I would like to thank Stacey Gerard for inviting the National Transportation Safety Board to make some opening remarks.

Pipelines provide a vital transportation service to America. Today, over 2.1 million miles of pipelines crisscross our country - many of them running underneath our cities and towns. The safe transportation of product by pipeline is vital to meeting the energy needs of every community in our country.

The operation of pipelines with integrity problems has been a recurring issue in accidents investigated by the Safety Board. In 1987, as a result of investigations into three pipeline accidents (Beaumont, Kentucky; Lancaster, Kentucky; and Mounds View, Minnesota), the Safety Board recommended that the Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) require pipeline operators to periodically inspect their pipelines to identify corrosion, mechanical damage, and other time-dependent defects that may affect their safe operation.

Because of the importance of this issue, the Safety Board held a Pipeline Safety Hearing on November 15, 2000, that focused on technologies available to assess the integrity of pipelines, such as the use of in-line inspection tools. The hearing covered the benefits and limitations of these tools, as well as the status of ongoing research. A transcript of this hearing can be found on our web site at www.ntsb.gov.

Many groups have done significant work in this area, and RSPA has recently issued rules on integrity management for hazardous liquid pipelines.

The Safety Board has investigated accidents involving the operation of natural gas transmission pipelines with time-dependent defects.

For example, in 1994, in Edison Township, New Jersey, a natural gas transmission pipeline ruptured. The gas ignited, sending flames 400 to 500 feet upward and destroyed eight buildings. Examination of the ruptured pipe revealed previous mechanical damage to the exterior of the pipe that reduced its wall thickness. A crack grew to critical size when it then ruptured. Contributing to the rupture were brittle properties of the pipe material.

On August 19, 2000, a natural gas transmission pipeline rupture and fire near Carlsbad, New Mexico, killed twelve people. While the Safety Board has not yet completed its investigation, examination of the ruptured pipe revealed significant internal corrosion at the rupture location. The pipeline segment that ruptured was constructed in 1950.

Pipeline operators have had programs in place to ensure the integrity of pipelines; but some of these programs haven't worked.

More needs to be done. The Safety Board has only six pipeline investigators for the entire country. With a staff this small, the Safety Board can investigate only a very limited number of accidents. RSPA and pipeline operators need to take hard looks at the many accidents the Board can't investigate, and take measures to prevent recurrences. The first step in this process is to collect adequate data. For over 25 years, the Safety Board has pointed out major deficiencies and recommended changes to RSPA's pipeline accident data collection. RSPA has acknowledged that this is an important problem and has recently been working to improve its accident data collection.

Structured and reliable means are needed to validate how well prevention and control measures are working. RSPA needs to be sure that these means adequately address all time-dependent defects. RSPA and the public need to have confidence that integrity management programs will prevent, find, and correct problems before tragedies result.

In the rule recently issued covering integrity management for liquid pipelines, RSPA has taken a risk management approach. Risk management principles, if properly applied, can be powerful tools by which the risks to pipeline integrity can be continually identified, and should lead pipeline operators to take action to mitigate those risks. But use of these principles must be rigorous to be effective. Operators need to continually assimilate all integrity-related information, and assess and reevaluate a pipeline's integrity. The process of planning, assessing, and evaluating can provide operators and regulators with better data by which to judge a pipeline's condition. To ensure that effective risk-based integrity management programs are employed, RSPA needs to be sure it has an effective evaluation program and vigorously examine operators' pipeline integrity programs. Doing so will require RSPA to develop significant additional expertise and resources.

Whatever direction RSPA takes, any new requirements should include criteria against which the adequacy of actions taken can be evaluated. When requirements do not contain measurable standards for performance, it is difficult to determine compliance.

The public needs to have confidence that integrity management programs will find and correct problems before they result in tragic accidents. Therefore, the public needs improved access to information about how pipelines are being operated, and how pipeline risks can be controlled. Improved ways should be found so that the public, communities, and States can better make their voices heard.

I look forward to hearing summaries on how to improve the integrity of natural gas pipelines, and then hearing reports on communication needs and options regarding natural gas as well as hazardous liquid pipelines.

Thank you.