A. LOUISE OLIVER
Administrative Appeals Judge
[ENDNOTES]
1 49 U.S.C.A. § 31105 (West 1997). STAA section 405 provides protection from discrimination to employees who report violations of commercial motor vehicle safety rules or who refuse to operate a vehicle when such operation would violate those rules. The STAA has been amended since Hutchins filed his complaint. See Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, P.L. 110-53, 121 Stat. 266 (Aug. 3, 2007). We need not decide here whether the amended provisions are applicable to this complaint because even if the amendments applied, they are not at issue in this case and thus would not affect our decision.
2 29 C.F.R. Part 1978 (2007).
3 See 29 C.F.R. § 1978.103.
4 See 29 C.F.R. § 1978.105.
5 Recommended Order of Dismissal (R. D.) at 1.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 29 C.F.R. § 1978.111(c).
9 R. D. at 2.
10 R. D. at 2.
11 Id.
12 See 29 C.F.R. § 1978.109(c)(2).
13 See e.g, Ferguson v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., ARB No. 06-093, ALJ No. 2006-STA-011, (ARB Aug. 25, 2006); Holmes v. Roadway Express, Inc., ARB No. 05-112, ALJ No. 2005-STA-030 (ARB Apr. 28, 2006); Pardis v. B & I Auto Supply, ARB No. 05-103, ALJ No. 2005-STA-017 (ARB Mar. 27, 2006); Davis v. Fonda Kaye, Inc., ARB No. 05-152, ALJ No. 2005-STA-042 (ARB Sept. 27, 2005); Palmer v. G.W. Lumber & Millwork, Inc., ARB No. 04-141, ALJ No. 2004-STA-045 (ARB Sept. 27, 2005); Wallace v. R. & L. Carriers, ARB No. 04-098; ALJ No. 2002-STA-040 (ARB Aug. 30, 2005); Sabin v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., ARB No. 04-032, ALJ No. 2003-STA-005 (ARB July 29, 2005); Elliot v. Chris Truck Line, ARB No. 04-132, ALJ No. 2002-STA-043 (ARB Jan. 28, 2005); Hardy v. Envil. Restoration, LLC., ARB No. 05-019, ALJ No. 2004-STA-020 (ARB Jan. 11, 2005); Berna v. USF Dugan, Inc., ARB No. 04-121, ALJ No. 2003-STA-007 (ARB Oct. 27, 2004); Pavon v. United Parcel Serv., ARB No. 04-127, ALJ No. 2003-STA-046 (ARB Oct. 27, 2004).
14 29 C.F.R. § 1978.109(a).
15 29 C.F.R. § 1978.109(c)(1).
16 Id.
17 29 C.F.R. § 1978.111(c).
18 Secretary’s Order 1-2002 (Delegation of Authority and Responsibility to the Administrative Review Board), 67 Fed. Reg. 64,272, 64,273 4(c) (Oct. 17, 2002).
19 29 C.F.R. § 1978.109(c).
20 29 C.F.R. § 1978.109(a).
21 Under the concurring opinion’s rationale, the denial of review would also extend to cases in which the parties object to an ALJ’s approval or denial of a settlement agreement, as the settlement provisions, like the withdrawal provisions, are found in 29 C.F.R. § 1978.111.
22 The concurring opinion suggests that in circumstances in which the ALJ has erred and that we might believe that justice required us to review a withdrawal order – for example, if an ALJ had mistakenly identified as a withdrawal a written communication that the complainant had not intended as a withdrawal, or had mistakenly approved a withdrawal based solely upon an oral statement, that we could simply invoke 29 C.F.R. § 1978.115, which allows the Board, in special circumstances, with three days notice to the parties to, "waive any rule or issue such orders as justice or the administration of section 405 requires." But such an ad hoc approach to review is simply inconsistent with the extraordinary protection the Department’s regulations afford to STAA whistleblower litigants as exemplified by the automatic review provisions. Furthermore, it is one thing to waive a rule or issue an order, but quite another to arrogate to the Board the jurisdiction to review an order that the concurrence asserts is otherwise final and not subject to review. The automatic review procedure is the only mechanism established by the STAA’s regulations for obtaining review of an ALJ decision. The concurrence points to no other authority that would permit the Board to review an ALJ order. If the automatic review regulations do not apply to these orders, as argued by the concurrence, then by what authority does the Board review the ALJ’s withdrawal orders?
The concurrence analogizes to the procedure for obtaining reconsideration of Board decisions. But this Board has recognized that "[t]he Administrative Review Board . . . has inherent authority to reconsider its decisions, so long as that authority has not been limited by a statute or regulatory provision." Henrich v. Ecolab, Inc., ARB No. 05-030, ALJ No. 2004-SOX-051, slip op. at 2 (May 30, 2007). The concurrence points to no such authority of the Board to review a decision issued by an ALJ (other than the automatic review provision). Furthermore, asking a body that has heard a case to reconsider its decision is a much more obvious proposition than contacting the Board to complain of an ALJ’s Order, given the ALJ’s affirmation in the decision that he or she has issued the final (i.e., not subject to appeal) decision for the Department and the lack of any regulations suggesting that requesting such consideration is either appropriate or possible Thus the circumstances under which justice required review would most likely remain unremedied.
23 1987-STA-021. The concurring opinion assumes, without discussion, that an Order to Show Cause, a procedural order that does not resolve the case, has the same precedential value as a final order.
24 Slip op. at 2.
25 See Hall v. Yellow Freight Sys., No. 1993-STA-024 (ARB July 1, 1993); Shown v. Wilson Truck Corp., 1992-STA-006 (Sec’y Apr. 30, 1992); Snow v. TNT Red Star Express, Inc., 1991-STA-044 (Sec’y Mar. 13, 1992); Mysinger v. Rent-A-Driver, 1990-STA-023 (Sec’y Sept. 21, 1990); Creech v. Salem Carriers, Inc., 1988-STA-029 (Sec’y Sept. 27, 1988). The decision to review the ALJ’s R.O. in this case is fully consistent with Underwood in one regard - the Secretary’s decision that it was appropriate to review the ALJ’s order once it was referred to him as if the withdrawal had occurred while the case was on review. See Underwood, Show Cause Order at 2.
26 The concurring opinion relies on "the Department’s highlighting of Underwood in the Preamble to the Final Regulation" citing 53 FR 47,676, 47,680 (Nov. 25, 1988)" as support for it position. The Preamble’s reference to Underwood was in response to the comment of an attorney who was concerned that § 1978.111(c) "unduly restricted settlement attempts since the subsection requires the ALJ or the Secretary to affirm any portion of the findings or order with respect to which objection is withdrawn." 53 FR 47,680. Responding to this concern, the Preamble states,
OSHA’s purpose in promulgating this rule was to cover unilateral withdrawals of objections to findings and an order where a party has determined on his or her own that he or she no longer wishes to pursue an objection and it is not intended to cover a settlement agreement. The Secretary in Underwood v. Blue Springs Hatchery, 87-STA-21, Order to Show Cause, issued September 23, 1987, has also ruled that § 1978.111(c) covers the withdrawal of complaint after the filing of objections. If the Parties, including the Assistant Secretary, agree, a settlement which includes a withdrawal of objections without admitting liability may be reached without engaging the provisions in § 1978.111(c). Such a settlement falls not under § 1978.111(c) but rather § 1978.111(d), where settlements are to be tri-partite as required by the statute.
Id. Thus, the Preamble did not address the issue the concurring opinion raises, i.e., whether withdrawal orders are subject to the STAA regulations’ automatic review provision. Furthermore, applying the automatic review provision to withdrawals under 29 C.F.R. § 1978.111(c) is fully consistent with the Preamble’s statement that, "The Secretary in Underwood v. Blue Springs Hatchery . . . has . . . ruled that § 1978.111(c) covers the withdrawal of complaint after the filing of objections."
* Although Judge Oliver is no longer serving on the ARB as of the publication date of this decision, she filed this concurrence during her tenure as an ARB Member.
27 See 51 Fed. Reg. 42091, 42094 (Nov. 26, 1986).
28 1987-STA-21, slip op. at 2 (Sec’y Show Cause Order issued September 23, 1987) (emphasis added). The provision interpreted by Secretary Brock was identical to the current provision except that "Secretary" was used in place of "Administrative Review Board." See 51 FR 42091, 42094 (Nov. 26, 1986); see also 61 FR 19982, 19987 (May 3, 1996) (changing "Secretary" to "Administrative Review Board" in numerous regulations including this one).
29 Underwood, Show Cause Order at 2. Although Underwood is not available to the public electronically, perhaps because it was a Show Cause Order rather than a final decision, it is publicly available in Department of Labor’s library. Moreover, this particular statement was often quoted by subsequent Secretarial decisions reaffirming the precedent established by Underwood.
30 See 53 FR 47676, 47680 (Nov. 25, 1988) (citing Underwood in order to explain the proper interpretation of the scope of the regulation’s withdrawal provision).
31 Secretary’s Order 1-2002, 67 FR 64272, 64273 (Oct. 17, 2002).
32 Several subsequent decisions appear inconsistent with Underwood. A line of three cases mistakenly follows the logic of Hester v. Blue Bell, 1986-STA-11 (Sec’y July 9, 1986), which relied upon Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41. See Transportation Services, Inc., 1988-STA-7 (Sec’y June 24, 1988) (applying Rule 41); Monroe v. QJ Transfer and Storage, 1989-STA-4 (Sec’y July 11, 1989) (same); A/S & Sharp v. Helwig & Sons, Inc., 1990-STA-30 (Dep. Sec’y Dec. 14, 1990) (same). Because Hester was issued before the publication of 29 C.F.R. § 1978.111(c), Hester should no longer have been followed once that provision had been published and interpreted in Underwood. Three other cases also diverge from Underwood’s approach: they are Hadley v. Southeast Cooperative Service Co., 1986-STA-24 (Sec’y Apr. 6, 1988) (declining to adopt ALJ’s order dismissing case, because complainant’s response to Secretary’s Show Cause order convinced Secretary that complainant had not intended to drop the case); Slaughter v. Pie Nationwide, 1989-STA-13 (Sec’y Feb. 23, 1990) (reviewing and adopting ALJ’s "recommended" order of dismissal based upon complainant’s withdrawal, but without noting that ALJ need not have forwarded the order); and Lizotte v. Road and Sea Transport, Inc., 1995-STA-13 (Sec’y July 26, 1995) (citing "29 C.F.R. 24.5(e)(4)(ii)" – a provision that Underwood states is "inapplicable" to STAA cases, see Underwood, Show Cause Order at 1). Because none of these decisions cite or distinguish Underwood, however, none of them can be considered an "explicit" reversal of it.
33 Although this concurrence quotes from the latest version of my colleagues’ opinion that has been made available for review, it is possible that certain quotations and references to that opinion may have become out-of-date insofar as any further alterations in my colleagues’ opinion were made subsequent to this concurrence being filed.
34 My colleagues note that "as a general rule the Board will not consider an issue that has not been raised and briefed by the parties," and that the Board is departing from that rule in this case. Opinion at 4. Of course, as we clarified only recently, the STAA is unique in that "the regulations implementing the STAA require us to review every decision issued under section 109(a), even if no party files a brief." Minne and Privott v. Star Air, Inc., ARB No. 05-005, ALJ No. 2004-STA-26, slip op. at 7 (Oct. 31, 2007). The reason we need not act in the present instance is not because the parties did not file briefs, but because the ALJ’s decision was not issued under section 109(a).
35 See, e.g., Saban v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, __ F. 3d. __, 2007 WL 4233516, at *2 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting panel decision’s compliance with Seventh Circuit Rule 40(e), requiring that panel decisions overruling a circuit precedent be "circulated . . . to the full court in advance of publication").
36 This lack may help explain some otherwise puzzling aspects of ARB jurisprudence. For example, in 2004 two Board Members issued a decision correctly noting the Supreme Court’s injunction that "jurisdiction . . . is not defeated . . . by the possibility that the averments might fail to state a cause of action." Pacific Stevedoring, Inc. v. Boyang, Ltd., ARB No. 03-041, ALJ No. 2002-ACM-1, slip op. at 7 (ARB June 30, 2004). Nonetheless, on the same day, one of those same Board Members (together with a third) issued another decision affirming an ALJ’s conclusion that there was no "jurisdiction" because the complainant had "failed to state a cause of action." Culligan v. American Heavy Lifting Shipping Co., ARB No. 03-046, ALJ Nos. 2000-CAA-20, 2001-CAA-09 and -11, slip op. at 8-9. The inconsistency between these decisions appears not to have been recognized for almost a year. Moreover, the decision that ultimately "clarif[ied]" the issue failed to admit that Culligan’s holding was inconsistent with the holding in Pacific Stevedoring. See Devers v. Kaiser-Hill Co., ARB 03-13, ALJ No. 2001-SWD-3, slip op. at 4 n.3 (ARB Mar. 31, 2005). Instead, that later decision – despite being written by the same two Board Members who had decided Culligan – described Culligan as having held what Pacific Stevedoring had held. See id. (asserting that Culligan had held that the ARB "ha[d] jurisdiction to decide that the complainant’s case must be dismissed") (emphasis added).
37 The first withdrawal decisions expressing this view were Foley v. J. B. Hunt Transportation, Inc., ARB No. 04-080, ALJ No. 2004-STA-14 (ARB Oct. 27, 2004), slip op. at 1-2; A/S and Boyd v. Palmentere Brothers Cartage Service, Inc., ARB No. 04-135, ALJ No. 2003-STA-40, slip op at 1-2 (ARB Oct. 27, 2004); and Pavon v. United Parcel Service, ARB No. 04-127, ALJ 2003-STA-46, slip op. at 1-2 (ARB Oct. 27, 2004).
38 The Board’s first decision taking this position appears to have been issued in May 2001. See n.13 and section c, below.
39 Section 109(a) states: "The administrative law judge shall issue a decision within 30 days after the close of the record. . . . The decision shall be forwarded immediately, together with the record, to the Secretary for review by the Secretary or his or her designee." 29 C.F.R. § 1978.109(a). Section 109(c)(1) states: "Within 120 days after issuance of the administrative law judge’s decision and order, the Administrative Review Board, United States Department of Labor, shall issue a final decision and order based on the record and the decision and order of the administrative law judge." 29 C.F.R. § 1978.109(c)(1). Section 109(c)(5) adds a requirement that "[t]he final decision and order of the Administrative Review Board, United States Department of Labor shall be served upon all parties to the proceeding." 29 C.F.R. § 1978.109(c)(5).
40 The Board first made this assertion in the 2001 decision that initiated the Board’s recent practice of reviewing settlement cases, and further relied upon it in the 2004 withdrawal decision that initiated the Board’s recent practice of reviewing withdrawal cases. See Cook v. Shaffer Trucking, Inc., ARB No. 01-051, ALJ No. 2000-STA-17, slip op. at 2 (ARB May 30, 2001) (noting that the Board issued the "Final Order in this [settlement] case" "[p]ursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1978.109(c)"); Boyd v. Palmentere Brothers Cartage Service, Inc., ARB No. 04-135, ALJ No. 2003-STA-40, slip op. at 1 (ARB Oct. 27, 2004) (asserting, in a withdrawal case, that "[t]he ALJ’s Order is subject to the automatic review provisions of 49 U.S.C.A. § 31105(b)(2)(C) and 29 C.F.R. § 1978.109(c)(1)").
By now, the error appears to have become boilerplate. See, e.g., Myers v. Sunstone II LLP, ARB No. 08-002, ALJ No. 2007-STA-25, slip op. at 2 & n.6 (ARB Oct. 16, 2007) (citing to section "109(c)(1)" to support the proposition that "the case is now before us pursuant to the STAA’s automatic review provisions"); LaRocque v. 4-D Trucking Co.,, ARB No. 07-117, ALJ No. 2007-STA-32, slip op. at 2 (ARB Oct. 31, 2007) (citing to "29 C.F.R. § 1978.109(c)(2)" to prove proposition that "[a]ccording to the STAA’s implementing regulations, the Administrative Review Board (ARB or Board) issues the final decision and order in this case").
41 See, e.g., APWU v. Potter, 343 F.3d 619, 626 (2d Cir. 2003) ("[A] basic tenet of . . . regulatory construction, [is] that [a regulation] should be construed so as to give effect to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant, and so that one section will not destroy another unless the provision is the result of obvious mistake or error") (citations and internal quotations omitted).
42 See, e.g., 73 CJS Public Admin. Law & Proc. § 211 (2005) ("The court should read a regulation as an entirety, and should harmonize the various parts and provisions of the entire regulation and given them effect, if possible."); see also Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 360 (1956) (Court must read regulation "so as to give effect, if possible, to all its provisions"); Miller v. AT&T Corp., 250 F.3d 820, 832 (4th Cir. 2001) (explaining requirement that in interpreting regulations, "[w]henever possible, this court must reconcile apparently conflicting provisions"). See also footnote 15.
43 Compare 51 Fed. Reg. 42091, 42094 (Nov. 21, 1986) (Interim Final Rule) with 53 Fed. Reg. 47676, 47680 (Nov. 25, 1988) (Final Rule); 61 Fed. Reg. 19982, 19986 (May 3, 1996) (alterations upon creating the ARB).
44 See, e.g., Fertilizer Institute v. EPA, 935 F.2d 1303, 1307-08 (D. C. Cir. 1991) ("preamble passage" to regulation was itself "interpretative rule").
45 See Secretary’s Order 1-2002. 67 Fed. Reg. 64272, 64273 (specifying that Board must "observe the provisions" of the "Code of Federal Regulations").
46 See LeBlanc v. Fogleman Truck Lines, 1989-STA-8 (Sec’y July 26, 1990), which does not discuss Thompson and does not itself appear to have been cited by any subsequent case.
47 See Tankersley v. Triple Crown Services, Inc., 1992-STA-8, slip op. at 1 n.1 (Sec’y Oct. 17, 1994) (reaffirming Thompson as "ordinarily" applicable to settlement cases, but taking jurisdiction "in view of the circumstances and disagreement here").
48 Such paucity of reasoning has been found unacceptable by various reviewing courts. See, e.g., Pegasus Consulting Group v. ARB, Civil Action No. 05-5161 (D.N.J. June 27, 2007), slip op. at 14, 16 (unpublished) (reversing the ARB’s decision because "the ARB’s finding that [a statute] mirrored the invalidated [interpretative regulation for that statute] is not warranted and this Court is troubled by what is, in effect, a finding of ‘no harm, no foul’ by the ARB," and because the ARB’s "failure to provide any meaningful analysis whatsoever for its decision to uphold the ALJ’s determination on alternative statutory grounds is the very definition of arbitrary and capricious administrative agency action"); Knox v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Case No. 06-1726, slip op. at 5, 8 (4th Cir., May 23, 2007) (unpublished) (remanding because the ARB had "concluded, without elaboration, that ‘Knox neither argues nor does the record contain any evidence that DOI was violating any EPA regulations’" even though Knox "ha[d], in fact, presented some evidence that arguably tends to establish that he informed DOI officials about his concern that DOI work-practice standards had been violated," and instructing that on remand the ARB "should reconsider the entire record in light of Knox’s contention" and "should specifically explain its findings and legal conclusions"); Knox v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, at 434 F.3d. 721, 725 n.4 (4th Cir. 2006) (remanding because ARB had "applied a different standard than formally announced and thus breached the required of reasoned decisonmaking under the APA," noting that "it is hard to imagine a more violent breach of that requirement [of reasoned decisionmaking] than applying a rule of primary conduct or a standard of proof which is in fact different from the rule or standard formally announced") (brackets in original); Roadway Exp., Inc. v. ARB, 116 Fed. Appx. 674, 675, 679 (6th Cir. 2004) (unpublished) (remanding because Board had "failed to explain its reasoning," "did not address Eash I in its decision," and thus had reached "different results in nearly identical cases").
49 Indeed, "[a]n agency’s failure to come to grips with conflicting precedent is an inexcusable departure from the essential requirement of reasoned decisionmaking." Ramaprakash v. FAA, 346 F.3d 1121, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing Columbia Broad.Sys. v. FCC, 454 F.2d 1-18, 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1971)) (vacating agency’s 2002 decision as arbitrary and capricious because it did not provide satisfactory explanation for agency’s departure from position held by agency for thirteen years; although 2002 decision cited as authority a 1998 decision (Ikela), Ikela had failed to provide any explanation for its own divergence from the thirteen-year line of controlling precedent, and thus Ikela did not constitute a controlling precedent justifying 2002 decision’s choice to follow Ikela rather than thirteen-year line of precedent); see also Thompson v. DOL, 885 F.2d 551, 557 (9th Cir. 1989) ("It is an elemental tenet of administrative law that an agency must either conform to its own precedents or explain its departure from them.").
50 For example, the statute also says that "the Secretary shall conduct an investigation," 49 U.S.C. § 31105(b)(2)(A) and that if a violator does not comply with an enforcement order, then "the Secretary shall bring a civil action to enforce the order," id. at 31105(d). These obligations are currently undertaken by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and by the Office of the Solicitor, respectively.
51 These percentages, which do not include those settlements reached and withdrawals sought while cases were pending before the ARB, were calculated based upon an analysis of those published decisions of the ARB available on the DOL’s website at www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/ARB/REFERENCES/CASELISTS/ARBINDEX.HTM. Because that website lists re-issued cases and errata notices as separate decisions, these percentages likely somewhat underestimate the total percentage of settlement and withdrawal reviews.
52 See, e.g., Pegasus, slip op. at 15 "[T]he basic notion of due process warrants a ruling by this Court that the ARB may not sua sponte find Pegasus culpable for violations of statutory provisions with which it was never charged . . . . The ARB’s decision to base its ruling on the statute is nothing more than an after the fact justification for an improperly prosecuted action."); see also Hasan v. Enercon Servs., Inc., ARB No. 05-037, ALJ Nos. 2004-ERA-22 and 27, slip op. at 11-16 (ARB July 31, 2007) (Oliver, dissenting).
53 Although the term "or" is sometimes used in other ways – for example, to indicate that a second phrase is either synonymous with, or a correction of, a first phrase – there can be no real argument that the disjunctive meaning is clearly the one intended here.
54 It is difficult to argue that "or" was not the intended term. The disjunctive nature of section 111 is emphasized by the inclusion of the phrase "as the case may be" at the end of the sentence.
55 Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (citing decisions from 2000, 1999, 1989, and 1917) (discussing how, if at all, possible absence of comma in text affected plain meaning of provision); see also Burlington Northern R.R. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 481 U.S. 454, 462-63 (1987) ("Unless exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise, ‘[w]hen we find the terms of a statute unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete.’ . . . Respondents’ position depends upon the addition of words to a statutory provision which is complete as it stands. Adoption of their view would require amendment rather than construction of the statute, and it must be rejected here.") (internal citations omitted).
56 Underwood, Show Cause Order at 2.
57 See Chapman v. Witt Corrugating, Inc., 1987-STA-14. slip op. at 2 (Sec’y May 24, 1988) (citing Underwood); Creech v. Salem Carriers, Inc., 1988-STA-29, slip op. at 2 (Sec’y Sept. 27, 1988) (same); Mysinger v. Rent-a-Driver, 1990-STA-23, slip op. at 2 (Sec’y Sept. 21, 1990) (citing Creech); Jarrett v. MGM Transport Corp., 1990-STA-38, slip op. at 1 (citing "judicial economy"); Snow v. TNT Red Star Express, Inc., 1991-STA-44, slip op. at 2 (Sec’y Mar. 13, 1992) (citing both "administrative efficiency" and Creech).
58 See Hall v. Yellow Freight Systems, 1993-STA-24, at 1 (Sec’y July 1, 1993).
59 Id. at 1; see Ford v. Robinson Cartage Co., 1994-STA-31, at 1 (Sec’y Aug. 22, 1994) (same); Adams v. Con-Way Southwest Express, 1995-STA-10, at 1 (OAA Mar. 30, 1995) (same); Trumble v. Goodway Transport Co., 1995-STA-16, at 1 (OAA June 22, 1995); see also Lepley v. Farmers Union Elevator at New Salem, ARB No 00-046, ALJ No. 1999-STA-48, slip op. at 1 (ARB Apr. 25, 2000) (noting that "the ALJ’s decision will be considered the final administrative order," but suggesting that the Board’s decision to consider it final was influenced by the fact that neither party had provided briefs in response to the Board’s invitation that they do so). Because the STAA’s implementing regulations require the ARB to review all ALJ decisions issued under 29 C.F.R. § 1978.109(a), even when no briefs have been filed, it is odd that Lepley’s conclusion that the ALJ’s decision was final appears to have been premised upon the absence of briefs; but no further explanation was provided.
60 Fundamental principles of appellate jurisprudence not only require that an appellate body follow its precedent, they also require, in the event that a line of decisions is found to be inconsistent with an earlier line of decisions, that the appellate body state which line should be followed and explain why. See footnote 23.
61 There appears to be continuing disagreement among the ALJs with the ARB’s conclusion in Boyd that ALJs were required to forward such decisions for review. Prior to Boyd’s issuance, ALJs did not routinely forward withdrawal-based affirmance orders to the ARB for review. See, e.g., Palmer v. G&W Lumber & Millwork, Inc., 2004-STA-45 (ALJ July 7, 2004) (Chief ALJ) (citing Creech in issuing "Final Decision and Order Approving Withdrawal of Objections and Dismissing Claim"). Subsequent to Boyd, while most ALJs forward such orders without comment, some continue to protest that their own orders are the final ones. Compare, e.g., Nicols v. Roma of Dallas, 2006-STA-9 (ALJ June 8, 2006) (citing Boyd in forwarding for review an order dismissing a claim on the basis of a withdrawal made under 1978.111(c)) with Drake v. Yellow Transportation, 2005-STA-3 (ALJ Mar. 2, 2005) (stating that "This Order is the final administrative action and no Secretarial review is required," yet also forwarding order to ARB for review) and Fraley v. Transservice Logistics, Inc., 2005-STA-11, slip op. at 2 (stating that "Despite the plain language of [section 111], the ARB in . . . Boyd . . . [a] case[] devoid of any authority or reasoning . . . found that the [ALJ’s] orders were subject to the automatic review provisions of 49 U.S.C.A. s. 31105(b)(2)(C) . . . . [This] holding that there is automatic review . . . of a voluntary withdrawal before an Administrative Law Judge in STAA cases appears to overrule, sub silentio the Secretary of Labor’s holding[] in [Underwood, as followed in] Shown . . . and Creech . . . .") (full citations omitted).
62 Nor has any party made an "application" asking the ARB to proceed under the provisions of section 115.
63 Therefore, in my view my colleagues’ opinion includes surplusage insofar as it purports to review the ALJ’s decision and the settlement agreement, and to dismiss (again) Hutchins’ claim.