United States Department of Labor
Office of Administrative Law Judges Law Library

NOTICE: THIS INDEX WAS PREPARED BY THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, FOR INTERNAL USE. IT IS NOT AN OFFICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE CASES, AND WAS LAST REVISED IN NOVEMBER, 1996.

Return to Table of Topics, 503 Index

Congress invested the DOL with the authority to initiate enforcement action under the Act and to determine the merits of the charges so presented. OFCCP v. E.E. Black, Ltd., 77-OFCCP-7R, Assistant Secretary for Employment Standards Dec. and Order, February 26, 1979, slip op. at 5, aff'd, E.E. Black v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Hi. 1980), E. E. Black v. Donovan, 26 FEP Cases 1183 (D. Hi. 1981).

An agency must honor its own regulation unless and until it has rescinded or amended it after rulemaking proceedings. OFCCP v. Western Electric Co., 80-OFCCP-29, Deputy Under Secretary for Employment Standards Remand Dec. and Order, April 24, 1985, slip op. at 14, rev'd, ALJ Rec. Dec., March 4, 1981.

The Secretary of Labor can void regulations only by proper rulemaking pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act. OFCCP v. Ozark Air Lines, Inc., 80-OFCCP-24, Deputy Under Secretary for Employment Standards Final Dec. and Order, June 13, 1986, slip op. at 5.

Administrative agencies must follow their own regulations. OFCCP v. Commonwealth Aluminum, 82-OFC-6, ALJ Rec. Dec. and Order, June 26, 1986, slip op. at 8, 10, rev'd on other grounds, Assistant Secretary for Employment Standards Final Decision and Order, February 10, 1994, remanded sub. nom., Commonwealth Aluminum Corp., v. United States Department of Labor, No. 94-0071-0(c)(W.D. Ky. September 6, 1996).

Courts must give deference to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations. Id. at 8, rev'd on other grounds, Assistant Secretary for Employment Standards Final Decision and Order, February 10, 1994, remanded sub. nom., Commonwealth Aluminum Corp., v. United States Department of Labor, No. 94-0071-0(c)(W.D. Ky. September 6, 1996).

While the OFCCP Federal Contract Compliance Manual provides that interest on back pay is to be compounded quarterly, a procedural manual which was not promulgated as a regulation or even published in the Federal Register cannot take precedence over a regulation, such as 29 CFR Part 20, which has the force and effect of law. OFCCP v. WMATA, 84-OFC-8, Assistant Secretary for Employment Standards Order Denying Motion to Amend August 23 Order, November 17, 1989, slip op. at 7, vacated on other grounds, WMATA v. DeArment, 55 EPD ¶40,507 (D.D.C. 1991).

Staff manuals and interpretative rules issued for the purpose of giving guidance to agency staff or to affected parties as to how an agency intends to administer a statute or regulation "[are] not controlling on the courts," Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944), because they are not promulgated under a delegation of rulemaking power by Congress. Id. at 7-8.

An agency has an obligation, when it is made aware of a potential conflict between a staff manual and a regulation, to follow the regulation if it concludes that it is controlling. Here, the Federal Contract Compliance Manual does not demonstrate that the potential conflict with 29 CFR Part 20 was considered at all, and no reasoning is given in the Manual as to why those formally promulgated regulations are not applicable to recovery of back pay in the Department of Labor litigation. Id. at 8.

OFCCP's proposed search -- an onsite complaint investigation -- is authorized by 41 C.F.R. 60-741.53, which requires contractors to permit OFCCP access to their premises and books and records for purposes of complaint investigations. OFCCP v. City Public Service of San Antonio, 89-OFC-5, ALJ Rec. Dec. and Order, April 4, 1990, slip op. at 5, reversed and remanded, Assistant Secretary for Employment Standards Decision and Remand Order, January 18, 1995; Consent Order dismissing case, February 5, 1996.

The Labor Department's regulation at 41 CFR 60-741.3(a)(5), which allows contractors to apply for a waiver of Section 503 coverage for certain facilities not connected with Government contract work is inconsistent with the Section 503 statute itself, which requires that, "in employing persons to carry out" Government contracts, the contractor shall take affirmative action to employ and advance in employment qualified individuals with handicaps. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority v. DeArment, 55 EPD ¶ 40,507, 65,559-60 (D.D.C. 1991).

The statute states that Section 503 covers persons employed to carry Government contacts; the Department of Labor's interpretation of that language sweeps all employees of the contractor in and, thus, is too broad. Id. at 65,560.

The Department of Labor's waiver regulation (41 CFR 60-741.3(a)(f)) assumes that all of a contractor's employees are covered by the statute unless the contractor shows that some employees are totally unconnected to the contract and have nothing to do with performance of the contract even for a minute a year. Ibid.

Congress could not have intended the broad interpretation of the carry out the contract language adopted by the Labor Department in it waiver regulation (41 CFR 60-741.3(a)(f)). Ibid.

Contractor's motion to dismiss complaint to the extent that it is based on an amended Notification of Results of Investigation is denied because OFCCP has inherent authority to reassess the results of an investigation based on advice of counsel. OFCCP v. Kapiolani Community College, University of Hawaii, 90-OFC-5, ALJ Order, February 6, 1991, slip op. at 1; Consent Decree, March 28, 1991.

Although ALJ has no authority to invalidate an OFCCP regulation, ALJ is obliged to determine whether a definition in the statute (the Vietnam Era Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act) or in the regulations control in a situation where there is a patent disparity between the two. Id. at 2.

Where there is a patent disparity between the definition of "Vietnam Era Veteran" in the statute and the regulations, the clear and unambiguous language of the statute controls because the statute is remedial in nature and, as such, should be construed liberally and because no authority has been furnished to support the proposition that Congress intended the scope of the statute to be narrowed by regulation. Ibid.

There is no regulatory authority for allowing OFCCP to reinvestigate a single Section 503 complaint after the OFCCP Director has issued a Notification of Results of Investigation. OFCCP v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 88-OFC-7, ALJ Rec. Dec. and Order, August 1, 1991, slip op. at 10, stipulated dismissal, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Employment Standards Notice of Case Closing, January 14, 1992.

A complainant's request for reconsideration of a determination set forth in a Notification of Results of Investigation must be accompanied by affidavits, signed testimony of supervisory or fellow workers or other written documents that would substantially alter the determination. Ibid.

OFCCP has authority to conduct second on-site investigation in order to complete a compliance review after an exit conference. Ibid.

Where a Section 503 complainant's request for reconsideration of a determination of no violation set forth in a Notification of Results of Investigation is not accompanied by evidence tending to show that the determination was erroneous, OFCCP Director has no authority to order reinvestigation of the complaint. Ibid.

The Secretary has authority to order debarment and cancellation of contracts under the Executive Order, Section 503 and VEVRA. OFCCP v. Disposable Safety Wear, Inc. (Executive Order, Section 503 and VEVRA), 92-OFC-11, Secretary of Labor Dec. and Final Administrative Order, September 29, 1992, slip op. at 4.

The Department of Labor derives investigatory and adjudicatory power directly from Section 503(b) of the Rehabilitation Act and derives authority to implement regulations from Section 503(b) of the Act. OFCCP v. Holly Farms Foods, Inc., 91-OFC-15, ALJ Decision and Order Denying Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, December 23, 1992, slip op. at 2; Consent Decree, June 2, 1993.

The regulations grant authority to the Director of OFCCP to assure compliance with Section 503. Id. at 2-3; Consent Decree, June 2, 1993.

As the agency charged with enforcing a public policy, OFCCP has broad powers to prosecute violations of the affirmative action clause on its own, even though no one complains of the violations. Thus, even though no class member filed a Section 503 complaint, ALJ denies contractor's motion for dismissal on the ground that OFCCP's administrative complaint sought more than individualized relief for the alleged discriminatees. Id. at 3; Consent Decree, June 2, 1993.

An administrative action cannot be maintained nor sanctions be imposed, if the Department of Labor exceeds its authority in pursuit of an action to benefit individual workers. Hence the question of jurisdiction must be resolved. Commonwealth Aluminum Corp. v. U.S. Department of Labor, et al., No. 94-0071-0 (C), (W.D.Ky. September 6, 1996) at 2-3.

Provisions of the [OFCCP Compliance] Manual, which state that the [Equal Opportunity Specialist] should keep the complainant informed of the progress of conciliation sessions, are more properly viewed as providing guidance to the EOS concerning how to facilitate the conciliation process, and the failure of the EOS to communicate offers of settlement to the complainant is not a failure to conciliate. Those provisions of the Manual confer no rights upon parties to an action under [Section 503 of the Rehabilitation] Act. OFCCP v. Commonwealth Aluminum Corp., 82-OFC-6, Assistant Secretary for Employment Standards Final Decision and Order, February 10, 1994, at 5-6; remanded sub. nom., Commonwealth Aluminum Corp., v. United States Department of Labor, No. 94-0071-0(c)(W.D. Ky. September 6, 1996).

There is no basis for concluding that the Compliance Manual confers rights upon a Section 503 defendant which could be raised as a defense to a Section 503 complaint. Id. at 6; remanded sub. nom., Commonwealth Aluminum Corp., v. United States Department of Labor, No. 94-0071-0(c)(W.D. Ky. September 6, 1996).

Although there are differences among Sections 501, 503, and 504, there are common elements in each section which are intended to be interpreted uniformly. Id. at 10, n.5; remanded sub. nom., Commonwealth Aluminum Corp., v. United States Department of Labor, No. 94-0071-0(c)(W.D. Ky. September 6, 1996).

The Assistant Secretary agreed with OFCCP that a Congressional committee report, cited by the ALJ, on a proposed amendment in 1979 to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that did not pass, carries little weight in discerning the intent of Congress five years earlier when it amended the Rehabilitation Act to include the current definition of handicapped individual. The legislative history of the recently enacted American with Disabilities Act [is] more relevant here because Congress explicitly stated that "[t]he definition of the term disability' . . . is comparable to the definition of the term individual with handicaps' in section 7(8)(B) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973." Id. at 13; remanded sub. nom., Commonwealth Aluminum Corp., v. United States Department of Labor, No. 94-0071-0(c)(W.D. Ky. September 6, 1996).

It is apparent that the absence of any mention of back pay in Section 503 does not preclude its availability as a remedy for violations. The Assistant Secretary has so held, finding that back pay is within the directive of Section 503(b) to "take such action thereon as the facts and circumstances warrant . . . " Id. at 24; remanded sub. nom., Commonwealth Aluminum Corp., v. United States Department of Labor, No. 94-0071-0(c)(W.D. Ky. September 6, 1996).

There is no provision in Department of Labor regulations governing administrative proceedings under Section 503, [for] an appeal of an ALJ order imposing or denying sanctions for alleged misconduct of an attorney. The only provision for review of ALJ orders in Section 503 cases permits any party to file exceptions to an ALJ recommended decision after the hearing. OFCCP v. Mississippi Power Co., 92-OFC-8, Assistant Secretary for Employment Standards Order, July 19, 1995, at 2.

Neither an ALJ nor the Secretary has the authority, absent an explicit grant by statute, to impose the personal sanctions provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, e.g., requiring payment of attorneys' fees and costs or holding an individual in contempt for failure to comply with a subpoena. Ibid.

The ALJ had no authority to issue the sanctions order, rather, his authority to regulate discovery and the conduct of parties and their representative is limited to that provided in the regulations. Id. at 3.

The Assistant Secretary does have the authority to review an ALJ's order imposing sanctions for failure to comply with the regulations where it is material to the issues decided in a recommended decision. Id. at 3, n.1.

The Assistant Secretary may review the propriety of the sanction or take other action provided for in the regulations. The Assistant Secretary may debar a contractor for refusal to comply with the discovery regulations. Ibid.

As to the permissible scope of an investigation based on a complaint under Section 503, the Asst. Secretary held that OFCCP had the authority, consonant with the Fourth Amendment, to conduct an investigation somewhat broader than the facts and circumstances of denial of employment to the complainant, but more limited in scope than sought by OFCCP. OFCCP v. City Public Service of San Antonio, 89-OFC-5, Assistant Secretary for Employment Standards Decision and Remand Order, January 18, 1995,

at 1-2.

The Assistant Secretary held that OFCCP has the authority to conduct broad based compliance reviews and seek relief for alleged victims of discrimination on the basis of disability. OFCCP v. American Airlines, Inc., 94-OFC-9, Assistant Secretary For Employment Standards Decision and Remand Order, April 26, 1996, at 1.

The starting point for interpretation of any legislation is the words of the statute itself. But the term "affirmative action" is not defined in the Rehabilitation Act. If it has any "plain meaning" at all that does not reduce it to an absurdity, it must clearly prohibit discrimination. Id. at 6.

The Assistant Secretary held that cases holding that a private right of action cannot be implied from Section 503 do not lead to the conclusion that Section 503 does not prohibit discrimination against the disabled. To the contrary, many of these cases rely in part on the existence of administrative remedies as a basis for concluding that a private right of action in court may not be inferred. Id. at 13.

The Assistant Secretary held that Section 503 delegates to the Secretary the authority to implement its regulations. Even if the meaning of the term "affirmative action" is unclear, there can be no question that the Secretary's interpretation of it in the Section 503 regulations as prohibiting discrimination and requiring all covered contracts to include a clause [Affirmative Action Clause] so committing the contractor is reasonable. Id. at 15.

The Assistant Secretary held, that as part of Congress' grant of broad legislative rule making authority to the Secretary to implement the provisions of Section 503 by promulgating regulations, the Secretary has the authority under the Act itself to establish a program of regular compliance reviews. Id. at 22.

The Assistant Secretary held that the Department of Labor had the authority to conduct compliance reviews and complaint investigations in light of Section 503 regulations which provide, that OFCCP has responsibility for undertaking such investigations of complaints and other matters as well as evaluations of contractor and agency performance as may be necessary; that require contractors to maintain records regarding complaints and actions taken under the regulations, and such other records as may be required by OFCCP or these regulations; that require contractors to permit OFCCP access to its premises and records for purposes of complaint investigations and investigations of performance under the affirmative action clause; and which prohibit retaliation and discrimination against any person for assisting or participating in a compliance review. Id. at 23-24.

One of the general purposes of the Act is to insure that any qualified handicapped individual shall be given full and fair consideration for employment by any contractor who seeks to contract with the Federal government. Therefore, OFCCP's interpretation of Section 503's affirmative action obligation as including a nondiscrimination component is reasonably within the contemplation of the statutory grant of authority. OFCCP v. American Airlines, Inc., 94-OFC-9, ALJ Dec. and Order on Defendant's Motions for Summary Judgment, September 19, 1995, at 4; reversed and remanded on other grounds, Assistant Secretary of Labor, Decision and Remand Order, April 19, 1996.

OFCCP does not have statutory authority to conduct compliance reviews under section 503. Several attempts to provide such authority by explicit regulatory amendments have not been successful, and OFCCP has nonetheless brought the instant action based on such an unauthorized compliance review without any complaint having been filed. Further, as distinguished from the issue of OFCCP's authority to proceed in behalf of discriminatees where at least one timely complaint was filed, the Assistant Secretary has expressly reserved judgment whether OFCCP may seek relief on behalf of alleged discriminatees following such compliance review in the absence of any individual complaints. OFCCP v. American Airlines, Inc., 94-OFC-9, ALJ Dec. and Order on Defendant's Motions for Summary Judgment, September 19, 1995, at 9-10; reversed and remanded, Assistant Secretary of Labor, Decision and Remand Order, April 19, 1996.

OFCCP is not bound by an adverse administrative decision of the Ohio Civil Rights Commission and may litigate a Section 503 Rehabilitation Act enforcement action involving the same alleged discriminatee and employer who were subjects of the Ohio administrative action, provided that jurisdiction is first established. OFCCP v. Norfolk Southern Corporation, 89-OFC-31, Assistant Secretary for Employment Standards Decision and Order of Remand, October 3, 1995,at 1-2.

The Assistant Secretary held that OFCCP was not collaterally estopped by the administrative decision of a state agency that did not rule on the separate nondiscrimination/affirmative action policy and standards allegations in OFCCP's enforcement action. Id. at 5-6.

The Assistant Secretary held that in accordance with judicial guidelines, the language, legislative scheme and history of Section 503 overcome any "lenient presumption" in favor of estoppel. . . . Further, the legislative history of the 1974 Rehabilitation Act Amendments reflects an "inten[tion] that sections 503 [applicable to Federal contractors] and 504 [applicable to Federal grantees] be administered in such a manner that a consistent, uniform and effective Federal approach to discrimination against handicapped persons would result." Id. at 9-10.

In evaluating the legislative history of Section 503, both the 1973 and 1974 legislative history are relevant. Id. at 10.

According estoppel effects to handicap discrimination decisions of state agencies acting under state laws would vitiate and be inconsistent with the Congressional policy for "a consistent, uniform and effective Federal approach to discrimination against handicapped persons" since estoppel would result in the forced Federal acceptance and recognition under Section 503 of separate and diverse standards of compliance, remedial relief, and crucial litigation matters, such as the establishment of a prima facie case and burden of proof. Id. at 10.

According estoppel effects to state agency decisions would threaten the uniformity of the §503 system, and unnecessarily establish a further limitation on Section 503 beyond its statutory scope, . . . "to promote and expand employment opportunities for the handicap." Id. at 10-11, n.6.

The Assistant Secretary has consistently held that the authority to award back pay is implicit under Section 503. OFCCP v. Cissell Manufacturing Co., 87-OFC-26, Acting Assistant Secretary for Employment Standards Final Decision and Order, February 14, 1994, at 14; final decision vacated sub. nom., Cissell Manufacturing Company v. U. S. Department of Labor, No. 94-0184 (W.D. Ky., May 24, 1994); appeal pending.

The authority to order back pay is implied by the broad grant of authority to the Department to "take such action [on a complaint] as the facts and circumstances warrant" (e.g., reinstatement, and back dated seniority and benefits). Id. at 15; final decision vacated sub. nom., Cissell Manufacturing Company v. U. S. Department of Labor, No. 94-0184 (W.D. Ky., May 24, 1994); appeal pending.

The argument made by Cissell based on the adoption by Section 504a, 29 U.S.C. § 794a, of the remedies available under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act for the actions under Section 504, actually tends to show that back pay is available under Section 503. Title VI also does not mention specific remedies for its violation, other than termination of funding, but the courts have held that back pay is an available remedy under Title VI. Id. at 15; final decision vacated sub. nom., Cissell Manufacturing Company v. U. S. Department of Labor, No. 94-0184 (W.D. Ky., May 24, 1994); appeal pending.

Section 503(a) lacks language which, by its own terms and standing alone, directly required nondiscrimination and affirmative action by Government contractors towards "qualified handicapped individuals" on the date of enactment. Instead, it mandated the development of such requirements through "a [contract] provision requiring . . . affirmative action to employ and advance in employment qualified individuals." The precise requirement, i.e., the affirmative action contract clause, was to be "implement[ed] . . . by promulgating regulations within ninety days" after enactment. Until such time as the regulatory affirmative action contract clause was issued through promulgation of 20 CFR Part 741 and thereby made applicable to contracts executed after October 11, 1974, see 20 CFR § 741.54, the statutory language indicates that contractors, such as Burlington, were not subject to Section 503 requirements, since such requirements devolved from the statutory mandate of a contract clause to be prescribed in the implementing regulations, rather than from the statute itself. OFCCP v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 80-OFCCP-6, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Employment Standards, Final Decision and Order of Dismissal, December 11, 1991, at 11-12.

[Section 503, without its implementing regulations], did not provide contractors with the "requisite clarity" to put them on sufficient notice that a nondiscrimination prohibition would be applicable to contracts let after the date of enactment by operation of the statute itself, rather than through the subsequent insertion of a standard and formal affirmative action clause by contracting agencies as a later date. Id. at 16.

[Section 503's implementing regulations] do not provide for retroactivity. Rather, they indicate only a prospective application. Id. at 17.

The Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary concurred with the ALJ that Section 503(b) gave the Department of Labor the power to enforce compliance with the affirmative action provision of a contract with the United States without conferring any broader powers. Id. at 18.

A decision by an arbitrator in favor of the company on the union's grievance concerning the company's removal of the complainant from active duty and retention on sickness benefits does not divest OFCCP of jurisdiction in this case, nor do principles of collateral estoppel or res judicata apply. OFCCP v. American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T), 92-OFC-5, ALJ Order Denying Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Granting in part Defendant's Motion in Limine, April 23, 1995, at 6-8; Consent Decree, March 15, 1996.

Even had the arbitrator's decision not been made pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, OFCCP may still bring an action in its role as a Government agency. The principles of res judicata or collateral estoppel do not apply to such an action based on an arbitrator's decision. Id. at 7.

Department of Labor regulations explicitly provide that "Government contract means any agreement . . . between any contracting agency and any person for the furnishing of supplies or services" and that "[t]he term services' . . . includes . . . fund depository." 41 CFR § 60-1.3. Defendant's fund depository agreement was sufficient to establish coverage. Government agencies are bound by their own regulations. OFCCP v. First Federal Savings Bank of Indiana, 91-OFC-23, Secretary of Labor, Amended Final Decision and Order, November 20, 1995, at 2-3.

In rejecting the Defendant's argument that it is not covered because its fund depository agreements did not include the equal opportunity clause, the Secretary of Labor held that the regulations establish that "[b]y operation of the [Executive] order, the equal opportunity clause shall be considered to be a part of every contract . . . required by the order and regulations . . . to include such a clause whether or not it is physically incorporated in such contracts. . . ." 41 CFR § 60-1.4(e). Id. at 3.

Where parties seek to resolve a dispute by agreement, if one party finds the form or substance of a proposed agreement inadequate, that party is free to reject the agreement and litigate the matter. In this case, OFCCP refused to accept a letter of commitment as the form of the settlement. It took the position, as it had a right to do, that it would only enter into a conciliation agreement. Nothing in the regulations gave Defendant the right to insist that the settlement take the form of a letter of commitment. Id. at 4.

The Secretary of Labor agreed with OFCCP that the building owner is a subcontractor because it supplies services necessary to the performance of Defendant's government contracts. 41 CFR § 60-1.4; OFCCP v. Coldwell, Banker and Co., Case No. 78-OFCCP-12, Sec. Dec., August 14, 1987, slip op. At 7-8. Defendant had an obligation to assure that its subcontractors complied with the requirements of Section 503, 41 CFR § 60-741.4(f), and by failing to make efforts to obtain handicapped parking spaces Defendant violated that obligation. Id. at 5.

A Conciliation Agreement is but one tool available to OFCCP in attempting to secure compliance informally, without the use of formal enforcement proceedings. See, e.g., 41 CFR § 60-1.24(c)(2). The refusal of a contractor to enter a Conciliation Agreement per se is not a violation of the Order or regulations. OFCCP v. First Federal Savings Bank of Indiana, 91-OFC-23, ALJ Order Denying Defendant's Post-Hearing Motion, June 29, 1994, at 5.

As to the use of a Conciliation Agreement, the regulations give OFCCP broad discretion in determining whether to settle the matter informally or proceed to formal enforcement. See 41 CFR § 60-1.33. Id. at 5.

The ALJ held that "[g]iven the discretion expressly delegated to OFCCP by the regulations in determining whether or not to pursue formal enforcement, I cannot say that OFCCP abused its discretion in any way by insisting on a Conciliation Agreement as a closing document." Id. at 6.

Administrative agencies are given wide latitude in determining whether or not to institute enforcement proceedings. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985). Ibid.

On April 17, 1996, the Secretary of Labor delegated authority to issue final agency decisions under, inter alia, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the implementing regulations, to the Administrative Review Board ("ARB"). Secretary's Order 2-96 (April 17, 1996), 61 Fed. Reg. 19978 (May 3, 1996). Secretary's Order 2-96 contains a comprehensive list of the statutes, executive order, and regulations under which the ARB now issues final agency decisions. OFCCP v. Exxon Corporation d/b/a/ Exxon Company, 92-OFC-4, Final Decision and Order, Administrative Review Board, October 28, 1996, at 1 n.1.