Stout v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., ARB No. 00-017, ALJ No. 1999-STA-42 (ARB Jan. 31, 2003)

U.S. Department of Labor

Administrative Review Board 200 Constitution Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20210

ARB CASE NO. 00-017
ALJ CASE NO. 1999-STA-42
DATE: January 31, 2003

In the Matter of:

MICHAEL J. STOUT,
    COMPLAINANT,

    v.

YELLOW FREIGHT SYSTEM, INC.,
    RESPONDENTS.

BEFORE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD

Appearances:

For the Complainant:
Michelle Malkin, Esq., Schwerin, Campbell & Barnard LLP, Seattle, Washington

For the Respondent:
Anderson B. Scott, Esq., Fisher & Phillips LLP, Atlanta, Georgia

   This case arises under the employee protection provisions of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act (STAA) of 1982, as amended and recodified, 49 U.S.C.A. § 31105 (West 1997). Complainant Michael J. Stout alleges that his employer, Respondent Yellow Freight System, Inc., violated the STAA when it suspended him for two weeks because he resisted taking driving assignments on two occasions due to illness and fatigue. A Department of Labor Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued a Recommended Decision and Order in which he concluded that Stout had failed to sustain his initial burden of establishing the elements of a prima facie case because he had not effectively informed Yellow Freight that he was too ill and fatigued to drive safely. The ALJ's decision is before the Administrative Review Board pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1978.109(c)(1)'s automatic review procedures. We affirm the ALJ's Recommended Decision and Order.

   We have jurisdiction to decide this matter by authority of 49 U.S.C.A. § 31105(b)(2)(C) (West 1997) and 29 C.F.R. § 1978.109(c)(2002).

   Under the STAA, the Administrative Review Board is bound by the factual findings of the ALJ if those findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole. 29 C.F.R. § 1978.109(c)(3); BSP Transp., Inc. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 160 F.3d 38, 46 (1st Cir. 1998); Castle Coal & Oil Co., Inc. v. Reich, 55 F.3d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 1995). Substantial evidence is that which is "more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Clean Harbors Envtl. Servs. v. Herman, 146 F.3d 12, 21 (1st Cir. 1998) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)).

   In reviewing the ALJ's conclusions of law, the Board, as the designee of the Secretary, acts with "all the powers [the Secretary] would have in making the initial decision . . . ." 5 U.S.C.A. § 557(b) (West 1996). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1978.109(b). Therefore, the Board reviews the ALJ's conclusions of law de novo. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Dole, 929 F.2d 1060, 1066 (5th Cir. 1991).

   We have reviewed the record and find that the ALJ's factual findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole and are therefore conclusive. 29 C.F.R. § 1978.109(c)(3). The record also supports the ALJ's thorough, well reasoned legal conclusions. Accordingly, we adopt and attach the ALJ's Recommended Decision and Order and AFFIRM the denial of Stout's complaint.

   SO ORDERED.

       M. CYNTHIA DOUGLASS
       Chief Administrative Appeals Judge

       OLIVER M. TRANSUE
       Administrative Appeals Judge