

The Monument erected in this city, to the memory of that patriotic warrior, the late General MONTCOMERY, has received the following elegant and ornamental addition, designed by Major D'Orville, the gentleman to whom we are indebted for the interesting original tradition:— "Hynes, exhibiting his torch, burns a rife the tomb. From behind the pyramid rises a sun with thirteen rays, which enlightens the quarter of a terrestrial globe, emblematical of America. Above the globe is the American Eagle flying from East to West, carrying in his talons a fiery banner, in which the globe appears to have been wrapped. It shall give real satisfaction to every patriotic mind, to behold the attention of genius and taste thus generously employed, in celebrating American heroism and departed virtues.

A Liverpool paper of the 14th Sept. says, "It is not improbable, after all the discoveries of the most daring powers, that the States of Holland, West Frisia, and Utrecht, will oblige the King of Prussia to proceed to extremities, as he may think proper, in vindication of the Stadtholder's rights, and to restore the ancient Constitution of the Republic, now broken and divided by the many injurious encroachments of the above-mentioned States. We confess we have our doubts of the probability of the French assisting the States; and it is even doubted by the political intelligencers on the Prussian side, that the system of the Court of France is changed on this head, and that they are to try every method in the way of mediation, fish, and specie, if possible, instead of irritating the Prussian Ministry.

"It puzzles the brain of the wisest politician to decide what kind of satisfaction France can offer, or Prussia accept, other than that which is impossible, viz. a disavowal of the attempt to seize the Princes of Orange, and the punishment of those who did make that attempt. This the States can never submit to, without violating their duty to their Supporters;—and violating truth at the same time; for it is well known, and they cannot deny it, that the Princes had been the object of their aversion. It is more than four years since they openly accused him of intruding politically against the States; and, when the Prince demanded satisfaction for this insult, they refused to prosecute the Princes of such insult.

"In fact, it may be said of Holland as it was said of America, 'The debtors to be independent did not, in the latter case, take in rifle from the Tea Act. It had before that period risen to a very considerable height. They were the possessors only. And in Holland, for a series of years, Jacobins have been encouraged and fomented by the Aristocratic and Democratic parties against the Monarchical or Stadtholder's party. Real injuries never were complained of. But families, institutions, and alterations, were made without number, and an aversion to the Stadtholder's person, family, and Government, is at the bottom of every proceeding since the American war.—At that time the Dutch furnished the Americans with every necessary for carrying on the war against Britain, contrary to the faith of mankind. When, in consequence of many French remonstrances, we were impelled to do ourselves justice, the Dutch, from the hesitating and slow form of their Constitution, were disappointed, and throughout the whole war successful. They regarded the Stadtholder as being in better combination with England; they proved nothing, even still the long enquiry into the affairs of the Bank free. But although they proved nothing, they have gone on ever since [appealing] and we believe that if any party were now most favorable against the Stadtholder, were to be aided this plain question, 'What are the facts?' they would be at a loss to make an answer.—Hence it is, that no nation will adopt the cause of the Dutch, unless from interested views, for to the plea of any nation they have no claim. And all that the philosopher and the philanthropist can do is, to brood over the impending calamities of a civil war, and to regret that a country that might be happy and flourishing, is like to be deluged in blood."

On the 23th of August, in lat. 45. 46. N, long. 45. 9. W. Capt. Callahan (of the Blackbird, which arrived at Liverpool on the 15th Sept. from Genoa) being about a mile above a French East-Indiaman, which was bound for Orléans, perceived a man floating on the water towards him; and which he taking for an empty cask or tub, he fired at him, and shot him dead, and got his boat out as soon as possible, with which he was fortunate enough to get him on board his vessel. On questioning him, he learned that he was one of three men, who, for some misbehavior, had been sentenced, in the East-Indiaman, to be sent to Orléans, and there they are each by way of exercise; when, being the Blackbird to pass, and being relieved from the boat which he had been for a long

time confined, impelled by that natural love of life which is implanted in our nature, he took the resolution of getting out of one of the portholes, and diving into the water, chafing to run the rigging of descending, rather than proceed to his native country, where certain death awaited him; and this rigging was very great, as he failed to know little more of swimming, than just to keep himself above water; for tho' the boat, which was thrown overboard, came within five yards, he forced out to know how to get near to it.

In the Liverpool papers, the Eliza, Mercer, and the Betty and Abney, War, are advertised for New-York; The Hall, War, for Philadelphia; The Irish Volunteer, Cooke, for Baltimore; The Peace and Plenty, Williams, for Boston; The Henderson, Steel, and the Abby, Braithwaite, for James River; The Alice, Tullon; Clio, Dawlog; Jane, Watson; and Ardor, Sutherland; for Charleston. They were all in Calcutta in October.

Extract from *Esquisse de l'histoire de la République de Hollande*.

L O N D O N. Sept. 11. Mr. Grenville is returned to the Continent, with full powers for executing the negotiation now on the table between His Majesty and the Prince of Orange. An anonymous correspondent says, he has received a letter from Holland, dated August 28, which states, that by account from Rotterdam it appears, that the Prince of Orange had received a wound near Okindia near Utrecht, which the surgeons had declared mortal; and that great alarm was spread in consequence of this affair. One of the principal articles of the late Convention between France and England is, "That no ships of war, or vessels of force, on either side, shall sail for the East-Indies, without mutual consent." This article will, in all probability, be one of the best preservatives against war, as it has been the policy of France, for near half a century, to strengthen herself, previous to a rupture, in her extra European Colonies. She did so in the West-Indies in the war of 1744; in America in the war of 1756; and in the East-Indies in the late war, all before she declared in favor of America.

The following is the 11th article in the Definitive Treaty of Peace, to which the Convention announced in the Gazette alludes: "Art. XIII. If either of the high contracting parties has granted, or shall grant, any bounties for encouraging the exportation of any article, being of the growth, produce, or manufacture of his Colonies, the other party shall be allowed to add, to the duties imposed by virtue of the present treaty, on the said goods and merchandises imported into his Colonies, such an import duty as shall be equivalent to said bounty. But this Repetition is not to be extended to cases of re-shipment of wares and imports (called draw-backs) which are allowed upon exports."

The FEDERALIST, Nov. X.

To the People of the State of New-York. AMONG the numerous advantages proposed by a well-ordered Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and correct the violence of factions. The friend of popular government, never feels himself so much alarmed for their character and fate, as when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice. He will not fail therefore to set a due value on any plan which, without violating the principles to which he is attached, provides a proper cure for it. The instability, injustice and confusion introduced into the public councils, have in truth been the mortal diseases under which popular governments have every where perished; as they continue to be the favorite and fruitful topics from which the adversaries to liberty derive their most specious declamations. The valuable improvements made by the American Constitution on the popular principle, both ancient and modern, cannot certainly be too much admired; but it would be an unwarrantable partiality, to contend that they have in effectually obviated the danger on this side as was wished and expected. Complaints are every where heard from our most confidential and virtuous citizens, equally the friends of public and private faith, and of public and personal liberty; that our governments are too unstable; that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties; and that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice, and the rights of the minor party; but by the superior force of an unassisted and opprobrious majority. However anxiously we may wish that these complaints had no foundation, the evidence of known facts will not permit us to deny that they are in some degree true. It will be found indeed, on a candid review of our situation, that some of the defects under which we labor, have been erroneously charged on the

operation of our governments; but it will be found, at the same time, that other causes will not admit account for many of our heaviest misfortunes; and particularly, for that prevailing and increasing distrust of public engagements, and alarm for private rights, which are echoed from one end of the continent to the other. These must be chiefly, if not wholly, effects of the unbalanced and unjust, with which a famous spirit has tainted our public administrations.

By a faction I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.

There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects. There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the one by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests.

It could never be more truly said than of the sick remedy, that it is worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction, what air is to fire; almost instant which it necessarily expires. But it could not be a less fully to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.

The second expedient is as impracticable, as the first would be unlawful. As long as the exercise of man continues free, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the constitution forbids his reason and his feelings, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves. The diversity is the faculties of man from which the rights of property originate, is not less an inseparable concomitant to a uniformity of interests. The possession of these faculties is the first object of Government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property necessarily results; and from the influence of these on the passions and views of each respectively, arises a diversity of interest in the same parties.

The latent causes of faction are thus found in the nature of man; and we see them every where brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning Government, and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to particular other different views of interest have been interesting to the human passions, have in turn divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other, than to co-operate for their common good. So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions, and excite their most violent contests. But the most common and durable source of factions, has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold, and those who are without property, have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views. The regulation of these various and interfering interests is the principal task of modern legislation; and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of Government.

No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause; because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men, are unfit to be both judges and parties, at the same time; yet what are many of the most important acts of legislation, but for so many judicial determinations, not indeed concerning the rights of single persons, but concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens; and what are the different classes of legislators, but advocates and parties to the causes which they determine? It is a law proposed concerning private debts? It is a question to which the creditors are parties on one side, and the debtors on the other. Justice demands to hold the balance between them. Yet the parties are, and must be themselves the judges; and the most powerful faction must be expected to prevail. Shall domestic manufactures be

encouraged, and in what degree? By subsidies on foreign manufactures? Are commodities which would be differently taxed by the landed and the manufacturing classes? and probably by neither, with a sole regard to justice and the public good. The apportionment of taxes on the various descriptions of property, is an act which seems to require the most exact impartiality; yet there is perhaps no legislative act, to which greater opportunity and temptation are given to a passionate party, to trample on the rules of justice. Every shilling with which they overburden the inferior number, is a shilling saved to their own pockets.

It is in vain to say, that enlightened self-interest will be able to adjust these clashing interests, and render them all subservient to the public good. Enlightened self-interest will not always be at the helm; Nor, in many cases, can such an adjustment be made at all, without taking into view interests and remote considerations, which will rarely prevail over the immediate interest which one party may find in disregarding the rights of another, or the good of the whole.

The inference to which we are brought, is, that the causes of faction cannot be removed; and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its effects.

If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote: If it can clog the administration, it may confuse the society; but it will be unable to execute and make its violence under the forms of the Constitution. When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government on the other hand enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest, both the public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the public good, and private rights, against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object to which our inquiries are directed: Let us add that it is the great desideratum, by which alone this form of government can be rescued from the opprobrium under which it has long labored, and be recommended to the citizens and adoption of mankind.

By what means is this object attainable? Evidently by one of two only. Either the existence of the same passion or interest in a majority at the same time, must be prevented; or the majority, having such a common passion or interest, must be rendered by their number and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression. If the impulse and the opportunity be fulfilled in coincidence, we will allow that neither moral nor religious motives can be relied on as an adequate control. They are not found to be such on the injustice and violence of individuals, and less their efficacy in proportion to the number combined together; that is, in proportion as their efficacy becomes general.

From the view of the subject, it may be concluded, that a pure Democracy, by which I mean, a Society, consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the Government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert will take the form of Government itself; and there is nothing to check the impulses to face the weaker party, or an obstinate individual. Hence it is, that such Democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with perfect security, or the rights of property; and have in general been short in their lives, as they have been violent in their deaths. Theoric politicians, who have patronized this species of Government, have grossly supposed, that by dividing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their passions, their opinions, and their pursuits.

A Republic, by which I mean a Government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which it varies from pure Democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure, and the efficacy which it must derive from the Union.

The two great points of difference between a Democracy and a Republic are, first, the delegation of the Government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended.

The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country; and on the other hand, to filter of justice, will be less likely to sacrifice to temporary or partial considerations. Under