ARB CASE NO. 99-033, 99-048
ALJ CASE NO. 95-CLA-31
DATE: June 30, 2000
In the Matter of:
ADMINISTRATOR,
WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
PLAINTIFF,
v.
MERLE ELDERKIN d/b/a ELDERKIN FARM,
RESPONDENT.
BEFORE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD
Appearances: For the Plaintiff:
Ellen R. Edmonds, Esq., Roger Wilkinson, Esq., Linda Jan S. Pack,
Esq., Steven J. Mandel, Esq., U.S. Department of Labor, Washington, D.C.
For the Respondent:
James E. Westman, Esq., Westman and Associates, Jamestown, New York
1 Immediately after the accident, Merle Elderkin
rushed Peter to the local firehouse which took him to the hospital. Peter's arm was reattached at the hospital.
Medical records indicate Peter has regained some sensation in and use of his right arm.
2 The Findings of Fact were also attached
to the ALJ's Decision and Order (D. & O.).
3 On April 17, 1996, the Secretary
delegated jurisdiction to issue final agency decisions under this statute to the Administrative Review Board.
Secretary's Order 2-96, 61 Fed. Reg. 19978 (May 3, 1996).
4 The Supreme Court has contrasted the
expansive scope of the FLSA's coverage of employees with that of the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA). In Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992), the Court ruled that in
the absence of a useful statutory definition or clear legislative history, the term "employee" as used in
ERISA should be given its common law meaning. While indicating that it might well apply this rule to a wide
variety of statutes which had definitions of "employee" similar to ERISA, the Court specifically noted that
the definition of employee under the FLSA was to be given a much broader meaning. The Court found it
significant that the FLSA defines "employ" to mean "suffer or permit to work." Nationwide
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. at 326. "This latter definition, whose striking breadth we have
previously noted, . . . stretches the meaning of 'employee' to cover some parties who might not qualify as such
under a strict application of traditional agency law principles." Id.
5 On review, Elderkin does not directly
challenge the sanctions order. In any event, the ALJ has broad discretion to exact penalties for failure to abide
by discovery orders. See 29 C.F.R. §18.6(d). We find no abuse of discretion here, where Elderkin
failed to comply with discovery and repeated orders of the Chief ALJ.
6 Of course, an ALJ's credibility
determinations are entitled to deference. See Donato v. Plainview-Old Bethpage Central Sch. Dist., 96
F.3d 623 (2d Cir. 1996).
7 It is also possible that Elderkin is
arguing that Peter was working as an employee of his stepfather, Frank Strouhauer, at the time of the accident,
and that Strouhauer was an independent contractor and not an employee of Elderkin. Even if this were a
plausible theory, we agree with the Administrator (Petitioner's Br. at 7-8) that Elderkin was at least a joint
employer.
8 Thus, we specifically reject the ALJ's
finding that Elderkin cooperated with the Division's investigation. D. & O. at 11.
9 We reject the ALJ's findings regarding
that minor, Brian Chadwick. The ALJ found:
One activity described by Brian, operating a chain saw to cut firewood, was performed at the
Respondent's home and not on the farm. He did not specify where the other activity, operating
a tractor to plow snow, was performed and whether he was paid to perform either of these tasks.
They did not corroborate Brian's allegations nor question the Respondent to verify his story.
D. & O. at 11 (footnote omitted). Elderkin's residence was on the farm property. And whether or not the
residence was on farm property, Elderkin's employment of a twelve year old child in hazardous employment
(cutting firewood with a chain saw) was unlawful. See 29 C.F.R. §579.3(b). Whether Brian was
paid for the tasks is largely irrelevant under the FLSA. As we have discussed above, the relevant inquiry is
whether the employer "suffer[s] or permit[s] [the employee] to work."
10 We therefore find that the discretionary
factors listed in 29 C.F.R. §579.5(d) do not apply to reduce the penalty.
11 Elderkin presented a witness who
testified that he recognized the handwriting on the notes as having been written by his brother. Elderkin did not
explain why the alleged penman of the notes was not produced.