Substantial evidence supports the ALJ's finding that UPS established a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Martin's employment and that Martin failed to prove that this reason was pretextual. Well established legal precedent and analysis supports the ALJ's conclusion that UPS did not discriminate against Martin in violation of the STAA.
Conclusion
We have reviewed the record and find that substantial evidence on the record as a whole supports the ALJ's factual findings and that they are therefore conclusive. 29
[Page 12]
C.F.R. § 1978.109(c)(3). The ALJ correctly applied the relevant law in a thorough, well-reasoned decision dismissing the complaint. Accordingly, we DENY Martin's complaint.
SO ORDERED.
DAVID G. DYE
Administrative Appeals Judge
M. CYNTHIA DOUGLASS
Chief Administrative Appeals Judge
[ENDNOTES]
1 Complaint at 1; Respondent's Brief at 3.
2 Transcript (Tr.) 50-52, 189-90, 882; R. D. & O. at 2-5.
3 Tr. 844, 1143-44; R. D. & O. at 4-5.
4 Tr. 845-46, 896-97, 940-41, 981.
5 See Joint Exhibit (Ex. J-) 1 ("Article 54 – Meal Period - The employee shall be entitled to and required to take a lunch period of one (1) hour. Failure to take and properly record the required meal period may be cause for disciplinary action.")
6 Tr. 87, 1001. Generally, drivers followed a "15-30-15" approach in which they took 15 minutes of meal on the drive to a hub, 30 minutes at the turnaround point, and another 15 minutes on the return trip to their point of origin. Tr. 87. UPS did not force Martin to adhere to this policy, but it required him to record his stops.
7 Id. at 921-922, 1120, 1142; R. D. & O. at 3-4. In practice, drivers who made short, unrecorded restroom stops (and did not purchase food) were not disciplined if those stops did not affect the drivers' finish times. Id. at 31.
8 See Ex. J-1 (CBA Article 52, Subsection A).
9 Id. (CBA Article 52, Subsections A and C); Tr. 701-02.
10 Id. at 37-38, 518, 744.
11 R. D. & O. at 29-30.
12 See, e.g., Ex. J-3-5, 13-15, 18-21, 25-29.
13 Tr. at 841-44.
14 Id. at 90, 885, 889.
15 Id. at 92.
16 Id. at 1003-04; R. D. & O. at 13; see, e.g., Ex. J-24 ("ALL DRIVERS MUST EXHAUST ALL OF THEIR MEAL PERIOD AT THEIR TURNAROUND POINT WHEN A DELAY OCCURS. YOU ARE ALLOWED TO SAVE 15 MINUTES FOR YOUR RETURN TRIP.")(emphasis retained).
17 Tr. 243, 245, 1019; Ex. J-37.
18 Id. at 98, 101.
19 Id. at 99, 248, 1017, 1020, 1022.
20 Id. at 112.
21 Id. at 114. Martin was referring to the Department of Transportation regulation at 49 C.F.R. § 392.3 (2006):
No driver shall operate a commercial motor vehicle, and a motor carrier shall not require or permit a driver to operate a commercial motor vehicle, while the driver's ability or alertness is so impaired, or so likely to become impaired, through fatigue, illness, or any other cause, as to make it unsafe for him/her to begin or continue to operate the commercial motor vehicle. However, in a case of grave emergency where the hazard to occupants of the commercial motor vehicle or other users of the highway would be increased by compliance with this section, the driver may continue to operate the commercial motor vehicle to the nearest place at which that hazard is removed.
22 Id. at 113. The intent to terminate was reduced to a warning pursuant to the December 13, 2001 letter. See infra.
23 Id. at 249, 1028.
24 Id. at 115-16.
25 Id. at 115-16, 252, 1027.
26 Complaint at 5.
27 See Ex. J-39 ("On your report dates of December 4, and December 7, 2001, you again failed to follow the instructions that you have been given in relation to your meal period. Through prior training you have been instructed on all meal period policies and you have repeatedly been asked to comply with these policies. This notice is to ensure that you both understand and comply with these instructions in the future in order to avoid further disciplinary action up to and including discharge.").
28 Tr. 119-20, 255, 1034; R. D. & O. at 17.
29 Tr. at 120-21.
30 Id. at 121, 125.
31 Id. at 256; R. D. & O. at 17.
32 Id. at 127.
33 Id. at 257-58, 1035; Ex. J-42.
34 Id. at 127-29.
35 See Ex. J-43 ("On January 8, 2002 a meeting was held to discuss your continuing failure to take your meal periods as instructed. Present at this meeting were Jim Brewer and Jeff Householder, UPS supervisors, Mike Selvidge, union steward, and you. A review of your record has revealed additional violations of the meal policy with the most recent occurrences being December 28, 2001 and January 4, 2002. Previous to this you were issued a final warning letter dated December 13, 2001 for failure to take your meal periods as instructed, and you were once again asked to comply with the meal period policy. Therefore, this letter will serve as an Intent to Discharge you from United Parcel Service.").
36 UPS explained why Martin's discharge was considered an "intent" to discharge: "The Court asked why UPS would need to fire Martin twice, in effect, and the answer again is found in the structure of the progressive discipline policy under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. When UPS issues an intent-to-discharge letter, it is exactly that – a letter of UPS's ‘intent' to fire the employee – and if the employee brings a grievance, the employee stays on the job until the grievance process ends." Respondent's Post Trial Brief at 45.
37 Ex. J-45-47; R. D. & O. at 20-21.
38 Id.; Tr. 798-801, 906-11, 965.
39 Tr. 132 ("At that point, they gave me a – they told me that I was being terminated for dishonesty. I think they used the phrase stealing time."); R. D. & O. at 23.
40 See Ex. J-49 ("On January 28, 2002, a meeting was held to discuss your acts of dishonesty and falsifying your timecard. Present at this meeting were Bill Rutherford Labor Manager, Lindsay Stipes Feeder Manager, Allen Steele Security Supervisor, Eric Cottrell union steward and yourself. This is to advise you that you are being discharged from United Parcel Service effective January 28, 2002, for just cause, acts of dishonesty, falsifying your timecard which resulted in theft of paid time inclusive of the most recent occurrence on January 25, 2002.").
41 R. D. & O. at 23; Tr. 708-15.
42 Tr. 134-36; Ex. J-54-55; R. D. & O. at 23-24. The SRAPGC deadlocked on Martin's discharge for acts of dishonesty.
43 Complaint at 2-7.
44 R. D. & O. at 2.
45 Secretary's Order 1-2002, 67 Fed. Reg. 64,272 (Oct. 17, 2002); 29 C.F.R. § 1978.109(a).
46 29 C.F.R. § 1978.109(c)(3); BSP Trans, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 160 F.3d 38, 46 (1st Cir. 1998); Castle Coal & Oil Co., Inc. v. Reich, 55 F.3d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 1995).
47 Clean Harbors Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Herman, 146 F.3d 12, 21 (1st Cir. 1998) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)).
48 5 U.S.C.A. § 557(b) (West 1996).
49 See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Dole, 929 F.2d 1060, 1066 (5th Cir. 1991).
50 49 U.S.C.A. § 31105(a)(1).
51 49 U.S.C.A. § 31105(a)(1)(A).
52 BSP Trans ,Inc., 160 F.3d at 45 (1st Cir. 1998); Yellow Freight Sys. , Inc. v. Reich, 27 F.3d 1133, 1138 (6th Cir. 1994); Eash v. Roadway Express, ARB No. 04-036, ALJ No. 1998-STA-28, slip op. at 5 (ARB Sept. 30, 2005); Densieski v. La Corte Farm Equip., ARB No. 03-145, ALJ No. 2003-STA-30, slip op. at 4 (ARB Oct. 20, 2004).
53 Feltner v. Century Trucking, Ltd., ARB No. 03-118, ALJ Nos. 03-STA-1, 03-STA-2, slip op. at 4-5 (ARB Oct. 27, 2004); Densienski, slip op. at 4. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142-43 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 513 (1993); Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Poll v. R.J. Vyhnalek Trucking, ARB No. 99-110, ALJ No. 96-STA-35, slip op. at 5-6 (ARB June 28, 2002).
54 Calhoun v. United Parcel Serv., ARB No. 00-026, ALJ No. 99-STA-7, slip op. at 5 (ARB Nov. 27, 2002).
55 St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 502; Densieski, slip op. at 4; Gale v. Ocean Imaging & Ocean Res., Inc., ARB No. 98-143, ALJ No. 97-ERA-38, slip op. at 8 (ARB July 31, 2002); Poll, slip op. at 5.
56 See, e.g., Erickson v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, ARB No. 03-002, ALJ No. 1999-CAA-2, slip op. at 16 (ARB May 31, 2006) ("because Erickson's complaints fail on other grounds, we will assume without deciding that [she engaged in] protected activity."); Trachman v. Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc., ARB No. 01-067, ALJ No. 2000-TSC-3, slip op. at 5 (ARB Apr. 25, 2003) ("For purposes of review we will assume, without deciding, that Trachman's complaints were protected under the whistleblower provisions....").
57 Tr. 889-90. See also Tr. 1170 (Rutherford) ("The intent to discharge was presented for failure to follow instructions. It was failure to log all stops. It was failure to take meal at turnaround. And it was failure to just simply follow instructions. It did not center around one issue ….").
58 R. D. & O. at 29-30; Tr. at 85-86; Ex. J-55.
59 Complainant's Post-Hearing Reply Brief at 18. We reject Martin's argument at pages 18-20 of his brief that logging his personal stops through its computer system would have forced him to falsify his "record of duty status."
60 R. D. & O. at 31.
61 Complainant's Brief at 25.
62 Ex. J-39.
63Ex. J-43.
64See, e.g., Hardy v. Mail Contractors of America, ARB No. 03-007, ALJ No. 2002-STA-22, slip op. at 3 (ARB Jan. 30, 2004)("Complainant was not engaged in protected activity when he refused to comply with the Respondent's clearly articulated policy concerning the logging of off-duty time.")
65 R. D. & O. at 30-31.
66 Id.; Tr. 892, 915-16.
67 Id. at 727.
68 Id. at 481.