But this argument overlooks the obvious and dispositive fact that to be employed as a consultant for Radio One, Sneed's employment as the Chief Operating Officer would first have to be terminated. Nor are we convinced by Sneed's argument that the use of the term "game plan" to describe the procedure to be followed in announcing Sneed's termination in any way detracts from the definitive and unequivocal tenor of the statement that "[t]omorrow will be your last day."
Conclusion
We agree with the ALJ that Sneed has failed to raise a question of material fact regarding the issue whether she filed a timely SOX complaint. Consequently, we agree with the ALJ's recommendation to grant Radio One's Motion for Summary Decision and we DISMISS Sneed's complaint.
SO ORDERED.
M. CYNTHIA DOUGLASS
Chief Administrative Appeals Judge
OLIVER M. TRANSUE
Administrative Appeals Judge
[ENDNOTES]
1 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514(A)(West 2007). SOX's section 806 prohibits certain covered employers from discharging, demoting, suspending, threatening, harassing, or in any other manner discriminating against employees who provide information to a covered employer or a Federal agency or Congress regarding conduct that the employee reasonably believes constitutes a violation of 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1341 (mail fraud), 1343 (wire, radio, TV fraud), 1344 (bank fraud), or 1348 (securities fraud), or any rule or regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission, or any provision of Federal law relating to fraud against shareholders. Employees are also protected against discrimination when they have filed, testified in, participated in, or otherwise assisted in a proceeding filed or about to be filed relating to a violation of the aforesaid fraud statutes, SEC rules, or federal law.
2 29 C.F.R. Part 1980 (2007).
3 Declaration of Mary Catherine Sneed, para. 11 (Mar. 27, 2007).
4 Respondent's Motion for Summary Decision (M. S. D.), Exh. B. (Feb. 16, 2007).
5 M. S. D., Exh. B. Initially, Sneed denied reading the 9:09 p.m. e-mail from Liggins until June 30, stating in her request for a hearing:
Attached as Exhibit B is an email that was not sent until June 29, 2006 at 9:09 PM. In all likelihood at 9:09 p.m., Ms. Sneed had turned off her Blackberry and was no longer reviewing any of her emails. There is no evidence that it was opened on that date and indeed, Ms. Sneed contends that she first learned that she was to be terminated on the 30th in a telephone conference with other managers in which they were informed of her termination.
Sneed's Objection and Request for a Hearing at 2 (Jan. 19, 2007). After Radio One provided to Sneed and the ALJ a copy of Sneed's e-mail indicating that she had responded to the June 29th e-mail that same night at 9:20 p.m., Sneed in her response to Radio One's motion to dismiss
retract[ed] her contention that she had turned off her Blackberry and was no longer reviewing any of her e-mails the evening of June 29. Further, Ms. Sneed shows that at the time that she made that statement, she had not been able to retrieve her reply e-mail and was uncertain of the time she opened the e-mail. She does not dispute that she received the e-mail, but does dispute that this e-mail was one which unequivocally terminated her, as it proposed only a "game plan."
Complainant's Response to Radio One's Motion for Summary Decision at 7 (Mar. 27, 2007).
6 M. S. D., Exh. B.
7 Id.
8 R. D. & O. at 1.
9 See 29 C.F.R. § 1980.106(a).
10 R. D. & O. at 1.
11 The ALJ subsequently granted Sneed's request, over Radio One's objection, to file a supplemental brief in reliance upon Sneed's counsel's assurance that he wished to address the issue of equitable relief. Nevertheless, Sneed failed to address equitable principles in her supplemental brief, and instead simply "extended her argument that there was no ‘final, definitive, and unequivocal notice' of an adverse employment decision until 30 Jun 06." R. D. & O. at 1 n.3. Nevertheless, the ALJ considered the supplemental brief. Id.
12 R. D. & O. at 5-6.
13 See 29 C.F.R. § 1980.110(a).
14 Secretary's Order No. 1-2002, 67 Fed. Reg. 64,272 (Oct. 17, 2002); 29 C.F.R. § 1980.110(a).
15 29 C.F.R. § 18.40 (2007).
16 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
17 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
18 Bobreski v. United States EPA, 284 F. Supp. 2d 67, 72-73 (D.D.C. 2003).
19 Lee v. Schneider Nat'l, Inc., ARB No. 02-102, ALJ No. 2002-STA-025, slip op. at 2 (ARB Aug. 28, 2003); Bushway v. Yellow Freight, Inc., ARB No. 01-018, ALJ No. 2000-STA-052, slip op. at 2 (Dec. 13, 2002).
20 Bobreski, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 73 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)).
21 Bobreski, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 73.
22 29 C.F.R. § 18.40(c). See Webb v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 1993-ERA-042, slip op. at 4-6 (Sec'y July 17, 1995).
23 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A(b)(2)(D) ("An action … shall be commenced not later than 90 days after the date on which the violation occurs."); 29 C.F.R. § 1980.103(d)("Time for filing. Within 90 days after an alleged violation of the Act occurs (i.e., when the discriminatory decision has been both made and communicated to the complainant), an employee who believes that he or she has been discriminated against in violation of the Act may file, or have filed by any person on the employee's behalf, a complaint alleging such discrimination.").
24 Allen v. U.S. Steel Corp., 665 F.2d 689, 692 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Ross v. Florida Power & Light Co., ARB No. 98-044, ALJ No. 1996-ERA-036, slip op. at 4 (ARB Mar. 31, 1999)(statute of limitations begins to run "on the date when facts which would support the discrimination complaint were apparent or should have been apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights").
25 Overall v. Tennessee Valley Auth., ARB Nos. 98-111, 98-128, ALJ No. 1997-ERA-053, slip op. at 36 (ARB Apr. 30, 2001). See Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 8 (1981) (proper focus contemplates the time the employee receives notification of the discriminatory act, not the point at which the consequences of the act become apparent); Delaware State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258 (1980) (limitations period began to run when the tenure decision was made and communicated rather than on the date his employment terminated).
26 See, e.g., Rollins, v. American Airlines, ARB No. 04-140, ALJ No. 2004-AIR-009, slip op. at 2 (ARB Apr. 3, 2007 (re-issued)); Halpern v. XL Capital, Ltd., ARB No. 04-120, ALJ No. 2004-SOX-054, slip op. at 3 (ARB Aug. 31, 2005); Jenkins v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, ARB No. 98-146, ALJ No. 1988-SWD-002, slip op. at 14 (ARB Feb. 28, 2003).
27 Larry v. The Detroit Edison Co., 1986-ERA-032, slip op. at 14 (Sec'y June 28, 1991). Cf. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Reich, 27 F.3d 1133, 1141 (6th Cir. 1994) (three letters warning of further discipline did not constitute final notice of employer's intent to discharge complainant).
28 Pearson v. Macon-Bibb County Hosp. Auth., 952 F.2d 1274, 1279-80 (1992). In Pearson, the employer gave the complainant the option to resign, transfer, or be terminated. After the complainant unsuccessfully attempted to find work elsewhere or to transfer to another department and she took an extended leave, the employer terminated her employment three months after it had originally offered her the three options. The complainant argued that the limitations period began to run when her employment was terminated, not when she was offered the three options. The court held,
[t]he equivocal character of the adverse employment decision of October 16 does not deprive that decision of its status as the operative act. Thus, even though the termination of Pearson's employment was not inevitable upon the passing of a designated date (as it was for the academicians in Ricks and Chardon) the distinctive fact that she was offered an opportunity to seek a transfer is relevant only to the availability of equitable modification of the deadline, and not the determination of when the alleged underlying discriminatory act occurred.
952 F.2d at 1279. We note that although given ample opportunity, Sneed chose not to present an equitable modification argument. R. D. O. at 1 n.3.
29 Rollins, slip op. at 4; Belt, slip op. at 5-8.
30 The ALJ noted the following examples of the language in the e-mails demonstrating objective evidence of termination: "Respondent: ‘Tomorrow will be your last day . . . since it is a long holiday weekend, you can gather your personal stuff.' Complainant: ‘That sounds good . . . '" R. D. & O. at 5 n.20. We also note additional examples: Respondent: "We will forward you a termination letter and a severance offer in the morning . . . ., A press release will also go out tomorrow by 1pm . . . ., I know you have rejected my verbal severance offer. . . .;" Complainant: "My lawyers [a]r[e] prepared to file a suit tomorrow by 2." M. S. D., Exh. B.
31 R. D. & O. at 5-6 (emphasis added).
32 Id. at 6.
33 Id.
34 Brief in Support of Appeal of Mary Catherine Sneed at 6 n.1.