
114 scientific literature reviews, data sources, and data analyses.

## 115 **THE PUBLIC HEALTH RISK-BASED INSPECTION SYSTEM FOR** 116 **PROCESSING AND SLAUGHTER**

### 117 **Within-establishment Public Health Risk-based Inspection**

118 In the proposed PHRBIS, FSIS will focus its verification activities on points within the  
119 operations of processing and slaughter establishments that have the greatest potential for  
120 microbial growth or contamination if process control is not maintained (vulnerable points). This  
121 approach fits within the current regulatory framework and is linked to inspectors carrying out  
122 their existing inspection procedures related to HACCP, SSOPs, and SPS activities. As shown in  
123 **Figure 1**, inspectors will be prompted by the new IT system to focus their activities on  
124 vulnerable points in the process. Specifically, as part of their routine activities, inspectors will  
125 identify noncompliance, verify corrective actions, and record any noncompliance record(s)  
126 (NRs) in the new IT system. Other establishment information will also be recorded in the  
127 system, including laboratory test results and establishment characteristics. Based on recorded  
128 information, the IT system will identify certain public health-related events, or combinations of  
129 those events, and will then prompt the inspectors to focus their inspection activities on

130 vulnerable points. At those vulnerable points, the inspectors will provide yes/no answers  
 131 regarding the presence and implementation of control measures. This information could provide  
 132 stronger support for further regulatory and/or enforcement actions.



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**Figure 1. Focused Inspection Activity Information Flow**

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**FSIS’ new information technology system will continuously monitor inspection findings and laboratory results and will direct inspectors to examine vulnerable points in the process when the threshold for the prompt is reached. In response to a prompt, inspectors will be automatically assigned a For Cause procedure by the information technology system, which will instruct them to respond to the vulnerable point questions. Inspectors will verify the establishment is in compliance with the FSIS regulations.**

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The within-establishment PHRBIS will assist inspectors to more effectively link and take action on instances of noncompliance. It will also assist inspectors to not only verify critical control points in an establishment’s overall food safety system, but also to verify the execution and supporting documentation of the decisions made by the establishment in its hazard analysis. On the basis of their hazard analyses, many establishments have decided that a food safety hazard is not reasonably likely to occur because of their prerequisite programs. Therefore, it is important that FSIS verify these programs that encompass vulnerable points where control measures are commercially available.

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The within-establishment inspection method is based on the scientific literature and Agency experience with HACCP and contamination events. Literature reviews,<sup>1</sup> which are summarized in Appendix C of this report, were carried out for each of the nine HACCP product categories to identify which steps in the production of those products are most vulnerable to microbial growth or contamination if process control is not maintained. Next, using the product-specific literature reviews as a guide, a group of FSIS experts determined a set of questions that inspectors should answer at each process step to help determine whether the food safety system is in control; this is

<sup>1</sup> Three literature reviews were conducted for slaughter—poultry slaughter, bovine slaughter, and swine slaughter, and results were summarized in Appendix C of this report.



157 the set of questions inspectors will be prompted to answer by the new IT system at the vulnerable  
158 points (see Figure 1).


159 The prompts in FSIS' new IT system will direct inspectors to examine vulnerable points in the  
160 process and to answer questions about process control at those points. Inspection program  
161 personnel will write NRs for observations at vulnerable points in accordance with FSIS  
162 regulations for meat, poultry, and egg products. Observations at vulnerable points may reveal  
163 the establishment is failing to maintain sanitary conditions (9 *Code of Federal Regulations*  
164 [CFR] 416.1) or failing to implement SSOPs (9 CFR 416.13) and consequently might be  
165 yielding product that is injurious to health. They might also demonstrate that an establishment is  
166 not executing a prerequisite program identified within the hazard analysis which would mean the  
167 establishment is failing to properly validate that the HACCP plan is functioning as intended (9  
168 CFR 417.4 [a]). Such a finding would bring into question whether supporting documentation for  
169 decisions in the hazard analysis is adequate (9 CFR 417.5 [a] [1] & [2]), and whether the hazard  
170 analysis itself is adequate (9 CFR 417.2) and would also bring into question whether the HACCP  
171 plan is adequate (9 CFR 417.6 [a]). Details of the product-specific prompts and questions are  
172 provided in Appendix B of this report. The literature reviews used to develop prompts and  
173 questions are described below and in Appendix C.

174 FSIS will develop training and guidance materials for the PHRBIS to ensure inspectors  
175 understand how to carry out their inspection activities under the proposed system, respond to  
176 questions regarding vulnerable points, and make decisions about noncompliance based upon  
177 responses to those questions. The within establishment system has been designed to reinforce the  
178 food safety regulatory training inspection program personnel currently receive.

179 An example of a focused inspection activity prompt and related For Cause procedure is provided  
180 in **Figure 2**. In the diagram, the prompt depicted is a repetitive pattern of sanitation  
181 noncompliance in an establishment producing fully cooked, not shelf-stable product (HACCP  
182 Category 03G). If a sanitation noncompliance is found during a routine 03G procedure, the FSIS  
183 inspector would document an NR and verify corrective actions. The IT system will continuously  
184 monitor inspection results and when the threshold for sanitation noncompliance is reached a For  
185 Cause procedure will be generated for the inspector. The inspector will carry out a For Cause  
186 procedure and will respond to questions regarding the implementation of control measures at  
187 vulnerable points. The inspector will record his or her responses to the questions regarding  
188 vulnerable points in the IT system, and, when appropriate, may use the responses to those  
189 questions to document an NR and/or enforcement action. Conducting For Cause procedures as a  
190 result of previous findings of noncompliance in an establishment does not preclude an inspector  
191 from taking enforcement actions at the time of the initial noncompliance finding.

192 Prior to implementation of the proposed PHRBIS system, FSIS will conduct a historical data  
193 analysis of inspection findings in order to determine prompt thresholds. In addition, FSIS will  
194 conduct a methods evaluation which will include a workshop and field evaluation. During the  
195 workshop, stakeholders (FSIS field employees, academics, industry, and consumer  
196 representatives) will evaluate the proposed prompts by playing out prompt scenarios for different  
197 product categories. The prompts will be refined based upon this workshop and then a field  
198 evaluation will be undertaken. During the field evaluation, FSIS supervisory IICs and PHVs will  
199 carry out prompt scenarios. The prompts, vulnerable points and questions will also be refined  
200 based upon the findings of the field evaluation.

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**Figure 2. Public Health Risk-Based Inspection 03G Sanitation Noncompliance Prompt Example**

205 ***Identification of Vulnerable Points***

206 FSIS must establish scientific support to determine which steps in the operations of processing  
 207 and slaughter facilities present the greatest hazard for microbial or other types of contamination  
 208 in order to focus its inspection activities on the most vulnerable points. Such information is  
 209 available from research published in scientific literature, laboratory testing data, risk  
 210 assessments, and expert opinion. The vulnerable points for each HACCP category are presented  
 211 in this section, along with a discussion of their vulnerabilities. These categories are based on the  
 212 nine HACCP categories, with the slaughter category (03J) presented separately for bovine, swine  
 213 and poultry slaughter.

214 This section is organized according to raw products (03B and 03C), other non-raw products  
 215 (03E, 03F, 03G, 03H, and 03I), and bovine (03J), swine (03J), and poultry slaughter (03J).  
 216 Detailed descriptions of the scientific literature that provides an underpinning for the  
 217 identification of vulnerable points and related questions are included in Appendix C of this  
 218 report.

219 ***HACCP Categories 03B and 03C (Raw Products)***

220 Within HACCP, raw products are divided into two categories: (1) 03B, or raw ground; and  
 221 (2) 03C, or raw not ground. Raw ground (03B) includes ground product (e.g., ground beef and  
 222 ground chicken), marinated products, injected products, and otherwise comminuted products.  
 223 Raw not ground (03C) includes intact products, such as steaks and chicken parts (e.g., breast,  
 224 wings), and products made with advanced meat recovery systems. For 03C, the products should  
 225 not have been marinated or water injected.

226 Both process categories have the same general steps: receiving/storage, processing,  
 227 packaging/labeling, and storage/shipping. The literature indicates that, for both categories, all  
 228 four steps are vulnerable. The concerns at receiving/storage and storage/shipping are the same

229 for both 03B and 03C, and are discussed together. The potential vulnerabilities at processing and  
230 packaging/labeling can vary between 03B and 03C, and are discussed separately.

231 For establishments processing and producing raw products, ensuring that products entering the  
232 facility are not sources of microbial contamination can greatly reduce the probability and levels  
233 of contamination on outgoing product. Testing products or requiring certification of product  
234 testing at the supplier as a purchasing specification can help ensure that incoming bacterial loads  
235 are below those that can be handled by downstream controls. Proper temperature controls at the  
236 receiving and storage area also ensure that bacterial levels do not increase during storage. If the  
237 establishment is processing beef, it also should have controls in place related to specified risk  
238 materials (SRMs). Purchase requirements and checks at receiving need to be in place to make  
239 sure any SRMs are properly identified and destined only for acceptable use. Because these  
240 control measures can be effective in limiting bacterial load downstream and controlling SRMs in  
241 beef operations, receiving/storage was identified as a vulnerable point.

242 At storage/shipping, proper temperature is essential to control bacteria. Maintaining control of  
243 product (either holding it or not releasing it for sale to consumers) until any tests, by FSIS, other  
244 government agencies, or the processing and slaughter establishment, have been completed and  
245 shown to be negative, is an important control to protect public health. Because these controls  
246 can limit bacteria levels reaching the consumer, storage/shipping was identified as a vulnerable  
247 step.

248 *Raw Ground (03B)*: The process steps for raw ground products (ground product, marinated  
249 products, injected products, and otherwise comminuted products) may include mixing, grinding,  
250 formulating, needling, marinating, and rework. Many of these activities result in extensive  
251 equipment contact with the raw product, creating opportunities for cross-contamination between  
252 the equipment and product, as well as lot-to-lot contamination. Rework also can result in lot-to-  
253 lot contamination if not properly controlled. Maintaining temperatures cold enough to inhibit  
254 microbial growth and properly implementing sanitary procedures can greatly limit product  
255 contamination. The processing step has been identified as a vulnerable step because of the  
256 combination of its high potential for cross-contamination and potential for reduction of that  
257 hazard if proper controls are in place.

258 During the packaging/labeling step, raw ground products should be labeled as to their intended  
259 use (e.g., For Cooking Only), and all ingredients should be declared on the label. Failure to label  
260 either use or ingredients could represent a risk to the public downstream. Also, labeling products  
261 to facilitate trace-back and trace-forward can control potential public health impacts. Therefore,  
262 packaging/labeling of raw ground products was identified as a vulnerable point.

263 *Raw Not Ground (03C)*: The process step for raw not ground products consists of cutting and  
264 trimming and advanced meat recovery. Proper sanitation and temperature controls at this step  
265 can reduce cross-contamination and bacterial growth, making this a vulnerable point.

266 At packaging/labeling, as for 03B products, 03C products should be labeled with their intended  
267 use (e.g., For Cooking Only), and all ingredients should be declared on the label. In addition,  
268 meat processed using advanced meat recovery should be labeled as such. The need for  
269 appropriate labels, therefore, makes packaging/labeling a vulnerable point.

270 *HACCP Categories 03E, F, G, H, and I*

271 The meat and poultry products encompassed by HACCP categories 03E, F, G, H, and I have  
272 common vulnerable points: receiving and storage, processing, post-processing (e.g., packaging),  
273 labeling, and storage. For all of these categories, receiving and storage is a vulnerable point  
274 because products may be contaminated if proper measures are not present to control the  
275 microbial load of incoming materials and to maintain proper temperatures. Post-processing  
276 slicing and packaging is a common vulnerable point among 03E, F, G, H, and I products because  
277 RTE products in these categories may be exposed to pathogens, such as *L. monocytogenes*, at  
278 this point. Further, slicing or peeling during post-processing may lead to product pathogen  
279 exposure and cross-contamination.

280 Labeling is a vulnerable point among 03E, F, G, H, and I products because many of these  
281 products may look like they are RTE, despite not being fully cooked or processed RTE products.  
282 It is important that labeling alert consumers that the product is not RTE and provide instructions  
283 for handling to prevent foodborne illness. Proper labeling is also needed to alert consumers of  
284 potential allergens found in these product categories. Storage is a vulnerable point for not shelf-  
285 stable products found in 03G and I, because they must be stored at or below the minimal  
286 temperature for microbial growth.

287 Processing is a vulnerable point for products in these categories because it requires complex  
288 combinations of process controls to reduce or eliminate microbes. Products encompassed by the  
289 HACCP categories 03E, F, G, H, and I have different vulnerabilities during processing  
290 depending on the steps taken at this point. Specific vulnerabilities at processing for the different  
291 HACCP categories are discussed below.

292 *Not Heat-treated, Shelf-stable (03E):* Not heat-treated, shelf-stable products are products from  
293 processes that do not apply heat as the primary lethality step. They consist of many diverse  
294 products, including salt-cured (e.g., country-cured ham, prosciutto, basturma, and coppa) and  
295 fermented products (e.g., pepperoni, summer sausage, salami, soudjouk, and Lebanon bologna).  
296 Depending on how the product is processed and decisions that establishments make, many of  
297 these products, such as country-cured ham, basturma, summer sausage, and pepperoni can fall  
298 under more than one HACCP category.

299 Not heat-treated, shelf-stable products include RTE and not-ready-to-eat (NRTE) products.  
300 Ready-to-eat products are those that have received a lethality treatment to eliminate pathogens  
301 and are safe to be eaten without additional preparation, such as cooking. Examples of not heat-  
302 treated, shelf-stable RTE products are prosciutto, salami, some basturma and country-cured ham,  
303 some summer sausage and pepperoni, and Lebanon bologna.

304 In contrast, NRTE products require cooking before eating. These may include country-cured  
305 ham, dried chorizo, Chinese sausage, basturma, and soujouk. One hazard associated with these  
306 types of dried meats is that consumers often think, due to the products' appearance, that they are  
307 RTE and, as a result, fail to cook them. To add to the confusion, some chorizos, soujouk, and  
308 other typically NRTE sausages may be fully processed and made RTE. Thus, proper labeling is  
309 crucial for consumer protection.

310 Based upon the scientific literature, not heat-treated, shelf-stable products are most vulnerable to  
311 bacterial pathogen survival, growth, and recontamination during the processing steps of salting,

312 drying, and fermentation. The pathogens of most concern during these processing steps are  
313 *Salmonella*, *E. coli* O157:H7, *Listeria monocytogenes*, and *Staphylococcus (S.) aureus*. For salt-  
314 cured products, the lethality of the process for pathogens achieved is dependent upon the  
315 interaction of salt content, pH, time and temperature of curing, cold smoking/drying and aging.  
316 For fermented products, such as dry and semi-dry fermented sausages, the degree-hours concept  
317 is the control measure used for microbial hazards (American Meat Institute Foundation 1997).  
318 Rework also presents vulnerability in processing because reworked products that become  
319 contaminated from a food contact surface or bacterial growth before being added back into the  
320 formulation may lead to cross-contamination, and could increase the bacterial load beyond that  
321 which the process is validated to eliminate.

322 *Heat-treated, Shelf-stable (03F)*: Heat-treated, shelf-stable meat and poultry products consist of  
323 many different types, including lard, tallow, popped pork skins, bacon bits, some basturma, some  
324 summer sausage and pepperoni, biltong, soup mixes, beef nuggets, jerky, and snack sticks.  
325 Some of these products, such as basturma, summer sausage, and pepperoni, can fall under more  
326 than one HACCP category, depending upon how the product is processed. Two of the most  
327 common heat-treated, shelf-stable products produced and consumed in the United States are  
328 snack foods jerky and snack sticks.

329 Based upon the scientific literature, heat-treated, shelf-stable processed products are most  
330 vulnerable to bacterial pathogen survival, growth, and recontamination during processing in the  
331 heat treatment and drying steps. The heating temperature and humidity (i.e., steam) are critical  
332 for achieving adequate lethality. As the water activity is reduced, the heat resistance of the  
333 bacteria increases (Goepfert et al. 1970). Therefore, if adequate humidity is not maintained  
334 during heating, the time it takes at a particular temperature to eliminate *Salmonella* greatly  
335 increases. It is crucial that the processor prevent drying of the product until a lethal  
336 time/temperature combination is attained. The humidity requirement must be applied during the  
337 first part of the heating process before any drying or an increase in solute concentration occurs.  
338 During processing, product must be dried to meet product standards of identity and to stabilize  
339 the finished product for food safety purposes and microbial stability. If the product is  
340 insufficiently dried, *S. aureus* and mold are potential hazards.

341 *Fully Cooked, Not Shelf-stable (03G)*: Fully cooked, not shelf-stable meat and poultry products  
342 include a variety of products, such as cooked ham and beef, roast beef, cooked corned beef  
343 products, fully cooked patties, and frankfurters.

344 Based upon the scientific literature, fully cooked, not shelf-stable products are most vulnerable to  
345 bacterial pathogen survival, growth, and recontamination during cooking and cooling.  
346 Mechanical processes (e.g., grinding, dicing, mixing, and tenderizing) may transfer surface  
347 contamination to the interior of meat and poultry products, and may lead to cross-contamination  
348 of product. During cooking, it is essential that controls are in place to ensure proper temperature  
349 and humidity are maintained to ensure pathogen reduction. Further, proper cooling during  
350 processing is necessary to ensure that products meet stabilization performance standards to  
351 prevent microbial growth. Another important aspect of processing for preventing microbial  
352 growth and cross-contamination is rework. Establishments must take proper measures to ensure  
353 that bacterial growth does not occur before product is added back into the processing line.

354 *Heat-treated, Not Fully Cooked, Not Shelf-stable Meat and Poultry Products (03H)*: Partially  
355 cooked beef patties, breaded poultry, and bacon are examples of heat-treated, not fully cooked

356 meat and poultry products that are not shelf-stable. Products in this category receive a thermal  
357 process that is insufficient to eliminate pathogens. These products receive a minimum thermal  
358 process or cold smoke. The thermal process requires that the product be properly cooled to  
359 prevent the growth of pathogens.

360 Mechanical processes (e.g., deboning, mixing, stuffing, and injecting) may transfer surface  
361 contamination to the interior of meat and poultry products. In addition, for those meat and  
362 poultry products that undergo slow partial cooking processes (e.g., bacon), microbial growth may  
363 occur if proper dwell time and temperature controls are not followed. Proper cooling during  
364 processing is also necessary to ensure that products meet stabilization performance standards to  
365 prevent microbial growth. Another important aspect of processing for preventing microbial  
366 growth and cross-contamination is rework. Establishments must take proper measures to ensure  
367 that bacterial growth does not occur before product is added back into the processing line.

368 *Product with Secondary Inhibitor, Not Shelf-stable (03I):* Some of the products in this category,  
369 such as semi-dry fermented sausages, are similar to products in the heat-treated, shelf-stable and  
370 not heat-treated, shelf-stable categories, except the finished products are not shelf-stable, but are  
371 RTE. Other products in this category, such as country-cured ham, may be NRTE. These  
372 products do not receive the amount of drying, or reduction in water activity, needed to make  
373 them shelf-stable. Consequently, bacterial contamination after processing can result in growth of  
374 the contaminating pathogens, such as *Salmonella*, *E. coli* O157:H7, or *L. monocytogenes*. In  
375 addition, the heating step in the process is below that normally associated with heat-treated  
376 products—48 degrees Celsius (°C) 120° degrees Fahrenheit (°F) or above. Examples of  
377 perishable, not shelf-stable, meat and poultry products with secondary inhibitors include semi-  
378 dry fermented sausages (e.g., cervalet, soft salami, and summer sausage) and country-style or  
379 country-cured ham.

380 For cured products (e.g., country-cured, not shelf-stable, ham), the lethality of processing for  
381 pathogens is dependent upon the interaction of salt content, pH, time and temperature of curing,  
382 cold smoking/drying, and aging. These steps are necessary to prevent, eliminate, or reduce to an  
383 acceptable level the pathogens of concern—*Salmonella*, *E. coli* O157:H7, *T. spiralis*, and *L.*  
384 *monocytogenes*. For fermented products, such as soft salami, the main microbial hazard  
385 associated with the fermentation step is *S. aureus* proliferation and the elaboration of its  
386 enterotoxins. The degree-hours concept is the control measure used for this biological hazard  
387 (the American Meat Institute Foundation 1997). Rework also presents a vulnerability during  
388 processing because reworked product that becomes contaminated from a food contact surface or  
389 bacterial growth before being added back into the formulation may lead to cross-contamination  
390 and may increase the bacterial load beyond that which the process is validated to eliminate.

### 391 *Bovine Slaughter (03J)*

392 Bovine slaughter facilities contain many environments that can lead to cross-contamination with  
393 pathogens. The bovine slaughter process can be divided into the following steps: live  
394 receiving/pen holding, stunning/bleeding, head skinning and removal, rodding the  
395 esophagus/hoof removal, skinning and related operations, evisceration and bunning, carcass  
396 splitting, chilling, head and cheek meat processing, product labeling, and storage/shipping.

397 Holding pens, slaughter and dressing processes, carcass skinning and evisceration have all been  
398 identified as points of entry for bacterial contamination. Contamination is also possible from

399 walls, floors, air, personnel, knives, and protective garments. Carcasses may even contaminate  
400 each other if they make direct contact. The extent to which carcasses are contaminated is  
401 directly influenced by plant design, the speed of slaughter, and the overall skill of employees.

402 *Live Receiving/Pen Holding*—Cattle from one or multiple farms are received and held until  
403 slaughtered. Multiple strains of *E. coli* O157:H7 and *Salmonella* can colonize a single animal or  
404 multiple animals from one farm; these bacteria are shed in the feces (McEvoy et al. 2003), which  
405 can then cross-contaminate other animals during transport, receiving, or pen holding. Ensuring  
406 that only clean, healthy animals are presented for slaughter and are processed correctly will  
407 reduce the incidence of contamination. At least one study has suggested that washing  
408 immediately before slaughter may not be the most effective point in the process to address  
409 cleanliness of the animal.

410 *Stunning/Bleeding*—The animal is directed out of the holding pen or taken off the truck via a  
411 chute to the “knock box,” where it is stunned. Cross-contamination of hides is possible as cattle  
412 fall to the floor or come into contact with sides of the chute through which contaminated cattle  
413 have already passed. Additional contamination can occur if cattle emit feces or rumen contents  
414 at the knock box, or if dirty knives are used during the bleeding process.

415 *Head skinning and Removal*—After stunning/bleeding, cattle are moved onto the main floor of  
416 the slaughter plant. Horns are removed using hydraulic cutters, and the head is skinned. The  
417 udder is removed. Next, the hide is cut down the midline, legs, and front shanks.

418 Although contamination can occur up to this point and good practices can reduce that  
419 contamination, many of the most effective means of controlling the microbial load coming onto  
420 the main floor of the slaughter plant occur preharvest; therefore, live receiving/pen holding,  
421 stunning/bleeding, and head skinning and removal were not identified as vulnerable points.

422 *Rodding the Esophagus/Hoof Removal*—After head skinning and removal, the esophagus must  
423 be properly tied to prevent the leakage of ingesta and to ensure that the gastrointestinal tract is  
424 removed without incident. If this step is not done correctly with proper controls, contamination  
425 is likely to occur. This step, rodding the esophagus/hoof removal, was identified as a vulnerable  
426 point.

427 *Skinning and Related Operations*—Next, skinning and related operations occur. It is at this point  
428 that normally sterile muscle and fat tissues on the carcass surface are exposed to microbial  
429 contaminants. An individual carcass may be self- or cross-contaminated. If the carcass  
430 originates from an animal that is not infected, contamination may occur via aerosol diffusion or  
431 contact with contaminated equipment or a contaminated carcass. If the carcass originates from  
432 an infected animal, it may be self-contaminated via fecal or hide sources or cross-contaminated  
433 by the pathways described for noninfected animals. Meat becomes contaminated when feces or  
434 contaminated hides contact the carcass during slaughter. The removal of the hide was identified  
435 as the chief source of contamination during slaughter and is a critical control point in beef  
436 slaughter HACCP plans. *E. coli* O157:H7 was often present on the hide of animals following  
437 stunning, and cross-contamination to the carcass was evident in that carcasses sampled  
438 immediately after dehiding were the most heavily contaminated. The bulk of microbial  
439 contamination occurs during hide removal from dust, dirt, and fecal material that accumulate on  
440 the hide. Cross-contamination can occur via workers’ gloves, knives, or clothing, or during the

441 changing of the hide-puller from one carcass to the next. Because skinning is a major source of  
442 contamination and methods for limiting that contamination exist, skinning and related operations  
443 was identified as a vulnerable point.

444 *Bunging*—Bung tying (bunging) is a possible source of contamination in the slaughter process,  
445 and great care must be taken to prevent bacterial transfer from the anus of the animal onto the  
446 edible adipose or muscle tissue (McEvoy et al. 2003b). The bung tying process involves cutting  
447 to loosen the anus, and then bagging the bung and securing it with either a tie or a clip. The  
448 bung is then pushed through to the abdominal cavity, where it can be removed during  
449 evisceration. Studies have shown that bung tying reduces, but does not eliminate, the spread of  
450 pathogens to the carcass. Tools or personnel that contact the bung may also contribute to cross-  
451 contamination (McEvoy et al. 2003b). Cross-contamination that is a direct result of manual bung  
452 tying may be eliminated by using an automated system. Such systems have reported lower total  
453 *E. coli* and coliform counts in the anal area than manual methods (Sheridan 1998). Bunging was  
454 identified as a vulnerable point.

455 *Evisceration*—During evisceration, the ventral midline of the carcass is split and the  
456 gastrointestinal tract is removed. The bung and esophagus must be tied off (done in previous  
457 steps) to prevent leakage and contamination, and the organs in the abdominal cavity must be  
458 removed. The gastrointestinal tracts of cattle can carry a multitude of enteric pathogens. The  
459 evisceration process carries the potential for ingesta contamination to the carcass, environment,  
460 and equipment. To prevent contamination, great care must be taken to minimize the potential for  
461 evisceration defects, such as puncturing or rupturing the intestines. Proper technique is critical to  
462 avoid contamination to the edible portion of the carcass (Aberle et al. 2001). If evisceration  
463 defects occur, corrective actions must be in place to remove any contamination from the carcass.  
464 Such measures include trimming visible contamination, reducing line speed so employees can  
465 exercise better caution, and sanitizing tools. Because proper evisceration can greatly reduce  
466 contamination and cross-contamination, it is a vulnerable point.

467 *Carcass Splitting*—At the splitting step, the carcass is sawed in half, the tail is removed, and  
468 excess fat is trimmed away from each side. A clean carcass might become contaminated if it  
469 comes into contact with contaminated machinery, hands, or carcasses during splitting. In  
470 addition, control measures must be in place during splitting to ensure that SRMs (e.g., spinal  
471 cord and dorsal root ganglia) are properly controlled. Because of concerns about both microbial  
472 contamination and SRMs, splitting was identified as a vulnerable step.

473 *Chilling*—Animals must be adequately spaced in the chiller to allow rapid cooling, but also to  
474 avoid carcass-to-carcass transfer of pathogens. Carcass sampling revealed that cross-  
475 contamination does occur during chilling. Prompt chilling of carcasses after slaughter to below  
476 optimal bacterial growth temperatures is important, and chilling may affect the recovery of  
477 *E. coli* O157:H7 from carcasses; however, chilling was not considered as vulnerable as other  
478 points in the bovine slaughter process.

479 *Head and Cheek Meat Processing*—The head and cheek meat processing step was identified as  
480 vulnerable. During the slaughter process, cattle are typically hung upside-down, potentially  
481 resulting in greater concentrations of microbial contamination in the head and cheek area.  
482 Therefore, when processing this area, it is essential to prevent these parts from cross-  
483 contaminating each other and other meat.



484 As for other HACCP categories, ensuring proper temperature control during storage/shipping is  
485 necessary to prevent microbial growth. However, given the other, more vulnerable points in the  
486 slaughter process, storage/shipping was not identified as a focus point of FSIS' inspection  
487 activities.

#### 488 *Swine Slaughter (03J)*

489 Swine slaughter is an open process with many opportunities for the contamination of the pork  
490 carcass with potentially pathogenic bacteria; at no point are hazards completely eliminated. The  
491 swine slaughter literature review addresses the specific considerations for food safety hazards at  
492 each of the following points in the slaughter process: live receiving/pen holding;  
493 stunning/sticking/bleeding; scalding/dehairing/gamberling or dehiding (for sows and boars);  
494 cleaning procedures (singeing/polishing/washing/hoof trimming); bunning; neck breaking/head  
495 dropping/brisket opening; carcass opening/evisceration; splitting/head removal/trimming; final  
496 wash; chilling; product labeling; and storage/shipping.

497 Of these points, scalding/dehairing/gamberling or dehiding (for sows and boars); bunning;  
498 carcass opening/evisceration; final wash; and chilling were determined to be the most vulnerable.

499 During scalding, a reduction in the bacterial levels takes place; the extent of reduction for a  
500 specific bacterial species depends on the heat resistance of the bacterium and the  
501 time/temperature combinations used. Scalding can be carried out on pigs either hanging or in  
502 vats using steam or recirculating water, and the method used could affect contamination levels.  
503 Dehairing machines consist of rotating drums equipped with scraper blocks that rotate the  
504 carcasses to remove the hairs. The skins of scalded pig carcasses are essentially free of both  
505 enteric pathogens and spoilage pathogens. Recontamination of the carcasses with these  
506 pathogens often occurs at dehairing. Dehairing equipment also has the potential to be a possible  
507 source of carcass contamination with spoilage bacteria. Given the potential for decreasing  
508 contamination and for recontamination, this has been identified as a vulnerable point.

509 The rectum may be circumcised manually or mechanically by means of a 'bung cutter,' which  
510 consists of a probe and a sharp rotating cylinder. The technique used during the dressing  
511 procedure will determine the extent of contamination of the carcass with fecal matter. In many  
512 countries, it is common to use plastic bags to seal off the rectum after loosening the circumanal  
513 skin. A procedure that prevents the dissemination of any pathogenic bacteria present in feces to  
514 the carcass and subsequently to the cut meat is of great significance for the hygienic production  
515 of pork. The potential for preventing high levels of contamination through control procedures  
516 make bunning a vulnerable point.

517 Splitting of carcasses is done with automatic splitting machines. There is a risk that the  
518 splitter/saw will come into contact with the rectal incision or the head. The machines should be  
519 disinfected between each carcass; some have automatic disinfection. Provided the machines are  
520 properly maintained and the line speed does not exceed the capacity of the machines, reducing  
521 the time available for disinfection, the splitting process should not contribute substantially to  
522 carcass contamination.

523 Evisceration, however, is considered to be one of the most important control points in the  
524 slaughter process, although there is disagreement in the literature as to how much contamination  
525 occurs in pork slaughter as a result of the evisceration process (likely due to variations in

526 processes between plants). The training of operators is fundamental to prevent problems in the  
527 evisceration stages. Because of the potential contamination at evisceration if not properly  
528 controlled, the carcass opening/evisceration step was identified as a vulnerable point.

529 At the final wash step, decontamination techniques for carcasses are targeted at reducing or  
530 eliminating bacteria that may be human pathogens, as well as those that may cause meat  
531 spoilage. Different methods of heat treatment of surface layers have been suggested and  
532 evaluated, including hot water, steam, and hot air. The final wash is an important step to  
533 decrease the bacterial load that could result from evisceration, and has been identified as a  
534 vulnerable step.

535 Generally, chilling consists of a “rapid chilling” stage, where the carcass surface temperature  
536 rapidly falls, followed by a slower chilling stage. The chilling parameters vary from  
537 slaughterhouse to slaughterhouse. Once chilled, the carcass must be stored at the appropriate  
538 temperature. Bacterial growth can occur if appropriate storage conditions, such as storage  
539 temperature, type of packaging, and display conditions, are not implemented.

#### 540 *Poultry Slaughter (03J)*

541 The poultry slaughter process can be divided into the following steps: live receiving, scalding,  
542 picking, evisceration (including on-line reprocessing), and chilling. Based on the existing  
543 scientific literature on poultry slaughter, carcasses can be contaminated or cross-contaminated  
544 during live receiving, picking, and evisceration. However, the greatest opportunities for  
545 decreasing or limiting microbial contamination using control measures occur at scalding,  
546 evisceration, and chilling, making these the vulnerable points identified.

547 *Live Receiving*—During live receiving, microbial contamination may occur from pathogens on  
548 the feathers and skin and in the crop, cecum, and colon of young chickens. Although a number  
549 of control measures may reduce incoming microbial load, including washing and sanitizing  
550 crates and feed withdrawal, preharvest controls are the most effective for reducing the incoming  
551 microbial load. Because preharvest controls are outside of FSIS’ regulatory purview, the  
552 Agency has not focused its inspection activities on live receiving.

553 *Scalding*—Scalding washes dirt and feces off the carcass exterior, offering the greatest  
554 opportunity to remove microorganisms compared with any other processing step. Microbial  
555 contamination can also occur during scalding from microorganisms present on the external and  
556 internal surfaces of the carcass and in the scalding water. Because scalding can lead to major  
557 reductions in microbes and has the potential to be a major site of cross-contamination between  
558 flocks if not properly controlled, it has been identified as one of the vulnerable points at which to  
559 focus FSIS inspection activities.

560 *Picking*—Microbial contamination may occur during picking from microorganisms present on  
561 the external and internal surfaces of the carcass, as well as on the feather removal equipment.  
562 Within the feather removal equipment, the rubber picking fingers and recycled water have been  
563 demonstrated to be sources of cross-contamination. Interventions applied during feather removal  
564 have yielded mixed results—some leading to reductions and others showing no effect. Given the  
565 inconsistent results and the lack of well-established, effective control measures to overcome the  
566 high levels of cross-contamination at picking, this step was not identified as one of the  
567 vulnerable points at which to focus FSIS inspection activities.

568 *Evisceration (including on-line reprocessing)*—Microbial contamination may occur during  
569 evisceration from microbes present on carcasses and equipment surfaces. The incidence of  
570 potential biological risk factors on carcasses and equipment varies widely between poultry  
571 processing operations due to differences in processing and sanitation practices. One of the main  
572 control measures for evisceration is on-line reprocessing. On-line reprocessing is an automated  
573 washing system that may use antimicrobial agents to remove fecal and/or ingesta contamination  
574 on carcasses that occurred during evisceration. Water temperature and pressure, nozzle type and  
575 arrangement, flow rate, and line speed all influence the effectiveness of the washing system.  
576 Multiple washers in series are generally more effective than a single large washer. Carcass  
577 rinses are effective interventions for removing loose material from the carcass surface during  
578 evisceration. Because of the potential cross-contamination at evisceration and the effective  
579 controls developed at this point (including on-line reprocessing, carcass rinses, and antimicrobial  
580 agents), evisceration has been identified as one of the vulnerable points for focusing inspection  
581 activities to determine whether controls are present and properly implemented.

582 *Chilling*—Microbial contamination during chilling may occur from microorganisms on the  
583 carcass and in the chiller environment. Immersion chilling has been shown to be effective at  
584 reducing contamination; however, immersion chilling can be a site of increased microbes due to  
585 cross-contamination. Because chilling can lead to major reductions in microbes, but has the  
586 potential to be a major site of cross-contamination between flocks, it has been identified as one  
587 of the vulnerable points at which to focus FSIS inspection activities.

## 588 **Across Establishment Public Health Ranking Algorithm**

589 The overall goal of the PHRBIS for processing and slaughter establishments is to achieve  
590 measurable improvements in the control of foodborne pathogens and, thereby, to reduce the  
591 potential public health impact of those establishments on foodborne illnesses. The National  
592 Academy of Sciences and the General Accounting Office have recommended that FSIS reduce  
593 its reliance on organoleptic (sensory) inspection and redeploy its resources by using inspection  
594 methods that are based on the risks inherent in processing and slaughter operations. The purpose  
595 of this section is to present an algorithm for creating a relative risk ranking of processing and  
596 slaughter establishments according to indicators of process control for the purpose of allocating  
597 flexible resources. FSIS recognizes that development of a health-based inspection model will be  
598 an ongoing process, and that the proposed algorithm may continue to evolve as more information  
599 about the risks associated with particular products and about the predictive indicators of food  
600 safety process controls at processing and slaughter establishments becomes available.

## 601 **Background**

602 In 2004, FSIS began the process of developing a RBI program that would assign more inspection  
603 resources to processing establishments that posed a greater food safety risk. The outcome of this  
604 process was a RBI algorithm to rank the potential risks at processing establishments for the  
605 purpose of allocating more inspection resources to riskier plants. This algorithm combined an  
606 estimate of the potential risk that was considered inherent to the establishment (inherent risk  
607 measure) and an estimate of how well the establishment controlled those potential risks (risk  
608 control measure). The algorithm employed nine parameters to characterize the risk of an  
609 establishment. The definitions and categories used in defining these parameters are described in  
610 Appendix D.


- 611 • Volume
- 612 • Inherent risk (attribution)
- 613 • *Salmonella* verification category (three categories)
- 614 • *E. coli* O157:H7 test results
- 615 • *L. monocytogenes* reduction interventions used by RTE establishments (four categories)
- 616 • Regulatory health-related instances of NRs
- 617 • Food recalls
- 618 • Enforcement actions
- 619 • Consumer complaints

620 The algorithm was reviewed by the USDA OIG and suggestions for improvement were made  
 621 (OIG 2007). Suggestions from OIG, industry sources, and consumer groups have been  
 622 incorporated, to the extent possible, in the current algorithm.

623

624 **Conceptual Approach**

625 Risk is defined as the combination of the consequence (hazard) of an event and the probability of  
 626 occurrence of that event. Any health-based ranking algorithm should account for both factors.  
 627 With respect to processing and slaughter establishments, the consequence (hazard) of a  
 628 contamination event is the magnitude of negative human health impacts that could occur  
 629 following a contamination event, while the probability of a contamination event is related to the  
 630 adequacy of the food safety systems in the establishment (See **Figure 3**).



631

632 **Figure 3. Factors Contributing to a Public Health Risk-Based Ranking Algorithm**

633 FSIS acknowledges that quantification of public health impacts resulting from processing and  
 634 slaughter establishments is not exact. Rather, the goal is to segregate establishments into  
 635 categories of high, medium, and low probability of contributing to negative public health  
 636 outcomes.

637 **Data Sources**

638 Various data sets have been identified that could be used to categorize meat and poultry  
639 establishments with respect to relative potential impact on public health. Those data sources are  
640 described in greater detail in Appendix D.

641 *Production Volume*

642 FSIS inspection personnel estimate production volume using a range of pounds produced in a  
643 typical day over a 30-day period. FSIS believes that higher production volumes are of greater  
644 concern because establishments that produce larger volumes of product have a greater potential  
645 to impact public health. Stakeholders have questioned whether inspection program personnel  
646 can accurately estimate an establishment's production volume. FSIS acknowledges that its  
647 inspection personnel are not currently able to precisely collect production volume information,  
648 however, given the wide categories, that precision is less of a concern. Appendix E provides  
649 further analyses of production volume data.

650 FSIS believes that production volume data, including pounds of product produced by product  
651 type, is important, and that the Agency needs to account for this information in the design of its  
652 verification activities. Consequently, through the new PHRBIS, FSIS expects to work to develop  
653 an improved mechanism for inspection program personnel to identify specific production records  
654 on which such information is based, and to provide the establishment management an  
655 opportunity to review the collected information. Collection of production volume data in this  
656 manner would provide FSIS a means to verify the source and accuracy of the information. The  
657 OIG has concurred with this approach to obtaining industry-verified estimates of process volume  
658 (OIG 2007).

659 *Attribution*

660 The ability to identify which foods are vehicles for specific cases of illnesses is a basic element  
661 of prioritizing and allocating resources to reduce the level of foodborne illness. The National  
662 Academy of Sciences (IOM/NRC 2003) and consumer groups (Waldrop 2007) have endorsed, in  
663 principle, the application of attribution data in prioritization efforts. Appendix A gives an  
664 overview of an approach for performing microbial foodborne disease attribution, and for relating  
665 FSIS inspection activities to public health impacts and public health goals. No single source of  
666 information can currently provide a comprehensive picture of the food attribution issue. Thus, it  
667 is necessary to combine a number of different methods and studies to arrive at more defensible  
668 estimates. The best estimates come from combined consideration of illness outbreak data, illness  
669 case-control studies, risk assessments, pathogen serotype data, and expert elicitation (Batz et  
670 al. 2005). FSIS has adopted this approach and considered the best information currently  
671 available.

- 672 • Outbreak data – The PHRBIS ranking algorithm employs the Centers for Disease Control  
673 and Prevention (CDC) outbreak data in developing estimates for food attribution.  
674 Reported data on foodborne disease outbreaks can be valuable in establishing a link  
675 between foodborne illness and the food sources that cause them. A strength of disease  
676 outbreak data is that the specific food sources causing the outbreak have generally been  
677 identified. However, only a small fraction of total foodborne disease is caused by  
678 outbreaks (usually in the range of 5 to 15 percent) and the food sources that cause

679 outbreaks may be different than those that cause sporadic foodborne diseases. While only  
680 a small fraction of total foodborne disease is caused by outbreaks, this does not  
681 automatically mean that attribution estimates derived from outbreak data disagree with  
682 those derived from sporadic disease data. Outbreak data represent the largest  
683 epidemiological dataset available for attribution studies and are a valuable source of  
684 information linking foodborne human illness with specific food sources. As demonstrated  
685 in Appendix A, attribution estimates for the major FSIS-inspected food categories of  
686 beef, poultry, pork, and deli meats derived from CDC outbreak data agree closely with  
687 estimates from two expert elicitations. This increases confidence in using the outbreak  
688 data.

- 689 • CDC case-control studies – CDC has conducted 18 twelve month population-based case  
690 control studies over the period 1996 to 2007 (Patrick 2007). The purpose of these studies  
691 was to identify risk factors (food sources) associated with sporadic illnesses. FSIS has  
692 reviewed the CDC case-control studies relevant to identification of food types  
693 contributing to human cases of *Salmonella*, *E. coli* O157:H7, and *Listeria monocytogenes*  
694 illnesses. Unfortunately, the utility of the published studies is limited in that: (1) there  
695 are very few studies; and (2) they are only able to identify one or two major sources of  
696 human foodborne illness exposure. For example, for *Salmonella*, CDC identified chicken  
697 and undercooked ground beef prepared outside the home, undercooked eggs,  
698 international travel, and exposure to birds and lizards as risk factors. For *Listeria*  
699 *monocytogenes*, CDC identified melons and hummus eaten at a commercial  
700 establishment, and living on a cattle farm as risk factors. Because of the limitations of  
701 these data, CDC case-control studies were not used for the attribution approach presented  
702 in Appendix A.
- 703 • Risk assessments – The value of current risk assessments for developing food attribution  
704 studies is limited since they are generally focused on a single food product or process  
705 and, therefore, do not provide attribution estimation across a range of food types,  
706 including both UDSA- and Food and Drug Administration (FDA)-inspected foods. For  
707 example, FSIS has conducted risk assessments on *Salmonella enteritidis* in Shell Eggs and  
708 *Salmonella* spp. in Egg Products (FSIS 2005), *E. coli* O157:H7 in ground beef (FSIS  
709 2001), *E. coli* O157:H7 in intact (non-tenderized) and non-intact (tenderized) beef (FSIS  
710 2002), *Listeria monocytogenes* in deli meat (FSIS 2003). Because these studies focused  
711 on a single food product, they are not used for the attribution approach presented in  
712 Appendix A. Various efforts are underway to use risk assessments in attribution studies,  
713 including using meta-analysis of multiple studies and developing new exposure models  
714 that consider multiple pathways to human exposure. As these efforts develop, they will  
715 be incorporated into the attribution approach.
- 716 • Pathogen serotype – A CDC/FDA/FSIS effort is underway to use *Salmonella* serotype  
717 data to estimate attribution for meat and poultry products and to better account for  
718 sporadic illnesses in attribution estimates (Guo 2007). This effort is characterizing the  
719 relative contribution of specific broad categories of meat and poultry products to total  
720 human *Salmonella* illness for these meat and poultry products. Currently, because of a  
721 lack of data, it does not include FDA-inspected products except eggs. FSIS has initiated  
722 a program of collecting *Salmonella* serotype data on broilers; these data will be available  
723 in the future to improve attribution estimates.

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- Expert elicitation – The use of expert elicitation in determining food attribution has been endorsed by the National Academy of Sciences (IOM/NRC 2003). FSIS will employ two different expert elicitations on food attribution: (1) an expert elicitation sponsored by FSIS (Karns et al. 2007) using a panel of 12 food safety experts to attribute foodborne illnesses of *Salmonella*, *E. coli* O157:H7, *Campylobacter*, and *L. monocytogenes* to handling and consuming foods in 25 processed meat and poultry product categories; and (2) an expert elicitation performed by Resources for the Future and Carnegie Mellon University (Hoffmann et al. 2007), which used a panel of 42 food safety experts to estimate food attribution for each of 11 pathogens. Appendix A gives more detail on these two studies. A valuable contribution of the Hoffmann et al. (2007) study is that it includes both FSIS- and FDA-inspected food categories. Thus, it provides a more complete picture of disease attribution than the FSIS expert elicitation. However, the FSIS expert elicitation provides more detail on specific FSIS-inspected meat and poultry food categories. Both elicitation studies provide different, yet valuable perspectives on the food attribution problem. It is acknowledged that expert elicitation studies have limitations, but the analysis in Appendix A indicates that at least for *Salmonella*, *E. coli* O157:H7, and *Listeria monocytogenes*, the two expert elicitations agree remarkably well with each other, giving increased confidence in their attribution estimates. In addition, the CDC outbreak data also produces attribution estimates that agree with the expert elicitations. Again, this increases confidence in the results of these two expert elicitations for the three pathogens considered.
  - Combined Approach – As described previously, the FSIS attribution methodology relies on two expert elicitations (FSIS 2007 and Hoffmann et al. 2007) and the CDC outbreak data. After review of all currently available approaches, FSIS has determined that these three data sources are the most comprehensive currently available datasets for use in estimating foodborne disease attribution. As additional datasets and other approaches (such as serotype for *Salmonella* sporadic disease) are developed, they will be incorporated. The CDC has reviewed and supports FSIS’ current methodology for estimating foodborne illness attributions to FSIS-regulated products.

753 *Salmonella Verification Testing*

754 FSIS performs *Salmonella* verification testing at establishments that produce nine categories of  
755 raw meat and poultry products. The results are recorded in the M2K database. The appropriate  
756 number of samples within a test set for a given product are collected from an establishment over  
757 successive days, with the plan (or goal) of one sample being collected each day of operation. For  
758 example, for a facility processing ground beef, 53 samples would be collected on 53 successive  
759 days when the establishment is processing. Depending on the frequency of production, product  
760 type, and availability of resources, the time to complete a set ranges from two months to over a  
761 year. In establishments that produce more than one product subject to *Salmonella* verification  
762 testing, only one product is tested at a time. FSIS considers *Salmonella* verification testing a  
763 direct indicator of the effectiveness of process control. The percent positive in the most recent  
764 *Salmonella* sample set is used as an indicator of process control. Annual reports summarizing  
765 results for calendar years are available on the FSIS website.

766 *RTE products*

767 RTE products are tested for *L. monocytogenes*, *Salmonella* and *E. coli* O157:H7. Establishments  
768 that test positive for these “zero tolerance” pathogens are considered to demonstrate a loss of  
769 food safety system process control.

770 *E. coli* O157:H7

771 Approximately 1,400 federally inspected establishments produce raw ground beef products  
772 subject to *E. coli* O157:H7 testing. The objective of the testing program is to detect *E. coli*  
773 O157:H7 and to stimulate industry action to reduce the presence of the pathogen in raw ground  
774 beef. For federally inspected establishments, 0.18 percent of samples were positive in 2004;  
775 0.17 percent in 2005; and 0.17 percent in 2006. In 2007, FSIS identified an increased number of  
776 *E. coli* O157:H7 positive tests in beef, as well as a larger number of recalls and illnesses caused  
777 by this pathogen than in recent years. In response, FSIS has accelerated implementation of  
778 initiatives and improvements to its sampling methodology, including implementation of a risk-  
779 based approach to *E. coli* O157:H7 sampling and testing. In 2007, routine sampling and testing  
780 of beef manufacturing trimmings for *E. coli* O157:H7 and follow-up testing of trimmings and  
781 other ground beef components began. FSIS also intends to begin gathering information on the  
782 production of blade tenderized or injected raw beef products.

783 Establishments that test positive for this “zero tolerance” pathogen are considered to demonstrate  
784 a loss of food safety system process control.

785 *Public Health Significant NRs*

786 FSIS inspection personnel document a regulatory NR at an establishment by recording a  
787 noncompliance report (NR) in the Agency’s Performance Based Inspection System (PBIS).  
788 When inspectors issue an NR, they cite one or more applicable regulatory requirements from a  
789 list of over 500 citations. The rate at which an establishment fails to meet these requirements  
790 and receives an NR is considered by FSIS to be an indication of the establishment’s inability to  
791 control risk. An FSIS panel ranked each regulatory requirement based on its public health  
792 significance, as measured by a loss of process control. Specifically, each regulatory requirement  
793 was categorized into one of four categories according to how strongly each indicated a loss of an  
794 establishment’s food safety system process control. The regulatory requirements that were  
795 considered most strongly related to public health, 66 out of over 564 possible regulatory  
796 citations, are referred to in this report as “W3NRs.” Thus, only about 12 percent of all possible  
797 NRs have been identified as indicative of a definite loss of process control.

798 An analysis by Carnegie Mellon University (CMU) considered the predictive ability of subsets  
799 of NRs as indicators of *Salmonella* contamination. They considered three classes of NRs: all  
800 NRs, all public health-related NRs as defined by an industry coalition, and all W3NRs. This  
801 analysis provides insight as to whether NRs or subsets of NRs are indicators of the likelihood  
802 that an establishment would have a loss of food safety control and, therefore, measures their  
803 importance as a possible component of the PHRBIS. Details of the analyses and results are  
804 presented in Appendix E. CMU found that an establishment with a W3NR in a given 7 day  
805 period is three times more likely to have a positive *Salmonella* verification testing result in the  
806 next 14 days than an establishment without a W3NR. An establishment with an industry  
807 coalition-defined NR is about 2.3 times more likely to have a positive *Salmonella* verification



808 testing, and an establishment with any type of NR is about 1.8 times more likely. All of these  
809 results are statistically significant and statistically different from each other. Thus, (1) the  
810 occurrence of an NR from any of the three sets of NRs is a statistically significant predictor of an  
811 increased probability of a positive *Salmonella* test in the following 14 days; and (2) W3NRs are  
812 better predictors than the industry coalition NRs, which are better predictors than all types of  
813 NRs. In other words, the risk of failing a test for *Salmonella* is substantially elevated at  
814 establishments that recently were found to be noncompliant.

#### 815 *Adulterated Product*

816 Establishments that ship adulterated meat or poultry product demonstrate a loss of food safety  
817 system process control. Food recalls are one indication of the shipment of adulterated product.  
818 Some examples of adulterated product include *E. coli* O157:H7 contamination of ground beef  
819 and *E. coli* O157:H7, *Lm*, or *Salmonella* contamination of RTE products.

#### 820 *Enforcement Actions*

821 Enforcement actions are a measure of an establishment's ability to implement and maintain  
822 corrective action once a noncompliance is observed and documented. FSIS can take a variety of  
823 enforcement actions (e.g., notice of intended enforcement [NOIE], suspension, and inspection  
824 under consent order) against establishments that fail to sufficiently comply with applicable  
825 requirements.

#### 826 *Food Safety Recalls*

827 A food recall is a voluntary action by a manufacturer or distributor to protect the public from  
828 products that may cause health problems. FSIS monitors recalls of meat and poultry products  
829 produced by federally-inspected establishments and publishes summary data on the FSIS Web  
830 site.

831 FSIS classifies recalls based on relative health risk, as follows:

- 832 • Class I: Reasonable probability of serious, adverse health problem or death
- 833 • Class II: Remote probability of adverse health problem
- 834 • Class III: No adverse health consequences

835 Class I and Class II affect public health. More details on the three classes of recalls are given  
836 below.

837 *Class I.* This is a health hazard situation where there is a reasonable probability that the  
838 use of the product will cause serious, adverse health consequences or death. For  
839 example, the presence of pathogens in a RTE product, the presence of *E. coli* O157:H7 in  
840 ground beef, or a reasonable probability of a health hazard situation due to an allergenic  
841 substance.

842 *Class II.* This is a health hazard situation where there is a remote probability of adverse  
843 health consequences from the use of the product. For example, the presence of

844 undeclared allergens such as very small amounts of potential allergenic substances (milk  
845 or soy) or small, blunt-edged foreign materials (e.g., plastic).

846 *Class III.* This is a health hazard situation where the use of the product will not cause  
847 adverse health consequences. For example, the presence of undeclared generally  
848 recognized as safe nonallergenic substances, such as excess water.

849 FSIS proposes to use Class I recalls as an indicator of a loss of process control.

#### 850 *STEPS Database*

851 FSIS has developed a “System for Tracking *E. coli* O157:H7 Positive Suppliers” (STEPS)  
852 database. The STEPS database captures positive laboratory results data for *E. coli* O157:H7 in  
853 ground beef. The database contains an early warning system for FSIS about repeat offenders; in  
854 particular, it will be used to identify plants that have been in STEPS more than once in the past  
855 120 days.

856 In 2007, FSIS began performing routine follow-up sampling at slaughter establishments that  
857 produced and supplied the carcasses (“the originating supplying slaughter establishment”).  
858 These establishments provided the beef manufacturing trimmings or other raw ground beef or  
859 beef patty components used in the production of raw ground beef products that tested positive for  
860 *E. coli* O157:H7 during FSIS inspection. This follow-up sampling, in conjunction with routine  
861 sampling of beef manufacturing trimmings, is a step toward developing a more risk-based  
862 sampling program for *E. coli* O157:H7 in raw beef products.

#### 863 *Link to an Outbreak*

864 Any establishment that is linked to a foodborne disease outbreak will receive a higher ranking.

#### 865 *Specified Risk Materials*

866 SRMs are inedible or potentially hazardous materials that cannot be used in human food.  
867 Establishments that slaughter cattle and establishments that process the carcasses or parts of  
868 cattle must develop, implement, and maintain procedures for the removal, segregation, and  
869 disposition of SRMs. In cattle of any age, tonsils and the distal ileum of the small intestine are  
870 SRMs (while only the distal ileum is an SRM, the entire small intestine must be removed and not  
871 used for human food). In cattle 30 months or older, the following parts are classified as SRMs:

- 872 • Brain
- 873 • Skull
- 874 • Eyes
- 875 • Trigeminal ganglia
- 876 • Spinal cord
- 877 • Dorsal root ganglia
- 878 • Vertebral column, excluding
- 879 – Vertebrae of the tail

- 880 – Transverse process of the thoracic and lumbar vertebrae
- 881 – Wings of the sacrum

882 Establishments that have shipped SRM will be placed in a higher risk category.

### 883 *Food Safety Assessment*

884 FSAs are conducted to analyze an establishment’s control of its food safety systems. FSAs  
885 assess all aspects of an establishment’s food safety system in accordance with FSIS Directive  
886 5100.1. While performing an FSA, Enforcement, Investigations, and Analysis Officers (EIAOs)  
887 assess whether meat and poultry establishments have designed their food safety systems to  
888 control, and thereby minimize, the presence of *Salmonella*, *E. coli* O157:H7, and *L.*  
889 *monocytogenes*.

890 FSIS recognizes that an FSA yields the Agency’s best evidence about the design of an  
891 establishment’s food safety system, in that it provides a top-to-bottom examination of a facility  
892 with a focus on interventions and practices used to control the presence of pathogens. The OIG  
893 review (OIG 2007) suggested that FSIS implement an action plan with specific milestone dates  
894 for capturing the results of FSAs in an appropriate configuration that allows for effective  
895 analysis. In September 2007, FSIS awarded a contract to build the Agency’s new IT system.  
896 FSIS plans to have a functional domestic inspection module, including a new electronic FSA  
897 module, ready for deployment in mid-2009. The IT system will facilitate effective analyses by  
898 capturing similar types of information for all establishments in quantifiable terms, and storing  
899 detailed FSA findings in an electronic format.

900 To ensure consistency and uniformity in the FSA process, FSIS is creating a new FSA  
901 instrument, consisting of sections containing a series of data gathering and data analysis  
902 questions tailored to the specific food safety hazards and regulatory requirements associated with  
903 each HACCP 03 process (e.g., 03B, raw ground product; 03E, not heat-treated, shelf-stable).  
904 The new FSA reporting instrument will be web-based and interactive with the new domestic  
905 inspection model to obtain needed profile data. It will consist of questions to help structure an  
906 EIAO’s investigation reporting, as well as prompt the officer to explain his or her findings;  
907 provide consistent information for analysis purposes to inform policy and inspection resource  
908 allocation; and contain a tracking system to ensure for cause FSAs are getting performed, and  
909 that all relevant establishments are assessed at least every four years.

910 In the new IT system, FSAs will have a quantitative score associated with them. The  
911 quantitative score is obtained by the addition of points for positive controls and zero points for  
912 no control or negative controls (noncompliance). Only yes/no and multiple choice questions in  
913 the FSA are scored. The range of FSA scores will be normalized so that all scores lie in a fixed  
914 range to facilitate the use of FSA results in a ranking algorithm.

### 915 *Salmonella Performance Standards*

916 The PR/HACCP rule sets *Salmonella* performance standards for establishments slaughtering  
917 selected classes of food animals or producing selected classes of raw ground products to verify  
918 that industry systems are effective in controlling the contamination of raw meat and poultry  
919 products with disease-causing bacteria. Raw products with established performance standards  
920 include carcasses of cows/bulls, steers/heifers, market hogs, and broilers. Processed products

921 measured by performance standards include ground beef, ground chicken, and ground turkey.  
922 The performance standards for these product classes are based on the prevalence of *Salmonella*  
923 as determined from the Agency's nationwide microbiological baseline studies conducted before  
924 PR/HACCP was implemented. In addition, turkey carcass sampling for *Salmonella* was initiated  
925 June 2006. Guidance using young turkey carcass baseline levels can be found in the *Federal*  
926 *Register*, Vol. 70, No. 32, pp. 8058-8060.

927 FSIS inspection personnel verify that establishments are meeting the standards by collecting  
928 randomly selected product samples and submitting them to one of three FSIS laboratories for  
929 *Salmonella* analysis, according to procedures described in Appendix E of the PR/HACCP Final  
930 Rule: *Federal Register*, Vol. 61, No. 144, pp. 38917-38928.

### 931 *Salmonella* Serotypes

932 Isolates of *Salmonella*-positive samples are serotyped at the USDA Animal and Plant Health  
933 Inspection Service's National Veterinary Services Laboratories in Ames, Iowa. *Salmonella*  
934 testing and serotype data, along with complementary data from molecular and phenotypic  
935 analyses, provide an opportunity to examine the association among serotypes isolated on-farm,  
936 from meat and poultry products, and from human cases of salmonellosis.

937 Some of the more common serotypes isolated from meat and poultry products are rarely isolated  
938 from human patients. Conversely, some of the serotypes frequently found in human cases of  
939 salmonellosis are found in various meat and poultry products. Serotypes identified from human  
940 cases of salmonellosis can also be found in other food and non-food sources.


941 CDC identifies Typhimurium, Enteritidis, Newport, Javiana, Montevideo, Heidelberg and I  
942 4,[5],12:i:- as the seven most commonly identified *Salmonella* serotypes causing human  
943 infection in the United States. Combined, these serotypes accounted for a majority (64 percent)  
944 of human infections in the Foodborne Diseases Active Surveillance Network (FoodNet) sites in  
945 2006.

### 946 **Overview of the Public Health Risk-Based Inspection Ranking Algorithm**

947 The goal of the PHRBIS ranking algorithm is to separate processing and slaughter  
948 establishments into three Levels of Inspection (LOI) based on indicators of how well an  
949 establishment is maintaining process control (e.g., HACCP activities, in-plant SSOPs, SPS  
950 activities, and prerequisite programs). The process has two steps. First, establishments are  
951 separated into three LOI based on indicators of an establishment's food safety process control  
952 systems. The levels are

- 953 • routine inspection (LOI 1),
- 954 • focused inspection (LOI 2), and
- 955 • in-depth inspection (LOI 3).

956 Second, establishments in LOI 1 and 2 are rank ordered based on potential public health impact.  
957 A diagram of the process is presented in **Figure 4**.



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**Figure 4. Overview of the Public Health Risk-Based Inspection Ranking Algorithm**

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First, processing and slaughter establishments are separated into three categories based on indicators of process control. Then, those establishments in LOI 2 and LOI 1 will be further ranked based on their potential public health impact. It is not necessary to rank order establishments in LOI 3 since all establishments in LOI 3 will receive in-depth inspection.

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*Levels of Inspection*

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FSIS’ Pathogen Reduction and HACCP Systems final rule mandates measures to target and reduce the presence of pathogenic organisms in meat and poultry products. Those measures include FSIS testing to verify pathogen reduction performance standards are being met, plant microbial testing to verify process control for fecal contamination, written SSOPs, and mandatory HACCP systems in all meat and poultry plants. HACCP provides the framework for industry to maintain science-based process controls to achieve pathogen control.

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The proposed new system uses measures of process control to categorize establishments into three LOI, defined as

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- LOI 1—Establishments that have demonstrated they consistently maintain an effective level of food safety process controls. Those establishments will receive a routine or baseline LOI consisting of
  - routine in-plant inspection, and
  - focused verification activities, prompted by in-plant results to identify and prevent possible problems (i.e., new within-establishment inspection system).
- LOI 2—Establishments with some indication that they may not be maintaining food safety process controls at a level compatible with industry norms. Those establishments will receive an increased LOI consisting of
  - routine in-plant inspection;
  - focused verification activities, prompted by in-plant results to identify and prevent possible problems (i.e., new within-establishment inspection system); and
  - focused in-plant verification activities at vulnerable points on a routine basis to verify the likelihood of a food safety system problem.

987 Establishments in LOI 2 will receive a higher priority, relative to LOI 1, for an in-depth FSA and  
988 possibly IVT.

- 989 • LOI 3—Establishments with strong indications that they are not maintaining food safety  
990 process controls. Those establishments will receive the highest LOI consisting of  
991 – routine in-plant inspection, and  
992 – focused verification activities, prompted by in-plant results to identify and prevent  
993 possible problems (i.e., new within-establishment inspection system);  
994 – focused in-plant verification activities at vulnerable points on a routine basis to verify  
995 the likelihood of a food safety system problem;  
996 – deployment of highly-trained FSIS resources (i.e., Enforcement, Investigations, and  
997 Analysis Officers/PHVs) for an FSA, and, if justified, IVT.

998 Establishments in LOI 3 will be scheduled for an FSA and will remain in LOI 3 until their FSA  
999 results demonstrate they are in compliance or an enforcement action is taken.

#### 1000 *Criteria for Processing and Slaughter Establishments to Receive In-depth Inspection (LOI 3)*

1001 Slaughter establishments in LOI 3 are scheduled for an FSA and possibly IVT to assess the status  
1002 of the establishment's food safety systems. Any food safety process control issues are corrected  
1003 or enforcement actions are taken. Once a satisfactory FSA is completed and any process control  
1004 issues are corrected, the establishment moves to LOI 2 if an IVT is ongoing. Once both the FSA  
1005 and IVT are completed and all other food safety system issues are satisfactory, the establishment  
1006 moves to LOI 1 or LOI 2 depending on other factors. It is not intended that establishments  
1007 remain in LOI 3 for significant periods of time.

1008 LOI 3 establishments are those that satisfy ANY of the following criteria.

- 1009 • Establishment has a positive *E. coli* O157:H7 verification result.
- 1010 • Establishment has a positive *L. monocytogenes*, *Salmonella* or *E. coli* O157:H7  
1011 verification result for an RTE product.
- 1012 • Establishment has an enforcement action (i.e., NOIE) or adulterated or misbranded  
1013 products shipped (captures recalls including those related to human illness).
- 1014 • Establishment is in *Salmonella* verification testing Category 3.
- 1015 • Establishment is in STEPS database more than once in the past 120 days.
- 1016 • Establishment has a single shipment of an SRM.
- 1017 • Establishment is linked to a foodborne disease outbreak.
- 1018 • Establishment has sustained structural damage due to a natural disaster or other cause.
- 1019 • Establishment has a high health-related NR rate (e.g., SRMs, Insanitary Dressing, Zero  
1020 Tolerance, and Residues) relative to other plants producing the same products. The use  
1021 of public health-related NRs as a criterion is justified through predictive analysis. The  
1022 window of time over which the NR rate is looked at is the past 30 days.
- 1023 • Establishment has a repetitive *Salmonella* serotype of human health concern or PFGE  
1024 match.\*

- 1025       • Consumer complaints raise public health concerns about the establishment.

1026       \* This criterion is not currently applied. FSIS will begin collecting this data in its new IT  
1027       system.

1028       *Criteria for Processing and Slaughter Establishments to Receive Routine Inspection (LOI 1)*

1029       Processing and slaughter establishments in LOI 1 have demonstrated that they can consistently  
1030       maintain an effective level of food safety process controls. Those establishments will receive a  
1031       routine or baseline LOI.

1032       LOI 1 establishments are those that satisfy ALL of the following criteria.

- 1033       • Establishment did not have a positive *E. coli* O157:H7 verification result in the past  
1034       120 days, or it did have a positive *E. coli* O157:H7 verification result in the past  
1035       120 days, but follow-up IVT has shown the plant to be *E. coli*-free. The approximate  
1036       time required for 16 follow-up *E. coli* samples is 120 days.
- 1037       • Establishment did not have a positive *L. monocytogenes*, *Salmonella* or *E. coli* O157:H7  
1038       verification result for an RTE product in the past 120 days, or it did have a positive *L.*  
1039       *monocytogenes*, *Salmonella* or *E. coli* O157:H7 verification result in the past 120 days,  
1040       and follow-up IVT has been completed without positive result for *L. monocytogenes*,  
1041       *Salmonella* or *E. coli* O157:H7.
- 1042       • Establishment did not have an enforcement action (i.e., NOIE) in the past 4 months or  
1043       adulterated or misbranded products in commerce in the past 4 months (captures recalls  
1044       including those related to human illness).
- 1045       • Establishment is in lower percentile of percent positives on most recent *Salmonella*  
1046       verification testing sample set, unannounced sampling or other *Salmonella* testing  
1047       program.\*
- 1048       • Establishment is in lower percentile of public health-related NR rates over the past 30  
1049       days (e.g., SRMs, Insanitary Dressing, Zero Tolerance, Residue) relative to other plants  
1050       producing the same products. The use of public health-related NRs as a criterion is  
1051       justified through predictive analysis.
- 1052       • Establishment has not been confirmed to be linked to a foodborne disease outbreak in the  
1053       past 6 months.
- 1054       • Establishment is in lower percentile on most recent FSA score.\*\*
- 1055       • Establishment is in lower percentile of scores on focused in-plant verification questions  
1056       regarding vulnerable points.\*\*
- 1057       • Consumer complaints have not raised a public health concern at establishment in the past  
1058       6 months.
- 1059       • Establishment is in the lower percentile of *Salmonella* serotypes of human health concern  
1060       or PFGE matches. FSIS will collect this data as part of the *Salmonella* Initiative  
1061       Program.\*\*

1062 \* FSIS *Salmonella* verification testing results will be used for this criterion. However, State  
1063 or local or other *Salmonella* testing results will be considered if they are available in the  
1064 Public Health Inspection System.

1065 \*\* This criterion is not currently applied. FSIS will begin collecting this data in its new IT  
1066 system.

1067 *Criteria for Processing and Slaughter Establishments to Receive Focused Inspection (LOI 2)*

1068 LOI 2 establishments are those that are not in the routine (LOI 1) or in-depth (LOI 3) LOI  
1069 categories. An establishment belongs in LOI 2 if any of the following statements are true.

1070 • The establishment had an *E. coli* positive sample within the last 120 days and an FSA has  
1071 been completed, but the establishment is still undergoing follow-up sampling. If the  
1072 establishment has had an FSA and follow-up sampling is complete without another  
1073 *E. coli* positive, the establishment moves to LOI 1 if all other criteria for LOI 1 are  
1074 satisfied.

1075 • The establishment producing RTE products had a positive *L. monocytogenes*, *Salmonella*  
1076 or *E. coli* O157:H7 sample within the last 120 days and an FSA has been completed, but  
1077 the establishment is still undergoing follow-up sampling. If the establishment has had an  
1078 FSA and follow-up sampling is complete without another positive *L. monocytogenes*,  
1079 *Salmonella* or *E. coli* O157:H7 sample, the establishment moves to LOI 1 if all other  
1080 criteria for LOI 1 are satisfied.

1081 • The establishment has an enforcement action (e.g., NOIE) or adulterated or misbranded  
1082 products shipped (captures recalls including those related to human illness) in the past  
1083 120 days, for which an FSA has been completed and corrective actions have been  
1084 verified, but other criteria for LOI 1 are not satisfied.

1085 • The establishment is in the STEPS database more than once in the past 120 days, for  
1086 which an FSA has been completed, but other criteria for LOI 1 are not satisfied.

1087 • Based on its history of *Salmonella* testing, the establishment is above the lower percentile  
1088 cut-off point for LOI 1 for percent positives on most recent sample set, unannounced  
1089 sampling or other *Salmonella* testing programs.

1090 • Based on its history of health-related NR rates over the past 30 days, the establishment is  
1091 above the percentile cut-off point for LOI 1 percent positives and below the percentile  
1092 cut-off point for LOI 3. The use of public health-related NRs as a criterion is justified  
1093 through predictive analysis. The establishment is confirmed to be linked to a foodborne  
1094 illness outbreak in the past 6 months, for which an FSA has been completed.

1095 • The establishment is above the lower percentile (cut-point for LOI 1) on most recent FSA  
1096 score.\*

1097 • Consumer complaints with public health concern raised at the establishment in past 6  
1098 months.

1099 • The establishment is above the lower percentile (cut-off point for LOI 1) of scores on  
1100 focused in-plant verification questions regarding food safety vulnerable points.\*



1101 • The establishment is above lower percentile (cut-off point for LOI 1) of *Salmonella*  
1102 serotypes of human health concern or PFGE matches. FSIS will collect this data as part  
1103 of the *Salmonella* Initiative Program.\*

1104 \* This criterion is not currently applied. FSIS will begin collecting this data in its new IT  
1105 system.

#### 1106 *Ranking of Processing and Slaughter Establishments by Public Health Impact*

1107 After establishments are separated into one of three LOI, the next step in the ranking algorithm is  
1108 to rank order establishments in LOI 2 and LOI 1 by potential public health impact. It is not  
1109 necessary to rank order establishments in LOI 3 since all establishments in LOI 3 will receive in-  
1110 depth inspection. Establishments in LOI 1 and 2 are ranked according to pathogens and product  
1111 type. That is, a separate list of rankings is developed for *Salmonella*, *E. coli* O157:H7,  
1112 *L. monocytogenes*, *Campylobacter*, and a fifth category of establishments that are not susceptible  
1113 to any of those specific pathogens. These five lists can be combined into an overall ranking of  
1114 the LOI 2 establishments based on public health impact. The ranking process is described  
1115 below.

1116 First, all LOI 2 establishments are ranked by public health impact. The process is as follows:

- 1117 • For a specific product (e.g., ground beef, broilers), compute the product fractional  
1118 volume =  $V_i / \sum V_i$  for an establishment *i*, where  $V_i$  is the volume of the product  
1119 produced by establishment *i*, and  $\sum V_i$  is the total volume of the product produced by all  
1120 establishments.
- 1121 • Obtain the foodborne disease attribution for pathogen-product class (e.g., ground beef  
1122 consumption causes 34 percent of all *E. coli* O157:H7 illnesses—see Table A–8 of  
1123 Appendix A).
- 1124 • The potential public impact from an establishment producing the pathogen-product pair is  
1125 then estimated as the product of the fractional volume times the pathogen-product pair  
1126 attribution.
- 1127 • If the establishment produces more than one product with the same pathogen of concern,  
1128 select the maximum potential public impact.

1129 Second, sort the ranked establishments into one of four pathogen categories—*Salmonella*,  
1130 *L. monocytogenes*, *E. coli* O157:H7, *Campylobacter*—or place in fifth category of  
1131 establishments not susceptible to any of those pathogens. Depending on FSIS priorities (e.g.,  
1132 performance standards, seasonality), the cut point for categorization of LOI 2a and LOI 2b may  
1133 be amended for specific pathogens. For each pathogen group, two sublevels within LOI 2 and 1  
1134 will be created using the 50<sup>th</sup> percentile as the cut point.

#### 1135 **Verification of Algorithm**

1136 Values for the parameters used in the ranking algorithm were assembled, and the algorithm was  
1137 utilized to separate meat and poultry establishments into three LOI. The ranking algorithm was  
1138 applied to establishments that produce three categories of meat and poultry products: young  
1139 chicken (broiler) slaughter establishments, raw ground beef establishments, and intact beef

slaughter establishments. The STEPS and SRM criteria were not applied in this exercise. They will be applied in future applications. A summary of the percentage of establishments in each level of inspection is given in Table 1.

**Table 1. Percentage of Establishments in Levels of Inspection**

	<i>Chicken Slaughter</i>	<i>Beef Slaughter</i>	<i>Ground Beef</i>
LOI 3	5	5	5
LOI 2	22	16	20
LOI 1	73	79	75

Details of the three applications are presented below.

**Young Chicken Slaughter Establishments**

A dataset of the 195 young chicken slaughter establishments receiving FSIS inspection and *Salmonella* verification testing in 2007 was assembled for purposes of this analysis.

**Criteria Used**

*Salmonella Verification Testing*

Broiler Establishment Distribution by Salmonella Category as of December 2007:

- Category 1: 74 percent
- Category 2: 24 percent
- Category 3: 2 percent (All of these would be placed in LOI 3)

*Distribution of Salmonella Results*

- The 3 establishments in *Salmonella* verification Category 3 are placed in LOI 3.
- The distribution of percentages on the most recent *Salmonella* data across 195 young chicken slaughter establishments is used as an indicator to separate establishments into LOI 1 or LOI 2.
- For this example, being in the bottom 96<sup>th</sup> percentile for *Salmonella* positives on most recent *Salmonella* set would make an establishment eligible to be in LOI 1. (Therefore, out of the 195 establishments, 187 would be eligible to be in LOI 1 based on *Salmonella* data.) NOTE – the 96<sup>th</sup> percentile is used for this example. A different *Salmonella* cut-point may be used for other food categories.

*W3NR Rate*

- The distribution of scores (percentiles) on the health-related regulatory noncompliance rates (W3NRs) over the most recent month across 195 young chicken slaughter establishments is used as an indicator to separate establishments in LOI 1, LOI 2, and LOI 3.
- For this example, using data from November 21, 2006 through December 21, 2006:

- 1171 – Being in the top 3<sup>rd</sup> percentile or above of the W3NR rates would place the  
1172 establishment in LOI 3. (Therefore, out of the 195 establishments, 6 establishments  
1173 would be in LOI 3 based on W3NR rates.)
- 1174 – Being in the lowest 96<sup>th</sup> percentile on W3NR rates would make the establishment  
1175 eligible to be in LOI 1. (Therefore, out of the 195 establishments, 187 would be  
1176 eligible to be in LOI 1 based on W3NR rate.)

1177 **Other Criteria**

- 1178 • Enforcement actions: Yes/No for LOI 3 versus LOI 2 versus LOI 1
  - 1179 ○ For the time period considered, one poultry establishment had an applicable  
1180 enforcement action.
- 1181 • Recalls:
  - 1182 ○ For the time period considered, no poultry establishments had an applicable  
1183 recall.
- 1184 • Linked to an outbreak: Yes/No for LOI 3 versus LOI 2 versus LOI 1
  - 1185 ○ For the time period considered, no poultry establishments were linked to an  
1186 outbreak.
- 1187 • Natural disasters/structural damage: Yes/No for LOI 3
  - 1188 ○ For the time period considered, no poultry establishments had major structural  
1189 damage.

1190 **Resulting Levels of Inspection**

- 1191 • Applying the ranking algorithm and the cut-off points discussed above resulted in the  
1192 following distribution of establishments:
  - 1193 – 9 young chicken slaughter establishments in LOI 3 (5 percent)
  - 1194 – 44 establishments in LOI 2 (22 percent)
  - 1195 – 142 establishments in LOI 1 (73 percent)

1196

1197 **Ground Beef Establishments**

1198 A dataset of the 837 ground beef establishments receiving FSIS inspection and *Salmonella*  
1199 verification testing in 2007 was assembled for purposes of this analysis.

1200 **Criteria Used**

1201 *Salmonella Verification Testing*

1202 Ground Beef Establishment Distribution by *Salmonella* Category as of December 2007:

- 1203 Category 1: 71 percent
- 1204 Category 2: 27 percent
- 1205 Category 3: 2 percent (All of these would be placed in LOI 3)

1206 *Distribution of Salmonella Results*

- 1207 • The 12 establishments in *Salmonella* verification Category 3 are placed in LOI 3.
- 1208 • The distribution of percentages on the most recent *Salmonella* data across ground beef  
1209 establishments is used as an indicator to separate establishments into LOI 1 or LOI 2.
- 1210 • For this example, being in the bottom 85<sup>th</sup> percentile for *Salmonella* positives on the most  
1211 recent *Salmonella* set would make an establishment eligible to be in LOI 1. (Therefore,  
1212 out of the 837 establishments, 711 would be eligible to be in LOI 1 based on *Salmonella*  
1213 data.) NOTE –A different *Salmonella* cut-point may be used for other food categories.

1214 *W3NR Rate*

- 1215 • The distribution of scores (percentiles) on the health-related regulatory noncompliance  
1216 rates (W3NRs) over the most recent month across 837 ground beef establishments is used  
1217 as an indicator to separate establishments in LOI 1, LOI 2, and LOI 3.
- 1218 • Using data from November 21, 2006 through December 21, 2006:
  - 1219 – Being in the top 3<sup>rd</sup> percentile or above of the W3NR rates would place the  
1220 establishment in LOI 3. (Therefore, out of the 837 establishments, 25 establishments  
1221 would be in LOI 3 based on W3NR rates.)
  - 1222 – Being in the lowest 85<sup>th</sup> percentile on W3NR rates would make the establishment  
1223 eligible to be in LOI 1. (Therefore, out of the 711 establishments, 795 would be  
1224 eligible to be in LOI 1 based on W3NR rate.)

1225 *Other Criteria*

- 1226 • Enforcement actions: Yes/No for LOI 3 versus LOI 2 versus LOI 1
  - 1227 ○ For the time period considered, two establishments had an applicable enforcement  
1228 action.
- 1229 • Recalls: Yes/No for LOI 3 versus LOI 2 versus LOI 1
  - 1230 ○ For the time period considered, 1 establishment had an applicable recall action.
- 1231 • Linked to an outbreak: Yes/No for LOI 3 versus LOI 2 versus LOI 1
  - 1232 ○ For the time period considered, no ground beef establishments were linked to an  
1233 outbreak.
- 1234 • Natural disasters/structural damage: Yes/No for LOI 3
  - 1235 ○ For the time period considered, no ground beef establishments had major  
1236 structural damage.

1237 **Resulting Levels of Inspection**

- 1238 • Applying the ranking algorithm and the cut-off points discussed above resulted in the  
1239 following distribution of establishments:
  - 1240 – 40 establishments in LOI 3 (5 percent)
  - 1241 – 139 establishments in LOI 2 (16 percent)
  - 1242 – 658 establishments in LOI 1 (79 percent)

1243 **Beef Slaughter Establishments**

1244 A dataset of 174 beef slaughter establishments receiving FSIS inspection and *Salmonella*  
1245 verification testing in 2007 was assembled for purposes of this analysis.

1246 **Criteria Used**

1247 *Salmonella Verification Testing*

1248 Beef Slaughter Establishment Distribution by *Salmonella* Category for the 174 establishment  
1249 dataset as of December 2007:

1250 Category 1: 63 percent

1251 Category 2: 35 percent

1252 Category 3: 2 percent (All of these would be placed in LOI 3)

1253 *Distribution of Salmonella Results*

- 1254 • The 4 establishments in *Salmonella* verification Category 3 are placed in LOI 3.
- 1255 • The distribution of percentages on the most recent *Salmonella* data across beef slaughter  
1256 establishments is used as an indicator to separate establishments into LOI 1 or LOI 2.
- 1257 • For this example, being in the bottom 95<sup>th</sup> percentile for *Salmonella* positives on the most  
1258 recent *Salmonella* set would make an establishment eligible to be in LOI 1. (Therefore,  
1259 out of the 174 establishments, 165 would be eligible to be in LOI 1 based on *Salmonella*  
1260 data.) NOTE –A different *Salmonella* cut-point may be used for other food categories.

1261 *W3NR Rate*

- 1262 • The distribution of scores (percentiles) on the health-related regulatory noncompliance  
1263 rates (W3NRs) over the most recent month across 174 beef slaughter establishments is  
1264 used as an indicator to separate establishments in LOI 1, LOI 2, and LOI 3.
- 1265 • Using data from November 21, 2006 through December 21, 2006:
- 1266 – Being in the top 3<sup>rd</sup> percentile or above of the W3NR rates would place the  
1267 establishment in LOI 3. (Therefore, out of the 174 establishments, 5 establishments  
1268 would be in LOI 3 based on W3NR rates.)
- 1269 – Being in the lowest 85<sup>th</sup> percentile on W3NR rates would make the establishment  
1270 eligible to be in LOI 1. (Therefore, out of the 174 establishments, 150 would be  
1271 eligible to be in LOI 1 based on W3NR rate.)

1272 **Other Criteria**

- 1273 • Enforcement actions: Yes/No for LOI 3 versus LOI 2 versus LOI 1
- 1274 ○ For the time period considered, four establishments had an applicable  
1275 enforcement action.
- 1276 • Recalls: Yes/No for LOI 3 versus LOI 2 versus LOI 1
- 1277 ○ For the time period considered, no establishment had an applicable recall action.
- 1278 • Linked to an outbreak: Yes/No for LOI 3 versus LOI 2 versus LOI 1

- 1279 ○ For the time period considered, no establishment was linked to an outbreak.
- 1280 ● Natural disasters/structural damage: Yes/No for LOI 3
- 1281 ○ For the time period considered, no beef slaughter establishments had major
- 1282 structural damage.

### 1283 Resulting Levels of Inspection

- 1284 ● Applying the ranking algorithm and the cut-off points discussed above resulted in the
- 1285 following distribution of establishments:
  - 1286 – 13 establishments in LOI 3 (7 percent)
  - 1287 – 37 establishments in LOI 2 (21 percent)
  - 1288 – 124 establishments in LOI 1 (72 percent)

1289

## 1290 **EVALUATION AND REFINEMENT OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH RISK-**

## 1291 **BASED INSPECTION SYSTEM FOR PROCESSING AND SLAUGHTER**

1292 Prior to implementation of the proposed PHRBIS system, FSIS will continue to refine the

1293 proposed within and across establishment components of the system.

1294 To further refine the within establishment component of the proposed PHRBIS, a methods

1295 evaluation will be undertaken that will include a workshop and field evaluation. During the

1296 workshop, stakeholders (FSIS field employees, academics, industry, and consumer

1297 representatives) will evaluate the proposed prompts by playing out prompt scenarios for different

1298 product categories. The prompts will be refined based upon this workshop and then a field

1299 evaluation will be undertaken. During the field evaluation, FSIS supervisory IICs and PHVs will

1300 carry out prompt scenarios. The prompts, vulnerable points and questions will also be refined

1301 based upon the findings of the field evaluation. FSIS also plans to undertake a historical data

1302 analysis to determine the thresholds for the proposed prompts. FSIS will analyze the frequency

1303 of prompts within establishments that make different product types in order to identify

1304 anomalies. This analysis will be used as the basis for prompt thresholds.

1305 FSIS will further refine the proposed across establishment algorithm by continuing to analyze the

1306 results of the algorithm for different HACCP product categories. FSIS will utilize these findings

1307 to refine the criteria in the algorithm. FSIS will also evaluate the ranking of FSIS establishments

1308 by the proposed algorithm in relationship to significant public health events to improve the

1309 algorithm's ability to predict and prevent significant public health events such as recalls. In

1310 addition FSIS will continue to develop methods to refine its attribution estimates by working

1311 with CDC and FDA to incorporate sporadic illness and serotype information.

1312 Prior to implementation of the proposed PHRBIS system, FSIS will develop its evaluation plan.

1313 The plan will include the types of outcome analyses to be conducted. The results of those

1314 analyses will be used to refine the PHRBIS.

1315 Outcome analysis has a role in program evaluation work, and seeks to measure how well a

1316 program achieves its designed objectives. The stated goals of most (though not all) FSIS

1317 programs are expressed in terms of improvements in public health, such as reductions in

1318 foodborne illness. Given the difficulty of measuring changes in foodborne illness—especially  
1319 attributable to a given type of food, Agency program, or establishment(s)—intermediate  
1320 outcomes, such as changes in pathogen prevalence or changes in product recalls, are typically  
1321 articulated and measured in lieu of direct public health outcomes. FSIS will evaluate the  
1322 PHRBIS system in terms of the Healthy People 2010 goals using the performance measures  
1323 discussed in Appendix A.

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