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(O+$0  2  0  )3  0` (#(#($0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#0 (# (#0h(#(#2  0  )3  0h(#h(#1i)(;$2  0  )3  0  (cc$0  0` (#(#2  0  )3  0 ` (#` (#(w$0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#2  0  )3  0 (# (#(G$0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#0 (# (#2  0  )3  0h(#(#(3$ !  (u$0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#0 (# (#0h(#(#0h(#h(#2  0  )3  0(#(#( $0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#0 (# (#0h(#(#0h(#h(#0(#(#2  0  )3  0p(#(#($0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#0 (# (#0h(#(#0h(#h(#0(#(#0p(#(#2  0  )3  0p(#p(#@=ABC>EFxIGaeimquy}Bullet ListBullets List\  `$Times NewRoman <'  _ XX  A!) xdtExA   P)  _A!) xdExA   XX   `    2002ReportonForeignPolicyExportControls6Times New Roman Regular(9 Z(Times New Roman !!!!)!dxdx($($     _  1  .0  Section6(b)(2)requirestheDepartmenttoconsiderthecriteriasetforthinSection   6(b)(1)whenextendingcontrolsineffectpriortoJuly12,1985.Inaddition,thereport p mustincludetheelementssetforthinSections6(f)(2)(A)(purposeofthecontrols); `  6(f)(2)(C)(consultationwithindustryandothercountries);6(f)(2)(D)(alternativemeans P  attempted);and6(f)(2)(E)(foreignavailability).<:Definition T _2.0  Section6(b)(1)requirestheDepartmenttomakedeterminationsregardingthecriteria G  setforththereinwhenimposing,extending,orexpandingcontrols.Thereportmustalso 7  containtheadditionalinformationrequiredinSection6(f)(2)(A),(C)(E)(assetforthin ' endnote1,supra.) _  3  .0  Limitationsexistwhenassessingtheeconomicimpactofcertaincontrolsbecauseofthe  unavailabilityofdataorbecauseoftheprevalenceofotherfactors,e.g.,currencyvalues, p foreigneconomicactivity,orforeignpoliticalregimes,whichmayrestrictimportsofU.S. ` productsmorestringentlythantheUnitedStatesrestrictsexports. _  4  .0  WhentheUnitedStatesimplementscontrolswithouttheimpositionofcorresponding W restrictionsbyothercountries,itisdifficulttoguardagainst_reexports_Ԁfromthird G countriestothetargetcountry,tosecurethirdcountrycooperationinenforcement 7 efforts,andtodetectviolationsabroadandinitiateproperenforcementaction.The ' relativeeaseordifficultyofidentifyingthemovementofcontrolledgoodsortechnical   dataisalsoafactor.Controlsonitemsthataresmall,inexpensive,easytotransportor ! conceal,orthathavemanyproducersandendusers,arehardertoenforce. #!(#(#  #@  @     MXX~8dd8CHAPTER2#XjXM#  H     MXXjCrimeControl/HumanRights  P Ѐ(Part742.7)#XjXMg#   C   h [ExportControlProgramDescriptionandLicensingPolicy  p ЀTheUnitedStatescontrolsexportsofcrimecontrolitems,asrequiredbySection6(n)oftheAct, P  toreflectitsconcernsaboutthehumanrightssituationinvariouspartsoftheworld. @  TheUnitedStatesrequiresalicensetoexportmostcrimecontrolanddetectioninstruments, o  equipment,relatedtechnology,andsoftwaretoanydestination,exceptAustralia,Japan,New _ Zealand,andmembersoftheNorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization(NATO).InSeptember2000, O BXApublishedaninterimruleintheFederalRegisterthatchangedthelicenserequirementsfor ? somecrimecontrolitemsincludingrestrainttypedevices(suchashandcuffsandshackles)and / dischargetypearms(suchasstungunsandshockbatons)toincludealldestinationsexcept  Canada.ThisrulealsocreateduniqueExportCommodityControlNumber(_ECCN_)  classificationsforsaps,policehelmetsandshields,fingerprintinksanddyes,andtechnologyfor  restrainttypeitems.TherulealsomodifiedU.S.licensingpolicytoincludetheconsiderationof  civildisorderinagivencountryorregioninlicensingdecisions.    LicensingPolicy p CrimeControl/ImplementsofTorture P  Ingeneral,nocrimecontrolitemsmaybeexportedtoacountryinwhichthegovernment  @ engagesinaconsistentpatternofgrossviolationsofinternationallyrecognizedhumanrights. !0 Forothercountries,theU.S.Governmentwillconsiderapplicationsforcrimecontrolitems o"  favorably,onacasebycasebasis,unlessthereiscivildisorderinthecountryorregion _# concerned,orthereisevidencethatthegovernmentmayhaveviolatedhumanrightsandthatthe O$ judicioususeofexportcontrolswouldbehelpfulinminimizingregionalinstability,deterringthe ?%  developmentofaconsistentpatternofsuchviolations,orindemonstratingtheU.S.oppositionto /&! suchviolations. ' " TheUnitedStatesrequiresalicensetoexportspeciallydesignedimplementsoftortureand ("$ thumbscrews,whicharesubsetsofthecrimecontrolcategory,toanydestination,withapolicy )#% ofdenialforallapplications. *$&  +%'  China  O FollowingthemilitaryassaultondemonstratorsbythePeople'sRepublicofChina(PRC)in ? TiananmenSquareinBeijinginJune1989,theUnitedStatesimposedconstraintsontheexport / tothePRCofcertainitemsontheCommerceControlList(CCL).Section902(a)(4)oftheFor   eignRelationsAuthorizationActforFY19901991,PublicLaw101246,suspendstheissuance   oflicensesunderSection6(n)oftheActfortheexportofanycrimecontrolordetectioninstru   mentsorequipmenttothePRC.ThePresidentmayterminatethesuspensionbyreportingto   CongressthatChinahasmadeprogressonpoliticalreformorthatitisinthenationalinterestof   theUnitedStatestoterminatethesuspension.    Indonesia `   TheUnitedStates,subjecttonarrowexceptions,deniesapplicationstoexportU.S.Munitions P  ListcommoditiesandcertaincrimecontrolitemstoIndonesia,consistentwithSection582ofthe @  ForeignOperations,ExportFinancingandRelatedPrograms1995Appropriationsand1994 0  SupplementalAppropriationsAct(PublicLaw103306). o   Rwanda  O InconformitywithU.N.Resolution918andtheUnitedNationsParticipationAct,theUnited ? Statesmaintainsanembargoonthesaleorsupplyofarmsandrelatedmaterieltonon / governmententitiesinRwanda.Therefore,applicationstoexportitemscontrolledforcrime  controlanddetectionreasonsontheCCLtosuchentitiesaresubjecttoageneralpolicyof  denial.   S2 S6XK XXXj FederalRepublicofYugoslavia( S#XjX X6XKd#FRYSerbiaandMontenegro)  2 TheU.N.SecurityCouncilhasrecentlyterminatedthearmsembargoontheFRY(Serbiaand " Montenegro).TheDepartmentofCommercewillshortlytakeactiontoremovetheadditional  controls,includingthedenialpolicyonarmsrelateditems,thathaveappliedtotheFRY  since1998.   Liberia g  ! BXAwillsoonpublisharulethatamendstheEARtoprohibitthesale,supply,orexportfrom "s theUnitedStatesorthesale,export,or_reexport_ԀbyU.S.personsofarmsrelateditems,including #c technicalassistanceandtraining,toLiberia.ThisBXAregulatoryactionisconsistentwithU.N. $S  Resolution1343ofMarch7,2001,andisbeingtakenincoordinationwithDepartmentofState %C! controlsondefensearticlesandservicestoLiberiaundertheInternationalTrafficinArms &3 " Regulation(_ITAR_). r'#!#  OrganizationofAmericanStatesMemberCountries  R)#% OnApril13,1999,BXApublishedaninterimruleimplementingtheprovisionsofthe B*#& OrganizationofAmericanStates(OAS)ModelRegulationsfortheControloftheInternational 2+$' MovementofFirearms.BXAdesignedtheseregulationstoharmonizeimportandexport ",%( controlsoverthelegalinternationalmovementoffirearmsamongOASmembercountriesandto O establishprocedurestopreventtheillegaltraffickingoffirearmsamongthesecountries. ? Undertheseprovisions,theUnitedStatesimposednewforeignpolicycontrolsonexportsof   certainfirearms,includingshotgunsandparts,buckshot,shotgunshellsandparts,andoptical   sightingdevicesforfirearmstoallOASmembercountries.TheUnitedStatespreviously   requiredalicensefortheexportoftheseitemstoallOASmembercountrieswiththeexception   ofCanada.TheUnitedStatesnowrequiresalicensetoexporttheseitemstoallOASmember   countries,includingCanada.InsupportoftheOASModelRegulations,theUnitedStates   imposedanImportCertificate(IC)requirementontheexporttoallOASmembercountriesof p  thoseitemsaffectedbytheregulations.Ingeneral,theDepartmentofCommerceapproves `  licenseapplicationsfortheexportoffirearmstoOASmembercountriesiftheapplicationis P  supportedbyanIC.BXAdeniesapplicationsthatinvolveenduseslinkedtodrugtrafficking, @  terrorism,internationalorganizedcrime,mercenary,andothercriminalactivities.   0   OtherLicensingConsiderations  _ TheDepartmentofStateannuallycompilestheCountryReportsonHumanRightsPractices. O TheDepartmentofStatepreparesthisreportinaccordancewithSections116(d)and502B(b)of ? theForeignAssistanceActof1961,asamended,forsubmissiontoCongress.Thefactual / informationpresentedinthisreportisasignificantelementinlicensingrecommendationsmade  bytheDepartmentofState.InaccordancewiththeForeignAssistanceAct,thereisadenial  policyforlicenseapplicationstoexportcrimecontrolitemstoanycountrywhosegovernment  engagesinaconsistentpatternofgrossviolationsofhumanrights.  TheInternationalReligiousFreedomActof1998(_IRFA_)callsforthePresidenttotake  diplomaticorotherappropriateactionwithrespecttoanycountrythatengagesinortolerates p violationsofreligiousfreedom.TheActalsoprovidesfortheimpositionofeconomicmeasures ` orcommensurateactionswhenacountryhasengagedinsystematic,ongoing,egregious P violationsofreligiousfreedomaccompaniedbyflagrantdenialsoftherightstolife,liberty,or  @ thesecurityofpersons,suchastorture,enforcedandarbitrarydisappearances,orarbitrary !0 prolongeddetention.Forsuchcountries,_IRFA_ԀprovidesthattheDepartmentofCommerce,with o"  DepartmentofStateconcurrence,shallincludeontheCCLforreasonsofcrimecontrolor _# detection,andrequireexportlicensesfor,itemsthatarebeingusedorareintendedforuse O$  directlyandinsignificantmeasuretocarryoutparticularlysevereviolationsofreligious ?%! freedom. OnNovember3,1999,theDepartmentofStatepublishedanoticeintheFederal /&" RegisterpursuanttoSection408(a)ofthe_IRFA_,statingthattheSecretaryofStatehad ' # designatedBurma,China,Iran,Iraq,andSudanas countriesofparticularconcernforengaging (!$ in,ortolerating,particularlysevereviolationsofreligiousfreedom.TheDepartmentof ("% CommercehasnotaddedadditionalitemstotheCCLpursuantto_IRFA_,butitreviewslicense )#&  applicationsforcrimecontrolitemstothesedestinationsinaccordancewiththe_IRFA_Ԁsanctions.  *$'    &       AnalysisofControlasRequiredbySection6(f)oftheAct  ? . A.ThePurposeoftheControl    ThesecontrolsseektoensurethatU.S.-origincrimecontrolequipmentisnotexportedto   countrieswhosegovernmentsfailtorespectinternationallyrecognizedhumanrights,orwhere   civil'O.Ԁdisorderisprevalent.Denialofexportlicenseapplicationstosuchcountrieshelpsto   preventthefurtheranceofhumanrightsviolationsandclearlysignalsU.S.concernsabouthuman   rightsinthesecountries.TheregulatorychangeofSeptember2000allowsforclosermonitoring p  ofexportsofcertainitemscontrolledforcrimecontrolpurposesthatcouldbemisusedtocommit `  humanrightsviolations. P  Controlsonimplementsoftorturesimilarlyhelptoensurethatitemsofthisnaturearenot 0  exportedfromtheUnitedStates.BXAhasneitherreceivedapplicationsforexportof specially o  designedimplementsoftorturenorwouldithaveapprovedtheexportofsuchitems. _ 0   (#(#  B.Considerationsand/orDeterminationsoftheSecretaryofCommerce  ?  1.  ProbabilityofAchievingtheIntendedForeignPolicyPurpose. Thelackof  complementarycontrolsbyotherproducernationslimitstheeffectivenessofthesecontrolsin  preventinghumanrightsviolations.Nevertheless,theydorestricthumanrightsviolatorsaccess  toU.S.-origingoodsandprovideimportantsymbolicevidenceofU.S.supportfortheprinciples  ofhumanrights.Theimpositionofmorestringentlicensingrequirementsforcrimecontrol  itemswillenabletheUnitedStatestomonitormorecloselyitemsthatcouldbeusedinhuman  rightsviolations. p  2.  CompatibilitywithForeignPolicyObjectives. Thiscontrolprogramisfullyconsistent P withU.S.policyinsupportofinternationallyrecognizedhumanrights,asexpressedby  @ successiveAdministrationsandbytheCongress.TheexpansionofcontrolsinSeptember2000 !0 isintendedtofurtherdeterthedevelopmentofaconsistentpatternofhumanrightsabusesand o"  distancetheUnitedStatesfromsuchviolations. _#  3.  ReactionofOtherCountries. Thesecontrolsareunique,serveadistinctforeignpolicy ?%! purpose,andariseoutofdeeplyheldconvictions.Othercountriesdonothaveequivalent /&" regulations,butmanyhaverestrictionsonexportsoflethalproductstoareasofcivilunrest. ' #  4.  EconomicImpactonUnitedStatesIndustry. InFY2001,BXAapproved1,962export ("% licenseapplicationsworthapproximately$146millionforcrimecontrolitemstoalldestinations. )#& Table1liststhetotalnumberandvalue(by_ECCN_)ofexportlicensesthattheUnitedStates *$' issuedforcrimecontrolitemsduringFY2001. +%( Ї   & 4 Table1:CRIMECONTROLAPPLICATIONSAPPROVED(FY2001)  O <*{d dd Xdd Xdd X(#(#,'dd ,A dd ,rdd ,dd +  * // * _ECCN_ 7 &!D"  7 ItemsControlled 7 &!D"  7 Applications D Approved 7 &! 4"  7   $Value '4O< >4&D2    >? 0A978 0&! " 0Saps D:   # D0 LB4  " #  LЀ$0 9/!  3 9 0A979 0&! < " 0Policehelmetsandshields PF <   Q@70Q@P70 XN@ <"  Q@70 Q@ X$2,207,003 9/! <3 9 򀀀0A982 0&!" 0_Thumbcuffs_,legirons,  shackles,handcuffs QG f@181f@Q181 YOA" f@181 f@ Y$7,072,342 9/!3 9 0A983 0&!4 " 0Speciallydesigned 4  implementsoftorture D:s$  # D0 4   LB4s$ " #  L$0 4  Ѐ 9/!s$ 3 9 0A984 0&! " 0Shotgunsandbuckshot   shotgun   shells QG @692@Q692    YOA !" @692 @ Y$33,008,074 9/! "3 9 0A985 0&![ #" 0Dischargetypearms(stun [ $ guns,shockbatons,etc.) QGK% i@206i@Q206 [ &  YOAK'" i@206 i@ Y$23,826,293 [ (  9/!K)3 9 0A987 0&!*" 0Opticalsightingdevices QG+ z@425z@Q425 YOA," z@425 z@ Y$29,001,097 MC!-3 # M 0E982 C94S." #  CTechnologyforitemsunder S/ 0A982/0A985 D:C0 # D0 LB4S1" #  L$0 MC!S23 # M 0E984 C94x3" #  CTechnologyforitemsunder x4 0A984 D:h5 # D0 LB4x6" #  L$0 9/!x73 9 1A984 0&!;8" 0Chemicalagentsincluding ;9 teargascontaining1%orless + : ofCSorCN PF!;  ,@14,@P14 ;<  XN@!>"  ,@14 ,@ X$301,296 ;?  9/!!A3 9  1A985 0&!"PB" 0Fingerprintingpowders,dyes "PC andinks QG#@D @a@138@a@Q138 "PE  YOA#@F" @a@138 @a@ Y$5,808,465 "PG Ѐ 9/!#@H3 9 3A980 0&!%I" 0Voiceprintidentificationand %J analysisequipment OE&K  ?1?O1 %L  WM?&M"  ?1 ? W$250,000 %N  9/!&O3 9 3A981 0&!'8!P" 0Polygraphs,fingerprint '8!Q analyzers,camerasand w(("R equipment QGg)#S `c@155`c@Q155 '8!T  YOAg)#V" `c@155 `c@ Y$32,925,525 '8!W  9/!g)#Y3 9 3D980 0&!*$Z" 0Softwareforitemsunder *$[ 3A980and3A981 PF+%\  ;@27;@P27 XN@*$]"  ;@27 ;@ X$1,261,908 9/!*$^3 9 3E980 0&!' d" 0     Technologyforitemsunder ' d 3A980and3A981 OE T  @2@O2 ' d  WM? T"  @2 @ W$701,400 ' d  9/! T3 9 4A003* 0&! " 0Digitalcomputersfor    computerizedfingerprint    equipmentonly D:{   # D0     LB4{ " #  L$0    9/!{ 3 9 4A980 0&!<" 0Computersforfingerprint < equipment PF,  .@15.@P15 <  XN@,"  .@15 .@ X$7,127,012 <  9/!,3 9 4D001* 0&!s" 0Softwareforitemsunder s 4A003only D:c  # D0 s  LB4c " #  L$0 s  9/!c 3 9 4D980 0&!$ " 0Softwareforitemsunder $ ! 4A980 PF "  @@33@@P33 $ #  XN@ $"  @@33 @@ X$2,413,430 $ %  9/! &3 9 4E001* 0&![ '" 0Technologyforitemsunder [ ( 4A003and4D001only D:K) # D0 [ *  LB4K+" #  L$0 [ ,  9/!K-3 9 4E980 0&! ." 0Technologyforitemsunder  / 4A980 OE0  @3@O3  1  WM?2"  @3 @ W$3  3  9/!43 9 6A002c* 0&!C5" 0Policemodelinfraredviewers C6 only D:3p7 # D0 C8  LB43p9" #  L$0 C:  9/!3p;3 9 6E001* 0&!<" 0Technologyfordevelopment = ofitemsunder6A002conly D:> # D0 ?  LB4@" #  L$0 A  9/!B3 9 6E002* 0&!+ hC" 0Technologyforproductionof + hD itemsunder6A002conly D:!XE # D0 + hF  LB4!XG" #  L$0 + hH  9/!!XI3 9 9A980 0&!"J" 0Mobilecrimescience "K laboratories D:#L # D0 "M  LB4#N" #  L$0 "O  @ /!#P3 @ TOTAL 7 &!%PQ"  7 Y H%PR  @1962@Y1,962 a PB%PS" @1962 @  a$145,903,8481'%%PT3    1  XXjNOTES: (1)Togivethereaderthebroadestperspectiveoftheitemscovered,#XjX f# XXjԀTable1listsallcrimecontrol #'`U _ECCNs_Ԁincludingthoseforwhichnolicenseapplicationsweresubmitted.(2)Those_ECCNs_Ԁmarkedwithan '(V asterisk(*)covermorethanjustcrimecontrolitems,butthecorrespondingstatisticsrepresentonlythecrime (W controlitemswithinthe_ECCN_.#XjX +g#  XXj {) X #XjX )i#InFY2001,BXAdenied42applicationsforcrimecontrolitemsworth$2.6million.Thelargest  +H"Z numberofdenialsinvolvedopticalsightingdevicesforfirearms(14cases),withapplicationsfor +8#[ dischargetypearmsbeingthesecondmostoftendenied(9cases).Table2listsonlythosecrime O control_ECCNs_Ԁforwhichapplicationsweredenied. ?    Table2:CRIMECONTROLAPPLICATIONSDENIED(FY2001)    Kk*{d d'dd 'A dd A rdd rdd (#(#,'dd , dd ,dd ,dd +  *    * _ECCN_ 7 &!S "  7 Description 7 &!S "  7 Applications S   Denied 7 &!C  "  7   $Value >4&S  2    > n 0A982 0&!x " 0_Thumbcuffs_,legirons, x  shackles OEh   @4@O4 x  WM?h "  @4 @ W$267,137 x  9/!h 3 9 0A984 0&!; " 0Shotgunsandshotgunshells OE;   @7@O7 WM?; "  @7 @ W$886,945 9/!; 3 9 0A985 0&!p " 0Dischargetypearms(e.g.,stun p  guns,shockbatons) OE`   "@9"@O9 p   WM?` "  "@9 "@ W$1,126,300 p  Ѐ 9/!` 3 9 0A987 0&!3" 0Opticalsightingdevicesfor 3 firearms PF#   ,@14,@P14 3! Ѐ XN@#""  ,@14 ,@ X$291,190 3#  9/!#$3 9 1A985 0&!X%" 0Fingerprintingpowders,dyes, X& andinks OEH'  @4@O4 WM?X("  @4 @ W$13,010 9/!X)3 9 3A981 0&!*" 0Fingerprintanalyzers, + polygraphs OE ,  @3@O3 WM?-"  @3 @ W$56,992 .  9/! /3 9 4D980 0&!@0" 0Softwareforcomputers @1 controlledunder4A980 OE02  ?1?O1 @3  WM?04"  ?1 ? W$5 @5 Ѐ @ /!063 @ TOTAL 7 &!7"  7 W F8   E@42E@W42 _ N@9"  E@42 E@  _$2,641,5791'%:3    1InFY2001,BXAapproved959exportlicenseapplicationsworth$58,496,082foritemsaffected !; bytheforeignpolicycontrolsonfirearmsandammunitioninstitutedin1999,insupportofthe "< OASModelRegulations.Thiscomparesto1,210approvalsvaluedat$69,669,241inFY2000, "= whichinturnwasadeclinefromFY1999levels.Thesetotalsarecomparabletothosefrom #> FY1998,whenBXAapproved986applications,valuedat$54,429,813,fortheseitems.Canada $? accountsformoreapplicationsthananyothercountry,withover400applicationsinFY2001. %t@ TheOAScontrolsarelimitedtothefollowingthree_ECCNs_Ԁcoveringarmsandaccessories: &d A 0A984,0A986,and0A987.Thetablebelowliststhenumberandvalueofexportlicensesthat 'T!B BXAissuedforfirearms,ammunition,sights,andrelateditemsaffectedbytheseforeignpolicy (D"C controlsinFY2001. )4#D  c+%F @ TABLE3:APPLICATIONSFORFIREARMS,AMMUNITION, O @= = ANDSIGHTSTOOASCOUNTRIESAPPROVEDINFY2001  ? *{d  d'dd ' dd dd dd (#(#,dd ,dd ,dd ,dd +  3 "   3_ECCN_ @ /! 4"  @ItemsControlled @ /! 4"  @Applications  4 Approved @ /!s $"  @  $Value  4 {  >4&s $ 2    >Ӏ0A984 0&!    0Shotgunsand    buckshotshotgun    shells H>    @548 @H  548 PFA    @548  @ Pׂ  $29,352,197   F  9/! 0 9  0A986 0&![   0׃Othershotgunshells H>[  @l@226@l@H  226 PFA[   @l@226 @l@ P  $19,403,003 [    9/!K 0 9/  0A987 0&!   0Opticalsighting   devicesforfirearms H>p   g@185 g@H  185    PFAp    g@185  g@ PV  Ӏ$9,740,882    @ /!p 0 @@  TOTAL 7 &!C   7 O >C   @959@O@%%1959 N =8C  @959 @  NЀ?"$58,496,082 0&C   0 0&!x! 0 'x" ' 'x# '(x$   (چIXK XXXj 5.  EnforcementofControl. Crimecontrolitemsandimplementsoftortureareeasily % recognizableanddonotpresentspecialenforcementproblemsrelatedtodetectingviolationsor x& verifyinguse.However,enforcementcooperationwithothercountriesgenerallyisdifficultin h' casesinvolvingunilaterallycontrolleditems,suchasthese,andoftendependsonthetypeand X( quantityofgoodsinquestion.Inaddition,enforcementofcontrolson_reexports_Ԁischallenging H) andrestsinlargepartonthewillingnessoftherecipienttoabidebythetermsoftheexport 8* license.#XjX XIXK^#IXK XXXjԀ#XjX XIXK#TheU.S.Governmentconductspostshipmentverificationstoverifythatthelistedend w(+ userhasreceivedtheexportsandtoconfirmthattheimporterisusingthecontrolleditems g, consistentwiththelicenseconditions. W-  C.ConsultationwithIndustry  7!/ OnNovember7,2001,theDepartmentofCommerce,viatheFederalRegisterandBXAsWeb #1 page,solicitedcommentsfromindustryontheeffectivenessofforeignpolicybasedexport $2 controls.AmoredetailedreviewofthecommentsisavailableinAppendixI. $3 TheInternationalBiometricIndustryAssociation(_IBIA_)advocatedtheremovalofbiometric & 5 products(includingfingerprintandvoiceidentificationapplications)fromtheCCLand 'x!6 recommendedthatBXAapplysuchrestrictionsonlywhentheseproductsareexportedto (h"7 terroristsupportingcountries.The_IBIA_Ԁcitedtheimportanceofbiometricproductsinensuring )X#8 theprotectionofelectroniccommerceandstatedthatthecurrentexportcontrolsplacetheUnited *H$9 Statesatadisadvantagetoforeigncompetitors. +8%: ЇTheDepartmentofCommercehasconsultedwithexportersofcrimecontrolitemsandwith O humanrightsgroupsconcernedaboutthemisuseofsuchitemsinvariouspartsoftheworld. ? TheU.S.Governmentmadecertainchangesinthelicensingpolicyandcoveredcommoditiesin / responsetotheconcernsofhumanrightsgroups.    D.ConsultationwithOtherCountries    Mostothersuppliercountrieshavenotplacedsimilarexportcontrolsoncrimecontroland   detectionequipment.TheUnitedKingdomandCanadamaintaincontrolsoncertaincrime   controlcommoditiesthataresimilartoU.S.controls. p   E.AlternativeMeans  P  Section6(n)oftheActrequiresexportcontrolsoncrimecontrolanddetectionequipment. 0  Alternativemeansdonotsatisfythisstatutoryrequirement.TheUnitedStatesdoes,however, o  usediplomaticdemarches,sanctions,andothermeanstoconveyitsconcernsaboutthehuman _ rightssituationinvariouscountries. O  F.ForeignAvailability  / TheforeignavailabilityprovisiondoesnotapplytoSection6(n)oftheAct.   C ׀Congresshas  recognizedtheusefulnessofthesecontrolsinsupportingUnitedStatespolicyonhumanrights  issues,foreignavailabilitynotwithstanding.      \  P @ MXXj   @ 8-dd8nCHAPTER3  H RegionalStability  x (Section742.6)#XjXM#   ݘExportControlProgramDescriptionandLicensingPolicy   ThePresidentdirectedthetransferofcertainmilitaryrelatedgoodsandtechnologytothe x  CommerceControlList(CCL)fromtheDepartmentofState'sUnitedStatesMunitionsList h  (_USML_)in1993.TheUnitedStatescontrolsmanyoftheseitemsforregionalstability(RS) X  purposes.Thiscontroltraditionallycoversitemsspeciallydesignedormodifiedformilitary H  purposesandcertaindualusecommoditiesthatcanbeusedtomanufacturemilitaryequipment. 8  ThisreportnotifiesCongressthatBXAintendstopublishanamendmenttotheExport g AdministrationRegulations(EAR)thatexpandsthescopeofexplosivedetectionequipment W controlledunderExportCommodityControlNumber(_ECCN_)2A993andcreatesnewlicense G requirementsfortheexportand_reexport_Ԁofrelatedsoftwareandtechnology.Itemscontrolled 7 under_ECCNs_Ԁ2D993and2E993willdelineatethesecontrols.Inthepast,theUnitedStates ' Governmentrequiredalicensefortheexportand_reexport_Ԁofthisequipmentonlytodesignated  terroristsupportingstates.Withthisamendment,BXAwillimposebroaderlicensing  requirementsonalldestinations,includingCanada,forregionalstabilityreasons.The  amendmentisdesignedtoenhancethesecurityandsafetyofairlinetravelandphysicalstructures  includinggovernmentbuildings.   LicensingPolicy   h TheUnitedStatesrequiresalicenseforforeignpolicypurposestoexportmilitaryitems(e.g. "H certainvehiclesandtraineraircraft)andcertaincommoditiesusedtomanufacturemilitary #8 equipmenttoalldestinationsexceptmembernationsoftheNorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization w$( (NATO),Australia,Japan,andNewZealand.TheUnitedStateswillgenerallyconsider g%  applicationsforsuchlicensesfavorably,onacasebycasebasis,unlesstheexportwould W& ! significantlydamageregionalstability. G' " Otheritemsformerlyonthe_USML_ԀthathavebeentransferredtotheCCLincludecertainimage ')"$ intensifiertubes,infraredfocalplanearrays,certainnavigationsystemssoftwareandtechnology *#% forinertialnavigationsystems,gyroscopes,andaccelerometers.TheUnitedStatesrequiresa +$& licensetoalldestinationsexceptCanadafortheseitems.Alllicenseapplicationsfortheseitems +%' _arereviewedonacasebycasebasistodeterminewhethertheexportcouldcontribute,directly O orindirectly,toacountry'smilitarycapabilitiesinamannerthatwoulddestabilizeoraltera ? region'smilitarybalancecontrarytoU.S.foreignpolicyinterests. / TheUnitedStateswillrequirealicensefortheexportandreexportofexplosivedetection   equipmentandrelatedsoftwareandtechnologiestoalldestinations.Licenseapplicationsforthe   exportorreexportofsuchitemstomostdestinationswillbereviewedonacasebycasebasis.     &  AnalysisofControlasRequiredbySection6(f)oftheAct     A.ThePurposeoftheControl  `  ThiscontrolprovidesamechanismfortheUnitedStatestomonitortheexportoftheseitemsin @  ordertorestrictth' eiruseininstancesthatwouldadverselyaffectregionalstabilityorthemilitary 0  balancewithinaregionandtoprotectthenationalsecurityoftheUnitedStates.Thepurposeof o  theextensionofcontrolsonexplosivedetectionequipmentistoenhancethesecurityandsafety _ ofairlinetravelworldwideandphysicalstructuresincludinggovernmentbuildings. O  B.Considerationsand/orDeterminationsoftheSecretaryofCommerce  /  1.  ProbabilityofAchievingtheIntendedForeignPolicyPurpose. Theseregionalstability  controls,includingnewcontrolsonexplosivedetectionequipment,contributetoU.S.national  securityandforeignpolicyobjectivesbyenablingtheUnitedStatestorestricttheuseor  availabilityofcertainU.S.originsensitivegoodsandtechnologiesthatwouldadverselyaffect  regionalstabilityorthemilitarybalanceincertainareas.   2.  CompatibilitywithForeignPolicyObjectives. Theseregionalstabilitycontrols, ` includingnewcontrolsonexplosivedetectionequipment,areconsistentwithU.S.foreignpolicy P goalstopromotepeaceandstabilityandpreventU.S.exportsthatmightcontributetoweapons  @ production,militarycapabilities, orterroristacts.  !0  3.  ReactionofOtherCountries. Anumberofothercountrieslimitexportsofitemsand _# technologieswithmilitaryapplicationstoareasofconcern,recognizingthatsuchequipment O$  couldadverselyaffectregionalstabilityandmilitarybalances.Forexample,theUnitedStates ?%! andothermembercountriesoftheWassenaarArrangementeachhasitsownnationalcontrolson /&" theexportofcertainnightvisiondevices.AllmembersoftheMissileTechnologyControl ' # Regime(MTCR)maintaincontrolsonsoftwareandtechnologyrelatedtomissileguidanceand (!$ controldevices.OthercountriesmayobjecttonewunilateralRScontrols;however,theUnited ("% StatesalliesandpartnerssupportU.S.effortsagainstterrorismandappreciatetheneedtokeep )#& certainequipmentandtechnologiesoutofterroristhands. *$' _ +%( Ђ 4.  EconomicImpactonUnitedStatesIndustry. Itemscontrolledforregionalstability O generallyrequireavalidatedlicenseforexporttoalldestinationsexceptNATOcountries, ? Australia,Japan,andNewZealand.Certainregionalstabilityitems,includingthosecontrolled / formissiletechnologyreasons,however,requireavalidatedlicensetoalldestinationsexcept   Canada.Explosivedetectionequipmentandrelatedsoftwareandtechnologywillrequirea   licensetoalldestinations,includingCanada.   InFY2001,BXAapproved1,406licenseapplicationsforregionalstabilityitemswithatotal   valueof$217.4million.Thirteenapplicationsfortheseitemsweredenied,withatotalvalueof   $1,277,905.Inaddition,BXAreturnedwithoutaction(_RWAd_)109applicationsforregional p  stabilityitems,havingatotalvalueof$6,230,409.Mostofthereturnedlicenseapplications `  were_RWAd_Ԁbecauseofcommodityjurisdictionissuesandinsufficientenduserorenduse P  information.Eightynineofthe109returnedcaseswerefortheexportofimagingcamerasin @  _ECCN_Ԁ6A003. 0  BXAexpectsthattheamendmenttotheEARcreatingstrictercontrolsontheexportand_reexport_ _ ofexplosivedetectionequipmentandrelatedsoftwareandtechnologywillsubstantiallyincrease O thenumberoflicenseapplicationsfortheseitems.BXAanticipatesthattheexpansionofthese ? controlstoincludeagreaterrangeofdetectionproductstoalldestinationswillhaveanimpacton / industry.Althoughthepotentialeconomicimpactisunclear,securityrisksnecessitatethe  control.BXAwillworkwithindustrytominimizeanyadverseeconomiceffectthatmayresult  fromthisnewcontrol.  Thetablebelowliststhetotalnumberandvalueby_ECCN_ԀofexportlicensesthatBXAissuedfor  regionalstabilityitemsduringFY2001.  @  RegionalStabilityApplicationsApproved@@!(FiscalYear2001)  ` *d ddd dd dd dd (#(#,dd ,dd ,dd ,'dd +  *  @ @ *_ECCN_ 7 &! "  7Description 7 &! "  7Numberof   Applications 7 &!! "  7DollarValue >4& !"    >9A018 9/!g#" 9Militarytraineraircraftandvehicles g## designedormodifiedformilitaryuse QG!W$$  o@249 o@Q249 PFAg#%"  o@249  o@ P$139,341,827 9/!g#&" 9C^n C 6A002 9/!%' 9Opticaldetectorsanddirectviewimaging %( equipmentincorporatingimageintensifier &| ) tubesorfocalplanearrays PF!'l!*  G@47G@P47 OE@%+"  G@47 G@ O$9,591,364 9/!%," 96A003 9/!?)"- 9Imagingcamerasincorporatingimage ?)". intensifiersorfocalplanearrays RH!/*#/ 4@11014@R1101 QGB?)"0" 4@1101 4@ Q$68,295,020 9/!?)"1" 9_6E001* 9/!' d 9Technologyforthedevelopmentof ' d      equipment,materials,orsoftwarecontrolled  T by6A,6B,6C,or6D OE! D  @5@O5 ND?' d"  @5 @ N$7 9/!' d" 96E002* 9/!  9Technologyfortheproductionof   equipmentormaterialscontrolledby6A, {   6B,or6C OE!k   @4@O4 ND?  "  @4 @ N$5 9/!  " 97D001 9/!,  9Softwareforthedevelopmentorproduction , ofequipmentin7Aor7B D:! # D0 C94," #  C$0 \R!," Q@7E001Q@\7E001 [QCc  Q@7E001 Q@ [Technologyforthedevelopmentofitemsin c  7A,7B,or7D OE!S   @3@O3 ND?c "  @3 @ N$0 \R!c " @7E002@\7E002 [QC  @7E002 @ [Technologyfortheproductionofitemsin   7Aor7B OE!   @2@O2 ND? "  @2 @ N$200,100 \R! " ѵaU7E101ѵaU\7E101 K  [QC;x ѵaU7E101 ѵaU [Technologyfortheuseofitemsin7A,7B, K or7D OE!;x  @4@O4 ND?K "  @4 @ N$0 9/!K!" 91B018.a 9/!" 9Equipmentfortheproductionofmilitary # explosivesandsolidpropellants D:!$ # D0 C94%" #  C$0 9/!&" 92B018 9/!3p' 9EquipmentontheInternationalMunitions 3p( List D:!#`) # D0 C943p*" #  C$0 @ /!3p+" @TOTAL @ /!,  @ a P!-  @829@a829 ` OA." @829 @  `$217,428,3231'%/"   10   XXjNOTE: ThenumberofsubcategoriesundereachECCNthatarenotcontrolledforregionalstability  0 reasonsisinsignificantandisnotreflectedinthisdata.4  #4XjX 4u#!1(#(#   4 X4Xj*AllcasesbutoneundertheseECCNswereforforeignnationalsemployedinU.S.facilities.#4XjX 4# 7#t3 #XjXX4XjH#X{BXXXj 5.  #XjXXX{B#X{BXXXjEnforcementofControl. #XjXXX{B#IXK XXXjԀImageintensifiertubes,infraredfocalplane $,5 arrays,certainnavigationsystemssoftwareandtechnologyforinertialnavigationsystems, %66 gyroscopes,andaccelerometersandotheritemscontrolledforregionalstabilitypurposesare &&7 almostallsubjecttomultilateralcontrolsforeithernationalsecurityormissiletechnology '8 reasons.Themultilateralnatureofthesecontrolsaidsinenforcement.#XjX XIXKE#MXjXXXjTheimpositionof ( 9 unilateralcontrolsforexplosivedetectionequipmentisintendedtoenhancethesecurityof ) : airlinetravelworldwideandthesafetyofphysicalstructuresincludinggovernmentbuildings. *!; Thelicenserequirementshouldassistintheenforcementofexplosivedetectionequipment +"< exportsbyprovidingamechanismfordeterminingwhoexportsthesesystemsandtowhich O destinations.BXAcaneffectivelyenforcethesecontrolsbyfocusingonpreventiveenforcement, ? usingregularoutreacheffortstokeepbusinessesinformedofconcerns,andgatheringleadson / activitiesofconcern.GiventheenhancedantiterrorismeffortsoftheU.S.Government,itis   expectedthatindustrywillsupportenforcementefforts.#XjXXMXjk#     C.ConsultationwithIndustry    BXAconsultedwithindustryduringthe1993transferofcertainUSMLitemsfromDepartment   ofStatetoDepartmentofCommercejurisdiction.Inthepastyear,issuesregardingthe p  jurisdictionfornightvisionequipmenthaveresurfaced.BXALXK XXXjhostedseveralinteragency `  meetingswithindustryduring2001todiscuss#XjX XLXK#Ԁnightvisionproductusesandcapabilitiesandto P  attempttodefineadistinctionbetweencommercialequipmentandmunitionsitemstoclarifythe @  licensingjurisdictionfortheseitems.Industryinputreceivedduringthisprocesscontinuedto 0  supportthetransferofmoreoftheseitemstoCommercecontrol.InDecember2000,the o  LXK XXXjinabilityoftheagenciestoresolvethenightvisionjurisdictionalissueresultedinan#XjX XLXK#escalationof _ theissuetotheNationalSecurityCouncil.Todate,theNationalSecurityCouncilhasnotmade O afinaldetermination. ? OnNovember7,2001,theDepartmentofCommerce,viatheFederalRegisterandBXAs  webpage,solicitedcommentsfromindustryontheeffectivenessofforeignpolicybasedexport  controls.OverallcommentsareavailableinAppendixI.6XK XXXj  #XjX X6XKK#TheSensorsandInstrumentationTechnicalAdvisoryCommittee(SITAC)requestedthat  Category6commoditiesrelatedtocommercialnightvisionandthermalimagingequipment  (specifically6A002,6A003,6E001,and6E002)bemovedfromRegionalStability(RS)Column p 1toRSColumn2.AlthoughRSColumn1includesallcountriesexceptCanada,theimposition ` ofRSColumn2controlswouldallowsuchitemstobeexportedtoCanada,mostEuropean P Unionmembers,Japan,andseveralotherscountrieswithoutalicense.Duetoforeign  @ competitionintheUnitedKingdom,France,andJapan,SITACstatedthat thenegativeeffecton !0 U.S.companiesfarexceedstheperceivedbenefittotheforeignpolicyobjective.SITACcited o"  theimportanceofthermalimagingforfirefighting,lawenforcement,andsecurityorganizations _# worldwide.SITACalsostatedthattheU.S.efforttobuildalargeinternationalcoalitionto O$  combatterrorismisunderminedwhentheUnitedStatesrestrictsaccessofkeytechnologyto ?%! allies.SITACfurtherstatedthattreatingallregionswiththeexceptionofCanadaasbeing /&" potentiallyunstable dilutesthefocusonregionswherestabilitymaytrulybeinquestion.6XK XXXj ' # AttheDecember2001meeting,BXAinformedtheRegulationsandProceduresTechnical ("% AdvisoryCommittee(RPTAC)#XjX X6XKG#ԀofBXAsintentiontoexpandthescopeofexplosivedetection )#& equipment.RPTACcommentswillbetakenintoconsiderationastheproposedregulation *$' undergoesgovernmentreview._ +%( Ї D.ConsultationwithOtherCountries  O The_Wassenaar_ԀArrangementcontrolscertainitemsthattheUnitedStatesalsocontrolsforRS / purposes._Wassenaar_Ԁmemberstateshaveagreedtoincorporatethe_Wassenaar_ԀDualUseControl   Listintotheirownnationalexportcontrolstopreventexportsthatcouldcontributeto   destabilizingbuildupsofconventionalarms.Inaddition,membersofthe_MTCR_Ԁincorporatethe   _MTCR_Ԁcontrollistintotheirownnationalcontrollists.BXAintendstobriefalliesandmajor   tradingpartnersontheimpositionofunilateralcontrolsforexplosivedetectionequipmentand   doesnotanticipatesignificantobjectionstothenewcontrols.    &  E.AlternativeMeans  `  TheUnitedStateshasundertakenawiderangeofactionstosupportandencourageregional @  stabilityandhasspecificallyencouragedeffortstolimittheflowofarmsandmilitarilyuseful 0  ' goodsandotherspecialequipmenttoregionsofconflictandtension.Nonetheless,U.S.regional o  stabilitycontrolsremainanimportantelementinU.S.effortstolimitregionalconflicts. _  F.ForeignAvailability  ? Militaryvehiclesandothermilitarytypeequipmentthatarecontrolledforregionalstability  purposesmaybeobtainedfromnumerousforeignsources.Nearlyallofthecommoditiesand  relatedsoftwareandtechnologycontrolledforregionalstabilitypurposesarealsosubjectto  multilateralcontrolsforeithernationalsecurityormissiletechnologyreasonsundermultilateral  regimes. 4XjXXXj Manufacturersofimagingcamerascontrolledin_ECCN_Ԁ6A003havevoicedcomplaints  toBXAthatthereisconsiderableforeignavailabilityoftheseitemsinEuropeandJapan.  Althoughtherearemultilateralcontrolsontheseitems,membersoftheEuropeanCommunitydo p notcontrolthemamongthemselves,whileU.S.companiesrequireexportlicensesforexportsto ` alldestinationsexceptCanada.U.S.industrybelievesthatthisdisparityhinderstheminthis P market.#XjXX4XjH#Therealsoare4XjXXXjforeignmanufacturersofexplosivedetectionequipment!althoughnone  @ produceitemswiththesametechnicalcapabilitiesastheU.S.products.#XjXX4Xj#ԀBXAisnotawareof !0 foreigncompetitorsthat,atthistime,producethehighestlevelofFederalAviation o"  Administrationcertifiedexplosivedetectionequipment.  _# __@   MXXj @ 8dd8CHAPTER4  H AntiTerrorismControls  x (Sections742.8,742.9,742.10,742.19,744.13,744.14,746.2,746.4,746.7)#XjXM#     ExportControlProgramDescriptionandLicensingPolicy   ThesecontrolsreflectU.S.oppositiontoactsofinternationalterrorismsupportedbyforeign x  governments,aswellasterroristactscarriedoutbydesignatedterroristentities. h  PursuanttoSection6(j)oftheExportAdministrationAct,theSecretaryofStatehasdesignated H  sevencountries!Cuba,Iran,Iraq,Libya,NorthKorea,Sudan,andSyria!asnationswhose 8 governmentshaverepeatedlyprovidedsupportforactsofinternationalterrorism.Asnoted w( below,theUnitedStatescontrolsmultilaterallistitemsdestinedtomilitaryorothersensitive g endusersindesignatedterroristsupportingcountriesforantiterrorismreasonsunderSection W 6(j)oftheAct.TheUnitedStatescontrolsadditionalitemsontheCommerceControlList G (CCL)toCuba,Iran,Sudan,NorthKorea,Libya,andSyriaforantiterrorismreasonsunderthe 7 generalauthorityofSection6(a)oftheAct.ComprehensivetradeembargoesapplytoCuba, ' Iran,Iraq,Libya,andSudan.f  g   Broadlyspeaking,theBureauofExportAdministration(BXA)haslicensingresponsibilityfor  exportsandreexportstoCuba,Syria,andNorthKoreaandforreexportstoLibya.  TheDepartmentoftheTreasurysOfficeofForeignAssetsControl(OFAC)haslicensing  responsibilitiesforexportsandreexportstoIranandIraqandforexportstoLibya.Both x DepartmentsmaintainlicenserequirementsforexportsandreexportstoSudan.Thisreportdoes  h notdescribetherestrictionsadministeredbyOFACagainstIran,Iraq,Libya,andSudan. f    g  !X TheembargoonexportstoCubaisadministeredbytheUnitedStatesundertheActandother #8 statutes.ThemajorpolicychangeforCubain2001wastheregulatoryimplementationofthe w$( TradeSanctionsReformandExportEnhancementActof2000(TSRA).UndertheJuly2001 g%  rule,exportsoffoodandotheragriculturalcommoditiesmaybeapprovedtoCubaunderanew W& ! priornotificationprocedureandLicenseExceptionAgriculturalCommodities(AGR). G' " TSRA,whichwascontainedinTitleIXofthe2000AgricultureAppropriationsAct,requiresthe ')"$ liftingofunilateralsanctionsgoverningagriculturalandmedicalcommoditiesworldwide,but *#% alsorequiresthatalicensingregimebeinplaceforexportsofsuchcommoditiestodesignated +$& terroristsupportingcountries.PleaseseeChapter5formoredetailonregulationspursuantto +%' thislegislation. O Inadditiontothediscussionoff  g countriesthatsupportinternationalterrorismf  g ,thischapter / describescontrolsonexportsandcertainreexportstoSpeciallyDesignatedTerrorists(SDTf  g sf  g )and   ForeignTerroristOrganizations(FTOf  g sf  g ).   InresponsetotheterroristactsofSeptember11,2001,thePresidentissuedExecutiveOrder   f  g (E.O.)f  g 13224ofSeptember23,2001!BlockingPropertyandProhibitingTransactionsWith   PersonsWhoCommit,ThreatentoCommit,orSupportMXjXXXjTerrorism!todealwiththecontinuing   andimmediatethreatoffurtherterroristattacksonU.S.nationalsortheUnitedStates.Inthis p  E.O.,thePresidentprohibitedanyU.S.personfromassisting,sponsoring,orprovidingfinancial, `  material,ortechnologicalsupportforsuchactsofterrorism.ThePresidentnamed27terrorist P  organizations,leaders,andcorporateandcharitablefronts.Theseentitiesandindividualsare @  listedintheAnnextoE.O.13224andareidentifiedbytheabbreviation"SDGT."Otherentities 0  havesubsequentlybeendesignatedpursuanttoE.O.13224,andallexistingFTOswerealso o  includedonthenewlistofSDGTs.ThelistofSDGTsispublishedbyOFACaspartofthelist _ ofblockedpersons,speciallydesignatednationals,speciallydesignatedterrorists,foreign O terroristorganizations,andspeciallydesignatednarcoticstraffickersdesignatedpursuanttothe ? variouseconomicsanctionsprogramsadministeredbyOFAC. #XjXXMXj># /  ThePresidentdirectedallagenciesoftheUnitedStatestotakeappropriatemeasureswithintheir  authoritytocarryouttheprovisionsoftheE.O.Inaddition,onSeptember28,2001,theUnited  NationsadoptedResolution1373,whichstatesthatmembernationsshallprohibitmaking  financialassetsoreconomicresourcesavailableforthebenefitofpersonswhoengageinor  attempttocommitorfacilitateterroristacts.  BXAwillsoonpublisharegulationconsistentwiththeprovisionsoff  g E.O.f  Ԁg f  g 13224f  g ԀandU.N. ` Resolutionf  g Ԁ1373f  g .Thepurposeofthf  g enewcontrolsistoimposeanexportlicenserequirementfor P theexportf  g f  g orf  g ԀreexportofallitemssubjecttotheEARdestinedtof  g f  g SDTs,FTOs,andSDGTs,  @ whereverlocated.f  g Ԁ  !0 BXAalsowillpublishanamendmenttotheEARthatexpandsthescopeofexplosivedetection _# systemscontrolledunderExportCommodityControlNumber(ECCN)2A993andcreatesnew O$  licenserequirementsfortheexportandreexportofrelatedsoftwareandtechnology.Thenew ?%! licensingrequirementswillbecontainedinECCNs2D993and2E993.Theamendmentwill /&" clarifythescopeofexplosivedetectionequipmentcontrolledundertheEARandexpandthe ' # numberofdestinationsthatrequirealicensefortheexportandreexportoftheseitems. (!$ Specifically,alicensewillberequiredtoexportorreexporttheseitemstoIraq.Alicensewas ("% alreadyrequiredfortheexportofitemscontrolledunderECCN2A993toIran,NorthKorea, )#& Sudan,Syria,Cuba,andLibya.Thisamendmentalsocreatesalicenserequirementforthe *$' exportandreexportofitemscontrolledunderECCNs2D993and2E993toalldesignated  +%(  terroristsupportingcountries.ItemscontrolledunderthethreeECCNsalsowillbecontrolled O forregionalstabilityandU.N.reasons.BXAdesignedtheamendmenttoenhancethesecurity ? andsafetyofairlinetravelandphysicalstructures,includinggovernmentbuildings.Chapter3 / providesdetailsofthenewcontrol.     EAASection6(j)determinations:    TheSecretaryofStatehasdeterminedthatLibya(1979),Syria(1979),Cuba(1982),Iran(1984),   NorthKorea(1988),Iraq(1990)andSudan(1993)arecountrieswhosegovernmentshave   repeatedlyprovidedsupportforactsofinternationalterrorism. p  EffectiveDecember28,1993,theActingSecretaryofStatedeterminedthattheUnitedStates P  wouldcontrolfivecategoriesofdualuseitemssubjecttomultilateralcontrolstocertainsensitive @  governmentendusersunderSection6(j)oftheAct,sincetheseitemsmeetthecriteriasetforth 0  inSection6(j)(1)(B).Specifically,theActingSecretarydeterminedthattheseitems,when o  exportedtomilitary,policeorintelligenceorganizations,ortoothersensitiveendusersina _ designatedterroristsupportingcountry,couldmakeasignificantcontributiontothatcountry's O militarypotentialorcouldenhanceitsabilitytosupportactsofinternationalterrorism.These ? antiterrorismcontrolsapplytoalldesignatedterroristsupportingcountries. / TheActingSecretaryalsoadvisedthattheUnitedStatesshouldcontinuetocontrolotheritems  notspecificallycontrolledunderSection6(j)forgeneralforeignpolicypurposesunderSection  6(a)toterroristsupportingcountriesandthattheUnitedStatesshouldcontinuetoreviewthe  exportofsuchitemspriortoapprovaltoevaluatewhether,underthecircumstancesofthe  application,therequirementsofSection6(j)apply.Thesemeasuresaredescribedindetail  below. p ParagraphAbelowreflectstheSection6(j)controlsandparagraphs(B),(C),(D)and(E)reflect P theSection6(a)controlsonIran,Sudan,Syria,andNorthKorea.  @  A. 0  TheActingSecretaryofStatedetermined,effectiveDecember28,1993,thattheexport o"  ofcertaincategoriesofgoodsandtechnologies,whendestinedtomilitary,police, _# intelligenceentities,andothersensitiveendusers,asdeterminedbytheDepartmentof O$  State,inanycountrydesignatedunderSection6(j)oftheActasacountrythathas ?%! repeatedlyprovidedsupportforactsofinternationalterrorism,"couldmakeasignificant /&" contributiontothemilitarypotentialofsuchcountry,includingitsmilitarylogistics ' # capability,orcouldenhancetheabilityofsuchcountrytosupportactsofinternational (!$ terrorism."Asaresultofthisdetermination,theSecretariesofStateandCommerce ("% wouldnotifyCongress30dayspriortotheissuanceofanylicensefortheexportofany )#& itemfromthefivecategorieslistedbelowtosensitiveendusersintheterrorist *$' supportingcountries.+%((#(# ЀPursuanttoSection6(j)oftheAct,BXArequiresalicensefortheexportofthefollowingitems ? tomilitaryorothersensitiveendusersindesignatedterroristsupportingcountries: / 0  1)0` (#(#Allitemssubjecttonationalsecuritycontrols,exceptcomputerswitha   performanceleveloflessthan500milliontheoreticaloperationspersecond   (WassenaarArrangement)   C .@ ` (#` (# 0  2)0` (#(#Allitemssubjecttochemicalandbiologicalweaponsproliferationcontrols   (AustraliaGroup). ` (#` (# 0  3)0` (#(#Alldualuseitemssubjecttomissileproliferationcontrols(MissileTechnology p  ControlRegime).` ` (#` (# 0  4)0` (#(#Allitemssubjecttonuclearweaponsproliferationcontrols(NuclearReferral P  List).@ ` (#` (# 0  5)0` (#(#Allmilitaryrelateditems(itemscontrolledbyf  g CCLf  g Ԁentriesendingwiththe 0  number18).o ` (#` (#  B. 0  PursuanttoSection6(a)oftheAct,theUnitedStatesrequiresalicenseforthecategories O ofitemslistedbelowforIran,NorthKorea,Sudan,andSyriatopromoteU.S.foreign ? policygoals.Sudan(asofNovember4,1997)andIran(asofMay7,1995)arealso / subjecttocomprehensivetradeandinvestmentembargoesadministeredbythe  DepartmentoftheTreasuryundertheauthorityvestedinthePresidentunderthe  InternationalEmergencyEconomicPowersAct(IEEPA).TheDepartmentofState  reviewslicenseapplicationsforitemscontrolledunderSection6(a)oftheActbefore  approvaltodeterminewhethertherequirementsofSection6(j)apply.IftheSecretaryof  Statedeterminesthattheparticularexport"couldmakeasignificantcontributiontothe  militarypotentialofsuchcountry,includingitsmilitarylogisticscapability,orcould p enhancetheabilityofsuchcountrytosupportactsofinternationalterrorism,"the ` DepartmentsofCommerceandStatewillnotifytheappropriateCongressional P committees30daysbeforeissuingalicense.Thecategoriesofitemscontrolledunder  @ Section6(a)include,butarenotlimitedto:!0(#(#  H@=ABC>EFG(IxxAH@=ABC>EF="@"    @.2I3  0 `   Aircraft,includinghelicoptersandengines.@./݌_#` (#` (# Ќ  :  :/0  "0` (#(#  Heavydutyonhighwaytractors.://݌O$ ` (#` (# Ќ  :  :00  "0` (#(#  Offhighwaywheeltractors(>10tons).:00݌?%!` (#` (# Ќ  :  :M10  "0` (#(#  Cryptographic,cryptoanalytic,andcryptologicequipment.:M1h1݌/&"` (#` (# Ќ  :  :&20  "0` (#(#  Navigation,directionfinding,andradarequipment.:&2A2݌' #` (#` (# Ќ  :  :20  "0` (#(#  Electronictestequipment.:23݌(!$` (#` (# Ќ  :  :30  "0` (#(#  Mobilecommunicationsequipment.:33݌("%` (#` (# Ќ  :  :t40  "0` (#(#  Acousticunderwaterdetectionequipment.:t44݌)#&` (#` (# Ќ  :  :<50  "0` (#(#  Vesselsandboats(includinginflatableboats).:<5W5݌*$'` (#` (# Ќ  :  : 60  "0` (#(#  Marineandsubmarineengines.: 6'6݌+%(` (#` (# Ќ  :  :60  "0` (#(#  Underwaterphotographicequipment.:66݌O` (#` (# Ќ  :  :70  "0` (#(#  Submersiblesystems.:77݌?` (#` (# Ќ  :  :@80  "0` (#(#  Computernumericallycontrolled(CNC)machinetools.:@8[8݌/` (#` (# Ќ  :  :90  "0` (#(#  Vibrationtestequipment.:9/9݌ ` (#` (# Ќ  :  :90  "0` (#(#  Certaindigitalcomputers(CTP6).:99݌ ` (#` (# Ќ  :  ::0  "0` (#(#  Certaintelecommunicationstransmissionequipment.:::݌ ` (#` (# Ќ  :  :f;0  "0` (#(#  Certainmicroprocessors(clockspeed>25Mhz).:f;;݌ ` (#` (# Ќ  :  :4<0  "0` (#(#  Certainsemiconductormanufacturingequipment.:4<O<݌ ` (#` (# Ќ  :  :=0  "0` (#(#  Softwarespeciallydesignedforcomputeraideddesign/computeraided   manufacture(CAD/CAM)integratedcircuitproduction.:==݌p ` (#` (# Ќ  :  :0>0  "0` (#(#  Packetswitches.:0>K>݌` ` (#` (# Ќ  :  :>0  "0` (#(#  Softwarespeciallydesignedforairtrafficcontrolapplications.:>>݌P ` (#` (# Ќ  :  :?0  "0` (#(#  Gravitymeters(staticaccuracy<100microgalorwithquartzelement).:??݌@ ` (#` (# Ќ  :  :@0  "0` (#(#  Certainmagnetometerswithsensitivity<1.0ntrmsperroothertz.:@@݌0 ` (#` (# Ќ  :  :A0  "0` (#(#  Certainfluorocarboncompoundsforcoolingfluidsforradarandsupercomputers.:AA݌o ` (#` (# Ќ  :  :zB0  "0` (#(#  Highstrengthorganicandinorganicfibers.:zBB݌_` (#` (# Ќ  :  :GC0  "0` (#(#  Certainmachinesforgearcutting(upto1.25meters).:GCbC݌O` (#` (# Ќ  :  :D0  "0` (#(#  Certainaircraftskinandsparmillingmachines.:D9D݌?` (#` (# Ќ  :  :D0  "0` (#(#  Certainmanualdimensionalinspectionmachines(linearpositioningaccuracy / 3+L/300).:D E݌` (#` (# Ќ  :  :E0  "0` (#(#  Robotsemployingfeedbackinformationinrealtime.:EF݌` (#` (# Ќ  :  :F0  "0` (#(#  Certainexplosivedevicedetectors.:FF݌` (#` (# Ќ  :  :G0  "0` (#(#  ProductiontechnologycontrolledunderECCN1C355.:GG݌` (#` (# Ќ  :  :gH0  "0` (#(#  CommercialchargesanddevicescontrolledunderECCN1C992.:gHH݌` (#` (# Ќ  :  :CI0  "0` (#(#  Ammoniumnitrate,includingcertainfertilizerscontainingammoniumnitrate,  underECCN1C997.:CI^I݌p` (#` (# Ќ  C. 0  ExportsofthefollowingadditionalitemstoIran,Sudan,andNorthKoreaaresubjecttoa P licenserequirementundertheExportAdministrationRegulations(EAR)forforeign  @ policyreasons:!0(#(# :  :nK0  "0` (#(#  Largedieselengines(>400hp).:nKK݌_#` (#` (# Ќ  :  :-L0  "0` (#(#  Scubagear.:-LHL݌O$ ` (#` (# Ќ  :  :L0  "0` (#(#  Pressurizedaircraftbreathingequipment.:LL݌?%!` (#` (# Ќ  D. 0  ExportofthefollowingadditionalitemtoIranandNorthKoreaissubjecttoalicense ' # requirementundertheEARforforeignpolicyreasons:portableelectricpowergenerators.(!$(#(#  E. 0  ExportsofthefollowingadditionalitemstoNorthKoreaaresubjecttoalicense  )#& requirementundertheEARforforeignpolicyreasons:*$'(#(#  +%( *,XX hXX*:  :O0  "0` (#(#  Ringmagnets.:OO݌O` (#` (# Ќ  :  :cP0  "0` (#(#  Hotcells.:cP~P݌?` (#` (# Ќ  :  : Q0  "0` (#(#  Gloveboxessuitableforusewithradioactivematerials.: Q(Q݌/` (#` (# Ќ  :  :Q0  "0` (#(#  Softwareforneutroniccalculations/modeling.:QR݌ ` (#` (# Ќ  :  :R0  "0` (#(#  Softwareforradiationtransportcalculations/modeling.:RR݌ ` (#` (# Ќ  :  :S0  "0` (#(#  Softwareforhydrodynamiccalculations/modeling.:SS݌ ` (#` (# Ќ  :  :YT0  "0` (#(#  Radiationdetection,monitoringandmeasurementequipment.:YTtT݌ ` (#` (# Ќ  :  :3U0  "0` (#(#  Radiographicdetectionequipmentsuchasxrayconverters,andstoragephosphor   imageplates.:3UNU݌ ` (#` (# Ќ  :  :DV0  "0` (#(#  Electrolyticcellsforflourineproduction.:DV_V݌p ` (#` (# Ќ  :  :W0  "0` (#(#  Particleaccelerators.:W*W݌` ` (#` (# Ќ  :  :W0  "0` (#(#  Industrialprocesscontrolhardware/systemsdesignedforpowerindustries.:WW݌P ` (#` (# Ќ  :  :X0  "0` (#(#  Freonandchilledwatercoolingsystemscapableofcontinuouscoolingdutiesof @  100,000BTU/hr(29.3kW)orgreater.:XX݌0 ` (#` (# Ќ  :  :Y0  "0` (#(#  Equipmentfortheproductionofstructuralcomposites,fibers,prepregsand o  preforms.:YY݌_` (#` (# Ќ  :  :Z0  "0` (#(#  Hardenedsteelandtungstencarbideprecisionballbearings(3mmorgreater O diameter).:ZZ݌?` (#` (# Ќ  :  :[0  "0` (#(#  304and316stainlesssteelplate.:[\݌/` (#` (# Ќ  :  :\0  "0` (#(#  Monelplate.:\\݌` (#` (# Ќ  :  :X]0  "0` (#(#  Tributylphosphate.:X]s]݌` (#` (# Ќ  :  : ^0  "0` (#(#  Nitricacidinconcentrationsof20weightpercentorgreater.: ^&^݌` (#` (# Ќ  :  :^0  "0` (#(#  Flourine.:^_݌` (#` (# Ќ  :  :_0  "0` (#(#  Alpha-emittingradionuclides.:__݌` (#` (# Ќ  :  :O`0  "0` (#(#  Softwarespeciallydesignedforindustrialprocesscontrolhardware/systems  controlledby1B999.:O`j`݌p` (#` (# Ќ  :  :ca0  "0` (#(#  Softwarespeciallydesignedforequipmentfortheproductionofstructural ` composites,fibers,prepregsandpreformscontrolledby1B999,n.e.s.(not P elsewherespecified).:ca~a݌ @` (#` (# Ќ  :  :b0  "0` (#(#  Bellowssealedvalves.:bb݌!0` (#` (# Ќ  :  :c0  "0` (#(#  Isostaticpresses,n.e.s.:cc݌o" ` (#` (# Ќ  :  :Ed0  "0` (#(#  Bellowsmanufacturingequipment,includinghydraulicformingequipmentand _# bellowsformingdies.:Ed`d݌O$ ` (#` (# Ќ  :  :Ye0  "0` (#(#  Laserweldingmachines.:Yete݌?%!` (#` (# Ќ  :  :f0  "0` (#(#  MIGwelders.:f+f݌/&"` (#` (# Ќ  :  :f0  "0` (#(#  Ebeamwelders.:ff݌' #` (#` (# Ќ  :  :kg0  "0` (#(#  Monelequipment,includingvalves,piping,tanksandvessels.:kgg݌(!$` (#` (# Ќ  :  :Hh0  "0` (#(#  304and316stainlesssteelvalves,piping,tanksandvessels.:Hhch݌("%` (#` (# Ќ  :  :&i0  "0` (#(#  Mininganddrillingequipment,asfollows::&iAi݌)#&` (#` (# Ќ  0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#0 (# (# !0 (# (#Largeboringequipmentcapableofdrillingholesgreaterthantwofeet *$' indiameter,_and+%( (# (# 0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#!0 (# (#Largeearthmovingequipmentusedintheminingindustry.O (# (# :  :k0  "0` (#(#  Electroplatingequipmentdesignedforcoatingpartswithnickeloraluminum.:kk݌?` (#` (# Ќ  :  :l0  "0` (#(#  Pumpsdesignedforindustrialserviceandforusewithanelectricalmotorof5HP / orgreater.:ll݌ ` (#` (# Ќ  :  :m0  "0` (#(#  Vacuumvalves,piping,flanges,gasketsandrelatedequipmentspeciallydesigned   foruseinhighvacuumservice.:mm݌ ` (#` (# Ќ  :  :n0  "0` (#(#  Spinformingandflowformingmachines.:nn݌ ` (#` (# Ќ  :  :o0  "0` (#(#  Centrifugal_multiplane_Ԁbalancingmachines.:oo݌ ` (#` (# Ќ  :  :qp0  "0` (#(#  Austeniticstainlesssteelplate,valves,piping,tanksandvessels.:qpp݌ ` (#` (# Ќ  :  :Uq0  "0` (#(#  Frequencychangerscapableofoperatinginthefrequencyrangefrom300upto p  600Hz.:Uqpq݌` ` (#` (# Ќ  :  :^r0  "0` (#(#  Massspectrometers.:^ryr݌P ` (#` (# Ќ  :  :s0  "0` (#(#  Allflashxraymachines,andcomponentsofpulsedpowersystemsdesigned @  thereof,includingMarxgenerators,highpowerpulseshapingnetworks,high 0  voltagecapacitors,andtriggers.:s,s݌o ` (#` (# Ќ  :  :t0  "0` (#(#  Pulseamplifiers.:tt݌_` (#` (# Ќ  :  :Au0  "0` (#(#  Electronicequipmentfortimedelaygenerationortimeintervalmeasurement,as O follows::Au\u݌?` (#` (# Ќ  0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#!0 (# (#Digitaltimedelaygeneratorswitharesolutionof50nanosecondsor / lessovertimeintervalsof1microsecondorgreater,or (# (# 0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#!0 (# (#Multichannel(threeormore)ormodulartimeintervalmeterand  _chronometry_Ԁequipmentwithresolutionof50nanosecondsorlessover  timeintervalsof1microsecondorgreater. (# (# :  :x0  "0` (#(#  Chromatographyandspectrometryanalyticalinstruments.:xx݌` (#` (# Ќ  :  :y0  "0` (#(#  Seismicdetectionequipment.:yy݌` (#` (# Ќ  :  :Bz0  "0` (#(#  RadiationhardenedTVcameras. :Bz]z݌p` (#` (# Ќ  LicenseRequirementsandLicensingPolicyforCuba  P  A. 0  BXArequiresalicenseforexporttoCubaofvirtuallyallcommodities,technology,and !0 software,except:o" (#(# 0  :  :|0` (#(#"0 ` (#` (#  Technologygenerallyavailabletothepublicandinformationalmaterials.:|.|݌O$  (# (# Ќ  0  :  :}0` (#(#"0 ` (#` (#  Sometypesofpersonalbaggage,crewbaggage,certainaircrafton ?%! temporarysojourn,shipstores(exceptasprohibitedbytheCuban /&" DemocracyActtoCuba)andplanestoresundercertaincircumstances.:}+}݌' # (# (# Ќ  0  :  :~0` (#(#"0 ` (#` (#  CertainforeignoriginitemsintransitthroughtheUnitedStates.:~~݌(!$ (# (# Ќ  0  :  :0` (#(#"0 ` (#` (#  ShipmentsforU.S.Governmentpersonnelandagencies.:݌("% (# (# Ќ  0  :  :0` (#(#"0 ` (#` (#  Giftparcelsnotexceeding$200forCubalimitedtofood,clothing:݌)#& (# (# Ќ  0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#(nonmilitary),vitamins,seeds,medicines,medicalsuppliesanddevices, *$' hospitalsuppliesandequipment,equipmentforthehandicapped,personal +%( _hygieneitems,veterinarymedicinesandsupplies,fishingequipmentand O supplies,soapmakingequipment,certainradioequipment,andbatteries ? forsuchequipment.Therearenofrequencyordollarvaluelimitsonfood / containedingiftparcelstoCuba.  (# (#  B. 0  TheUnitedStatesgenerallydeniesexportlicenseapplicationsforexportstoCuba.   However,BXAwillconsiderapplicationsforthefollowingonacase-by-casebasis: (#(# 0  :  :ք0` (#(#"0 ` (#` (#  Exportstomeetbasichumanneeds.:ք݌  (# (# Ќ  0  :  :0` (#(#"0 ` (#` (#  ExportstoCubafromforeigncountriesofnon-strategic,foreignmade p  productscontaining20percentorlessU.S.-originparts,componentsor `  materials,providedtheexporterisnotaU.S.ownedorcontrolled P  subsidiaryinathirdcountry.:Dž݌@  (# (# Ќ  0  :  :0` (#(#"0 ` (#` (#  ExportstoCubaoftelecommunicationsequipment,totheextentpermitted 0  aspartofatelecommunicationsprojectapprovedbytheFederalCom o  municationsCommission,necessarytodeliverasignaltoaninternational _ telecommunicationsgatewayinCuba.:݌O (# (# Ќ  :  0  :r0` (#(#"0 ` (#` (#  ExportstoCubaofbusinessandofficeequipmentifdestinedtohuman ? rightsorganizationsortoindividualsandnongovernmentalorganizations / thatpromoteindependentactivity.:r݌ (# (# Ќ  :  0  :0` (#(#"0 ` (#` (#  CertaincommoditiesandsoftwareforU.S.newsbureausinCuba.:'݌ (# (# Ќ  C. 0  TheDepartmentofCommercereviewsapplicationsforexportsofdonatedand  commerciallysuppliedmedicineormedicalitemstoCubaonacasebycasebasis.The  UnitedStatesdoesnotrestrictexportsoftheseitems,exceptinthefollowingcases:(#(# 0  :  :U0` (#(#"0 ` (#` (#  TotheextentSection5(m)oftheExportAdministrationActof1979or ` Section203(b)(2)oftheIEEPAwouldpermitsuchrestrictions.:Up݌P (# (# Ќ  0  :  :0` (#(#"0 ` (#` (#  Inacaseinwhichthereisareasonablelikelihoodtheitemtobeexported  @ willbeusedforpurposesoftortureorotherhumanrightsabuses.:݌!0 (# (# Ќ  0  :  :0` (#(#"0 ` (#` (#  Inacaseinwhichthereisareasonablelikelihoodtheitemtobeexported o"  willbereexported.:݌_# (# (# Ќ  0  :  : 0` (#(#"0 ` (#` (#  Inacaseinwhichtheitemtobeexportedcouldbeusedintheproduction O$  ofanybiotechnologicalproduct.: ;݌?%! (# (# Ќ  0  :  :T0` (#(#"0 ` (#` (#  InacasewheretheU.S.Governmentdeterminesitwouldbeunableto /&" verify,byonsiteinspectionandotherappropriatemeans,thattheitemto ' # beexportedwillbeusedforthepurposeforwhichitwasintendedand (!$ onlyfortheuseandbenefitoftheCubanpeople.Thisexceptiondoesnot ("% applytodonationsofmedicineforhumanitarianpurposestoanon )#& governmentalorganizationinCuba.:To݌*$' (# (# Ќ  _f  g f  g  +%( f  + g LicenseRequirementsandLicensingPolicyforNorthKorea O  MXjXXXjItemsontheCCLcontinuetorequirealicensetoNorthKorea.#XjXXMXjە#TheUnitedStateshasageneral / policyofdenialforstrategic,nuclear,missile,chemical,biological,andothersensitiveitemson   thef  g f  g CCLf  g ԀtoallendusersinNorthKorea.Inaddition,thereisapolicyofdenialforitemsonthe   CCLtomilitaryendusersorenduses,anditemswithpotentialnuclearapplicabilitytonuclear   endusersorendusesinNorthKorea.Certainitemsonthef  g f  g CCLf  g Ԁmaybelicensedtof  g f  g civilianf  g Ԁend   usersorendusesonacasebycasebasis,subjecttoU.S.interagencyreview.MXjXXXjItemscontrolled   forantiterrorismreasonstoNorthKoreainclude:aircraftandaircraftparts,encryptionproducts,   mosttelecommunicationsequipment,andcomputers.Licenseapplicationsforcomputersupto p  2,000_MTOPS_Ԁaswellasmicroprocessorsupto550_MTOPS_Ԁtononmilitaryornonnuclearend `  usersarereviewedonacasebycasebasis.#XjXXMXjy# P  Commodities,technology,orsoftwarenotonthef  g f  g CCLf  g ԀmaybeexportedtoNorthKoreawithouta 0  license,providedthattheenduserisnotinvolvedinweaponsproliferationactivities,inwhich o  caseprovisionsoftheEnhancedProliferationControlInitiative catchallcontrolwouldapply.MXjXXXj _ #XjXXMXjH# LicenseRequirementsandLicensingPolicyforLibya  ?  A. 0  BXArequiresalicenseforthe_reexport_ԀofU.S.origingoods,technology,orsoftware  subjecttotheEARtoLibyafromthirdcountries,exceptforthefollowing:(#(# 0  :  : 0` (#(#"0 ` (#` (#  Medicineandmedicalsupplies.: %݌ (# (# Ќ    :  :ܟ0 ` "0 ` (#` (#  Foodandagriculturalcommodities.:ܟ݌ (# (# Ќ    :  :0 ` "0 ` (#` (#  Itemspermittedundercertainlicenseexceptions.:Ơ݌ (# (# Ќ    :  :0 ` "0 ` (#` (#  ForeignnonstrategicproductsofU.S.-origintechnologyorsoftware.:݌p (# (# Ќ    :  :{0 ` "0 ` (#` (#  ForeignstrategicproductsofU.S.-origintechnologyorsoftwareexported ` fromtheUnitedStatesbeforeMarch12,1982.:{݌P (# (# Ќ  B.   BXAwillgenerallydenyapplicationsfor_reexport_Ԁofthefollowing: !0 0  :  :@0` (#(#"0 ` (#` (#  Off-highwaywheeltractorswithcarriagecapacityof10tonsormore, _# exceptforexportsofsuchtractorsinreasonablequantitiesforciviluse.:@[݌O$  (# (# Ќ  0  :  :0` (#(#"0 ` (#` (#  Aircraft(includinghelicopters),andspecifiedpartsandaccessories.:݌?%! (# (# Ќ  0  :  :0` (#(#"0 ` (#` (#  Othercommoditiesandrelatedtechnologyandsoftwarecontrolledfor /&" nationalsecuritypurposes,includingcontrolledforeignproducedproducts ' # ofU.S.technologyandsoftwareexportedfromtheUnitedStatesafter (!$ March12,1982,andoilandgasequipmentandrelatedtechnologyand ("% softwarenotreadilyavailablefromnon-U.S.sources.:݌)#& (# (# Ќ  0  :  :0` (#(#"0 ` (#` (#  Commodities,software,andtechnologydestinedfortheRas_Lanuf_ *$' PetrochemicalProcessingComplex,exceptfor(a)exportsor_reexports_ +%( _pursuanttoacontractualarrangementineffectpriortoDecember20, O 1983;and(b)thereexportofgoodsortechnologyalreadyoutsidethe ? UnitedStatesonDecember20,1983,forwhichlicenseapplicationswill / bereviewedonacasebycasebasis.:݌  (# (# Ќ  0  :  :ګ0` (#(#"0 ` (#` (#  ItemssubjecttoU.N.S.C.Resolution748ofMarch30,1992(effective   April5,1992)andU.N.S.C.Resolution883ofNovember11,1993   (effectiveDecember1,1993)@   C @.:ګ݌  (# (# Ќ    0   C.   BXAwillconsiderexceptionstothisdenialpolicyonacase-by-casebasisforthe   following:p (#(# 0  :  :l0` (#(#"0 ` (#` (#  Reexportsofcommoditiesortechnologyandsoftwareinvolvingacontract P  ineffectpriortoMarch12,1982,wherefailuretoobtainanauthorization @  wouldnotexcuseperformanceofthecontract.:l݌0  (# (# Ќ  0  :  : 0` (#(#"0 ` (#` (#  Thereexportofgoodsortechnologysubjecttonationalsecuritycontrols o  alreadyoutsidetheUnitedStatesonMarch12,1982,ortheexportof _ foreignproductsincorporatingsuchitemsascomponents.: (݌O (# (# Ќ  0  :  :0` (#(#"0 ` (#` (#  TheuseofU.S.-origincomponentsincorporatedincertainforeignorigin ? equipmentandconstituting20percentorlessbyvalueofthatequipment.:б݌/ (# (# Ќ  0   D.   Allotherreexports,withtheexceptionofhumanitarianitemsandmedicalequipmentas  definedintheTSRA,willgenerallybedenied.(#(#  LicenseRequirementsandLicensingPolicyforSudan   TheUnitedStateshasageneralpolicyofdenialforallendusersinSudanforallitems p controlledforchemical,biological,missileandnuclearproliferationreasons,militaryrelated ` itemscontrolledfornationalsecurityreasons(CCLentriesendinginthenumber18),andf  g Ԁcertain P itemscontrolledfornationalsecurityorforeignpolicyreasonsforexportandreexport,suchasf  g   @ aircraft,cryptologicitems,andexplosivedevicedetectors.OtheritemscontrolledtoSudanfor !0 nationalsecurityorforeignpolicyreasonsaresubjecttoapolicyofdenialformilitaryendusers o"  orendusesandarereviewedonacasebycasebasisfornonmilitaryendusersorenduses. _# PursuanttoExecutiveOrder13067ofNovember3,1997,theDepartmentoftheTreasury O$  maintainscomprehensivetraderestrictionsonexportsandreexportstoSudan.Incasesinwhich ?%! aproposedexportorreexportinvolvesanitemontheCCLrequiringalicensefromboththe /&" TreasuryandCommerceDepartments,Commercewillonlyreviewalicenseapplicationifthe ' # DepartmentoftheTreasuryhasapproved.f  g Treasuryissolelyresponsibleforlicensingtheexport (!$ ofnonCCLlevelagriculturalandmedicalitemstoSudanundertheprovisionsoftheTSRA.f  Ԁ  ("%  G LicenseRequirementsandLicensingPolicyforSyria  *$'  +%( TheUnitedStateshasageneralpolicyofdenialforexportsandreexportsofitemscontrolledfor O chemical,biological,andmissileproliferationreasons;militaryrelateditemscontrolledfor ? nationalsecurityreasons(CCLentriesendinginthenumber18);andcertainothernational / securityorforeignpolicycontrolleditems,suchasaircraft,cryptologicitems,andexplosive   devicedetectors,toallendusersinSyria.BXAreviewsothernationalsecurityandforeign   policycontrolleditemsunderapolicyofdenialtomilitaryendusersandendusesandonacase   bycasebasistononmilitaryendusersandenduses.   BXAwillconsiderapplicationsforexportandreexporttoSyriaonacasebycasebasisifthey   meetthefollowingconditions: p    0 ` ThetransactioninvolvesthereexporttoSyriaofitemswhereSyriawasnotthe P  intendedultimatedestinationatthetimeoforiginalexportfromtheUnitedStates, @  providedthattheexportfromtheUnitedStatesoccurredpriortotheapplicable 0  contractsanctitydate.o ` (#` (#   0 ` TheU.S.contentvalueofforeignproducedcommoditiesis20percentorless.Ԁ_` (#` (#   0 ` Thecommoditiesaremedicalequipment.O` (#` (#   0 ` Thecommoditiesareaircraftequipmentnecessarytomaintainthesafetyofcivil ? aviationandthesafeoperationofcommercialpassengeraircraft./` (#` (# Applicantswishingtohavecontractsanctityconsideredinreviewingtheirapplicationsmust  submitadequatedocumentationdemonstratingtheexistenceofacontractthatpredatesthe  impositionorexpansionofcontrolsontheitem(s)intendedforexport.  7 LicenseRequirementsandLicensingPolicyforIran   TheUnitedStateshasageneralpolicyofdenialforallitemscontrolledfornationalsecurityor ` foreignpolicyreasonsthatrequirealicensetoIran.PursuanttoExecutiveOrder12959ofMay P 6,1995,theDepartmentoftheTreasurymaintainscomprehensivetraderestrictionsonexports  @ andreexportstoIran.TheDepartmentoftheTreasuryisresponsibleforlicensingagricultural !0 andmedicalitemsclassifiedasEAR99(itemsnotontheCCL)toIran. o"  f  g f  g f   g LicenseRequirementsandLicensingPolicyforf  g f  g SDTs,FTOs,andSDGTs f  g  O$   TheUnitedStateshasageneralpolicyofdenialforapplicationstoexportorreexportanyitem /&" subjecttotheEARtoSDTsandFTOs. Alicensewillberequiredfortheexportofitemsto ' # SDGTspursuanttotherulethatwillsoonbepublished.Alistofdesignatedpersonsisavailable (!$ intheAppendicesto31CFRChapterV.  ("%    AnalysisofControlasRequiredbySection6(f)ofTheAct  *$'  +%(  A.ThePurposeoftheControl  O AntiterrorismcontrolsseektopreventactsofterrorismandtodistancetheUnitedStatesfrom / nationsthathaverepeatedlysupportedactsofinternationalterrorismandfromindividualsand   organizationsthatcommitterroristacts.ThecontrolsdemonstratetheresolveoftheUnited   Statesnottotradewithnationsorentitiesthatfailtoadheretoacceptablenormsofinternational   behavior.ThepolicyprovidestheUnitedStateswiththemeanstocontrolanyU.S.goodsor   servicesthatmightcontributetothemilitarypotentialofdesignatedcountriesandtolimitthe   availabilityofsuchgoodsforuseinsupportofinternationalterrorism.U.S.foreignpolicy   objectivesalsoarefurtheredbyensuringthatitemsremovedfrommultilateralregimelists p  continuetobecontrolledforantiterrorismreasonsandsuchcontrolsareappliedconsistentlyto `  allterroristsupportingcountries.  P    Cuba 0   TheUnitedStatesimposedanembargoseveraldecadesagowhenCubanactionsposedaserious o  threattothestabilityoftheWesternHemisphereandtheCubangovernmentexpropriated _ propertyfromU.S.citizenswithoutcompensation.InMarch1982,asaresultofCubassupport O forinsurgentgroupsthatengagedinterrorism,theSecretaryofStatedesignateditasastate ? sponsorofterrorismunderSection6(j)oftheAct. /  NorthKorea   AlthoughtherehasbeenabilateraldialogueonterrorismwithNorthKorea,antiterrorism  controlsremainbecauseofunresolvedissuesconcerningNorthKoreascontinuingsupportof  internationalterrorism,including,butnotlimitedto,harboringmembersoftheJapaneseRed  ArmyFaction.TheallegedabductionofJapaneseindividualsbyNorthKoreanintelligence  servicesduringthe1980sand1990sremainsofconcernaswell.Althoughthereisnorecent p evidenceofNorthKoreancomplicityinthedisappearanceofJapanesenationals,government ` activityinotherareassupportsthecontinuationoftheantiterrorismcontrols.Thepurposeofthe P controlsincludesrestrictingtheimportofequipmentusefulinenhancingthemilitaryorterrorist  @ supportingcapabilitiesoftheregimeandaddressingotherU.S.foreignpolicyconcerns, !0 includinghumanrights,nonproliferation,andregionalstability. o"   Libya  O$  ThepurposeofexportandreexportcontrolstowardLibyaistodemonstrateU.S.oppositionto, ?%! andtodistancetheUnitedStatesfrom,Libya'sinterventionintheaffairsofneighboringstates /&" andsupportforactsofinternationalterrorismandinternationalsubversiveactivities.Although ' # Libyahasmadeprogressindistancingitselffromterroristorganizationsandactivitiesandinits (!$ multilateralrelations,theU.S.Governmentbelievesthatfurtherprogressisneededbeforethe ("% UnitedStatescanconsiderresumingnormaleconomicties.Meanwhile,theU.S.Governments )#& policyofsupportforexportsandreexportsoffood,medicines,andmedicalequipmentensures *$' thattheLibyanpopulationhasaccesstoitemsnecessaryforbasichumanneeds. +%( Ї Sudan O  EvidenceindicatesthatSudanallowstheuseofitsterritoryasasanctuaryforf  g f  g terrorist ? organizationsf  g Ԁincludingf  Ԁg OsamabinLadinsalQaef  g danetwork,theEgyptianIslamicGroup,the / EgyptianIslamicJihad,Hamas,andPalestinianIslamicJihad.Theembargoandexportcontrols   demonstrateU.S.oppositiontoSudan'ssupportforinternationalterrorismandrestrictaccessto   itemsthatcouldmakeasignificantcontributiontoSudan'smilitarycapabilityandabilityto   supportinternationalterrorism.Inthepastyear,theU.S.Governmenthasheldusefuldialogue   withthegovernmentofSudan,whichhastakenstepsthattheUnitedStatesconsiderstobe   positive.InSeptember,thePresidentnamedformerSenatorf  g f  g Johnf  g ԀDanforthasf  g f  g Sf  g pecialf  g f  g Ef  g nvoyto   SudantocontinueworkonissuesofcontinuingconcerntotheUnitedStates,includingthecivil p  war,humanrights,religiousfreedom,andslavery.Sudanmusttakeadditionalf  ,g Ԁsubstantivesteps `  intheseareasbeforetheUnitedStateswillconsiderestablishingnormalrelationsormodifying P  itsexportcontrols.AstheU.S.Sudanesedialoguecontinues,theU.S.Governments @  authorizationofexportsoffood,medicine,andmedicalequipmentensuresthattheSudanese 0  populationdoesnotsufferundulyintermsofbasichumanneedsasaresultofU.S.export o  controls.SudansongoingcooperativeeffortswiththeUnitedStatesindicatetheeffectivenessof _ thecontrols. O  Syria /  AlthoughtherehasbeennoevidenceofdirectinvolvementbytheSyrianGovernmentinthe  planningorimplementationofterroristactssince1986,Syriacontinuestoprovidesanctuaryand  supporttogroupsengaginginterrorism.ThetradecontrolsreflectU.S.oppositiontoSyria's  supportofterroristgroups,preventsignificantU.S.contributiontoSyria'smilitarycapabilities  andabilitytosupportinternationalterrorism,andpromoteotherU.S.foreignpolicyinterests,  includinghumanrightsandregionalstability.   Iran `  ThesecontrolsrespondtothecontinuedIraniansponsorshipofterrorism.Thepurposeofthe P controlsistorestrictexportsofequipmentthatwouldbeusefulinenhancingIran'smilitaryor  @ terroristsupportingcapabilitiesandtoaddressotherU.S.foreignpolicyconcerns,including !0 humanrights,nonproliferation,andregionalstability. o"  ThecontrolsallowtheUnitedStatestopreventshipmentsofU.S.originequipmenttoIranfor O$  usesthatcouldposeadirectthreattoU.S.interests.Irancontinuestosupportgroupsthat ?%! practiceterrorism,includingterrorismtodisrupttheMiddleEastpeacenegotiations.By /&" restrictingitemswithmilitaryuse,thecontrolsdemonstratetheresolveoftheUnitedStatesnot ' # toprovideanydirectorindirectmilitarysupportforIranandtosupportotherU.S.foreignpolicy (!$ objectives.TheUnitedStatessupportforexportsandreexportsoffooditems,medicalsupplies, ("% andmedicalequipmentaddsanadditionalfacettothebilateraldialogueandensuresthatthe )#& Iranianpopulationreceiveswhatitneedsforhumanitarianpurposes. *$'  +%( f   g f  g SDTs,FTOs,andSDGTs f  g  O  ThepurposeoftheunilateralcontrolsontheexportorreexportofitemssubjecttotheEARto ? SDTs,FTOs,andSDGTsistotakeactionconsistentwithE.O.13224.Thesecontrolsalso / furtherthegeneralpolicyoftheUnitedStatestopreventsupportersofterrorismandterrorist   elementsfromacquiringtechnologythatmightenhanceterroristcapabilities.Thecontrols   enableBXAtouseitsenforcementmechanismsandresourcestosupportU.S.counterterrorism   effortsbyinvestigatingunlicensedexports,reexports,anddiversionofitemssubjecttotheEAR   topartiesdesignatedasterroristsbytheU.S.Government.    B.Considerationsand/orDeterminationsoftheSecretaryofCommerce  @   1.  ProbabilityofAchievingtheIntendedForeignPolicyPurpose. Althoughwidespread o  availabilityofcomparablegoodsfromforeignsourceslimitstheeffectivenessofthesecontrols, _ thecontrolsdorestrictaccessbythesecountriesandpersonstoU.S.origincommodities, O technology,andsoftware,anddemonstratetheU.S.determinationtoopposeanddistanceitself ? frominternationalterrorism.Inextendingcontrolsthesecontrols,theSecretaryhasdetermined / thatthecontrolsarelikelytoachievetheintendedforeignpolicypurpose.Duringtheperiodthat  theUnitedStateshasimposedsanctionsagainstthedesignatedterroristcountries,theirlevelof  activesupportforterroristactivitieshasgenerallydeclined.Severalcountrieshavesought  removalfromtheterrorismlist.   Cuba   TheUnitedStatesmaintainsanembargoandanti-terroristsanctionsagainstCubatoexpressU.S. p oppositiontothecontinuedrepressivepoliciesoftheCastrogovernment.TheUnitedStateshas ` modifiedtheembargoonnumerousoccasionstoaidtheCubanpeopleinbringingabouta P transitiontodemocracyandafreemarketeconomyandtoexpandhumanitarianassistancetothe  @ Cubanpeople. !0  NorthKorea _#  ThecontrolsdenytheNorthKoreangovernmentmostcommodities,technology,andsoftware O$  controlledontheCCLtosupportactsofinternationalterrorismortoexpanditsproliferation ?%! activities.TheUnitedStateshas,duetocertainNorthKoreancommitmentsregardingnuclear /&" andmissileactivities,modifieditsembargotoallowexportsofcertainlowlevelcommoditiesto ' # civilendusersandenduses.OnJune19,2000,BXApublishedregulationsthatauthorizeU.S. (!$ exporterstoexportconsumerproductstoNorthKoreawithoutalicense,includingagricultural, ("% medical,andlowlevelindustrialgoodsandservices.ExportstoNorthKoreahavetraditionally )#& beenhumanitarianinnature,comprisingfood,medicine,andmedicalequipment.Priortothe *$' June2000liberalization,thesehumanitarianexportsrequiredalicense. +%( Ї Libya  O TheUnitedStatesmaintainsexportandreexportprohibitionsforcommoditiescontrolledfor ? nationalsecurityreasons,forcertaintypesofoilterminalandrefiningequipment,foritemsused / toserviceormaintainLibyanaircraftandairfields,andforallotheritemssubjecttotheEAR,   withfewexceptions.TheintentoftheserestrictionsistopreventU.S.contributionstoLibya's   involvementinactivitiesdetrimentaltotheU.S.nationalsecurityandforeignpolicyobjectives.   ThecontrolssendaclearsignalthatdespitetheresumptionoftradebetweenLibyaandEuropean   Union,theUnitedStatesisunwillingtoresumenormaltraderelationsuntilLibyasbehavior   improves.      Sudan  p  ThecontrolsonSudanaffirmthecommitmentoftheUnitedStatestoopposeinternational `  terrorismbylimitingSudan'sabilitytoobtainanduseU.S.originitemsinsupportofterroristor P  militaryactivities.ThesecontrolssendaclearmessagetoSudanofstrongU.S.oppositiontoits @  supportforterroristgroups. 0     Syria _  ThesecontrolsareanimportantmeansofdemonstratingU.S.resolvetolimitSyria'sabilityto O obtainU.S.-originitemsthatcouldbeusedtosupportterroristactivitiesorcontribute ? significantlytoSyria'smilitarypotential.Althoughothernationsproducemanyoftheitems / subjecttoU.S.antiterrorismcontrols,thisfactdoesnoteliminatetheneedtosendastrong  signaltotheSyriangovernmentofU.S.disapprovalofitssupportforterroristgroups.   Iran   ThecontrolsonIranrestrictitsaccesstospecifiedU.S.originitemsthatcouldbeusedto  threatenU.S.interests.TheUnitedStateshassought,andwillcontinuetoseek,thecooperation  ofothercountriesincuttingofftheflowofmilitaryandmilitaryrelatedequipmenttoIran. p f   g f  g SDTs,FTOs,andSDGTs f  g  P ThesecontrolsseektopreventactsofterrorismandtoaffirmU.S.oppositiontointernational  @ terrorismbylimitingtheabilityofdesignatedterroristorganizationsandindividualstoobtain !0 anduseU.S.originitemsinterroristoperations. o"  Ѐ 2.  CompatibilitywithForeignPolicyObjectives. Inextendingcurrentcontrols,the O$  SecretaryhasdeterminedthattheyarecompatiblewithU.S.foreignpolicyobjectivestoward ?%! countriesandpersonswhosupportterrorism.TheyalsoarecompatiblewithoverallU.S.policy /&" towardIran,Sudan,Cuba,NorthKorea,Libya,andSyriaandterroristgroupsandorganizations. ' # Thecontrolstospeciallydesignatedterroristgroupsandindividuals(f  g f  g SDTs,FTOs,andSDGTsf  g ), (!$ whereverlocated,affirmsU.S.commitmenttorestricttheflowofitemsandotherformsof ("% materialsupporttocountries,individuals,orgroupsformilitaryorterroristpurposes. )#&  3.  ReactionofOtherCountries. MostcountriesaregenerallysupportiveofU.S.effortsto +%( fightterrorismandstoptheproliferationofweaponsofmassdestructionincountriesofconcern. O However,almostnonehaveimposedembargoesascomprehensiveasthosethattheUnitedStates ? hasimposed.SomecountrieshavechallengedcertainU.S.controlsasextraterritorial. / OppositiontoU.S.foreignpolicybasedcontrolsbymanyofitsmajortradingpartners,including   somecloseallies,hasbecomeapointofcontention.Thisreactionhasledsomeforeignfirmsto   designoutU.S.componentsortocitethelackoftheirownnationalsanctionsasamarketingtool   tosecurebusinesscontractsthatmayhavegonetoU.S.companies.Insomeinstances,foreign   governmentshaveinstructedforeignfirmstoignoreU.S.reexportcontrols.    Cuba  p  AlthoughmostcountriesrecognizetherightoftheUnitedStatestodetermineitsownforeign `  policyandsecurityconcerns,manycountries,particularlyCanada,Mexicoandthemembersof P  theEuropeanUnion,opposedtheCubanLibertyandDemocraticSolidarity(Libertad)Actof @  1996(HelmsBurton). 0   NorthKorea _  TheUnitedStatesmaintainedacomprehensivetradeembargoagainstNorthKoreafor50years. O Ingeneral,theU.S.allieshavelargelyactedinconcertwiththeUnitedStatestodenyNorth ? Koreamodernequipmentandtechnology.TherecenteasingofU.S.sanctionstowardNorth / KoreaandtheremovalofsomeU.S.controlshasbeenechoedbyotherwesterncountries.U.S.  allieswilllikelyfollowtheUnitedStatesleadandnotgobeyondthescopeofU.S.  liberalizationsuntilNorthKoreaplacesfurtherlimitsonitsproliferationandmilitaryactivities.   Libya   ManycountriesbelievethatinturningoverthetwoLibyannationalsfortrial,Libyafulfilledits  obligationstotheUnitedNationsinregardtothePanAm103bombing.TheUnitedNations p suspendeditssanctionsagainstLibyainApril1999.MostcountriesdidnotsupporttheUnited ` StatesrenewalthisyearoftheIranLibyaSanctionsActandwouldliketoseetheUnitedStates P removethesanctionsmaintainedunderIEEPAonitemsincludingaircraftpartsandcomponents  @ andoilwellequipment.TheUnitedStateshassoughtandwillcontinuetoseekothercountries !0 supportincuttingofftheflowofsensitiveitemstoLibya. o"   Sudan  O$  TheUnitedStatesimposedthecontrols(andsubsequentembargo)inresponsetocredible ?%! evidencethatSudanassistsinternationalterroristgroups,destabilizesneighboringgovernments /&" andviolateshumanrights.TheUnitedStatescontinuestoconsultwithkeyalliesandurgesthem ' # totakeallpossiblemeasurestoconvinceSudantohaltitssupportofterrorism.OnSeptember (!$ 28,2001,theUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilpassedResolution1054,whichliftedthe ("% sanctionsimposedasaresultofSudansinvolvementintheassassinationattemptonPresident )#& MubarakofEgypt.TheUnitedStatesmaintainsitsunilateralsanctions. *$' _ +%( Ї Syria    TheUnitedStatesmaintainscontrolsinresponsetoSyria'slackofconcretestepstoendsupport   fortheinternationalterroristgroupsthatmaintainapresenceinSyriaandSyriancontrolledareas   ofLebanon.AlthoughothercountriesconcurthatSyriasregionalactivitiesaredestabilizing,   fewcountriesmaintaincontrolssimilartothoseimplementedbytheUnitedStates.    Iran  p  Regardingthecontrolsonspecificproductcategories,othercountriessharetheU.S.concern `  overIran'ssupportofterrorism,humanrightsabuses,andattemptstoacquireweaponsofmass P  destruction.Forinstance,the_Wassenaar_ԀArrangementhasrecognizedIranasacountrywhose @  behaviorisacauseofconcern.Ingeneral,however,U.S.controlsoncommercialgoodstoIran 0  aremorestringentthanthoseofothercountries.IranstradepartnersincludeGermany,Japan, o  theUnitedKingdom,andmanyothernations. _ f   g f  g _SDTs_,_FTOs_,and_SDGTs_  f  g  ?  ManycountriessupportU.S.effortstofightterrorismthroughblockingterroristorganizations / andindividualsfromacquiringcommoditiesthatcouldassistsaidgroupsincommittingfuture  actsofviolence.Whilesomecountriesareconsideringrestrictivelegislation,veryfewmaintain  exportcontrolssimilartothoseimplementedbytheUnitedStates.Theterroristattacksof  September11,2001,couldprovidetheimpetustoexpandexportcontrolsonsuchorganizations  andindividualsbyU.S.alliesand,thus,furtherrestrictterroristsfromobtainingcommodities,  whetherofU.S.orforeignorigin.   4.  EconomicImpactonUnitedStatesIndustry.  `  Cuba   @ TheUnitedStatesrequiresalicensefortheexportand_reexport_ԀofallU.S.origincommodities, !0 technology,andsoftwaresubjecttotheEARtoCuba.Inrecentyears,thenumberoflicense o"  applicationsthatBXAapprovedtoCubahasincreasedsignificantly,particularlyoverthemid _# 1990slevelswhenBXAapprovedabout100licensesperyear.InFY2001,BXAapproved240 O$  applicationsvaluedat$452million.However,thisisaconsiderabledecreasefromFY2000, ?%! whenBXAapproved310applicationsvaluedat$737million.Muchoftheincreaseinapproved /&" exportlicenseapplicationstoCubacanbeattributedtochangesmadeduringthelate1990sin ' # U.S.exportpolicies,includingtheresumptionofdirectflights,exportsofmedicinesandmedical (!$ suppliesandequipment,andexportsoffoodandcertainagriculturalcommoditiesforsaleto ("% independentnongovernmententities.In2001,BXAdeniedtwolicenseapplications(valuedat )#& $12,885)andreturnedwithoutaction(_RWAd_)30licenseapplications(valuedat$63.7million). *$'  +%( Ї   Table1:ExportLicenseApplicationsApprovedforCuba(FY19952001)  ? "*d  ddd dd dd 'dd '(#(#,( dd ,( dd ,( dd +  *    *  FiscalYear 7 &! 4  7$NumberofApplications 7 &! 4"  7  TotalValueinU.S.Dollars WM& 42    ,@1995,@W0%  1995 rhB  ,@1995 ,@ [@111[@r%111 YOA " [@111 [@ YЀ$604,004,985 RH!  3 0@19960@R  1996 qgB <  0@1996 0@  T@83T@q 'Ӏ83 XN@ < "  T@83 T@ XЀ$592,738,313 RH! < 3 4@19974@R  1997 qgB  4@1997 4@  U@87U@q[(Ӏ87 XN@"  U@87 U@ XЀ$493,414,819 RH!3 8@19988@R  1998 rhBD  8@1998 8@ `@128`@r)128 YOAD " `@128 `@ YЀ$544,659,988 RH!D 3 <@1999<@R  1999 rhB  <@1999 <@ f@181f@r*181 YOA " f@181 f@ YЀ$758,407,893 RH! 3 @@2000@@R  2000 rhBL  @@2000 @@ `s@310`s@rG,310 YOAL " `s@310 `s@ YЀ$737,108,231 Y H!L 3 D@2001D@Y  2001 y hB  D@2001 D@  n@240n@y-240 ` OA " n@240 n@  `$452,989,260 7 &! 3  7  TOTAL(19952001) b Q!T  Б@1140Б@b.1140 a PBT" Б@1140 Б@  aЀ$4,183,323,4891'%T3    10   `  (#(# ThemajorityofexportlicensesapprovedforCubainFY2001(192ofthe240cases)werefor d EAR99items,includingmedicinesandmedicalsupplies,instruments,equipment,andgift T  parcels.Inaddition,aircraftandoceanvesselsontemporarysojournaccountedfor49cases. D! TheU.S.embargoonCubaisunilateral.AccordingtotheCentralIntelligenceAgencys(CIA) s$# World_Factbook_Ԁ2001,Cubaimported$3.4billionincommoditiesin2000.Leadingimports c$ werepetroleum,foodstuffs,machinery,andchemicals.LeadingsupplierswereSpain, S% Venezuela,andCanada.f  g Ingeneral,southernFlorida(particularlytheportareaofTampa)and C& exportersthatwouldbenefitfromthecostadvantagesoftheUnitedStatesproximitytoCubaare 3' mostaffectedbythetradeembargo. # (  NorthKorea  "* U.S.exportsanctionsonNorthKoreahavehadaminimalimpactonU.S.industry.North "+ Koreastotalimportsaverageabout$12billionperyear,withtheprimaryimportsincluding #, petroleum,grain,cokingcoal,machineryandequipment,andconsumergoods.Asreportedby $- theKoreaTradePromotionCorporation,NorthKoreasfivemajortradingpartnersareChina, %t. Japan,Russia,SouthKorea,andGermany,whichaccountformorethan60percentofNorth &d / Koreastotaltrade.TheCIAestimatesthatimportstotaled$960millionin1999. 'T!0 Basef  g f  g df  g ԀonU.S.CensusBureaustatistics,totalU.S.exportstoNorthKorea,althoughfarbelowthe )4#2 levelsofotherdevelopedcountries,increasedsignificantlyafterthesigningoftheU.S.North s*$$3 KoreaAgreedFrameworkinOctoberof1994.Exportsrosefromonly$179,730in1994to c+%4 between$3and$4millioneachyearfrom1995through1998.In1999,U.S.exportstoNorth O Koreanearlytripledto$11.3million.However,in2000,U.S.exportsweredownto$2.7 ? million.ThemajorityofU.S.exportsin2000werecereals,especiallycorn. / ThetotalnumberofexportlicenseapplicationsthatBXAapprovedhasexperienceda   correspondingsurge,increasingfromsixlicenses(valuedat$66,443)inFY1994toanannual   averageof40licenses,valuedatover$1.5billionthroughFY1999(seeTable2).However,in   FY2000,BXAapprovedonlytenlicensesforNorthKorea,valuedat$31.1million.InFY   2001,BXAapprovedsevenlicenseapplicationsvaluedat$1,187,232forNorthKorea;no   applicationswererejectedandone(valuedat$11,067)was_RWAd_. p  OnSeptember17,1999,PresidentClintonannouncedhisdecisiontoeasesomeofthesanctions P  maintainedagainstNorthKorea.ThesanctionseasingwasimplementedinJune2000,and @  resultedinmostU.S.consumergoodsbeingauthorizedforexporttoNorthKorea.f  g Thisaccounts 0  forthedeclineinlicenseapplicationsforNorthKoreainFY2000and2001;themajorityofthe o  itemsformerlyrequiringalicensearenowabletobeshippedlicensefree. _ @tt Table2:ExportLicenseApplicationsApprovedforNorthKorea(FY19942001)  ? *d  d( dd ( ( dd ( ( dd ( (#(#,( dd , dd ,A dd +  *  *  FiscalYear 7 &!4  7X@NumberofApplications 7 &!4"  7  TotalValueinU.S.Dollars WM&42    (@1994(@WA  1994 pfB (@1994 (@  @6@pAӀ6 WM?"  @6 @ WЀ$66,443 RH!3 ,@1995,@R  1995 qgB< ,@1995 ,@  ;@27;@qBӀ27 XN@<"  ;@27 ;@ XЀ$366,498,433 RH!<3 0@19960@R  1996 qgB 0@1996 0@  C@39C@q/DӀ39 XN@"  C@39 C@ XЀ$209,134,369 RH!3 4@19974@R  1997 qgBD  4@1997 4@  G@47G@q}EӀ47 XN@D!"  G@47 G@ XЀ$393,281,396 RH!D"3 8@19988@R  1998 qgB # 8@1998 8@  E@43E@qFӀ43 XN@ $"  E@43 E@ XЀ$129,113,580 RH! %3 <@1999<@R  1999 qgB!L& <@1999 <@  @@32@@qHӀ32 XN@!L'"  @@32 @@ X  Ӏ$407,887,147 RH!!L(0 @@2000@@RI2000 zpB#) @@2000 @@  $@10$@z10 XN@#*"  $@10 $@ X  Ӏ$31,130,643 Y H!#+0 D@2001D@Y\J2001  oB$T, D@2001 D@   @7@7 ^ M?$T-"  @7 @  ^  Ӏ$1,187,232 7 &!$T.0  7KTOTAL a P!'&/  `j@211`j@a211 ` OA'&0" `j@211 `j@  `  Ӏ$1,538,299,2431'%'&10   1Lg Libya  +$5 AccordingtoCensusBureaustatistics,U.S.exportstoLibyaincalendaryear2000totaled$17.9 +%6 million,mostlyconsistingofwheat.ThisaccountsforanegligiblepercentageofLibyastotal O importsof$7.6billionin2000,accordingtotheCIAsWorld_Factbook_.Libyasmajorsuppliers ? includeItaly(24percent),Germany(12percent),Tunisia(9percent),theU.K.(7percent), / France(6percent),andSouthKorea(5percent).Libyasmajorimportsweremachinery,   transportequipment,food,andmanufacturedgoods.   U.S.exportstoLibyahavedeclinedsteadilysince1979whenexportcontrolswerefirst   tightened.Sincethen,theUnitedStateshasauthorizedexportstofulfillpre1982contractual   obligationsandhumanitarianaid.AnnualU.S.exportsand_reexports_ԀtoLibyafellfrom$860   millionin1979tolessthan$1millionannuallyfrom1987through1994.TotalU.S.exportsto p  Libyahavebeenvirtuallyzeroforeveryyearfrom1992through1999.InFY2000,exports `  totaled$1.6million,duetotheshipmentofcorn.InFY2001,BXAissuedonelicensevaluedat P  $305,000anddeniedtwovaluedat$1,312,122. @  f  g f  KS g Sudan  o  U.S.unilateralexportsanctionsonSudanhavehadonlyaminoraffectonU.S.industry. _ Sudanspooreconomicperformanceoverthepastdecadepreventsthecountryfromimportinga O significantamountofgoodsfromanysupplier,includingtheUnitedStates.BeforetheU.S. ? embargowentintoeffectonNovember4,1997,thesmallamountthatSudanimportedfromthe / UnitedStatesgenerallydidnotrequireanexportlicenseand,thus,wasnotaffectedbytheexport  controls.H( ` hp x ,XX hXHӀAccordingtoCensusBureaustatistics,U.S.exportstoSudanincalendaryear2000  totaled$16.9million,mostlywheatandlegumes.TheCIAestimatesthatSudanstotalimports  fromallsourceswere$1.2billionin2000;leadingsupplierswereChina,Libya,SaudiArabia,  theUnitedKingdom,andFrance.Leadingimportswerefoodstuffs,manufacturedgoods,  machineryandtransportequipment,andmedicines.  TheU.S.aerospaceindustryappearstohavebeenthemostaffectedbytheanti-terrorismcontrols ` onSudan.AircraftexportsfromtheUnitedStatestoSudantotaledmorethan$6.4millionin P 1992,butnosuchexportshavebeenreportedsince1994.Exportsofaircraftenginesandaircraft  @ enginepartsshowasimilardecline,fallingfrom$845,142in1992tobarely$10,000in1997. !0 By1998,U.S.aerospaceexportstoSudanhadfallentovirtuallyzero. o"  ThenumberofU.S.exportlicensesissuedforSudanwasnegligiblebeforethesanctionswere O$  implemented,sincelowleveltechnologyitems(whichdidnotrequireexportlicenses) ?%! constitutedthebulkofU.S.exports.Aftersanctionswereimposed,_OFAC_Ԁacquiredexport /&" controlauthorityforSudan.Sincethen,BXAhasonlyprocessedlicenseapplicationswith ' # Sudaneseenduserswhentheapplicationisfora deemedexport.Therewerenolicense (!$ applicationsapprovedorrejectedforSudaninFY2001andfivewere_RWAd_Ԁ(valuedat$9.3 ("% million),withinstructionsfortheexportertocontact_OFAC_. )#&   Table3:ApprovedLicensesforSudan(FY1992toFY2001) +%( _  * d d( dd (  dd  A dd A (#(#,', ,m +  8 '?? (8Q=` hp x (#%'0*,.XQFiscalYear = ,!g  =  TotalApplicationsApproved = ,!g   =_  TotalValue(inU.S.dollars) ka'g0 (    @1992( @kn`1992 ^T*0  @1992  @  ?1?^1 E;00"  ?1 ? EЀ$25 \R03 ( $@1993($@\1993 ^T* H $@1993 $@  @2@^2 E;0 H "  @2 @ E$5,404,000 \R H 3 ( (@1994((@\1994 SI* `  (@1994 (@ # S0 :0% ` " #  :Ѐ$0 \R ` 3 ( ,@1995(,@\1995 SI* x ,@1995 ,@ # S0 :0% x" #  :Ѐ$0 \R x3 ( 0@1996(0@\1996 ^T*  0@1996 0@  @7@^7 E;0 "  @7 @ EЀ$571,992 \R 3 ( 4@1997(4@\1997 _U*  4@1997 4@  $@10$@_10 F<1 "  $@10 $@ F$7,095,973 \R 3 ( 8@1998(8@\1998 SI* 8@1998 8@ # S0 :0%" #  :Ѐ$0 \R3 ( <@1999(<@\1999 ^T*'  <@1999 <@  ?1?^1 E;0' "  ?1 ? EЀ$1 ND' 3 ( D@2001(D@N2001 ^T*?  D@2001 D@  ?1?^1 E;0? "  ?1 ? E$1 Z I? 3 ( D@2001(D@Z2001 i X9W  D@2001 D@  # i0 P ?4W !" #   P$0 K :'W "3 (   (K  TOTAL ] L!o #   6@226@]Ik22 \ K@o $"  6@22 6@  \ $13,071,992 7-+o %3 (   7  Syria  O& U.S.controlshavehadminimalimpactonindustrybecausetheU.S.Governmentdoesnot ?' requirealicenseformostitemsforSyriasleadingimportsectors,includingagriculturalitems /( andEAR99productsforthepetroleumindustry.DespiterecentsetbackstotheSyrianeconomy, ) theeconomicreformsandinfrastructureimprovementsundertakenbythegovernmentinthe * early1990s,whilelimited,haveenhancedthecountryspotentialasamarketforU.S.exports. + From1992-2000,thevolumeofU.S.exportstoSyriahasbeenrelativelystable,fallingwithin - therangeof$161millionand$226millionperyear.Incalendaryear2000,U.S.exportstotaled . $219.0million.Cereals,mostlycorn,accountedforaboutaquarterofU.S.exports,asdid p/ varioustypesofmachinery.Otherleadingexportsincludedtobaccoandpharmaceuticals. `0 TheaverageannualvalueofexportlicensesissuedbyBXAforSyriahasincreasedinthelastten  @2 years.InFY1991,BXAapprovedeightlicenseswithatotalvalueof$1,041,504.However,the !03 valuelicensedtradehasrisentoanaverageofmorethan$83millionperyearbetweenFY1994 o" 4 throughFY2000.InFY2001therewasadeclineinboththenumberoflicensesapprovedfor _#5 Syriaaswellastheirvalue.f   g  O$6 ThemajorityoflicenseditemsforexportduringtheperiodcoveredbyTable4consistofaircraft /&8 partsandcomponents,digitalcomputers,andcertainelectronicdevicesandtelecommunications ' 9 equipmentcontrolledforforeignpolicyreasonsonly.BXAdeniednineapplicationsvaluedat (!: $67,996inFY2001,bringingthetotalnumberofapplicationsdeniedforSyriasinceFY1991to ("; 75applicationswithatotalvalueof$32.8million. )#<   Table4:ApprovedLicensesforSyria(FY1991-2001) +%>   * d d'' m m (#(#,( ,; , +  8 '?? (8Q=` hp x (#%'0*,.XQ  FiscalYear = ,!g  =vTotalApplicationsApproved = ,!g"  =  TotalValue g (inU.S.dollars) pf,W0 (    @1991(@puw 1991 ^T*o  @1991 @   @8 @^ 8 E;0o "   @8  @ EЀ$1,041,504 \Ro U (  @1992( @\ 1992 _U* 8   @1992  @  ?@31?@_ 31 F<1 8 "  ?@31 ?@ F$46,366,527 \R 8 U ( $@1993($@\ 1993 `V* P  $@1993 $@ Z@106Z@` 106 G=2 P " Z@106 Z@ G$42,896,103 \R PU ( (@1994((@\ 1994 `V* h (@1994 (@ d@167d@` 167 G=2 h" d@167 d@ G$76,379,096 \R hU ( ,@1995(,@\ 1995 `V*  ,@1995 ,@ `a@139`a@` 139 G=2 " `a@139 `a@ G$68,298,135 \R U ( 0@1996(0@\ 1996 _U* 0@1996 0@  T@80T@_ 80 F<1"  T@80 T@ F$81,006,877 \RU ( 4@1997(4@\ 1997 `V*  4@1997 4@ Y@100Y@` 100 G=2 " Y@100 Y@ G$107,003,346 \R U ( 8@1998(8@\ 1998 _U*  8@1998 8@  @T@81@T@_ 81 F<1 "  @T@81 @T@ F$80,707,010 WM U ( <@1999(<@W 1999 `V*/  <@1999 <@ Y@100Y@` 100 G=2/ " Y@100 Y@ G$86,534,591 ND/ U ( @@2000(@@N 2000 `V*G ! @@2000 @@ @^@121@^@`121 G=2G "" @^@121 @^@ G$141,539,669 Z IG #U ( D@2001(D@Z 2001 v e9_$ D@2001 D@  Z@106Z@v 106 ] LA_%" Z@106 Z@  ]$70,269,323 K :'_&U (   (KTOTAL _ N!w('  <@1039<@_1039 ^ MBw((" <@1039 <@  ^$802,042,1817-+w()U (   7  TheU.S.policyofcasebycasereviewforaircraftpartsandcomponentsandaircraftengine W* partsandcomponentsforairsafetyhasledtoanincreaseinaerospaceexportstoSyria.From G+ 1991-98,exportsofaircraftenginepartstoSyriatotaled$3.1million(slightlymorethan17.4 7, percentoftotalU.S.aerospaceexportstoSyriaduringthisperiod)whileexportsofavionics '- equipmenttotaledonly$355,596(just1.9percentoftotalU.S.aerospaceexportstoSyria).In . 1998,miscellaneousaircraftpartsandequipmentaccountedfor71.4percent($1.39million)of / totalU.S.aerospaceexports,whileexportsofavionicsequipmenttotaled$52,139(2.7percentof 0 totalU.S.aerospaceexportstoSyria).ExportsofaircraftenginepartstoSyria,whichhadfallen 1 tovirtuallyzeroin1997,increasedto$503,991in1998(25.9percentoftotal1998U.S. 2 aerospaceexportstoSyria).Incalendaryear2000,totalU.S.aerospaceexportstoSyriaequalled x3 g f  g $600,000f  g ,allofwhichwasintheformofaircraftparts.  h4 TheU.S.policyofnotapprovingthesaleofnewaircrafttoSyriahasresultedinagradualshift "H6 fromtheexportofaircraftpartsandcomponentsforU.S.-originplanestotheexportofpartsfor #87 non-U.S.-originplanes.AlthoughSyrianArabAirlines(SAA)operatesseveralBoeingaircraft, w$(8 which,becausetheyareall20-25yearsold,requirelargeamountsofspareandmaintenance g%9 partstooperatesafely,theirrecentpurchaseofsixAirbusaircraftindicatethattheBoeing W& : aircraftmayberetired.ManyofthecomponentscurrentlyrequiredbySAAforuseonthe G' ; BoeingaircraftareprovidedbyU.S.exporters.AlthoughtheimpactofretiringtheBoeing 7(!< aircrafthasnotyetbeendetermined,U.S.exportersarealsoprovidingpartsandcomponentsfor ')"= theAirbusaircraft,albeitatlowerlevels. *#> U.S.informationtechnologyfirmsalsoareincreasinglyaffectedbyexportcontrolsonSyria. +%@ Thetechnologylevelatwhichexportlicensesarerequiredhasnotchangedinrecentyears, O despiterapidtechnologicaladvancements.Thishastheeffectofcontrollingevenverylowlevel ? items.Forexample,thecontrollevelforcomputerexportstoSyriastandsat6millionsof / theoreticaloperationspersecond(MTOPS).    Iran    U.S.policyistodenydual-uselicensesforIran,consistentwiththeIran-IraqArms   Non-proliferationActof1992,containedintheNationalDefenseAuthorizationActofFY1993   (NDAA),andtheU.S.tradeandinvestmentembargoof1995.PriortotheNDAAandthe   impositionoftheembargo,U.S.exportstoIranhadrisensharplyintheearly1990sinresponse p  toIransremovalofcertainimportrestrictions.From1991through1994,U.S.exportstoIran `  totaledcloseto$2.2billion,makingtheUnitedStatesthesixthlargestexportertoIranduring P  thisperiod.Suchexports,however,amountedtoonlyfivepercentofIranstotalimportsand @  lessthanonepercentofoverallU.S.exports. 0  FollowingthedenialpolicymandatedbyFY1993NDAAandthe1995U.S.tradeand _ investmentembargo,U.S.exportstoIranhavefallendramatically.In1999,theU.S.exported O $48.1milliontoIran,virtuallyallintheformofcerealssuchascorn.In2000,exportsfell ? furtherto$16.6million!again,almostallcereal. / Since1997,BXAhasonlyapprovedapplicationsfor"deemedexports"(transfersofcontrolled  U.S.technologytoIraniannationalslegallyresidinginandworkingintheUnitedStates),rather  thanactualexports.InFY2001,BXAapproved19deemedexportlicensesforIraniannationals.  Incontrast,duringthefourfiscalyearspriortoFY1995(FY1991-94),theUnitedStates  approvedanaverageof$177millioninapplicationstoIraneachyear.Table5showstheimpact  oftheNDAAonU.S.tradewithIran: p   Table5:ApprovedApplicationstoIran(FY1991-2001) o"    * d d( ( ; ;   (#(#,( ,( ,( +  8 'O$ O$ (8Q=` hp x (#%'0*,.XQFiscalYear = ,!w$(!  =  NumberofApplications = ,!w$("   =,  TotalValueinU.S.Dollars pf,w$(#0 (    @1991(@p1991 _U*%@$ @1991 @  @V@89@V@_Ѐ89 F<1%@%"  @V@89 @V@ F$60,149,182 \R%@&U (  @1992( @\1992 `V*&X '  @1992  @ ``@131``@`131 G=2&X (" ``@131 ``@ G$567,559,528 \R&X )U ( $@1993($@\1993 _U*'p!* $@1993 $@  F@44F@_Ѐ44 F<1'p!+"  F@44 F@ F$63,834,952 \R'p!,U ( (@1994((@\1994 _U*("- (@1994 (@  $@10$@_Ѐ10 F<1("."  $@10 $@ F$16,774,377 \R("/U ( ,@1995(,@\1995 SI*)#0 ,@1995 ,@ # SЀ0 :0%)#1" #  :Ѐ$0 \R)#2U ( 0@1996(0@\1996 SI*+$3 0@1996 0@ # SЀ0 :0%+$4" #  :Ѐ$0 \R+$5U ( 4@1997(4@\1997 ^T*,%6 4@1997 4@  @5@^Ѐ5 E;0,%7"  @5 @ EЀ$19 \R,%8U ( 8@1998(8@\1998 ^T*( 8@1998 8@  @6@^Ѐ6 E;0("  @6 @ EЀ$10,012 WM(U ( <@1999(<@W1999 _U*@ <@1999 <@  $@10$@_Ѐ10 F<1@"  $@10 $@ FЀ$20,408 ND@U ( @@2000(@@N2000 _U* X @@2000 @@  7@237@_23 F<1 X"  7@23 7@ F$35 Z I X U ( D@2001(D@Z2001 u d9 p  D@2001 D@   3@193@u19 \ K@ p "  3@19 3@  \$32 K :' p U (   (K  TOTAL ^ M!    @]@117@]@^117 ] LA " @]@117 @]@  ]  $80,639,835 D:' 2 (   (D '   'Ј ' U 'Ј( U ( (  TheU.S.tradeandinvestmentembargoradicallytransformedthecompositionofU.S.tradewith   Iran.Since1996,thefirstfullyearoftheembargo,topU.S.exportstoIranarecompletely  differentthanpreviousyears.Incalendaryear2000,nearly90percentofU.S.exportstoIran p wereintheformofcereals,withpharmaceuticalproducts,suchasbloodantisera,andprinted `  materialsmakinguptheremainder. P  Table6indicatethattheagriculturalandoilindustrywereamongthosemostdirectlyaffectedby 0  theembargo.TheU.S.aerospaceindustryhasbeenalsosignificantlyaffected.From1991   through1994,U.S.exportsofaircraftenginepartstoIrantotalednearlyg $9.4million,averaging w $2.3millionperyearandpeakingatmorethan$7.5millionin1994.By1996,thefirstyearthat g thetradeembargowasfullyineffect,aerospaceexportsdeclinedtovirtuallyzero. W Priortotheembargo,theUnitedStatescompetedwithIransmajortradingpartnersinindustrial 7 machinery,motorvehiclesandautoparts,powergeneratingmachinery,measuringand ' controllingdevices,computers,plasticsandresins,andindustrialorganicchemicals.In2000,   Iranimportedatotalof$50billioningoods.Iransleadingsourcesoftheseproductsin2000 ! wereGermany,SouthKorea,Italy,theUnitedArabEmirates,France,andJapan. "   Table6:TopU.S.ExportstoIran,1991-1995(FASValue,inU.S.Dollars) !@'   * dd( ( ( ( ( ( (#(#,,,+  8 '# )#  (8Q=` hp x (#%'0*,.XQS.I.C.Number #H*  = ,!$8+  =  DescriptionofGoods = ,!#H,   =  TotalValue ka'#H-0 (   n@3511(n@k 3511 ?5*%P. n@3511 n@ ?Turbines&turbinegeneratorsets '%P/ '$322.5million \R%P03 ( @3531(@\3531 ?5*&h1 @3531 @ ?Constructionmachinery&parts '&h2 '$307.8million \R&h33 ( @3533(@\3533 ?5*' 4 @3533 @ ?Oil&gasfieldequipment '' 5 'Ѐ$250.1million \R' 63 ( @2044(@\2044 ?5*(!7 @2044 @ ?Milledrice&by-products '(!8 'Ѐ$166.3million \R(!93 ( \@0115(\@\0115 ?5**": \@0115 \@ ?Corn  *"; $137.4million \R*"<3 ( r@2873(r@\2873 ?5*/+#= r@2873 r@ ?Nitrogenousfertilizers  /+#> $124.2million \R/+#?3 ( @3714(@\3714 ?5*G,$@ @3714 @ ?Motorvehicleparts&accessories  G,$A $50.8million \RG,$B3 (  @2821( @\2821 ?5*w(  @2821  @ ?Plasticsmaterials&resins  w( $45.4million \Rw(3 ( >@3743(>@\3743 ?5*@ >@3743 >@ ?Railroadequipment&parts  @ $42.7million Z I@3 ( @3569(@Z3569 L ;9X @3569 @  LGeneralindustrialmachinery&equipment 4 #X  4$41.8million7-+X 3 (   7  Themostdamagingeffectoftheembargoonindustryhasbeenthereactionofforeignfirmsto  8  U.S.reexportrequirements.U.S.exportersreportthattheirproductsareoftendesignedoutof w (  foreignmanufacturedgoodstoinsurethatforeignexportsdonotfallwithinthescopeofU.S. g   controls.This"designingout"damagesU.S.exports,bothforsalestoembargoedcountriesand W   non-embargoedcountries. G f   g f  g SDTs,FTOs,andSDGTs  f  g  '  BXAdidnotreviewanylicenseapplicationsforSDTsorFTOsinFY2001;thus,theeconomic   impactofthesecontrolsisminimal.OFACmaintainsrestrictionsonactivitiesofU.S.persons   involvingdesignatedterroristentities,whichBXAscontrolsaugment.   f  g f   g 5.  EnforcementofControl. Becauseofthewellpublicizedinvolvementofthesecountries  inactsofinternationalterrorism,thereispublicknowledgeandsupportforU.S.controls,which x facilitatesenforcement.Thelargenumberofitemsexportedinnormaltradetoothercountries, h includingsomeaircraftitemsandconsumergoodsthathavemanyproducersandendusers X aroundtheworld,createsinnumerableprocurementopportunitiesforbrokers,agents,andfront H companiesworkingforthesecountries.Inaddition,differencesinexportlawsandstandardsof 8 evidenceforviolationsalsocomplicatelawenforcementcooperationbetweencountries.f  g  w( Thecontrolsondesignatedterroristentitiesfacilitatef  g ԀexportenforcementbyenablingBXAto W investigateexportsandreexportsofunlicenseditemssubjecttotheEARtosuchterroristentities,f  g  G whereverlocated.f  g  7 BXAviewsthesecontrolsasakeyenforcementtarget,usingregularoutreacheffortstokeep  ! businessesinformedofconcernsandgatheringleadsonactivitiesofconcern,safeguardvisitsto !" verifyenduseandendusersofU.S.commodities,andotherprogramstomaintainastrong !# enforcementeffort.BXAismovingtoimplementastrongprogramtodealwithprocurementby "$ orfordesignatedterroristsupportingcountriesandentities.Thisprogramincludesenhanced #% agenttraining,developmentofatargetedoutreachprogramtofamiliarizeU.S.businesswith $x& concerns,andclosecooperationwithleadagenciesworkingterrorismissues. %h'  C.ConsultationwithIndustry  'H!)  f   g OnNovember7,2001,theDepartmentofCommerce,viatheFederalRegisterandonBXAs w)(#+ Webpage,solicitedcommentsfromindustryontheeffectivenessofforeignpolicybasedexport g*$, controls.AdetailedreviewofthecommentsisavailableinAppendixI. W+%- _ G,%. OverhalfofthecommentsreceivedaddressedtheneedtoliftU.S.unilateral_reexport_Ԁcontrolson O Libya.ThelettersweresubmittedbytheNationalAssociationofManufacturers,thePetroleum ? EquipmentSuppliersCorporation,BakerHughes,_Halliburton_,andtheNationalForeignTrade / Council.Thecommentscontainedacommonviewthatcontinued_reexport_Ԁcontrolsensurethat   U.S.companieswillbeleftoutoftheLibyanmarketwithoutanyresultingforeignpolicybenefit.   BakerHughesstatedthefollowing: ThecompetitivepositionofU.S.companiesishurtbythe   existenceofthese_reexport_Ԁcontrols,sincetheycauseforeigncustomerstodesignoutU.S.   products,andforeigncompetitorsusethesecontrolstopersuadepotentialcustomersnottobuy   Americangoods.   BakerHughesrecommendedaligningcontrolsonLibyawiththoseimposedonothercountriesof `  concern.ThisviewwasechoedbyNAM,whichstatedthefollowing: TheUnitedStatesdoes P  notapplythisstandardon_reexports_Ԁtoothercountriesofspecialconcern,suchasIranandSudan, @  exceptfornarrowde_minimis_Ԁexceptions.Whileweoppose,asageneralrule,unilateraltrade 0  sanctions,iftheymustcontinue,wewouldliketoseemoreconsistencyintheirapplication.This o  canbeachievedbyallowingtheforeignpolicybased_reexport_ԀcontrolsonLibyalapsewhenthey _ expireinJanuary2002.SeveralotherlettersalsoadvocatedthattheSecretaryofCommercenot O extend_reexport_Ԁcontrolsfor2002.TheorganizationsrecommendedthattheUnitedStatesfocus ? oncontrollingitemsthatcouldcompromisenationalsecurity,nonproliferation,orantiterrorism / concernswhileliberalizingnonsensitiveEAR99_reexports_.  InJulyof2001,BXAheldabriefingf  g forover75industryrepresentativesonthedetailsofthe  regulationsimplementingtheTradeSanctionsReformandExportEnhancementActof2000.  InDecember2001,BXAalsobriefedtheTechnicalAdvisoryCommitteeabouttheintended  expansionofcontrolsonchemicalmixtures.  BXAcontinuestoreceiveinquiriesandtoconsultwithindustryinregardtolicensingpolicyand ` practicesfordesignatedterroristsupportingcountriesandforf  g f  g designatedterroristentities.BXA P alsoworksincoordinationwiththeDepartmentsofState,Defense,and_OFAC_Ԁtokeepindustry  @ informedofchangesinlicensingrequirementsandpoliciestowardembargoedanddesignated !0 terroristsupportingcountries. o"   D.ConsultationwithOtherCountries  O$  ЀTheUnitedStatescontinuestoconsultwithanumberofcountries,bothonabilateralanda /&" multilateralbasis,onactivitiesofdesignatedterroristsupportingcountries.TheU.S. ' # Governmentalsoholdsongoingconsultationsondesignatedterroristentities.Ingeneral,most (!$ countriesaresupportiveofU.S.antiterrorismeffortsbutdonotimplementstrictexportcontrol ("% programssimilartotheUnitedStates. )#&  Cuba  +%( TheAdministrationhasworkedhardwithothernations,especiallynationsinEuropeandLatin O America,toresolvedisputesthatarisebecauseofimplementationoftheU.S.embargo. ? AlthoughdifferencesremainbetweentheUnitedStatesandothercountriesconcerningthebest / methodtoencouragedemocracyandhumanrights,theEuropeanUnionscommitmenttoits   position(renewedinDecember2001)thatrelationscannotimproveunlessHavanamakes   significantimprovementsinhumanrightsremainsveryhelpful.Similarly,cooperationwitha   numberofcountriesthroughouttheworldresultedinapositiveoutcomeattheU.N.Commission   onHumanRightsearlierin2001.    NorthKorea  p  TheUnitedStatesconsultsonanongoingbasiswithitsregionalalliesregardingantiterrorism `  controlsonNorthKorea.Inparticular,theUnitedStatesworkscloselywithJapanoncontinuing P  antiterrorismcontrolsonNorthKorea. @   Libya  o  ExtensiveconsultationwithothernationsonLibyancontrolscontinuestotakeplaceunderthe _ auspicesoftheUnitedNations.TheUnitedStatesalsohasconductednumerousbilateral O discussionsonthistopic. ? f  g f  g f  g f  H g Sudan   TheUnitedStatescontinuestoconsultwithothercountriesregardingtheinternalconflictin  Sudan,theresultingrefugeeproblem,andthemilitaryattacksonaidworkerscommittedbyboth  sidesofSudansinternaldispute.Manyoftheseconsultationshaveoccurredwithintheforumof  theUnitedNations.   Syria  p TheUnitedStatesconsultsonanongoingbasiswithSyriaandtheothercountriesinvolvedin,or ` partyto,theMiddleEastpeacenegotiations. P  Iran !0  TheUnitedStateshasanongoingdialoguewithitsalliesandpartnersonIransactivities.The o"  UnitedStatescontinuestoworkwithotherstatestocurbIransproliferationactivities. _# f   g f  g _SDTs_,_FTOs_,and_SDGTs_ f  g  ?%!  TheUnitedStatescooperateswithalliesandpartnersandsharesinformationonf  g f  g theactivitiesof /&" designatedterroristentities.ItisexpectedthatstrongallysupportfortheU.S.fightagainst ' # terrorismwillfurtherfacilitatedialogueonforeignexportcontrolexpansion. (!$  E.AlternativeMeans  )#& TheUnitedStateshastakenawiderangeofdiplomatic,political,andsecurityrelatedsteps,in +%( additiontoeconomicmeasuressuchasexportcontrols,topersuadecertaincountriestostoptheir O supportforterroristactivities.ThemethodsthattheUnitedStatesusesagainstacountry, ? terroristorganization,orindividualvariesandisdictatedbythecircumstancesprevailingatany / giventime.f  g Forexample,inthecaseofSyria,theUnitedStatesbelievesthatmaintenanceof   antiterrorismcontrolsisanappropriatemethodtoreinforcetoSyriaitsobligationstoactagainst   terroristelements.Thef  g controlsondesignatedterroristentitiesf  g indicatetheUnitedStatesdesire   topreventsuchf  g f  g entitiesfromacquiringcommodities,whetherofU.S.orforeignorigin.   f   g f  g f   g F.ForeignAvailability    TheforeignavailabilityprovisiondoesnotapplytoitemsdeterminedbytheSecretaryofStateto `  requirecontrolunderSection6(j)oftheActf  g .f  g    C f  g ԀCognizantofthevalueofsuchcontrolsin P  emphasizingtheU.S.positiontowardcountriessupportinginternationalterrorism,Congress @  specificallyexcludedthemfromforeignavailabilityassessmentsotherwiserequiredbytheAct. 0  However,BXAhasconsideredforeignavailabilityofitemscontrolledtodesignatedterrorist o  supportingcountriesunderSection6(a). _ ForSyriaandIran,therearenumerousforeignsourcesforcommoditiessimilartothosesubject ? tocontrol.AlthoughSudansimportsarelowtechnologyitemsforwhichnumerousforeign / sourcesexist,thepoorhealthofSudanseconomy,andthusitsinabilitytoimportthesegoods,  makesforeignavailabilitylessofanissue.ThedevelopmentofSudansoilresourceswould  changethisperceptionradically,aswouldanendtothecivilwar,sincetheseeventsarelikelyto  haveapositiveimpactonthehealthofSudanseconomy.ForNorthKorea,thecontinued  maintenanceofsanctionsbymanyothercountriesseverelylimitstheimpactofforeign  availability.     ` __@9MXXj 8dd8  CHAPTER5  H EmbargoesandSanctionedCountriesandEntities  x (Part746)#XjXM#   ExportControlProgramDescriptionandLicensingPolicy   TheUnitedStatesmaintainscomprehensiveeconomicembargoesagainstCuba,Iran,Iraq, x  Libya,andSudan(fiveofthesevencountriesdesignatedbytheSecretaryofStateasstate h  sponsorsofinternationalterrorism).ThecomprehensivecontrolsmaintainedbytheDepartment X  ofCommerceonCuba,Iran,Libya,andSudanarediscussedindetailinChapter4.Controlson H  Iraq   C ׀implementingtheUnitedNationsembargoareadministeredbytheDepartmentofthe 8 TreasurysOfficeofForeignAssetsControl(OFAC). w( TheUnitedStatesmaintainsarmsembargoesontheTalibancontrolledareasofAfghanistan, W Liberia,Rwanda,andtheFederalRepublicofYugoslavia.Inaddition,anembargoismaintained G onarmsandotherspecificcommoditiesfortheNationalUnionfortheTotalIndependenceof 7 Angola(UNITA)inAngolaconsistentwithU.N.mandatedarmsbans.TheDepartmentsof ' StateandCommercehaveauthoritytoimplementsuchembargoesundertheirrespectiveexport  controlauthorities.TheStateDepartmentcontrolsdefensearticlesandservicesunderthe  InternationalTrafficinArmsRegulations(ITAR).TheCommerceDepartmentcontrolscertain  shotgunsandarangeofarmsrelateditemsundertheExportAdministrationRegulations(EAR).  WhenaU.N.Resolutionmandatesabanon"arms"and"relatedmateriel,"thebanappliesto  itemscontrolledunderbothStateandCommerceregulatoryauthority.Armsrelatedmaterielis x generallyconsideredtobecommoditiesandtechnologythattheCommerceDepartmentcontrols  h forregionalstabilityandcrimecontrolreasons,aswellasitemssubjecttotheEARthatareon !X theInternationalMunitionsList.However,insomeinstances,theCommerceDepartmenthas "H controlledadditionalitemsinlightofparticularU.N.Resolutions.Forinstance,theCommerce #8 DepartmentimposedcontrolsonafewadditionalitemstoRwanda,theFederalRepublicof w$( Yugoslavia,andLiberia.AsconcernsUNITAandtheTaliban,theCommerceDepartment g%  controlsonarmsrelatedmaterieltoallofAngolaandAfghanistancontinueineffectandsupport W& ! thebanthattheDepartmentoftheTreasurymaintainsonarmsandotherspecificitemsto G' " UNITAandthefulltradebanthatOFACmaintainsontheTalibanandTalibancontrolled 7(!# territoryinAfghanistan. ')"$ InApril2001,theUnitedStatesremovedcomprehensivetradesanctionsimposedin1999 +%' againstSerbiabecauseoftheethnicconflictinKosovo.TheBureauofExportAdministration O (BXA)alsoremovedspecialexportsanctionsimposedin1998againstIndiaandPakistan ? becauseoftheirdetonationofnucleardevices.Inaddition,BXAimplementedtherequirements / oftheTradeSanctionsReformandExportEnhancementActof2000(TSRA)(TitleIXofPublic   Law106387)forexportsofagriculturalcommoditiestoCuba.   BXAwillpublishanamendmenttotheEARthatexpandsthescopeofexplosivedetection   systemscontrolledunderExportControlClassificationnumber(ECCN)2A993,andcreatenew   licenserequirementsfortheexportandreexportofrelatedsoftwareandtechnology.Thenew   licensingrequirementswillbecontainedinECCNs2D993and2E993.Inthepast,theU.S. p  Governmentrequiredalicensefortheexportandreexportofthisequipmentonlytothe `  designatedterroristsupportingcountries.Withthisamendment,BXAimposesspecificcontrols P  ontheFederalRepublicofYugoslavia.BXAdesignedtheamendmenttoenhancethesecurity @  andsafetyofairlinetravelworldwide,andforphysicalstructuresincludinggovernment 0  buildings,byrestrictingtheexportandreexportofU.S.originexplosivedetectionsystemsand o  relatedsoftwareandtechnology.Chapter3providesdetailsofthenewproposedregulation. _ Thischapterisdividedintotwosections:PartIaddressestradeembargoesnotcoveredin ? Chapter4andsanctionsimposedpursuanttostatute,andPartIIaddressesembargoesonarms / relateditemsimplementedbyBXA.   &  PartI:TradeEmbargoesandSanctions    IndiaandPakistan   OnSeptember22,2001,PresidentGeorgeW.Bushwaivedtheapplicationofcertainsanctions  placedonIndiaandPakistan,includingthosesanctionsimplementedbyregulationsissuedon p November19,1998(63FR64322).BXApublishedaruleonOctober'Ԁ1,2001thatimplemented ` thewaiverofthesesanctionsbyremovingthepolicyofdenialforexportsandreexportsofitems P controlledforNuclearProliferationandMissileTechnologyreasonstoIndiaandPakistanand  @ restoringtheuseofLicenseExceptionsfortheseitemsforentitiesnotlistedonBXAsEntity !0 List.Inaddition,theruleremovedcertainsupplementarymeasurestakeninconnectionwiththe o"  sanctionsbyremovingalargenumberofIndianandPakistanientitiesfromtheEntityList. _#  Serbia  ?%! FromMay4,1999toMarch1,2001,BXAmaintainedcomprehensivesanctionsonexportsto /&" Serbia.OnMarch1,2001,BXApublishedaruleg generallyrestoringSerbiatotheexportcontrol ' # statusithadpriortoMay4,1999.Underthisrule,manyitemsmaynowbeexportedand (!$ reexportedtoSerbiawithoutalicense.However,certainrestrictionsaremaintainedonpersons ("% designatedpursuanttoExecutiveOrder13088,asamendedbyExecutiveOrder13192of )#& January17,2001f  .UnitedStatespersonsmaynotexportorreexportanyitemsubjecttotheEAR *$' toanysuchdesignatedperson,includingSlobodanMilosevic,certainfamilymembersandclose +%( associatesf  g ,f  g ԀandpersonsunderopenindictmentbytheInternationalCriminalTribunalforthe O formerYugoslaviaf  g .f  Ԁ ?  FoodandMedicineExports    OnJuly12,2001,BXAandOFACpublishedregulationsimplementingcertainprovisionsofthe   TSRA.BXAimplementedtherequirementsoftheActforexportsofagriculturalcommodities   toCuba.BXAcreatedLicenseException AgriculturalCommodities(AGR)topermitexports   ofagriculturalcommoditiesthatareclassifiedEAR99andnotspecificallyidentifiedontheCCL.   InordertoutilizeAGR,theexportermustfirstsubmittoBXAanotificationoftheproposed p  export.Ifnoagencyobjectstothetransaction,thenBXAnotifiestheexporterthatAGRmaybe `  used.Exceptforshipmentsofcommercialsamplesordonations,allotherexportsunderAGR P  mustbemadepursuanttoawrittencontract.Exportsalesmusttakeplacewithinoneyearofthe @  signingofthecontract. 0  ExportsandreexportsofmedicinesandmedicaldevicestoCubaarenoteligibleforAGR, _ becauseTSRAdidnotoverridethespecificlicensingrequirementsformedicinesandmedical O devicesassetforthintheCubanDemocracyActof1992(PublicLaw102484),butareeligible ? forexistingBXAlicenseapplicationprocedures. / TSRArequiredtheuseofanewdefinitionof agriculturalcommodity,incorporatingby  referencethedefinitionofagriculturalcommodityinsection102oftheAgricultureTradeActof  1978(7U.S.C.5602),whichincludesbothfoodandnonfoodproducts.Section775ofPublic  Law106387alsoprovidesthat,forpurposesofadministeringf  g f  g f  g theTSRA,thetermagricultural  commodityalsoincludesfertilizerandorganicfertilizer.Basedonconcernaboutpossible  terroristuseofcertainfertilizers,BXAsubmittedaforeignpolicyreporttotheCongress, p providingnoticethat,afterconsultingtheSecretaryofStateandconsistentwiththeprovisionsof ` theExportAdministrationAct(EAA),asamended,itintendedtoimposenewforeignpolicy P controlsondryfertilizersandfertilizerblendscontainingmorethanf  g 15f  g Ԁpercentbyweight  @ ammoniumnitrate.TheseitemsarenowclassifiedasECCN1C997andrequirealicensefor !0 antiterrorismreasons.TheforeignpolicyreportwassenttoCongressonJune15,2001. o"  ControlsonexportsofitemstoCuba,otherthanagriculturalandmedicalitems,arediscussedin O$  Chapter4.OFACregulatesexportsofagriculturalcommodities,medicines,andmedicaldevices ?%! toIran,Libya,andSudanpursuanttotheTSRA.OFACcontrolsonagriculturalandmedical /&" itemstoIran,Libya,andSudanarenotdiscussedinthisreport. ' #  LicensingAgenciesforEmbargoesandSanctionedCountriesandEntities  (!$ BXAhasexportcontrolauthorityfordualuseitemssubjecttoitsjurisdictiontoallcountries, )#& includingcountriessubjecttocomprehensivetradeembargoesadministeredbyOFAC.The *$' CommerceandTreasuryDepartmentsoftenconsultandexchangeinformationonspecificissues +%( andcaseswithintheirconcurrentexportcontrolauthority.Duplicatelicensingrequirementsare O generallyavoidedbyallocatingmostexportlicensingresponsibilitiesforspecificcountriesto ? oneagency.Forexample,forcasesinwhichBXAhaslicensingresponsibility,itwillnote / potentialapplicabilityofTreasuryrestrictionsonU.S.personactivities.Incasesinwhichthe   TreasuryDepartmenthasexportlicensingresponsibility,theTreasuryDepartmentwill,on   occasion,requestcommodityclassificationsandothertechnicaladvicefromBXA.   Ininstancesinwhichtwolicensesarerequired(e.g.,exports/reexportstoSudan,Taliban   controlledareasofAfghanistan,UNITAinAngola),BXAencouragesapplicantstofirstseek   TreasuryDepartmentauthorizationsincetheU.S.policyisoneofdenialforembargoeditems. p   &  PartII:UnitedNationsArmsEmbargoes P   TheDepartmentofCommerceandtheDepartmentofStateareresponsibleforimplementingthe 0  embargoonarms,armsrelateditems,andcertainothercommoditiesundertheirrespective o  exportcontroljurisdiction.'&  _  FederalRepublicofYugoslavia(FRY)  ? TheUnitedStateshasmaintainedanembargoontheFRYpursuanttoU.N.Resolution1160of / March3,1998,whichdirectedmembercountriestoimposeanembargoonthesaleofarmsand  relatedmaterialstotheFRY.InkeepingwiththisResolution,BXApublishedafinalruleon  July14,1998,implementingtheembargoonarmsandarmsrelateditemstotheFRY.  TheU.N.SecurityCouncilrecentlyterminatedthearmsembargoontheFRY(Serbiaand  Montenegro).TheDepartmentwillshortlytakeactiontoremovetheadditionalcontrols,  includingthedenialpolicyonarmsrelateditems,thathaveappliedtotheFf  g RYsince1998. p  Rwanda  P TheU.N.SecurityCouncilimposedanarmsembargoonRwandaonMay17,1994.In1995,the  @ SecurityCouncilsuspendedtheapplicationofthearmsembargototheGovernmentofRwandaif !0 itemswereshippedthroughspecifiedpointsofentry,andlaterterminated(effectiveSeptember o"  1,1996)theapplicationofrestrictionsonsalesorsuppliestothegovernmentofRwanda.The _# saleorsupplyofsucharmsandrelatedmaterieltonongovernmentalforcesinRwandaremains O$  prohibited. ?%! BXAcontrolsthesaleorsupplytonongovernmentalforcesinRwandabyU.S.personsorfrom ' # theUnitedStates,includingtheuseofU.S.registeredvesselsoraircraft,ofarmsandrelated (!$ materielofalltypes,includingweaponsandammunition,militaryvehiclesandequipment, ("% paramilitarypoliceequipmentandsparepartsfortheaforementioned,regardlessoforigin.For )#& detailsontheDepartmentofStatecontrolsonRwandasee22CFR126.1(c). *$'  +%(  &  Liberia g  O BXAwillsoonpublisharulethatamendstheEARtoprohibitthesale,supply,orexportfrom ? theUnitedStatesorthesale,export,orreexportbyU.S.personsofarmsrelateditems,including / technicalassistanceandtraining,toLiberia.ThisactionisconsistentwithU.N.Resolution1343   ofMarch7,2001,andistakenincoordinationwiththeDepartmentofState,whichcontrols   defensearticlesandservicestoLiberiaundertheITAR. 'O)     LicensingRequirementsandLicensingPolicyforRwandaandLiberia    TheUnitedStatesrequiresalicenseforforeignpolicypurposesforexporttoRwandaorLiberia p  ofallarmsandrelatedmaterielofalltypes,regardlessoforigin,includingweaponsand `  ammunition,militaryvehiclesandequipment,paramilitarypoliceequipmentandsparepartsfor P  theseitems.ThisrequirementappliestotheexportbyanypersonfromU.S.territoryorbyany @  U.S.personinanyforeigncountryorotherlocationtoRwandaorLiberia.TheUnitedStates 0  alsorequiresalicensefortheuseofanyU.S.aircraftorvesseltosupplyortransportanysuch o  itemstoRwandaorLiberia. _ f  g TheUnitedStateshasageneralpolicyofdenialforexportorreexportofcontrolleditemsto ? RwandaorLiberia. /   AnalysisofControlasRequiredbySection6(f)ofTheAct   0f  g Rwanda,Liberia,andPersonsNamedPursuanttoExecutiveOrder13088,asamendedby  ExecutiveOrder13192    A.ThePurposeoftheControl  p TherestrictionsonallitemssubjecttotheEARtopersonsdesignatedpursuantto ` ExecutiveOrder13088,asamendedbyExecutiveOrder13192(associatesofSlobodan P MilosevicandindicteesoftheInternationalCriminalTribunalfortheFormerYugoslavia)are  @ maintainedtosupporttheimplementationandenforcementofsanctionsonthesedestinationsand !0 entities.Thecontrolsonarmsrelateditems toRwandaandLiberiaremaininplacetoprevent o"  anyU.S.contributiontopotentialconflictinthesecountriesandtoconformtoUnitedNations _# mandatedsanctions. O$   B.Considerationsand/orDeterminationsoftheSecretaryofCommerce  /&"  1.  ProbabilityofAchievingIntendedForeignPolicyPurpose. Therestrictions have (!$ deniedtheseentitiesandnationscertaintraderelationswiththeUnitedStates.Thecontrols ("% continuetoputpressureontheseentitiesand thegovernmentsofthesecountriestomodifytheir )#& policiessincetheUnitedStateswillnotlifttheseembargoeswithoutageneralimprovementin *$' relations.Inaddition,theapplicablecontrolsmayservetoreducethepotentialforconflict. +%(  2.  CompatibilitywithForeignPolicyObjectives. ThecontrolscomplementU.S.foreign ? policyinotheraspectsofU.S.relationswiththeseentitiesandcountries.Theyencouragethese / entitiesandthegovernmentsofthesecountriestomodifytheirpolicieswiththegoalof   improvingrelationswiththeUnitedStates.f  g ThesecontrolsareconsistentwithU.S.foreign   policygoalsofpromotingpeaceandstability,preventingweaponsproliferation,and human   rightsabuses.    3.  ReactionofOtherCountries. g ThearmsembargoesonRwandaandLiberiaare   consistentwiththeobjectivesoftheUnitedNations;theUnitedStateshasreceivednosignificant p  objectionstothesecontrols.ThesanctionsonentitiesassociatedwithSlobodanMilosevicand `  indicteesoftheInternationalCriminalTribunalfortheFormerYugoslaviahavemultinational P  support.  @  4.  EconomicImpactonUnitedStatesIndustry. Thearmsembargoeshavehadlittle o  impactonU.S.industrysinceinception.U.S.exportstoRwandawere$18.9millionin2000,of _ which$14millionwascomprisedofagriculturalandforestproducts.Electronicproducts O accountedforanadditional$2.5million,followedbytransportationequipmentwith ? $1million.BXAreceivednolicenseapplicationsforRwandaduringFY2001. Theeconomic / impactofrestrictionsonassociatesofSlobodanMilosevicandindicteesoftheInternational  CriminalTribunalfortheFormerYugoslaviashouldhavelittle,ifany,economicimpact.    MXjXXXjBXAreceivedonelicenseapplicationforLiberiainFY2001.Thisapplicationwasforthe  exportofhandcuffsvaluedat$2,187andwasrejectedforforeignpolicyreasons.U.S.exportsto  Liberiawere$42.4millionin2000,comprisedmostlyofarticlesofironandsteel(20percent),  cereals(20percent),andcharitydonations(15percent).Liberia'stotalimportswere$170 p millionin2000;sourcesofimportswereSouthKorea(30percent),Italy(24percent),andJapan ` (15percent).Leadingimportswerefuels,chemicals,machinery,andtransportationequipment.#XjXXMXj>#f  g  P  5.  EnforcementofControl. Controlsonexportstoembargoedandsanctionedcountries, !0 coveringvirtuallyallU.S.origingoods,includingconsumeritemsthatwouldnotordinarily o"  attractenforcementattention,raiseanumberofchallenges.Theseincludetheneedto _# concentratelimitedresourcesonpriorityareas,developingnewstrategiestolimitreexport O$  violations,strengtheningthecooperativerelationshipwithotherlawenforcementagenciesinthe ?%! UnitedStatesandoverseas,andmaintainingaconsistentoutreachefforttohelplimitU.S. /&" businessvulnerability.Overall,theembargoesaregenerallyunderstoodandsupportedbythe ' # U.S.public.VoluntarycooperationfrommostU.S.exportersisexpected.f  g  (!$  C.ConsultationwithIndustry  )#& BXApublishedanoticeintheFederalRegisteronNovember7,2001,requestingpublic *$' commentsonitsforeignpolicybasedexportcontrols.Anoticewasalsopublishedonthe_BXA +%( Webpage.Nocommentswerereceivedspecifictothecontrolsdescribedinthischapter. O AmoredetailedreviewofcommentsreceivedisavailableinAppendixI.f  g  ?  D.ConsultationwithOtherCountries    f  g MostcountriessupportinternationaleffortstostabilizeRwandaandLiberiaandtoprevent   furtherethnicconflictandregionalinstability. TheUnitedStatesworkscloselywithalliesto   supportthenewgovernmentinSerbiaandstabilizethesituationintheBalkans.Therestrictions   imposedon_Milosevic_Ԁassociatesand_indictees_ԀoftheInternationalTribunalfortheFormer   Yugoslaviaareintendedtopreventthe_destabilization_ԀofthenewgovernmentinSerbiaandthe   diversionofresources.  p   &  E.AlternativeMeans  P  TheUnitedStatesimposesembargoesandsanctionsinanefforttomakethestrongestpossible @  statementagainstaparticularcountry'spolicies.Restrictionsonexportscansupplementother 0  actionsthattheUnitedStatestakestochangethebehaviorofthetargetcountries,including o  severingdiplomaticrelations,banningimportsintotheUnitedStates,seekingU.N. _ denunciations,andcurtailingordiscouragingbilateraleducational,scientificorcultural O exchanges.UnitedStatescomplementdiplomaticmeasuresandcontinuetobeusedtoinfluence ? thebehaviorofthesecountries.'J /  F.ForeignAvailability   TheforeignavailabilityofitemscontrolledunderSection6(a)hasbeenconsideredbyBXA.In  general,numerousforeignsourcesofcommoditiessimilartothosesubjecttothesecontrolsare  known,especiallyforitemscontrolledbytheUnitedStates.    ?O  p __@A @ MXXj8dd8CHAPTER6  H ToxicChemicals,ChemicalPrecursors,andAssociatedEquipment,  x TechnologyandSoftware   (Sections742.2#XjXMO#MXXj,742.18,744.4,744.6,and745)#XjXMQ#   7PExportControlProgramDescriptionAndLicensingPolicy   TheUnitedStatesmaintainsexportcontrolsoncertainchemicals,equipment,materials,   software,technology,andwholeplantstofurtherU.S.foreignpolicyopposingthe   proliferationanduseofchemicalweapons. TheUnitedStatesimplementsthesecontrolsin p  coordinationwiththeAustraliaGroup(AG),aninformalforumof33nationsthat ` cooperatetohalttheproliferationofchemicalandbiologicalweapons.(SeeAppendixII P forcompletelistofAGmembers).Exportcontrolsoncertainchemicalsarealso @  maintainedinfulfillmentofU.S.obligationsundertheChemicalWeaponsConvention 0 (CWC). o  AustraliaGroupControls O TheAGwasformedin1985whentheUnitedStatesand15othernationsjoinedin ? imposingexportcontrolsonanumberofchemicalsthatcouldbeusedtoproducechemical / weapons.  Sincethen,theAGhasexpandeditsmembershipandexportcontrollisttocoverother  chemicalandbiologicalweaponsrelateditems.Basedonthislist,exportcontrolsare  appliedby  eachAGmemberonanationalbasis.   Thelicensingrequirementsforchemicals,equipment,materials,software,technology,and "p wholeplantsimposedinaccordancewithAGcommitmentsareasfollows: #` A.  TheUnitedStatesrequiresalicensefortheexporttoalldestinations,exceptAG %@  membercountries,oftheprecursorandintermediatechemicalsusedintheproductionof &0 ! toxicchemicalwarfareagents;relevantprocesscontrolsoftware;technologyfortheiruse, o' !" productionand/ordisposal;andthefacilitiesdesignedtoproducethem. _("# TheUnitedStatesrequiresalicensefortheexporttospecifieddestinationsofcertain ?*#% chemicalmanufacturingfacilitiesandequipment,toxicgasmonitoringsystemsand /+$& detectorsthatcanbeusedintheproductionofchemicalwarfareagents,andtechnology_for ,%' theuseofsuchitems. O ThecountriestowhichtheselicensingrequirementsapplyareindicatedinColumnCB:3of ? theCommerceCountryChart,ExportAdministrationRegulations(EAR),Part738, / Supplement   No .1.   C ׀Theseitemsarealsocontrolledtodesignatedterroristsupportingcountries.   ̂InadditiontoitemsontheAGlist,theUnitedStatescontrolsotheritemssubjecttothe   EARbecauseofchemicalorbiologicalenduseorenduserconcerns.Thesecontrolsare   partofthe1990EnhancedProliferationControlInitiative(_EPCI_).TheUnitedStatesalso   requiresalicensefortheexportofanycommodity,technology,orsoftwarewhenthe p  exporterknowsthatitwillbeusedinthedesign,development,production,stockpiling,or `  useofchemicalweaponsin,orby,specifiedcountries(CountryGroupD:3,EAR,Part740, P  SupplementNo.1   C ).TheUnitedStatesmayinformtheexporteror_reexporter_Ԁthatalicense @  isrequiredduetoanunacceptableriskthattheitemswillbeusedin,ordivertedto, 0  chemicalweaponsactivitiesanywhereintheworld. NoU.S.personmayknowingly o  supportsuchanexport,_reexport_,ortransferwithoutalicense. Supportisdefinedas _ anyaction,includingfinancing,transportation,orfreightforwarding,thatfacilitatesthe O export,_reexport_,ortransferoftheseitems.Inaddition,noU.S.personmay,withouta ? license,performanycontract,service,oremploymentknowingthatitwilldirectlyassistin / thedesign,development,production,stockpiling,oruseofchemicalweaponsin,orby,a  countrylistedinCountryGroupD:3.  B.  TheUnitedStateswillconsiderapplicationsforlicensesonacasebycasebasisto  determinewhethertheexportwouldmakeamaterialcontributiontothedesign,  development,production,stockpiling,oruseofchemicalweapons.WhenBXAdetermines  thatanexportwillmakesuchacontribution,theUnitedStateswilldenytheexport. p  TradeRestrictionsundertheChemicalWeaponsConvention(_CWC_) P The_CWC_   C ,ratifiedinApril1997,bansthedevelopment,production,stockpiling,and  @ retentionofchemicalweaponsandprovidesforanextensiveverificationregime.The !0 _CWC_ԀChemicalsAnnexgroupsspecifiedchemicals,whichincludebothtoxicchemicalsand o"  chemicalprecursors,intothreeschedulesbasedontheleveloftoxicityandotherproperties _# thatenabletheiruseinchemicalweapons.ThetoxicchemicalsandprecursorsonSchedule O$  1posethehighestrisktothepurposeofthe_CWC_Ԁandhavefewcommercialapplications; ?%! thetoxicchemicalsandprecursorsonSchedule2poseasignificantrisktothepurposeof /&" the_CWC_Ԁandhavecertainlimitedcommercialapplications;andthetoxicchemicalsand ' # precursorsonSchedule3posearisktothepurposeofthe_CWC_Ԁandhavewidecommercial (!$ applications.Chemicalwarfareagentsdeemedtohavedirectmilitaryapplicationare ("% controlledbytheStateDepartmentundertheInternationalTrafficinArmsRegulations. )#&  +%( _ԇTheexportrestrictionsandlicensingrequirementsforchemicalsandtechnologyimposed O infulfillmentofCWCtreatyobligationsareasfollows: ? A.  ExportsofSchedule1chemicalsaresubjecttoexportcontrolsandbannedto   countriesthathavenotratifiedtheCWC(StatesnotParty).Alicenseandprior   notificationofaplannedexportisrequiredforexportsofSchedule1chemicalstoallState   Parties,includingCanada.    AllexportsofSchedule2chemicalsareprohibitedtoStatesnotParty.   ShipmentsofcertainSchedule3chemicalsrequirealicensetoStateParties.Enduse `  certificatesfromthegovernmentsofimportingcountriesarerequiredforexportsof P  Schedule3chemicalstoStatesnotParty. @  Inaddition,theUnitedStateshasunilaterallyimposedalicensingrequirementfor o  chemicalweaponsreasonsfortheexportoftechnologytoproducefourchemicalstoall  _ StatesnotParty,exceptIsraelandTaiwan.   C Thisrequirementistheresultofinteragency O discussionsstemmingfromconcernsbyotheragenciesoftheU.S.Governmentoverthe ? potentialchemicalweaponsuseofthefourchemicals. / B.  BXAgenerallyapprovesapplicationstoexportSchedule1chemicalstoStateParties  andgenerallydeniesapplicationstoexportSchedule1chemicalsto StatesnotParty.  BXAgenerallydeniesapplicationstoexportSchedule2chemicalstoStatesnotParty.  BXAalsowillgenerallydenyanapplicationstoexportSchedule3chemicalstoStatesnot  Partyunlessanendusecertificatefromtheimportingcountryhasbeenobtained. p TheUnitedStatesreviewsexportsandreexportsoftechnologyrelatedtothedevelopment P andproductionoffourchemicals,includingPFIB,phosgene,cyanogenchloride,and  @ hydrogencyanide,onacasebycasebasistomostdestinationsforwhichalicenseis !0 required.However,thereisapolicyofdenialforCuba,Iran,Iraq,Libya,Sudan,and o"  NorthKorea.ForSyria,BXAappliesapolicyofdenialformilitaryendusersandend _# usesandreviewsapplicationsforcivilianendusersandendusesonacasebycasebasis. O$    AnalysisofControlasRequiredbySection6(f)ofTheAct /&" #vA.ThePurposeoftheControl (!$ ThepurposeofthesecontrolsistosupportthemultilaterallycoordinatedeffortsoftheAG )#& tohalttheproliferationofchemicalweaponsandtocomplywithinternationalobligations *$' undertheCWC.Inaddition,thesecontrolsimplementcertainmeasuresspecified_in +%( ExecutiveOrder12735ofNovember16,1990,itssuccessor,ExecutiveOrder12938of O November14,1994,and_EPCI_ԀofDecember13,l990.Insodoing,thecontrolsprovidethe ? UnitedStateswiththeauthoritytocontroltheexportofanyitemfromtheUnitedStates / whenthereisasignificantriskthatitwillbeusedforchemicalweaponpurposes.   TheAGworkstofurther_nonproliferation_Ԁobjectivesthroughtheharmonizationofexport   controls,theexchangeofinformationandotherdiplomaticmeans.Inadditionto   furtheringtheobjectivesoftheAG,thesecontrolssupportU.S.complianceeffortswiththe   _CWC_,whichprohibitsthedevelopment,production,stockpiling,retentionortransferof   chemicalweapons.ToensurethatStatePartiesdonottransferchemicalsthatcouldassist p  StatesnotPartyinacquiringchemicalweapons,the_CWC_ԀrequiresthatStateParties `  restricttheexportofcertainchemicalslistedinthe_CWC_sAnnexonChemicals.The P  controlsalsosupportthegoalsofthe1925GenevaProtocolfortheProhibitionoftheUsein @  WarofAsphyxiating,PoisonousorotherGases,andofBacteriologicalMethodsof 0  Warfare,whichprohibitsthefirstuseinwartimeofchemicalorbiologicalweapons. o  B.Considerationsand/orDeterminationsoftheSecretaryofCommerce O 1.  ProbabilityofAchievingtheIntendedForeignPolicyPurpose.Manyoftheitems / coveredbythesecontrolshavecommercialusesandarewidelyavailablefromforeign  sources.Someofthemajorsourcesoftheseitemsareinindustrializedcountriesthatare  membersoftheAGandStatePartiestothe_CWC_.Whileitisnotexpectedthatexport  controlsalonecanpreventtheproliferationofchemicalweapons,thesecontrolsstrengthen  U.S.effortstostemthespreadofsuchweaponsandcontinuetobeasignificantpartofthe  UnitedStatesoverall_nonproliferation_Ԁstrategy.Accordingly,theSecretaryhas  determinedthatthesecontrolsarelikelytoachievetheintendedforeignpolicypurpose. p 0   (#(# 2.  CompatibilitywithForeignPolicyObjectives.Inextendingthesecontrols,the P Secretaryhasdeterminedthatthecontrolsarecompatiblewiththeforeignpolicyobjec  @ tivesofthe !0 UnitedStates.TheUnitedStateshasastronginterestinremainingattheforefrontof o"  internationaleffortstostemtheproliferationofchemicalweapons.Thesecontrolsare _# compatiblewiththemultilateralexportcontrolsforchemicalsandrelatedequipmentand O$  technologyagreedtobytheAG.Moreover,theUnitedStateshasabindinginternational ?%! commitmentunderthe_CWC_Ԁtoprohibitandeliminatechemicalweapons,andtonotassist /&" anyone,inanyway,inchemicalweaponsactivities. ' # Ѐ3.  ReactionofOtherCountries.TheSecretaryhasdeterminedthatthereactionof ("% othercountriestothesecontrolsbytheUnitedStatesisnotlikelytorenderthecontrols )#& ineffectiveinachievingtheirintendedforeignpolicypurposeortobecounterproductiveto *$' U.S.foreignpolicyinterests.TheUnitedStatescontinuestodiscusschemicaland +%( _biologicalexportcontrolswithcountriesoutsideoftheAGtoadvancethegoalsof O nonproliferation.ThegovernmentsofsomedevelopingcountriesclaimthatAGexport ? controlsdiscriminateagainstlessindustrializednationsbydeprivingthemofgoodsand / assistanceinthefieldofchemicalandbiologicaltechnology.TheUnitedStatesdoesnot   considerthattheevidencesupportsthisposition.Ininternationalfora,theUnitedStates   hassoughttodispelthisfalseperceptionbyclarifyingthepurposeofthecontrolsandby   demonstratingthattheUnitedStatesdeniesveryfewexportrequests.AllAGmembers   haveratifiedboththeCWCandtheBWCandsupportthefullimplementationofboth   treaties.   4.  EconomicImpactonUnitedStatesIndustry.TheSecretaryhasdeterminedthatthe `  potentialimpactoftheseexportcontrolsonU.S.industryisminimal.InFY2001,BXA P  received728licenseapplications,valuedat$726.8million,fortheexportorreexportof @  controlledchemicalprecursorsandequipment.Ofthese,theUnitedStatesapproved592 0  applications,deniedtwo,andreturnedwithoutaction103;thirtyoneapplicationswerestill o  pendingatthecloseofFY2001.Theactualtradeinthesecontrolledcommoditiesis _ significantlygreaterthanthevalueofthelicenseapplicationsbecauseexportersmay O exportmanyofthesecommoditiestoselectedcountrieswithoutalicense. ? 5.  EnforcementofControl.Thesize,dispersion,diversity,andspecializednatureofthe  dualusechemicalindustrymakedetectingandinvestigatingpotentialviolationsdifficult  forenforcementpersonnel.Challengesincludedistinguishingcommercialprocurement  fromchemicalweaponsrelatedtransactions,andestablishingappropriatecommodity  thresholdsfortargetingandtrackingexportsandreexportsforverificationofenduseand  endusers.Inaddition,enforcementofficersmaybeexposedtopersonalsafetyriskswhen  seizingandinspectingchemicalmaterials. p Tomeetthechallengeofeffectiveenforcementofthesecontrols,BXAhasdirected P resourcestowardpreventiveenforcement,inadditiontocontinuedeffortstopursueall  @ leadsprovidedbyintelligence,industry,andothersourcesonactivitiesofconcern. !0 AnalysisofShipper'sExportDeclarationshelpsensurethattheshipmentslabeled No o"  LicenseRequiredareinfacteligibleforsuchtreatment.Also,BXAsextensiveoutreach _# programeducatescompaniesaboutexportcontrolsrelatedtochemicalproductsandhelps O$  preventtheillegalexportofdual-useproductsthatcanbeusedtomakechemicalweapons. ?%! &  C.ConsultationwithIndustry ' # BXAmaintainsongoinginteractionwiththechemicalindustryonseverallevels:through ("% individualcompaniesseekingexportlicenses;throughtheTechnicalAdvisoryCommittees )#& (TACs);''0andthroughtradeassociations.BXAconsultsregularlywithexportingfirmson *$' proposedexporttransactionsandmarketingplanstofacilitatethethorough,yet_prompt +%( reviewofexportlicenseapplications.Throughthe_TACs_,BXAkeepsindustry O representativesabreastofproposalsforthereviewofitemsonthecontrollistandgives ? themtheopportunitytoprovidetechnicalinput. / BXAworkswithchemicalindustryassociations,includingtheAmericanChemistry   CouncilandtheSyntheticOrganicChemicalManufacturersAssociation,andwithother   governmentagencies,suchastheFederalBureauofInvestigationandtheDepartmentof   DefensesDefenseThreatReductionAgency,togainvaluableinputregarding_CWC_   implementationandtomeetits_CWC_Ԁresponsibilities.(SeeSectionE, Alternative   Means.) p  OnNovember7,2001,theDepartmentofCommerce,viatheFederalRegisterandtheBXA P  Webpage,solicitedcommentsfromindustryontheeffectivenessofforeignpolicybased @  exportcontrols.AmoredetailedreviewofthecommentsisavailableinAppendixI. 0  _Goulds_ԀPumpsrecommendedthedeletionof_ECCN_Ԁ2B350ifromCategory2,statingthat _ foreignavailabilityofproductsthatfallunderthis_ECCN_Ԁcausesexportcontrolsplaced O upontheseitemstobeineffectiveandthusadverselyimpactU.S.companiescompetitive ? position.GouldPumpsstatedthatthelicenseprocesshindersthecompanysshortlead / timebusinessthatnecessitatesshippingwithinfourtosixweeksfollowingorderplacement.  D.ConsultationwithOtherCountries  ThesecontrolsareconsistentwiththemultilateralexportcontrolcriteriaoftheAG,which  includesmanyoftheworld'smajorchemicalproducersandtraders.Inaddition,a  numberof p nonAGcountries,includingRussiaandUkraine,havetakenstepstoadoptAGtype ` controls.AnimportantelementoftheAGseffortstocurbtheproliferationofchemical P weaponsiscontactingnonmemberstoencouragethemtoobservelikemindedexport  @ controls.The !0 UnitedStatescontinuestoencourageharmonizationofexportcontrolprovisionsamong o"  AGparticipantstoensurealevelplayingfieldforU.S.exporters. _# E.AlternativeMeans (!$ TheUnitedStatescontinuestoaddresstheproblemoftheproliferationofchemical )#& weaponsonanumberoffronts.Directnegotiationswithcountriesintentonacquiring *$' chemicalweaponsarenotlikelytopreventtheuseofU.S.originmaterialsinsuch +%( activities,noraresuchnegotiationslikelytoaffectthebehaviorofthesecountries. O Alternativemeanstocurtailtheacquisitionanddevelopmentofchemicalwarfare / capabilities,suchasdiplomaticnegotiations,donotobviatetheneedforcontrols.   ExamplesofadditionalmeansthattheUnitedStateshasused,andwillcontinuetouse,in   anattempttocurbtheuseandspreadofchemicalweaponsinclude:   :  :0  "0` (#(#  U.S.legislation:TheChemicalandBiologicalWeaponsControland   WarfareEliminationActof1991(TitleIII,Pub.L.102182)providesforthe   impositionofsanctionsonforeignentitiesandcountriesforcertainkindsof p  chemicalandbiologicalweaponsrelatedactivity.TheUnitedStateshas `  imposedsanctionsoncertainentitiesforchemicalweaponsrelatedactivities.:݌P ` (#` (# Ќ  :  :0  "0` (#(#  The_CWC_:Asanothertoolforstemmingtheproliferationofchemical 0  weapons,the_CWC_Ԁimposesaglobalbanonthedevelopment,production, o  stockpiling,retentionanduseofchemicalweapons.The_CWC_Ԁalsoprohibits _ thedirectorindirecttransferofchemicalweapons,restrictstradeincertain O chemicalstononStatePartiesandcreatesaninternationalorganizationto ? monitorthedestructionofchemicalweaponsandtheproduction,use,and / tradeoftoxicchemicalsandchemicalprecursorsforindustrial,agricultural,  medical,andotherpeacefulpurposesincountriespartytothe_CWC_.:݌` (#` (# Ќ  BXAcollectsindustryreportsregardingtheproduction,processing,consumption,import  andexportoftoxicchemicalsandchemicalprecursorsforpurposesnotprohibitedbythe  _CWC_Ԁ(e.g.,industrial,agriculturalandotherpeacefulpurposes),whichisforwardedtothe  OrganizationfortheProhibitionofChemicalWeapons(_OPCW_).BXAalsoescorts p inspectorsfromthe_OPCW_ԀastheyinspectcertainU.S.chemicalproductionfacilitiesto ` verifythatactivitiesareconsistentwiththeinformationprovidedintheindustryreports P andwithothertreatyprovisions.  @ F.ForeignAvailability o"  PastreviewsconductedbyBXArevealedthatawiderangeofAGchemicalprecursorsand O$  productionequipmentwasavailablefromnonAGcountries.NonAGsuppliersof ?%! precursorsand/orrelatedproductionequipmentincludeBrazil,Chile,Colombia,India, /&" Mexico,China(PRC),SouthAfrica,thecountriesoftheformerSovietUnion,Taiwan,and ' # Thailand.However,mostofthesecountrieshaveaccededtothe_CWC_Ԁandwilltakesteps (!$ underthistreatytopreventchemicalweaponsproliferation. ("%    +%( Ї  _@I @ 8Edd8;   MXXjCHAPTER7   <BiologicalAgentsandAssociatedEquipmentandTechnicalData O  (Sections742.2,744.4and744.6)#XjXM#  g   ExportControlProgramDescriptionAndLicensingPolicy  o  TheUnitedStatesexercisesexportcontrolsovercertainmicroorganisms,toxins,biological O  equipment,andrelatedtechnologytofurtherU.S.foreignpolicyopposingtheproliferationand ?  illegaluseofbiologicalweapons.TheUnitedStatesimplementstheseexportcontrols /  multilaterallyincoordinationwiththeAustraliaGroup(AG),aninformalforumof33nations   cooperatingtohalttheproliferationofchemicalandbiologicalweapons.TheUnitedStatesalso   participatesininternationaleffortstoeffectatotalbanonbiologicalweaponsincompliancewith  theConventionontheProhibitionoftheDevelopment,ProductionandStockpilingof  Bacteriological(Biological)andToxinWeaponsandonTheirDestruction(_BWC_). =  C    LicensingRequirementsandPolicy p  Thelicensingrequirementsforbiologicalagents,relatedequipment,andtechnologyasspecified P ontheCommerceControlList(CCL)are: @ 0   (#(#  A.   TheUnitedStatesrequiresalicensefortheexporttoalldestinations,exceptCanada,of o  certainhumanpathogens,_zoonoses_,toxins,animalpathogens,geneticallymodified _ microorganismsandplantpathogens,andthetechnologyfortheirproductionand/ordisposal. O TheUnitedStatesrequiresalicensefortheexporttospecifiedcountriesofcertaindualuse /! equipmentandmaterialsthatcanbeusedintheproductionofbiologicalagents,andthe " technologythatcanbeusedintheirproduction.Thecountriestowhichthislicensing # requirementappliesarethoseindicatedinColumnCB:3oftheCommerceCountryChart,Export # AdministrationRegulations(EAR),SupplementNo.1toPart738,aswellastheembargoed $  destinationsidentifiedinEARPart746. %! TheUnitedStatesrequiresalicensefortheexportofanyitemsubjecttotheEARwhenthe 'p!# exporterknowsthatitwillbeusedinthedesign,development,production,stockpilingoruseof (`"$ biologicalweaponsin,orby,specifiedcountries(CountryGroupD:3,EAR,SupplementNo.1 )P#% toPart740).BXAmayinformtheexporteror_reexporter_Ԁthatalicenseisrequiredduetoan *@$& unacceptableriskthattheitemswillbeusedin,ordivertedto,abiologicalweaponsproject +0%' _anywhereintheworld. O NoU.S.personmayexport,reexport,ortransferanyitemwithoutalicensewhenthatperson / knowstheitemwillbeusedinthedesign,development,production,stockpilingoruseof   biologicalweaponsin,orby,acountrylistedinCountryGroupD:3.NoU.S.personmay   knowinglysupportsuchanexport,reexport,ortransferwithoutalicense. Supportisdefined   asaction,includingfinancing,transportation,orfreightforwarding,thatfacilitatestheexport,   reexport,ortransfer.Additionally,noU.S.personmay,withoutalicense,performanycontract   serviceoremploymentknowingthatitwilldirectlyassistinthedesign,development,   production,stockpiling,oruseofbiologicalweaponsin,orby,acountrylistedinCountryGroup p  D:3. `   B.   BXAwillconsiderapplicationsforlicensesonacasebycasebasistodeterminewhether @  theexportwouldmakeamaterialcontributiontothedesign,development,production,stock 0  piling,oruseofbiologicalweapons.WhenBXAdeterminesthatanexportisdeemedtomake o  suchacontribution,theapplicationisdenied. _   AnalysisofControlasRequiredbySection6(f)ofTheAct /   A.ThePurposeoftheControl   ThecontrolsdescribedabovearetopreventanyU.S.contributiontotheproliferationandillegal  useofbiologicalweapons,andtosupportmultilaterallycoordinatedcontrolefforts.Thecontrols  alsoprovidetheregulatoryauthoritytostoptheexportofanyitemfromtheUnitedStateswhen  thereisasignificantriskthatitwillbeusedforbiologicalweaponspurposes.Thecontrols p implement certainmeasuresdirectedinExecutiveOrder12735ofNovember16,1990,its ` successor,ExecutiveOrder12938ofNovember14,1994,andtheEnhancedProliferation P ControlInitiativeofDecember13,1990.  @ TheUnitedStatesimplementsthesecontrolsincoordinationwiththeAG.TheAGworksto o"  accomplishthisobjectivethroughtheharmonizationofexportcontrols,theexchangeof _# information,andotherdiplomaticmeans.Inaddition,thesecontrolsdemonstratethe O$  UnitedStatescommitmenttoitsobligationundertheBWCnottodevelop,produce,stockpile, ?%! acquireorretainbiologicalagents,weapons,equipmentorthemeansofdeliveryforwarfare /&" purposes.Thecontrolsalsoadvancethegoalsofthe1925GenevaProtocolfortheProhibitionof ' # theUseinWarofAsphyxiating,PoisonousorotherGasesandofBacteriologicalMethodsof (!$ Warfare(GenevaProtocol),prohibitingthefirstuseinwartimeofchemicalorbiological ("% weapons. )#&  B.Considerationsand/orDeterminationsoftheSecretaryofCommerce  +%( Ї 1.  ProbabilityofAchievingtheIntendedForeignPolicyPurpose. TheSecretaryhas O determinedthatthesecontrolsarelikelytoachievetheirintendedforeignpolicypurposedespite ? theexistenceoffactors,includingavailabilityoftheseitemsfromothersources,thatchallenge / thatachievement.ThesecontrolsaffirmU.S.oppositiontothedevelopment,proliferationand   useofbiologicalweaponsandservetodistancetheUnitedStatesfromsuchactivities.    2.  CompatibilitywithForeignPolicyObjectives. Inextendingthecurrentcontrols,the   Secretaryhasdeterminedthatthecontrolsarecompatiblewiththeforeignpolicyobjectivesof   theUnitedStates.TheUnitedStateshasastronginterestinremainingattheforefrontof   internationaleffortstostemtheproliferationofbiologicalweapons.Thesecontrolsare p  compatiblewiththemultilateralexportcontrolsforbiologicalmaterialsagreedtobytheAG. `  Moreover,theUnitedStateshasabindinginternationalcommitmentundertheBWCandthe P  GenevaProtocoltoprohibitandeliminatebiologicalweapons,andtonotassistanyonein @  biologicalwarfareactivities. 0   3.  ReactionofOtherCountries. TheSecretaryhasdeterminedthatthereactionofother _ countriestothesecontrolsbytheUnitedStatesisnotlikelytorenderthecontrolsineffectivein O achievingtheintendedforeignpolicypurposeortobecounterproductivetoU.S.foreignpolicy ? interests.TheUnitedStatescontinuestodiscusschemicalandbiologicalexportcontrolswith / countriesoutsideoftheAGtoadvancethegoalsofnonproliferation.Someofthesecountries  claimthatthecontrolscouldhindertheirright,underArticleXoftheBWC,toparticipateinthe  fullestpossibleexchangeofequipment,materialsandtechnologyfortheagentsandtoxinsfor  peacefulpurposes.TheUnitedStatesdoesnotbelievethattheevidencesupportsthisposition  (seenextsection,EconomicImpactonU.S.Industry).Ininternationalfora,theUnitedStates  hassoughttodispelthisfalseperceptionbyclarifyingthepurposeofthecontrolsandby  demonstratingthattheUnitedStatesdeniesveryfewexportrequests.AllAGmembershave p ratifiedboththeCWCandtheBWC,andsupportthefullimplementationofbothtreaties. `  4.  EconomicImpactonU.S.Industry. TheSecretaryhasdeterminedthatthepotential  @ impactoftheseexportcontrolsonU.S.industryisnotsignificant.InFY2001,BXAreceived !0 563licenseapplications,valuedat$21.3million,fortheexportorreexportofbiologicalagents. o"  Ofthese,BXAapproved460applications,denied1application,andreturnedwithoutaction54 _# applications.FortyeightapplicationswerestillpendingatthecloseofFY2001. O$  IXK XXXj 5.  EnforcementofControl. Enforcingcontrolsonbiologicalweaponsmaterialsposes /&" problemssimilartotheenforcementofchemicalcontrols,butwithadditionaldifficulties. ' # Biologicalmaterialsaremicroscopicorganismsthatrequiretechnicalexpertiseandspecialized (!$ facilitiestoidentifyandtohandlethem.Becauseoftheirsize,biologicalagentscanoftenbe ("% concealedandtransportedwithease. )#& Tomeetthechallengeofeffectiveenforcementoftheseproliferationcontrols,BXAhas +%( redirectedresourcestowardpreventiveenforcement.Enforcementpersonnelconductan O extensive,on-goingoutreachprogramtoeducateindustryaboutexportcontrols.Theprogramis ? alsodesignedtoincreaseindustry'sawarenessofsuspectordersforproductsorequipmentthat / couldbeusedforbiologicalweaponsproliferation.Asaresult,asignificantnumberof   investigationshavebeenopenedintoallegationsofillegalactivity.Incaseswhereunlicensed   shipmentsofbiologicalmaterialshavealreadytakenplace,BXAhasfoundthat,asinother   exportcontrolenforcementcases#XjX XIXK#IXK XXXj,commercialshippingdocumentationcanformthebasisfor   successfulinvestigationsandprosecutions.#XjX XIXK`#IXK XXXj     #XjX XIXK# C.ConsultationwithIndustry  p  Exportersofbiologicalproductsincludecommercialfirms,aswellasacademicandgovernment P  entities.TheDepartmentofCommercemaintainsongoinginteractionwithindividualexporters, @  TechnicalAdvisoryCommittees(TACs),andtradeassociationstodiscussproposedexport 0  transactionsandmarketingplanstofacilitatethethorough,yetprompt,reviewofexportlicense o  applications.ThroughtheTACs,BXAkeepsindustryrepresentativesabreastoflicensing _ proposalsforitemsonthecontrollistandgivesthemtheopportunitytoprovidetechnicalinput. O ThroughoutCY2001,BXAkepttheMaterialsTACinformedofthestatusofnegotiationsona / ProtocoltostrengthentheBWC.InJuly2001,theUnitedStatesrejectedthedraftBWC  ProtocolsetforthbyAmbassadorTiborToth,ChairmanoftheBWCAdHocGroup,inchargeof  developmentoftheProtocol.TheUnitedStatesviewsthedraftProtocolasineffectivein  promotingU.S.nonproliferationandarmscontrolobjectives.Asanalternativeapproach,the  UnitedStatesbeganworkonapackageofotherproposalstostrengthentheBWC.Duringthe  reportingperiod,BXArepresentativesparticipatedinbriefingsontheseBWCissuesfortrade  associationssuchasthePharmaceuticalResearchandManufacturersofAmerica,the p BiotechnologyIndustryOrganization,andtheAnimalHealthInstitute. ` OnNovember7,2001,theDepartmentofCommerce,viatheFederalRegisterandtheBXA  @ Webpage,solicitedcommentsfromindustryontheeffectivenessofforeignpolicybasedexport !0 controls.Nocommentswerereceivedspecifictothecontrolsdescribedinthischapter.Amore o"  detailedreviewofthecommentsisavailableinAppendixI . _#  &  D.ConsultationwithOtherCountries  ?%! ЀRecognizingthatmultilateralcoordinationofexportcontrolsandenforcementactionsisthemost ' # effectivemeansofrestrictingproliferationactivities,theUnitedStatescoordinatesitscontrolson (!$ 'O$biologicalitemswithothercountriesintheAG.AttheannualAGplenary(October14,2001), ("% twoU.S.proposalswereadopted.  )#&  Thefirstproposalliberalizescontrolsonmedicalanddiagnostickitscontainingcontrolled +%( chemicalsandthesecondproposalimposescontrolsoncriticalcomponentsthatcanbeusedto O upgradefreelyexportedequipmenttothefunctionalequivalentofacontrolleditem.TheAG ? alsowelcomedBulgariaasamember.TheUnitedStatescontinuestoaddresstheproblemof / biologicalweaponsproliferationthroughavarietyofinternationalforaandurgesotherAG   memberstopursueexportcontrolcooperationwithnonmembersonabilateralorregionalbasis.   During2001,asnotedabove,internationalnegotiationstostrengthentheBWCcontinued.The   BWC,whichenteredintoforcein1975,isaninternationalarmscontrolagreementamong140   nations.AsanalternativetotheProtocolsuggestedbyAmbassadorTiborToth,the   UnitedStatesisnowpursuingvariousalternativemeanstostrengthentheBWCincluding p  agreementsbyBWCadherentstoenactnationalcriminallegislation,enhancedeffortsonglobal `  diseasesurveillance,andtheestablishmentofbiosafetystandards.Therewillbeanothermeeting P  inlate2002todiscussthenextstepsintheinternationalefforttostrengthentheBWC. @   E.AlternativeMeans  o  TheUnitedStatescontinuestoaddresstheproblemofbiologicalweaponsproliferationona O numberoffronts.Directnegotiationswithcountriesintentonacquiringbiologicalweaponsare ? notlikelytopreventtheuseofU.S.originmaterialsinsuchactivities;neitheraresuch / negotiationslikelytoaffectthebehaviorofthesecountries.  Alternativemeanstocurtailtheacquisitionanddevelopmentofbiologicalwarfarecapabilities,  suchasdiplomaticnegotiations,donotobviatetheneedforcontrols.Thefollowingexamples  demonstrateadditionalmeansthathavebeen,andwillcontinuetobe,usedinanattempttocurb  theuseandspreadofbiologicalweapons:  :  :&0  "0` (#(#  U.S.Legislation:RegulationsissuedbythePublicHealthService(42CFRPart ` 72)pursuanttothe TheAntiterrorismandEffectiveDeathPenaltyActof1996" P (Sec.511ofPub.L.104132)placeadditionalshippingandhandlingrequirements  @ onlaboratoryfacilitiesthattransferorreceiveselectinfectiousagentscapableof !0 causingsubstantialharmtohumanhealth.:&A݌o" ` (#` (# Ќ  :  :0  "0` (#(#  TheChemicalandBiologicalWeaponsControlandWarfareEliminationActof O$  1991(TitleIII,Pub.L.102182)providesfortheimpositionofsanctionson ?%! foreignpersonsandcountriesforcertainkindsofchemicalandbiological /&" weaponsrelatedactivity.Todate,nosanctionshavebeenimposedforbiological ' # weaponsrelatedactivities.:݌(!$` (#` (# Ќ  :  :0  "0` (#(#  TrilateralUS/UK/RussianStatement:InSeptember1992,theUnitedStates,the:݌)#&` (#` (# Ќ  0  UnitedKingdom,andRussiaconfirmedtheircommitmenttofullcompliancewiththe *$' BWCandagreedtoanumberofstepsincludingdataexchanges,visitstosites,_and +%( furtherconsultationstoenhancecooperationandconfidence.O(#(# :  :0  "0` (#(#  _BWC_:TheUnitedStatescontinuestopursueoptionsthatwillstrengthenthe / _BWC_.:݌ ` (#` (# Ќ  F.ForeignAvailability    ̂PastreviewsconductedbyBXAidentifiedtheavailabilityofAGcontrolledvirusesandbacteria   inthenonAGcountriesofBrazil,India,Indonesia,Iran,Jordan,Mexico,thePeoplesRepublic   ofChina,Senegal,Singapore,Taiwan,andThailandandtheavailabilityofAGcontrolled p  equipmentitemsinBrazil,HongKong,India,Israel,Malaysia,Pakistan,thePeoplesRepublic `  ofChina,Russia,SaudiArabia,Singapore,SouthAfrica,Taiwan,andUkraine.Mostofthis P  equipmenthasapplicationinthefoodprocessingandpharmaceuticalindustries.Manyofthe @  countrieslistedabovearepartiestothe_BWC_,andBXAisworkingwithotherU.S.agenciesas 0  partofongoinginternationaleffortstostrengthentheeffectivenessofthisConvention. o     ? @OMXXj @ ?8dd8@ CHAPTER8  H MissileTechnology  x (Sections742.5and744.3) #XjXMi#    ExportControlProgramDescriptionAndLicensingPolicy     OnApril16,1987,theUnitedStates,Canada,France,Germany,Italy,Japan,andthe x  UnitedKingdomcreatedtheMissileTechnologyControlRegime(_MTCR_)inordertolimitthe h  proliferationofmissilescapableofdeliveringnuclearweapons.Expandedin1993toinclude X  missiledeliverysystemsforalltypesofweaponsofmassdestruction,the_MTCR_Ԁnowhas33 H  membercountries.(SeeAppendixIIforacompletelistof_MTCR_Ԁmembercountries).In 8 addition,thereareseveralcountries,includingIsraelandRomania,thathaveannouncedtheir w( unilateraladherencetothe_MTCR_ԀGuidelines. g The_MTCR_ԀGuidelinesandtheEquipmentandTechnologyAnnexformthebasisforU.S. G missiletechnologycontrols.The_MTCR_ԀGuidelinesprovidelicensingpolicy,procedures,review 7 factors,andstandardassurancesonmissiletechnologyexports.TheAnnexisthelistofmissile ' relatedcommodities(goods,technology/technologicaldata,andsoftware)subjecttocontrols,  andisdividedintotwocategories.CategoryIitemsincludemissilesystemsandmajor  subsystems,productionfacilities,andproductionequipmentformissilesystemscapableof  deliveringa500kgpayloadtoatleasta300kmrange.CategoryIIitemsincludematerials,  components,andproductionandtestequipmentassociatedwithCategoryIitems,aswellas  missilesubsystems,productionfacilities,andproductionequipmentformissilesystemswitha x 300kmrange,regardlessofpayload.  h BXAisresponsibleforadministeringcontrolsondualusemanufacturingequipmentfor "H CategoryIitems,andalldualuseitemsinCategoryII.Thereareapproximately120entrieson #8 theCCLthataresubjecttomissiletechnologycontrols.CategoryIitemscarryastrong w$( presumptionofdenial,andBXArarelyapproveslicensesfortheirexport.Transfersof g%  productionfacilitiesforCategoryIitemsareprohibited.BXAwillapprovetheexportof W& ! CategoryIIitemsonlyafteracasebycasereview.Additionally,theUnitedStatesobservesthe G' " multilateralcommitmenttohonorothermembersdenialsoflicensesandtosupportsuchdenials 7(!# througha"noundercut"policy,enhancingglobaleffortstopreventmissileproliferationandpre ')"$ ventingunfaircommercialadvantageamongregimemembers. *#% Themembercountriesofthe_MTCR_Ԁseektofosterthecooperationofnonmembercountriesin +%' _limitingthespreadofdeliverysystemsforweaponsofmassdestructionandhavefocusedthose O effortsinanMTCRsponsoredseriesofworkshopsandseminars,begunin1996,inwhich ? MTCRmembersandinvitednonMTCRcountriesexploredifferentapproachestoimprove / worldwideexportcontrolsandhelppreventmissileproliferation.   ЀThereareadditionalexportcontrolsonitemsthatnormallydonotrequirealicense,orare   controlledforreasonsotherthanmissiletechnology,undertheEnhancedProliferationControl   Initiative(EPCI).EPCIsintentistoprecludecountriesfromobtainingU.S.goodsand   technologiesforindigenousmissileprograms.Internationally,thesetypesofcontrolsareknown   as catchallcontrols.Anexportermustobtainalicense,evenifoneisnototherwiseneeded,if p  theexporterknowsorBXAinformshim/herthattheexportisforuseinnuclear,chemicalor `  biologicalweapons,ormissileprograms.UnitedStatespersonsarealsorestrictedfromactivities P  abroadinsupportofnuclear,chemicalorbiologicalweapons,ormissilerelatedprojects.EPCI @  regulationsaredesignedtopreventexportsthatcouldmakeamaterialcontributiontomissile 0  proliferationprojectsofconcern,butarenotintendedtoprohibitlegitimatecommercialtrade. o  MXjXXXjEPCIlicenserestrictionsalsoapplytocertainformsof"knowing"participationandsupportby O U.S.persons,includingforeignbranchesofU.S.companiesinmissileactivitiesincountries ? listedinCountryGroupD:4,foundinSupplement1toPart740oftheExportAdministration / Regulations(EAR).Restrictionsapplytotheexport,reexport,ortransferofanyitem,including  foreignoriginitems,byaU.S.personwherethepersonknowstheitemwillbeusedinthe  design,development,productionoruseofmissilesinorbysuchcountries.Supportactivities  requiringalicenseincludefinancing,freightforwarding,transportationandothercomparable  assistancethroughwhichapersonfacilitatesanexport,reexport,ortransfer.Inaddition,noU.S.  personmayperformanycontract,service,oremploymentknowingitwillassistinmissile  activitiesinacountrylistedinCountryGroupD:4.#XjXXMXjl# p EPCIbeganasaunilateralcontrol,butwithU.S.leadership,alargemajorityofour P nonproliferationregimepartnershavealsoincorporated catchallexportcontrols.The  @ EuropeanUnionandAustraliaimplementedcatchallcontrolsin1995,Japanin1996,Argentina !0 in1997,andRussiain1999.Atpresent,allbutafewoftheMTCRmembercountrieshave o"  someformofcatchallcontrols,andtheUnitedStatescontinuestoencouragepartnersto _# implementandstrengthenthesecontrols. O$   LicensingRequirementsandPolicy  /&" Insummary,thelicensingrequirementsandpolicyformissiletechnologycontrolsdescribedin (!$ Parts742.5and744.3oftheEARareasfollows: ("%  A.   BXArequiresalicensefortheexportorreexporttoalldestinations(exceptCanada)of *$' thosedualuseitemsspecificallyidentifiedontheCCLascontrolledformissiletechnology +%( reasons.Thepolicyexcludingexportsandreexportsofmissiletechnologycontrolleditems O destinedforCanadafromalicenserequirementiscurrentlyunderreview.MXjXXXjAnAdvanceNoticeof ? ProposedRulemakingwaspublishedonDecember20,2001,statingthatBXAisreviewingthe / existinglicenseexemptionandaskingforcommentsonhowremovaloftheexemptionwould   affectexporters.BXAisalsomeetingwiththeCanadiangovernmenttodiscusstheproposed   policychange.#XjXXMXj#     BXArequiresalicenseforanydualuseexportorreexportsubjecttotheEARwhentheexporter   knowsthattheitemiseither(1)destinedforamissileprojectlistedinthefootnotetoCountry   GroupD:4inSupplement1toPart740oftheEAR,or(2)willbeusedinthedesign, p  development,productionoruseofmissilesinorbyacountrylistedinCountryGroupD:4.The `  samelicenserequirementappliestoactivitiesbyU.S.personsthatwouldsupportamissile P  programinthedesignatedcountries. @  BXAmayinformtheexporterthatalicenseisrequiredforanyitembecausethereisanunac o  ceptableriskofuseinordiversiontosuchactivitiesanywhereintheworld. _  B.   Applicationsforexportlicenseswillbeconsideredonacasebycasebasistodetermine ? whethertheexportwouldmakeamaterialcontributiontotheproliferationofmissiles. /  AnalysisofControlasRequiredbySection6(f)ofTheAct   A.ThePurposeoftheControl   Thesecontrolscurtailtheavailabilityofgoodsandtechnologythatcouldcontributetomissile p proliferation.TheU.S.regulationofexportsofspecifictypesofmissilerelatedequipmentand ` technology,incoordinationwithothersuppliercountries,helpslimitthedestabilizingspreadof P missilesystemsandrelatedtechnologyaroundtheworld.ThesecontrolscomplementU.S.and  @ internationalnuclear,chemicalandbiologicalnonproliferationeffortsbyblockingthe !0 developmentofunmanneddeliverysystemsforweaponsofmassdestruction. o"  ThesecontrolslendclearU.S.supporttothecollectiveeffortoftheother32membercountriesof O$  theMTCRandunderscoreU.S.resolvetoaddressthemountinginternationalconcernregarding ?%! missileproliferation. /&" &  B.Considerationsand/orDeterminationsoftheSecretaryofCommerce  (!$  1.  ProbabilityofAchievingtheIntendedForeignPolicyPurpose. Althoughsome )#& controlleditemsareavailablefromothercountries,cooperationamongtheUnitedStates,its *$' MTCR''(partnersandotherlikemindedcountries,manyofwhicharemajorproducersoftheitems +%( undercontrol,hashinderedtheeffortsofproliferatorstosuccessfullydeveloporacquire O militarilyeffectivemissiles.TheSecretaryhasdeterminedthatextendingthesecontrolsislikely ? tolimitthespreadofmissiledeliverysystems. /  2.  CompatibilitywithForeignPolicyObjectives. 󀀀Haltingthespreadofmissilesandrelated   equipmentandtechnologyworldwideisakeyU.S.nationalsecurityandnonproliferation   objective.Missiletechnologycontrolsareconsistentwith,andcontributeto,achievementofthis   objective.Moreover,U.S.membershipintheMTCR,andrigorousapplicationoftheMTCR   GuidelinesandAnnex,complementexistingnuclear,chemicalandbiologicalnonproliferation   controlpoliciesbyworkingactivelytocurbthespreadofmissiletechnologyandequipmentfor p  thedeliveryofsuchweapons. `   3.  ReactionofOtherCountries. TheSecretaryhasdeterminedthatthereactionofother @  countriestothesecontrolswillnotrenderthecontrolsineffectiveorbecounterproductivetoU.S. 0  policy.TheUnitedStatesisconfidentthatothermembersofandadherentstotheMTCR,many o  ofwhomarealsotheleadingsuppliersofmissiletechnology,willcontinuetosupportand _ strengthenthiscontrolregime.TheMTCRpartnersshareinformationregardingdenialsof O MTCRAnnexitems,andarecommittedtoconsultwitheachotherbeforeapprovingan ? essentiallyidenticalexportdeniedtoaspecificenduserbyanotherpartner(the"noundercut / policy.")TheMTCRpartnersalsoshareinformationaboutpotentialproliferationconcern  activities,andhavecooperatedtointerdictcertaintransactions.Inaddition,thenumberof  MTCRmembersandothercountrieswillingtocooperatewiththeregimehasincreasedoverthe  pastfewyears.Finally,theUnitedStatesanditsMTCRpartnersareactivelyengagedinan  outreachprogramtoencourageadditionalcountriestoadheretotheGuidelinesandimplement  effectiveexportcontrolsonMTCRitems.   4.  EconomicImpactonU.S.Industry. 󀀀Inextendingthesecontrols,theSecretaryhas ` determinedthattheeconomicimpactdoesnotoutweightheforeignpolicybenefitofthecontrol. P TheMTCRaffectsonlyaconfinedlistofcommoditiesandhaslimitedeconomicimpactonthe  @ themajorityofU.S.exports.MultilateralsupportfortheMTCRAnnexbyothermajorsuppliers !0 ofcontrolledtechnologiesandproductshelpsrestraintheflowofmissilerelatedgoodsand o"  technologiestoactivitiesandprojectsofproliferationconcern.MTCRmemberscommitmentto _# the noundercutpolicyhelpsensurethatnomembercountryobtainsanunfaircommercial O$  advantageinthepursuitofforeignsales. ?%! InFY2001,BXAreceived1,140licenseapplications,valuedat$1.7billion,fortheexportor ' # reexportofmissiletechnologyequipment.Ofthese,BXAapproved925applications,denied61 (!$ applications,andreturnedwithoutaction125applications,with29applicationsstillinprocessat ("% theendofFY2001.Thesignificantdollarvolumeisreflectiveofthelargenumberofexportsof )#& expensiveaircraftinertialnavigationunits. *$'  +%( TheincreaseinthenumberoflicenseapplicationsreceivedinFY2001(1,140)comparedtothe O totalreceivedinFY2000(942)isattributedinparttothechangeinpolicyregardingexportsto ? IndiaandPakistan.ExportsandreexportsofallitemssubjecttotheEARtoIndianandPakistani / entitieslistedinSupplementNo.4toPart744oftheEAR(theEntityList)requirealicense.On   March17,2000,thelicensereviewpolicyfortheexportofitemsclassifiedasEAR99tothese   listedentitieschangedfromapolicyofdenialtoapresumptionofapproval.Thisaction   contributedtoanincreaseinthevolumeofapplicationsreceived.OnOctober1,2001,the   DepartmentofCommercepublishedaregulationwhichliftedmissiletechnologysanctions   againstIndiaandPakistanandreducedthenumberofIndianandPakistanientitiesontheEntity   List. p  Therearecomparativelyfewdeniedlicensesformissiletechnologycontrolleditemsbecause P  (1)exportersdonotgenerallypursuetransactionstheyunderstand(basedoninformal @  discussions)willberejected;and(2)manyoftheapprovedtransactionsaretocountriesthatdo 0  notposemissileproliferationconcerns(e.g.,MTCRmembernations).Thus,thelicensing o  requirementsprovideaneffectiveandefficientwaytocontrolthesesensitivemissilerelated _ items,greatlyreducingthechancethatitemswillbedivertedtoanentitythatmightusethemfor O proliferationactivities. ?  5.  EnforcementofControl. IXK XXXjThepresenceofmultilateralcontrolsonmissiletechnology  providesastrongframeworkforcooperativeenforcementeffortsoverseas,butthereare  challengesfortheenforcementofcontrolsondualusegoodsrelatedtomissiledevelopment.  First,itisdifficulttodetect,investigate,andprosecutecasesunderthe knowstandardsetby  theEPCI catchallprovision.Second,somecountriesdonotyethavecatchalllawsorhave  differentstandardsfor catchall,complicatinglawenforcementcooperation.Third,identifying  illegalexportsandreexportsofdualusemissilerelatedgoodsrequiresasignificantresource p commitment.#XjX XIXK A#IXK XXXj ` Inordertoenforcethesecontrolseffectively#XjX XIXKvD#IXK XXXj,BXAcontinuestofocusonpreventiveenforce  @ ment.Itmaintainsanextensiveoutreachprogramtoeducatecompaniesaboutexportcontrols !0 andtoincreasetheirawarenessof"redflags"thatmayindicatepotentiallyriskytransactions. o"  ThisprogramisanimportantcomponentoftheBXAseffortstopreventcompaniesfrom _# illegallyexportingdualuseproductsorequipmentthatcouldbeusedtomakemissiles. O$  Recognizingtheimportanceofexportenforcement,theMTCRhelditsfirstEnforcementExperts ?%! meetingattheMTCRPlenaryinOttawa,CanadainSeptember2001.#XjX XIXKD#   /&"  C.ConsultationwithIndustry  (!$ TheUnitedStatesnormallyholdsdiscussionswithindustryrepresentativesonissuesinvolving )#& theMTCRAnnexthroughtheTransportationTechnicalAdvisoryCommittee(TransTAC),a *$' BXAcharteredcommitteeofindustryrepresentatives.Therearealsoregularconsultationswith +%( otherrelevantTACsonmissilerelatedissues,suchastheEPCIclarificationprojectandother O currentMTCRtechnicalissues.BXAparticipatesininteragencyworkinggroupsthatreview ? proposedchangestotheAnnexandengagesindiscussionsoftheproposalswithcompaniesthat / haverelevantexpertise.Forexample,inFY2001,BXAworkedwithindustrytoclarifycontrols   ontelemetryequipment.   OnNovember7,2001,theDepartmentofCommerce,viatheFederalRegisterandtheBXA   Webpage,solicitedcommentsfromindustryontheeffectivenessofforeignpolicybasedexport   controls.AmoredetailedreviewofthecommentsisavailableinAppendixI.   Sartomeradvocatedeasingforeignpolicybasedcontrolsonhydroxylterminatedpolybutadiene `  resins(HTPBresins),whichareclassifiedunderECCN1C111b.2.Sartomerstatedthatthe P  controls haveanadverseeconomicimpactonourexportactivities,especiallyinasmuchasthese @  controlscreateanunfaircommercialadvantageforforeignproducers.Todecreasedelaysinthe 0  licensingprocess,Sartomerrecommendedadoptingaframeworkthatwouldpermitstreamlined o  authorizationfortheexportationofHTPBresins.Suggestionsincludethecreationofalicense _ renewalprocess,licenseexceptionavailabilityforsamples,andgrantingBXAwithdelegationof O authorityinordertoavoid repetitiveinteragencyreferral.Sartomeralsorecommends ? broadeningtheMTCR noundercutpolicy,statingthat disparitiesbetweenthenational / regimesleadtoinequities,especiallyinviewofcumbersomeU.S.regulatoryrequirements,  whichwebelieveundercutU.S.economicinterests.   D.ConsultationwithOtherCountries   OngoingconsultationswiththeothermembersoftheMTCRareafundamentalelementof  U.S.missiletechnologycontrols.ConsultationswithnonMTCRcountriesarealsoessentialto p U.S.missilenonproliferationpolicy.TheU.S.Governmentsharesinformationaboutactivities ` ofconcernwithothercountriesandseekstopreventorstopcertaintransactions.TheUnited P StatesalsosharesdenialinformationwithitsMTCRpartners.Althoughexportcontrolsare  @ coordinatedmultilaterally,nationaldiscretionremainstheultimatedecisionmakingauthority. !0  E.AlternativeMeans  O$  ThemissilesanctionprovisionsoftheNationalDefenseAuthorizationActofFY1991provide /&" fortheimpositionofexport,import,andprocurementsanctionsonforeignentitiesengagedin ' # certainkindsofactivitiesrelatingtothetransferofMTCRAnnexitemstononMTCRadherent (!$ countries.Inthepast,theUnitedStateshasimposedsanctionsonentitiesinChina,India, ("% NorthKorea,Pakistan,andRussia.Onegoalofthemissilesanctionsistoencouragethe )#& governmentsofthesanctionedentitiestoadoptresponsiblenonproliferationbehavior. *$' _ +%( DiplomaticeffortsbytheUnitedStatesand_MTCR_Ԁpartnerstoencourageadditionalcountries, O includingotherpotentialsuppliersofmissiletechnology,toabidebythe_MTCR_ԀGuidelinesare ? ongoing.Theseeffortsareaimedatencouragingnon_MTCR_Ԁmemberstoadhereunilaterallyto / the_MTCR_ԀGuidelinesandtoimplementeffectivemissileexportcontrols.    &  F.ForeignAvailability    TheUnitedStatesevaluatestheforeignavailabilityofmissilesystemsandlaunchvehiclesprior   totheimpositionof_MTCR_Ԅbasedcontrols.' YPossiblesuppliersofmissiletechnologywhoarenot   _MTCR_Ԁmembersinclude,butarenotlimitedto,China(PRC),Egypt,India,Israel,andTaiwan. p  Someofthesecountries,suchasIsrael,abidebythe_MTCR_ԀGuidelinesandapply_MTCR_Ԅtype `  controls.TheUnitedStatescontinuestoapproachothernationsthatproduce_MTCR_ԀAnnex P  controlleditemstourgevigilanceinreviewingrequeststoexporttheseitemsandtorigorously @  applythe_MTCR_ԀGuidelinestohelppreventmissileproliferationworldwide. 0    O @W IXK XXXjC @ 8tdd8I" XIXKCHAPTER9   DHighPerformanceComputers O  (Section742.12)#IXK XI"à^# g    ExportControlProgramDescriptionAndLicensingPolicy o  l_    Adjustingexportcontrolsonhighperformancecomputers(_HPCs_)isahighpriorityforthe O  UnitedStatesasimprovementsincomputertechnologycontinuetoenhancesystemperformance. ?  InFY2001,twomajoradjustmentsweremadeto_HPC_Ԁcontrols.Thefirstsetofchangeswas /  announcedinFY2000(August2000)butwasnotfullyeffectiveuntilFY2001duetoa   f  g f  g congressionallymandatedf  g Ԁwaitingperiod.Thesechangeswereasfollows:   #XjX XIXK%^#IXK XXXj&  :  :b0  "0` (#(#  RaisedtheTierIIlicenseexceptionlimitto45,000from33,000_MTOPS_.:bc݌` (#` (# Ќ  :  :c0  "0` (#(#  RaisedtheTierIIIlicenseexceptionlimitto28,000from20,000_MTOPS_Ԁfor  civilianendusersandfrom12,500formilitaryendusers.:cd݌` (#` (# Ќ  :  :Ge0  "0` (#(#  'bRaisedthe_NDAA_Ԁnotificationlevelto28,000_MTOPS_Ԁ:Gebe݌p` (#` (# Ќ     ` (effectiveFebruary28,2001). ` :  :f0  "0` (#(#  #XjX XIXKb#MXjXXXjRemovedthedistinctionbetweenmilitaryandcivilianendusersinTierIII;#XjXXMXj9g#IXK XXXj:ff݌P` (#` (# Ќ  :  :)h0  "0` (#(#  MovedArgentinafromTierIItoTierI.:)hDh݌@` (#` (# Ќ  :  :h0  "0` (#(#  MovedEstoniafromTierIIItoTierII(effectiveDecember29,2000).#XjX XIXKg#IXK XXXj:h i݌0` (#` (# Ќ  #XjX XIXKi#X{BXXXj#XjXXX{B=j#MXjXXXj ThePresidentsentareporttoCongressjustifyingthechangestotheTierIIIcountrygroupand i _NDAA_ԀnotificationlevelonAugust31,2000.TheDepartmentofCommercepublisheda Y  regulationintheFederalRegisteronOctober13,2000,implementingthenewcontrols.As I  stipulatedintheFY1998NationalDefenseAuthorizationAct(_NDAA_),themovementof 9! EstoniafromTierIIItoTierIItookeffect120daysfromthedatethePresidentsReportwentto )" Congress(December29,2000)andtheupdateofthe_NDAA_Ԁnotificationleveltookeffect180 # daysfromthedatethePresidentsReportwasdeliveredtoCongress(February28,2001).  $ Thesecondsetofchangesto_HPC_ԀpolicyinFY2001wasannouncedonJanuary10,2001and %! wasimplementedinregulationspublishedonJanuary19,2001intheFederalRegister. & " PresidentClintonsubmittedareporttoCongressannouncingthechangesalsoonJanuary19, 'z!# 2001.Therevisionsto_HPC_Ԁcontrolpolicywereasfollows:#XjXXMXjj#X{BXXXj (j"$  H@=ABC>EFG(IyxH@=ABC>EFG#XjXXX{Bp#MXjXXXj"@"    @q2I3  0 `   CombinedComputerTiersIandIIintoasingleTierI(f  all_HPCs_Ԁregardlessof *T$& _MTOPS_ԀareeligibleforLicenseException_CTP_g f  g f  g g f  g f  g f  g f  g f  g ).@q?q݌+D%'` (#` (# Ќ  "@"    @js2I3  0 `   RaisedtheTierIIIlicenseexception_CTP_Ԁlimitto85,000_MTOPS_Ԁfrom28,000 O _MTOPS_.@jss݌?` (#` (# Ќ  "@"    @t2I3  0 `   Raisedthe_NDAA_Ԁnotificationlevelto85,000_MTOPS_Ԁ(effectiveMarch20, / 2001).@t+u݌ ` (#` (# Ќ  "@"    @Vv2I3  0 `   MovedLithuaniafromTierIIItoTierI(effectiveMay19,2001).#XjXXMXjp#X{BXXXj@Vvv݌ ` (#` (# Ќ  #XjXXX{B:w#IXK XXXjAsstipulatedintheFY1998_NDAA_Ԁ(asamended),theupdateofthe_NDAA_Ԁnotificationlevel   waseffective60daysafterthePresidentsReportwenttoCongress(March20,2001)and#XjX XIXKw#IXK XXXjԀthe   movementofLithuaniafromTierIIItoTierIwaseffective120daysafterthedatethatthe   ReportwasdeliveredtoCongress(May19,2001).#XjX XIXK y#MXjXXXjTheExportofanycomputertoproliferation z  relatedendusersandendusesstillrequiresalicense.#XjXXMXj z#X{BXXXj j  #XjXXX{Bz#MXjXXXjInlateFY2001,theAdministrationbegananinteragencyreviewofcurrentcomputercontrols. J  Thisreviewtakesintoconsiderationtechnologytrends,suchasclustering,andmarketrealities, :  suchasthevolumeproductionofsystemsbasedonmassmarketmicroprocessors.#XjXXMXj{#X{BXXXj y*  #XjXXX{B|#IXK XXXj  Ӏ i  AnalysisofControlasRequiredbySection6(f)ofTheAct Y   }A.ThePurposeoftheControl  9 Thepurposeofthe_HPC_Ԁcontrolsistopreventthetransferordiversionofcomputerstoendusers  whousethecomputersinanunauthorizedmanner.ThecontrolsdemonstratethedegreeofU.S.   concernoverillegitimateaccesstosuchmachinesandassisttheUnitedStatestoobtain  multilateralcooperationconsistentwiththe_HPC_ԀAgreementandobligationsunderthe  _Wassenaar_ԀArrangement.   B.Considerationsand/orDeterminationsoftheSecretaryofCommerce  j  Z  1.  ProbabilityofAchievingtheIntendedForeignPolicyPurpose. Thewidespread  J availabilityofthecomponents,thetechnicalknowhowneededtobuild_HPCs_,andthespeed !: withwhichthetechnologyoftheseitemsimproves,arechallengestoachievingthecontrols y"* objectives.U.S._HPC_Ԁcontrolsaredesignedtopermitthegovernmenttocalibratecontrollevels i# andlicensingconditionsdependingonthenationalsecurityorproliferationriskposedbya Y$   specificdestination,enhanceU.S.nationalsecurity,andpreservethetechnologicalleadofU.S. I%! industrybyensuringthatcontrolsoncomputersareeffectiveanddonotunnecessarilyimpede 9&" legitimatecomputerexports. )' #  2.  CompatibilitywithForeignPolicyObjectives. Preventingtheproliferationofweapons  )"% ofmassdestructionandthemeanstodeliverthemisafundamentalgoalofU.S.foreignpolicy. )#& Since_HPCs_Ԁcanbeusedtodevelopsuchweapons,U.S.exportcontrols,inconcertwiththoseof *$' ourallies,deny_HPCs_Ԁtopotential_proliferators_.ExtensiveU.S.participationinvarious +%( multilateralcontrolgroups,specificallythe_Wassenaar_ԀArrangement,demonstratestheU.S. O commitmentinthisregard. ?  3.  ReactionofOtherCountries. Sincemanyofthecountriesthathavethecapacityto   produce_HPCs_ԀshareU.S.oppositiontotheproliferationofweaponsofmassdestruction,thereis   ahighdegreeofcooperationbetweentheUnitedStatesanditspartnersinmultilateralexport   controlregimes.    4.  EconomicImpactonU.S.Industry. #XjX XIXK|#IXK XXXjRegularrevisionsto_HPC_Ԁcontrolthresholdsenable   U.S.industrytoremaincompetitiveintheworldmarketandensurethatU.S.nationalsecurity p  interestsaremaintainedbykeepingsensitivecomputersunderexportcontrols.Therewere `  severaladjustmentstothecontrolthresholdsduringFY2001,asdescribedabove,culminatingin P  theJanuary2001decisiontoallowtheuseofLicenseException_CTP_Ԁforall_HPCs_,regardlessof @  _MTOPS_,toalldestinations#XjX XIXK#IXK XXXjԀexceptTiers3and4.TheTier3licenseexceptioneligibilitylevel 0  wasraisedto85,000_MTOPS_Ԁ(effectiveMarch2001);theTier4controllevelremainsat6 o  _MTOPS_.Thenewcontrollevelsreflectadvancesincomputertechnology,massmarket _ conditions,andincreasedforeignavailability. O InFY2001,BXAapproved32licensesforexportofcomputersf  g f  g listedunderf  g Ԁ_ECCN_Ԁ4A003, / valuedat$96.9million.ThisincludesexportstoTier3countries(22cases),aswellastoTier2  countries(priortothef  g f  g Ԁmergeroff  g ԀTier1f  g f  g ;7cases),andexportsoflowerlevelcomputerstocivilian  endusersinSyria(3cases).Onelicenseapplicationvaluedat$767,000wasdeniedand39  applicationsvaluedat$39.9millionwerereturnedwithoutaction,mostoftenbecausealicense  wasnotrequiredforthetransaction.#XjX XIXKv#IXK XXXj  #XjX XIXK#X{BXXXj 5.  #XjXXX{B#LXK XXXjEnforcementofControl. Aslongas_HPC_Ԁcontrolsareimposedonthemostadvanced p models,whicharegenerallymanufacturedbyafewcompaniesandnotinlargesupply,thereare z noparticularenforcementconcerns.However,astechnologyoutpacesthecontrollevels,itis j difficulttoenforcecontrolsonlowerlevelitemsthataremanufacturedforthemassmarket.#XjX XLXKU#LXK XXXj  Z #XjX XLXKf#X{BXXXj#XjXXX{B#IXK XXXj C.ConsultationwithIndustry  "D #XjX XIXK#IXK XXXjTheDepartmentofCommerce,throughitsInformationSystemsTechnicalAdvisoryCommittee s$$  (_ISTAC_)andthePresidentsExportCouncilSubcommitteeonExportAdministration c%! (_PECSEA_),holdsongoingdiscussionswithindustry.Industryhasrepeatedlyurgedthat S& " improvementsinperformancebetakenintoaccountinadjustingexportcontrolpolicy. C' # Inresponsetothisurging,theAdministrationisworkingcloselywithindustryonexamining 3(!$ futurecontrols.#XjX XIXK#IXK XXXj #)"% #XjX XIXK1#OnNovember7,2001,theDepartmentofCommerce,viatheFederalRegisterandviaBXAs +$' Webpage,solicitedcommentsfromindustryontheeffectivenessofforeignpolicybasedexport +%( _ controls.Nocommentswerereceivedspecifictothecontrolsdescribedinthischapter.Amore O detailedreviewofthecommentsisavailableinAppendixI. IXK XXXj ?  D.ConsultationwithOtherCountries    #XjX XIXK7#IXK XXXjTheUnitedStatesactivelyconsultswithalliesandotherpotentialsuppliernationstoensurethat   theyunderstandthebasisforU.S.controls.TheUnitedStatesisworkingparticularlyclosely   withJapan.   #XjX XIXKؚ#IXK XXXj E.AlternativeMeans  p  TheUnitedStateswillcontinuetousediplomaticeffortstodiscourageothernationsfrom P  acquiring_ HPCs_ Ԁforthedevelopmentofweaponsofmassdestructionandotherusesthatthreaten @  U.S.interests.TheUnitedStatesalsowillworkcloselywithothersuppliercountriestoincrease 0  theeffectivenessofmultilateralcontrols.However,theseeffortscanonlysupplement,not o  replace,theeffectivenessofactualexportcontrols. _  F.ForeignAvailability #XjX XIXK*#LXK XXXj ? #XjX XLXK#MXjXXXjThekeytoeffectiveexportcontrolsistosetlevelsjustabovethelevelofcomputercapability  thatenduserswithsecurityandproliferationriskscanobtainfromnonU.S.sourcesasaresult  ofwidespreadavailability.Theabilityoftheseenduserstoachievehighperformance  computingcapabilitybyclusteringtogetherlowerlevelcomponentsisafactorindetermining  theappropriatecontrollevel.Theongoingreviewof_ HPC_ Ԁcontrollevelsisintendedtomaintain  realisticexportcontrollevelsinthisdynamicmarket.However,accordingtoprivatesector  forecasts,multiprocessorsystemsmaysoonbeavailableonaworldwidebasisfromforeign p manufacturers,includingconfigurationsthatexceedcurrentU.S.computercontrolthresholds. ` Inaddition,theabilitytoclustercomputerstogetherusingofftheshelfcomponentstoachieve P highperformancecomputingpowerhasbecomewidespread.#XjXXMXj_#   @ _ _ @[IXK XXXj     @ I8 dd8Ju  I" XIXK CHAPTER10   Encryption O  (Section742.15) #IXK XI"# g  ˥ ExportControlProgramDescriptionandLicensingPolicy  o  󀀀 _  #XjX XIXKJ#<( ` hp x X<6XK XXXjOnDecember30,1996,BXAissuedaninterimruleintheFederalRegister(61FR68572)that O  exercisedjurisdictionoverdualuseencryptionproducts.Theruleimposednationalsecurityand ?  foreignpolicycontrolsoncertaincryptographicitems,includingcommercialencryption /   softwareand hardware,thatwereontheUnitedStatesMunitionsList(USML).Thisaction   wastakenconsistentwithExecutiveOrder(E.O.)#XjX X6XK #6XK XXXjԀ13026andpursuanttothePresidential   Memorandum,bothofwhichwereissuedbyPresidentClintononNovember15,1996.The  MemorandumandE.O.13026directedthatallencryptionitemscontrolledontheUSML,with  theexceptionofthosespecificallydesigned,developed,configured,adapted,ormodifiedfor  militaryapplications(includingcommand,control,andintelligenceapplications),betransferred  totheCommerceControlList(CCL).Theitemsspecificallydesignedformilitaryapplications p remainontheUSMLandcontinuetobecontrolledbytheOfficeofDefenseTradeControls#XjX X6XKR#6XK XXXjԀat ` theDepartmentofState. P IntheCCLtheacronym EI(EncryptionItems)designatescryptographicitemsforwhichthe 0 highestlevelofnationalsecuritybasedcontrolsareappliedundertheExportAdministration o  Regulations(EAR). Accordingly,suchitemsaresubjecttocertainuniquerestrictionsunderthe _ EAR.Forinstance,exportersmustnotifyBXA,orelseprovideacopyofthesourcecode,prior O tomakingEIcontrolledencryptionsoftwarefreelyandpubliclyavailable(e.g.,bypostingtothe ?  Internet)underlicenseexceptionTechnologyandSoftwareUnrestricted(TSU).Inaddition,EI /! controlledparts,components,software,andtechnologyarenoteligiblefordeminimistreatment " whenincorporatedintoforeignproducts,absentspecificauthorizationbyBXA#XjX X6XK[#6XK XXXj.#XjX X6XKl#6XK XXXj # U.S.encryptionpolicyrestsonthreetenets:areviewofencryptionproductsinadvanceofsale,a $  streamlinedpostexportreportingsystem,andalicenseprocessthatpreservestheU.S. %! Government'sabilitytoreviewthesaleofstrongencryptiontoforeigngovernments,military & " organizations,andnationsofconcern.Justasthemarketforinformationsecurityproductshas 'p!# grownandchanged,thispolicycontinuestoevolveconsistentwithnationalinterestinareassuch (`"$ aselectroniccommerce,nationalsecurity,andsupporttolawenforcement.The )P#% AdministrationsencryptionpolicymakesiteasierforAmericanstousestrongerencryption *@$& productstoprotecttheirprivacy,intellectualproperty,andothervaluableinformation. +0%' ЇSincethepublicationoftheinterimrulein1996,exportcontrolsonencryptionhaveevolved, O withthemostrecentannouncementupdatingcontrolsbeingmadeonOctober19,2000.Key ? featuresofthecurrentregulationsaredescribedinthefollowingparagraphs. /  /EEEEEEEEE(8yH@=ABC>EFG?+ 4 <DL!X?U.S.companiescanexportencryptionproductsandtechnologyunderalicenseexceptiontoany   enduserinthe15nationsoftheEuropeanUnionaswellasAustralia,Norway,CzechRepublic,   Hungary,Poland,Japan,NewZealand,andSwitzerlandimmediatelyuponnotifyingBXAof   intenttoexport.   E+ 4 <DL!4X!EAnyencryptioncommodityorsoftwarecanbeexportedunderalicenseexception,aftera p  technicalreview,toanynongovernmentenduserworldwide,exceptforsanctionedor `  embargoeddestinations,ordeniedpersons.Toensurestreamlinedexportstonongovernment P  endusers,companiesmayexportproductsunderthisprovision30daysaftersubmittingthe @  productsfortechnicalreview. 0  Anyencryptionitem,includingencryption#XjX X6XK#6XK XXXjԀtechnologyandsourcecode,exceptencryption _ technologytonationalsofCuba,Iran,Iraq,Libya,NorthKorea,Sudan,orSyria#XjX X6XKe#6XK XXXj,maybereleased O toforeignnationalsworkingforU.S.companiesintheUnitedStates  forinternalcompanyuse#XjX X6XK:#6XK XXXj ? withoutreviewbyBXA.Exportsortransfersofencryptiontechnologytonationalsof / designatedterroristsupportingcountriesrequirealicense.   E+ 4 <DL!4X!EAcategoryofproductscalled retailencryptioncommoditiesandsoftwaremaybeexported  aftertechnicalreviewtoanyenduser,includinggovernmentendusers,underalicense  exception.Retailencryptioncommoditiesandsoftwarearegenerallyavailabletothepublic,are  easytoinstall,andimplementcryptographythatcannotbeeasilychanged,modified,or  customizedbythecustomer.Thiscategoryincludesfinancialrelatedproductsintendedforuse p bybanks,financialinstitutions,andotherapprovedsectors.Certainrestrictionsapplyto ` telecommunicationsandInternetserviceproviders,andnetworkinfrastructureproductssuchas P highendroutersandswitchesmaynotbeexportedundertheseretailprovisions.  @ E+ 4 <DL!4X!EProductsthatincorporatecomponentsprovidingcryptographicfunctionalitylimitedtoshort o"  rangewirelesstechnologycanbeexportedunderalicenseexceptiontoanyenduser.These _# itemsincludeconsumerproductssuchasaudiodevices,cameras,videorecorders,computer O$  accessories,handhelddevices,mobilephones,andhouseholdappliances.Theseproductsdonot ?%! requirereviewbyBXAandareexemptfrompostexportreportingrequirements. /&" Ѐ ' # E+ 4 <DL!4X!ETofacilitatethedevelopmentofnextgenerationproductsandtoallowmoremarketflexibility, (!$ productsthatenableU.S.andnonU.S.sourceproductstooperatetogethermayalsobe ("% immediatelyexported.Licensesareonlyrequiredfor cryptanalyticitems,aspecializedclass )#& oftoolsnotnormallyusedincommercialenvironments,and opencryptographicinterface *$' productswhichprovidean opendoorfortheinsertionofforeignorcustomizedcryptography. +%( ЇE+ 4 <DL!4X!EPostexportreportingundertheencryptionlicenseexceptionensurescompliancewithU.S. O regulationsandhasallowedtheAdministrationtoreducelicensingrequirementsfornon ? embargoeddestinations.ReportingisnolongerrequiredforproductsexportedbyU.S.owned / overseassubsidiaries,retailoperatingsystems,anddesktopapplications(suchasemail   programsandbrowsers)designedfor,bundledwith,orpreloadedonsinglecentralprocessing   unitdevicessuchaspersonalcomputers,laptops,orhandhelddevices.   E+ 4 <DL!4X!EExporterscanselfclassifyunilaterallycontrolledencryptionproductsthataresubjecttoforeign   policycontrolsonly(i.e.,itemsclassifiedunderECCNs5A992,5D992,and5E992)upon   notificationtoBXA.ValidatedlicensesarerequiredonexportsbyU.S.personstodesignated p  terroristsupportingcountries(Cuba,Iran,Iraq,Libya,NorthKorea,Sudan,orSyria),their `  nationals,andothersanctionedentities. P   H@=ABC>EFG(Ix8/EEEEEEEEE#XjX X6XK# IXK XXXj #XjX XIXKB#IXK XXXj   &  AnalysisofControlasRequiredbySection6(f)oftheAct o  A.ThePurposeoftheControl  O EncryptionexportcontrolsareinplacetoprotectU.S.nationalsecurity,foreignpolicy,andlaw / enforcementinter'oests,particularlyastheyrelatetothesafetyofU.S.citizensathomeand  abroad.Encryptioncanbeusedtoconcealthecommunicationsof,forexample,terrorists,drug  smugglers,andotherindividualsintentontakingactionsharmfultoU.S.facilities,personnel,or  securityinterests.Useofcryptographicproductsbycriminalsandterroristsmakesitmore  difficultforlawenforcementagenciestouncoverandpreventhostileactsbeforetheyoccur.  Cryptographicproductsandsoftwarealsohavemilitaryandintelligenceapplicationsthat,inthe  handsofhostilenations,couldposeathreattoU.S.nationalsecurity.Thesecontrolsare p consistentwithE.O.13026ofNovember15,1996,andthePresidentialMemorandumofthe ` samedate. K  C ׀ P  B.Considerationsand/orDeterminationsoftheSecretaryofCommerce  !0  1.  ProbabilityofAchievingtheIntendedForeignPolicyPurpose. Commensuratewiththe _# growthofelectroniccommerceintheworldsmostdevelopednations,thenumberofcountries O$  withthetechnologytoproducehighlysophisticatedencryptionproductsisgrowing.This ?%! growthisconcentrated,however,amongnationsandtradingpartnersthatgenerallyshareU.S. /&" securityconcernsandforeignpolicyinterests.Also,sincemuchoftheworldscryptography#XjX XIXK#IXK XXXjԀis ' # suppliedbyacoregroupofinformationsecurityindustryleaders,encryptionexportcontrolscan (!$ beveryeffectiveinachievingtheirintendedforeignpolicypurpose.ConsistentwithE.O.13026 ("% ofNovember15,1996,andthePresidentialMemorandumofthesamedate,theSecretaryhas )#& determinedthatthesecontrolsachievetheintendedpurposeofrestrictingtheexportof *$' commercialencryptionitems,insituationsinwhichtheirexportwouldbecontrarytoU.S. +%( nationalsecurityorforeignpolicyinterests#XjX XIXKw#IXK XXXj. O  2.  CompatibilitywithForeignPolicyObjectives. TheSecretaryhasdeterminedthatthe / controlsarecompatiblewiththeforeignpolicyobjectivesoftheUnitedStates.Thecontrolsare   consistentwiththeU.S.foreignpolicygoalofpreventingU.S.exportsthatmightcontributeto   destabilizingmilitarycapabilitiesortointernationalterroristorcriminalactivitiesagainstthe   UnitedStatesanditscitizens.Thecontrolsalsocontributetopublicsafetybypromotingthe   protectionofU.S.citizensoverseas.    3.  ReactionofOtherCountries. TheSecretaryhasdeterminedthatthereactionofother p  countriestothiscontrolhasnotrenderedthecontrolineffectiveinachievingitsintendedforeign `  policypurposenorcounterproductivetoU.S.foreignpolicyinterests.Otheralliedcountries, P  particularlythosewiththecapabilitytoproducehighlysophisticatedencryptionproducts, @  recognizetheneedtocontrolexportsofencryptionproductsfornationalsecurityandlaw 0  enforcementreasons.TheUnitedStatesanditskeytradingandsecuritypartnersrecognizethe o  desirabilityofsecuringcriticalinfrastructures,developingnewtechnologiesandstandards, _ thwartingcybercrime,andpromotingelectroniccommerce,whilerestrictinggoodsthatcould O compromiseourcommonsecurityandforeignpolicyinterests.Asaresult,membersofthe ? WassenaarArrangementandotherinternationalarrangements,suchastheEuropeanUnion, / continuetotracktheU.S.positionandimplementthemultilateralagreements.   4.  EconomicImpactonUnitedStatesIndustry. TheSecretaryhasdeterminedthatthe  AdministrationsupdatedframeworkforencryptionexportcontrolsmeetstheneedofU.S.  industrytoremaintheleaderintheglobalmarketforinformationsecurityproductswhile  continuingtoprovideessentialprotectionsfornationalsecurityreasons.  InFY2001,theUnitedStatesprocessed341licenseapplicationsforencryptionitems.The ` UnitedStatesapproved243licenseapplicationsvaluedat$31.1million.Theseincludelicenses P forexportstogovernmentendusersofnonretailitems,aswellasencryptiontechnology  @ exports,exportscivilianendusersinSyria(whichisnoteligibleforlicenseexceptionENC),and !0  deemedexportsofencryptiontechnologyforemploymentofforeignnationals#XjX XIXK4#6XK XXXjofCuba,Iran, o"  Iraq,Libya,NorthKorea,Sudan,orSyria#XjX X6XK#IXK XXXj.#XjX XIXKx#IXK XXXjԀInadditiontotheseapprovals,theUnitedStates _# rejectedfiveapplicationsvaluedat$65,907andreturnedwithoutaction93applicationsvaluedat O$  $67.9million.ManyoftheseapplicationswereRWAdbecausetheyqualifiedforlicense ?%! exceptionENC.FY2001licenselevelscontinuethedownwardtrendthatbeganinFY2000 /&" whenencryptionpolicywassignificantlyliberalized.Inthelastfiscalyear,1,094applications ' # wereprocessed. (!$ Undercurrentencryptionpolicy,mostencryptionproductsrequireaonetimetechnicalreview )#& andclassificationpriortoexport.InFY2001,BXAreceived983requestsfortechnicalreview *$' covering1,553controlledencryptionproducts,components,toolkitsandsourcecodeitems.Of +%( the1,405encryptionproductsreviewed,nearly80percentwereclassifiedas retailencryption O items,makingthembroadlyeligibleforexportwithoutalicense.Thiscompareswith680 ? applicationsrepresenting1,077encryptionitemsclassifiedlastyear(fromJanuary14,2000 / whenthecurrentencryptionpolicytookeffecttotheendofFY2000).Lastyear65percentof   encryptionproductsreviewedweremadeeligibleforexportas retailitems.   Inaddition,inFY2001,422antiterrorismcontrolledencryptionitems(5A992/5D992)were   reviewedfrom233requestsforclassification.BXAalsoreceived241notificationsofencryption   itemseligibleforexportpursuanttolicenseexceptionTSUorENC. #XjX XIXK#IXK XXXj     #XjX XIXK# 7(8xH@=ABC>EFG! !"@"  6XK XXXj@ 2  5  )3  0    EnforcementofControl. Detectionofsomeencryptiontransactionsisdifficultsince@ Z݌` (#(# Ќ  encryptioncapabilityisoftenincorporatedintootherproductsandencryptionsoftwarecanbe P  transferredovertheInternet.Conversely,theimportanceandvalueofthecapabilitytoencrypt @  dataleadstotransfersthatleaveacommercialtrailthatcanbefollowed.Itiseasiertoenforce 0  controlsonproprietaryencryptionthanon"opensource"encryption.#XjX X6XK;# #ddX{BXXXj o  #dd'#XjXXX{B9#X{BXXXj#XjXXX{B#IXK XXXj C.ConsultationwithIndustry  Y  SinceMarch1998,andcontinuingthroughout2001,theAdministrationhasengagedinan 9 intensivedialoguewithU.S.industryonencryptionpolicy.Theparticipantsinthisdialogue ) havesoughttofindcooperativesolutionsthatwouldassistlawenforcement,protectnational  security,ensurecontinuedU.S.technologicalleadership,andpromotetheprivacyandsecurityof   U.S.firmsandcitizensengagedinelectroniccommerce.Thisdialoguehasprovensuccessful,as  evidencedbytheeverincreasingnumberofencryptionitemssubmittedforexportreviewand  classification,alongwithcontinuedindustrycommitmenttoassistlawenforcementinbetter  understandingcurrentandfuturetechnologies. z U.S.firmshaveoverwhelminglysupportedtheAdministrationsnewexportcontrolsframework. Z Industryprovidedvaluableinputonitsbusinessmodelsandpracticesforreportingpurposesand  J otherissuesduringthedraftingphaseoftheregulations.Encryptionpolicyandother !: informationsecuritytopics#XjX XIXK#IXK XXXjԀareregularlydiscussedatconferences#XjX XIXK6#IXK XXXj,seminars,andmeetingswith y"* industry.#XjX XIXK#IXK XXXj i# ThePresidentsExportCouncilSubcommitteeonEncryption,metthroughouttheyeartoadvise I%! thePresident,throughthePresidentsExportCouncilandtheSecretaryofCommerce,onmatters 9&" pertinenttoimplementinganencryptionpolicythatwillsupportthegrowthofelectronic )' # commercewhileprotectingpublicsafety,andpromotingforeignpolicyandnationalsecurity (!$ interests.#XjX XIXK#IXK XXXjԀU.S.policyandregulationsalsoreflectconsultationwithgroupssuchasthe  )"% RegulationsandProceduresTechnicalAdvisoryCommittee,AllianceforNetworkSecurity, )#& AmericansforComputerPrivacy,andtheComputerSystemsPolicyProject. *$'  +%( #XjX XIXKH#OnNovember7,2001,theDepartmentofCommerce,viatheFederalRegisterandviaBXAs O Webpage,solicitedcommentsfromindustryontheeffectivenessofforeignpolicybasedexport ? controls.Nocommentswerereceivedspecifictothecontrolsdescribedinthischapter.Amore / detailedreviewofthecommentsisavailableinAppendixI. IXK XXXj    D.ConsultationwithOtherCountries    TheUnitedStateshastakentheleadineffortstopreventinternationalcriminals,terroristsand   roguestatesfromacquiringsophisticatedencryptionproducts,urgingothersuppliernationsto   adoptexportcontrolscomparabletothoseoftheUnitedStates.Asaresult,themajorindustrial p  partnersoftheUnitedStatesmaintaintheirownexportcontrolsonencryptionequipmentand `  technology.Inaddition,theUnitedStatesandtheotherparticipantsintheWassenaar P  Arrangementhaveestablishedmultilateralcontrolsfortheseitems. @  TheregulationsofJanuary14,2000,reflecttheDecember1998agreementmadebyWassenaar o  memberstomoveencryptionitemsfromtheSensitiveListtotheBasicList,andtomakeother _ revisionstoencryptioncontrols.#XjX XIXKj#IXK XXXjThisagreementsimplifiedexportcontrolsonmanyencryption O products.Forexample,itcreatedapositivelistofcontrolledencryptionproducts.Inthepast, ? theWassenaarArrangementrequiredparticipatingcountriestocontrolallencryptionproducts / withoutregardtoencryptionstrength.Now,thenewlistclearlystatesthatproductswithan  encryptionkeylengthof56bitsorlessarenolongercontrolled.  Wassenaarmembercountriesalsoagreedin1998thattheGeneralSoftwareNote(GSN)should  notapplytoencryption.Itwasreplacedwithanewcryptographynote.TheGSNallowed  countriestoexportmass-marketencryptionsoftwarewithoutlimitsonthekeylength.The  December3,1998,modificationwasessentialtocloseloopholesthatpermittedtheuncontrolled p exportofencryptionwithunlimitedkeylength.Accordingly,theagreementsetthekeylength ` thresholdformassmarketproductsat64bitsorless.Theagreementalsoextendedliberalized P mass-markettreatmenttohardwareencryptionproducts.Previously,onlymassmarketsoftware  @ enjoyedthisliberalizedtreatment.TheDecember1998agreementalsoeliminatedrequirements !0 toreportexportsofencryptionproducts,andremovedcontrolsoncertainconsumerelectronic o"  itemssuchasDVDproducts,personalcomputerbasedmediaplayers,andcordlesstelephone _# systemsdesignedforhomeorofficeuse. O$  #XjX XIXK# E.AlternativeMeans  /&" TheUnitedStateshasundertakenarangeofdiplomaticmeans,bothbilateralandmultilateral,to (!$ encourageothernationstoadoptappropriaterestrictionsontheexportofencryptionproducts. ("% Throughcooperationwithlawenforcementofficialsinfriendlycountries,theUnitedStateshas )#& alsosoughttokeepencryptionproductsoutofthehandsofterroristsandcriminals.However, *$' theseeffortscanonlysupplement,notreplace,theeffectivenessofactualexport_ controls. +%( Ї F.ForeignAvailability  O TheUnitedStatesrecognizesthegrowinguseofencryptionoverseas,andthecontinued / developmentofforeignmadeencryptionhardwareandsoftware.TheAdministrationsnew   encryptionframeworkrespondstointernationalmarketplacedevelopmentstoguaranteethatU.S.   industrycanmaintainitstechnologicalleadershipininformationsecurityproductsinamanner   thatsafeguardsournationalsecurityandpublicsafetyinterests.   ExecutiveOrder13026ofNovember15,1996,addressedtheissueofforeignavailabilityasit   relatestoencryptionitemstransferredfromthe_ USML_ ԀtotheCCLwiththefollowingstatement: p  0  Ihavedeterminedthattheexportofencryptionproductscouldharmnationalsecurityand P  foreignpolicyinterestsevenwherecomparableproductsareorappeartobeavailablefrom @  sourcesoutsidetheUnitedStates,andthatfactsandquestionsconcerningtheforeign 0  availabilityofsuchencryptionproductscannotbemadesubjecttopublicdisclosureor o  judicialreviewwithoutrevealingorimplicatingclassifiedinformationthatcouldharm _ UnitedStatesnationalsecurityandforeignpolicyinterests.O(#(# 0  Accordingly,sections4(c)and6(h)(2)-(4)oftheExportAdministrationActof1979,50 / U.S.C.App.2403(c)and2405(h)(2)-(4),asamendedandascontinuedineffectbyExecutive  Order12924ofAugust19,1994,andbynoticesofAugust15,1995,andAugust14,1996,  allotheranalogousprovisionsofthe_ EAA_ Ԁrelatingtoforeignavailability,andtheregulations  intheEARrelatingtosuch_ EAA_ Ԁprovisions,shallnotbeapplicablewithrespecttoexport  controlsonsuchencryptionproducts.Notwithstandingthis,theSecretaryofCommerce  may,inhisdiscretion,considertheforeignavailabilityofcomparableencryptionproductsin  determiningwhethertoissuealicenseinaparticularcaseortoremovecontrolsonparticular p products,butisnotrequiredtoissuelicensesinparticularcasesortoremovecontrolson ` particularproductsbasedonsuchconsideration.P(#(# IXK XXXj  #XjX XIXK#  o"  @c  @ M8 dd8NMXXjCHAPTER11   SignificantItems;HotSectionTechnology O  (Section742.14) #XjXM# g   ExportControlProgramDescriptionandLicensingPolicy  o    4XjXXXjCertainitemstransferredfromtheUnitedStatesMunitionsListtotheCommerceControlList O  (CCL)aresubjectto enhancedcontrol.TheseitemsaredesignatedontheCCLbythe ?  acronym SIwhichstandsfor SignificantItems. Hotsectiontechnologyforthe /  development,production,oroverhaulofcommercialaircraftengines,componentsandsystemsis   controlledforSIreasonsandisincludedinExportCommodityControlNumber(_ ECCN_ )9E003   ontheCCL.#XjXX4Xj#  4XjXXXjThelicensingpolicyfor hotsectiontechnologyisasfollows:#XjXX4Xjr#   A.  4 TheUnitedStatesrequiresalicenseforexportsand_ reexports_ Ԁtoalldestinations, p exceptCanada,forhotsectiontechnology,whichalsoiscontrolledfornationalsecurityreasons. `  B.  4 TheUnitedStatesreviewsalllicenseapplicationsforthehotsectiontechnologyona @ casebycasebasistodeterminewhethertheirexportor_ reexport_ ԀisconsistentwithU.S.national 0 securityandforeignpolicyinterests. o   AnalysisofControlasRequiredbySection6(f)oftheAct  O  A.ThePurposeoftheControl  /! ThiscontrolprovidesamechanismfortheUnitedStatestomonitortheexportoftheseitemsin # ordertopreventtheiruseininstancesthatwouldadverselyeffectourweaponsofmass # destructionnonproliferationgoalsorthemilitarybalancewithinaregion. $   B.Considerationsand/orDeterminationsoftheSecretaryofCommerce  'p!#  1.  ProbabilityofAchievingtheIntendedForeignPolicyPurpose. TheSecretaryof )P#% Commercehasdeterminedthatthecontrolislikelytoachievetheintendedpurposeofdenying *@$& exportswhentheexportwouldbecontrarytoU.S.nationalsecurityorforeignpolicyinterests. +0%' Ї 2.  CompatibilitywithForeignPolicyObjectives. TheSecretaryhasalsodeterminedthatthe O controlsarecompatiblewiththeforeignpolicyobjectivesoftheUnitedStates.Thecontrolis ? consistentwithU.S.foreignpolicygoalstopromotepeaceandstabilityandtopreventU.S. / exportswhentheywouldcontributetoinappropriatemilitarycapabilitiesabroad.    3.  ReactionofOtherCountries. TheSecretaryhasdeterminedthatthereactionofother   countriestothiscontrolisnotlikelytorenderthecontrolineffectiveinachievingitsintended   foreignpolicypurposeortobecounterproductivetoU.S.foreignpolicyinterests.Otherallied   countriescontrolhotsectiontechnologyforcommercialjetenginesasdualusecommodities.   Thesecountriesalsorecognizethedesirabilityofrestrictinggoodsthatcouldcompromiseshared p  securityandforeignpolicyinterests. `   4.  EconomicImpact. InFY2001,TheBureauofExportAdministration(BXA)approved130 @  licensesfortechnologyfor_ ECCN_ Ԁ9E003andreturnedwithoutactiontwoapplications.Ofthe 0  130licensesapproved,mostinvolved hotsectiontechnology.Thetotaldollarvalueofthese o  approvalswas$31.0million. _  5.  EnforcementofControl. TheUnitedStatesdoesnotexperienceanyunusualproblemsin ? enforcingthesecontrols.ManufacturersandintermediarycompaniesarefamiliarwithU.S. / controlsontheseproductsandtechnology.Theseitemsarealsosubjecttomultilateralcontrols,  therefore,cooperationfromforeigngovernmentenforcementagenciesisusefulinpreventingand  punishingviolators.   C.ConsultationwithIndustry   Asneeded,BXAconsultswiththeTransportationTechnicalAdvisoryCommittee,althoughno p majorchangesareenvisionedtocontrolsontheCommerceControlList. ` OnNovember7,2001,theDepartmentofCommerce,viatheFederalRegisterandviaBXAs  @ _ webpage_ ,solicitedcommentsfromindustryontheeffectivenessofforeignpolicybasedexport !0 controls.Nocommentswerereceivedspecifictothecontrolsdescribedinthischapter.Amore o"  detailedreviewoftheothercommentsisavailableinAppendixI.  _# Ѐ D.ConsultationwithOtherCountries  ?%! TheUnitedStateshastakentheleadininternationaleffortstostemtheproliferationofsensitive ' # items,urgingothersuppliernationstoadoptandapplyexportcontrolscomparabletothoseofthe (!$ UnitedStates.ThemajorindustrialpartnersoftheUnitedStatesmaintainexportcontrolsonthis ("% equipmentandtechnologyandcontrolthemasdualusecommodities.Pursuanttotheir )#& agreementtoestablisha regimeforthecontrolofconventionalarmsandsensitivedualusegoods *$' andtechnologies,theparticipantsinthe_ Wassenaar_ ԀArrangementhaveagreedtocontrolthese +%( _ itemsandtoensurethattransfersofsuchitemsarecarriedoutresponsiblyandinfurtheranceof O internationalpeaceandsecurity. ?  E.AlternativeMeans    TheUnitedStateshasundertakenawiderangeofdiplomaticendeavors,bothbilateraland   multilateral,toencouragethepropercontrolovertheseitems.TheUnitedStateshasspecifically   encouragedeffortstopreventtheunauthorizeduseordiversionoftheseitemstoactivities   contrarytoU.S.securityandforeignpolicyconcerns.&      F.ForeignAvailability  `  AlthoughtheUnitedStateshasbeentheworldleaderinthistechnology,othercountriesproduce @  hotsectiontechnology.Mostproducersofhotsectiontechnologyaremembersofthe_ Wassenaar_  0  Arrangementandcontroltheseitemsasdualuseitemsinaccordancewiththeirnational o  licensingpolicies.' /  _ _ _ @g  @ P8dd8Q  MXXjCHAPTER#XjXM2#MXXjԀ12   #XjXM2#MXXjNuclearNonproliferation O  (Sections742.3and744.2) #XjXMK3# g  2 ExportControlProgramDescriptionandLicensingPolicy  o    TheUnitedStatesmaintainscontrolsonexportsofnuclearrelateditemsundertheauthorityof O  theNuclearNonproliferationActof1978inordertofurtherthecountrysnuclear ?  nonproliferationpolicy.Althoughtherearenoforeignpolicybasedexportcontrolsfornuclear /  nonproliferationbasedonSection6oftheExportAdministrationActof1979,theyhavebeen   includedinthisreportbecausetheyareusuallygroupedwiththeothernonproliferationcontrols   referencedelsewhere.    TheDepartmentofCommercerequiresalicensefortheexportofthefollowingitems:   A.   Commodities,relatedtechnology,orsoftwarethatcouldbeofsignificancefornuclear p explosivepurposes(i.e.,theNuclearReferralListincludedintheCommerceControlList);and `  B.   Anycommodity,relatedtechnology,orsoftwarethattheexporterknows,orhasreasonto @ know,willbeuseddirectlyorindirectlyinanyofthefollowingactivities: 0 0  :  :$904(#(#"0 4(#4(#  Nuclearexplosiveactivitiesincludingdesigning,developing,manufacturing, _ ortestingnuclearweaponsornuclearexplosivedevices.:$9?9݌O (# (# Ќ  0  :  :v:04(#(#"0 4(#4(#  Unsafeguardednuclearactivitiesincludingthedesign,development,or /! manufactureofanynuclearreactor,criticalfacility,facilityforthefabrication " ofnuclearfuel,facilityfortheconversionofnuclearmaterialfromonechemi # calformtoanother,orseparatestorageinstallationwherethereisno # obligationtoacceptInternationalAtomicEnergyAgencysafeguardsatthe $  facilityor:v::݌%! (# (# Ќ  0  04(#(#installation,whenitcontainsanysourceofspecialfissionablematerial,orwhereany & " suchobligationisnotmet.'p!#4(#4(# 0  :  :=04(#(#"0 4(#4(#  Safeguardedandunsafeguardednuclearactivitiesincludingdesigning, )P#% constructing,fabricating,oroperatingthefollowingfacilities,orcomponents *@$& forsuchfacilities:(i)facilitiesforthechemicalprocessingofirradiated +0%' specialnuclearorsourcematerials;(ii)facilitiesfortheproductionofheavy O water;(iii)facilitiesfortheseparationofisotopesofsourceandspecial ? nuclearmaterial;or(iv)facilitiesforthefabricationofnuclearreactorfuel / containingplutonium.:=>݌  (# (# Ќ  C.   BXAmayinformtheexporterthatalicenseisrequiredforanyitemsubjecttotheExport   AdministrationRegulations(EAR)becausethereisanunacceptableriskofuseinordiversionto   activitiesdescribedaboveinsubparagraphtwo.   Factorsconsideredinreviewingapplicationsforlicensesinclude: p  0  :  :B04(#(#"0 4(#4(#  Thestatedend-useoftheitem.:BB݌P  (# (# Ќ  0  :  :nC04(#(#"0 4(#4(#  Thesignificancefornuclearpurposesoftheparticularcomponentandits @  availabilityelsewhere.:nCC݌0  (# (# Ќ  0  :  :D04(#(#"0 4(#4(#  Thetypesofnuclearnonproliferationassurancesorguaranteesgivenina o  particularcase.:DD݌_ (# (# Ќ  0  :  :E04(#(#"0 4(#4(#  Thenonproliferationcredentialsoftherecipientcountry.:EE݌O (# (# Ќ  @< <  AnalysisofControlasRequiredbyLaw R  C   Section17(d)oftheActandSection309(c)oftheNuclearNonproliferationActof1978are  interpretedtoprovidethat:   A.   Nuclearnonproliferationcontrolsdonotexpireannuallyanddeterminationstoextendthem  arethusnotrequired;and p  B.   ThecriteriaandotherfactorssetforthinSections6(b)through6(f)oftheActarenot P applicabletothesecontrols.  @ TheCongressis,therefore,notifiedthatthesecontrolscontinueineffect.Thesecontrolsfurther o"  significantlythenuclearnonproliferationpolicyoftheUnitedStatesandhavemadeitmore _# difficultfornationstoacquiresensitivenucleartechnologyorequipment. O$  ThesecontrolssupportU.S.internationalnuclearnonproliferationobligations.TheUnitedStates /&" maintainsongoingdiscussionswithothercountriestocoordinateexportcontrolsfornuclear ' # nonproliferationpurposesandisamemberofthemultilateralNuclearSuppliersGroup(NSG). (!$ TheNSG,composedof39members,setsforthexportcontrolguidelinesforitemsonalistof ("% nuclearrelateddualuseitems(seeAppendixIIforacompletelistofregimemembers).The )#& UnitedStatesisalsoamemberoftheZanggerCommittee,amultilateralgroupformedinthe *$' early1970stoestablishguidelinesfortheexportcontrolprovisionsofthe_ Nuclear +%( _ Nonproliferation_ ԀTreaty. O TheDepartmentsofCommerceandEnergy,inconsultationwiththeDepartmentsofState, / Defense,andtheNuclearRegulatoryCommission,regularlyreviewandrevisethislistofU.S.   dualuseitemscontrolledfornuclear_ nonproliferation_ Ԁreasons.ReferredtoastheNuclear   ReferralList(_ NRL_ ),thislistconformswithourinternationalcommitmentsunderthe_ NSG_ .The   _ NRL_ Ԁiscurrentlybeingrevisedtoreflectrecentchangesmadebythe_ NSG_ .      Theproposedrevisionsarepredominantlyformatrelated.Thelastrevisionofthe_ NRL_ Ԁwas   publishedinJanuary1996. p      @  _ _  TUV8dd8@@* XXjqQ  APPENDIXI#XjX NR#MXXj   #XjXMR#MXXjSummaryofPublicComments c  onForeignPolicyExportControls #XjXMS# { , }RTheBureauofExportAdministration(BXA)requestedpubliccommentsonexistingforeign 4 policybasedexportcontrolsmaintainedunderSection6oftheExportAdministrationAct s$  throughaFederalRegisternoticepublishedNovember7,2001.Anoticealsowaspostedonthe c  BXAwebsite.BXArequestedcommentsonhowexistingforeignpolicybasedcontrolshave S  affectedexportersandtheoverallpublic.Specifically,thenoticeinvitedpubliccommentsabout C  issuessuchastheeffectivenessofcontrolswhereforeignavailabilityexists;whetherthegoalsof 3  thecontrolscanbeachievedthroughothermeanssuchasnegotiations;thecompatibilityofthe #  controlswiththeoverallU.S.policytowardthecountryinquestion;theeffectofcontrolsonU.S.  economicperformance;andtheabilitytoenforcethecontrols.BXAalsorequestedcomments  fromthemembercompaniesoftheTechnicalAdvisoryCommittees(TACs)andthePresidents  ExportCouncilSubcommitteeonExportAdministration(PECSEA).  BXAreceivedtwelveresponsestothisrequestfromthefollowingorganizations:theSensorsand t InstrumentationTechnicalAdvisoryCommittee(SITAC);theNationalForeignTradeCouncil, d Inc.(NFTC);thePetroleumEquipmentSuppliersAssociation(PESA);BakerHughes T Incorporated;HalliburtonCompany;theNationalAssociationofManufacturers(NAM);the D InternationalBiometricIndustryAssociation(IBIA);GouldsPumps;Sartomer;Conoco;the 4 IndustryCoalitiononTechnologyTransfer(ICOTT);andanindividualcomment.BXAmakes s$ thecommentsavailableforpublicreviewuponrequest.ThisAppendixsummarizesthe c commentsreceived. S   IndustryComments  3" SixofthetwelvelettersaddressedtheneedtoliftU.S.unilateralreexportcontrolsonLibya. $ ThelettersweresubmittedbyNAM,PESA,BakerHughes,Halliburton,Conoco,andtheNFTC. %  ThecommentseachcontainedacommonviewthatcontinuedreexportcontrolsensurethatU.S. %! companieswillbeleftoutoftheLibyanmarketwithoutanyresultingforeignpolicybenefit. & " BakerHughesstated: '!#  ThecompetitivepositionofU.S.companiesishurtbytheexistenceofthesereexportcontrols, *T$& sincetheycauseforeigncustomersto designoutU.S.products,andforeigncompetitorsuse +D%' thesecontrolstopersuadepotentialcustomersnottobuyAmericangoods.BakerHughes O recommendedaligningcontrolsonLibyawiththoseimposedonothercountriesofconcern. ? ThisviewwasechoedbyNAM,whichstated:    TheUnitedStatesdoesnotapplythisstandardonreexportstoothercountriesofspecial   concern,suchasIranandSudan,exceptfornarrowdeminimisexceptions.Whileweoppose,as   ageneralrule,unilateraltradesanctions,iftheymustcontinue,wewouldliketoseemore   consistencyintheirapplication.Thiscanbeachievedbyallowingtheforeignpolicybased   reexportcontrolsonLibyalapsewhentheyexpireinJanuary2002. p  Conocostatedthat: TheforeignpolicyreexportcontrolsonLibyaaretighterthanforother P  countriessanctionedbytheU.S.;thisrepresentsanunevennessintheapplicationofforeign @  policycontrolsthatdoesnotreflectthecurrentstateofeitherLibyaortheworldatlarge. 0  SeveralotherlettersalsoadvocatedthattheSecretaryofCommercenotextendreexportcontrols _ for2002.TheorganizationsrecommendedthattheUnitedStatesfocusoncontrollingitemsthat O couldcompromisenationalsecurity,nonproliferation,orantiterrorismconcernswhile ? liberalizingnonsensitiveEAR99reexports. / SITACrequeststhatCategory6commoditiesrelatedtocommercialnightvisionandthermal  imagingequipment(specifically6A002,6A003,6E001,and6E002)whicharecontrolledfor  RegionalStability(RS)Column1bemovedtoRSColumn2.WhileRS1includesallcountries  exceptCanada,theimpositionofRS2controlswouldallowitemsclassifiedundertheseECCNs  tobeexportedtoCanada,mostE.U.members,Japan,andseveralotherswithoutalicense.Due  tothedevelopmentofforeigncompetitionintheUnitedKingdom,France,andJapan,SITAC p statedthat thenegativeeffectonU.S.companiesfarexceedstheperceivedbenefittotheforeign ` policyobjective.SITACcitedtheimportanceofthermalimagingforfirefighting,law P enforcement,andsecurityorganizationsworldwideandstatedthattheU.S.callforbuildinga  @ largeinternationalcoalitiontocombatterrorismisunderminedwhenalliesaccesstoavailable !0 U.S.technologyisrestricted.SITACfurtherstatedthattreatingallregionswiththeexceptionof o"  Canadaasbeingpotentiallyunstable dilutesthefocusonregionswherestabilitymaytrulybe _# inquestion. O$  TheInternationalBiometricIndustryAssociation(IBIA)advocatedfortheremovalofbiometric /&" products(includingfingerprintandvoiceidentificationapplications)fromtheCommerce ' # ControlListandrecommendedthatrestrictionsbeappliedonlywhentheseproductsare (!$ exportedtodesignatedterroristsupportingcountries.TheIBIAcitedtheimportanceof ("% biometricproductsinensuringtheprotectionofelectroniccommerceandstatedthattheUnited )#& Statesisplacedatadisadvantagetoforeigncompetitorsasaresultofcurrentexportcontrols. *$' _  +%(  Globally,theUnitedStatesnowholdsthelargestmarketshareofbiometricproductsyetitis O theonlycountrythatrestrictstheirexport.TheserestrictionsdelayorderfulfillmentbyU.S. ? companies,deteroverseascompaniesfromenteringintojointventureswithU.S.companies,and / channelcustomersforbiometricproductstooverseascompaniesattheexpenseofU.S.   companies.   _ Goulds_ ԀPumpsrecommendedthedeletionof_ ECCN_ Ԁ2B350ifromCategory2,statingthatforeign   availabilityofproductsthatfallunderthis_ ECCN_ Ԁcausesexportcontrolsplacedupontheseitems   tobeineffectiveandthusadverselyimpactU.S.companiescompetitiveposition.GouldPumps   statedthatthelicenseprocesshindersthecompanysshortleadtimebusinessthatnecessitates p  shippingwithinfourtosixweeksfollowingorderplacement. `  _ Sartomer_ Ԁadvocatedeasingforeignpolicybasedcontrolsonhydroxylterminated_ polybutadiene_  @  resins(_ HTPB_ Ԁresins),whichareclassifiedunder_ ECCN_ Ԁ1C111b.2._ Sartomer_ Ԁstatedthatthe 0  controls haveanadverseeconomicimpactonourexportactivities,especiallyinasmuchas o  thesecontrolscreateanunfaircommercialadvantageforforeignproducers.Todecrease _ delaysinthelicensingprocess,_ Sartomer_ Ԁrecommendedadoptingaframeworkthatwouldpermit O streamlinedauthorizationfortheexportationof_ HTPB_ Ԁresins.Suggestionsincludethecreation ? ofalicenserenewalprocess,licenseexceptionavailabilityforsamples,andgrantingBXAwith / delegationofauthorityinordertoavoid repetitiveinteragencyreferral._ Sartomer_ Ԁalso  recommendsbroadeningtheMissileTechnologyControlRegime noundercutpolicy,stating  that disparitiesbetweenthenationalregimesleadtoinequities,especiallyinviewof  cumbersomeU.S.regulatoryrequirements,whichwebelieveundercutU.S.economicinterests.  The_ ICOTT_ Ԁrecommendedremovingallunilateralcontrols,statingthefollowing: ...unilateral  controlsshouldbeinvoked!orcontinued!onlywheretheresultinginjurytoAmericanworkers p andbusinessescanbejustifiedwhenbalancedagainstthesymboliccharacteroftherestrictions. ` Nationalsecurityincludeseconomicaswellasmilitarysecurity,andbothoftheseelements P mustbetakenintoaccountintheadministrationofourexportcontrolsystem.  @ Commentsreceivedfromanindividualrecommendedarangeofsuggestionsincludingtherepeal o"  oftheCubanembargoandtheremovaloftheterroristsupportingdesignationfromCubaand _# NorthKorea.TheletterrecommendedthattheembargoonIraqbereplacedbyselectiveexport O$  controlsandthattheembargosonIran,Libya,andSudanbereducedtocontrolsbasedon ?%! terrorismconcerns.AlsorecommendedwasthespecificationoflicenseexceptionstoIranand /&" SudanintheeventofcontrolreductionbytheOfficeofForeignAssetsControlintheTreasury ' # Department.Suggestionsrelatedtoregionalstabilityand_ nonproliferation_ Ԁ catchallcontrols (!$ werealsoincluded.  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P)  _   ` A!) xdExA  XX   `    2002ReportonForeignPolicyExportControls   x   2_1.0  Citationsfollowingeachoftheforeignpolicycontrolprogramsrefertothosesectionsof p theExportAdministrationRegulations(EAR),15_CFR_ԀParts730774,thatdescribethe `  controlprogram.TABLE B  <'  _XX  Chapter2#X:X+#XX:CrimeControl/HumanRights#X:X#XX:  JA!) xd2EwxA#X:X#  TABLE ATABLE C  !  _  2  .0  Provisionspertainingtoforeignavailabilitydonotapplytoexportcontrolsineffect W  beforeJuly12,1985,underSections6(_i_)(InternationalObligations),6(j)(Countries G  SupportingInternationalTerrorism),and6(n)(CrimeControlInstruments).Seethe 7  ExportAdministrationAmendmentsActof1985,PublicLawNo.9964,Section ' 108(g)(2),99Stat.120,13435.Moreover,Sections6(_i_),6(j),and6(n)requirethat  controlsbeimplementedundercertainconditionswithoutconsiderationofforeignavail  ability. dy!%:2   PC)  _A!) xdExA     `    -XX2002ReportonForeignPolicyExportControls <'  _  -XXChapter3RegionalStability  A!) xd2EwxA x  ##d#TABLE A\  `Times New b PC)  _A!) xdExA-XX  #X*X-l#   `    -XX*2002ReportonForeignPolicyExportControls#X*X-#1i)+ +dX XdHG P)  _A!) xdExA     `    XX2002ReportonForeignPolicyExportControls <'  _  XXChapter4AntiTerrorismControls  A!) xdEwxA x   x%  1  .  _0  TheDepartmentofCommercerequiresalicenseunderSection6(a)oftheActforall   computersgoingtoIran,NorthKorea,Sudan,orSyriawitha_CTP_Ԁof6_MTOPS_Ԁor   above.NotealsothatcontrolsapplytoexportsofalllevelsofcomputerstoCubaand o Libya.ForIraq,theDepartmentofCommercemaintainsrestrictionsonitemssubjectto _ theEARthatarealsocontrolledbytheTreasuryDepartment,whichadministersa Op comprehensiveembargoonIraq. x%  2  .  _0  See15_CFR_Ԁ746.4(c)(2)(iv,v,viandvii).TABLE BTABLE DTable_ETable_CTable_ATable_B % x%  3  .  _f  g f  g 0  Provisionspertainingtoforeignavailabilitydonotapplytoexportcontrolsineffect   beforeJuly12,1985,undersections6(_i_)(InternationalObligations),6(j)(Countries   SupportingInternationalTerrorism),and6(n)(CrimeControlInstruments).Seethe  ExportAdministrationAmendmentsActof1985,PublicLaw9964,section108(g)(2),  Stat.120,13435.Moreover,sections6(_i_),6(j),and6(n)requirethatcontrolsbe o implementedundercertainconditionswithoutconsiderationofforeignavailability.((3$ !      0  (#$  0  2$Square0  V& 8Document[8]Document Style0..8` ..` (O$ <'  _XX  Chapter5EmbargoesandSanctionedCountriesandEntities  A!) xdEwxA x  P)  _A!) xdExA  XX   `    2002ReportonForeignPolicyExportControls i x%XXXX  1  .  _Ԁ0  MXXXXToreinforceDepartmentofTreasuryadministeredMDXXԀ#MXXD#controls,theDepartmentof )! CommercehasmadeitaviolationoftheExportAdministrationRegulationstoexportor *" _reexport_ԀtoIranorIraqanyitemthatissubjecttoTreasurysregulationsandalso +#  subjecttotheEARwithoutTreasuryauthorization.Itshouldalsobenotedthatthe  DepartmentofCommercehasalsotakenactiontopreventdiversionfromthirdcountries  toIraq.Specifically,CommerceissuedGeneralOrderNo.3inDecember2000to   requirealicensetoexportor_reexport_ԀitemsontheCommerceControlListto_Shaykh_   _Hamad_ԀBinAliBin_Jaber_ԀAl_thani_MDXX,#MXXD#acitizenofQatar,totheGulfFalconGroup.Ltd.,an   entitylocatedinDoha,Qatar,ortorelatedentitieslocatedin_Sharjah_,UnitedArab   Emirates.The_Shaykh_ԀdonatedaU.S.originaircrafttoIraqinNovember2000in   violationofU.N.sanctions.ThelicenserequirementallowstheU.S.Governmentto o reviewproposedexportsand_reexports_Ԁtothe_Shaykh_Ԁandtothelistedentitiesonacase _ bycaseMDXXԀ#MXXD]#basistodeterminewhetherthereisariskofdiversioncontrarytoU.S.or Op  internationallaw.?` (#(# #XXXX΄#  $ <'  _XX  Chapter6ToxicChemicals,ChemicalPrecursors,andAssociatedEquipment,TechnologyandSoftware  A!) xdEwxA x  P)  _A!) xdExA  XX   `    2002ReportonForeignPolicyExportControls  x%XXXX  1  .  _0  Asofthedateofthisreport,thecountriesintheCommerceCountryChartCBcolumn3   includedAfghanistan,Armenia,Azerbaijan,Bahrain,Belarus,Bulgaria,Burma,China o (PRC),Egypt,Georgia,India,Israel,Jordan,Kazakhstan,NorthKorea,Kuwait, _ _Kyrgyzstan_,Lebanon,Macau,Moldova,Mongolia,Oman,Pakistan,Qatar,Russia,St. Op Kitts&Nevis,SaudiArabia,Syria,Taiwan,Tajikistan,Turkmenistan,Ukraine,the ?`  UnitedArabEmirates,Uzbekistan,Vietnam,andYemen. * x%XXXX  2  .  _0  AsofJanuary4,2002,thecountriesinCountryGroupD:3includedAfghanistan,   Armenia,Azerbaijan,Bahrain,Belarus,Bulgaria,Burma,China(PRC),Cuba,Egypt,   Georgia,India,Iran,Iraq,Israel,Jordan,Kazakhstan,NorthKorea,Kuwait,_Kyrgyzstan_,   Lebanon,Libya,Macau,Moldova,Mongolia,Oman,Pakistan,Qatar,Russia,Saudi  Arabia,Syria,Taiwan,Tajikistan,_Turkmenistan,Ukraine_,theUnitedArabEmirates,  Uzbekistan,Vietnam,andYemen.(#(# 3.  TheConventionontheProhibitionoftheDevelopment,Production,Stockpilingand w 0  UseofChemicalWeaponsandontheirDestruction(the ChemicalWeapons g Conventionor_CWC_)wasratifiedbytheUnitedStatesonApril25,1997,andentered Wx  intoforceonApril29,1997.Gh (#(# 4.0  Alicensealsoisrequiredtoexportthistechnology forantiterrorism(AT)reasons. 'H (#(#  _ _>b$Large Circle0   <'  _EXX  Chapter7BiologicalAgentsandAssociatedEquipmentandTechnicalData  A!) xdEwxA x  P)  _A!) xd9ExA     `    EXX2002ReportonForeignPolicyExportControls x%  1  .  _0  TheTreatywassignedin1972andratifiedbytheUnitedStatesin1975. <'  _  XXChapter8MissileTechnology  A!) xd2EwxA x  P)  _A!) xd2ExA  XX   `    2002ReportonForeignPolicyExportControls1i) <'USUS.,  _4tXX  Chapter9HighPerformanceComputers  A!) xdEwxA x   P)USUS.,  _A!) xdExA  4tXX   `    2002ReportonForeignPolicyExportControls2P+M 0_level1  , 8.4 <DL!823  ..  5+ 4 <DL!5  1i)71. <'  _ XX  Chapter10Encryption  A!) xdEw xA x  P)  _A!) xdE xA   XX   `    2002ReportonForeignPolicyExportControls  x%  1  .  _Ԁ  E.O.13026formallyannouncedthetransferoflicensingjurisdictionforencryptionitems X   fromtheDepartmentofStatetotheDepartmentofCommerce. - <'  _ XX  Chapter11_Commercial_ԀCommunicationsSatellitesandHotSectionTechnology  A!) xdEwxA x  P)  _A!) xd.ExA   XX   `    2002ReportonForeignPolicyControls  <'  _XX  Chapter12Nuclear_Nonproliferation_  A!) xdEwxA x  PC)  _A!) xdExA  XX   `    2002ReportonForeignPolicyExportControls  !  _  1  .0  Theanalysisrequiredbylawdiffersfornuclear_nonproliferation_Ԁcontrols.Itisgoverned  bytheNuclear_Nonproliferation_ԀActof1978.Therefore,theheadingsunderthissection  differfromtherestofthereport. b <'  _XX  Appendix1_Summary_ԀofPublicCommentsonForeignPolicyExportControls #XX+#  JA!) xdEwxA x   f P)  _A!) xdExA  XX   `    2002ReportonForeignPolicyExportControls   x       `    - -d<6X9`("Courier 10cpiXx6X@8;X@+_ 0CG TimesBoldScalableXXz_ p^7X) `(CG TimesScalableblec P7Pdd2d < <D'   _LXXXXL%XX  AppendixII_Multilateral_ԀExportControlRegimes  A!) xdEwxA x  ( PD)   _A!) xd9ExA  LXXXXL%XX   `    2002ReportonForeignPolicyExportControlsTable_A(99Z 6Times New Roman Regular - <'  _  XXAAppendixIIIComputerTierCountryChart#AV#  A!) xdEwxA x  P)  _A!) xdExA  AXX   `    2002ReportonForeignPolicyExportControlsTable_A  x<%  1  .  _AXXԀ0  Exportsof_HPC_ԀitemsclassifiedontheCommerceControlListunderExportControlClassification ((  Number(_ECCN_)4A003canbeexportedtoCanadawithnolicenserequired(_NLR_)ratherthanunderthe )! licenseexceptionforhighperformancecomputers(_CTP_).Therecordkeepingrequirementsdonotapply _*! for_HPC_ԀexportstoCanada.Retransferand_reexport_Ԁrestrictionsstillapply. !  _  MXX 55A&) xdtEPxA   M#M #vzM2002ReportOn  O ForeignPolicyExportControlsA) xdE7 xA#Mvz*#  / @/*/*Y@U.S.DepartmentofCommerce  BureauofExportAdministration  LKFJMJanuary2002#MJLKF# 7'" __A&) xdtE+PxA +o&    n+&  84j4XXdd8  XjXM6XK XXXjTheHonorableRichardCheney `    PresidentoftheSenate P  Washington,D.C.20510 @  DearMr.President:  p  Iampleasedtosubmitthe#XjX X6XK#6XK XXXjAnnualReportforFiscalYear2001#XjX X6XKC#6XK XXXjԀ#XjX X6XK#6XK XXXj(AnnualReport)oftheBureauof P  ExportAdministration(BXA)oftheDepartmentofCommerce.Iamalsoherewithsubmitting @  BXAs#XjX X6XK#4XjXXXj2002#XjXX4Xj#6XK XXXjReporttotheCongressonForeignPolicyExportControls#XjX X6XK#4XjXXXjԀ(ForeignPolicyReport).#XjXX4Xj#6XK XXXjԀ 0      ThesubmissionofthesereportstotheCongressisprovidedforinSections6and14ofthe  ExportAdministrationActof1979,asamended(theAct).Asyouknow,theActexpiredin  August2001and,sincethattime,exportcontrolsadministeredbyBXAhavebeenmaintained  undertheauthorityoftheInternationalEmergencyEconomicPowersAct(_IEEPA_)pursuanttoa  declarationofnationalemergencybythePresident.TheDepartmentofCommerceissubmitting  thesereportsunderapolicyofconformingitsactionsunder_IEEPA_,insofarasappropriate,to p thosetakenundertheAct. ` The#XjX X6XK#6XK XXXjAnnualReportdescribestheactivitiesundertakenbyBXAduringFiscalYear2001, @ includingexportcontrolactivitiesundertakenpursuanttotheAct.BXAtodayhandlesawide 0 andexpandingrangeofissuesthatariseattheintersectionofindustryandnationalsecurity.  p Whilecontinuingtoperformitstraditionalcorefunctionofadministeringandenforcing ` U.S.exportcontrols,duringthepastfiscalyearBXAalsoperformedavarietyofothernational P securityrelatedactivities,includinganalyzingandpromotingtheU.S.defenseindustrialbase, @ workingwiththeprivatesectoronassuranceofthenationscriticalinfrastructures,and 0 participatinginhomelandsecurityinitiatives.ThefullbreadthofBXAsactivitiesisdetailedin   theAnnualReport. ! #XjX X6XK| #6XK XXXjThe#XjX X6XKz#6XK XXXjԀForeignPolicyReport#XjX X6XK#6XK XXXjԀaddressesalloftheexportcontrolsimplementedbytheDepartment #! pursuanttoSection6oftheAct tofurthersignificantlytheforeignpolicyoftheUnitedStatesor $" tofulfillitsdeclaredinternationalobligations.TheReportdiscusses,interalia,thepurpose, % # effectiveness,andeconomicimpactofsuchcontrols.#XjX X6XK#4XjXXXjԀThisletter,andtheaccompanyingForeign p&!$ PolicyReport,serveasformalnotificationtoCongressthatIamherebyextendingfrom `'"%  -@), _TheHonorableRichardCheney(#(#K(#  Page2  January21,2002,toJanuary20,2003,theexportcontrolsthataremaintainedforforeignpolicy p reasons,asdescribedintheReport.Itakethisactionaftercarefulreviewofallrelevantfactors, `  andattherecommendationoftheSecretaryofState,inthebeliefthatitisnecessarytofurther P  significantlytheforeignpolicyoftheUnitedStatesortofulfilldeclaredinternationalobligations @  oftheUnitedStates. 0    -p x X-Warmregards, `   ?+ ` hp x X?   `     h   /S/ @   -p x X-DonaldL.Evans   ?+ ` hp x X?Enclosure   _JK  8 d4XXd8_  #4MX4Xj# 5O5 A&) xdtENPxA#M4M#4MM  O 4 4M2002REPORTONFOREIGNPOLICYEXPORTCONTROLSA) xdExA#4M4 # O @/*/*@U.S.DepartmentofCommerce  BureauofExportAdministration    A&) xdE% PxA#M4M#4MM  &    4XjX4MChapter10 `  Introduction V` (#` (# Chapter2 `  CrimeControl/HumanRights 6  Chapter3 `  RegionalStability e  Chapter4 `  AntiTerrorismControls E  Chapter5 `  EmbargoesandSanctionedCountriesandEntities % Chapter6 ` 0 ToxicChemicals,ChemicalPrecursors,andAssociatedEquipment,  Technology,andSoftware (# (# Chapter7 ` 0 BiologicalAgentsandAssociatedEquipmentandTechnicalData (# (# Chapter8 `  MissileTechnology f Chapter9 `  HighPerformanceComputers F Chapter10 ` 0 Encryptionu& (# (# Chapter11 ` 0 SignificantItemsU! (# (# Chapter12 `  Nuclear_Nonproliferation_ 5# AppendixI0 ` 0 ` (#` (#SummaryofPublicCommentsonForeignPolicyExportControls%! (# (# AppendixII0 `  MultilateralExportControlRegimes& #` (#` (# AppendixIII `  ComputerTierCountryChart#4MX4Xj#  ("% _#M4M#XjXM4XjXXXj  #4MX4Xj !#CHAPTER1   Introduction4XjX4M  O  K!̀Exportcontrolsmaintainedforforeignpolicypurposesrequireannualextensionaccordingtothe G provisionsofSection6oftheExportAdministrationActof1979,asamended(theAct).Section 7  6(f)oftheActrequirestheSecretaryofCommerce,throughauthoritydelegatedbythePresident, '  tosubmitareporttoCongresstoextendthecontrols.Sections6(b)and6(f)oftheActrequire   thereporttoincludecertainconsiderations S R  1      ׀anddeterminations U R  2      ׀onthecriteriaestablishedinthat   section.ThisreportcomplieswithalltherequirementssetoutintheActforextending,   amending,orimposingforeignpolicycontrols.   TheDepartmentofCommerceisactingundertheauthorityconferredbyExecutiveOrder x No.13222ofAugust17,2001.Therein,thePresident,byreasonoftheexpirationoftheAct, h invokedhisauthority,includingauthorityundertheInternationalEmergencyEconomicPowers X Act,tocontinueineffectthesystemofcontrolsthathadbeenmaintainedundertheAct.Undera H policyofconformingactionsundertheExecutiveOrdertothoseundertheAct,theDepartment 8 ofCommerce,insofarasappropriate,isfollowingtheprovisionsofSection6oftheActwith w( regardtoextendingforeignpolicycontrols. g Withthisreport,theDepartmentofCommerceherebyextendsallforeignpolicycontrolsin G effectonDecember31,2001.TheBureauofExportAdministration(BXA)oftheDepartmentof 7 CommerceistakingthisactionattherecommendationoftheSecretaryofState.Asfurther ' providedbytheAct,foreignpolicycontrolsremainineffectforreplacementpartsandforparts   containedingoodssubjecttosuchcontrols.Thecontrolsadministeredinaccordancewithproce ! duresestablishedpursuanttoSection309(c)oftheNuclearNonproliferationActof1978 ! likewiseremainineffect. " Eachchapterofthisreportdescribesaparticularcategoryofforeignpolicycontrolsand $x  delineatesmodificationsthathavetakenplaceoverthepastyear.Althoughthisreportcoversthe %h! 2001calendaryear,mostofthestatisticaldatapresentedinthereportarebasedonfiscalyear &X " 2001exportlicensingstatistics,unlessotherwisenoted.BXAgeneratesthisdatafromthe 'H!# computerautomatedsystemitusestoprocessandtrackexportlicenseactivity.Duetothe (8"$ tabulatingproceduresusedbythesysteminaccountingforoccasionallicenseapplicationsthat w)(#% listmorethanonecountryordestination,thesystemhascertainlimitationsasameansof g*$& gatheringdata.Inaddition,BXAbasesthedatainthisreportonvaluescontainedinexport W+%' licensesitissued.Suchvaluesmaynotrepresentthevaluesofactualshipmentsmadeagainst G,%( thoselicenses,becauseinsomecasesanexportermayshiponlyaportionofthevalueofan O approvedlicense. ? Certaingoods,technology,andsoftwaredescribedinthisreportmayalsorequirealicensefor   exporttocertaindestinationsfornationalsecuritypurposesinaccordancewithSection5of   theAct.    #4MX4Xj!#Highlightsfor20014XjX4M     ImplementationoftheTradeSanctionsReformandExportEnhancementActof2000     OnJuly12,2001,BXAandtheDepartmentoftheTreasurysOfficeofForeignAssetsControl   (OFAC)publishedrulesimplementingcertainprovisionsoftheTradeSanctionsReformand x  ExportEnhancementActof2000(TSRA)(TitleIXofPublicLaw106387).BXAimplemented h  therequirementsofTSRAforexportsandreexportsofagriculturalcommoditiestoCuba.BXA X  createdLicenseException AgriculturalCommodities(AGR)topermitexportsandreexportsto H  CubaofagriculturalcommoditiesthatareclassifiedEAR99andarenotspecificallyidentifiedon 8 theCommerceControlList(CCL).Exportsandreexportsofmedicinesandmedicaldevicesto w( CubaarenoteligibleforAGRbecauseTSRAdidnotoverridethespecificprovisionsfor g medicinesandmedicaldevicessetforthintheCubanDemocracyActof1992(PublicLaw102 W 484).However,exportersmayexportmedicinesandmedicaldevicesunderexistingBXA G licenseapplicationprocedures.OFACsJuly12rulespecifieslicensingproceduresforexports 7 ofagriculturalandmedicalitemstoIran,Libya,andSudan. '  AmmoniumNitrateControlExpansion   In2001,BXAimposednewforeignpolicycontrolsonammoniumnitrate,includingdry  fertilizersandfertilizerblendscontainingmorethan15percentbyweightofammoniumnitrate.  TheseitemsarenowclassifiedasExportCommodityControlNumber(ECCN)1C997and  requirealicenseforantiterrorismreasonsduetotheirpotentialuseinexplosivesproduction. x  RemovalofSanctionsonSerbia,India,andPakistan  !X OnApril1,2001,theUnitedStatesremovedcomprehensivetradesanctionsimposedin1999 "H againstSerbiabecauseoftheethnicconflictinKosovo.OnOctober1,2001,BXAalsoremoved #8 sanctionsandcertaincontrolsimposedin1998againstIndiaandPakistanbecauseoftheir w$(  detonationofnucleardevices. g%!  RegionalStability  ')"% ThisreportnotifiesCongressthatBXAintendstopublishanamendmenttotheExport *#& AdministrationRegulations(EAR)thatexpandsthescopeofexplosivedetectionequipment +$' controlledunderECCN2A993andcreatesnewlicenserequirementsfortheexportandreexport +%( ofrelatedsoftwareandtechnology.ThenewlicensingrequirementswillbecontainedinECCNs O 2D993and2E993.Inthepast,theU.S.Governmentrequiredalicensefortheexportand ? reexportofthisequipmentonlytodesignatedterroristsupportingcountries.Withthis / amendment,BXAalsowillimposebroaderlicensingrequirementsonalldestinations,including   Canada,forregionalstabilityreasons.BXAdesignedtheamendmenttoenhancethesecurity   andsafetyofairlinetravelandphysicalstructuresincludinggovernmentbuildings.     AntiTerrorismControls    InresponsetotheterroristactsofSeptember11,2001,thePresidentissuedExecutiveOrder   13224ofSeptember23,2001!BlockingPropertyandProhibitingTransactionsWithPersons p  WhoCommit,ThreatentoCommit,orSupportTerrorism!todealwiththecontinuingand `  immediatethreatoffurtherterroristattacksonU.S.nationalsortheUnitedStates.On P  September28,2001,theUnitedNationsSecurityCounciladoptedResolution1373,whichstates @  thatmembernationsshallprohibitmakingfinancialassetsoreconomicresourcesavailablefor 0  thebenefitofpersonswhoengageinorattempttocommitorfacilitateterroristacts. o  BXAsoonwillpublisharuleconsistentwiththeprovisionsofExecutiveOrder13224andU.N. O Resolution1373.Thepurposeofthesenewcontrolsistoimposealicenserequirementforthe ? exportandreexportofallitemssubjecttotheEARdestinedtonewlydesignatedterroristsand / terroristgroupslocatedanywhereintheworld.Inaddition,currentexportcontrolswillbe  expandedtoimposealicenserequirementforthereexportofallitemssubjecttotheEARby  foreignpersonstopersonspreviouslydesignatedasterrorists.Comprehensivecontrolson  exportsfromtheUnitedStatesandbyU.S.personswillcontinueineffect.Previously,alicense  wasrequiredonlyforthereexportbyforeignpersonsofitemslistedontheCCL.   Liberia  p BXAwillsoonpublisharulethatamendstheEARtoprohibitthesale,supply,orexportfrom ` theUnitedStatesorthesale,export,orreexportbyU.S.personsofarmsrelateditems,including P technicalassistanceandtraining,toLiberia.ThisregulatoryactionisconsistentwithU.N.  @ Resolution1343ofMarch7,2001,andisbeingtakenincoordinationwiththeDepartmentof !0 State,whichcontrolsdefensearticlesandservicestoLiberiaundertheInternationalTrafficin o"  ArmsRegulation(ITAR). #XjXX4Xj)!#LXK XXXj _# ChemicalPrecursorsandRelatedEquipment ' # #XjX XLXKH# TheAustraliaGroup(AG),whichisaninformalforumofindustrializednationsthathaveagreed (!$ tocooperateincurbingtheproliferationofchemicalandbiologicalweapons,welcomedBulgaria ("% asits33rdmemberattheAGPlenaryinOctober2001.TheAG,viaeachmemberstates )#& nationallawsandregulations,maintainsexportcontrolsonalistofchemicals,biologicalagents, *$' andrelatedequipmentandtechnologythatcouldbeusedinchemicalorbiologicalweapons. +%( Actionsatthe2001Plenaryincludedadoptingcontrolsoncriticalcomponentsthatcanupgrade O chemicalmanufacturingequipmenttofunctionalequivalentsofcontrolleditems,andliberalizing ? controlsonmedicalanddiagnostickitscontainingsmallquantitiesofcontrolledchemicals. / Ѐ IXK XXXj   HighPerformanceComputers    #XjX XIXKL#IXK XXXjInFY2001,BXAmadetwomajoradjustmentstoHighPerformanceComputer(HPC)controls.   ThefirstsetofchangestoHPCcontrolswasannouncedinFY2000(August2000),butwasnot   fullyeffectiveuntilFY2001duetoalegislativelymandatedwaitingperiod.Thesechanges:   #XjX XIXKwM#IXK XXXj&  :  :5O0  "0` (#(#  RaisedtheTierIIlicenseexceptioneligibilityto45,000from33,000MTOPS.:5OPO݌p ` (#` (# Ќ  :  :"P0  "0` (#(#  RaisedtheTierIIIlicenseexceptioneligibilityto28,000from20,000MTOPSfor `  civilianendusersandfrom12,500MTOPSformilitaryendusers.:"P=P݌P ` (#` (# Ќ  :  :hQ0  "0` (#(#  ' (ORaisedtheNDAAnotificationlevelto28,000MTOPS:hQQ݌@ ` (#` (# Ќ     ` (effectiveFebruary28,2001). 0  :  :R0  "0` (#(#  #XjX XIXK O#MXjXXXjRemovedthedistinctionbetweenmilitaryandcivilianendusersinTierIII.#XjXXMXjS#IXK XXXj:RR݌o ` (#` (# Ќ  :  : T0  "0` (#(#  MovedArgentinafromTierIItoTierI.: T%T݌_` (#` (# Ќ  :  :T0  "0` (#(#  MovedEstoniafromTierIIItoTierII(effectiveDecember29,2000).:TT݌O` (#` (# Ќ  #XjX XIXKS#MXjXXXjThe#XjXXMXjU#MXjXXXjsecondsetofchangestoHPCpolicyinFY2001wasannouncedonJanuary10,2001,and / wasimplementedinregulationspublishedonJanuary19,2001.ThePresidentalso#XjXXMXj!V#MXjXXXjsubmitteda  reporttoCongressannouncingthechangesonJanuary19,2001.TherevisionstoHPCcontrol  policy:   H@=ABC>EFG(Iy31"@"    @mX2I3  0 `   CombinedComputerTiersIandIIintoasingleTierI(allHPCs,regardlessof  performancecapabilities,areeligibleforLicenseExceptionCTP).@mXX݌` (#` (# Ќ  "@"    @Y2I3  0 `   RaisedtheTierIIIlicenseexceptioneligibilityto85,000from28,000MTOPS.@Y Z݌p` (#` (# Ќ  "@"    @Z2I3  0 `   RaisedtheNDAAnotificationlevelto85,000MTOPS(effective@Z[݌`` (#` (# Ќ     ` March20,2001). P "@"    @!\2I3  0 `   MovedLithuaniafromTierIIItoTierI(effectiveMay19,2001).#XjXXMXjW#<( ` hp x X<@!\Z\݌ @` (#` (# Ќ    #MXXj]1#n*MFormatofAnalysisUsedinChapters212ofThisReport#Mn*]#XjXM  ?%! ]Chapters212ofthisreportdescribethevariousexportcontrolprogramsmaintainedbythe 1' # DepartmentofCommerceforforeignpolicyreasons,includingcontrolsmaintainedforcrime !(!$ control,regionalstability,chemicalandbiologicalnonproliferation,andantiterrorismreasons. )"% Eachoftheseprogramsisextendedforanotheryear.Theanalysisrequiredforsuchanextension *#&  ispresentedineachchapterintheformatdescribedbelow. *$'   &   ExportControlProgramDescriptionandLicensingPolicy  ? `Thissectiondefinestheexportcontrolsmaintainedforaparticularforeignpolicypurposethat   arei'O`mposedorextendedfortheyear2002.Eachofthefollowingchaptersdescribesthe   licensingrequirementsandpolicyapplicabletoaparticularcontrol.     &  AnalysisofControlasRequiredbySection6(f)oftheAct    {bSection6(f)(2)oftheActrequiresthattheSecretaryofCommercedescribethepurposeofthe p  controlsandconsideror' bԀdeterminewhethertoimposeorextendforeignpolicycontrolsbasedon `  specifiedcriteria,includingconsultationefforts,economicimpact,alternativemeans,andforeign P  availability.Foreachcontrolprogram,theCommerceDepartmentsconclusionsarebasedon @  thefollowingrequiredcriteria: 0   A.ThePurposeoftheControl  _ Thissectionprovidestheforeignpolicypurposeandrationaleforeachparticularcontrol. ?  B.Considerationsand/orDeterminationsoftheSecretaryofCommerce    1.  ProbabilityofAchievingtheIntendedForeignPolicyPurpose. Thissectionconsiders  ordetermineswhethersuchcontrolsarelikelytoachievetheintendedforeignpolicypurposein  lightofotherfactors,includingtheavailabilityfromothercountriesofthegoodsortechnology  subjecttocontrol,andwhethertheforeignpolicypurposecanbeachievedthroughnegotiations  orotheralternativemeans. p  2.  CompatibilitywithForeignPolicyObjectives. Thissectionconsidersordetermines P whetherthecontrolsarecompatiblewiththeforeignpolicyobjectivesoftheUnitedStatesand  @ withoverallU.S.policytowardthecountryortheproscribedendusesubjecttothecontrols. !0  3.  ReactionofOtherCountries. Thissectionconsidersordetermineswhetherthereaction _# ofothercountriestotheextensionofsuchexportcontrolsbytheUnitedStatesislikelytorender O$  thecontrolsineffectiveinachievingtheintendedforeignpolicypurposeortobecounter ?%! productivetootherU.S.foreignpolicyinterests. /&"  4.  EconomicImpactonUnitedStatesIndustry. Thissectionconsidersordetermines (!$ whethertheeffectofthecontrolsontheexportperformanceoftheUnitedStates,itscompetitive ("% positionintheinternationaleconomy,theinternationalreputationoftheUnitedStatesasa )#& reliablesupplierofgoodsandtechnology,ortheeconomicwell-beingofindividualU.S. *$' companiesexceedsthebenefittoU.S.foreignpolicyobjectives. V R  3       +%( Ї 5.  EnforcementofControl. ThissectionconsidersordeterminestheabilityoftheUnited O Statestoenforcethecontrols.Someenforcementproblemsarecommontoallforeignpolicy ? controls. W R  4      ׀Othersenforcementproblemsareassociatedwithonlyoneorafewcontrols.Each / controlhasbeenassessedtodetermineifithaspresented,orisexpectedtopresent,an   uncharacteristicenforcementproblem.     C.ConsultationwithIndustry    Thissectiondiscussestheresultsofconsultationswithindustryleadinguptotheextensionor   impositionofcontrols.ItalsoincludescommentsprovidedtoBXAbyTechnicalAdvisory p  Committees(TACs)andthePresident'sExportCouncilSubcommitteeonExportAdministration `  (PECSEA).SuchcommentsaretobeattributedtotheTACsorPECSEAunlessotherwise P  indicated. @   D.ConsultationwithOtherCountries  o  ThissectionreflectsconsultationsonthecontrolswithcountriesthatcooperatewiththeUnited O Statesonmultilateralcontrolsandwithothercountriesasappropriate. ?  E.AlternativeMeans   Thissectionspecifiesthenatureandresultsofanyalternativemeansattemptedtoaccomplishthe  foreignpolicypurpose,orthereasonsforextendingthecontrolswithoutattemptinganysuch  alternativemeans.   F.ForeignAvailability   @ Thissectionconsiderstheavailabilityfromothercountriesofgoodsortechnologycomparableto o"  thosesubjecttotheproposedexportcontrol.Italsodescribesthenatureandresultsoftheefforts _# madepursuanttoSection6(h)oftheActtosecurethecooperationofforeigngovernmentsin O$  controllingtheforeignavailabilityofsuchcomparablegoodsortechnology.Inaccordancewith ?%! theAct,foreignavailabilityconsiderationsdonotapplytoexportcontrolsineffectpriortoJune /&" 12,1985,tocontrolsmaintainedforhumanrightsandantiterrorismreasons,ortocontrolsin ' # supportoftheinternationalobligationsoftheUnitedStates. (!$  #MXXj4^#GeneralCommentsfromIndustryXjXM  )#&   +$' InaNovember7,2001,FederalRegisternotice,theDepartmentofCommercesolicited O  commentsfromindustryontheeffectivenessoftheU.S.exportcontrolpolicy.Commentswere ? alsosolicitedviatheBXAWebpage.Adetailedreviewofthecommentsreceivedcanbefound / inAppendixI.     ENDNOTES      #MXXjnx#4MM4XjX4M  #XjXX4Xjz##MXXjz#