As a result of this altercation, BECO initiated an audit of Foley's work. When the audit revealed that Foley had falsified documents relating to the inspection of various materials, BECO reprimanded Foley, removed him from the quality assurance department, revoked his certification as a plant engineer, and suspended him for 20 days. Additionally, BECO required Foley to undergo a "remediation" process which included progress tests and evaluations. Dissatisfied with these constraints, Foley sought another position with the Company.

   In November 1995, Foley began work as a mechanical planner. Ten months later, however, Foley claimed that he was suffering from severe emotional stress and went on disability leave. When Foley returned to work in March 1997, he requested a transfer away from the Pilgrim plant. In response, BECO reassigned Foley to a clerical position in the billing department of its corporate offices in Boston at the same wages and benefits.

   In June 1997, Foley requested tuition reimbursement for an $8,000 computer course on network administration that was scheduled to begin in September of that year. Although BECO initially denied it, the request was ultimately approved. Foley, however, never took the course as he again went on disability leave in August 1997 and subsequently resigned from the Company in May 1998.

   On July 7, 1997, Foley filed a written complaint with the Department of Labor ("DOL") alleging that BECO retaliated against him in violation of the ERA. Specifically, Foley alleged that he engaged in protected activity in May 1995 when he insisted that the RHT was not properly calibrated and that BECO retaliated by reprimanding and suspending him. Foley further alleged that BECO also retaliated against him in 1997 by transferring him to clerical duties and by initially denying his request for tuition reimbursement.

II. JURISDICTION

   We have jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 5851 and 29 C.F.R. § 24.8.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

   Under the Administrative Procedure Act, we have plenary power to review an ALJ's factual and legal conclusions. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 557(b) (West 1996). As a result, the Board is not bound by the conclusion of the ALJ, but retains complete freedom to review factual and legal findings de novo. See Masek v. Cadle Co., ARB Case No. 97-069, ALJ Case No. 95-WPC-1, Dec. and Ord., Apr. 28, 2000, slip op. at 7.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Timeliness

   The ERA and its implementing regulations provide that any complaint shall be filed, in writing, within 180 days after the occurrence of the alleged violation. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5851(b)(1); 29 C.F.R. § 24.3(b)(2). In his appeal, Foley argues that the ALJ erred in not tolling the 180-day time limit because:

Foley did not make these particular arguments prior to the close of the record.

   The Board and its predecessors generally have not considered arguments that are raised for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., Swanson Group, Inc., BSCA No. 94-05 (BSCA May 31, 1995) slip op. at 8 (in Service Contract Act enforcement action, "failure to raise a defense [before an ALJ] in a timely manner constitutes waiver of that claim," citing Thompson Brothers, Inc., BSCA Case No. 92- 32 (Jan. 29, 1993)). Cf. Immanual v. Wyoming Concrete Industries, Inc., ARB No. 96-022, ALJ No. 95-WPC-3 (ARB May 28, 1997) rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Immanuel v. U.S. Dept. of Labor, 139 F.3d 889 (4th Cir. 1998)(Table) slip op. at 2-3 (although argument raised on appeal to ARB was not briefed to the ALJ, the claim was raised at trial and therefore preserved). Even if we were to consider these arguments, they are clearly without merit.

   Foley's first argument is nothing more than a bald assertion that he was incapacitated. Although Foley has submitted letters showing that he was under a doctor's care, his doctor does not state or even suggest that Foley's illness was so debilitating that it prevented him from either understanding his legal rights or acting upon them. In support of his second argument, Foley submitted a copy of H.R. No. 101-474 (VIII), reprinted in 1992 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1953 , 2296-2297. The reprint is a section-by-section analysis of a bill that was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives and references a proposal to increase the time limit for filing a complaint from thirty days to one year. This particular proposal did not become law, so it is not inconsistent with the 180-day time limit finally adopted by Congress and codified in 42 U.S.C.A. § 5851(b)(1). Furthermore, as Foley filed his complaint approximately two years after the alleged adverse action, even with a one-year filing requirement his complaint would still be untimely. Foley's last argument is simply that, if the NRC had acted sooner, he might have chosen not to sit on his rights. Absent a showing that the NRC's actions somehow prevented Foley from exercising his right to file a complaint, we see no basis upon which to conclude that the statute's 180-day time limit should be tolled.

B. The Discovery Process

   Foley's remaining challenge to the Recommended Decision concerns what he believes were inappropriate actions by both BECO and the ALJ during the post-hearing discovery process. Specifically, Foley notes that, when he attempted to obtain a particular investigative file through discovery, BECO objected on the grounds that it was irrelevant to Foley's case. Although the ALJ ultimately ordered BECO to provide Foley with the documents, he also issued a protective order precluding Foley from disclosing the contents or substance of the documents to any person or entity and requiring Foley to sign a statement if he agreed to accept the restriction. Post Hearing Order No. 3. Foley agreed to abide by the protective order. However, when BECO proffered an agreement adopting the non-disclosure language of the protective order, Foley refused to sign it and asserted that BECO's proffer of the agreement constituted a new retaliatory action.