ARB CASE NO. 05-104
ALJ CASE NO. 2004-STA-061
DATE: October 24, 2007
In the Matter of:
CHRIS MENTER,
COMPLAINANT,
v.
NORTH COUNTY TRANSPORT,
RESPONDENT.
BEFORE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD
FINAL DECISION AND ORDER
Chris Menter filed a
complaint under the employee protection provisions of the Surface
Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 (STAA), as amended, 49 U.S.C.A. § 31105
(West 2007), and its implementing regulations, 29 C.F.R. Part 1978 (2007), alleging that his former employer,
North County Transport (NCT), violated the STAA by disciplining him because he
refused to drive a truck with unsafe tires. After a hearing, a United States
Department of Labor (DOL) Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that NCT had not
violated the STAA and dismissed Menter’s complaint. The
Administrative Review Board automatically reviews an ALJ’s recommended STAA
decision. 29 C.F.R. § 1978.109(c)(1).
Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
We have jurisdiction to decide this matter
by authority of 49 U.S.C.A. § 31105(b)(2)(C)[1]
and 29 C.F.R. § 1978.109(c)(2006). Under the STAA, the Administrative Review
Board is bound by the ALJ’s factual findings if substantial evidence on the
record considered as a whole supports those findings. 29 C.F.R. §
[Page 2]
1978.109(c)(3); BSP Transp., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 160 F.3d 38,
46 (1st Cir. 1998); Castle Coal & Oil Co., Inc. v. Reich, 55 F.3d
41, 44 (2d Cir. 1995). Substantial evidence is that which is “more than a mere
scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.” Clean Harbors Envtl. Servs. v.
Herman, 146 F.3d 12, 21 (1st Cir. 1998) (quoting Richardson v. Perales,
402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). In reviewing the ALJ’s conclusions of law, the
Board, as the Secretary’s designee, acts with “all the powers [the Secretary]
would have in making the initial decision . . . .” 5 U.S.C.A. § 557(b) (West
1996). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1978.109(b). Therefore, the Board reviews
the ALJ’s conclusions of law de novo. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Dole,
929 F.2d 1060, 1066 (5th Cir. 1991).
Decision
The ALJ found that Menter failed to prove that he
engaged in protected activity under § 31105 (a)(1)(B)(i),(ii) and (a)(2) of the
STAA since he did not prove that the condition of his tires violated safety
regulations or that a reasonable person would have believed the condition of
the tires were such that the truck was unsafe to drive. R. D. & O. at 7–10.
Moreover, even if he had engaged in protected activity, Menter “failed to show
that [NCT] terminated him from its employ.” R. D. & O. at 13. Therefore,
the ALJ recommended that Menter’s complaint be dismissed. Id.
The ALJ’s decision thoroughly and fairly
recites the relevant facts underlying this dispute. We have reviewed the
record and find that substantial evidence on the record as a whole supports the
ALJ’s findings. Those findings are therefore conclusive. 29 C.F.R. §
1978.109(c)(3). The ALJ’s decision is in accordance with law. Accordingly, we
adopt and attach the ALJ’s R. D. & O. and DENY Menter’s complaint.
SO ORDERED.
DAVID G. DYE
Administrative Appeals Judge
M. CYNTHIA DOUGLASS
Chief Administrative Appeals Judge
[1] Congress has amended the STAA since Menter filed his complaint. See
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, P.L. 110-53, 121 Stat. 266 (Aug. 3, 2007). Even if the amendments were applicable to this
complaint, they would not affect our decision.
