ARB CASE NO. 06-095
ALJ CASE NO. 2006-STA-002
DATE: September 28, 2007
In the Matter of:
LINDA G. BALAZS,
COMPLAINANT,
v.
DIMARE FRESH, INC.,
RESPONDENT.
BEFORE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD
Appearance:
For the Respondent:
W. Stephen Cockerham, Esq., Hunton & Williams LLP, Dallas, Texas
FINAL DECISION AND ORDER
This
case arises under the employee protection provisions of the Surface
Transportation Assistance Act (STAA) of 1982, as amended and recodified, 49
U.S.C.A. § 31105 (West 1997).[1]
Section 31105 provides protection from discrimination to employees who
report violations of commercial motor vehicle safety rules or who refuse to
operate a vehicle when such operation would violate those rules. Linda G.
Balazs alleges that her former employer, DiMare
Fresh, Inc., violated the STAA when it terminated her employment. After a hearing, a Department of Labor Administrative
Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that DiMare Fresh did not violate the STAA because it
fired Balazs for unsatisfactory performance. The Administrative Review Board automatically reviews an ALJ’s recommended
STAA decision. 29 C.F.R. § 1978.109(c)(1)(2007).
[Page 2]
Jurisdiction and Standard Of Review
We have jurisdiction to decide this matter
by authority of 49 U.S.C.A. § 31105(b)(2)(C) and 29 C.F.R. § 1978.109(c).
Under the STAA, the Administrative Review Board is bound by the ALJ’s factual
findings if substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole supports
those findings. 29 C.F.R. § 1978.109(c)(3); BSP Transp., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 160 F.3d 38, 46 (1st Cir. 1998); Castle Coal & Oil Co., Inc. v.
Reich, 55 F.3d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 1995). Substantial evidence is that which
is “more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Clean
Harbors Envtl. Servs. v. Herman, 146 F.3d 12, 21 (1st Cir. 1998) (quoting Richardson
v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). In reviewing the ALJ’s conclusions
of law, the Board, as the Secretary’s designee, acts with “all the powers [the
Secretary] would have in making the initial decision . . . .” 5 U.S.C.A. §
557(b) (West 1996). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1978.109(b). Therefore, the
Board reviews the ALJ’s conclusions of law de novo. Roadway Express, Inc.
v. Dole, 929 F.2d 1060, 1066 (5th Cir. 1991).
Decision
The ALJ’s decision thoroughly and fairly
recites the relevant facts underlying this dispute. We have reviewed the
record and find that substantial evidence on the record as a whole supports the
ALJ’s findings. Those findings are therefore conclusive. 29 C.F.R. §
1978.109(c)(3). The ALJ’s decision is in accordance with law.[2]
Accordingly, we adopt and attach the ALJ’s R. D. & O. and DENY Balazs’s
complaint.
SO ORDERED.
M. CYNTHIA DOUGLASS
Chief Administrative Appeals Judge
DAVID G. DYE
Administrative Appeals Judge
[1] The STAA has been amended since Balazs
filed his complaint. See Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007, P.L. 110-53, 121 Stat. 266 (Aug. 3, 2007). Even if the
amendments were applicable to this complaint, they would not affect our
decision.
[2] On page 9 of the R. D. & O., the ALJ stated
that “Respondent has proven by clear and convincing evidence that Complainant
was terminated for a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason.” Because Balazs “offered
no evidence that there was a relationship between her protected activity and
the adverse employment action” (R. D. & O. at 8, n.10), we interpret this
language not as a statement of DiMare Fresh’s burden of proof, but as a
conclusory statement regarding the record evidence.
