Testimony of Robert Chipkevich, Chief Pipeline/Hazardous Materials Division
Office of Surface Transportation Safety, National Transportation Safety Board
before the Committee on Commerce, Subcommittee on Energy and Power
House of Representatives
Regarding One-Call Systems
June 27, 1996

Excavation-caused damage is the single largest cause of pipeline accidents reported to the U.S. Department of Transportation's Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS). Of the accidents reported to OPS in 1993, the latest year for which we have reviewed OPS reports and manually separated excavation-caused damages from the broader "Outside Force Damage" category, 27 percent of the 188 natural gas distribution system accidents, 17 percent of the 97 natural gas gathering and transmission accidents, and 22 percent of the 229 liquid pipeline accidents were caused by excavation errors.

Reported property damage losses in 1993 exceeded $18 million; however, we have found that the value of property losses reported to the OPS are grossly underestimated. For example, while the narrative portion of many accident report forms document that damages occurred, the value of the damages are not recorded. In addition to damaging real property, excavation-caused accidents also result in untold millions of dollars in losses as a result of service outages in gas, electrical, water, sewer, and communication systems or as a result of traffic rerouting and other disruptions to community life.

Safety Board accident investigations in the late 1960s and early 1970s prompted the Safety Board to hold a symposium in 1972 on preventing excavation-caused damages. That symposium brought together representatives of organizations involved with excavation and pipeline operations to explore solutions that would enhance public safety. As a result of the symposium and the recommendations subsequently issued by the Safety Board, the American Public Works Association today serves as the primary support for local, state, and national groups dedicated to preventing excavation damages to our Nation's infrastructure. During that symposium, we learned of systems begun by facility operators in two states (New York and Oregon) in which excavators were able to make one telephone call to notify most buried facility operators of their plans to excavate. This allowed the operators to mark the locations of their facilities in advance of excavation operations. Use of these systems was found to reduce significantly the number of excavation damages to buried facilities, especially gas pipelines.

Based on the symposium findings, we made recommendations to all the States and several agencies, including the Office of Pipeline Safety at the U.S. Department of Transportation, for implementing similar systems nationwide. We also recommended that the States enact legislation to require that all buried facility operators participate in the one-call systems where available. Through the symposium we learned that the desired reduction in excavation damages to pipelines can not be achieved without having all buried facility operators participate in the program. We recommended also that all excavators be required to use available one-call notification systems to provide notice of planned excavations.

Since those early safety recommendations, much improvement has been made for reducing excavation-caused damages to buried facilities. This improvement has been achieved largely because of action by the States for enacting the requirements recommended and for fostering the development of one-call excavation notification systems. In 1972, there were no State laws on excavation damage prevention, but in 1995 all but six States (Alabama, Alaska, Hawaii, Nebraska, Texas, and West Virginia) have legislation requiring most or all facility operators to participate in the one-call systems and most or all excavators to notify the operators of planned excavations using the one-call centers. In 1972 there were but three metropolitan areas (Chicago, Portland, and Rochester) served by excavation notification centers; by 1995, all but two States (Hawaii and South Dakota) had one call notification centers providing statewide service.

Clearly progress has been made. The voluntary, cooperative actions of buried facility operators, State lawmakers, and excavators have been most responsible for reversing the increasing excavation-caused accident trend experienced in the 1970s. As a result of those safety advances, many lives were saved, injuries were prevented, and countless dollars in property damage were avoided. It is relevant to note that this improvement came at a time when there was substantial growth in residential, commercial and highway construction, and extensive urban renewal projects in most large cities.

However, our investigations of pipeline accidents and our review of reports on excavation-caused damages to facilities other than pipelines show that the full potential of the one-call system is far from being realized. The Safety Board believes that much more must be done to minimize the potential to damage pipelines and other buried facilities by excavation activities. Our concern about this safety issue was heightened by a rash of excavation-caused pipeline accidents that occurred in a 16-month period in 1993 and 1994. Those accidents were in:

Allentown, Pennsylvania, on June 9, 1994, in which natural gas escaped from a 2-inch-diameter natural-gas service line whose location was marked but still was ruptured by a contractor during excavation at a high-rise housing authority building for the elderly. Gas entered the 8-story building and migrated to all floors before being ignited. The resulting explosion caused the death of one resident and injured 90 others. That building and several adjacent ones were severely damaged. Property losses were in excess of $5 million.

Green River, Wyoming, on May 3, 1994, in which a 10-inch-diameter natural-gas gathering pipeline was ruptured by employees operating excavation equipment for a highway contractor. Two contractor employees were killed, and two others were injured, one of whom died later. The one-call notification center for the area was not used, and the pipeline operator did not participate in the excavation-notification system.

Edison Township, New Jersey, on March 23, 1994, in which a 36-inch natural-gas pipeline ruptured and set fire to a nearby apartment building complex. More than 100 people were injured, eight apartment buildings were destroyed, about 1,500 residents were evacuated, and property damages exceeded $25 million. The pipeline company had not been notified when excavation activities were conducted in the area of the rupture some years earlier.

St. Paul, Minnesota, on July 22, 1993, in which a city sewer crew struck and ruptured a marked gas service line. Gas migrated into an adjacent commercial building and exploded. Three people were killed and 12 others injured.

Cliffwood Beach, New Jersey, on June 9, 1993, in which a gas company contractor struck and ruptured an unmarked gas line no longer used as a service line. The contractor repaired an obvious break in the gas line, but gas being released from a second, hidden break migrated into an adjacent house where it exploded destroying the house, killing three people, and injuring three others.

Reston, Virginia, on March 29, 1993, in which a 36-inch-diameter pipeline ruptured, releasing more than 400,000 gallons of diesel fuel into Sugar Run, a tributary of the Potomac River. This accident caused substantial environmental damage and community disruption, but no injuries. The rupture resulted from damages inflicted by heavy construction equipment at an unknown time before the rupture. No record of when the construction work was performed could be found. Environmental damage and clean-up costs exceeded $10 million.

In cooperation with the Department of Transportation's Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), the National Transportation Safety Board sponsored an Excavation-Damage Prevention Workshop in Washington, DC on September 8 and 9, 1994. Our purpose in holding the workshop was:

1. To increase public awareness of the potentially catastrophic consequences to public safety from excavation-caused damages to buried facilities, and

2. To propose solutions for preventing the recurrence of excavation-caused damages. During this workshop, almost 400 safety professionals from across the United States and Canada, including Federal, State, local-government, and industry representatives, participated, lending their expertise to developing solutions to reduce excavation-caused damages to our infrastructure.

At that workshop, we heard from States that had modified their excavation damage prevention programs and who were achieving significantly greater reductions in excavation damages. First, they required all buried facility operators and all excavators participate in the damage prevention program. Then they assigned responsibility for administering the program to a single State agency and provided effective, efficient enforcement powers to that agency. And last, they levied on the administering State agency the responsibility of educating the public, buried-facility operators, and excavators about the requirements of the program.

Three states presented information on their programs to the 1994 workshop participants - Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Minnesota. The Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities representative, Ms. Gail Soars, stated that its initial legislation was typical of most States today. She said that it required all excavators to notify utilities before they began to dig, but the law did not really work because there was no effective education or enforcement.

Ms. Soars attributed the effectiveness of the present legislation to the creation of a one-call system, requiring everyone to notify the system of proposed excavations, including homeowners who excavate or contract to excavate, and requiring excavators to (1) take reasonable precautions to protect buried facilities from excavation activities; (2) maintain the location markings made by facility operators; and most importantly, (3) notify the facility operators immediately should any underground facility be damaged. The Massachusetts Legislature empowered a single State agency, the Department of Public Utilities, as the administrator of the law and gave it the authority to enforce the law and assess fines. Previously, the Commonwealth had established penalties into its legislation, but provided no effective way to enforce them.

The most meaningful result of the Massachusetts program has been the reduction in excavation-caused damage to natural-gas pipelines from 1,138 incidents in 1986 to 412 in 1993. The DPU's success is not measured in the fines collected for violations, but in the reduction in damages to buried facilities. With more than a 63-percent decrease in damage since 1986, the Massachusetts program has been exceedingly successful.

The States of Connecticut and Minnesota advised workshop participants that they also implemented administrative programs similar to that of Massachusetts. The Connecticut representative advised that since passage of its new law, damage to underground facilities has decreased by over 60 percent. More specifically, damage caused by not giving notice to buried-facility operators has declined more than 85 percent. He emphasized that the statistics are even more meaningful than they seem because the net trench miles (the number of miles of pipe, cable, and conduit underground) has more than doubled during the same time period.

The Minnesota representative stated that he believed their damage-prevention program is highly successful because it includes an effective education program and because the law is enforced by the Department of Public Safety's Office of Public Safety. The Minnesota program has a unique board of directors, made up of volunteer representatives from associations that represent the entire interest group rather than an individual company. The Minnesota Office of Pipeline Safety, whose director is a member, stated that any damage-prevention program should be State-enforced under Federal guidance. These programs also need sufficient flexibility to allow people in the various States to work with one another in identifying the best ways of getting excavators and buried-facility operators to work together. There must be sufficient flexibility to deal with changes in either industry.

The recommendations developed by the workshop participants on ways of preventing excavation damage are presently being used by pipeline operators, other utility operators, and related agencies, such as one-call centers and State regulatory agencies, to guide their near-term safety efforts. The candid discussions and thoughtful consideration during the workshop made it possible for all to agree upon resolutions that will be used to guide this nation into the twenty-first century by identifying legislative and other improvements, including the conduct of future workshops.

Other States, such as Utah and New Jersey, have modified their damage prevention statutes to bring them more in line with the provisions just discussed. More importantly though are the States that are considering changes to their damage prevention legislation this year and those that will be reviewing their legislation next year. Those States are trying to improve their programs, but they need help to keep interests such as municipal utility systems, state transportation departments, and others from obtaining exemptions from the excavation damage statutes. Also, they need guidance about provisions essential to the program's success for reducing excavation-caused damages to buried facilities and to make them more uniform to encourage improved participation from contractors that operate in several States.

The Safety Board believes that to motivate the States to timely and uniformly modify their excavation damage prevention programs to achieve the previous stated objectives, Federal support is needed. That support, we believe, can be provided most effectively through a Federal statute setting forth the provisions each State program should include if it is to provide maximum safety for excavators and the public. The Safety Board believes that each State program, at a minimum, must require:

Full participation from all organizations that excavate or that operate buried facilities;

Statewide one-call notification centers that accept emergency notifications 24 hours a day;

Effective State damage-prevention requirements that include compliance monitoring and effective enforcement; and

Comprehensive education programs for buried-facility operators, excavators, and the public that explain how to use the damage-prevention program and the penalties for improper or nonuse.

That concludes the Safety Board's prepared remarks and I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.