ARB CASE NO. 00-075
ALJ CASE NO. 2000-STA-28
DATE: February 28, 2003
In the Matter of:
NANCY YOUNG,
COMPLAINANT,
v.
SCHLUMBERGER OIL FIELD SERVICES,
RESPONDENT.
BEFORE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD
Appearances:
For the Complainant:
Nancy Young, pro se, Corpus Christi, Texas
For the Respondent:
Tonya Beane Webber, Esq., Melissa M. Ricard, Esq., Porter, Rogers, Dahlman & Gordon, Corpus Christi, Texas
FINAL DECISION AND ORDER
This case involves the whistleblower protection provision of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act, 49 U.S.C.A. § 31105 (West 1997), and implementing regulations, 29 C.F.R. Part 1978 (2002). Nancy Young alleges that Schlumberger Oil Field Services violated § 31105 when it terminated her employment during a Reduction in Force (RIF). A Labor Department Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) conducted an evidentiary hearing. He found that Young did not prove essential elements of her case. Therefore, he recommends that her complaint be dismissed. Young v. Schlumberger Oil Field Services, 2000-STA-28 (Aug. 10, 2000) (R. D. & O.). Young appealed. We concur that dismissal is warranted.
JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
We have jurisdiction to review the R. D. & O. and to issue the final agency decision pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1978.109(c)(1) and Secretary's Order No. 1-2002, 67 Fed. Reg. 64,272 (Oct. 17, 2002).
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We review the ALJ's findings of fact under the substantial evidence standard. "The findings of the administrative law judge with respect to questions of fact, if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole, shall be considered conclusive." 29 C.F.R. § 1978.109(c)(3). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477, 71 S.Ct. 456, 477 (1951).
ISSUES ON APPEAL
A. Whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's findings that Young did not prove essential elements for each of her claims.
B. Whether the ALJ erred in failing to give Young greater assistance.
BACKGROUND
Schlumberger Oil Field Services is a corporation which does business nationwide. It provides a wide range of services to customers engaged in the search for and production of oil and gas. Schlumberger uses a large fleet of commercial motor vehicles (CMVs or trucks).
In early 1998, Schlumberger began equipping its CMVs with on-board computers. Soon, in April 1998, Schlumberger hired Young to assist in developing appropriate software and software applications for its computer system in the Alice District in southern Texas. Shortly after she started, Young's supervisor asked her (or permitted her, the record is unclear) to help mechanics in the Alice District install the computers. Thereafter, Young spent a large part of her time working on computer installation instead of developing software programs and working with computer-generated data.
Meanwhile, Young's counterpart in the Southeast Texas District, Paul Rose, never involved himself with computer installation. Rose worked with managers who needed computer data for planning and evaluation. He developed appropriate software programs and generated data in forms useful to the managers.
Unfortunately, the oil industry experienced a financial downturn in early 1998. The industry slump meant less work for Schlumberger. It responded by downsizing its operations. It downsized by consolidating districts, eliminating positions, and RIFing staff. Schlumberger made RIF decisions based on the employees' experience, expertise in light of the company's future needs, and past performance. If two or more employees competing for a single position were equally competent, Schlumberger broke the tie based on seniority.
Eventually, in early 1999, Schlumberger merged the Alice District and the Southeast Texas District into its Central Region and closed each district's headquarters office. As a result, the company needed only one CMV computer data specialist. The two candidates for the position were Young and Rose.
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Guy Lombardo, a company manager who had worked with them both, applied the RIF criteria and concluded that Rose was better qualified than Young. The "start up" phase, when Young's installation skills had been useful, was ending. Henceforth the CMV computer system would be operating on a routine basis, and data and software management skills would be at a premium. Rose had been doing this kind of work successfully throughout the installation phase, whereas Young had concentrated on hardware installation. Lombardo also ranked Rose above Young in past performance. He based this judgment on the fact that Rose promptly and correctly produced data that Lombardo requested, but Young did not. Rose also had greater seniority than Young. On July 6, 1999, Schlumberger notified Young that she was being RIF'd.
1 Young contends that the ALJ should have ruled in her favor and awarded her relief. Her brief, however, is mostly a narrative account of the evidence as Young sees it. It contains almost no explicit argument as to how or why the ALJ's findings and conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence.
However, because Young is acting pro se, we have construed her assertions concerning the merits of her complaint liberally and in light of the substantial evidence standard of review. See Section B, infra.
2 31105(a) Prohibitions.� (1) A person may not discharge an employee, or discipline or discriminate against an employee regarding pay, terms, or privileges of employment, because�
(A) the employee . . . has filed a complaint or begun a proceeding related to a violation of a commercial motor vehicle safety regulation, standard, or order, or has testified or will testify in such a proceeding; or
(B) the employee refuses to operate a vehicle because�
(i) the operation violates a regulation, standard, or order of the United States related to commercial motor vehicle safety or health; or
(ii) the employee has a reasonable apprehension of serious injury to the employee or the public because of the vehicle's unsafe condition.
(2) Under paragraph (1)(B)(ii) of this subsection, an employee's apprehension of serious injury is reasonable only if a reasonable individual in the circumstances then confronting the employee would conclude that the unsafe condition establishes a real danger of accident, injury, or serious impairment to health. To qualify for protection, the employee must have sought from the employer, and been unable to obtain, correction of the unsafe condition.
49 U.S.C.A. § 31105(a)(2).
3 "Her testimony centered on problems with CMVs, such as inoperable speedometers and alleged falsification of electronic and paper logs. Her safety concerns included improper . . . wiring of electrical circuits which caused unit [truck] fires; electrical shorts causing cellular phones and batteries to die out; distractive keypad mountings; wire harnesses; and unsafe emergency exits, fire protection and hearing protection." R. D. & O. slip op. at 50. "I agree with Respondent that Complainant engaged in a 憇hotgun approach' of uncorroborated allegations, which for the most part, were either refuted, rebutted or corrected by Respondent." Id. at 52.
4 Section 31105(a)(1)(A) does not expressly distinguish between internal and external complaints. The distinction arose in litigation over the meaning of the terms "filing a complaint or beginning a proceeding." See e.g., Clean Harbors Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Herman, 146 F.3d 12, 19� (1st Cir. 1998) (discussing and rejecting putative distinction between internal and external complaints).
5 (a) Prohibitions.�(1) A person may not discharge an employee, or discipline or discriminate against an employee regarding pay, terms, or privileges of employment because�
(B) the employee refuses to operate a vehicle because�
(i) the operation violates a regulation, standard, or order of the United States related to commercial motor vehicle safety or health
. . . .
6 "[A]n employee's apprehension of serious injury is reasonable only if a reasonable individual in the circumstances then confronting the employee would conclude that the unsafe condition establishes a real danger of accident, injury, or serious impairment to health. To qualify for protection, the employee must have sought from the employer, and been unable to obtain, correction of the unsafe condition."
49 U.S.C.A. § 31105(a)(2).
7 "The Judge even stated that he would have a conference with me if he felt that I in fact needed counsel as a result of my shortcomings. However, he instead never followed through with this statement, and he just proceeded to get on my case for not understanding what he was trying to get across." Young Br. at 3-4.
Whether and in precisely what terms the ALJ made such a promise is not reflected in the written record. However, it is not necessary to know more about any promise the ALJ might have made to dispose of the underlying issue杦as the assistance this ALJ provided to Young legally sufficient.