Sprint has made no such showing in this case. Nevertheless, consistent with the ALJ's O.P.D.O., we will permit Sprint to identify in its brief to the Board specific statements and or documents that it contends are covered by the attorney-client privilege and Jordan to respond to Sprint's contentions. If Sprint identifies such statements and or documents, the Board will then, in the context of its decision of the issue whether Jordan may rely on statements or documents covered by the attorney-client privilege, consider whether it would be appropriate to permit redaction of the record to protect the alleged privileged communications. Accordingly, Sprint's motion for a blanket protective order to seal the entire record is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
M. CYNTHIA DOUGLASS
Chief Administrative Appeals Judge
OLIVER M. TRANSUE
Administrative Appeals Judge
[ENDNOTES]
1 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A (West 2002). Title VIII of Sarbanes-Oxley is designated the Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002. Section 806 covers companies with a class of securities registered under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78l, and companies required to file reports under section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 780(d)), or any officer, employee, contractor, subcontractor, or agent of such companies. Section 806 protects employees who provide information to a covered employer or a Federal agency or Congress relating to alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. 1341, 1343, 1344, or 1348, or any rule or regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission, or any provision of Federal law relating to fraud against shareholders. In addition, employees are protected against discrimination when they have filed, testified in, participated in, or otherwise assisted in a proceeding filed or about to be filed against one of the above companies relating to any such violation or alleged violation. 68 Fed. Reg. 31,864 (May 28, 2003).
2 The ALJ notes in this order that Sprint has contested Jordan's right to include the three individually named parties as respondents in this matter. Because the ALJ found that Jordan properly named the three individuals, the ALJ explained that any reference to "Sprint" or "Respondent" in his order should be construed as including both the corporate and individual respondents. Although the Board has not yet ruled on whether the individuals were properly named and because the three individuals do not appear to have obtained separate counsel, for present purposes references to "Sprint" or "Respondents" in this order include the three individually named parties.
3 Order Denying in Part Respondent's Motion for a Protective Order to Proceed under Seal and Ordering Supplemental Briefing (O.D.P.O.).
4 Given that the Board has granted Sprint's petition for interlocutory review, Sprint's request to respond to Jordan's opposition to it is denied as moot.
5 1986-CAA-006 (Sec'y April 29, 1987).
6 Slip op. at 2.
7 Id. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(b) provides:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals which would have jurisdiction of an appeal of such action may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application is made to it within ten days after the entry of the order. Provided, however, That application for an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district judge or the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order.
8 See Ford v. Nw. Airlines, ARB No. 03-014, ALJ No. 2002-AIR-021, slip op. at 2-3 (ARB Jan. 24, 2003); Greene v. EPA Chief Susan Biro, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, ARB No. 02-050, ALJ No.2002-SWD-001, slip op. at 2-3 (ARB Sept. 18, 2002).
9 See e.g., Welch v. Cardinal Bankshares Corp., ARB No. 04-054, ALJ No. 2003-SOX-015 (ARB May 13, 2004); Hibler v. Exelon Generation Co., LLC, ARB No. 03-106, ALJ No. 2003-ERA-009 ( ARB Feb. 26, 2004); Amato v. Assured Transp. & Delivery, Inc., ARB No. 98-167, ALJ No. 1998-TSC-006 (ARB Jan. 31, 2000); Hasan v. Commonwealth Edison Co., ARB No. 99-097; ALJ No. 1999-ERA-017 (ARB Sept. 16, 1999); Carter v. B & W Nuclear Techs., Inc., ALJ No.1994-ERA-013 (Sec'y Sept. 28, 1994).
10 See Greene, slip op. at 4 (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949)).
11 Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978); see Greene, slip op. at 4.
12 Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. Steering Comm. v. Mead Corp., 614 F.2d 958, 961 n.2, (5th Cir.1980) (quoting Nissan Motor Corp. Antitrust Litig., 552 F.2d 1088, 1094 (5th Cir. 1977)).
13 ARB No. 98-060, ALJ No. 1985-CAA-001 (ARB Feb. 27, 2004), rev'd sub nom., Willy v. Admin. Review Bd., 423 F.3d 483 (5th Cir. 2005).
14 O.D.M.D. at 9-14.
15 In support of this proposition, the ALJ cited: Foster v. Hill, 188 F.3d 1259, 1264 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v. White, 970 F.2d 328, 334 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Rockwell Intern'l, 897 F.2d 1255 (3d Cir. 1990); In re Walsh, 623 F.2d 489, 493 (7th Cir. 1980).
16 O.D.M.D. at 14.
17 Id. at 15.
18 Accord United States v. Philip Morris Inc., 314 F.3d 612, 617 (D.C. Cir. 2003)("The first [Cohen] requirement is satisfied because the district court's order conclusively and finally determined that the Foyle Memorandum is not protected by the attorney-client privilege. In no way does the record suggest that the district court's conclusion is tentative or subject to revision."); In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 958 (3d Cir. 1997)("It is beyond cavil that the first element is satisfied here. The district court's December 18 order requiring the production of the disputed documents leaves no room for further consideration by the district court of the claim that the documents are protected.").
19 Accord Philip Morris, 314 F.3d at 617 ("Clearly the privilege question is separable from the merits of the underlying case."); Ford, 110 F.3d at 958 ("We can resolve the privilege and work product issues without delving into the disputed facts about Ford's knowledge and actions [i.e., the merits]."
20 Philip Morris, 314 F.3d at 617.
21 Id. at 618 (citations omitted).
22 Id. Accord Ford, 110 F.3d at 961 ("[W]e believe that the attorney-client question before us also satisfies the importance criterion because the interests protected by the privilege are significant relative to the interests advanced by adherence to the final judgment rule.").
23 Id. at 619. ("In this case, the right sought to be protected – BATCo's privilege – would be destroyed if interlocutory appeal is not allowed."). Contra Boughton v. Cotter Corp., 10 F.3d 746, 751 (10th Cir. 1993)("The rulings [ordering production of documents allegedly subject to attorney-client privilege] can be reviewed upon appeal after a final judgment"). But see In re Qwest Commc'ns Int'l Inc., 450 F.3d 1179, 1183 (10th Cir. 2006)("‘Any subsequent review [of documents subject to attorney-client privilege], even after limited disclosure, would be for naught, because the damage would already be accomplished. Thus, appellate review of the claim would be meaningless.' Boughton did not address this principle." (Citation omitted).
24 Id. at 619-620 and cases cited therein.
25 29 C.F.R. § 18.29 (2006).
26 See e.g., Qwest Commc'ns, 450 F.3d at 1182-1184; In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929, 931-934 (8th Cir. 1994).
27 Somerson v. Eagle Express Lines, Inc., ARB No. 04-046, ALJ No. 2004-STA-012, slip op. at 3, n.2 (ARB May 28, 2004).
28 Respondent's Motion for a Protective Order to Proceed under Seal and with Use of Pseudonyms at 3-4.
29 951 F.2d 320, 322 (1992)(citations omitted).
30 Doe v. Smith, 429 F.3d 706, 710 (2005).
31 Doe v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United, 112 F.3d 869, 872 (7th Cir. 1997).
32 Femedeer v. Haun, 227 F.3d 1244, 1246 (10th Cir. 2000).
33 Canero v. Boston Scientific Corp., 433 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2006).
34 Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d 320, 324 (11th Cir. 1992). Accord Femedeer, 227 F.3d at 1246. Although in most cases involving a motion to proceed using pseudonyms, the plaintiff is the moving party, the courts often speak generally in terms of the requirement that parties be named in pleadings. See e.g., Femedeer, 227 F.3d at 1246 ("the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandate that all pleadings contain the name of the parties"); Doe v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United, 112 F.3d at 872 ("the privilege of suing or defending under a fictitious name should not be granted automatically. … Rule 10(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in providing that the complaint shall give the names of all the parties to the suit … instantiates the principle that judicial proceedings, civil as well as criminal, are to be conducted in public."); Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d at 322 ("Generally, parties to a lawsuit must identify themselves in their respective pleadings."). In Guerrilla Girls, Inc. v. Kaz, 224 F.R.D. 571, 574 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), a case in which the defendants requested to proceed anonymously, the court held that in such cases a number of factors should be considered, including potential mental or physical injury to the moving party, but that it was not appropriate to proceed anonymously just to protect the moving party's professional or economic life.
35 Doe v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United, 112 F.3d at 872.
36 709 F.2d at 1044 n.1.
37 805 F. Supp. at 1300 n.1.
38 Humphreys, Hutchinson & Moseley v. Donovan, 755 F.2d 1211, 1219 (6th Cir. Feb. 20, 1985)(citations omitted).
39 See e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 906 F.2d 1485, 1488 (10th Cir. 1990) ("It is well recognized in every circuit, including our own, that the identity of an attorney's client and the source of payment for legal fees are not normally protected by the attorney-client privilege.")(citations omitted).
40 I.e., whether the case "‘involves matters of a highly sensitive and personal nature, real danger of physical harm, or where the injury litigated against would be incurred as a result of the disclosure of the plaintiff's identity.'" 227 F.3d at 1246 (quoting Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d at 234). Although Sprint contended before the ALJ that this case arose in the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, O.D.P.O. at 4. n.5, Sprint has failed to discuss any Tenth Circuit precedent on the issue. As the ALJ recognized, any party adversely affected or aggrieved by a final disposition of the Board may obtain review either in the circuit in which the alleged violation occurred (in this case the Tenth Circuit) or in the circuit in which the complainant resided when the alleged violation was committed (in this case, the Eighth Circuit). O.D.P.O. at 4 n.5. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A(b)(2); 49 U.S.C.A. § 42121(b)(4)(A)(West Supp. 2005).
41 O.D.P.O. at 5. Once Jordan filed his request for a hearing before the Office of Administrative Law Judges (OALJ), the parties' names and case number became publicly available on the OALJ website. Id. at 5.
42 Id.
43 James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 239 (4th Cir. 1993)(district court judge failed to properly exercise discretion in ruling on motion to proceed anonymously in case in which he neglected to adequately take into account judicially recognized factors constraining its exercise). Cf. Doe v. Smith, 429 F.3d at 710 (case remanded to district court to revisit question whether the plaintiff should be allowed to proceed anonymously in case in which the judge granted party's application to do so without discussing the circuit's decisions, "which disfavor anonymous litigation.").
44 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (West 1996).
45 See e.g., McDowell v. Doyon Drilling Servs., ARB No. 97-053, ALJ No. 1996-TSC-008 (ARB May 19, 1997); Debose v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 1992-ERA-014, 1994 WL 897419 (Sec'y Feb. 7, 1994).
46 Debose, 1994 WL 897419 at 3 (citations omitted).
47 Foster, 188 F.3d at 1264.
48 Id.
49 O.P.D.O. at 7.
50 Id. at 8.
51 Id.
52 898 F.2d 1371 (8th Cir. 1990).
53 Id. at 1377.
54 Id.