Testimony of Steve Blackistone
National Transportation Safety Board
before the
House and Senate Transportation Committees
Kentucky General Assembly on
Highway Safety in Kentucky
Frankfort, Kentucky
October 7, 2003


Good morning Chairman Moore, Chairman Collins, and members of the Committees on Transportation. It is my pleasure to be here in Frankfort to talk about the National Transportation Safety Board's highway safety recommendations.

The National Transportation Safety Board is an independent Federal agency charged by Congress to investigate transportation accidents, determine their probable cause, and made recommendations to prevent their recurrence. The recommendations that arise from our investigations and safety studies are our most important product. The Safety Board has neither regulatory authority nor grant funds. In our 36-year history, organizations and government bodies have adopted more than 80 percent of our recommendations.

The Safety Board has recognized for many years that traffic crashes are one of this nation's most serious transportation safety problems. More than 90 percent of all transportation related deaths each year result from highway crashes. And, with nearly 1,000 persons killed on Kentucky highways in 2002, you face a significant problem here in Kentucky. Today, I want to focus my remarks on just 3 of the important highway safety issues you should address: impaired driving, graduated driver licensing, and 15-passenger vans.

 

THE ALCOHOL-HIGHWAY SAFETY PROBLEM

Impaired driving is one of the most often committed crimes. It kills someone in America every 30 minutes. Almost 41 percent of the country's highway deaths are alcohol-related. Unfortunately the number and percentage of alcohol-related fatalities nationwide, has increased in each of the past 3 years. The lifetime cost to society for each fatality is over $977,000, so alcohol-related crashes cost society over $17 billion per year. While the affected individual covers some of these costs, those not directly involved in crashes pay for nearly three-quarters of all crash costs, primarily through insurance premiums, taxes, and travel delay. Clearly, much needs to be done to reduce this ongoing tragedy.

For two decades, the Safety Board has issued recommendations aimed at reducing impaired driving. In 1988, the Board investigated the worst alcohol-related highway collision in American history, the collision of a pick-up truck and a church activity bus in Carrollton, Kentucky. The crash killed 27 and injured 34 innocent people. The pick-up driver had been drinking and was traveling the wrong way on an Interstate. Ninety minutes after the crash, the pick-up driver's blood alcohol content (BAC) was 0.26 percent. This individual was a hard core drinking driver.

The Safety Board defines hard core drinking drivers as individuals who drive with a BAC of 0.15 percent or greater, or who are arrested for or convicted of driving while intoxicated within 10 years of a prior driving while impaired (DWI) conviction. From 1983 through 1998, more than 137,000 people died in crashes involving hard core drinking drivers. Analysis of current fatality numbers reveals that more than 48 percent of the alcohol-related deaths involve hard core drinking drivers.

Most experts agree that impaired drivers persist in their behavior because these drivers believe that they will not be caught and/or convicted. That perception is based on reality. An intoxicated person can drive from New York to Los Angeles and halfway back without being arrested.

The problem of hard core drinking drivers is complex. No single countermeasure appears to be sufficient to address hard core drinking drivers. These offenders require different approaches. In 2000, the Safety Board reviewed the systems addressing hard core drinking drivers, and asked States to implement a comprehensive program (attached), which would include stronger sanctions for first offenders with a high BAC, a look-back period of at least 10 years, administrative license revocation, vehicle sanctions, and accurate record keeping. We need a comprehensive system of prevention, apprehension, sanction, and treatment to reduce the crashes, injuries, and fatalities caused by these drivers.

Drivers with High Blood Alcohol Content

Drivers with a high BAC, 0.15 percent or greater, require strong intervention similar to that ordinarily prescribed for repeat offenders. Those who reach this high BAC level have consumed large amounts of alcohol, much more than is considered to be social or responsible drinking. High BAC offenders are also likely to be repeat offenders. Research has found that drivers with a high BAC are substantially more likely to be involved in a fatal crash. The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety has estimated that the relative fatality risk for drivers in single-vehicle crashes with a high BAC is 385 times that of a zero-BAC driver and for male drivers the risk is 607 times that of a sober driver.

One Pennsylvania accident investigated by the Safety Board illustrates the risks created by high BAC drivers. On November 25, 1999, about 1:20 a.m., a 1993 Pontiac Grand Am had been traveling for more than 5 miles in the wrong direction in Interstate 76 in Pennsylvania when it collided head-on with a 1993 Nissan Altima transporting the driver and four passengers. The impact caused the Altima to spin, strike a concrete barrier, and catch fire. One passenger was trapped in the Altima and died of burns, multiple injuries, and smoke inhalation. The three remaining passengers and the driver of the Altima sustained minor to serious injuries. The driver of the Pontiac was found to have a BAC of 0.24 percent.

Kentucky law does provide enhanced penalties for drivers having a BAC of 0.18 percent or greater. The Safety Board would like to see Kentucky lower that level to 0.15 percent.

Repeat Offenders

The Safety Board defines repeat offenders as individuals who are arrested or convicted of a driving-while-impaired (DWI) offense within 10 years of a prior DWI arrest or conviction. Two facts support the Board's definition. First, DWI offenders are not always convicted of DWI violations; their charges may be reduced to a non-alcohol-related offense, erased, or not used for enhancement after participating in a diversion program. While Kentucky prohibits prosecutors from accepting pleas to lesser, non-alcohol-related charges, Kentucky still allows diversion for first offenders. Diversion systems are inherently logically flawed. Research indicates that offenders who receive diversion recidivate faster that offenders receiving conviction and traditional sanctions.

Because diversion programs interfere with the State's retention of accurate records, a subsequent DWI conviction may not cause the individual to be identified as a repeat offender. Yet such behavior, a repeat DWI arrest, supports the conclusion that the individual has an alcohol abuse problem. The American Psychological Association Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-IV) states that one DWI offense is indicative of a substance problem. Therefore, the Safety Board includes arrests as well as convictions in the definition of repeat offender. Moreover, given the low likelihood of arrest and the need for long-term measures to change the behavior of hard core drinking drivers, record-retention and look-back periods of longer than 5 years are needed.

Administrative License Revocation

Administrative License Revocation (ALR) gives a law enforcement officer the authority, on behalf of the State licensing agency, to confiscate the license of any driver who either fails or refuses to take a chemical breath test. Once a driver's license has been confiscated, the driver is issued a temporary license that is valid for a short, specified period of time. During that time he or she may seek an administrative hearing - a process that is independent of any criminal proceedings. That hearing addresses a single issue: Did the driver fail or refuse to take a breath test? If the answer is yes, the license is revoked.

The drunk driver is off the road, with no dilatory tactics, no mitigating circumstances, no plea-bargaining and no pre-trial diversion. The offender may still face criminal proceedings, but the important thing is that he or she is off the road in very short order.

Opponents of administrative license revocation argue that it is unconstitutional - that it denies the impaired driver due process. However, ALR has not been declared unconstitutional in any State. To the contrary, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that revocation of a license, prior to an administrative hearing, is not a violation of due process as long as there are provisions for a swift post-suspension hearing.

The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) conducted one of the most important studies of the issue. This study examined the effects of ALR and other laws on fatal accidents in selected States. IIHS concluded that ALR laws were the most effective of the laws studied. Between 6:00 PM and 6:00 AM - when more than half of all fatally injured drivers had BACs over 0.10 percent - ALR is estimated to have reduced the involvement of drivers in fatal accidents by nine percent.

A U.S. Department of Justice study demonstrates that States with an ALR law have reduced recidivism rates among drinking/driving offenders. The most startling effect was found in North Dakota. The rate of recidivism declined by nearly 40 percent, suggesting the potential for long-term behavior modification. This study is consistent with others that indicate, even though some drivers will continue to drive after revocation, they tend to drive less frequently and more cautiously. Most important, however, is the fact that most drivers adhere to the law and do not drive at all.

The concern that the loss of driving privileges, especially in rural areas, would result in the loss of a job, prompted studies in New Mexico, Mississippi and Delaware to determine whether the concern is justified. In all three States, the problem was minimal. For example, in Delaware, a rural State with little public transit, only 1.2 percent of those whose licenses were revoked lost their jobs. Loss of employment resulting from the loss of a driver's license is unusual.

When the Federal Aviation Administration believes that public safety is endangered, it immediately revokes a pilot's license. There is no reason why we cannot and should not do at least as much to protect the public on our nation's streets and highways. I urge this Committee to pursue legislation that will make ALR possible in Kentucky.

Vehicle Sanctions

License sanctions are useful measures for preventing DWI violations. Hard core drinking drivers, however, will continue to drive while their licenses are suspended or revoked. In a recent survey, 65 percent of suspended drivers and 71 percent of revoked drivers in California admitted to driving during their disqualification. A Safety Board analysis of 1998 FARS data showed that, if involved in a fatal crash, drivers with suspended or revoked licenses and a prior DWI conviction are 4.43 times more likely to be drinking at the time of the crash than drivers with a valid license and no prior DWI conviction. One California study found that California drivers with suspended or revoked licenses have 3.7 times the fatal crash rate of the average driver, and a second study determined that the relative risk of a fatal crash is substantially higher than average among drivers suspended or revoked for drinking and driving offenses. States must create a system to effectively intervene with DWI offenders the very first time they are arrested.

Thus, the Safety Board recommended the use of vehicle sanctions such as license plate impoundment, vehicle immobilization, vehicle impoundment, vehicle forfeiture, and ignition interlock. Vehicle sanctions substantially decrease the opportunity for hard core drinking drivers to operate vehicles illegally. In its 2000 safety study, the Safety Board reviewed numerous vehicle sanction programs and noted these results:

The Safety Board also found that immobilization should occur at the time of arrest, not conviction, thereby both ensuring that the immobilization will take place and preventing the hard core drinking driver from transferring vehicle ownership. Vehicle sanctions should be imposed administratively, when possible. This is especially important to expand the use of ignition interlocks to more offenders. A very small proportion of eligible offenders are actually ordered to install interlocks

BAC Testing

Substantial commitments of financial and human resources are made annually in every State to implement or expand DWI countermeasures. Obtaining support, particularly at the local level, for DWI countermeasures is dependent upon demonstrating that DWI violations are a serious local problem. Complete and accurate information on the involvement of alcohol in fatal highway crashes is essential for acquiring such support. To allocate resources for, and to evaluate the effectiveness of, DWI laws and programs, each State must know both the level of, and the annual changes in, alcohol involvement in highway crashes. Such knowledge also is a critical prerequisite to the planning and implementation of effective countermeasures. The Safety Board recognized the value of testing drivers involved in fatal crashes nearly 19 years ago, when it recommended that Kentucky and the other States require alcohol testing of all drivers involved in fatal highway crashes.

In 1982, only 40.8 percent of the fatally injured and surviving drivers involved in fatal crashes nationwide were tested for alcohol content. Test results were obtained for only 33 percent of those drivers involved in fatal crashes. Kentucky tested 50 percent of the drivers involved in fatal crashes, but obtained results for only 45.8 percent. By 2002, the national testing rate had risen only to 49.7 percent, with results for 43.4 percent. Kentucky actually regressed, testing only 48.2 percent, although Kentucky obtained results for 47.2 percent. There remains a significant portion of the drivers involved in fatal crashes for whom we never obtained a BAC test, and even a portion of tested drivers for whom we never obtain a test result. It is entirely likely that more people are killed in Kentucky and nationwide from alcohol-related crashes than estimated. The scope of the problem may well be larger than we all think.

Common reasons for failing to test drivers include lack of expertise, personal reluctance of those in the "testing system" (such as police officers and physicians), and lack of resources. Test refusal also plays a significant role. Repeat offenders, those familiar with the system, whether previously convicted or diverted, are more likely to refuse a test than first offenders. By refusing the test, a repeat offender essentially opts himself out of the system. The lack of a valid test result robs the State of a valuable piece of information in identifying those most in need of a significant intervention and substantially weakens the system for preventing alcohol-related fatalities. Sanctions for refusal need to be increased and police need authority to demand a test.

Holding and Release Policies

Holding and release policies for DWI offenders should reflect the nature of the driving impairment, especially for high BAC and repeat offenders. In 1984, the Safety Board recommended that the States adopt improved detention and release policies, explaining that States should not permit the release of alcohol offenders until the blood alcohol concentration has dropped below the lowest level of impairment specified in State law. That recommendation was made following a study on deficiencies in enforcement, judicial and treatment programs related to drunk drivers.

The Safety Board's recommendation grew out of an accident the Board investigated in which a 19-year-old driver was killed while riding a motorcycle, six hours after he had been arrested for DWI. The motorcycle skidded 60 feet, vaulted 28 feet, landed on its side, and then rolled 107 feet before it came to rest. The driver had a blood alcohol content of 0.16 percent following his initial arrest, but was released only 90 minutes after the alcohol test was conducted. The city jail in which the driver was held had a policy of holding persons arrested for alcohol-related offenses for 4 hours, or releasing them to a responsible adult.

While the Safety Board found that many detoxification centers at that time held individuals until their blood alcohol level dropped to zero, even this may not be enough. Sweden's National Road and Traffic Research Institute has reported that a person's ability to carry out complex driving maneuvers is reduced for at least 3 hours after the blood alcohol concentration reaches zero. Those with hangovers show a "marked inability to subjectively determine if they are fit to drive at all." The dizzy, queasy feeling often accompanying a hangover may diminish driving ability by as much as 20 percent, even when the blood alcohol concentration is zero.

Holding offenders until their BAC is below the legal level of intoxication (0.08 percent in Kentucky) is a minimum step for preventing the offender from driving.

 

THE TEEN DRIVING PROBLEM

Crash rates for teen drivers are significantly higher than crash rates for other driving populations. Teen drivers comprise about 6.6 percent of the driving population, but comprise about 14 percent of the drivers involved in fatal crashes. Further, 22 percent of all highway fatalities occur in crashes involving teen drivers. Crash statistics for Kentucky are just as ominous. In 2001, teens made up a little more than 5 percent of the driving population, but almost 23 percent of the deaths occurred in crashes involving teen drivers.

Although teen drivers are on the road at night only 20 percent of the time, 50 percent of their fatalities occur at night. Traffic crashes account for 40 percent of all deaths among 15-20 year olds, making traffic crashes the leading cause of death for this age group.

The current system does not teach young people to drive; it teaches them to pass a test. Learning to drive is a long-term process, one that cannot be effectively managed through the traditional driver education program. Once young people learn the mechanics of driving, they should receive additional "on-the-job" training, without unnecessary distractions, and with the assistance of a more mature and experienced driver. As their skills and maturity develop, teen drivers can proceed to full licensure.

A 3-Stage System

In a 1993 study of drinking and licensing for young drivers under the age of 21, the Safety Board recommended that Kentucky and the other States implement graduated driver licensing (GDL), the comprehensive provisional license system for teen drivers. GDL imposes restrictions so that initial driving occurs in less dangerous circumstances (daytime and with adult supervision at night) until the driver has had an opportunity to gain experience. Restrictions are lifted after successful completion of the driver development period.

The model GDL program consists of a learner's permit, an intermediate or provisional license, and a full license. This program also promotes driver education, parent participation, restricted night driving, and rapid corrective action following at fault crashes and violations. The basic elements for a GDL program need to include:

Beginning drivers should be introduced gradually to the driving experience. They should be provided the maximum time to practice, under the safest possible real-world conditions. They should be given the opportunity to develop gradually the skills needed for full licensure. We need to identify quickly young problem drivers before bad habits and behaviors become ingrained, and then take action to correct those problems. The National Safety Council has described this system of graduated licensing as "training wheels for young drivers." This analogy makes good sense; we do not proceed from walking to riding a bicycle in one step. We need training wheels to make the process safer.

Night Time Driving Restriction

North Carolina implemented a comprehensive GDL system with a 9:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m. nighttime driving restriction in December 1997. A study of North Carolina's crash data found at least a 25 percent reduction in injuries and deaths involving 16-year-old drivers. Data released by the Iowa Department of Transportation reveals that GDL has been very effective for Iowa as well. In 2001, 16-year-old drivers were involved in 20 percent fewer traffic crashes than the same group in 1998, the year before Iowa adopted GDL. Also, 16-year-old drivers received 38 percent fewer traffic citations.

Nighttime driving restrictions are especially important and effective in reducing crashes. Forty-three percent of teen motor vehicle deaths in 2001 occurred between 9:00 pm and 6:00 am. Studies have revealed that nighttime driving restrictions are associated with crash reductions of up to 60 percent during the restricted hours. A 1984 study of nighttime driving restrictions in four States found among 16-year-old drivers that crashes were reduced by 69 percent in Pennsylvania, 62 percent in New York, 40 percent in Maryland, and 25 percent in Louisiana. Because many of these crashes occur in the evening hours, a greater crash reduction is achieved when the restriction starts earlier in the night. Many States include conditions or exemptions related to work or school, and may limit routes or number of passengers as well.

Many parents and even young drivers support the restriction when they understand the justification for it. A November 1994 survey by the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety found that 74 percent of parents of 17-year-olds favor night driving restrictions for beginning drivers. Of those in favor, 48 percent preferred a restriction beginning at 10 p.m. A telephone survey of 16- to 18-year-olds in four States with such restrictions indicated that 63 percent of the teens in Illinois, 67 percent in New York, 80 percent in Pennsylvania and 47 percent in Indiana, were in favor of some kind of night driving restrictions for beginning teenage drivers.

Passenger Restriction

In 2002, the Safety Board revisited the teen driving issue and added a passenger restriction to its GDL recommendation. The Safety Board investigated several crashes involving young novice drivers that illustrate the tragic consequences of allowing inexperienced young drivers who have just recently obtained their licenses to drive with multiple teen passengers in the vehicle.

Teen drivers generally have more passengers than older drivers, and these passengers are usually the drivers' peers. This results in a deadly combination of inexperience and immaturity, such as the decision by occupants not to use their seat belts. The presence of teen passengers also can influence the risk-taking behavior of teen drivers, leading to crashes with increased injuries and deaths for both the drivers and their passengers. The relative risk of death among 16- and 17-year-old drivers who have at least one passenger in the car is significantly greater compared to driving alone. The risk increases with an increase in the number of passengers. Carrying at least three teen passengers results in a threefold increase in the probability of a teen in that vehicle suffering a fatal injury.

Indeed, two-thirds of teenage vehicle deaths occur in vehicles driven by teenagers. More teenagers die in vehicles driven by 16-year-olds than in vehicles driven by 17-, 18-, or 19-year-olds. The Safety Board found that teen drivers were involved in 6,796 single-vehicle fatal crashes from 1997 through 2001. Sixty-seven percent of the passengers killed in crashes involving teen drivers were teenagers themselves between the ages of 15 and 19, and 17 percent were younger than 14 years of age.

The National Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances (NCUTLO) added a passenger restriction into its Model Graduated Licensing Law in 2000, and incorporated it into the Uniform Vehicle Code. In a footnote, the UVC provides that "States can provide family-related exemptions from the prohibition against unsupervised transporting of teenage passengers, as deemed necessary."

There has been a remarkable movement to enact passenger restrictions since they were first implemented in the mid-1990s. Today, 21 States, and the District of Columbia, have added passenger restrictions to their graduated licensing systems. These include all but 2 of the 7 States that border Kentucky.

The jurisdictions adopting passenger restrictions have generally followed the UVC model law, particularly in regard to the elements of the passenger restriction:

Based on the available research, the UVC model law, and FARS data, the Board concluded that by restricting to zero or one the number of passengers carried by young novice drivers during the provisional (intermediate) license stage, states can reduce crashes involving young novice drivers and reduce fatalities among teenage occupants. The Board also concluded that if the passenger restriction and provisional (intermediate) license stage last only a few months, they are unlikely to have a substantial safety benefit. The Board, therefore, believes that Kentucky should restrict young novice drivers with a graduated license from carrying more than one passenger under the age of 20 until they receive an unrestricted license or for at least 6 months (whichever is longer).

Cell Phone Restrictions

Another new Safety Board recommendation on teen driving involves restricting their use of wireless communication devices.

In June of this year, the Safety Board issued a series of recommendations to addressing the growing problem of driver distraction, specifically distractions relating to wireless communication devices. The Board asked States to prohibit holders of learner's permits and intermediate licenses from using such devices while driving. The Board also recommended that States add driver distraction codes, including codes for wireless communication devices, to their State crash investigation forms.

These recommendations resulted from the Safety Board's investigation of a crash near Largo, Maryland where a Ford Explorer driven on Interstate 495 by a 20-year-old, novice driver veered off the left side of the roadway, crossed over the median, climbed a guardrail, flipped over, and landed on top of a southbound Ford minivan. All 5 persons in both vehicles were killed.

Just before the accident, the SUV driver had made a cell phone call, and she was talking on the phone at the time of the crash. The Safety Board concluded that contributing to the crash was the driver's inexperience and distraction caused by her use of a wireless telephone. Learning how to drive and getting comfortable in traffic requires all the concentration a novice driver can muster. As a result, we asked that States prohibit young novice drivers from using cell phones while driving.

Maine and New Jersey prohibit young, inexperienced drivers from using such devices. The Maine law applies to any driver under age 18, while the New Jersey law applies to holders of license permits. Similar bills were introduced in about 2 dozen States this year. We urge Kentucky to enact similar legislation and prohibit holders of learner's permits and intermediate licenses from using interactive wireless communications devices while driving.

The Safety Board concluded that more data is needed to determine the full scope of driver distraction, especially from wireless communication devices. According to the Cellular Telecommunications & Internet Association, the number of wireless telephone subscribers was approximately 145 million as of May 2003. The potential for distraction is growing! The Board encourages States, such as Kentucky, to make necessary changes to their crash report forms.

 

15-PASSENGER VANS

Although not a new issue, the dangers posed by 15-passenger vans have resurfaced recently. In the last 3 years, the Safety Board has investigated 11 crashes involving 15-passenger vans. These accidents have involved a daycare center transporting children, church vans, a college sports team, farm workers, and a family. A total of 60 people were killed and 77 injured in these 11 accidents. These numbers are unacceptable!

In our investigation of this growing problem, the Safety Board identified several factors that contribute to the dangers posed by 15-passenger vans. Passenger vans are not required to meet the same Federal motor vehicle safety standards as passenger vehicles, even though vans are used in a similar manner. Vans also have a higher center of gravity and different handling characteristics than traditional passenger vehicles, making passenger vans more prone to rollovers. And drivers of these vehicles do not have special licensing or training requirements.

More efforts need to be made to impress upon drivers the inherent danger of operating 15-passenger vans, particularly when fully loaded, and educating drivers about proper handling and control, particularly during emergency situations. Drivers operating vehicles carrying more than 15 passengers are required to have Commercial Drivers Licenses that come with specialized training, and the same should hold true for drivers of 15-passenger vans. I ask you to pursue changes to require a special endorsement for operating 15-passenger vans in Kentucky.

As we advocate our new recommendation on licensing, the Safety Board continues to promote our recommendations on proper transportation vehicles for school age children. In 1999, the Board asked States to require that all vehicles carrying more than 10 passengers and transporting children to and from school or school-related activities meets the school bus structural standards. School buses are built with extra safety features that 15-passenger vans do not have, such as compartmentalization, roof rollover protection, and specialty devices, such as flashing lights, swing-out stop arms, emergency egress areas, fire extinguishers, the bright yellow color, etc.

The Federal government regulates the standards to which vehicles must be built, but the States mandate what type of vehicle should be used to transport school children. Most States require that children be transported to and from school only on buses meeting Federal school bus crashworthiness standards. However, some States either allow or do not prohibit the use of nonconforming buses, such as 15-passenger vans, for school-related activities.

The Safety Board is firmly convinced that the best way to maximize pupil transportation safety is to require the use of school buses or buses built to equivalent occupant protection standards. When State governments do not prohibit the use of vans or buses that do not comply with the Federal school bus standards, parents may mistakenly believe their children are being transported in the safest mode possible. The lack of State legislation allows for situations in which the protection of children is undermined as students may be transported in a vehicle that does not provide the maximum available protection during accidents.

 

CONCLUSION

In 2002, 915 people lost their lives in traffic crashes on Kentucky roads. This fact, alone, should cause you to make improving highway safety a top priority for your Committees in the next legislative session. I have highlighted a few, but by no means all, of the areas in which improvements are needed in Kentucky.

I hope that my comments will provoke action that will lead to widespread improvements in Kentucky's highway safety laws and programs. We at the Safety Board are ready to assist you in any way that we can in this important task.

Thank you again for the opportunity to visit Frankfort again. I would be pleased to answer any questions on these, or any other highway safety topics, that you may have.



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