Testimony
of
Robert S. Mueller, III
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Before the
Senate Committee on Intelligence of the
United States Senate
February 16, 2005
Introduction
Good
afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Senator Rockefeller,
and members of the Committee. I appreciate
this opportunity to discuss our current
view of threats to the United States
and the FBI's efforts to address them.
Before
I begin, I would like to take a moment
to thank all of our partners in the
Law Enforcement and Intelligence Communities.
They have shared their information
and expertise, and in many cases worked
side-by-side with us, and together
we made great progress over the past
year to protect our nation and our
communities from terrorism and crime.
I
would also like to thank the men and
women of the FBI for continuing to
embrace our changing mission, for
working to enhance our intelligence
capabilities, for adapting to new
technologies and new ways of doing
things, and for doing all of this
without ever pausing in our forward
push to protect this country from
active threats.
Mr.
Chairman, over the past year, through
unprecedented cooperation, enhanced
intelligence capabilities, and continued
unwavering commitment to protect the
American people, we have achieved
considerable victories against national
security and criminal threats facing
the U.S. However, I must also report
that these threats continue to evolve
and to pose new challenges to the
FBI and our partners.
It
remains the FBI's overriding priority
to predict and prevent terrorist attacks.
The threat posed by international
terrorism, and in particular from
al Qa'ida and related groups, continues
to be the gravest we face.
Al-Qa'ida
and Related Terrorist Groups
In
2004, our efforts in the War on Terrorism
grew more intelligence-driven, more
coordinated, and produced many tangible
results.
In
2004 we learned that operatives had
conducted detailed surveillance of
financial targets in New York, Washington
DC, and New Jersey. In response to
this threat, in coordination with
DHS, the threat level was raised from
yellow to orange for the cities referenced
in the threat and we mobilized a large
contingent of analysts and agents
to review the massive amount of information
connected with the attack planning,
and to uncover any additional information
that would give us insight into the
plot .
Previously,
in the Spring of 2004, our allies
in the United Kingdom arrested a group
of terrorists who were plotting an
imminent attack inside the UK. In
response, we immediately formed a
task force of analysts and agents
to determine if there was a U.S. nexus
to the plot or if any of the UK subjects
had links to individuals in the U.S.
Later
in the year, we received information
suggesting that there was an attack
being planned -- possibly timed to
coincide with the 2004 Presidential
Election. To counter the threat, the
FBI created the 2004 Threat Task
Force in May 2004. With thousands
of FBI personnel, supported by individuals
from outside agencies, it was the
largest task force created since 9/11,
and it brought to bear every possible
resource in an effort to identify
the operatives and disrupt the attack
plan.
As
part of the Task Force's initiatives,
field offices conducted a thorough
canvass of all counterterrorism investigations
and FBI sources to develop any further
information that could help us find
these individuals. During the seven
months the task force was up and running,
we also checked every tangible lead
provided in the threat intelligence.
It was an extraordinary effort and
while we may never know if an operation
was indeed being planned, I am certain
that the FBI's tremendous response
to the threat played an integral role
in disrupting any operational plans
that may have been underway.
Mr.
Chairman, since we last spoke, the
FBI has identified various extremists
located throughout the U.S. and is
monitoring their activities. Although
these efforts have made us safer,
they are also a sobering reminder
of the threat we continue to face.
-
In
Virginia, Mohammed Ali al-Timimi,
the spiritual leader of the Virginia
Jihad training group disrupted last
year, was indicted for his involvement
in the recruitment of US citizens
for extremist training and jihad
preparation. Al-Timimi, the primary
lecturer at a northern Virginia
Islamic center, preached jihad to
a small core group of followers,
provided them paramilitary training
and facilitated their travel to
Pakistan in the days after September
11th to attend Lashkar-e-Taiba training
camp in preparation to fight the
United States in Afghanistan
-
In
Minneapolis, we arrested Mohamad
Kamal El-Zahabi, a Lebanese citizen
who admitted to serving in Afghanistan
and Chechnya as a sniper and to providing
sniper training at Khalden camp in Afghanistan
and in Lebanon in the 1990s. We first
learned of El-Zahabi during our investigation
of Boston-based Sunni extremists Ra'ed
Hijazi, convicted for his role in the
Millennium plot in Jordan, and Bassam
Kanj, who was killed in a plot to overthrow
the Lebanese government in 2000.
-
In
New York, Yassin Muhiddin
Aref was arrested on money laundering
charges connected to a possible
terrorist plot to kill a Pakistani
diplomat.
Unfortunately,
in spite of these accomplishments,
al-Qa'ida continues to adapt and move
forward with its desire to attack
the United States using any means
at its disposal. Their intent to attack
us at home remains -- and their resolve
to destroy America has never faltered.
Al-Qa'ida's
overall attack methodology has adapted
and evolved to address the changes
to their operating environment. While
we still assess that a mass casualty
attack using relatively low-tech methods
will be their most likely approach,
we are concerned that they are seeking
weapons of mass destruction including
chemical weapons, so-called "dirty
bombs" or some type of biological
agent such as anthrax.
Every
day, personnel in our Counterterrorism
Division and in 100 Joint Terrorism
Task Forces around the country, work
to determine where, when, and how
the next attack will occur. The fact
remains -- America is awash in desirable
targets -- those that are symbolic
like the U.S. Capitol and the White
House -- as well as the many infrastructure
targets, like nuclear power plants,
mass transit systems, bridges and
tunnels, shipping and port facilities,
financial centers, and airports --
that if successfully hit, would cause
both mass casualties and a crippling
effect on our economy.
We
continue to be concerned that U.S.
transportation systems remain a
key target. The attacks in Madrid
last March show the devastation that
a simple, low-tech operation can achieve
and the resulting impact to the government
and economy, which makes this type
of attack in the U.S. particularly
attractive to al-Qa'ida.
Another
area we consider vulnerable and target
rich is the energy sector, particularly
nuclear power plants. Al-Qa'ida
planner Khalid Sheikh Mohammed had
nuclear power plants as part of his
target set and we have no reason to
believe that al-Qa'ida has reconsidered.
Looking
ahead, there are three areas that
cause us the greatest concern.
First
is the threat from covert operatives
who may be inside the U.S. who have
the intention to facilitate or conduct
an attack. Finding them is a top
priority for the FBI, but it is also
one of the most difficult challenges.
The very nature of a covert operative
-- trained to not raise suspicion
and to appear benign -- is what makes
their detection so difficult.
Mr.
Chairman, while we are proud of our
accomplishments this year and the
additional insight we have gained
into al-Qa'ida's activity, I remain
very concerned about what we are
not seeing.
Whether
we are talking about a true sleeper
operative who has been in place for
years, waiting to be activated to
conduct an attack or a recently deployed
operative that has entered the U.S.
to facilitate or conduct an attack,
we are continuously adapting our methods
to reflect newly received intelligence
and to ensure we are as proactive
and as targeted as we can be in detecting
their presence.
Second,
because of al-Qa'ida's directed efforts
this year to infiltrate covert operatives
into the U.S., I am also very concerned
with the growing body of sensitive
reporting that continues to show al-Qa'ida's
clear intention to obtain and ultimately
use some form of chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear or high-energy
explosives (CBRNE) material in its
attacks against America.
Third,
we remain concerned about the potential
for al-Qa'ida to leverage extremist
groups with peripheral or historical
connections to al-Qa'ida, particularly
its ability to exploit radical American
converts and other indigenous extremists.
While we still believe the most serious
threat to the Homeland originates
from al-Qa'ida members located overseas,
the bombings in Madrid last March
have heightened our concern regarding
the possible role that indigenous
Islamic extremists, already in the
U.S., may play in future terrorist
plots. Also of concern is the possible
role that peripheral groups with a
significant presence in the U.S. may
play if called upon by members of
al-Qa'ida to assist them with attack
planning or logistical support.
The
potential recruitment of radicalized
American Muslim converts continues
to be a concern and poses an increasingly
challenging issue for the FBI because
the process of recruitment is subtle
and many times, self initiated and
radicalization tends to occur over
a long period of time and under many
different circumstances.
As
part of our continued efforts to identify
populations that may be a target for
extremist recruitment, the FBI has
been involved in a coordinated effort
between law enforcement and corrections
personnel to combat the recruitment
and radicalization of prison inmates.
Prisons continue to be fertile ground
for extremists who exploit both a
prisoner's conversion to Islam while
still in prison, as well as their
socio-economic status and placement
in the community upon their release.
Extremist
recruitment at schools and universities
inside the United States also poses
a particularly difficult problem.
Because the environment on campuses
is so open and isolated, schools provide
a particularly impressionable and
captive audience for extremists to
target.
Additionally,
keeping in mind al-Qa'ida recruitment
efforts occur primarily overseas,
we are closely monitoring any possible
methods for moving individuals to
extremist-linked institutions overseas,
specifically religious schools and
mosques that have overt ties to al-Qa'ida
or other terrorist organizations.
We
are also concerned about the possibility
that individuals who are members of
groups previously considered to be
peripheral to the current threat,
could be convinced by more radical,
external influences to take on a facilitation
or even worse -- an operational role
-- with little or no warning. Individual
members of legitimate organizations,
such Jama'at Tabligh, may be targeted
by al-Qa'ida in an effort to exploit
their networks and contacts here in
the United States.
Efforts
by extremists to obtain training inside
the U.S. is also an ongoing concern.
Although there are multiple reports
and ongoing investigations associated
with the paramilitary training activities
of suspected extremists nationwide,
the majority of these cases involve
small groups of like-minded individuals
who are inspired by the jihadist rhetoric
experienced in radical mosques or
prison proselytizing.
Fortunately,
the recent amendment to Title 18 adding
a provision whereby an individual
knowingly receiving military-type
training from a designated foreign
terrorist organization is committing
an offense, makes it possible to now
prosecute individuals who participate
or assist individuals in receiving
this type of training.
Another
area of concern is the recent merging
of Iraqi jihadist leader Abu Mu'sab
al-Zarqawi with al-Qa'ida. Zarqawi
has a demonstrated capability of directing
external operations while maintaining
his focus on Iraq as noted with the
disrupted Jordan plot in April.
Another
aspect of extremist activity in the
U.S. is the extensive fundraising
efforts by various terrorist groups.
We continue to identify and block
funding conduits, freeze assets of
terrorists and those who support them,
protect legitimate charities, and
disrupt the movement of money through
peripheral financial systems such
as Hawalas.
As
part of this effort, the FBI has engaged
in extensive coordination with authorities
of numerous foreign governments in
terrorist financing matters, leading
to joint investigative efforts throughout
the world. The FBI's participation
in a U.S. - Saudi Arabia Joint Terrorism
Task Force, the U.S. - Swiss Terrorism
Financing Task Force and the International
Working Group on Terrorist Financing
has enhanced cooperation between these
agencies and the U.S. and allowed
the FBI unprecedented access that
has increased our understanding of
these complex financing networks.
Since 2002, we have provided terrorism
financing training and technical assistance
to liaison partners in almost 50 countries.
The
Threat from Other International Terrorist
Groups
Mr.
Chairman, al-Qa'ida and the groups
that support it are still the most
lethal threat we face today. However,
other terrorist groups that have a
presence in the U.S. require careful
monitoring.
It
is the FBI's assessment, at this time,
that there is a limited threat of
a coordinated terrorist attack in
the U.S. from Palestinian terrorist
organizations, such as HAMAS, the
Palestine Islamic Jihad, and the al-Aqsa
Martyr's Brigade. These groups have
maintained a longstanding policy of
focusing their attacks on Israeli
targets in Israel and the Palestinian
territories. We believe that the primary
interest of Palestinian terrorist
groups in the U.S. remains the raising
of funds to support their regional
goals.
The
FBI is committed to staunching the
flow of funds from the U.S. to Palestinian
terrorist organizations. As an example
of this effort, the former leadership
of the Holy Land for Relief and Development,
a HAMAS front organization, was indicted
this past year and convictions were
won against the Elashi brothers who
owned and ran Infocom, another HAMAS
front organization.
Of
all the Palestinian groups, HAMAS
has the largest presence in the U.S.
with a robust infrastructure, primarily
focused on fundraising, propaganda
for the Palestinian cause, and proselytizing.
Although it would be a major strategic
shift for HAMAS, its U.S. network
is theoretically capable of facilitating
acts of terrorism in the U.S.
Like
HAMAS, but on a much smaller scale,
U.S.-based Palestine Islamic Jihad
members and supporters are primarily
engaged in fundraising, propaganda
and proselytizing activities. In 2003,
the Palestine Islamic Jihad, or PIJ,
activities and capabilities in the
U.S. were severely undercut by the
arrests of the U.S. PIJ leader, Sami
al-Arian, and three of his top lieutenants.
There have also been two additional
arrests of suspected PIJ activists
on charges unrelated to terrorism.
There has been no indication of a
new U.S. PIJ leadership since the
arrest of al-Arian.
Currently,
the most likely threat of terrorist
attacks from Palestinian groups to
the U.S. homeland is from a "lone
wolf" scenario. In this scenario,
a terrorist attack would be perpetrated
by one or more individuals who may
embrace the ideology of a Palestinian
terrorist group, but act without assistance
or approval of any established group.
Lebanese
Hizballah retains the capability to
strike in the U.S., although we have
no credible information to indicate
that US-based Hizballah members have
plans to attack American interests
within the U.S. or abroad. In 2004,
we had some success in uncovering
individuals providing material support
to Hizballah.
-
In
Detroit, Mahmoud Youssef
Kourani was indicted in the Eastern
District of Michigan on one count
of Conspiracy to Provide Material
Support to Hizballah. Kourani was
already in custody for entering
the country illegally through Mexico
and was involved in fundraising
activities on behalf of Hizballah.
-
Also
in Detroit, Fawzi Assi was arrested
in May of 2004 and was charged under
the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act for providing material
support to Hizballah. Assi was initially
arrested in 1998 after an outbound US
Customs search at the Detroit Metro
Airport discovered night vision goggles,
one thermal imaging scope and two Boeing
Global Positioning System devices. Assi
later fled the country after being released
by the court on bail but was later turned
over to us in Lebanon to face US criminal
charges.
The
Threat from Domestic Terrorism
While
national attention is focused
on the substantial threat posed
by international terrorists
to the homeland, law enforcement
officials must also contend
with an ongoing threat posed
by domestic terrorists based
and operating strictly within
the U.S. Domestic terrorists
motivated by a number of political
or social agendas -- including
white supremacists, black separatists,
animal rights/environmental
terrorists, anarchists, anti-abortion
extremists, and self-styled
militia -- continue to employ
violence and criminal activity
in furtherance of these agendas.
Animal
rights and environmental extremists,
operating under the umbrella
of the Animal Liberation Front
(ALF) and Earth Liberation Front
(ELF) utilize a variety of tactics
against their targets, including
arson, sabotage/vandalism, theft
of research animals, and the
occasional use of explosive
devices.
Serious
incidents of animal rights/eco-terrorism
decreased in 2004, a fact we
attribute to a series of law
enforcement successes that are
likely deterring large-scale
arsons and property destruction.
Following a rash of serious
incidents of animal rights/eco-terrorism,
including a $50 million arson
in San Diego and two bombing
incidents in the San Francisco
area, law enforcement authorities
achieved several significant
successes which have likely
deterred additional terrorist
activity. Despite these successes,
we anticipate that animal rights
extremism and eco-terrorism
will continue to threaten certain
segments of government and private
industry, specifically in the
areas of animal research and
residential/commercial development.
The
potential for violence by anarchists
and other emerging revolutionary
groups, such as the Anarchist
Black Cross Federation (ABCF),
will continue to be an issue
for law enforcement. The stated
goals of the ABCF are "the
abolishment of prisons, the
system of laws, and the Capitalist
state." The ABCF believes
in armed resistance to achieve
a stateless and classless society.
ABCF has continued to organize,
recruit, and train anarchists
in the tactical use of firearms.
US-based
black separatist groups
follow radical variants of Islam,
and in some cases express solidarity
with al-Qa'ida and other international
terrorist groups.
Incidents
of organized white supremacist
group violence decreased in
2004. This is due to several
high profile law enforcement
arrests over the last several
years, as well as the continued
fragmentation of white supremacist
groups because of the deaths
or the arrests of leaders. We
judge that violence on the part
of white supremacists remains
an ongoing threat to government
targets, Jewish individuals
and establishments, and non-white
ethnic groups.
However,
the right-wing Patriot movement
-- consisting of militias, common
law courts, tax protesters,
and other anti-government extremists
-- remains a continuing threat
in America today. Sporadic incidents
resulting in direct clashes
with law enforcement are possible
and will most likely involve
state and local law enforcement
personnel, such as highway patrol
officers and sheriff's deputies.
Potential
violent anti-abortion extremists
linked to terrorism ideologies
or groups pose a current threat.
The admiration of violent high-profile
offenders by extremists highlight
continued concerns relating
to potential or similar anti-abortion
threat activity.
WMD
Proliferation and other Foreign
Intelligence Threats
Although
the impact of terrorism is more
immediate and highly visible,
espionage and foreign intelligence
activity are no less a threat
to the US national security.
Many countries consider the
US to be their primary intelligence
target; so long as the US maintains
its position in world affairs,
it will continue to be targeted.
As part of its reinvigorated
and refocused foreign counterintelligence
(FCI) program, the FBI has applied
a more rigorous methodology
to its efforts to assess and
articulate the current threat
environment.
One of the key elements of the
FBI's National Strategy for
Counterintelligence (adopted
in August 2002) is the threat
assessment. Over the past two
years, the FBI has produced
comprehensive threat assessments
on several countries deemed
to be of particular CI concern.
The National Strategy for Counterintelligence
identified five categories of
foreign intelligence activity
as being especially harmful
to the US national security.
These five categories of activity
are weighted in terms of importance,
the in the following order:
-
Proliferation
of chemical, biological, radiological,
nuclear, and high-energy explosives
(CBRNE) information and technology:
-
Penetration
of the US Intelligence Community
(USIC)
-
Penetration
of US Government entities
and contractors
-
Compromise
of Critical National Assets
(CNAs), defined as any information,
policies, plans, technologies,
or industries that, if stolen,
modified, or manipulated by
an adversary would seriously
threaten US national or economic
security; and
-
Conduct
of clandestine foreign intelligence
activities in the US.
Several
countries have traditionally
considered the US to be their
primary intelligence target,
as well as an adversary or threat.
This prioritization is manifested
through their continued large
and active intelligence presence
in the US and their aggressive
targeting of US persons, information
and technology. Other countries,
while not necessarily viewing
the U.S. as an adversary or
threat, seek information to
help them compete economically,
militarily, and politically
in world affairs. As the current
leader in all three areas, the
US becomes their primary target.
For still other countries, rather
than being an intelligence target,
the US represents an operating
environment in which to conduct
intelligence-related activities
focused on their domestic security.
Some
foreign countries are becoming
increasingly sophisticated in
their CI awareness, training
and capabilities. Also of growing
concern is the asymmetrical
threat posed by certain intelligence
services that supplement their
collection capabilities in the
US by using non-traditional
collectors. These collectors
include students, delegations,
business visitors, émigrés,
and retired intelligence officers
who are collecting against targets
of opportunity or responding
to ad hoc requests from the
intelligence services. Such
non-traditional collectors pose
a potential threat across the
US, requiring a coordinated
response by all FBI field offices.
The
FBI does not foresee any significant
changes in the official foreign
intelligence presence in the
US over the next two to three
years. However, in addition
to using non-traditional collectors,
several countries appear to
be exploiting their military
liaison officers, who are in
the US on overt, legitimate
intelligence-sharing missions,
to target and collect sensitive
defense information that is
outside the scope of their official
access. Most difficult to identify
and assess is the intelligence
collection activity being directed
and/or conducted by non-intelligence
organizations, such as other
foreign government agencies
and/or foreign companies. The
FBI sees this type of activity
most frequently in the targeting
and collection of CBRNE information
and technology.
Another
challenge the FBI will face
is the tendency of some foreign
intelligence services to leverage
liaison relationships for intelligence
collection purposes. US Government
representatives participating
in international conferences
and exchanges, or whose duties
include routine liaison with
foreign intelligence representatives,
frequently report that their
contacts engage in elicitation,
sometimes to a surprisingly
aggressive level.
The
FBI expects to see a continued
increase in the use of technology
as an enabler for intelligence
operations, such as contacting,
tasking, and debriefing sources
and agents in the US.
Over
the near term, the priority collection
targets for these countries will
be:
-
The
effects of the recent 2004
US elections on US foreign
and domestic policies;
-
US
military actions in Iraq and
Afghanistan;
-
US
counterterrorism policy;
-
US
dual use technologies; and
-
US
policy vis-à-vis particular
countries or regions of the
world.
The
FBI expects to see continued
lobbying, political influence,
and/or perception management
activities by countries hoping
to affect US policy.
Many
foreign intelligence services
will also continue to exploit
their presence in the US to
target and collect against third
countries. Most will also engage
in defensive intelligence activities,
targeting their own expatriate
and ethnic communities in the
US, especially those groups
deemed to be a threat to the
current regime.
The
FBI's National Strategy for Counterintelligence
sets forth national priorities
and strategic objectives as well
as changes in management and organizational
culture intended to redirect and
significantly enhance the overall
performance of the FBI's FCI program.
Program objectives and outcomes
include:
-
Identify
intelligence service objectives,
officers, assets, and operations;
-
Disrupt
the operations of intelligence
services; and
-
Change
the behavior of exploited
institutions and individuals.
To
that end, the FBI has identified
five program strategies: Know
the Domain; Understand the Threat;
Engage in Strategic Partnerships;
Conduct Sophisticated Operations;
and Inform Policymakers.
During
FY 2004, the FBI FCI program accomplished
the following:
-
Six
foreign intelligence officers
and/or agents were arrested;
-
67
requests for persona non grata
actions and visa denials were
issued;
-
1,667
Intelligence Information Reports
were disseminated.
In
addition, the Asset Validation
Review process was implemented
in July 2002, and the FBI began
providing mandatory asset validation
training for Asset Coordinators
in the field regarding procedures
and policies. The FBI also implemented
the Agents in Laboratories Initiative
(AILI) in February 2003, through
which FBI agents have been placed
in Department of Energy nuclear
weapons and science laboratories.
The
FBI has also developed several
strategic partnerships, to include
the Regional CI Working Group
(RCIWG) Initiative, which was
established in October 2003
to implement the National Strategy
for Counterintelligence, leverage
the RCIWGs in tasking our USIC
partners, address intelligence
gaps, identify CI trends and
priorities in the operational
arena among USIC agencies at
the field level, and ensure
that all CI operational initiatives
and projects across agencies
are coordinated through the
FBI.
Similarly,
the National CI Working Group
(NCIWG) was established and
is led by the FBI and consists
of other CI agency head-level
representatives. The mission
is to establish ongoing interagency
planning discussions to better
coordinate CI operations USIC-wide.
Domain Task Forces are CI project
level task forces led by the
FBI, in vulnerabilities associated
with at-risk national security
projects, i.e., sensitive technologies,
information, and research and
development.
FBI
field offices are developing
"business alliances"
to build executive-level relationships
and foster threat and vulnerability
information sharing, with private
industries and academic institutions
located within their territories
having at-risk and sensitive
national security and economic
technologies, research and development
projects.
Finally,
the FBI has reinvigorated its
CI training process. For example,
field agents are trained in
the key components of basic
CI operations through an intensive
four-week Basic CI Operations
course. Other advanced, highly
specialized CI courses and seminars
provide training to agents and
analysts through a variety of
innovative instructional methods
and include in-services and
conferences, the Interactive
Multimedia Instruction and Simulation
(IMIS) computer-based training
program, and the FBI Intranet.
The
cyber-threat to the U.S. is
serious and continues to expand
rapidly the number of actors
with both the ability and the
desire to utilize computers
for illegal and harmful purposes
rises.
Cyber
threats stems from both state
actors, including foreign governments
that use their vast resources
to develop cyber technologies
with which to attack our networks,
and non-state actors such as
terrorist groups and hackers
that act independently of foreign
governments. The increasing
number of foreign governments
and non-state actors exploiting
U.S. computer networks is a
major concern to the FBI and
the Intelligence Community as
a whole.
State
actors continue to be a threat
to both our national security
as well as our economic security
because they have the technical
and financial resources to support
advanced network exploitation
and attack. The greatest cyber
threat is posed by countries
that continue to openly conduct
computer network attacks and
exploitations on American systems.
Terrorists
show a growing understanding
of the critical role that information
technology plays in the day-to-day
operations of our economy and
national security. Their recruitment
efforts have expanded to include
young people studying mathematics,
computer science and engineering
in an effort to move from the
limited physical attacks to
attacks against our technical
systems.
Fortunately,
the large majority of hackers
do not have the resources or
motivation to attack the US
critical information infrastructures.
Most targets of the hacker are
viewed as "challenges"
to break into a system. These
individuals do not introduce
malicious code to the system
but usually leave their "cyber
signature." Although a
nuisance, the single hacker
does not pose a great threat;
however, the increasing volume
of hacking activity worldwide
does inadvertently disrupt networks,
including that of the U.S. information
infrastructures. Hackers that
plant malicious code or upload
bots that are designed to steal
information are the main threats
in this group. These individuals
have the ability to take down
a system or steal trade secrets,
either of which can be devastating
to a company or agency.
The
growing number of hackers motivated
by money is a cause for concern.
If this pool of talent is utilized
by terrorists, foreign governments
or criminal organizations, the
potential for a successful cyber
attack on our critical infrastructures
is greatly increased.
To
combat these and other cyber
threats, the FBI established
a national cyber program with
a Cyber Division at FBI Headquarters
and dedicated cyber squads in
the field offices. The program
enables us to coordinate and
facilitate investigations of
those federal criminal violations
using the Internet, computer
systems, or networks. It also
helps us to build and maintain
public/private alliances to
maximize counterterrorism, counterintelligence,
and law enforcement cyber response
capabilities. We are also working
to aggregate the technological
and investigative expertise
necessary to meet the challenges
that lie ahead. We are recruiting
and hiring individuals who possess
degrees and experience in computer
sciences, information systems,
or related disciplines. We are
looking for specialists who
possess a bedrock of experience
and a profound understanding
of the cyber world.
Converging
Criminal Threats
It
is increasingly the case that
counterterrorism, counterintelligence,
cyber, and criminal investigations
are interrelated. There are
rarely clear dividing lines
that distinguish terrorist,
counterintelligence, and criminal
activity. Recognizing this trend
toward convergence, the first
priority of the FBI's Criminal
Investigative Program is to
leverage criminal investigative
resources to enhance the FBI's
Counterterrorism, Counterintelligence
and Cyber programs.
Terrorists
use criminal enterprises and
criminal activities to support
and fund terrorist organizations.
The FBI's criminal investigations
of these crimes and criminal
enterprises, often in task forces
in conjunction with other federal,
state, and local law enforcement,
continue to develop invaluable
intelligence, as well as to
initiate investigations, which
further identify the United
States' vulnerability to attack
and directly support the FBI's
and the Intelligence Community's
counterterrorism, counterintelligence,
and cyber crime efforts.
One
of the FBI's first investigations
to utilize the material support
of a terrorist organization
statute evolved from a criminal
investigation of Hizballah operators
utilizing credit card scams,
cigarette smuggling and loan
fraud to support the purchase
of dual use equipment for Hizballah
procurement leaders in Lebanon.
The FBI used the criminal RICO
statute to fully neutralize
this terrorist cell.
In
combatting converging threats,
the FBI's Criminal Program is
placing greater emphasis on
the collection, analysis, dissemination
and effective use of intelligence,
including intelligence derived
from criminal investigations,
including intelligence derived
from human sources and the use
of sophisticated investigative
techniques. We are using intelligence
to identify crime problems and
trends, to conduct threat assessments,
and to drive investigative efforts.
Currently, we are aggressively
pursuing intelligence collection
and threat assessments on Organized
Crime, Human Smuggling and Trafficking,
Violent Gangs, Public Corruption,
Civil Rights, and Middle Eastern
Criminal Enterprises.
After
CT, CI, and Cyber, the Criminal
Investigative Program's other
priorities in descending order
are Criminal Intelligence, Public
Corruption, Civil Rights, Violent
Gangs, Criminal Enterprises,
Corporate and Securities Fraud,
Health Care Fraud, Mortgage
Fraud, Major Financial Institution
Fraud, and Crimes Against Children
and other Violent Crimes.
Public
Corruption continues to pose
the greatest threat to the integrity
of all levels of government.
Recent investigative efforts
have been intensified to identify
and convict Immigration, Department
of State, and DMV officials
illegally selling visas or other
citizenship documents and drivers
licenses to anyone with enough
money. Their illegal activities
potentially conceal the identity
and purpose of terrorists and
other criminals, facilitating
their entry, travel, and operation
without detection in the U.S.
Other investigations have convicted
numerous law enforcement officers,
including those who formed criminal
organizations involved in drug
trafficking. Many major metropolitan
areas in the U.S. have witnessed
the indictment and conviction
of corrupt public officials
who betrayed the public trust
for profit or personal gain.
Over the last two years alone,
the FBI has convicted more than
1050 corrupt government employees,
including 177 federal officials,
158 state officials, 360 local
officials, and more than 365
police officers. In addition
to pursuing criminal investigations
against corrupt law enforcement
officers, the FBI has initiated
awareness and training efforts
to deter corruption, such as
"Project Integrity."
During
FY 2004, the FBI initiated 1,744
civil rights investigations
and obtained 154 convictions,
focusing its efforts on Hate
Crimes, Color of Law, and Involuntary
Servitude and Slavery matters.
The FBI and the United States
depend on the support, cooperation
and assistance of the Arab,
Muslim and Sikh Communities
in the United States to fight
terrorism and to fight crime.
These communities are entitled
to the same civil rights of
every citizen and person in
the United States. The FBI has
worked with these communities
to ease their fears concerning
the FBI's interest in securing
their help in the fight against
terrorism and to address the
backlash of hate crimes directed
against them following 9/11
and the war in Iraq. Since 9/11,
more than 500 hate crime investigations
have been initiated, where the
victims were Arab, Muslim, Sikh,
or perceived to be as such,
resulting in more than 150 federal
and local prosecutions. During
2004, the FBI initiated 53 hate
crime investigations where the
victims were of Arab, Muslim,
or Sikh descent or were perceived
to be such. Thirteen of those
cases resulted in criminal charges
being filed by either state
or federal law enforcement authorities.
Other groups also continue to
be the victims of Hate Crimes,
including African American and
Jewish communities.
Human
trafficking and modern day slavery
are a worldwide crime and human
rights problem, due to global,
economic, and political factors.
Approximately 17,000 victims
each year are lured to the United
States with false promises of
good jobs and better lives and
then forced to work under brutal
and inhumane conditions. Many
trafficking victims, including
women and children, are forced
to work in the sex industry,
prison like factories, and migrant
agricultural work.
Violent
gangs are more organized, larger,
more violent, and more widespread
than ever before, and they pose
a growing threat to the safety
and security of Americans. The
Department of Justice estimates
there are approximately 30,000
gangs with more than 800,000
members in the U.S.
Our
communities continue to experience
devastating incidences of murder,
drive-by shootings, and assaults
by gangs mainly involved in
the sale and distribution of
illicit drugs. However, gang
activity extends far beyond
protection of turf. It impacts
innocent citizens who have no
connection or involvement with
gangs, and it increasingly transcends
municipal boundaries. Gang members
travel from city to city, between
states and, on occasion, between
countries to commit their crimes.
In
response, the FBI is implementing
a coordinated, intelligence-driven
National Gang Strategy to disrupt
and dismantle gangs that pose
the greatest threats to America's
communities. In the past year,
we have increased the number
of Safe Street Task Forces from
78 to 107 and we are seeking
to increase the number by an
additional 10 to 20 percent
in the coming year. We are also
centralizing gang investigations
at FBI Headquarters with a new
$10 million National Gang Intelligence
Center (NGIC). The NGIC will
collect intelligence on gangs
from across the U.S., analyze
this intelligence, and disseminate
it to help law enforcement authorities
throughout the country plan
and execute strategies to prevent
further gang activity and violence.
The
FBI has reclassified gang matters
from "violent criminal
offenders" to "criminal
organizations and enterprises"
-- a higher priority area. The
new classification also allows
the U.S. Department of Justice
to charge gang members under
federal racketeering statues
which can result in stiffer
prison sentences for convicted
subjects. This approach is similar
to the successful strategy used
by the FBI to dismantle traditional
organized crime groups.
Under
the National Gang Strategy,
priority is given to efforts
to disrupt and dismantle gangs
that are national in their scope
and exhibit significant connectivity
and internal alliances. Among
the first to be targeted is
Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), a
violent gang which originated
in Los Angeles comprised primarily
of Central American immigrants.
We have created a National Gang
Task Force specifically to address
MS-13.
Organized
criminal enterprises operating
in the U.S. and throughout the
world pose increasing concerns
for the international law enforcement
and intelligence communities.
Their skill in using international
monetary systems to conduct
and conceal their criminal activity,
their use of state of the art
communications encryption to
further safeguard their illegal
activity, and their transnational
mobility increases the likelihood
they will escape detection or
otherwise cover their illegal
activities with a cloak of legitimacy.
Although the FBI prioritizes
its efforts on criminal enterprises
with possible connections to
terrorist and counterintelligence
activities, public corruption,
human smuggling of Special Interest
Aliens and women and children,
or violent and pervasive racketeering
activity, the impact from just
one criminal activity alone,
theft, is staggering. Annual
property losses from cargo/high
tech/retail theft is estimated
at $30 billion, from vehicle
theft $8 billion, from art/cultural
heritage artifact theft $500
million, and from jewelry and
gem theft $135 million. However,
theft by criminal enterprises
often represents a multifaceted
threat. For example, Middle
Eastern Criminal Enterprises
involved in the organized theft
and resale of infant formula
pose not only an economic threat,
but a public health threat to
infants, and a potential source
of material support to a terrorist
organization.
The
FBI is increasing its intelligence
collection and assessment efforts
on criminal enterprises, as
well as its joint efforts with
the intelligence and law enforcement
services of other nations, to
combat the criminal activities
of the La Cosa Nostra, Italian,
Russian, Balkan, Albanian, Asian,
African, Middle Eastern, Colombian/South
American and other criminal
enterprises. The FBI/Hungarian
National Bureau of Investigation
Organized Crime Task Force in
Budapest, Hungary, which is
investigating a Russian Criminal
Enterprise engaged in murder,
extortion, prostitution, and
other significant racketeering
activity, represents an unprecedented
cooperative effort between the
FBI and the Hungarians.
Although
new criminal enterprises continue
to emerge, the LCN remains a
formidable and ever changing
criminal threat. This year,
in just one criminal scheme,
identified by the Federal Trade
Commission as the largest consumer
fraud investigated in the history
of the United States, members
of the Gambino LCN family were
convicted for using pornographic
websites and adult entertainment
1 800 numbers to defraud thousands
of individuals of $750,000,000.
Asian Criminal Enterprises also
pose a continued threat, as
exemplified by one which was
dismantled earlier this year
during a coordinated arrest
operation with Canada, which
resulted in the arrest of 36
subjects in Canada and 102 subjects
in the U.S. for drug trafficking
and money laundering. Millions
of dollars and 21 firearms,
including an AK 47 assault rifle
and a sawed off shotgun were
seized during the operation.
Corporate/Securities
Fraud
Corporate
fraud can cost Americans their
jobs and rob them of hard-earned
savings. It shakes the public's
confidence in corporate America
to its foundation. Since the
initiation of the FBI Corporate
Fraud Task Force in December
2001, there have been 480 indictments
and 305 convictions of corporate
executives and their associates.
The FBI's efforts have also
resulted in over $2 billion
in restitutions, recoveries
and fines, in addition to over
$30 million in seizures and
forfeitures. In the Enron, HealthSouth,
Cendant Corporation, Credit
Suisse First Boston, Computer
Associates International, Worldcom,
Imclone, Royal Ahold, Perigrine
Systems, and America On Line
cases the FBI obtained 119 indictments/
informations and 79 convictions.
The former Chief Executive Officer
(CEO) of Worldcom is on trial
in New York and the former CEO
of HealthSouth is on trial in
Alabama. Several additional
high profile trials are anticipated
in the near future, to include
the trial of Enron's former
CEOs and Chief Accounting Officer
anticipated to be scheduled
for August or September 2005.
The
FBI is currently pursuing 334
Corporate Fraud cases throughout
the U.S. This is more than a
100 percent increase from FY
2003. Eighteen of the pending
cases involve losses to public
investors which each exceed
$1 billion. Unfortunately, the
volume of cases has yet to reach
a plateau, and the FBI continues
to open three to six new cases
each month, each case averaging
a loss exceeding $100 million.
American's
health care expenditures continue
to climb at rates higher than
inflation and will soon consume
more than 17 percent of the
Gross Domestic Product. It is
estimated that health care fraud
costs consumers, Medicare, Medicaid,
and private insurers tens of
billions of dollars each year
in blatant fraud schemes in
every sector of the industry.
The FBI recently instituted
the Out Patient Surgery and
Pharmaceutical Fraud Initiatives
to combat blatant fraud identified
in those health care programs.
During FY 2004, the FBI had
2,468 pending health care fraud
investigations, obtained 693
indictments and informations,
564 convictions or pre trial
diversions, $1.05 billion in
restitution, $543 million in
fines, $28.8 million in seizures,
$19.05 million in forfeitures
and disrupted 186 and dismantled
105 criminal organizations.
The
number of FBI mortgage fraud
investigations, including major
undercover operations, rose
from 102 in FY 2001 to approximately
550 in FY 2004. This rise is
expected to continue. During
FYs 2001-2004 the FBI received
over 17,000 mortgage fraud related
Suspicious Activity Reports
from federally insured financial
institutions alone. The FBI
worked with the Mortgage Bankers'
Association (MBA), the National
Notary Association (NNA), as
well as FINCEN, the Department
of Housing and Urban Development,
and major mortgage lending institutions,
to improve the reporting and
detection of potential mortgage
fraud.
Crimes
Against Children/Violent Incident
Crime
Of
all violent crime, crimes against
children and child prostitution
are of particular concern. Over
300,000 children per year are
forced into prostitution. The
FBI's Lost Innocence, Child
Prostitution Initiative, has
opened 13 cases in 11 field
offices, emphasizing the use
of sophisticated investigative
techniques, to obtain 135 arrests/locates,
3 complaints, 13 indictments/informations,
11 convictions/pre trial diversions,
and 4 child locates. Major violent
crime incidents, such as sniper
murders, serial killings and
child abductions can paralyze
whole communities and require
the cooperative efforts of the
FBI and local, state and other
federal law enforcement agencies.
The FBI also continues to address
the 6,218 bank robberies, resulting
in 153 injuries, and 15 deaths,
that occurred within the first
ten months of 2004, albeit with
a greater reliance on other
agencies and a lesser use of
its own resources where possible.
Enhancing
the FBI's Capabilities
Mr.
Chairman, you will notice that
our accomplishments over the
past year consistently have
two things in common, the effective
collection and use of intelligence
and inter-agency cooperation.
The improvements that made these
accomplishments possible result
from the continued efforts of
the men and women of the FBI
to implement a plan that fundamentally
transforms our agency and enhances
our ability to predict and prevent
terrorism.
As
set forth above, threat information
crosses both internal and external
organizational boundaries. Counterterrorism
efforts must draw from, and
contribute to, counterintelligence,
cyber and criminal programs.
In order to most effectively
address all threats, we are
continuing to strengthen the
FBI's enterprise-wide intelligence
program.
We
began in 2001 with a dedicated
analysis section in the Counterterrorism
Division and, in 2002, we created
an Office of Intelligence in
the Counterterrorism Division.
The structure and capability
significantly enhanced our CT
operations and those of our
partners. In 2003, we extended
this concept across all FBI
programs -- Criminal Cyber,
Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence-and
unified intelligence authorities
under a new FBI Office of Intelligence
led by an Executive Assistant
Director. The Office of Intelligence
adopted Intelligence Community
best practices to direct all
FBI intelligence activities.
Congress and the 9/11 Commission
reviewed these efforts and provided
recommendations to further strengthen
the FBI's intelligence capability.
The
newly established Directorate
of Intelligence is the dedicated
national security workforce
that the Congress established
within the FBI. It comprises
a dedicated Headquarters element
and embedded intelligence entities
in each FBI field office called
Field Intelligence Groups (FIGs).
The FIGs are central to the
integration of the intelligence
cycle into field operations.
The FIGS include Special Agents,
Intelligence Analysts, Language
Specialists, and Surveillance
Specialists, as well as officers
and analysts from other intelligence
and law enforcement agencies.
They are responsible for coordinating,
managing, and executing all
of the functions of the intelligence
cycle and have significantly
improved the FBI's intelligence
capability. This integrated
intelligence service leverages
the core strengths of the law
enforcement culture -- such
as reliability of sources and
fact-based analysis -- while
ensuring that no walls exist
between collectors, analysts
and those who must act upon
intelligence information. The
Directorate also benefits from
the strong FBI history of joint
operations by unifying FBI intelligence
professional and integrating
all partners, particularly state,
local, and tribal law enforcement,
into our intelligence structures.
The
central mission of the Directorate
is to optimally position the
FBI to meet current and emerging
national security and criminal
threats by: (1) assuring that
the FBI proactively targets
threats to the US, inhibiting
them and dissuading them before
they become crimes; (2) providing
useful, appropriate and timely
information and analysis to
the national security, homeland
security, and law enforcement
communities; and (3) building
and sustaining FBI-wide intelligence
policies and capabilities.
In
2004, we made substantial progress
to expand and strengthen our
intelligence workforce. For
the first time, the FBI offered
recruitment bonuses for Intelligence
Analysts. As a result of these
and other efforts, the FBI received
over 80,000 applications and
hired over 650 Intelligence
Analysts.
We
built on the College of Analytic
Studies, created in October
2001, with the addition of two
new courses based on intelligence
community best practices: ACES
1.0, a new basis intelligence
analytic course, and ACES 1.5,
a course for experienced, on-board
analysts that provides information
on the latest analytic resources
and techniques. To ensure a
consistent level of knowledge
across the workforce on intelligence
concepts and processes, ACES
Training is now mandatory for
all FBI Intelligence Analysts.
We have increased our training
expertise and capacity and are
on track to deliver basic training
to 1,000 Intelligence Analysts
by December 2005. In addition,
we have incorporated intelligence
training into New Agents class,
including a joint exercise with
Intelligence Analysts and joint
evening seminars.
The
Intelligence Analyst career
path, with multiple work roles
and cross-training requirements
not only provides career development
opportunities, it also creates
a workforce with the agility
and flexibility needed to respond
to the changing threat environment.
In
addition, we implemented several
initiatives to enhance the analyst
career path and improve retention.
We extended the promotion potential
for analysts in the field from
GS-12 to GS-14. We created an
Intelligence Analyst Advisory
Board, leveraging the strong
FBI culture of creating advisory
groups to provide advocacy for
specific career fields. At the
same time we worked with Congress
and were granted pay flexibilities,
such that FBI intelligence professionals
now can be compensated at a
rate equal to that of their
Intelligence Community peers.
These and other initiatives
have helped us to stabilize
our attrition rate between 8
percent and 9 percent and FY05
statistics to date look promising.
We
have also taken steps to strengthen
the Special Agent component
of our intelligence workforce.
In March 2004 we established
a new career path for Special
Agents with three objectives.
First, the career path gives
all Agents experience in intelligence
collection, analysis and dissemination.
Second, the career path will
give Agents an opportunity to
develop specialized skills,
experience and aptitudes in
one of four areas: 1) Intelligence,
2) Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence,
3) Cyber or 4) Criminal. Third,
it makes Intelligence Officer
Certification a prerequisite
for advancement to senior supervisory
ranks. The Special Agent career
path will produce a cadre of
Agents who are proficient in
both intelligence and law enforcement
operations. This is key to achieving
the full integration of law
enforcement and intelligence
operations.
To
improve our foreign language
capabilities, we have recruited
and processed more than 50,000
translator applicants. These
efforts have resulted in the
addition of 778 new Contract
Linguists (net gain of 493 after
attrition) and 109 new Language
Analysts (net gain of 34 after
attrition). The FBI has increased
its overall number of linguists
by 67%, with the number of linguists
in certain high priority languages
increasing by 200% or more.
We
have integrated management of
the FBI's Foreign Language Program
(FLP) into the Directorate of
Intelligence. This integration
fully aligns FBI foreign language
and intelligence management
activities and delivers a cross-cutting
platform for future improvements
across all program areas, including
translation quality controls.
We
also established the Language
Services Translation Center
(LSTC), a command and control
structure at FBI Headquarters
to ensure that our finite translator
resource base of over 1,300
translators, distributed across
52 field offices, is strategically
aligned with priorities set
by our operational divisions
on a national level.
We
have built a secure network
that allows us to efficiently
route FISA audio collection
to any FBI field office. This
technology allows us to more
effectively utilize our national
translator base.
We
now possess sufficient translation
capability to promptly address
all of our highest priority
counterterrorism intelligence,
often within 12 hours. Of the
several hundred thousand hours
of audio materials and several
million pages of text collected
in connection with counterterrorism
investigations over the last
two years, a nominal level of
backlog exists only because
of obscure languages or dialects.
We
have instituted a national translation
quality assurance program. Countervailing
operational pressures, however,
limit our ability to fully comply
with instituted translation
review procedures in those languages
for which demand continues to
outpace supply. In those languages
for which we have already achieved
excess translation capacity,
e.g., Farsi, Pashto, and Vietnamese,
100% quality assurance compliance
is expected by April 2005.
Translation
backlogs continue to exist within
our counterintelligence program.
To target these deficiencies,
we have implemented a highly
successful workforce planning
model which links field-wide
workload measurements, trend
analysis, and geo-political
indicators to our recruitment
and applicant processing efforts.
In
2005, we plan to strengthen
the integration of the entire
intelligence cycle (requirements
management; planning and direction;
collection; processing and exploitation
of collected information; analysis
and production; and dissemination)
into field office operations.
We
will incorporate the recently-developed
new critical element entitled,
"Intelligence," into
the performance plans of all
Special Agents and Supervisory
Special Agents; this new element
emphasizes participation in
intelligence cycle functions,
in particular human source development
and contributions to intelligence
production.
We
will also establish "fly-teams"
of Agents with intelligence
experience, Intelligence Analysts,
Language Specialists, and Surveillance
Specialists to travel to five
field offices and provide hands-on
guidance and training for the
full integration of the intelligence
cycle within the office.
Our
ability to coordinate and communicate
with other members of the Intelligence
Community has never been better.
Our face-to-face interaction
with the National Counterterrorism
Center and members of the CIA
and DHS has positively impacted
our ability to come together
on a common problem and the
results of the cooperation are
evident. Case in point: during
the election threat, analysts
were able to meet daily to discuss
assessments and develop theories
that were fundamental to understanding
the threat, and from those meetings,
on-line forums were created
to facilitate continued sharing
of ideas and new intelligence
finds -- all from the desktop.
The
FBI's Information Sharing Policy
Group, chaired by the FBI's
EAD-Intelligence, brings together
the FBI entities that generate
and disseminate law enforcement
information and intelligence
to implement the FBI's goal
of sharing as much as possible
consistent with security and
privacy protections.
Within
the Intelligence Community,
the FBI has a two-level approach:
-
For those agencies that operate
at the Top Secret-SCI level,
we are investing in secure
facilities for an FBI network
(SCI On-Line, or SCION) that
is linked to the DOD-based
JWICS network used by CIA,
NSA, and other national agencies.
-
For
those agencies that operate
at the Secret level, we have
connected the FBI's internal
electronic communications
system to the DoD-based SIPRNET
network that serves. As a
result, all FBI Agents or
analysts who need to communicate
at the Secret-level with other
agencies can do so from their
desktop.
Within
the law enforcement community,
the FBI's National Information
Sharing
Strategy (NISS) is part of the
DOJ Law Enforcement Information
Sharing Program and builds upon
the FBI Criminal Justice Information
(CJIS) Services program.
-
The
Law Enforcement National Data
Exchange (N-DEx) will provide
a nationwide capability to
exchange data derived from
incident and event reports.
Data from incident and arrest
reports -- name, address,
and non-specific crime characteristics
-- will be entered into a
central repository to be queried
against by future data submissions.
The national scale of N-DEx
will enable rapid coordination
among all strata of law enforcement.
-
The
Law Enforcement Regional Data
Exchange (R-DEx) will enable
the FBI to join participating
Federal, state, tribal, and
local law enforcement agencies
in regional full-text information
sharing systems under standard
technical procedures and policy
agreements.
-
The
FBI makes national intelligence
more readily available to
state, tribal, and local law
enforcement agencies through
the Law Enforcement Online
(LEO) network.
-
The
Terrorist Screening Center
(TSC) also leverages the CJIS
backbone to provide real-time
actionable intelligence to
state and local law enforcement.
Recognizing
that the ability to assemble,
analyze and disseminate information
both internally and with other
intelligence and law enforcement
agencies is essential to our
success in the war on terrorism,
the FBI has made modernization
of its information technology
(IT) a priority.
Under
the centralized leadership of
the Chief Information Officer
(CIO), the FBI is now taking
a coordinated, strategic approach
to IT. We have a Strategic IT
Plan, a baseline Enterprise
Architecture, and a system for
managing IT projects at each
stage of their "life cycle"
from planning and investment,
through development and deployment,
operation and maintenance, and
disposal. This involves regular
technical reviews to see if
milestones are met.
The
first two phases of the Trilogy
IT modernization program have
been completed. The FBI is now
modernized with:
-
Deployment of a high-speed,
secure network that enables
personnel in FBI offices around
the country to share data,
including audio, video and
image files.
-
More than 30,000 new desktop
computers with modern software
applications 3,700 printers,
1600 scanners, 465 servers
and 1400 routers.
-
An IT infrastructure that
provides for secure communication
with our Intelligence Community
partners.
The
third phase of Trilogy, which
includes the Virtual Case File
(VCF) has not yet been completed.
Plans for VCF have changed both
in response to identified technical
problems and because the FBI's
refocused mission created requirements
that did not exist when VCF
was originally envisioned, such
as requirements related to information
sharing. Last June, after we
determined that the product
delivered did not meet our needs,
we decided to move forward with
a two-track action plan for
VCF.
-
In accordance with this plan,
we asked a new contractor
to examine the latest working
version of the VCF as well
as available off-the-shelf
software applications and
those designed for other agencies,
to determine the best combination
to meet the FBI's needs. In
many ways, the pace of technological
innovation has overtaken our
original vision for VCF, and
there are now existing products
to suit our purposes that
did not exist when Trilogy
began.
-
As we move forward, we will
apply all that we have learned
and leverage what we have
already developed, including
a critical interface to our
existing data systems that
will be a key component of
our final solution.
Separate
from the Trilogy Program, we
have successfully developed
and deployed a number of new
investigative and information
sharing capabilities.
The
Investigative Data Warehouse
(IDW) offers Agents and
analysts alike the technology
to perform link analysis, while
also providing enhanced search
and analytical tools. IDW provides
FBI users with a single access
point to more than 47 sources
of counterterrorism data, including
information from FBI files,
other government agency data,
and open source news feeds,
that were previously available
only through separate, stove-piped
systems. Most of these users
are with the Directorate of
Intelligence, Counterterrorism
or Counterintelligence Divisions.
These users provide search and
analysis services using the
IDW for personnel throughout
the Bureau.
The
FBI Automated Messaging System
(FAMS) began operations
in December and now provides
more than 300 users with the
capability to send and receive
critical organizational message
traffic to any of the 40,000+
addresses on the Defense Messaging
System (DMS). The FBI is the
first civilian agency to operate
a classified DMS.
The
FBI Intelligence Information
Reports Dissemination System
(FIDS) is a web-based software
application that allows all
FBI personnel with access to
the FBI's Intranet to create
and disseminate standardized
Intelligence Information Reports
(IIRs) quickly and efficiently.
FIDS allows the Directorate
of Intelligence to automate
and standardize IIR creation
and dissemination functions.
Looking
forward, we expect certain trends
to continue. Our adversaries
will keep evolving, national
security and criminal threats
will further converge, and old
jurisdictional boundaries will
become less and less relevant.
If we are to address these trends
successfully, we must be willing
and able to evolve ourselves.
The FBI must continue to build
our intelligence capabilities,
including a strong intelligence
workforce. We must continue
hiring and training personnel
with technical expertise and
foreign language skills. We
must continue to seek new ways
to share information and collaborate
with partners in the Intelligence
and Law Enforcement Communities.
Above all, we must be agile,
and encourage creativity, innovation,
and strategic thinking. If we
do all of these things, I am
confident that we will out-network,
out-think, and ultimately defeat
our adversaries.
Mr.
Chairman, I thank you again for
this opportunity. I look forward
to working with this committee
as we continue our efforts to
address threats to the U.S. I
would be happy to take any questions
you might have.
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