Peru Threshold Program

Component 1: Reduce Corruption in Public Administration

February, 2008

1. Overview and Objectives

1.1. Analytical framework

In order to organize our discussion regarding the situation of Peru's anti-corruption initiatives and, more importantly, to design and articulate the activities comprised in this component in a comprehensive manner, we have developed a framework based on the existence of three drivers behind the occurrence of corrupt practices. These are: (i) the **lack of awareness** regarding the nature of corruption, the actions being implemented to fight against it and the role that citizens can and must play to complement these actions; (ii) **weak enforcement** due to the existence of weak institutions and inefficient control, investigation and sanction mechanisms; and (iii) the existence of **too many opportunities** for the occurrence of corrupt practices, due to limited access to information and the presence of complicated and costly administrative processes.

The first driver leads to weak citizen participation and oversight and a lack of trust in government institutions responsible for dealing with corruption. Inadequate enforcement mechanisms, on the other hand, contribute to reduce the expected cost of engaging in corruption from the point of view of the public servant that asks for or accepts a bribe. Finally, limited access to information and understanding of the norms and procedures that govern interactions and the prevalence of complicated and costly administrative processes, increase the expected benefit of engaging in a corrupt practice from the standpoint of the citizen that accepts paying or offers a bribe.

Based on the above, the possibility of observing a reduction in the levels of corruption within public administration will depend on the successful implementation of policy interventions aimed at **fostering awareness** (by informing and educating citizens and public servants about the nature of the problem of corruption, its costs, and the creation and use of mechanisms that foster their participation), **enhancing enforcement** (by strengthening control, investigation and sanction mechanisms within public institutions), and **reducing opportunities** (via the provision of public information and the streamlining of administrative processes).

1.2. Our strategy within the Threshold Program

The government of Peru is aware that our country's competitiveness relies on the efficiency and integrity of the public sector. Based on this, the fight against corruption stands out as one of the government's highest priorities.

Despite Peru failed scoring 39th percentile in the Control of Corruption indicator according to FY 2007 data, recent updates reveal some positive trends in several subcomponents, and these have allowed our country to score above the median of our group (56th percentile) in the MCC FY 2008 scorecard. In particular, and according to the World Bank Enterprise Surveys (2004-2006), there has been a major reduction in procurement-related corruption between 2002 and 2006, while both the Global

Competitiveness Report (2006)[1] and the Global Corruption Barometer (2006)[2] report improvements in terms of perceived corruption (by entrepreneurs and citizens, respectively) in the majority of sectors/categories considered. Finally, *Proetica*'s (the Peruvian chapter of Transparency International) last national survey (2006) shows a higher degree of citizen's confidence on the reduction of corruption in the next five years, with respect to the previous measurement (2004).

Despite the above, the government acknowledges the existence of several weak points that still preclude our country from scoring significantly above the median of our group in the Control of Corruption indicator. On the perception side, measurements captured during 2005 reveal that the general public exhibits high levels of skepticism regarding the government's commitment to fight corruption. In fact, and according to the Global Corruption Barometer (2006), while only 20% of the population thinks that the government encourages corruption, nearly 60% agrees that it is not effective in fighting against it. Regarding perception of corruption within specific sectors, on the other hand, both entrepreneurs and citizens agree in classifying the Judiciary as highly corrupt in absolute and relative terms (entrepreneurs assign this sector a score of 3.3 against an average of 5.04 –Global Competitiveness Report (2006), while citizens assign a score of 4.5 against an average of 4.0 –Global Corruption Barometer (2006)). According to this last survey, citizens also identify the Police as "very corrupt", with a score of 4.2.

If we refer to experience, measurements captured during 2005 and presented in the 2006 Global Corruption Barometer report, reveal that petty bribery is a pervasive phenomenon affecting mainly the relationship between citizens, police officers and justice operators. In fact, the percentage of respondents who declare that they themselves or a member of their family has paid a bribe in the last year is as high as 21%. A cross-sectional comparison reveals a similar percentage for the Judiciary and 31% for the Police, against an average of 12.6% if we consider other instances/services such as medical services, public utilities, tax collection and education. This evidence is confirmed by the Barometro de las Americas LAPOP survey (2006), which reveals that the prevalence of bribe-paying within the Police and the Judiciary stand out among the highest.

To guarantee that the Threshold Program contributes to our process of improvement, Component 1 comprises ten activities, organized on the basis of the framework explained above, and involving four sectors or public offices as well as civil society organizations. Within the Judiciary and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, proposed activities seek to reduce corruption within their own ranks. In the case of the Office of the Comptroller General, the Ombudsman Office and civil society organizations, activities are aimed at fighting corruption within public administration in general, evaluating and disseminating progress in anti-corruption initiatives, and enhancing citizen's ability to asses and monitor transparency and accountability in public administration, respectively.

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[1] Referring to a survey made to entrepreneurs were they are asked about their perception of corruption within export/import transactions, tax collection, public contracts, judicial decisions and public utilities. Their answers are scaled from 1 to 7 were 1 denotes high levels of corruption.

[2] Referring to a survey made to citizens where they are asked about their perception of corruption within Parliament, the educational sector, the Judiciary, access to registry/permit services, the Police and the Military. Their answers are scaled from 0 to 5 where the latter denotes high levels of corruption.

In accordance with our weak points in the Control of Corruption indicator (stressed in the previous discussion) activities within the Judiciary are aimed at reducing the probability of occurrence of a bribe in the interaction citizen-justice operator. Component 1 activities to be developed with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, on the other hand, seek the same objective but in the interaction citizen-police officer. Finally, activities involving the Office of the Comptroller General, the Ombudsman Office and civil society organizations are aimed at reducing the prevalence of bribe-paying in the interaction public servant – citizen / entrepreneur, and fostering awareness regarding the fight against corruption as well as transparency and accountability at the different levels of government.

Regarding this last issue, and acknowledging the critical role played by citizens, civil society organizations and the media in the fight against corruption, it is worth mentioning that all nine activities across the four public sectors involved will provide regular and robust information to the public on what the government is doing and intends to do in the anti-corruption field, enabling civil society to effectively perform its oversight role. The tools provided by these first nine activities to civil society will not only comprise more effective report mechanisms but also crucial information to monitor government performance and, thus, foster accountability. To complement this, Activity 10 (to be developed by selected civil society organizations) seeks to foster an educated demand for such information.

Figure 1 summarizes the anti-corruption strategy of our Threshold Program and describes these ten activities within the proposed framework.

The Judiciary

A1: *Fostering awareness* – Inform the general public about existing control mechanisms, their results and how they can participate.

A2: *Enhancing enforcement* – Strengthen the Internal Affairs Offices at the central and decentralized level.

Ministry of Internal Affairs

A3: *Fostering awareness* – Inform the general public and the Police about the mechanisms through which they can participate in the fight against corruption.

A4: *Enhancing enforcement* – Streamline norms and processes, and strengthen the offices in charge of receiving, investigating and sanctioning corruption reports.

A5: *Reducing opportunities* – Revise, streamline and inform about the procedures that govern the interaction citizen-Police officer.

Office of the Comptroller General

A6: *Fostering awareness* – Inform the general public about the policy actions and the results obtained as part of the OCG's anti-corruption preventive strategy and corruption risks within public administration.

A7: *Enhancing enforcement* – Reinforce preventive control in government procurement processes and the provision of business licenses, and internal control within State institutions.

A8: *Reducing opportunities* – Inform about and contribute to streamline administrative processes.

Ombudsman Office

A9: *Fostering awareness* – Strengthen the Ombudsman Office specialized anti-corruption unit to monitor anti-corruption initiatives, provide recommendations and disseminate their results.

Civil Society Organizations

A10: *Fostering awareness* – Strengthen civil society organizations' capacity to assess and monitor transparency and accountability in public administration.

Prevalence of bribe-paying in the interaction citizen / lawyer – justice operator reduced

Prevalence of bribe-paying in the interaction citizen – police officer reduced

Prevalence of bribe-paying in the interaction citizen / entrepreneur – public servant reduced

Awareness regarding corruption and the actions taken to fight against it increased

Citizens' ability to use public information to effectively assess and monitor transparency and accountability increased

Figure 1: Summary of Component 1

Raw score in the MCC Control of Corruption indicator improves

Government actions
- Perception
- Experience

2. Activities and Performance Objectives

2.1. The Judiciary: Activities 1 and 2

2.1.1   Overview and specific goals

The Judiciary acknowledges that the overwhelming public perception is that Peru's legal system is corrupt and slow, and that this precludes our country from obtaining higher scores not only in the Control of Corruption indicator, but also in the Rule of Law indicator. As explained in the previous section, both entrepreneurs and citizens agree in classifying the Judiciary as highly corrupt in absolute and relative terms, and this is confirmed by those indicators based on experience.

To tackle these weaknesses and improve the efficiency of our legal system, the recently elected President of the Supreme Court has launched a strategic plan based on seven lines of action to be implemented during the period 2007-2008.

- Strengthen the role of the Supreme Court: thanks to the assistance provided by project JUSPER (funded by the European Union), consultants are already evaluating the implementation of a technical bureau to provide juridical analysis for the production of binding Supreme Court resolutions.

- Improve the Judiciary's internal structure: the organizational design and management system of administrative and judicial offices is currently under revision to produce a new Organization and Functions Manual. This will be accomplished thanks to the technical assistance provided by the World Bank as part of the Project for the Improvement of Justice Services (*Proyecto de Mejoramiento de los Servicios de Justicia*).

- Improve access to justice: in January 2007, decentralized offices to support the activities of the Justices of the Peace have been implemented in each of the 29 Judicial Districts.

- Enhance transparency: last year, all Supreme Court decisions produced in the period 2004-2006 were systematized and made available via the Judiciary's web portal. Magistrates' CVs and income statements were also published.

- Modernize legal management: the New Code of Penal Procedure has already been implemented in two Judicial Districts and will be put into practice nationwide by year 2012. These two pilot experiences have revealed that the new legal proceedings considered in this Code will reduce to a matter of weeks the resolution of cases that currently take years to solve. In addition, the number of commercial courts will be raised from 12 to 22; in the past two years these courts have provided effective and swift administration of justice in business cases.

- Strengthen human resources: a permanent training program is currently in place, covering aspects related not only to legal procedures but also aimed at sensitizing magistrates and auxiliary justice operators regarding efficient job practices.

- Fight against corruption: judicial backlog[3] promotes the prevalence of opportunities for the occurrence of corrupt practices and weakens citizens' confidence in our legal system. Regarding this, we are confident that actions taken to improve the Judiciary's internal structure and modernize legal management (described above) will effectively contribute to ease judicial processes. However, and since they imply a profound restructuring of our justice system, these policy initiatives will yield measurable results in the medium and long term. Therefore, and to complement these efforts and help deliver results in the short run, further policy actions are required to strengthen internal control mechanisms. To guarantee this, the recently appointed Chief of the Internal Affairs Office (OCMA) has launched a comprehensive operational plan that comprises: (i) the introduction of swifter procedures for disciplinary processes; (ii) the identification and sanctioning of litigants and lawyers involved in corrupt practices (through agreements with the Bar Association and the Office of the Attorney General); (iii) a permanent monitoring of justice operators' income statements; (iv) the dissemination of the results derived from control activities; and (v) monitoring control activities performed by the OCMA's decentralized offices operating at the district level (ODICMAS[4]). Progress made within this plan led, last year, to a record number of 52 magistrates (including the President of the Superior Court of Lima) being suspended, who are currently facing disciplinary processes and dismissal.

Despite these efforts, important weaknesses persist that can preclude the effectiveness of internal control mechanisms. In fact, between 2005 and 2006, the total number of disciplinary processes executed by the OCMA represented only 0.11% of all cases processed by the Judiciary[5]. In addition, only 33% of these disciplinary actions ended up in a resolution where a sanction was advised. Far from implying that corruption levels are low, and given the evidence regarding the prevalence of bribe-paying, these results reveal that control activities are still narrow and that, in many cases, OCMA's limited physical and human resources are diverted to process "frivolous" corruption reports originated by complainants' disagreement with supposedly "unfair" verdicts.

In addition, and due to limited investigative capacity to generate sufficient and/or appropriate evidence, only a small proportion of OCMA's resolutions where a sanction/dismissal is advised are effectively ratified by the National Judicial Council (CNM). In fact, between 2005 and 2006, the OCMA advised the dismissal of 40 magistrates but only 17 were finally separated by the CNM.

Based on this, we propose to focus Threshold Program assistance to the Judiciary on two activities that will effectively add to current efforts devoted to enhance the effectiveness of internal control mechanisms. In particular, and following the analytical framework discussed in the previous section, Activity 1 implies fostering awareness regarding report, control and sanction procedures, and their results. On the enforcement front, Activity 2 seeks to strengthen internal affairs offices at the central and

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[3] Current judicial backlog levels imply that it would take up to 2 years to resolve all cases pending up to December 2006.
[4] ODICMAS were created to deconcentrate OCMAS's work. In addition, civil society participation in these offices was granted in 2003 (Law No. 28149) in an effort to foster oversight of control activities.
[5] The total number of disciplinary processes amounted to 4,124, against a total of 3,684,910 cases processed by the Judiciary.

decentralized level. These two activities will complement current efforts to ease judicial processes and reduce opportunities for the occurrence of corrupt practices (described above) and, together, will allow a measurable reduction in the prevalence of bribe-paying in the interaction between citizens/lawyers and justice operators.

2.1.2 Outputs, expected outcomes and related indicators

▶ *Fostering awareness* – Activity 1: Inform the general public about existing control mechanisms, their results and how they can participate.

Taking the above into consideration, Activity 1 within this component of our Threshold Program will yield five different products:

- A baseline study (implemented by an independent third party) to identify the proportion of citizens that: (i) are aware of existing report, control and sanction mechanisms; (ii) know how to use report and control mechanisms offered by the OCMA and the ODICMAS; (iii) would file a corruption complaint and the reasons for not filing one; and (iv) have trust in OCMA's performance and independence. This baseline study and its public dissemination will help monitor this activity's performance.

- Training workshops (32 each year) covering the 29 Judicial Districts will be delivered to the 50 most important civil society representatives at the local level, including the media. Training will be aimed at informing and educating about the mechanisms already in place that grant citizens' participation in control activities, and about their rights and obligations in their interaction with the Judiciary.

- Dissemination campaigns (32 each year) covering the 29 Judicial Districts will be delivered to citizens (as potential users) and magistrates and lawyers (as potential subjects of a control action). These campaigns will be aimed at collecting citizens' opinion and informing about the results of control activities in an effort to foster accountability, further promote citizens' participation and deter lawyers and justice operators from committing corrupt practices.

- To guarantee the sustainability and effectiveness of the education and dissemination campaigns explained above, a radio campaign will be designed, taking into account language diversity, and launched nationwide. The objective is to publicize: (i) the strengthening of internal control mechanisms within the Judiciary; (ii) citizens' participation in the education and dissemination campaigns delivered as part of this activity and in control activities as such; and (iii) the results obtained thanks to citizens' participation. With this, the general public will be sensitized to the importance of their role in control activities and the perception regarding control organs will improve. The Judiciary will assume the continuous implementation of this radio campaign beyond the 2-year period of the Threshold Program.

- Finally, a monitoring and dissemination plan, including the publication of an annual report on anti-corruption activities and sanctions imposed, will be designed and implemented in order to update baseline results and inform the general public about progress made in all performance indicators comprised in Activities 1 and 2.

Performance regarding this activity will be monitored by means of the indicators generated in the baseline study and the proportion of "frivolous" claims received by the

OCMA and ODICMAS. Regarding the former, we expect these five products will deliver an increase of, at least, 30 percentage points in the proportion of citizens that are aware of existing report, control and sanction mechanisms, and an increase of at least 15 percentage points in the proportion that knows how to use them. Thanks to the education and dissemination campaigns, we also expect a reduction of at least 20 percentage points in the proportion of "frivolous" reports, implying the control organs' activities will be effectively devoted to process corruption cases. Thanks to the publishing of OCMA's advances in anti-corruption efforts, a 20 percentage point increase is expected in the level of willingness to file a complaint for corruption, and in the level of trust in OCMA's performance and independence.

▶ *Enhancing enforcement* – Activity 2: Strengthen the Internal Affairs Offices at the central and decentralized level.

On the enforcement front, Activity 2 will deliver six products aimed at strengthening internal control mechanisms. This activity will complement efforts to foster awareness (Activity 1) since the provision of information to the general public regarding corruption and how to report it in the absence of adequate mechanisms to manage these cases, will not suffice to reduce bribe-paying and can even imply a backlash against the judicial system in terms of citizens' perception.

- A baseline study will be implemented by an independent third party, to identify year 0 values for the proportion of "frivolous" reports received by the OCMA and ODICMAS, the time required to process a corruption report, and the proportion of OCMA resolutions executed by the CNM appealed and confirmed.

- Technical assistance will be provided to revise and streamline process involved in the reception, investigation and sanctioning of corruption reports. An Operative Manual summarizing these procedures will be prepared and disseminated to all control organs.

- In accordance to the new and/or improved processes, an information system (involving both software and hardware) will be designed and implemented. This system will consolidate all information regarding control activities performed by the OCMA and its ODICMAS and will allow: (i) registering and modifying rules and procedures to be followed in control activities; (ii) immediate registry of corruption reports and actions taken to process these cases; (iii) a permanent monitoring of the status of disciplinary processes nationwide (with the possibility of screening them by Judicial District, ODICMA, magistrate, and internal control officer); and (iv) automated scrutiny of violations made to pre-established rules regarding control processes.

- In order to facilitate the implementation of the information system described above, computer equipment will be provided to the OCMA and all 29 ODICMAS. In addition, specialized equipment (such as audio and video equipment) will also be supplied in order to enhance OCMA's investigative capacity and guarantee that appropriate evidence can be provided for the application of swifter sanctions.

- Agreements will be made with key public and private agencies[6] to share financial and other crucial information required to enhance investigation processes, referred

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[6] Bar Associations in each Judicial District, the Office of the Attorney General, the National Institute for the Defense of Free Competition and the Protection of Intellectual Property – Indecopi, the National

to magistrates, auxiliary justice operators, lawyers and litigants. To formalize this, inter-institutional cooperation protocols will be designed and implemented within the current legal framework.

- An information system to centralize the data provided by these public and private agencies will be designed and implemented. This system, together with the one described above, will allow to cross-check the financial information of those involved in a control action and provide further evidence to initiate (in coordination with Office of the Attorney General) an investigation that will imply the disclosure of banking, tributary and telephonic records.

These six products will allow swift and adequate processing of corruption reports and enhance the investigational capacity of the OCMA and its ODICMAS. As a consequence, we expect swifter resolutions and more sanctions advised and applied when appropriate. To measure this, we will rely on four indicators that have a sequential nature: (i) the time required to process a corruption report from filing to closure -via a final resolution emitted by the OCMA- (where we expect a reduction of 20%); (ii) the proportion of corruption reports with a final OCMA resolution where a sanction is recommended, with respect to the total number of corruption reports with a final OCMA resolution (where we expect an increase of 20 percentage points); (iii) the proportion of OCMA resolutions where a sanction is recommended and is executed by the CNM, with respect to the total number of OCMA resolutions where a sanction is advised (where we expect an increase of 30 percentage points); and (iv) the proportion of OCMA resolutions executed by the CNM appealed and confirmed, with respect to the total number of OCMA resolutions executed by the CNM appealed (where we expect an increase of 15 percentage points).

2.1.3   Sustainability

All recurrent costs associated to the offices involved in the implementation of these activities are and will be funded via the Judiciary's regular budget, which has already experienced and increase of 56% in the last five years. Moreover, and as explained above, the two activities proposed fall within the OCMA's operational plan (already endorsed by its Chief Officer and the President of the Supreme Court) and, thus, all processes involved will be incorporated within this office's regular activities.

2.2. Ministry of Internal Affairs: Activities 3, 4, and 5

2.2.1   Overview and specific goals

The Ministry of Internal Affairs is aware that petty bribery is a pervasive phenomenon in the interaction citizen-Police officer and that this heavily weakens citizens' trust in the State. In fact, Police officers are among those public servants most in contact with the population and, thus, the prevalence of corruption in this relation directly harms the reputation of the State.

Super-intendancy of Tributary Administration – SUNAT, Public Registries, Migration Control Offices, the Office of the Comptroller General, credit risk information agencies – Infocorp, etc.

According to the surveys used to build the MCC's Control of Corruption Indicator, the Police stands out as one of the public sectors with the poorest scores in those indicators that measure both perception and experience. To complement this evidence, a diagnostic made by the Ministry's Internal Affairs Office (IAO)[7] during 2005 revealed that bribe-paying is particularly frequent during police traffic interventions and especially in cases where those intervened were found driving under the influence of alcohol[8]. Moreover, this same diagnostic revealed that corruption is also pervasive in passport expedition services and in the administration of police owned firearms and ammunition.

To reduce corruption in traffic interventions related to alcohol infractions, the Ministry has already implemented 3 pilot police operatives within its Zero Alcohol Plan which included the use of digital breathalyzers, with the objective of reducing the possibility of bribery. In fact, bribe-paying in this type of traffic intervention is commonly due to the lack of impartial and hard evidence regarding drivers' alcohol levels. Regarding passport expedition services, the IAO has recently concluded 18 investigations and found evidence of corruption in 9 of them. All migration officers involved in these 9 cases have been suspended. Finally, a Permanent Firearms and Ammunition Control Plan has been designed and will be implemented this year to guarantee proper administration of these supplies.

In addition, the Ministry of Internal Affairs is also aware of the importance of fighting against drug-related corruption. In this front, it has given evidence in favor of its strong commitment to punish police personnel involved with drug dealers. On April the 4th 2007, anti-drug police officers filed a corruption report against a Police captain and, the next day, 3 majors, 2 captains and 3 petty officers were arrested and are currently in prison. Regarding the Police's anti-narcotic activities, in 2007 the Ministry of Internal Affairs conducted a total of 9,358 anti-narcotic interventions. These resulted in the confiscation of 14,409 kg. of drug and the detention of 10,163 people. In addition, 1,411 clandestine drug laboratories were destroyed, reducing potential drug production by more than 15 tons.

To help deliver a measurable improvement on the MCC Control of Corruption Indicator, the Ministry's anticorruption initiatives within our Threshold Program will focus on fighting against the prevalence of petty bribery in the daily interaction between citizens and Police officers. For this, and in accordance to the analytical framework explained in the previous section, activities will focus on: (i) fostering public awareness regarding the existence and use of report mechanisms (we believe the general public is a good source of information regarding Police misconduct); (ii) enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of reception, investigation and sanction mechanisms (to adequately use this information and satisfy citizens' demand for corrective measures); and (iii) simplifying and disseminating the norms and procedures that govern the daily

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[7] This office was created in year 2002 to strengthen control and investigation mechanisms and complement the efforts of the Office of the Inspector General. This was accomplished thanks to the technical assistance provided by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). It is worth mentioning that the IAO's financial needs were initially funded by the Soro's Foundation, but they have been recently incorporated within the Ministry's regular budget.

[8] In all police stations inspected by the IAO, evidence of malpractices were found in the processing of such cases.

interaction between citizens and Police officers (in an effort to reduce the incentives to engage in bribery).

In particular, the prevalence of bribe-paying is partially due to the fact that both citizens and Police officers usually regard them as a common and acceptable practice[9], while those that don't are not aware of the channels by which they can file a complaint or believe these mechanisms will not be effective. In fact, impunity fuels frustration and indifference and this, in turn, contributes to transform bribe paying into a tolerable practice. Therefore, fostering awareness regarding report procedures must be accompanied by policy measures aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of control mechanisms.

Within the Ministry of Internal affairs, the latter implies conducting a thorough revision and streamlining of current norms and administrative processes involved in the reception of corruption reports, their investigation, and the application of sanctions. Last year, a total of 16 officers and 172 non-commissioned officers were dismissed, while other 17 officers and 282 non-commissioned officers were suspended because of their involvement in corrupt practices and/or administrative misconducts. Despite this, each year, an average number of 200 cases where evidence of corruption and/or administrative misconducts is found, do not have a definite sentence. In fact, on the enforcement front, the main problem is the lack of a clear and effective process connecting report reception, investigation and sanctioning. This, together with the lack of staff and equipment, generates delays in processing and investigating corruption reports, and precludes the provision of adequate evidence to support recommendations for sanctions that are made to the Disciplinary Tribunal[10]. In particular, offices in charge of receiving, investigating and sanctioning corruption reports still exhibit weaknesses regarding human and physical resources, and this contributes to the backlog. Within the Ministry, these offices are: (i) the Human Rights Office (which currently operates the Citizen Service Tip Line[11]); (ii) the Employee Protection Unit (*Defensoría de la Policía*)[12]; (iii) the IAO; (iv) the Office of the Inspector General; and (v) the Disciplinary Tribunal.

Finally, bribe-paying is also fostered by the existence of time-consuming procedures and citizens' lack of familiarity with the norms that govern their interaction with the Police. In fact, and related to traffic interventions, citizens are usually lured to pay a bribe not just to avoid a fine but also to avoid the intricate procedures required to determine their responsibility when Police intervention occurs after a car crash or a violation to traffic rules. Moreover, citizens' unawareness regarding these procedures fosters Police discretion and this, again, increases the expected benefit of offering a bribe. To mitigate the prevalence of such opportunities for the occurrence of corrupt practices, Police intervention protocols should be streamlined and the general public should be informed about the norms that regulate their interaction with the Police.

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[9] According to Proetica's 2006 National Corruption Survey, up 72% of respondents agree that offering a bribe to avoid a fine is acceptable.

[10] Created in 2002 as an independent entity to sanction Police personnel involved in corrupt practices.

[11] Introduced in 2004 in an effort to foster citizens' participation in the fight against corruption within the Police. In year 2006, this tip line received a total of 10,072 calls, however up 88% of these had a deceptive nature. Of those regarded as legitimate, 49% referred to Police officer misconducts and nearly half of these complaints are still being processed.

[12] Created in 2002 to protect the rights and provide legal assistance to the Police personnel.

2.2.2   Outputs, expected outcomes and related indicators

▶ *Fostering awareness* – Activity 3: Inform the general public and the Police about the mechanisms through which they can participate in the fight against corruption.

Taking the above into consideration, Activity 3 within this component of our Threshold Program will yield six different products focused on enhancing awareness and proper use of corruption report mechanisms already in place within the Ministry:

- A baseline study (implemented by an independent third party) to determine the proportion of citizens and Police officers that: (i) are aware of what can be regarded as a "corrupt practice" in the interaction citizen-Police officer; (ii) are aware of report mechanisms provided via the Citizen Service Tip Line, the Internal Affairs Office and the Office of the Inspector General; (iii) know how to use these report mechanisms; (iv) would file a complaint and the reasons for not filing one; and (v) have trust on these report mechanisms. This baseline study and its dissemination will help monitor this activity's performance and provide crucial information for the second product.

- Based on the information provided by the baseline study, the Ministry will develop a plan to inform and educate both the general public and Police officers, considering that a differentiated communication strategy is required to reach these two populations.

- Two information/education campaigns will be launched nationwide. These campaigns will be aimed at guaranteeing that both citizens and Police officers are aware of and trust existing report mechanisms, and know how to use them. For this, it will be important to ensure that potential users, and civil society organizations including the media, can properly identify what type of behaviors can be regarded as corrupt so they know what to report, how to file a report, and to inform them about the process that their reports will follow.

- To complement these campaigns, 24 ethics training workshops will be delivered to the Police personnel, following the professional ethics principles established in the Police Disciplinary Regime Law (*Ley del Regimen Disciplinario de la Policia Nacional* – RM No. 1994-2004-IN/0105 – 09/2004).

- To ensure the sustainability of these efforts, information regarding these report mechanisms and their results will be permanently updated and disseminated via the Ministry's and the Police web portal.

- Finally, a monitoring and dissemination plan will be designed and implemented in order to update baseline results and inform the general public about progress made in all performance indicators comprised in Activities 3, 4 and 5.

Performance regarding this activity will be monitored by means of the indicators generated in the baseline study and the proportion of "deceptive" calls[13] made to the

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[13] The Human Rights Office (which operates the Citizen Service Tip Line) currently understands as "deceptive" (*viciada*) those calls that do not fall in any of the following categories: (i) corruption reports (2%); (ii) complaints regarding service provided by the Ministry's personnel --including the police- (5%); emergencies requesting police presence (1%); queries and suggestions (4%). The remaining 88% (out of a total of 10,072 calls made during 2006) were classified as "deceptive". Given these results, we acknowledge the need for a better classification in order to identify those calls that do not pertain to the

Citizen Service Tip Line. Regarding the former, we expect these six products will deliver an increase of, at least, 30 percentage points in the proportion of citizens that are aware of report mechanisms and know how to use them; and a similar increase in the proportion of citizens and Police officers that trust these mechanisms and will, therefore, be willing to file a complaint. We further expect a reduction from 88% to 25% in the proportion of "deceptive" calls made to the Citizen Service Tip Line as complementary evidence in favor of the fact that more potential users are aware of what a corrupt behavior is and, thus, will know what to report via this service. Finally, we expect an increase of, at least, 40 percentage points in the proportion of Police officers that are aware of what can be regarded as a corrupt practice in the interaction citizen-Police officer.

▶ *Enhancing enforcement* – Activity 4: Streamline norms and processes, and strengthen the offices in charge of receiving, investigating and sanctioning corruption reports.

On the enforcement front, Activity 4 will deliver five products required to strengthen report reception, investigation and sanction mechanisms. In fact, this activity will not only deter Police officers from committing corrupt practices but will also help reduce impunity and further reinforce reliability on report mechanisms.

- Technical assistance will be provided for a thorough revision and streamlining of norms and processes involved in the reception, investigation and sanctioning of corruption reports.

- Since there are several offices involved in these processes, an information system to centralize and monitor corruption reports, investigations and sanctions will be designed and implemented. This system will include a mechanism to monitor complainants' perception about the quality of service and provide baseline values for the performance indicators considered in this activity.

- All five offices involved in receiving, investigating and sanctioning corruption reports will be reinforced by the provision of equipment. This equipment will involve: software for the reception and follow-up of corruption reports (for the Human Rights Office and the Employee Protection Unit); audio and video equipment (to enhance the IAO's investigative capacity and guarantee that appropriate evidence can be provided for the application of swifter sanctions); and computer equipment (for the Human Rights Office, the Employee Protection Unit, the IAO, the Office of the Inspector General and the Disciplinary Tribunal).

- To strengthen human resources, procedures regarding selection, protection, promotion and incentives for these offices' personnel will be revised and improved to guarantee that they feel both secure and rewarded for their efficiency.

- In addition, three training activities regarding new and/or improved processes will be delivered to these offices' personnel.

These products will allow swift and adequate processing of corruption reports and enhance transparency regarding control organs' decisions. These results will, in turn,

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functions of the tip line. This will be accomplished via the first output of Activity 4, which comprises a revision and streamlining of the process of report reception.

translate into more sanctions applied when appropriate and into an increase in complainants' satisfaction with the service provided. Therefore, this activity's results will imply: (i) a reduction to 7 days in the time required to determine and inform the complainant (with proper justification) if a corruption report has been admitted for investigation; (ii) that, in all cases, the complainant will be informed about the opening and conclusion of an investigation and the release of a final report to the Disciplinary Tribunal; (iii) that 100% of all resolutions emitted by this Tribunal will be published; (iv) an increase of, at least, 40 percentage points in the proportion of final reports where a sanction is recommended and it is executed by the Disciplinary Tribunal, with respect to the total number of final reports where a sanction is recommended; and (iv) that, at least, 75% of complainants declare that an adequate service and follow-up has been provided to their corruption report.

▶ *Reducing opportunities* – Activity 5: Revise, streamline and inform about the procedures and norms that govern the interaction citizen-Police officer.

As already mentioned, the 2005 IAO diagnostic revealed that bribe-paying is particularly frequent during police traffic interventions and especially in alcohol-related infractions. A more recent study (conducted by *Proetica* as part of its 2006 National Corruption Survey) demonstrates that traffic infractions not only stand out as the case with the highest incidence of bribe-paying (among a total of 34 processes that involve an interaction between citizens and public servants) but also that this incidence has increased significantly between 2004 and 2006[14].

Therefore, and to complement the previous activities by reducing opportunities for the prevalence of bribe-paying in those instances where there is both a high degree of interaction between citizens and Police officers and this phenomenon is more pervasive, Activity 5 will comprise:

- A baseline study to determine: (i) the proportion of citizens informed about the norms and procedures that govern their interaction with a Police officer; and (ii) citizens' perception regarding the complexity of these procedures. An assessment of police corruption in the interaction with citizens to help focus this activity's efforts regarding the revision and simplification of norms and procedures.

- The revision and streamlining of traffic intervention protocols.

- The revision and streamlining of protocols for interventions related to alcohol infractions.

- An information/education campaign regarding norms and procedures associated to the interaction citizen-Police officer.

- A special section of the Ministry's web portal to be devoted to a permanent updating and dissemination of these procedures.

This activity's performance will be monitored using the indicators provided by the baseline study. Regarding these, we expect and increase of, at least, 30 percentage

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[14] In 2006, of all respondents involved in a traffic infraction, up to 27.4% admitted having paid a bribe to avoid the fine. This result is almost 6.5 percentage points higher than the 2004 figure, and almost 8 percentage points above the second case in the bribe-paying incidence ranking.

points in the proportion of drivers that are informed about the norms and procedures that govern their interaction with a Police officer, and recognize them as simple.

2.2.3 Sustainability

All recurrent financial needs of the offices that will be involved in the implementation of these three activities are funded via the Ministry's regular budget. Moreover, in the past two years, resources devoted to the IAO's and Human Rights Office have increased in nearly 25%, while those funding the Employee Protection Unit's activities have risen in almost 60%.

To further guarantee sustainability, the Ministry is committed to incorporate Threshold Program activities and expected results as part of its Operational Plan and, thus, to absorb within its regular budget the resources needed to guarantee proper maintenance of all supplies provided and permanent training of the staff involved.

2.3. Office of the Comptroller General: Activities 6, 7 and 8

2.3.1 Overview and specific goals

The Office of the Comptroller General (OCG) plays a decisive role in the fight against corruption in public administration. Moreover, the OCG is aware that efforts to evaluate public servant's performance (within a traditional ex-post control scheme[15]) must be complemented by policy actions aimed at preventing misconducts. To guarantee this, in 2006, the OCG launched its Anti-corruption Preventive Strategy[16] (APE) in an effort to strengthen preventive control mechanisms. This strategy seeks to develop and implement recommendations to avoid the misuse of public funds, enhance internal control mechanisms in public agencies, promote an ethical and honest culture within public administration, foster civil society oversight and social control of government actions, and promote transparency and probity in the relationship between the State and the private sector.

Several initiatives are already in place to implement this strategy. In particular, the OCG is currently working on the design of the technical regulations that should be followed by all public offices when implementing their internal control mechanisms[17]. In addition, and also within its APE, the OCG is already making efforts to promote a market atmosphere of transparent competition in the relationship between private firms and the government, through an association with the entrepreneurial sector (Program *Juega Limpio* – Play Fair). For this, the OCG has already signed inter-institutional

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[15] In recent years, regular ex-post control activities have experienced a significant impulse thanks to the strengthening of the OCG's human and physical resources. In fact, the OCG's budget has increased in 229% between 2001 and 2006.

[16] Decree No. 233-2006-CG (08/08/2006). This strategy has the strong support of the current Comptroller General, appointed by the former government and ratified by the current administration in an effort to grant continuity to OCG's activities.

[17] In accordance to the general norms approved by the OCG in November 2006 and the Internal Control Law (*Ley de Control Interno de las Entidades del Estado* – No. 28716) approved by Congress in March 2006.

cooperation agreements with five business and three professional associations[18], and has subscribed 42 *Juega Limpio* ethics pacts with the associates of three committees[19]. Moreover, and in an effort to foster awareness and fight against indifference regarding the occurrence of corrupt practices, Program *Juega Limpio* also comprises working with the younger segments of society through education and communication campaigns launched in schools. Currently, up to 45,000 students (enrolled in primary and secondary education) have been educated in matters regarding the nature of a corrupt behavior, their duty to report such practices and the role of the OCG.

The OCG is also aware that Institutional Control Offices (ICOs - established within key public agencies including municipalities and regional governments) play a decisive role in guaranteeing a proper control environment to prevent corruption. Traditionally, these offices' personnel and budget were administrated by each public agency and this, obviously, limited ICOs' control activities. Since 2002, the National Control System Law (Law No. 27785) established that ICO directors' salaries should be gradually incorporated to the OCG's regular budget and, in an effort to guarantee the independence of these offices, 192 directors (out of 761) have already been incorporated. Moreover, and to establish the basis to overcome ICOs' weaknesses regarding access to proper human and physical resources, the OCG is currently inventorying these offices' assets and developing a classification to identify the minimum set of physical and human resources required by different types of ICOs in accordance to the characteristics of the public agency they serve. In addition, training modules for ICO's personnel have already been developed by the National Control School (*Escuela Nacional de Control* – ENC).

We are confident that policy actions taken within the OCG's APE will help prevent the occurrence of corrupt practices in public administration. In fact, and within the analytical framework used to build this component of our Threshold Program, strengthening the OCG's preventive strategy can directly add to our efforts to foster awareness and reduce opportunities for the occurrence of corrupt practices. In addition, reinforcing public-private associations aimed at preventing corruption and complementing OCGs efforts to promote internal control practices and strengthen ICOs, will effectively contribute on the enforcement front.

Therefore, Threshold Program assistance for the OCG will be focused on three activities that, together, seek a reduction in the prevalence of bribe paying in the interaction citizen/entrepreneur-public servant: (i) inform the general public about the policy actions and results obtained as part of the OCGs APE and corruption risks within public administration; (ii) reinforce preventive control in government procurement processes and internal control within State institutions; and (iii) inform about and contribute to the streamlining of administrative processes involved in the interaction citizen/entrepreneur - public servant.

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[18] National Society of Industry; Exporters Association; Lima Chamber of Commerce; National Chamber of Commerce, Production and Services; Peruvian Chamber of Construction; Peruvian Board of Accountancy; Lima Board of Accountancy; Peruvian Board of Engineering.
[19] Medical and Surgical Supplies Committee of the National Society of Industry; Pharmaceutical Industry Committee of the National Society of Industry; Health and Related Sciences Supplies Committee of the Lima Chamber of Commerce.

It is worth mentioning that these three activities will be further complemented by current OCG's actions taken within its Project for the Modernization of the Office of the Comptroller General and the Strengthening of the National Control System (financed by the Inter-American Development Bank). Currently, this project is focused on the design of a map to identify and measure corruption levels within public offices. This effort is being complemented by the incorporation of Sector Analysts who will be in charge of monitoring internal control mechanisms and assessing the risks for the occurrence of corrupt practices within particular public offices nationwide.

2.3.2   Outputs, expected outcomes and related indicators

▶ *Fostering awareness* – Activity 6: Inform the general public about the policy actions and the results obtained as part of the OCG's APE and corruption risks within public administration.

In order to foster awareness regarding policy actions and results associated to the OCGs APE and corruption risks within public administration, Activity 6 will yield four products:

- Technical assistance will be provided by an independent third party to build a baseline study aimed at identifying corruption levels within: (i) those services where there is a high degree of interaction between public servants and citizens and public servants and private firms; and (ii) the main transactions that link the State and the private sector. This baseline study and its dissemination will help foster awareness, prioritize policy interventions within Activity 8 (explained below) and provide crucial information to keep track of APE's results to be disseminated via the third product[20].

- A baseline study (implemented by an independent third party) to determine the proportion of citizens, entrepreneurs and public servants that are aware of preventive control activities performed by the OCG and believe in the effectiveness of their results. This baseline study will help monitor this activity's performance.

- Four information campaigns will be launched nationwide. These campaigns will be aimed at guaranteeing that both citizens (including entrepreneurs and the younger segments of society) and public servants are aware of the progress

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[20] This baseline study will update and enhance available information regarding services most demanded by citizens and private firms. A 2006 survey built to prioritize the provision of on-line services via the web portal www.serviciosalciudadano.gob.pe, reveals that the 10 most demanded services are: (i) public health appointments; (ii) certification of payment invoices - National Super-intendancy of Tributary Administration – SUNAT; (iii) Public Registries transcripts; (iv) police record certificates; (v) passport expedition services; (vi) police report transcripts; (vii) driver licenses; (viii) inscription in the National Supplier Registry - CONSUCODE; (ix) degree certificates; and (x) I.D. and birth certificates. In addition, it is worth mentioning that this baseline study will not overlap with activities funded by the IADB, since they differ in scope and source of information; on the contrary, they are complementary. IADB funding will be devoted to conduct sector analyses and identify (map) corruption risks within public institutions by collecting information, directly, from government officials on their perception of programmatic and management processes, as well as their internal control environment. To complement this effort, this output will focus on identifying corruption levels within those services most demanded by citizens and private firms. This information will allow: (i) prioritizing those processes to be mapped, systematized and disseminated; and (ii) to focus training regarding the implementation of information systems (both outputs comprised in Activity 8.).

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attained via the OCGs APE (including progress in all performance indicators considered for Activities 6, 7, and 8).

- Finally, and in an effort to decentralize preventive control and further foster awareness regarding OCGs preventive control activities, public audiences will be held through agreements with local civil society organizations.

This activity's performance will be measured by means of the indicators generated in the second baseline study. In particular, we expect these four products will deliver an increase of at least 25 percentage points in the proportion of citizens, entrepreneurs and public servants that are aware of preventive control activities performed by the OCG and believe in the effectiveness of their results.

▶ *Enhancing enforcement* – Activity 7: Reinforce preventive control in government procurement processes and the provision of business licenses, and strengthen internal control within State institutions.

On the enforcement front, Activity 7 involves reinforcing preventive control in government procurement process and the provision of business licenses, and strengthening internal control within State institutions. For this, we plan to take advantage of the already implemented Program *Juega Limpio*, existing technical regulations for the implementation of the Internal Control Law, and OCGs current efforts to assess the operational capacity of its ICOs. In particular, this activity comprises output at five different levels:

- Technical assistance will be provided to revise and streamline processes involved in receiving and investigating corruption reports.

- An ad-hoc system to receive and process corruption reports from private sector associations will be designed and implemented nationwide. These reports will stem from private firms' involvement in government procurement processes and the provision of business licenses. In fact, one the weaknesses of Program *Juega Limpio* (that puts at risk the possibility of new affiliations and can even imply desertion of those firms that are already part of the program) is the lack of specific procedures and a special unit within the OCG to receive and process reports that originate from the program, together with the absence of a system to follow-up and account for the status of reports when required by business associations.

- The OCGs Central Report Unit will be strengthened via the provision of software and computer equipment.

- To foster the implementation of OCG's technical regulations in accordance to the Internal Control Law, private consultants will be appointed to revise and audit (under OCG's supervision) internal control procedures, including systems such as procurement and personnel, within the Judiciary, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Health and all regional governments. By identifying those areas with the highest risk of corruption within these specific agency's internal processes and implementing OCG's regulations and recommendations, this specific product will effectively complement all the efforts comprised within Component 1 of our Threshold Program. Regional governments will also be included in this effort taking into consideration the need to foster internal control at the decentralized level now that several regional governments are currently administrating significant funds from the mining canon. In fact, the OCG has

recently signed an agreement with the regional government of Cajamarca (the most important region in terms of gold deposits) to provide assistance for the implementation of an internal control system.

- Finally, and to guarantee a proper control environment within public offices and contribute to the success of Activities 7 and 8, technical assistance will be provided to finish assessing ICOs operational capacity and, in accordance to this diagnostic, equipment and training will be supplied to, at least, 250 of these offices (with special emphasis on those related to municipalities and regional governments). Training will be based on the modules and contents already designed by the National Control School.

The first three products will reduce the time required to investigate a corruption report and will guarantee swift action from the OCG to prevent corruption in government procurement process and the provision of business licenses. Regarding the former, we expect a reduction of, at least, 50% in the time employed to investigate a report from a private sector association (it now takes an average of 4.5 months). Swifter response, on the other hand, will imply that, at least, 80% of all government procurement and business license provision processes where evidence of corruption is found will be immediately reported by the OCG and a control action will be initiated. Performance regarding internal control, on the other hand, will be measured in terms of the proportion OCG's recommendations effectively implemented. Regarding this indicator, we expect that, thanks to the revision and auditing of internal control procedures, at least 75% of OCG's recommendations made to the Judiciary, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Health and all regional governments will be implemented.

▸ *Reducing opportunities* – Activity 8: Inform about and contribute to the streamlining of administrative processes involved in the interaction citizen/entrepreneur-public servant.

Finally, and in an effort to further progress in the implementation of the OCG's APE, Activity 8 seeks to reduce opportunities for the occurrence of corrupt practices by informing about and helping to simplify administrative processes. For this, four different products are proposed:

- Results provided by the first baseline study will rank services most demanded by citizens according to corruption incidence. Based on this, processes involved in the provision of at least 50% of these services (ranging from high to moderate corruption incidence), will be mapped and summary diagrams will be published via leaflets and posters. This particular product will complement current government efforts to streamline administrative processes not only by providing information regarding simplified processes, but also by allowing to focus attention on those with the highest incidence of corruption.

- The second product involves the same as the previous one, but referring to the services most demanded by private firms, including business registration and licenses to operate.

- At least, 40 training workshops for public servants involved in the processes prioritized in the first two products of this activity will be delivered. Training will be focused on the implementation of information systems for the simplification of these processes.

- An automated system to monitor maintenance and update information that should be contained in public web portals will be designed and implemented. This evaluation will be performed following the requirements already established in the Transparency and Access to Public Information Law (Law No. 27806, approved in 2002), including publishing of annual budgets, staffing patterns, procurement plans and processes, among others. To guarantee that monitoring translates into accomplishment, this evaluation will be implemented in all public offices where an ICO is established (with special emphasis on those related to municipalities and regional governments) and, thus, where administrative sanctions can be enforced in case of non-compliance. Semi-annual reports on the compliance status of public offices will be issued.

Three different indicators will be used to monitor this activity's performance: (i) the proportion of users of those services most demanded and with the highest incidence of corruption that know the costs and administrative steps involved; (ii) the proportion of processes involved in the provision of these services that have been simplified thanks to the implementation of information systems; and (iii) the proportion of public agencies that have an ICO and maintain an updated web portal in accordance to the regulations established in the Transparency and Access to Public Information Law. Regarding the first two, we expect these proportions will be, at least, 50%. Regarding the third indicator, we expect it to be as high as 80%.

2.3.3 Sustainability

As already mentioned, the three activities proposed fall within the OCG's Anti-corruption Preventive Strategy and this implies that all processes involved will be incorporated into its regular activities. To further ensure sustainability, the OCG is currently making important efforts to strengthen human resources and information technologies that will be involved in the implementation of these three activities.

In particular, and through its National Control School the OCG's personnel is permanently trained in matters of preventive control and public management. The OCG is committed to assign part of these resources to ensure that the implementation of these activities will continue beyond the 2-year period comprised in the Threshold Program.

In addition, the OCG has already acquired last generation software for data analysis and is committed to assimilate within its information technology structure all new systems required for the implementation of the corruption map (Activity 6), the ad-hoc system to receive and process corruption reports (Activity 7) and the system to monitor maintenance and updating of information contained in public web portals (Activity 8).

2.4. Ombudsman Office: Activity 9

2.4.1   Overview and specific goals

The Ombudsman Office is the public institution with the highest degree of legitimacy in the fight against corruption[21], and its autonomy guarantees a credible monitoring of the policy measures implemented in this matter.

In fact, after more than 10 years of activities, the Ombudsman Office has increased its legitimacy as an autonomous and efficient institution. It has been developing specific interventions to promote and oversight government's performance, particularly those oriented to foster transparency and access to public information. For instance, the Ombudsman Office impelled the National Congress to approve the Transparency and Access to Information Law (Law No. 27806) and elaborated two Ombudsman Reports on that same matter; one prior to the promulgation of the Law (Report N°60, 2001) and the other two years after its approval (Report N°96, 2005). Currently, the Ombudsman Office develops dissemination and capacity-building campaigns to promote transparency in public management and to encourage citizens to demand it as a primary right. It also promotes and supervises transparency web pages at the different levels of government.

In addition, the Ombudsman Office is carrying on an anti-corruption campaign in the education sector with the support of *Proetica*. This was implemented as a pilot project in 6 regions of the country, revealing the main clusters of corruption that directly affect the quality of education. This experience was systematized in the Ombudsman Working Paper No. 001 "With Corruption there is no education" and, currently, the recommendations put forward in this document are being evaluated by an ad-hoc commission created within the Ministry of Education. Due to this success, the 2007 campaign was implemented in 12 regions, with an increasing expectation of all actors involved.

Nevertheless, and acknowledging that the effectiveness of public policies and the realization of citizen's rights are affected by corruption, the Ombudsman Office aims to accomplish a role of greater presence in the fight against corruption, propelling processes to guarantee greater transparency and more active control-of-corruption policies in public administration through monitoring and social watch. In this sense, it requires a specialized office with enough resources to take ahead a systematic and proactive work of supervision which will generate information about corruption and provide public institutions and civil society with the necessary tools to carry out more effective actions. The Ombudswoman has demonstrated, convincingly, that she has the political will required to play this decisive role. In fact, on May 14th 2007, she announced the creation of a specialized anti-corruption unit that will be in charge of developing and putting forward concrete proposals and recommendations, taking into account the point of view of a variety of actors.

In this sense, Activity 9 seeks to strengthen the specialized unit the Ombudsman Office has already created, in an effort to evaluate anti-corruption policies, identify corruption

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[21]According to Proetica's 2006 National Corruption Survey, the Ombudsman Office is the most reliable institution in matters regarding the fight against corruption. In fact, 17% of respondents agree in qualifying this office as highly reliable and up to 23% qualify its performance as "very good" or "good".

cases in selected sectors of the public administration, and propose concrete actions to further advance in the fight against corruption. This unit falls within the powers vested by Article 162° of the Constitution to the Ombudsman Office, to promote and supervise the accomplishment of legal and international obligations assumed by the country in the fight against corruption, without interfering with functions corresponding to other government sectors. Moreover, the Ombudsman Office is also committed to take into consideration civil society's perspective and, hence, will convene the organizations of greatest reputation in the fight against corruption.

In this way, and within the analytical framework discussed in the previous section, our goal is to supervise the accomplishment of national and international obligations of the State in fighting against corruption, obtaining and disseminating information needed to both foster awareness regarding corruption and give alerts and recommendations to the public administration. With this, we seek to complement the rest of activities comprised in this component of our Threshold Program, and help deliver a measurable impact on those subcomponents of the MCC Control of Corruption indicator based on citizens' and businesses' perception.

Through this particular activity, the Ombudsman Office offers an important asset that will add to the success of our Threshold Program. In particular, and thanks to its reputation, credibility, neutrality, capacity to convene, and privileged legal status, this office will offer credible monitoring of anti-corruption policy measures and will serve as a nexus between public institutions' initiatives and civil society organizations' efforts. This role will effectively add to the success of the Program since fighting corruption is not only a matter of supply but also of demand, where public awareness plays a crucial role.

2.4.2 Outputs, expected outcomes and related indicators

▸ *Fostering awareness* – Activity 9: Strengthen the Ombudsman Office specialized anti-corruption unit.

This specific activity will deliver the following products:

- Equipment and technical assistance will be provided to the specialized unit created within the Ombudsman Office.

- A baseline study will be implemented to identify: (i) the degree of citizens' and civil society organizations' awareness regarding anti-corruption initiatives implemented by selected public bodies and their results (including those sectors involved in the Threshold Program); and (ii) the degree of citizens' recognition of the Ombudsman Office as an independent entity who effectively monitors anti-corruption actions.

- A system to monitor the accomplishment of State obligations in fighting against corruption within selected bodies of the public administration, based on prevention, detection and sanction indicators will be designed in a pilot program. This system will allow a permanent provision of reliable information to measure progress in the fight against corruption in terms of public institutions' policy commitments, particularly those sectors involved in the Threshold Program.

- Seven periodic reports will be developed, systematizing: (i) progress and drawbacks in the fight against corruption; (ii) problems detected in selected sectors; (iii) policies aimed at fostering public ethics, probity and transparency; (iv) remarks of the main civil society anti-corruption organizations; and (v) Ombudsman's conclusions and recommendations.

- Three dissemination campaigns of reports, alerts and Ombudsman's recommendations will be launched in coordination with the Ombudsman Regional Offices.

- To complement the latter, two campaigns to promote ethics, transparency and efficiency in public administration will also be launched through the Ombudsman Regional Offices. For this, the Ombudsman Office will consider strategic alliances with key civil society organizations at the local level.

Outcomes related to this activity will be measured by means of the indicators built in the first baseline study. Depending on the results shown by that study, and after the rest of products are displayed, we can expect an increase of, at least, 20 percentage points in the proportion of citizens and civil society organizations that are aware of anti-corruption initiatives put forward by public sectors, and their results. However, we are aware of the external factors that could affect citizens' perception, such as public corruption scandals due to the strengthening of control and sanction mechanisms. Because of this, results will be measured considering these factors in a complete analytical report. In addition, we also expect an increase of 15 percentage points in the proportion of citizens that recognize the Ombudsman Office as an independent institution devoted to monitor anti-corruption policies.

2.4.3   Sustainability

To guarantee the sustainability of this activity, the Ombudsman Office is committed to maintain its specialized anti-corruption unit in full operation beyond the two-year period of the Threshold Program. In addition, the monitoring system and all processes involved in monitoring anti-corruption policies will be coordinated by the specialized unit with the Deputy Offices and the 28 Ombudsman Regional Offices.

Moreover, monitoring activities, recommendations and results will be included in the annual report of the Ombudsman Office before Congress, in accordance to its Constitutional mandate to promote and supervise the accomplishment of legal and international obligations assumed by the country in matters regarding the fight against corruption.

2.5. Civil Society Organizations: Activity 10

2.5.1   Overview and specific goals

As already mentioned, all nine activities across the four public sectors involved in the Threshold Program seek to provide regular information on what the government is doing and intends to do in the anti-corruption field. In particular, all communication and dissemination plans pursue this objective, while Activity 9 (to be implemented by the Ombudsman Office) will further help systematize and disseminate reliable and

independent information regarding progress and drawbacks in the fight against corruption within specific public offices, including those directly comprised in the Program. In addition, Activity 8 (to be implemented by the OCG) will also help foster transparency by guaranteeing that the different levels of government (with special emphasis on regional and local governments) maintain an updated web page with information regarding annual budgets, staffing patterns, procurement plans and processes, etc., in accordance to the Transparency and Access to Public Information Law.

While regular and reliable information is granted on the supply side, fostering awareness also requires an educated demand. In this sense, Activity 10 of our Threshold Program aims at improving citizens' ability to understand and know how to use public information to effectively assess and monitor transparency and accountability in public administration. For this, Activity 10 will strengthen civil society organizations' (CSOs) capacity to build an educated demand for public information and coordinate these requirements with public actors responsible of supplying it. We expect this particular activity will contribute on the awareness front and help deliver an improvement on those subcomponents of the MCC Control of Corruption indicator based on citizens' perception.

2.5.2   Outputs, expected outcomes and related indicators

▸ *Fostering awareness* – Activity 10: Strengthen civil society organizations' capacity to assess and monitor transparency and accountability in public administration.

This particular activity will deliver five different products:

- A baseline study, conducted by the USAID implementing partner, to assess CSOs oversight capacity. Oversight capacity will be measured in terms of CSOs representatives' degree of understanding of citizens' rights regarding access to public information (including progress attained in the fight against corruption) and their ability to use this information to assess and monitor transparency and accountability in public administration. Results provided by this baseline study will not only provide information to monitor this activity's performance, but will also serve to identify those CSOs with the proper outreach to maximize the impact of the technical assistance to be provided as part of this activity, as well as weak areas to focus training.

- Two training workshops and technical assistance will be provided to the most representative CSO in every region (26 in total), in matters regarding access to public information and its use to asses and monitor transparency and accountability in public administration. This assistance will be provided to those CSOs selected by the USAID implementing partner on the basis of a competitive process and the results obtained in the first baseline study.

- A baseline study, implemented by an independent third party, that will allow each CSO to determine the proportion of citizens that consider that their authorities (at the different levels of government) are transparent and accountable for their actions.

- Each of these CSOs will organize two public audiences with regional and local authorities in an effort to foster transparency and accountability. In particular,

these public audiences will be aimed at convening the demand and supply of public information. On the demand side, and thanks to the training and technical assistance provided, CSOs will be in a better position to organize their public information requirements and coordinate with regional and local authorities (at the supply side) so these can explain how is that they are already satisfying or intend to satisfy these demands. Results obtained in each public audience will be systematized by the organizing CSO.

- A dissemination campaign for each of these public audiences. These campaigns will be aimed at fostering citizen participation and disseminating their results.

Performance regarding this activity will be assessed by means of the indicators generated in the two baseline studies. In particular, we expect representatives of all 26 CSOs selected for the provision of training and technical assistance will exhibit proper understanding of citizens' rights regarding access to public information and the way to use this information to assess and monitor transparency and accountability in public administration. Thanks to the realization of public audiences and the dissemination of their results, we also expect an increase of, at least, 40 percentage points in the proportion of citizens that consider that their authorities are transparent and accountable for their actions.

2.5.3 Sustainability

Capacity building (via the provision of training and technical assistance) will guarantee that CSOs involved in this activity will achieve and sustain a more active role fostering transparency and accountability. In addition, CSOs will be selected on the basis of their outreach and commitment to implement public audiences beyond the term of the Threshold Program.

Appendix 1: Component 1 - Summary of activities, outputs and outcomes

The Judiciary - Activities 1 and 2

Activities/Inputs	Outputs (two years)	Outcomes (two years)	Targeted Subcomponents (two years)
Activity 1. (*Fostering awareness*) Inform the general public about existing control mechanisms, their results and how they can participate.	- The Judiciary identifies the proportion of citizens that: (i) are aware of existing report, control and sanction mechanisms; (ii) know how to use report and control mechanisms offered by the OCMA and the ODICMAS; (iii) would file a corruption complaint and the reasons for not filing one; and (iv) have trust in OCMA's performance and independence. - 32 training workshops regarding report, control and sanction procedures, and citizens' rights and obligations in their interaction with the Judiciary, are delivered each year. -32 dissemination campaigns are launched each year regarding the results and progress of control activities. - 1 radio campaign is launched to publicize anti-corruption activities within the Judiciary and foster citizens' participation. - A monitoring and dissemination plan is implemented to report progress in all performance indicators considered in these two activities.	- An increase of, at least, 30 percentage points in the proportion of citizens that are aware of existing report, control and sanction mechanisms within the Judiciary. *Subject to revision. Baseline values will be provided by the first output of Activity 1.* - An increase of, at least, 15 percentage points in the proportion of citizens that know how to use report and control mechanisms offered by the OCMA and ODICMAS. *Subject to revision. Baseline values will be provided by the first output of Activity 1.* - A reduction of, at least, 20 percentage points in the proportion of "frivolous" reports received by the OCMA and ODICMAS. *Subject to revision. Baseline values will be provided by the first output of Activity 2.* - An increase of 20 percentage points in the level of willingness to file a complaint for corruption, and in the level of trust in OCMA's performance and independence. *Subject to revision. Baseline values will be provided by the first output of Activity 1.*	**For activities related to the Judiciary (Activities 1 and 2):** ** Perception:* - Business perception of corruption in judicial decisions (scale 1-7; 1 = worst score) improves from **3.3** (2006) to **5** (2006 average of the five categories considered) – Global Competitiveness Report. - Citizen perception of corruption in the Judiciary (scale 0-5; 5 = highly corrupt) improves from **4.5** (2006) to **3.5** (2006 score for the Education sector) – Global Corruption Barometer. ** Experience:* - Percent of respondents that replied that they or a family member had paid a bribe in the past year in the Judiciary improves from **18%** (2006) to **13%** (2006 average for the six categories considered) – Global Corruption Barometer. - Percent of respondents who declare having being asked for a bribe in the Judiciary improves from **11.6%** (2006) to **8%** (2006 score for schools) – Barometro de las Americas - LAPOP.

Activity 2. **(Enhancing enforcement)** Strengthen the Internal Affairs Offices at the central and decentralized level.	- The Judiciary identifies baseline values for the proportion of "frivolous" reports received by the OCMA and ODICMAS, the time required to process a corruption report, and the proportion of OCMA resolutions executed by the CNM appealed and confirmed. - Processes involved in the reception, investigation and sanctioning of corruption reports are revised and streamlined; an Operative Manual summarizing these procedures is prepared and disseminated. - The OCMA has an information system to monitor and follow-up control activities. - The OCMA and all 29 ODICMAS are properly equipped. - Agreements are made with key public and private agencies to share financial and other crucial information required to enhance investigation processes, referred to magistrates, auxiliary justice operators, lawyers and litigants. - The OCMA has an information system to centralize this information.	- A reduction of, at least, 20% in the time required to process a corruption report (from filing to closure via a final resolution emitted by the OCMA). *Subject to revision. Baseline values will be provided by the first output of Activity 2.* - In increase of 20 percentage points in the proportion of corruption reports with a final OCMA resolution where a sanction is recommended, with respect to the total number of corruption reports with a final OCMA resolution. *Estimated baseline: 33% (2005-2006 percentage of cases that originated a resolution where a sanction was advised).* - An increase of 30 percentage points in the proportion of OCMA resolutions where a sanction is recommended and is executed by the National Judicial Council (CNM), with respect to the total number of OCMA resolutions where a sanction is advised. *Estimated baseline: 42.5% (2005-2006 percentage of OCMA dismissal recommendations ratified by the CNM).* - An increase of 15 percentage points in the proportion of OCMA resolutions executed by the CNM appealed and confirmed, with respect to the total number of OCMA resolutions executed by the CNM appealed. *Subject to revision. Baseline values will be provided by the first output of Activity 2.*	

Ministry of Internal Affairs - Activities 3, 4 and 5

Activities/Inputs	Outputs (two years)	Outcomes (two years)	Targeted Subcomponents (two years)
Activity 3. (*Fostering awareness*) Inform the general public and the Police about the mechanisms through which they can participate in the fight against corruption.	- The Ministry of Internal Affairs identifies the proportion of citizens and Police officers that: (i) are aware of what can be regarded as a "corrupt practice" in the interaction citizen-Police officer; (ii) are aware of report mechanisms provided via the Citizen Service Tip Line, the Internal Affairs Office and the Office of the Inspector General; (iii) know how to use these report mechanisms; (iv) would file a complaint and the reasons for not filing one; and (v) have trust on these report mechanisms. - A plan to foster awareness regarding the nature of corrupt practices and report mechanisms is designed. - 2 information/education campaigns regarding report mechanisms are launched nationwide (what to report, how to file a report, and the process these reports will follow). - 24 ethics training workshops delivered to Police personnel. - Information regarding report mechanisms and their results is permanently disseminated via the Ministry's and the Police web portal. - A monitoring and dissemination plan is implemented to report progress in all performance indicators considered in these three activities.	- An increase of, at least, 30 percentage points in the proportion of citizens that are aware of report mechanisms. *Subject to revision. Baseline values will be provided by the first output of Activity 3.* - An increase of, at least, 30 percentage points in the proportion of citizens that know how to use report mechanisms. *Subject to revision. Baseline values will be provided by the first output of Activity 3.* - An increase of 30 percentage points in the proportion of citizens and Police officers that are willing to file a complaint. *Subject to revision. Baseline values will be provided by the first output of Activity 3.* - A reduction to 25% in the proportion of calls not pertaining to the functions of the Citizen Service Tip Line. *Estimated baseline: 88% (2006 percentage of calls classified as "deceptive" by the Human Rights Office).* - An increase of, at least, 40 percentage points in the proportion of Police officers that are aware of what can be regarded as a corrupt practice in the interaction citizen-Police officer. *Subject to revision. Baseline values will be provided by the first output of Activity 3.*	**For activities related to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Activities 3, 4 and 5):** ** Perception:* - Citizen perception of corruption in the Police (scale 0-5; 5 = highly corrupt) improves from **4.2** (2006) to **3.5** (2006 score for the Education sector) – Global Corruption Barometer. ** Experience:* - Percent of respondents that replied that they or a family member had paid a bribe in the past year to the Police improves from **39%** (2006) to **25%** (5 percentage points below the 2006 LAC average) – Global Corruption Barometer. - Percent of respondents who declare having being asked for a bribe by a Police officer improves from **18.8%** (2006) to **11%** (2006 average for the eight categories considered) – Barometro de las Americas - LAPOP.

Activity 4. (*Enhancing enforcement*) Streamline norms and processes, and strengthen the offices in charge of receiving, investigating and sanctioning corruption reports.	- Processes and norms involved in the reception, investigation and sanctioning of corruption reports are revised and streamlined. - An information system to centralize and monitor corruption reports, investigations and sanctions is designed and implemented, including a system to monitor complainants perception about the quality of service. - The Human Rights Office, Employee Protection Unit, Internal Affairs Office, the Office of the Inspector General, and the Disciplinary Tribunal, are properly equipped. - Procedures regarding selection, protection, promotion and incentives for these offices' personnel are revised and improved, to guarantee that they feel both secure and rewarded for their efficiency. - 3 training activities regarding new and/or improved processes are delivered to these offices' personnel.	- A reduction to 7 days in the time required to determine and inform the complainant (with proper justification) if a corruption report has been admitted for investigation. *Subject to revision. Baseline, midterm and endline values will be provided by the information system – output2 of Activity4.* - In all cases, the complainant is informed about the opening of an investigation, its conclusion and the release of a final report to the Disciplinary Tribunal. *Subject to revision. Baseline, midterm and endline values will be provided by the information system – output2 of Activity4.* - All resolutions emitted by the Disciplinary Tribunal are published. - An increase of, at least, 40 percentage points in the proportion of final reports where a sanction is recommended and it is executed by the Disciplinary Tribunal, with respect to the total number of final reports where a sanction is recommended. *Subject to revision. Baseline, midterm and endline values will be provided by the information system – second output of Activity4.* - At least, 75% of complainants declare that an adequate service and follow-up has been provided to their corruption report.	

Activity 5. (*Reducing opportunities*) Revise, streamline and inform about the procedures and norms that govern the interaction citizen-Police officer.	- The Ministry of Internal Affairs identifies: (i) the proportion of citizens informed about the norms and procedures that govern their interaction with a Police officer; and (ii) citizens' perception regarding the complexity of these procedures; and performs an assessment of police corruption in the interaction with citizens. - Traffic intervention protocols are revised and streamlined. - Protocols for interventions related to alcohol infractions are revised and streamlined. - An information / education campaign regarding norms and procedures associated to the interaction citizen-Police officer is launched. - A special section of the Ministry's web portal is devoted to a permanent updating and dissemination of these procedures.	- An increase of, at least, 30 percentage points in the proportion of drivers that are informed about the norms and procedures that govern their interaction with a Police officer. *Subject to revision. Baseline values will be provided by the first output of Activity 5.* - An increase of, at least, 30 percentage points in the proportion of drivers that recognize that procedures that govern their interaction with a Police officer are simple. *Subject to revision. Baseline values will be provided by the first output of Activity 5.*	

Office of the Comptroller General - Activities 6, 7 and 8

Activities/Inputs	Outputs (two years)	Outcomes (two years)	Targeted Subcomponents (two years)
Activity 6. (*Fostering awareness*) Inform the general public about the policy actions and the results obtained as part of the OCG's APE and corruption risks within public administration.	- The OCG identifies corruption levels within: (i) those services where there is a high degree of interaction between public servants and citizens and public servants and private firms; and (ii) the main transactions that link the State and the private sector. - The OCG identifies the proportion of citizens, entrepreneurs and public servants that are aware of preventive control activities performed by the OCG and believe in the effectiveness of their results. - 4 information campaigns regarding preventive control activities and their results are launched, covering citizens, the young population, entrepreneurs and public servants. These include reporting progress in all performance indicators considered for Activities 6, 7 and 8. - Public audiences are held and preventive control activities are reinforced at the decentralized level, through agreements with local civil society organizations.	- An increase of, at least, 25 percentage points in the proportion of citizens, entrepreneurs and public servants that is aware of preventive control activities performed by the OCG and believe in the effectiveness of their results. *Subject to revision. Baseline values will be provided by the second output of Activity 6.*	**For activities related to the Office of the Comptroller General (Activities 6, 7 and 8):** ** Perception:* - Business perception of corruption in public contracts (scale 1-7; 1 = worst score) improves from **4.7** (2006) to **5.7** (2006 score for tax collection) – Global Competitiveness Report. - Citizen perception of corruption in registry/permit services (scale 0-5; 5 = highly corrupt) improves from **3.7** to **3.0** (0.5 points below the 2006 score for education) – Global Corruption Barometer. ** Experience:* - Percent of respondents that replied that they or a family member had paid a bribe in the past year --in general- improves from **21%** (2006) to **14%** (2005 Peruvian score and LAC average) – Global Corruption Barometer. - Percent of respondents who declare having being asked for a bribe by a public servant improves from **10.7%** (2006) to **8%** (2006 score for schools) – Barometro de las Americas - LAPOP.

Activity 7. (***Enhancing enforcement***) Reinforce preventive control in government procurement processes and the provision of business licenses, and strengthen internal control within State institutions.	- Processes involved in receiving and investigating corruption reports are revised and streamlined. - An ad-hoc system to receive and process corruption reports from private sector associations is designed and implemented. - The OCGs Central Report Unit is properly equipped. - Internal control mechanisms within the Judiciary, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Health and all regional governments are revised and audited. - Institutional Control Offices' operational capacity is assessed; training and equipment is provided to 250 prioritized offices.	- A reduction of, at least, 50% in the time required to investigate a corruption report from a private sector association. **Estimated baseline: 4.5 months.* - At least, 80% of all government procurement and business license provision processes where evidence of corruption is found are immediately reported by the OCG and a control action is initiated. **Subject to revision. Baseline, midterm and endline values will be provided by the ad-hoc system to receive and process corruption reports – second output of Activity 7.* - At least, 75% of all OCG's recommendations regarding internal control processes made to the Judiciary, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Health and all regional governments are implemented.	

Activity 8. (*Reducing opportunities*) Inform about and contribute to the streamlining of administrative processes involved in the interaction citizen/entrepreneur-public servant.	- Processes involved in the provision of at least 50% of those services most demanded by citizens (prioritized according to corruption incidence following the results of the first baseline study) are mapped and summary diagrams are published via leaflets and posters. - Processes involved in the provision of at least 50% of those services most demanded by private firms (prioritized according to corruption incidence following the results of the first baseline study) are mapped and summary diagrams are published via leaflets and posters. - 40 training workshops for public servants regarding the implementation of information systems are delivered. - A system to monitor maintenance and update information that should be contained in public web portals is designed and implemented.	- At least, 50% of users of those services in highest demand and with the highest incidence of corruption know the costs and administrative steps involved. - At least, 50% of the processes involved in the provision of these services are simplified using information systems. - 80% of public agencies that have an Institutional Control Office maintain and update their web portal.	

Ombudsman Office - Activity 9

Activities/Inputs	Outputs (two years)	Outcomes (two years)	Targeted Subcomponents (two years)
Activity 9. (*Fostering awareness*) Strengthen the Ombudsman Office specialized anti-corruption unit.	- Specialized anti-corruption unit is properly equipped. - The Ombudsman Office identifies: (i) the degree of citizens' and civil society organizations' awareness regarding anti-corruption initiatives implemented by selected public bodies and their results (including those sectors involved in the Threshold Program); and (ii) the degree of citizens' recognition of the Ombudsman Office as an independent entity who monitors anti-corruption actions. - A system to monitor the accomplishment of State obligations in fighting against corruption within selected bodies of the public administration (including those sectors involved in the Threshold Program) is designed and implemented. - 7 periodic reports are developed, systematizing: (i) progress and drawbacks in the fight against corruption; (ii) problems detected in selected sectors; (iii) policies aimed at fostering public ethics, probity and transparency; (iv) remarks of the main civil society anti-corruption organizations; and (v) Ombudsman's conclusions and recommendations. - 3 dissemination campaigns of reports, alerts and Ombudsman's recommendations are launched in coordination with its regional offices. - 2 campaigns to promote ethics, transparency and efficiency in public administration are launched in coordination with its regional offices and key civil society organizations at the local level.	- An increase of, at least, 20 percentage points in the proportion of citizens and civil society organizations that are aware of anti-corruption initiatives put forward by public sectors and their results. *Subject to revision. Baseline values will be provided by the second output of Activity 9.* - An increase of 15 percentage points in the proportion of citizens that recognize the Ombudsman Office as an independent institution devoted to monitor anti-corruption policies. *Subject to revision. Baseline values will be provided by the second output of Activity 9.*	**For activities related to the Ombudsman Office (Activity 9):** * *Government actions:* - Percentage of respondents who agree the government encourages corruption improves from **19%** (2006) to **10%** - Global Corruption Barometer. - Percentage of respondents who agree the government is effective in fighting corruption improves from **11%** (2006) to **30%** (slightly above 2006 LAC average) - Global Corruption Barometer. - Percentage of respondents who agree the government is not effective in fighting corruption improves from **59%** (2006) to **40%** - Global Corruption Barometer.

Civil Society Organizations - Activity 10

Activities/Inputs	**Outputs (two years)**	**Outcomes (two years)**	**Targeted Subcomponents (two years)**
Activity 10. (*Fostering awareness*) Strengthen civil society organizations' capacity to assess and monitor transparency and accountability in public administration.	- The USAID implementing partner identifies CSOs oversight capacity in terms of their degree of understanding of citizens' rights regarding access to public information, and their ability to use this information to assess and monitor transparency and accountability in public administration. - Based on these results, selected CSOs (one in every region) receive training and technical assistance in matters regarding access to public information and its use to asses and monitor transparency and accountability in public administration. - Selected CSOs (one in every region) identify the proportion of citizens that consider that their authorities (at the different levels of government) are transparent and accountable for their actions. - Two public audiences with regional and local authorities are launched in every region by selected CSOs. - A dissemination campaign for each public audience is launched to foster citizen participation and disseminate its results.	- Representatives of all 26 CSOs selected for the provision of training and technical assistance exhibit proper understanding of citizens' rights regarding access to public information and the way to use this information to assess and monitor transparency and accountability in public administration. - An increase of, at least, 40 percentage points in the proportion of citizens that consider that their authorities are transparent and accountable for their actions.	**For activities related to CSOs (Activity 10):** - Anticorruption and transparency indicator (scale 0-7; 0 = worst score) improves from **3.21** (2005) to **4.0** (slightly above the score of the best performer –Colombia- in the 2005 survey) – Freedom House.

Appendix 2: Component 2 - Schedule of activities and related tasks

Activities / related tasks	Year 1 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	Year 2 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
The Judiciary – Activities 1 and 2.																								
Base line studies.	X	X	X																					
Revision and streamlining of processes involved in the reception, investigation and sanctioning of corruption reports.	X	X	X	X	X	X																		
Design of inter-institutional cooperation protocols; signature of agreements.	X	X	X																					
Design and implementation of the information system to centralize financial information.				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X												
Design and implementation of the information system to monitor and follow-up control activities.				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X												
Training workshops.				X	X	X										X	X	X						
Provision of equipment.							X	X	X	X	X	X												
Dissemination campaigns.								X	X	X	X									X	X	X	X	
Radio campaign.	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Activities' performance assessment; dissemination of results.											X	X											X	X

Months / Activities / related tasks	Year 1												Year 2											
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Ministry of Internal Affairs - Activities 3, 4 and 5.																								
Base line studies, communication plan.	�	▪	▪	▪																				
Revision and streamlining of processes involved in: (i) the reception, investigation and sanctioning of corruption reports; (ii) personnel selection, protection, promotion and incentives; and (iii) traffic interventions and those related to alcohol infractions.	▪	▪	▪	▪	▪	▪																		
Design and implementation of a system to centralize and monitor corruption reports, investigations and sanctions.				▪	▪	▪	▪																	
Provision of equipment, personnel training.				▪	▪	▪																		
Information/education campaigns regarding: (i) report mechanisms; and (ii) norms and procedures that govern the interaction citizen-Police.							▪	▪	▪	▪	▪	▪	▪	▪	▪	▪	▪	▪	▪	▪	▪	▪	▪	▪
Ethics training workshops.	▪	▪	▪	▪	▪	▪	▪	▪	▪	▪	▪	▪	▪	▪	▪	▪	▪	▪	▪	▪	▪	▪	▪	▪
Activities' performance assessment; dissemination of results.													▪	▪									▪	▪

Months / Activities / related tasks	Year 1												Year 2											
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Office of the Comptroller General – Activities 6, 7 and 8.																								
Base line studies.	X	X	X	X																				
Revision and streamlining of process involved in receiving and investigating corruption reports; design and implementation of the ad-hoc system; provision of equipment.	X	X	X	X	X																			
Design and implementation of the system to monitor maintenance and updating of information contained in public web portals.	X	X	X	X	X																			
Assessment of ICOs operational capacity; provision of training and equipment.	X	X	X	X	X	X																		
Information campaigns regarding preventive control activities and their results.					X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Revision and auditing of internal control mechanisms within the Judiciary, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Health, and all regional governments.							X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Mapping and dissemination of processes involved in the provision of services most demanded by citizens and private firms.						X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Training workshops for public servants (information systems).						X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Agreements with local civil society organizations; public audiences.	X	X	X																					
Activities' performance assessment; dissemination of results.													X										X	X

Months	Year 1												Year 2											
Activities / related tasks	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Ombudsman Office - Activity 9.																								
Provision of equipment.	▓	▓	▓																					
Base line studies.				▓	▓																			
Design and implementation of the monitoring system.						▓	▓	▓	▓	▓														
Periodic reports.											▓		▓		▓		▓		▓		▓		▓	
Dissemination campaigns.														▓	▓			▓	▓			▓	▓	▓
Campaigns to promote ethics, transparency and efficiency in public administration.								▓	▓	▓						▓	▓	▓						

Months	Year 1												Year 2											
Activities / related tasks	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**	**11**	**12**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**	**11**	**12**
Civil Society Organizations – Activity 10																								
Base line study to assess CSOs oversight capacity.	▓	▓																						
CSOs selection, provision of training and technical assistance.			▓	▓	▓	▓									▓	▓	▓	▓						
Baseline studies to identify the proportion of citizens that consider that their authorities are transparent and accountable for their actions.						▓	▓	▓																
Public audiences and dissemination campaigns.											▓	▓										▓	▓	
Activities' performance assessment; dissemination of results.												▓	▓										▓	▓