Three criteria ordinarily are used when
considering a request for a stay: the likelihood that the movant will prevail on the merits, whether
the movant will suffer irreparable injury in the absence of a stay, and whether a stay is in the public
interest. See Hoffman v. Bossert, Case No. 94-CAA-004, Sec. Order Denying Stay, Nov.
20, 1995, slip op. at 1-2, citing stay criteria outlined in Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v.
Federal Power Comm'n, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1958). We consider each of these criteria
in turn.
A. EG&G is not likely to prevail on the merits
EG&G contends that, on judicial review, it is likely to prevail on the issue that
it is entitled to a jury trial under the Constitution. The company maintains that it meets the three part
test for the availability of a jury trial established in Granfinanciera S.A. v. Nordberg, 492
U.S. 33 (1989). We earlier declined to address the merits of the jury trial issue, noting that in the
usual case an administrative agency will not opine on the constitutionality of Federal statutes that
it administers. FD at 8-9.
Without addressing the argument in full, we note our disagreement with
EG&G's view that the employee protection provisions of the environmental acts provide a private
right of action that is not closely integrated into the regulatory scheme of those statutes. Rather, we
find that the employee protection provisions are a critical piece well integrated into the whole. At
least one court has agreed. In reference to the analogous employee protection provision of the Clean
Water Act, the Third Circuit explained in Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm'rs v. United States
Dep't of Labor, 992 F.2d 474, 478, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 964 (1993):
-
Such "whistle-blower" provisions are intended to promote a working
environment in which employees are relatively free from the debilitating threat of
employment reprisals for publicly asserting company violations of statutes protecting
the environment, such as the Clean Water Act and nuclear safety statutes. They are
intended to encourage employees to aid in the enforcement of these statutes by
raising substantiated claims through protected procedural channels. * * * The
[Page 13]-
whistleblower provision was enacted for the broad remedial purpose of shielding employees from
retaliatory actions taken against them by management to discourage or punish employee efforts to
bring the corporation into compliance with the Clean Water Act's safety and quality standards. If
the regulatory scheme is to effectuate its substantial goals, employees must be free from threats to
their job security in retaliation for their good faith assertions of corporate violations of the statute.
Thus, the public purpose of the environmental acts is protected by the whistleblower provisions
that protect employees, who likely will be the first to perceive a violation of the underlying purposes
or standards of the act. Therefore, EG&G is not likely to prevail on its argument that the employee
protection provisions of the environmental acts provide a private right of action that is not closely
integrated into the regulatory schemes of those acts.
Nor is EG&G likely to prevail on the issues of reinstatement and back pay,
on which the Board affirmed the recommended order of the Administrative Law Judge.
B. A stay will harm Jones and is contrary to the public
interest
Jones bears the stigma of working in a field other than his chosen one, and in
a position with less responsibility, challenge, and compensation. A stay would prolong the stigma,
as well as frustrate the public interest of restoring a successful complainant under the employee
protection provisions to the status he enjoyed prior to the statutory violation. We find that the
balance of harm and the public interest both favor Jones, and do not support EG&G's stay request.
C. There is no irreparable harm to EG&G absent a
stay
EG&G cites three types of allegedly irreparable harm it would suffer absent
a stay. The first is that reinstating Jones will bump the current safety manager, Sam Guello, from
his position. As we stated above, there is little chance that EG&G, a large entity, cannot find
satisfactory work for Guello. Moreover, to find that reinstatement constitutes irreparable harm
where it will cause another employee to be bumped from his position would be to punish Jones for
having worked in a unique, high level position. The whistleblower provisions require reinstatement
as a remedy for all complainants, and do not exclude such protection for complainants such as Jones,
who occupied a unique, senior position.
Likewise, the other "irreparable harms" cited by EG&G
improperly blame the victim of discrimination, Jones. Jones should not be faulted for testifying as
an expert witness against EG&G in a citizen action complaint under the environmental laws. Nor
should he be punished for lacking experience at managing the safety department during "hot
operation" at the plant, since EG&G's discharge prohibited him from gaining that experience.
Jones stands ready to undergo any necessary training.
[Page 14]
Finally, there is no irreparable harm because Jones publicly has expressed
reservations about the safety of the Disposal Facility. EG&G threatens that "it will be unable
to establish a good working relationship with Jones" because of his public statements. Like
any litigant, EG&G has the
power to accept the Board's ruling and instruct its other employees to cooperate fully with Jones
when he resumes the position of Safety Manager.
Since EG&G is not likely to prevail on the merits and will not suffer
irreparable injury absent a stay, and because a stay would harm both Jones and the public interest,
we deny the motion for stay pending judicial review.
CONCLUSION
We amend two factual findings in the final decision, but the amendments do
not alter our conclusion that EG&G violated the employee protection provisions of the
environmental acts. Upon reconsideration, we again order EG&G to reinstate Jones to his former
position and affirm the other remedies ordered in the final decision, with a minor amendment to the
back pay order allowing EG&G to subtract the amounts Jones has earned through other employment.
We lift the earlier ordered stay and deny a stay pending judicial review.
ORDER
It is ORDERED that EG&G:
1. Reinstate Jones to his former position as Safety Manager at the Tooele
Disposal Facility with the same wages, benefits, and conditions of employment that he would have
enjoyed if EG&G had not discharged him.
2. Pay Jones back pay from the date of termination to the date of reinstatement,
or declination of a bona fide offer of reinstatement. Any severance payments EG&G made
to Jones and any salary Jones has received from other employment shall be deducted from the
amount of back pay owed. EG&G shall pay prejudgment interest on the back pay award at the
interest rate set forth in 26 U.S.C. §6621 (1994).
3. Pay Jones compensatory damages of $50,000.00
4. It is further ORDERED that the ALJ shall issue a supplemental
recommended decision on attorney fees and costs.
SO ORDERED.
PAUL
GREENBERG
Chair
CYNTHIA L.
ATTWOOD
Acting
Member