I
am here today to express to you how crucial
renewal of the USA Patriot Act provisions related
to information and intelligence sharing is to
fulfilling the responsibilities of the FBI's
new Directorate of Intelligence as envisioned
by Congress.
There
are two components to this subject: first, the
issue of collecting intelligence and the legal
authorities and policies that govern that collection;
and second, how that information is actually
shared once it is collected. I will address
both in turn.
I
realize that the collection authorities granted
under the Patriot Act are of concern to many
individuals and organizations. In that regard
I want to say two things.
First,
the FBI is committed to carrying out its mission
in accordance with the protections provided
by the Constitution. FBI agents are trained
to understand and appreciate that the responsibility
to respect and protect the law is the basis
for their authority to enforce it. Respect for
Constitutional liberties is not optional, it
is mandatory for all FBI employees. The FBI
could not be effective--and would not exist--without
it.
Second,
the FBI's authority to collect information is
very clearly laid out in law and is directed
by the Attorney General--the chief law enforcement
officer for the United States. Intelligence
collection is only done in accordance with the
intelligence priorities set by the President,
and is guided at every step by procedures mandated
by the Attorney General. As soon as an international
terrorism intelligence or counterintelligence
case is opened, both Headquarters and the Department
of Justice are notified. We are subject to and
follow Attorney General's guidelines and procedures
for FBI National Security Investigations and
Foreign Intelligence Collection (NSIG); and
all terrorism-related cases are subject to in-progress
review by the Department of Justice (DOJ) Office
of Intelligence Policy and Review, the DOJ Criminal
Division, and local offices of U.S. Attorneys.
We report annually to the Department of Justice
on the progress of intelligence cases. The FBI's
collection authorities are also controlled by
the Federal Courts. Under the USA Patriot Act,
a federal judge must still approve search warrants
and wiretaps for counterintelligence and counterterrorism
investigations and Agents must establish probable
cause in order to obtain a FISA warrant. The
FBI only collects and disseminates intelligence
under guidelines designed specifically to protect
the privacy of United States persons, and we
are committed to using our authorities and resources
responsibly.
After
information is legally collected, the issue
of how we pool that information arises. Effective
intelligence requires skilled analysis and dissemination
to meet the requirements of customers inside
and outside the FBI. My job as the FBI's Executive
Assistant Director for Intelligence is to manage
the entire intelligence cycle to ensure that
the FBI has the collection, reporting, analysis
and dissemination capability it needs to protect
the country. Information sharing is vital to
that capability.
Effective
FBI intelligence capabilities depend, first
of all, on the integration of our intelligence
collection and criminal investigative operations.
During hearings on the 9/11 attacks, Congress
heard testimony about meetings between the CIA
and FBI where it was unclear what information
on a hijacker could be legally shared under
the widely-misunderstood set of rules and laws
that was known as "the Wall." This
wall extended into the FBI itself. Agents pursuing
cases involving the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act (FISA) could not readily share information
with agents or prosecutors working criminal
investigations. And the wall worked both ways--without
FISA-derived information agents or prosecutors
involved in a criminal case might not have any
way of knowing what information from the criminal
investigation might be useful to an agent working
on a parallel international terrorism or counterintelligence
investigation. Although there was some legal
capability to share information, the law was
complex and as a result, agents often erred
on the side of caution and refrained from sharing
the information. In addition, the wall functioned
to discourage criminal and intelligence investigators
from talking about their cases, such that investigators
on either side might have no idea what might
be useful to share with those on the other side
of wall.
The
Patriot Act tore down those legal walls between
FISA-related intelligence and criminal investigations.
Law enforcement and intelligence agents were
able to coordinate terrorism investigations
without fear of running afoul of the law as
then interpreted.
Patriot
Act Section 203(b) authorizes the sharing of
foreign intelligence information obtained in
a Title III electronic surveillance with other
federal officials, including intelligence officers,
DHS/DOD/ICE officials, and national security
officials. If Section 203(b) were allowed to
expire, FBI Agents would be allowed to share
certain foreign intelligence information collected
through criminal investigative wiretaps with
foreign intelligence services, such as MI-5,
but would arguably not be allowed to share that
same information with the CIA. This result would
be inconsistent with the spirit of the recently
enacted Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act of 2004, which included many provisions
designed to enhance information sharing within
the federal government.
An
example of information sharing now permitted
by section 203 of the USA PATRIOT Act takes
place in the National Counterterrorism Center
(NCTC) (formerly the Terrorist Threat Integration
Center). The NCTC receives foreign intelligence
information lawfully collected by its member
entities, which includes international terrorism
information collected by the law enforcement
community. Information provided to NCTC pursuant
to section 203 of the PATRIOT act is used in
three crucial NCTC missions: the production
of all-source terrorism analysis, updating the
database used by other federal entities to prevent
known or suspected terrorists from entering
U.S. borders, and to ensure that agencies, as
appropriate, have access to and receive all-source
intelligence needed to execute their counterterrorism
plans or perform independent, alternative analysis.
The FBI, one of the NCTC's key members, relies
upon section 203(d) of the USA PATRIOT Act to
provide information related to international
terrorism to NCTC analysts including intelligence,
protective, immigration, national defense, national
security, and other information related to international
terrorism (a subset of foreign intelligence
and counterintelligence information) obtained
as part of FBI criminal investigations. In particular,
section 203(d) authorizes law enforcement officers
to disclose foreign intelligence or counterintelligence
information to various federal officials, notwithstanding
any other legal restriction. Without section
203(d), access to such FBI information by non-FBI
personnel at NCTC could put us back to the pre
9-11 days of uncertainty about information sharing
authorities. A decision by this Congress to
allow section 203(d) to sunset would send the
message that full information sharing is discouraged
and law enforcement and intelligence officials
will once again be left with a complex legal
regime and err on the side of caution and refrain
from sharing terrorism information.
Furthermore,
section 203 of the PATRIOT Act facilitates the
NCTC's ability to provide strategic analysis
to policy makers and actionable leads to officers
within the FBI and the Intelligence Community
(including components of the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS)), transcending traditional government
boundaries.
The
NCTC estimates that the number of known or appropriately
suspected terrorists intercepted at borders
of the United States, based on FBI reporting
alone, has increased due to the information
sharing provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act. The
NCTC maintains TIPOFF, an up-to-date database
of known and appropriately suspected terrorists.
The NCTC relies upon various agencies, which
provide terrorist identity information on an
on-going basis. Much of the terrorist identities
information the NCTC receives from the FBI is
collected in the course of criminal investigations
and is shared pursuant to section 203.
Tearing
down the wall between criminal and intelligence
investigations actually enabled the FBI to conduct
intelligence analysis and to integrate intelligence
analysis into the Bureau. Our Intelligence Program
now crosses all investigative programs--Criminal,
Cyber, Counterterrorism, and Counterintelligence.
And the Directorate of Intelligence is able
to leverage the core strengths of the law enforcement
culture--with its attention to the pedigree
of sources and fact-based analysis--while ensuring
no walls exist between collectors, analysts,
and those who must act upon intelligence information
to keep our nation safe. As FBI Director Mueller
said in a speech to the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) in 2003: "Critical to preventing
future terrorist attacks is improving our intelligence
capabilities so that we can increase the most
important aspect of terrorist intelligence information--its
predictive value
.The global aspect of
terrorism creates an even greater need for the
FBI to integrate its intelligence program and
criminal operations to prevent attacks."
Facing
today's threats, it makes no sense not to share
information that has been legally collected
with those who have a need for it and can maintain
proper security and privacy safeguards.
Experience
has taught the FBI that there are no neat dividing
lines that distinguish criminal, terrorist,
and foreign intelligence activity. Criminal,
terrorist, and foreign intelligence organizations
and activities are often interrelated or interdependent.
FBI files are full of examples of investigations
where information sharing between counterterrorism,
counterintelligence and criminal intelligence
efforts and investigations was essential to
the FBI's ability to protect the United States
from terrorists, foreign intelligence activity,
and criminal activity. Some cases that start
out as criminal cases become counterterrorism
cases. Some cases that start out as counterintelligence
cases become criminal cases. Sometimes the FBI
will initiate parallel criminal and counterterrorism
or counterintelligence cases to maximize the
FBI's ability to adequately identify, investigate,
and address a variety of threats to the United
States while protecting vulnerable sources and
methods. The success of these cases in providing
accurate intelligence threat assessments as
well as arrests and convictions is entirely
dependent on the free flow of information between
the respective investigations, investigators
and analysts.
Ongoing
criminal investigations of transnational criminal
enterprises involved in counterfeit goods, drug/weapons
trafficking, money laundering and other criminal
activity depend on close coordination and information
sharing with the FBI's Counterterrorism and
Counterintelligence Programs, as well as with
other agencies in the intelligence community,
when intelligence is developed which connects
these criminal enterprises to terrorism, the
material support of terrorism or state sponsored
intelligence activity.
As
an example of benefits from sharing intelligence
from such a case, information from a criminal
Title III surveillance and criminal investigation
was passed to FBI Counterterrorism investigators
and intelligence community partners, because
the subject of the criminal case had previously
been targeted by other agencies. Information
sharing permitted the agencies to pool their
information and resources to uncover the interplay
of criminal and foreign intelligence activity.
As
an example of sharing from a terrorism intelligence
case, a terrorism investigation initiated in
Minneapolis was subsequently transferred to
San Diego and converted to a criminal case.
The investigation focused on a group of Pakistan-based
individuals who were involved in arms trafficking,
the production and distribution of multi-ton
quantities of hashish and heroin, and the discussion
of an exchange of a large quantity of drugs
for four stinger anti-aircraft missiles to be
used by Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. The operation
resulted in the arrest, indictment and subsequent
deportation of the subjects, Syed Mustajab Shah,
Muhammed Afridi, and Ilyas Ali, from Hong Kong
to San Diego to face drug charges and charges
of providing material support to Al Qaeda. In
this case the benefits of immediate disruption
by arrest outweighed the need for long-term
intelligence coverage of the conspirators.
Another
example came in the aftermath of the September
11th attacks. A reliable intelligence asset
identified a naturalized U.S. citizen as a leader
among a group of Islamic extremists residing
in the U.S. The subject's extremist views, his
affiliations with other terrorism subjects,
and his heavy involvement in the stock market
increased the potential that he was a possible
financier and material supporter of terrorist
activities. Early in the criminal investigation
it was confirmed that the subject had developed
a complex scheme to defraud multiple brokerage
firms of large amounts of money. The subject
was arrested and pled guilty to wire fraud.
The close interaction between the criminal and
intelligence cases was critical both to the
successful arrest of the subject before he left
the country and to the eventual outcome of the
case. Once again, intelligence led to an arrest
that was determined to be the most effective
means to disrupt a potential terrorist threat.
Criminal
enterprises are also frequently involved in,
allied with, or otherwise rely on smuggling
operations that do not respect jurisdictional
lines between types of investigations or intelligence.
Alien smugglers frequently use the same routes
used by drug and contraband smugglers and do
not limit their smuggling to aliens--they will
smuggle anything or anyone for the right price.
Terrorists can take advantage of these smuggling
routes and enterprises to enter the U.S. and
are willing to pay top dollar to smugglers.
Intelligence developed in these cases also frequently
identifies corrupt U.S. and foreign officials
who facilitate smuggling activities. Current
intelligence, based on information sharing between
criminal, counterterrorism, and counterintelligence
efforts, has identified smugglers who provide
false travel documents to special interest aliens,
deal with corrupt foreign officials, and financially
support extremist organizations, as well as
illegitimate and quasi-legitimate business operators
in the United States, who not only use the services
of illegal aliens, but are also actively involved
in smuggling as well. These transnational criminal
enterprises require global intelligence coverage,
domestic as well as foreign, that transcends
out-dated divisions between national security
and criminal law enforcement.
Obviously,
considering the cases I've just described, the
information sharing provisions are overwhelmingly
heralded by FBI Field Offices as the most important
provisions in the USA Patriot Act. The ability
to share critical information has significantly
altered the entire manner in which terrorism
and criminal investigations are conducted, allowing
for a much more coordinated and effective approach
than prior to the USA Patriot Act. Specifically,
the Field Offices note that these provisions
enable case agents to involve other agencies
in investigations, resulting in a style of teamwork
that enables more effective and responsive investigations,
improves the utilization of resources allowing
a better focus on the case, allows for follow-up
investigations by other agencies when the criminal
subject leaves the U.S., and helps prevent the
compromise of foreign intelligence investigations.
From
the perspective of the Directorate of Intelligence,
the USA Patriot Act information sharing provisions
are critical to the effectiveness of the Directorate's
Field Intelligence Groups (FIGs) and to the
integration of Directorate of Intelligence elements
that are embedded in each of our headquarters
investigative divisions. As authorized by the
Congress, the Directorate now has a Field Intelligence
Group in each field office that brings together
the intelligence from criminal, counterterrorism,
counterintelligence, and cyber investigations.
The FIGs also include our language analysts
who provide vital support to the full range
of FBI investigations and intelligence collection.
At headquarters, the Directorate manages intelligence
analysis, in coordination with other elements
of the intelligence community, to support both
national security and criminal law enforcement
requirements. Allowing the information sharing
provisions of the USA Patriot Act to sunset
would re-introduce barriers that would make
intelligence sharing more difficult.
The
Intelligence Reform Act directs the President
to "create an information sharing environment
for the sharing of terrorism information in
a manner consistent with national security and
with applicable legal standards." It also
directs the President to incorporate "protections
for individuals' privacy and civil liberties,"
and further, to incorporate "strong mechanisms
to enhance accountability and facilitate oversight,
including audits, authentication, and access
controls." The Intelligence Reform Act
directs the DNI to implement those provisions
and provides the DNI with a privacy and civil
liberties officer to ensure implementation.
The FBI has already implemented Executive Order
12333 in both our privacy systems and in the
dissemination of information from our intelligence
databases.
Specifically,
we use a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) process
to evaluate privacy in major record systems
prior to system implementation. The PIA process
requires that the system sponsor/developer conduct
a thorough, written analysis of the impact on
privacy that will result from the creation of
a proposed system prior to the system's implementation.
We assess both impacts attributable solely to
the proposed system and the cumulative impacts
arising from the proposed system's interface
with existing systems. The PIA provides senior
FBI management officials with a systemic assessment
of a major new system's impact on privacy before
the system becomes operational. The FBI PIA
process includes a review of major systems by
the FBI Privacy Council, a group composed of
representatives from several FBI divisions,
as well as an FBI Senior Privacy Official.
In
summary, the information sharing provisions
of the USA Patriot Act are vital to our national
security. Allowing these provisions to sunset
would be inconsistent with the spirit of the
recently enacted Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004, which included many
provisions designed to enhance information sharing
within the federal government. Provisions of
the USA Patriot Act are critical to implementing
the Congressional mandate for an "information
sharing environment." Section 203(b) of
the USA Patriot Act specifically authorizes
the sharing of foreign intelligence information
obtained in a Title III electronic surveillance
with other federal officials, including intelligence
officers and national security officials, such
as DHS and DOD officials. Section 203(d) specifically
authorizes the sharing of foreign intelligence
information collected in a criminal investigation
with intelligence officials. Allowing either
of these provisions to sunset could seriously
damage our information sharing and coordination
efforts with the CIA, other intelligence agencies,
and even internally between criminal and intelligence
investigations.
Mr.
Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee--thank
you for your time and for your continued support
of the FBI's information sharing efforts. I
am happy to answer any questions.