U.S. Department of Labor Administrative Review Board 200 Constitution Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C.  20210 USDOL/OALJ REPORTER PAGE 1 In the Matter of: DARRYL THOMPSON, ARB CASE NO.  06-061 COMPLAINANT,     ALJ CASE NO.  05-AIR-32 v. DATE:  June 30, 2006 BAA INDIANAPOLIS, LLC, RESPONDENT. BEFORE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD Appearances: For the Respondent: Kim F. Ebert, Esq. and Kristin B. Keltner, Esq., Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stuart, P.C. FINAL DECISION AND ORDER DISMISSING   INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL BACKGROUND             The  Complainant,  Darryl  Thompson,  has  filed  a  complaint  alleging  that  the
Respondent,  BAA  Indianapolis  LLC,  has  retaliated  against  him  in  violation  of  the
whistleblower  protection  provisions  of  the  Wendell  H.  Ford  Aviation  Investment  and
Reform Act for the 21st Century (AIR 21).¹  The complaint was referred to a Department
of   Labor   Administrative   Law   Judge   (ALJ)   for   hearing   and   initial   administrative
adjudication.   Under contract with the Indianapolis Airport Authority, BAA’s primary functions include  maintaining  required  Federal  Aviation  Authority  certifications  for  six  airport                                                 1 49 U.S.C.A. § 42121(a) (West 2005 Supp.).   

USDOL/OALJ REPORTER PAGE 2 facilities  that  the  Indianapolis  Airport  Authority  owns,  increasing  terminal  revenue
through   management   of   the   airport’s   parking   and   concessions,   and   providing
administrative  support.    On  November  16,  2005,  BAA  filed  a  Motion  for  Summary
Judgment  with  the  ALJ  alleging  that  it  is  not  subject  to  AIR  21’s  whistleblower
protection provisions.  In particular, BAA argued that it is not an air carrier and does not
contract or subcontract with any air carrier to provide safety sensitive functions.²    The ALJ denied BAA’s motion.  The ALJ concluded: I find that BAA, as an entity charged with maintaining the
safety and security of the landing areas, indirectly provides
air   transportation,   and   thus   falls   squarely   within   the
definition   of   “air   carrier”   in   AIR   21.      .   .   .   [W]hat
[legislative]  history  there  is  clearly  evinces  the  intent  of
Congress  to  insure  that  persons  who  are  in  a  position  to
observe  safety  violations  or  concerns  are  free  to  report
those concerns to the appropriate authorities without fear of
jeopardizing their livelihood.[³] In response, BAA filed a Motion to Certify Interlocutory Order for Appeal and to Stay
Proceedings  During  Pendency  of  Appeal.    The  ALJ  granted  BAA’s  Motion  and  BAA                                                  2   Air 21 provides in pertinent part: (a) Discrimination Against Airline Employees.--No air carrier
or contractor or subcontractor of an air carrier may discharge
an  employee  or  otherwise  discriminate  against  an  employee
with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of  employment  because  the  employee  (or  any  person  acting
pursuant  to  a  request  of  the  employee)[engaged  in  protected
activity]. 49  U.S.C.A.  §  42121(a)  (West  2005  Supp.).    AIR  21  regulations  define  “air  carrier”  and
“contractor:” Air carrier means a citizen of the United States undertaking by    any    means,    directly    or    indirectly,    to    provide    air
transportation. Contractor  means  a  company  that  performs  safety-sensitive functions by contract for an air carrier. 29 C.F.R. § 1979.101 (2005). 3   Order Denying Motion for Summary Judgment and Scheduling Hearing (O. D. M.) at 3.

USDOL/OALJ REPORTER PAGE 3 filed  a  petition  for  interlocutory  review  with  the  Administrative  Review  Board.⁴    The
Board issued an order on February 17, 2006, permitting Thompson to respond to BAA’s
motion  but  he  chose  not  to  respond.    Accordingly,  we  must  decide  whether  to  accept
BAA’s appeal.  Because BAA has failed to provide a convincing reason to depart from
the  Board’s  well-established  policy  against  accepting  piecemeal  appeals,  we  will  not
accept its interlocutory appeal. DISCUSSION              The Secretary and the Board have held many times that interlocutory appeals are
generally  disfavored  and  that  there  is  a  strong  policy  against  piecemeal  appeals.⁵    In
Greene v. EPA Chief Susan Biro, United States Envtl. Prot. Agency,⁶ the Board examined
two principles underlying the Board’s policy against accepting appeals from interlocutory
orders.  First, the Board addressed an administrative law judge’s authority to request the
Board to review an interlocutory order that turns on an unsettled question of law.  The
Board   explained   that   an   administrative   law   judge   may   resort   to   procedural   rules
applicable to the Federal district courts in circumstances that the Part 18 Rules of Practice
and Procedure for Department of Labor Administrative Law Judges do not specifically
address.⁷    Under  limited  circumstances,  federal  district  court  judges  are  authorized  to
certify questions for review by Federal appellate courts at an interlocutory stage of a civil
proceeding.⁸  An administrative law judge’s certification of such a question is a relevant,                                                  4   The  Secretary  of  Labor  has  delegated  her  authority  to  issue  final  administrative decisions in cases arising under AIR 21 to the Board.  Secretary’s Order 1-2002 (Delegation
of Authority and Responsibility to the Administrative Review Board), 67 Fed. Reg. 64,272
(Oct.  17,  2002).    The  Secretary’s delegated  authority  to  the  Board  includes,  “discretionary
authority to review interlocutory rulings in exceptional circumstances, provided such review
is not prohibited by statute.”  Id. at 64,273. 5   See  e.g.,  Welch  v.  Cardinal  Bankshares  Corp.,  ARB  No.  04-054,  ALJ  03-SOX-15 (ARB  May  13,  2004); Hibler v. Exelon Generation Co., LLC,  ARB  No.  03-106,  ALJ  No.
2003-ERA-9 (Feb. 26, 2004); Amato v. Assured Transp. and Delivery, Inc., ARB No. 98-167,
ALJ No. 98-TSC-6 (ARB Jan. 31, 2000); Hasan v. Commonwealth Edison Co., ARB No. 99-
097;  ALJ No.  99-ERA-17  (ARB Sept.  16,  1999);  Carter v. B & W Nuclear Technologies, Inc., ALJ No. 94- ERA-13 (Sec’y Sept. 28, 1994).   6   ARB No. 02-050, ALJ No. 02-SWD-1 (Sept. 18, 2002). 7   Greene,  slip  op.  at  2-3  (citing  Plumley  v.  Fed.  Bureau  of  Prisons,  No.  86-CAA-6 (Sec’y Apr. 29, 1987)).  See also 29 C.F.R. §§ 18.1(a), 18.29(a), 8   28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(b) (West 1993).  See Plumley, slip op. at 2.

USDOL/OALJ REPORTER PAGE 4 but   not   the   determinative,   factor   in   the   Board’s   decision   whether   to   accept   the interlocutory appeal for review.⁹              The  second  principle  that  the  Board  discussed  in  Greene    is  the  final  decision
requirement  that  applies  to  the  Federal  appellate  courts.¹⁰    The  Board’s  general  rule
against  accepting  appeals  from  interlocutory  orders  parallels  the  standard  that  federal
courts  have  developed  in  interpreting  section  1291.    Similar  to  the  federal  appellate
courts, the Board applies the finality requirement in the interest of “‘combin[ing] in one
review all stages of the proceeding that effectively may be reviewed and corrected if and
when’” the administrative law judge issues a decision on the merits of the case.¹¹  The
Board also applies the collateral  order  exception  to  finality  and  will  hear  appeals  from
orders rendered in the course of the proceeding before the administrative law judge that meet  certain  criteria.    Specifically,  the  collateral  order  exception  permits  the  review  of orders  that  “conclusively  determine  the  disputed  question,  resolve  an  important  issue
completely separate from the merits of the action, and [are] effectively unreviewable on
appeal from a final judgment.”¹² Threshold jurisdictional issue or issue of SOX coverage In determining whether to accept an interlocutory appeal, we strictly construe the collateral  appeal  exception  to  avoid  the  serious  “‘hazard  that  piecemeal  appeals  will
burden the efficacious administration of justice and unnecessarily protract litigation.’”¹³              In  support  of  its  petition  for  review,  BAA  argues  that  its  appeal  presents  a
“threshold   jurisdictional   issue”¹⁴   that   is   “particularly   well-suited   for   interlocutory
appeal.”¹⁵  BAA is incorrect.  BAA seeks interlocutory review of the issue whether BAA                                                  9 See Ford v. Northwest Airlines, ARB No. 03-014, ALJ No. 02-AIR-21, slip op. at 2-3 (ARB Jan. 24, 2003); Greene, slip op. at 2-3. 10   See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (West 2001). 11 See Greene, slip op. at 4 (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949)). 12   Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978); see Greene, slip op. at 4. 13   Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. Steering Comm. v. Mead Corp., 614 F.2d 958, 961 n.2 (5th Cir. 1980), quoting  Nissan Motor Corp. Antitrust Litig., 552 F.2d 1088, 1094
(5th Cir. 1977). 14                   Respondent BAA Indianapolis, LLC’s Petition to the Administrative Review Board
for Permission to Appeal (Pet.) at 2. 15   Id. at 8.

USDOL/OALJ REPORTER PAGE 5 is an “air carrier or contractor or subcontractor of an air carrier.”¹⁶  In asserting that this is
a threshold jurisdictional issue, BAA has confused the Labor Department’s subject matter
jurisdiction  over  a  whistleblower  complaint  with  the  wholly  separate  question  whether
BAA is a covered employer under AIR 21.¹⁷  As we recognized in Sasse, “‘A court is
said to have jurisdiction, in the sense that its erroneous action is voidable only, not void, when  the  parties  are  properly  before  it,  the  proceeding  is  of  a  kind  or  class  which  the court is authorized to adjudicate, and the claim set forth in the paper writing invoking the
court’s action is not obviously frivolous.’”¹⁸  Moreover, [j]urisdiction  .  .  .  is  not  defeated  as  respondents  seem  to
contend, by the possibility that the averments might fail to
state a cause of action on which petitioners could actually
recover.    For  it  is  well  settled  that  the  failure  to  state  a
proper  cause  of  action  calls  for  a  judgment  on  the  merits
and  not  for  a  dismissal  for  want  of  jurisdiction.    Whether
the complaint states a cause of action on which relief could
be granted is a question of law and just as issues of fact it
must be decided after and not before the court has assumed jurisdiction  over  the  controversy.    If  the  court  does  later exercise its jurisdiction to determine that the allegations in the   complaint   do   not   state   a   ground   for   relief,   then dismissal of the case would be on the merits, not for want
of jurisdiction.[¹⁹]              By filing a complaint alleging a violation of AIR 21’s whistleblower protection
provisions,   Thompson   properly   invoked   the   Department   of   Labor’s   jurisdiction   to adjudicate   the   complaint.      Furthermore,   BAA   does   not   contend   that   Thompson’s
arguments   are   frivolous   or   without   color   or   merit.      In   fact,   BAA   admitted   that “reasonable minds could substantially differ as to whether the definition of ‘air carrier’ in
49 U.S.C. § 40102(2) captures airports . . . .”²⁰  Thus, even if we should ultimately agree with  BAA  that  it  is  not  an  “air  carrier  or  contractor  or  subcontractor  of  an  air  carrier”                                                 16   49 U.S.C.A. § 42121(a). 17   Accord Sasse v. United States Dep’t of Justice, ARB No. 99-053, ALJ No. 98-CAA- 7, slip op. at 3-4(ARB Aug. 31, 2000).  See also Ramos v. Universal Dredging Corp., 653
F.2d 1353, 1355-1359 (9th Cir. 1981); OFCCP v. Keebler Co., ARB No. 97-127, ALJ No.
87-OFC-20, slip op. at 10 (ARB Dec. 21, 1999). 18   Slip op. at 3, citing West Coast Exploration Co. v. McKay, 213 F.2d 582, 591 (D.C. Cir.). 19 Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946). 20   Pet. at 10.

USDOL/OALJ REPORTER PAGE 6 such finding would not divest the Department of Labor of jurisdiction to hear and decide
the case. Collateral order criterion – reviewability on appeal             BAA, in its attempt to meet the collateral order exception, argues that the issue
whether  it  falls  within  SOX’s  coverage  will  be  effectively  unreviewable  on  appeal.²¹  
Again, BAA is incorrect.  Should Thompson prevail before the ALJ, the question whether
BAA is a covered employer will be fully reviewable on appeal.  Apparently recognizing
this weakness in its argument, BAA turns this criterion on its head and argues not that the
issue will be effectively unreviewable if it loses before the ALJ, but instead, that it will be
effectively unreviewable if it wins.  BAA argues, “if the opportunity to appeal is denied
now and BAA later succeeds on the merits, it will be satisfied with the result and will
not  exercise  its  opportunity  to  appeal  that  final  order.”²²    Even  assuming,  as  has
BAA, that it would have standing to appeal the ALJ’s recommended decision should it
prevail,²³ choosing not to appeal an issue would not render that issue unreviewable.  As
the Supreme Court has repeatedly held, “the general rule [is] that an order is effectively
unreviewable  only  where  the  order  at  issue  involves  an  asserted  right  the  legal  and
practical value of which would be destroyed if it were not vindicated before trial.”²⁴  The
assumption  underlying  BAA’s  argument,  that BAA  could  appeal  the  ALJ’s  coverage
decision  should  Thompson  prevail  and  obtain  a  meaningful  decision  that  would  fully
protect its rights, establishes that the legal and practical value of such rights will not be destroyed  if  not  vindicated  before  trial.    Thus,  we  practice  appellate  restraint  to  assure that  if,  and  when,  the  coverage  question  at  issue  here  is  presented  to  the  Board  for
disposition, it is presented in an appeal in which all parties have an incentive to fully and
vigorously litigate it and the Board’s disposition of the issue is necessary to the resolution
of the case.                                                 21   Id. at 13. 22   Pet. at 13 (emphasis added). 23   Asking  the  Board  to  decide  an  issue  that  could  not  affect  the  outcome  of  the  case would, in essence, be asking the Board for an advisory opinion, but the Board has a well-
established  policy  against  issuing  such  opinions.   See e.g., Agee v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc.,
ARB No. 04-182, ALJ No. 04-STA-40 (ARB Dec. 12, 2005); Edmonds v. Tennessee Valley Auth., ARB No. 05-02, ALJ No. 04-CAA-15 (ARB July 22, 2005); Migliore v. Rhode Island
Dep’t of Envt’l Mgmt., ARB No. 99-118; ALJ Nos. 98-SWD-3, 99-SWD-1, 2 (ARB July 11, 2003); Williams v. Lockheed Martin Energy Sys., Inc., ARB No. 98-059, ALJ No. 95-CAA-
10 (ARB Jan. 31, 2001).   24   Lauro  Lines  S.R.L.  v.  Chasser,  490  U.S.  495,  498-499  (May  22,  1989)(internal quotations and citations omitted).

USDOL/OALJ REPORTER PAGE 7             BAA has not satisfied the collateral order exception to the finality rule nor has it
presented  the  Board  with  any  reason  to  depart  from  its  well-established  precedent  
eschewing   interlocutory   review.      Accordingly,   in   the   interest   of   the   efficient
administration  of  justice  and  to  forestall  unnecessarily  prolonged  litigation,  we  DENY
BAA’s petition for interlocutory review and REMAND the case to the ALJ for further
adjudication. SO ORDERED. M. CYNTHIA DOUGLASS Chief Administrative Appeals Judge OLIVER M. TRANSUE Administrative Appeals Judge