U.S. Department of Labor Administrative Review Board 200 Constitution Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C.  20210 USDOL/OALJ REPORTER PAGE 1 In the Matter of: ADMINISTRATOR, WAGE & HOUR                   ARB CASE NO.  04-076
DIVISION, EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS            
ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT           ALJ CASE NO.   2003-LCA-022
OF LABOR                                                                                      PROSECUTING PARTY,                DATE:  June 30, 2006                                                     v. SYNERGY SYSTEMS, INCORPORATED, RESPONDENT. BEFORE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD Appearances: For the Prosecuting Party: Joan Brenner, Esq., Paul L. Frieden, Esq., William C. Lesser, Esq., Steven J. Mandel,  
Esq., Howard M. Radzely, Esq., United States Department of Labor, Washington, D.C. For the Respondent: James R. Gotcher, Esq., The Gotcher Law Group, PC, Sherman Oaks, California FINAL DECISION AND ORDER             The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA or the Act)¹ requires that employers
pay a certain, prescribed wage to the nonimmigrant alien workers whom they hire, even if
the  nonimmigrant  is  in  a  nonproductive  status  (i.e.,  not  performing  work)  due  to  a
decision by the employer, such as the lack of assigned work.  The Administrator of the
United  States  Department  of  Labor’s  Wage  and  Hour  Division  contends  that  Synergy                                                  1 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101-1537 (West 1999 & Supp. 2004) and implemented at 20 C.F.R. Part 655, Subparts H and I (2006).

USDOL/OALJ REPORTER PAGE 2 Systems, Incorporated, (Synergy) violated the Act when it did not pay two nonimmigrant
alien  workers  during  periods  when  they  performed  work  and  when  they  were  in  a
nonproductive status.  A Department of Labor (DOL) Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
ruled  in  favor  of  the  Administrator  and  the  two  employees.    Synergy  appealed.    We
affirm the ALJ’s decision with some modification.    REGULATORY FRAMEWORK             The  INA  permits  employers  in  the  United  States  to  hire  nonimmigrant  alien
workers  in  specialty  occupations.    8  U.S.C.A.  §  1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b).    These  workers
commonly  are  referred  to  as  H-1B  nonimmigrants.    Specialty  occupations  require
specialized  knowledge  and  a  degree  in  the  specialty.    8  U.S.C.A.  §  1184(i)(1).    To
employ H-1B nonimmigrants, the employer must fill out a Labor Condition Application
(LCA).  8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(n).  The LCA stipulates the wage levels that the employer
guarantees for the H-1B nonimmigrants.  8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(n)(1); 20 C.F.R. §§ 655.731,
655.732.  After securing DOL certification for the LCA, the employer petitions for and
the nonimmigrants receive H-1B visas from the State Department after Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) approval.  20 C.F.R. § 655.705(a), (b).² An employer violates the INA if it fails to pay an H-1B nonimmigrant for work performed  or  when  the  worker  is  in  “nonproductive  status”  for  employment-related
reasons.  Employment-related nonproductive status results from factors such as lack of
available  work  for  the  nonimmigrant  or  lack  of  a  permit  or  license.    8  U.S.C.A.  §
1182(n)(2)(C)(vii); 20 C.F.R. § 655.731(c)(7)(i).  But an employer need not compensate a   nonimmigrant   if   it   has   effected   a   “bona   fide   termination”   of   the   employment relationship.  20 C.F.R. § 655.731(c)(7)(ii).  The employer must notify the INS that it has
terminated the employment relationship so that the INS may revoke approval of the H-1B
visa.  8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(11) (2005). BACKGROUND             At  all  relevant  times,  Synergy  was  a  California  contractor  firm  that  provided
computer  support  services  to  other  businesses.    Administrative  Law  Judge’s  Exhibit
(ALJX)  6  at  10.    Synergy  submitted  the  LCA  at  issue  to  the  DOL  on  May  18,  2000,
seeking certification to employ as many as 20 H-1B nonimmigrants to work as program
analysts at a prevailing wage rate of $44,000 per year.  The DOL certified the LCA on
June  1,  2000.    Prosecuting  Party’s  Exhibi t  (PX)  12;    ALJX  6  at  4-5.    Ramesh
Balakrishnan  and  Durgesh  Trimbakkar  were  citizens  of  India  who  came  to  the  United
States  in  2000  under  H-1B  nonimmigrant  visas.    ALJX  6  at  6,  15.    In  February  2001,
Balakrishnan  and  Trimbakkar  began  working  for  Synergy  and  were  assigned  contract                                                  2   The INS is now the “U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services” or “USCIS.”  See Homeland  Security  Act  of  2002,  Pub.  L.  No.  107-296,  116  Stat.  2135,  2194-96  (Nov.  25,
2002).   

USDOL/OALJ REPORTER PAGE 3 projects for Synergy clients.  ALJX 3 at 14-15; Hearing Transcript (HT) at 19-20.  The
petitions   for   H-1B   visas   for   Balakrishnan   and   Trimbakkar   that   Synergy   submitted
indicated that they were to be paid $45,000 per year.  ALJX 6.                  Both  Balakrishnan  and  Trimbakkar  testified  that,  in  March  2001,  before  they
received a paycheck, they each received a $1,500 check from Synergy, labeled “advance
loan.”    ALJX  3  at  17-18  (Exhibit  1);  HT  at  24-25;  PX  6-7.    Subsequent  paycheck
earnings  statements  indicate  that  $1,000  was  deducted  from  both  Balakrishnan’s  and
Trimbakkar’s wages as repayment for the “advance.”  PX 4 at 0; PX 5 at 1.  Between
February  2001  and  September  2001,  Balakrishnan  and  Trimbakkar  worked  on  various
assigned  contracted  projects  for  Synergy  clients   and   for   varying   durations.      After
Balakrishnan  stopped  working  for  Synergy,  he  filed  a  complaint  with  the  DOL  on
November 1, 2001, alleging that Synergy had failed to pay him all of the required wages
he believed he was owed.  ALJX 7.    After   conducting   an   investigation,   the   DOL’s   Wage   and   Hour   Division Administrator  issued  an  April  15,  2003  determination  that  Synergy  violated  the  H-1B
provisions of the INA.  PX 1-3.  The Administrator found that Synergy willfully failed to
pay Balakrishnan and Trimbakkar $12,115.38 in required wages for nonproductive time.  
And since the violation was willful, the Administrator also assessed a civil money penalty
of $5,000 against Synergy.  In addition, the Administrator determined that Synergy failed
to pay Balakrishnan and Trimbakkar $11,340.43 in required wages for certain periods of
productive work between February and September 2001.  Specifically, the Administrator
calculated   that   Synergy   owed   Balakrishnan   $6,304.94   in   back   wages   and   owed  
Trimbakkar $17,150.87 in back wages.  PX 2.  Finally, the Administrator determined that
Synergy violated the Act when it failed to provide Balakrishnan and Trimbakkar with a
copy   of   the   LCA   and   failed   to   make   it   available   for   public   examination.      The
Administrator   did   not   assess   civil   money   penalties   for   those   violations.      Synergy
appealed the Administrator’s determination,  and the case was assigned to the ALJ for a
hearing.               The  ALJ  conducted  a  hearing  and  issued  a  Decision  and  Order  (D.  &  O.)  on
March 5, 2004.  In ruling on  Synergy’s post-hearing jurisd ictional arguments, the ALJ
held that since Balakrishnan filed a timely complaint with the DOL though Trimbakkar
did  not,  the  Administrator  had  jurisdiction  over  the  alleged  violations  involving  both
Balakrishnan  and  Trimbakkar.    D.  &  O.  at  16.    In  addition,  the  ALJ  held  that  the
Administrator’s   failure   to   comply   with    statutory   time   limits   in   conducting   an
investigation  and  determining  whether  the  compliant  had  merit  did  not  preclude  the
Administrator from exercising jurisdiction.  He also ruled that the fact that a hearing was
not  scheduled  within  60  days  from  the  date  the  Administrator  should  have  made  a
determination did not prevent the Administrator from prosecuting the case.  D. & O. at
16-17.    As for the back wages, the ALJ noted that at the hearing the Administrator had corrected  the  calculations  as  to  what  Synergy  specifically  owed  to  Balakrishnan  and
Trimbakkar  individually.    D.  &  O.  at  17,  20,  22.    The  Administrator  indicated  that

USDOL/OALJ REPORTER PAGE 4 Balakrishnan is actually owed $8,035.71 in back wages (or an additional $1,730.77) and
Trimbakkar is owed $15,420.10 (or a reduction of $1,730.77) in back wages.  HT at 215-
216.³                The  ALJ  then  found  that  Balakrishnan  and  Trimbakkar  worked  for  Synergy,
without any legitimate leaves of absence, from February 1, 2001, until the end of October
2001.  D. & O. at 17-20.  Therefore, the ALJ held that Synergy owed Balakrishnan and
Trimbakkar the amounts that the Administrator calculated, but he reduced the amounts
owed to each by $500 to account for the remaining portion of the $1,500 “advance loan”
they   each   had   received   but   never   was   deducted   from   their   subsequent   wages   or
paychecks.  D. & O. at 20, 22.  Finally, the ALJ concluded that Synergy willfully failed
to pay Balakrishnan and Trimbakkar required wages for nonproductive time in May and
June 2001 and, therefore, adopted the Administrator’s recommended civil money penalty
of $5,000 against Synergy.  D. & O. at 21.⁴    Synergy filed a timely petition for review.
See 20 C.F.R. § 655.655.   JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW The Administrative Review Board (ARB or the Board) has jurisdiction to review an  ALJ’s  decision  concerning  the  INA.     8  U.S.C.A.  §  1182(n)(2)  and  20  C.F.R.  §
655.845.  See also Secretary’s Order No. 1-2002,  67 Fed. Reg. 64,272 (Oct. 17, 2002)
(delegating to the ARB the Secretary’s authority  to review cases arising under, inter alia,
the INA).                Under  the  Administrative  Procedure  Act,  the  Board,  as  the  designee  of  the
Secretary of Labor, acts with “all the powers [the Secretary] would have in making the
initial decision . . . .” 5 U.S.C.A. § 557(B) (West 1996), quoted in Goldstein v. Ebasco
Constructors,  Inc.,  1986-ERA-36,  slip  op.  at  19  (Sec’y  Apr.  7,  1992).    The  Board
engages   in   de   novo   review   of   an   ALJ’s   INA   decision.      Yano   Enters.,   Inc.   v.
Administrator, ARB No. 01-050, ALJ No. 2001-LCA-0001, slip op. at 3 (ARB Sept. 26,
2001); Administrator v. Jackson, ARB No. 00-068, ALJ No. 1999-LCA-0004, slip op. at
3 (ARB Apr. 30, 2001).  See generally Mattes v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 721 F.2d                                                  3 The  ALJ  erred  in  stating  that  the  Administrator  indicated  that  Balakrishnan  was actually  owed  $8,035  in back  wages,  as  a  review  of  the  hearing  transcript  reveals  that  the
Administrator indicated that Balakrishnan was actually owed $8,035.71 in back wages, or an
additional .71 cents.  HT at 215-216. 4                   The ALJ also determined that, while the weight of the evidence did not establish that
Synergy  failed  to  make  the  LCA  at  issue  available  for  public  examination  pursuant  to  20
C.F.R.  §  655.760(a),  Synergy  did  fail  to  send  Balakrishnan  and  Trimbakkar  copies  of  the
LCA  by  their  first  day  of  work  in  accordance  with  20  C.F.R.  §  655.734(a)(3).    Like  the
Administrator, the ALJ did not impose any civil money penalty for the violation.  D. & O. at
21-22.  The parties do not contest these findings.  

USDOL/OALJ REPORTER PAGE 5 1125,  1128-1130  (7th  Cir.  1983)  (rejecting  argument  that  higher  level  administrative
official was bound by ALJ’s decision);  McCann v. Califano, 621 F.2d 829, 831 (6th Cir.
1980),  and  cases  cited  therein  (sustaining  rejection  of  ALJ’s  decision  by  higher  level
administrative review body). ISSUES 1.      Did  the  Administrator  have  the  authority  to  investigate  Synergy  regarding  INA
violations involving a nonimmigrant employee who did not file a timely complaint? 2.  Did the Administrator’s fail ure to comply with the statutory deadline to conduct an
investigation  and  issue  a  determination  deprive  the  Administrator  of  jurisdiction  to
prosecute the case or prejudice Synergy’s defense?   Did DOL’s Office of Administrative
Law Judges’s (OALJ) failure to comply with  the statutory deadline to provide a hearing
preclude the Administrator from prosecuting the case or prejudice Synergy?   3.   Are Balakrishnan and Trimbakkar entitled to back pay?   4.   Did Synergy willfully violate the INA ? DISCUSSION 1.   Jurisdiction The Administrator had the authority to investigate INA violations involving Trimbakkar.               Synergy contends that because the record contains no evidence that Trimbakkar
filed a complaint as an aggrieved person within 12 months after the termination of his employment  with  Synergy,  the  Administrator  did  not  have  the  authority  to  investigate Synergy regarding any INA violations involving Trimbakkar.⁵  Synergy Brief at 2-3.  In                                                  5 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(n)(2)(A) states:    The   Secretary   shall   establish   a   process   for   the   receipt,
investigation,   and   disposition   of   complaints   respecting   a
petitioner’s   failure   to   meet   a   condition   specified   in   an
application  submitted  under  paragraph  (1)  or  a  petitioner’s
misrepresentation  of  material  facts  in  such  an  application.
Complaints   may   be   filed   by   any   aggrieved   person   or
organization    (including    bargaining    representatives).    No
investigation  or  hearing  shall  be  conducted  on  a  complaint
concerning  such  a  failure  or  misrepresentation  unless  the

USDOL/OALJ REPORTER PAGE 6 response,  the  Administrator  argues  that  because  Balakrishnan  timely  filed  a  complaint,
the Administrator had the authority to investigate Synergy regarding not only any INA
violations   involving   Balakrishnan,   but   any   other   INA   violations,   including   those
involving Trimbakkar.  Administrator’s Brief at 23-25.               The ALJ determined that Balakrishnan’s complaint under section 1182(n)(2)(A)
encompasses not only his grievances “but also all other similar violations involving the
same LCA, even if those other violations involve other aggrieved persons who were not
identified by the person making the complaint.”  D. & O. at 16.  Thus, the ALJ concluded
that Balakrishnan’s complaint provided a suffi cient basis for exercising jurisdiction over
the alleged violations involving both Balakrishnan and Trimbakkar. The   Administrator   has   the   authority   to   investigate   Synergy’s   alleged   INA violations involving Trimbakkar even in the absence of a complaint.  “The Administrator, either  pursuant   to   a   complaint   or  otherwise,   shall   conduct   such   investigations   as appropriate.”  20 C.F.R. § 655.800(b) (emphasis added).  In Adm’r v. Beverly Enter., Inc.,
ARB  No.  99-050,  ALJ  No.  98-ARN-3,  slip  op.  at  9-10  (ARB  July  31,  2002),  a  case
brought under the Immigration Nursing Relief Act of 1989, 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101 et seq.
(West 1999) and its implementing regulation at 20 C.F.R. § 655.400(b), which contains
the same language as 20 C.F.R. § 655.800(b), we held that the Secretary of Labor could
act, complaint or not, when a facility seeking to employ a nurse is allegedly violating the
terms of an LCA.  Synergy’s construction  of the INA and 20 C.F.R. § 655.800(b) would
have   the   Administrator   “stand   idly   by,   despite   having   received,   as   here,   serious
allegations  from  a  credible  source.”    Beverly  Enter.,  Inc.,  slip  op.  at  10.    Thus,  the
Administrator   had   the   authority   to   investigate   alleged   INA   violations   involving
Trimbakkar.   The  Administrator  and  OALJ’s    failure  to comply  with  statutory  deadlines  does  not
deprive  the  Administrator  of    jurisdiction  to  prosecute  the  case.    Nor  did  such  failure
prejudice Synergy.                Synergy  also  argues  that  since  the  Administrator  did  not  issue  a  determination
(whether a reasonable basis existed that Synergy violated the Act) within 30 days after
Balakrishnan  filed  his  complaint  and  since  the  DOL’s  Office  of  Administrative  Law
Judges (OALJ) did not provide an opportunity for a hearing within the next 60 days, the
Administrator lacks jurisdiction to proceed against Synergy.⁶  Synergy also contends that                                                                                                                                                  complaint was filed not later than 12 months after the date of
the failure or misrepresentation, respectively.   See also 20 C.F.R. § 655.806(a)(5) (A complaint must be filed not later than 12 months after
the latest date on which the alleged violation(s) were committed).   6   8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(n)(2)(B) states: Under  such  process,  the  Secretary  shall  provide,  within  30
days   after   the   date   such   a   complaint   is   filed,   for   a

USDOL/OALJ REPORTER PAGE 7 the Administrator’s delays in  issuing a determination prejudiced its opportunity to depose
other   Synergy   employees   who   could   contradict   Balakrishnan   and   Trimbakkar’s
allegations.  In response, the Administrator contends that the statute’s requirements that
the Administrator “shall” issue a determination within 30 days of the complaint and the OALJ  “shall”  provide  an  opportunity  for  a  hearing  within  60  days  of  a  determination, without  stating  anything  more  or  specifying  any  consequence  for  failing  to  do  so,  are
merely  directory  instructions  and  not  jurisdictional  bars.    Moreover,  according  to  the
Administrator, Synergy failed to show any actual prejudice it suffered as a result of any
delay.    The  ALJ  held  that  the  failure  to  comply  with  the  statutory  time  limits  did  not preclude the Administrator from exercising jurisdiction.  D. & O. at 16-17.  As authority,
he cited Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S. 253 (1986).  In Pierce County, the Supreme Court  held  that  the  Comprehensive  Employment  and  Training  Act’s⁷  use  of  the  word “shall” when setting deadlines for agency action, standing alone, cannot be jurisdictional
and is not enough to remove the Secretary of Labor’s power to act after the deadline has expired.    A  contrary  interpretation  would  permit  agency  inaction  to  prejudice  both  the public interest that the statute addresses and individual complainants seeking to enforce
their rights.  Pierce County, 476 U.S. at 261-262.  The Court held that such a statutory
deadline “was clearly intended to spur the Secretary [of Labor] to action, not to limit the
scope of his authority.”  476 U.S. at 265.   We conclude that the rationale of the holding
in Pierce County applies here.  Thus, the Administrator and OALJ’s failure to comply
with the statutory deadlines did not remove the Administrator’s jurisdiction to prosecute
the case.⁸                                                                                                                                                  determination as to whether or not a reasonable basis exists to
make a finding described in subparagraph (C). If the Secretary
determines  that  such  a  reasonable  basis  exists,  the  Secretary
shall provide for notice of such determination to the interested
parties and an opportunity for a hearing on the complaint, in
accordance with section 556 of Title 5, within 60 days after
the date of the determination. If such a hearing is requested,
the  Secretary  shall  make  a  finding  concerning  the  matter  by
not later than 60 days after the date of the hearing. In the case
of   similar   complaints   respecting   the   same   applicant,   the
Secretary     may     consolidate     the     hearings     under     this
subparagraph on such complaints. See also 20 C.F.R. §§ 655.806(a)(3), 655.835(c). 7   29 U.S.C.A. § 816(b) (West 1976, Supp. V). 8                We   note   that   it   appears   that   both   the   ALJ   and   the   Administrator   have
mischaracterized  the  Pierce  County  holding.    Both  read  Pierce  County  as  holding  that
government agencies do not lose jurisdiction for failure to comply with statutory time limits
unless  the  statute  “both  expressly  requires  an  agency  or  public  official  to  act  within  a
particular time period and specifies a consequence for failure to comply with the provision.”  

USDOL/OALJ REPORTER PAGE 8             We also reject Synergy’s contention that  the Administrator’s delays in issuing a
determination prejudiced its opportunity to depose other Synergy employees.  Although
excessive delay prior to a hearing may create a presumption of prejudice, Synergy must
demonstrate actual prejudice to warrant dismissal of a case.  See Ray Wilson Co., ARB No.  02-086,  ALJ  No.  2000-DBA-14,  slip  op.  at  6-7  (Feb.  27,  2004).    Synergy  cannot claim actual prejudice because as early as December 2001, Synergy was aware that the
Administrator  was  investigating  Balakrishnan’s  complaint  and  had  the  opportunity  to
collect favorable testimony and evidence then available.  See HT at 305-306.  Synergy
did not show that it even attempted, but failed, to depose any of its employees or former
employees.   2.  Synergy Owes Balakrishnan and Trimbakkar Back Wages Synergy argues that the ALJ erred in finding that Balakrishnan and Trimbakkar were  entitled  to  full  wages  for  the  period  between  February  1,  2001,  and  the  end  of
October 2001.  It claims that both were either on leave of absence during that period or
had been terminated before October 31, 2001.  Specifically, Synergy asserts that the ALJ
erred in crediting the employee interview statements that  DOL investigators took from
Gita  Rowlands,  a  Synergy  receptionist.    The  statements  indicate  that  Balakrishnan  and
Trimbakkar  reported  to  work  at  Synergy’ s  office  during  periods  in  which  Synergy
management  officials  allege  Balakrishnan  and  Trimbakkar  were  on  leave  of  absence.                                                                                                                                                    D.  &  O.  at  16;  Administrator's  Brief  at  25-26.    To  the  contrary,  the  Court  explained  in
holding that the Secretary had not forfeited its jurisdiction under the facts of that case: We  need  not,  and  do  not,  hold  that  a  statutory  deadline  for
agency    action    can    never    bar    later    action    unless    that
consequence is stated explicitly in the statute. In this case, we
need not go beyond the normal indicia of congressional intent
to conclude that § 106(b) [of the Comprehensive Employment
and  Training  Act]  permits  the  Secretary  to  recover  misspent
funds after the 120-day deadline has expired. 476 U.S. at 262 n.9.  The quotation upon which both the ALJ and the Administrator rely in
stating that the statute must specify a consequence for failure to comply is simply the Court’s
acknowledgement  of  the  appellate  precedent  upon  which  the  Secretary  relied;  it  is  not  a
statement  of  the  Court’s  holding  in  the  case.    See  476  U.S.  at  259;  see  also  United  Gov’t Security Officers, Local # 50, ARB No. 05-157, slip op. at 7 n.34 (Dec. 29, 2005).  To the extent that this Board has also previously relied on such a mischaracterization of the holding
in Pierce County, we hereby properly enunciate the Pierce County holding.  See e.g., Alden Mgmt. Serv., Inc., ARB Nos. 00-020, 00-021, slip op. at 5; Beverly Enters., Inc., ARB No. 99-050, slip op. at 17-18; The Law Co., Inc., ARB No. 98-107, slip op. at 13 (ARB Sept. 30,
1999); Adm’r v. Nurses PRN of Denver, Inc., ARB No. 97-131, ALJ No. 94-ARN-1, slip op.
at 8 (ARB June 30, 1999).

USDOL/OALJ REPORTER PAGE 9 Synergy maintains that Rowlands’s deposition  testimony contradicts these statements.  In
addition, Synergy argues that, while the ALJ did not believe Trimbakkar’s testimony that
he  worked  with  Synergy  until  the  end  of  October  2001,  the  ALJ  failed  to  adequately
explain   how   he   nevertheless   found   that   the   evidence   of   record   established   that
Trimbakkar did in fact work with Synergy until the end of October 2001.  Synergy claims
that  it  terminated  Trimbakkar’s  employment  in  Sept ember  2001.    Finally,  Synergy
contends that the ALJ did not adequately explain how he calculated the amount of back
wages owed to Balakrishnan and Trimbakkar.  Synergy Brief at 5-7.             The ALJ found that neither the testimony of Balakrishnan and Trimbakkar, nor
the testimony of Synergy management officials, was reliable or credible.  D. & O. at 17-
19.    Instead,  the  ALJ  relied  on  the  documentary  evidence,  which  included  payroll
records,  earnings  statements,  time  sheets,  employee  status  reports,  the  LCA  and  H-1B
petitions,  medical  insurance  records,  employee  interview  statements,  and  a  written
request for leave and e-mail messages from Trimbakkar.  He found that Balakrishnan and
Trimbakkar worked continuously for Synergy, without ever taking any leave of absence,
from February 1, 2001 through the end of October 2001.  D. & O. at 19-20.  Although the ALJ  found  that  Trimbakkar’s  testimony  that  he   worked  with  Synergy  until  the  end  of October  2001  was  inconsistent  with  a  separation  agreement  he  had  signed  and  with
Synergy’s   payroll   records   indicating   that   his   employment   with   Synergy   ended   in
September 2001, the ALJ also noted that Synergy did not produce any records that it had
notified the INS that it had terminated either Balakrishnan or Trimbakkar.  D. & O. at 17-
18.    Moreover,  the  ALJ  characterized  documents  indicating  that  Balakrishnan  and
Trimbakkar  had  taken  leaves  of  absence  during  their  employment  with  Synergy  as “phony,”  “bogus,”  and  inconsistent  with  Rowlands’s  statements  that  they  continued  to report to work at Synergy’s office during their “purported” leaves of absence.  D. & O. at
18-19.  Thus, the ALJ held that Synergy owed Balakrishnan and Trimbakkar the amounts
that the Administrator calculated, but he reduced those amounts by $500 to account for
the remaining portion of the $1,500 “advance loan” each received but was never deducted
from their subsequent wages.  D. & O. at 20, 22. Under its “no benching” provisions, the INA requires  that an employer pay the required  wage  specified  in  the  LCA  even  if  the  H-1B  nonimmigrant  employee  is  in  a
nonproductive  status  (i.e.,  not  performing  work)  because  of  lack  of  assigned  work  or
some other employment-related reason.  8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(n)(2)(C)(vii)(I); 20 C.F.R. §
655.731(c)(6)(ii), (7)(i); Administrator v. Kutty, ARB No. 03-022, ALJ Nos. 01-LCA-010
through  01-LCA-025,  slip  op.  at  7  (ARB  May  31,  2005);  Rajan  v.  International  Bus. Solutions,  Ltd.,  ARB  No.  03-104,  ALJ  No.  03-LCA-12,  slip  op.  at  7  (ARB  Aug.  31, 2004).    But  an  employer  need  not  pay  wages  to  H-1B  nonimmigrants  that  are  in
nonproductive status due to conditions that remove the nonimmigrants from their duties
at their “voluntary request and convenience” or which render them unable to work, such
as a requested leave of absence.  20 C.F.R. § 655.731(c)(7)(ii).                We  find  that  the  record  supports  the  ALJ’s  finding  that  Balakrishnan  and
Trimbakkar  were  available  to  work  continuously  for  Synergy  from  February  1,  2001,
through the end of October 2001 and never took a legitimate leave of absence during that

USDOL/OALJ REPORTER PAGE 10 time.    Contrary  to  Synergy’s  contention,  Rowl ands’s  statements  to  the  Administrator’s investigator  that  Balakrishnan  and  Trimbakkar  worked  eight  hours  a  day  at  Synergy’s
office  in  May  2001  are  not  necessarily  inconsistent  with  her  subsequent  deposition
testimony.  PX 11.  Rowlands testified that Balakrishnan and Trimbakkar came into the
office most days in May 2001 for at least four to six hours a day.  HT at 24, 26, 30.  In
any event, whether Balakrishnan and Trimbakkar reported to the office or not while they
were in a nonproductive status because of lack of assigned work, Synergy was required to
pay them the wages due under the LCA.  8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(n)(2)(C)(vii)(I); 20 C.F.R. §
655.731(c)(6)(ii), (7)(i); Kutty, slip op. at 7; Rajan, slip op. at 7.      Synergy   also   submits   that   Trimbakkar’s   employment   was   terminated   in September  2001.    The  relevant  INA  regulation  pertaining  to  termination  specifies  that wage  payments  “need  not  be  made  if  there  has  been  a  bona  fide  termination  of  the employment  relationship”  and  that  “INS  regulations  require  the  employer  to  notify  the INS that the employment relationship has been terminated so that the [H-1B] petition is
canceled  (8  C.F.R.  214.2(h)(11)).”    20  C.F.R.  §  655.731(c)(7)(ii).    And  the  applicable
INS regulation provides that an H-1B petitioner, such as Synergy, shall “immediately”
notify the INS if it “no longer employs the beneficiary.”  8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(11)(i)(A).  
Synergy produced one witness who testified that she mailed the notice of Trimbakkar’s
termination to the INS.  But in light of the ALJ’s finding th at none of the witnesses were entirely  credible  and  in  light  of  the  fact  that  Synergy  did  not  produce  a  record  that  it notified the INS, we find that Trimbakkar’s  alleged termination in September 2001 was
not bona fide.  Thus, Synergy is liable for wages owed to Trimbakkar for October 2001.             Synergy  further  contends  that  the  ALJ  did  not  explain  how  he  determined  the
amount of back wages he awarded to Balakrishnan and Trimbakkar.  Synergy Brief at 6.  
We assume that Synergy is arguing that since the record does not support the ALJ’s back
wage calculations, we should vacate the back wage awards.  But since the ALJ accepted
the  Administrator’s  back  wage  calcula tions  (though  he  reduced  them  by  $500)  and
Synergy  did  not  contest  those  calculations  at  the  hearing  below,  Synergy  waived  this
argument.    Saporito  v.  Central  Locating  Serv.,  Ltd.,  ARB  No.  05-004,  ALJ  No.  2001-
CAA-00013, slip op. at 9 (ARB Feb. 28, 2006).  Moreover, the Administrator is vested
with “enforcement discretion” and considers the totality of circumstances “in fashioning
remedies appropriate to the violation,” 65 Fed. Reg. at 80180 (2000).  Under 20 C.F.R. §
655.810(e)(2) “the Administrator may impose such other administrative remedies as the
Administrator determines to be appropriate,” “including . . . back wages to workers . . .
whose employment has been terminated in violation of these provisions.”  Therefore, we
will not disturb the Administrator’s calculations because the record contains no evidence
that they are arbitrary or an abuse of discretion. The  ALJ  did  err,  however,  in  reducing  the  amounts  owed  to  Balakrishnan  and Trimbakkar by $500 to account for the remaining portion of the $1,500 “advance loan”
each received but was never deducted from their subsequent wages.  Payments to H-1B
workers do not qualify as “wages paid” unless they are:

USDOL/OALJ REPORTER PAGE 11 (i)             Payments shown in the employer’s payroll records
as   earnings   for   the   employee,   and   disbursed   to   the
employee,  cash  in  hand,  free  and  clear,  when  due,  except
for authorized deductions;
(ii)             Payments reported to the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS)   as   the   employee’s   earnings,   with   appropriate
withholding for the employee’s tax paid to the IRS . . . . 20  C.F.R.  §  655-731(c)(2)(i)-(ii).    See  also  59  Fed.  Reg.  65,646;  65,652-53  (Dec.  20,
1994) (amounts to be treated as “wages paid” shall be paid to the employee free and clear
when due); Administrator v. Pegasus Consulting Group, Inc., ARN Nos. 03-032, 03-033;
ALJ No. 2001-LCA-29, slip op. at 10 (June 30, 2005).    The first payments Synergy made to Balakrishnan and Trimbakkar were $1,500 checks  labeled  “advance  loan.”    ALJX  3  at 17-18  (Exhibit  1);  HT  at  24-25;  PX  6-7.  
Subsequent paycheck earnings statements indicate that $1,000 was deducted from both
Balakrishnan’s and Trimbakkar’s wages as repa yment for the “advance.”  PX 4 at 0; PX
5  at  1.    But  the  “advance  loan”  checks  that  Synergy  provided  to  Balakrishnan  and
Trimbakkar do not qualify as “wages paid” because they were not shown on Synergy’s
payroll records, and the record contains no evidence that Synergy reported them to the
IRS.    Thus,  the  $1,500  should  not  have  been  deducted  from  the  wages  owed  to
Balakrishnan  and  Trimbakkar.    Therefore,  the  $1,000  previously  deducted  from  the
wages   of   Balakrishnan   and   Trimbakkar   must   be   added   to   the   Administrator’s
determination   that   Synergy   owed   Balakrishnan   $8,035.71   and   owed   Trimbakkar $15,420.10.      See      HT   at   215-216.      Consequently,   we   hold   that   Synergy   owes Balakrishnan $9,035.71 in back wages and owes Trimbakkar $16,420.10 in back wages.   Finally,  Synergy  also  contends  in  its  petition  for  review  that  the  ALJ  erred because  he  did  not  permit  it  to  inquire  into  the  post-termination  immigration  status  of Balakrishnan and Trimbakkar.  We reject this argument for two reasons.  First, in a pre-
hearing ruling denying Synergy’s request to in quire into the immigration status, the ALJ
relied on case-law arising under the Fair Labor Standards Act holding that an employee’s
immigration status is not relevant in a case in which unpaid wages are being sought for
work  already  performed.⁹    This  ruling  is  consistent  with  the  Board’s  holding  in Administrator v. Ken Tech., Inc., ARB No. 03-140, ALJ No. 2003-LCA-00015, slip op. at 5 (ARB Sep. 30, 2004) (whether employee was undocumented is not at issue in an H-
1B  case).    And  second,  we  note  that  at  the  hearing  the  ALJ  did  permit  Synergy  to
question Trimbakkar regarding his immigration status as of February 2002.  HT at 69-74,
87-92.                                                         9   See June 12, 2003 Ruling On Prosecuting Party’s Motion  In Limine citing Flores v. Amigon, 233 F. Supp. 2d 462, 463 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); Liu v. Donna Karan Int’l, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 191,192 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Flores v. Albertson’s, Inc., 2002 WL 1163623 (C.D. Cal.
2002).   

USDOL/OALJ REPORTER PAGE 12 3.  Civil Money Penalties and Disqualification The Act provides that the Administrator “may” assess civil money penalties up to $1,000   for   non-willful   violations   and   up   to   $5,000   for   willful   violations   or   for discrimination.  8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(n)(2)(C)(i)-(ii); 20 C.F.R. § 655.810(b)(1)-(2)(i)-(iii).  
The Administrator assessed Synergy $5,000 in civil money penalties because he found
that   it   willfully   failed   to   pay   Balakrishnan   and   Trimbakkar   required   wages   for
nonproductive time.  PX 1.                    The ALJ agreed that the violation was willful because the evidence showed that
Synergy generated and retained written records which falsely suggested that Balakrishnan
and Trimbakkar were on leave of absence during periods when they were in fact working in  Synergy’s  office.    D.  &  O.  at  20.    “Willful”  is  defined  as  “a  knowing  failure  or  a reckless  disregard  with  respect  to  whether  the  conduct  was  contrary  to”  the  INA.    20
C.F.R. § 655.805(c); D. & O. at 20.  We find that the Administrator and the ALJ correctly
concluded  that  Synergy’s  failure  to  pay  such  wages  was  willful  because  the  record
supports such a conclusion.    The regulations specify seven factors that may be considered in determining the amount of the civil money penalties to be assessed:   previous history of violations by the
employer, the number of workers affected, the gravity of the violations, the employer’s
good faith efforts to comply, the employer’s  explanation, the employer’s commitment to
future  compliance,  the  employer’s  financial   gain  due  to  the  violations  or  potential
financial loss, injury or adverse effect to others.  20 C.F.R. § 655.810(c).             The ALJ considered these factors and concluded that the Administrator’s decision
to  assess  a  $5,000  civil  money  penalty  was  appropriate.    D.  &  O.  at  21.    The
Administrator   is   vested   with   “enforcement   discretion”   “in   fashioning   remedies
appropriate   to   the   violation.”      65   Fed.   Reg.   at   80,180.     See   also   8   US.C.A.   § 1182(n)(2)(C)(i)-(ii);  20  C.F.R.  §  655.810(b)(1)-(2)(i)-(iii),  (e)(2),  (f).    Thus,  since  the record  demonstrates  that  the  Administrator  did  not  abuse  his  discretion,  we  will  not
modify the ALJ’s finding that the Admini strator’s assessment was appropriate. Finally, the Act compels the Secretary of Labor to notify the Attorney General in the  event  the  Secretary  finds  that  an  “employer”  has  willfully  violated  the  Act.    The Attorney    General    then    must    disqualify    the    employer    from    employing    H-1B
nonimmigrants  for  at  least  two  years.    8  U.S.C.A.  §  1182(n)(2)(C)(ii).    Consequently,
since  we  have  affirmed  the  ALJ’s  finding  that   Synergy  willfully  violated  the  Act,  the
Attorney General shall disqualify Synergy for at least two years.    CONCLUSION The  Administrator  proved  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence  that  Synergy willfully violated the Act when it did not pay Balakrishnan and Trimbakkar the required
wages.  Moreover, the Administrator’s assessme nt of civil money penalties is reasonable.  

USDOL/OALJ REPORTER PAGE 13 Therefore, it is ORDERED that Synergy pay Balakrishnan $9,035.71 in back wages pay
Trimbakkar $16,420.10 in back wages, and pay the Administrator $5,000 in civil money
penalties.  Finally, the Attorney General shall disqualify Synergy for at least two years.    SO ORDERED.   OLIVER M. TRANSUE Administrative Appeals Judge              WAYNE C. BEYER Administrative Appeals Judge