

1 **STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE CLIMATE SCIENCE PROGRAM**
2 **COLLATION OF COMMENTS – ADDENDUM**
3 **November, 2002 – January, 2003**
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38 **General Comments**

39 **Earth Institute, Columbia University**

40 The mandate of the CCSP requires the adoption of a broad definition of “science.” It
41 should aim to not only improve the quality of observation and projection of long-term
42 climate trends, but to also establish innovative ways of capturing the socio-economic
43 value of projections through their successful utilization. While the development of data,
44 information, analytic resources and models to facilitate risk assessment are important,
45 CCSP should also promote their scientific demonstrations in specific settings in order to
46 evaluate their full potential. Integrating science into policy development and operational

1 decision making in pilot demonstrations would be of immense value. The work of the
2 IRI and its partners on managing seasonal to annual climate variability provides an
3 exceptional opportunity to ground truth many of these issues. The IRI has underway
4 project activities on a number of fronts of critical interest to the CCSP, including: stake
5 holder/scientist fora on uncertainty; joint development of innovative decision tools for
6 effective planning over variable time scales and forcing factors; development of
7 integrated data sets; spatial and temporal downscaling; validation of models; and building
8 capacity to utilize climate information products at key policy and decision levels.
9

10 Decisions undertaken at multiple time scales, and long-lead decisions are very difficult to
11 evaluate, since the outcome of the decision can be decades in the future. How can we
12 know we have assessed all the important variables, and anticipated socially accepted
13 policies? One way is to more strongly recognize confidence building by both policy
14 makers and social groups on shorter term decisions. Year to year successes are likely to
15 build confidence in longer lead decisions. Hence, better capability in decisions on annual
16 or seasonal time frames is critical to building the credibility that is needed for harder,
17 longer outlook decisions. It also allows the trial of decision options, and evaluation of
18 effective decision strategies, that will also inform longer term decisions.
19

20 Whereas the report focuses on opportunities and capacities in the US, we would also
21 benefit from better decision capacity elsewhere in the world (that reduces food insecurity
22 or improves quality of life/social stability in developing regions of the world, for
23 example). Improving the capability to forecast climate conditions at different time scales
24 – from seasonal and inter-annual to decadal is of significant socio-economic value only if
25 societies have the capacity to utilize them in a significant manner. Hence, in order to add
26 value, the CCSP would need to facilitate building the capacity of socio-economic
27 institutions, in the US and internationally, to utilize climate forecasts effectively.
28

29 The spatial and temporal patterns of climate events and their frequency and amplitude
30 determine their socio-economic impacts. The CCSP should support scientific efforts at
31 better projecting climate change in terms of all of these variables. In addition to the
32 availability of resources (fiscal and scientific/technological), the adaptation potential of
33 societies is determined strongly by the ability of institutions to manage impacts. The
34 ability of institutions in the government, NGO and the private sectors to respond
35 successfully to climate events in the short term would lay the foundation for success in
36 adapting to climate change. Hence, CCSP should support research on innovative ways of
37 managing climate variability with the explicit mandate of utilizing such approaches for
38 long term adaptation. Identifying existing practices and their policy arrangements in
39 successfully managing climate variability and extreme climate events is one way.
40

41 While it is important to understand sources and magnitudes of climate change
42 uncertainty, there also needs to be clarity as to what kinds of uncertainties are needed by
43 decision makers. The plan addresses the skill of models in assessing climate change, but
44 tends to focus strongly on shifts in trends and absolute magnitude of change (1-5 degrees)
45 as the most important aspects of uncertainty. However, the influence of climate change
46 on climate fluctuations at shorter (annual - decadal) time scales may end up being the
47 more important signal for society, planning, and adaptation.
48

1 The report has a strong emphasis on longer-term changes and less so on interannual
2 variability, whereas the observing systems need to support analysis, decision
3 opportunities, and decision validation across a range of time scales. There is also a
4 critical need to retain long historical records for the analysis of climate, and for the
5 validation of climate models – especially important for the ‘next-generation’ climate
6 observing systems.

7
8 Many of the human dimension challenges would benefit by consideration of decision
9 systems utilizing seasonal and interannual information. This is especially the case for
10 building trust with decision makers. Trust is built up over time and over several orders of
11 decision capability. Seasonal and interannual time frames offer opportunities to test ideas
12 and build trust, and to evaluate the aspects of human-environment systems that represent
13 ‘low hanging fruits’. At the shorter time scales there is good opportunity for building
14 capability within institutions, validating aspects of model results, and conducting
15 experiments in the integration of quantitative and qualitative information at timescales of
16 interest to decision makers today -- to facilitate a deeper understanding of decision
17 making for the longer term.

18 (Neil Ward, Shiv Someshware, Shiv Someshwar, Carolyn Mutter)

19
20 My comments are on the natural science aspects of the document. I have read chapters 1-
21 7 and 12.

22 Overall this is a good document, reflecting current understanding of the climate system
23 and the limits of our knowledge. It lays out an ambitious, comprehensive research
24 program, which, if it could be carried out, would accelerate gains in understanding of
25 climate change. To do so demands a generous increase in the budget allocated to this
26 “War on Global Warming” (on the order of 2% of the cost of the war on Iraq). It may
27 also require an increase in the number of scientists working on these problems. Since
28 neither increase is likely to be forthcoming, the plan may be criticized for not setting the
29 priorities needed to carry out the triage a more realistic budget makes inevitable.

30
31 It is worth mentioning that the overall numbers presented as the amount of money the US
32 has spent on Global Change research must be broken down a bit to appreciate what it has
33 meant for research. Most of the money has gone into NASA’s earth observing satellites.
34 It would be worthwhile to analyze the “almost \$20 billion” claimed as the US “scientific
35 investment” over the past 13 years (p9 line 16ff). What did it actually go to? I suspect
36 much of it is just taking credit for all the usual research in the climate area. Is the
37 spending structure and trajectory much different from what it was before the USGCRP?
38 While this system is an essential part of the suite of climate observations, the allocation
39 going to research and surface observations has been unimpressive. It has not been an
40 adequate response to the potential threat climate change poses to the US and the world.
41 (Mark A. Cane)

42
43 A few caveats. I am affiliated with NASA GISS and the Columbia Earth Institute, but
44 these are my personal opinions not an organizational position. Also, I am giving here
45 only my criticisms of the current plan, so I would like to apologize to the people who
46 prepared it, because there are many excellent statements and sections in the report.
47 Finally, I recognize that the plan is in a sense a product of all of us, who, one way or
48 another, have contributed ideas to it, so I realize that we share the responsibility.

1 Now, let's ask how well this plan responds to the direction of the President when
2 he announced the Climate Change Research Initiative June 11 last year. The President
3 said "Climate change ... is an issue that must be addressed." He said specifically "We
4 will act, learn and act again, adjusting our approaches as science advances and
5 technology evolves." In explanatory statements it was indicated that we knew enough
6 from research in the past decade that "acting now" included energy efficiency,
7 encouraging more renewable energy, and developing technologies for the future. He
8 mentioned 2012 as a time for reassessment, in recognition of both the decadal time scale
9 of the problem and the fact that fundamental advances in our understanding of climate
10 and in our technologies are needed to develop the most effective strategies for dealing
11 with this issue. And Dr. Marburger mentioned that the decadal time scale will not
12 prevent prompt actions in response to discovery-based research and assessments.

13 So, how well are we, with this plan, achieving the intentions that the President set
14 for us? What the plan seems to have are reports and products in 2 years, 4 years. And we
15 seem to be getting an added level of bureaucracy, which thinks that scientific progress
16 can be "ordered up". The scientific community is already handicapped by excessive
17 report writing and proposal writing for less and less research funding. However, instead
18 of providing increased resources and getting out of the way, the plan seems to be to
19 create more bureaucracy, thus reducing resources for true research and taking from our
20 most valuable resource, the time spent on innovative productive research, which is
21 needed to make substantial progress in our scientific understanding and without which we
22 cannot provide the information that policy makers seek.

23 There is a naivete in the plan that reminds me of my first proposal for global
24 climate modeling, which I wrote in the mid 1970s to solve the climate impact of ozone
25 and CFCs in 3 years. In rejecting the proposal, Don Hunten said that instead I should
26 indicate some recognition of the decadal time scale of the problem and the need for a
27 broad base of understanding developed from the combination of observations and
28 models, so that we could respond promptly and effectively to decision makers as new
29 issues about stratospheric ozone arose.

30 In important ways, the climate plan fails to see the forest for the trees. It points
31 out the importance of understanding climate sensitivity, and it attacks this issue by
32 proposing to compare two models, a useful exercise that will reveal some problems in
33 one or both models, but it will do very little to advance our understanding about climate
34 sensitivity of the real world. Besides, climate sensitivity is more yesterday's problem
35 than today's. We know that climate is sensitive from paleoclimate evidence. Whether it
36 is 3C for doubled carbon dioxide or 2C or 4C is worth knowing, and, now that adequate
37 computer power is on the horizon, significant progress in our understanding is possible,
38 provided that we are given the resources not only for computer power but to support the
39 brainpower needed for the research and observations and field work that are inherently
40 expensive.

41 However, we need to demonstrate that we understand what the large issues are
42 today and tomorrow. For example, all nations agree that we need to avoid the level of
43 "dangerous anthropogenic interference" with climate, but we have provided precious
44 little information to decision-makers about what that level is. We could use a
45 fundamental issue such as this to make clear that what we need is a broad decadal
46 research program that gives primacy to science, with all that implies, including
47 observations. As a specific example, I think that there should be a major effort to
48 improve our understanding of how stable or unstable the ice sheets are to the strong

1 surface forcing that is now being applied to them. The ice sheets, I believe, will be the
2 issue that defines the level of dangerous anthropogenic interference, yet this issue is
3 treated simplistically by IPCC and receives short shrift here. The necessary
4 understanding requires increased support for glaciology and development of improved
5 modeling capabilities for this highly nonlinear problem, including full account of the
6 effects of summer precipitation. Investigation should aim at determining how close we
7 are to the point when future irreversible disintegration will be unavoidable.

8 One puzzling thing about this document is that it seems to be two documents
9 stapled together. This raises concern that we may be getting layers of added bureaucracy,
10 which could reduce science support in more ways than one. I could not study each of the
11 more than 150 pages. However, I discerned a distinction between the two parts. For
12 example, the modeling chapter in the second document starts out with a statement “The
13 study of global change requires a strong base of observations”, and in general I found
14 many such good rational statements. Also I thought that the organization of this second
15 part of the document was very good, so let me end my comments on this positive note.
16 (James E. Hansen)

17
18
19 **Soulen, J. Richard – Retired**

20 A large number of efforts are called for in the Review Draft, many of which are
21 continuations or augmentations of what is being done in the USGCRP. It is difficult,
22 however, for the reader to discern which of the *areas* of effort are most vital, and, within
23 each area of effort, which of its component *activities* are most necessary. Statements
24 such as “Modeling is one of the most important components of the CSR” and
25 “Emphasize comprehensive climate response simulations” give some indication, but the
26 final Plan would be improved considerably by the inclusion of well thought out
27 *prioritizations* both *of* and *within* all areas of activity in the Plan. Such information
28 would be important for effective management and direction (or re-direction) of the
29 overall effort.

30
31 Regarding priorities among the major *areas* of effort, I believe that the *Science of*
32 *Climate Change* is so vital that its importance can hardly be overestimated. Accurate
33 answers to the core questions “What has happened?” “What has caused what has
34 happened?” and “What will happen?” are crucial as inputs if we are to obtain accurate,
35 reliable answers to questions regarding “downstream” areas, i.e., effects of climate
36 change, and effective measures for mitigation and adaptation.

37
38 Second Overview Comment. *State Needs More Explicitly.*

39
40 *An example:* Lack of adequate computing power has been a chronic problem of U.S.
41 scientists addressing climate change. As mentioned in the Review Draft, NRC reports
42 have called attention to it. Quoting from one of them:

43
44 “The ability of the United States to assess future climate change is
45 severely limited . . . by inadequate computational resources . . .”
46 (Review Draft ref. NRC, 2001a, p. 24)

1 This is a serious matter, but the Review Draft is not specific as to how this situation
2 should be rectified. It does state that “substantial and continuing investments in high-end
3 computing” are required for success. It would be helpful, however, if the resources --
4 especially supercomputing hardware – needed to meet our scientists’ needs were
5 described explicitly.

6
7 Similar information should be provided for all high priority activities, especially those
8 that have previously been lacking in the resources necessary for timely accomplishment
9 of goals. Incorporating this information into the final Plan as a series of Appendixes
10 might be the most effective way to highlight these needs.

11
12 Some people may believe that a document entitled Strategic Plan should contain general
13 information regarding what is to be done, but not details on how things are to be
14 accomplished. I believe, however, that the final Plan would be considerably stronger if,
15 for high priority activities at least, all three of the questions, “What?” “Why?” and
16 “How?” were addressed.

17
18 This would have two advantages. It would give those who requested the Plan confidence
19 that matters have been thought through to the point of knowing, explicitly, what is
20 required to accomplish the high priority goals. And it would tell those who provide
21 funding the most important needs of the program.

22
23 **Wagner, Thomas - University of Michigan**

24 “What processes determine the temporal and spatial distributions of land cover and land
25 use change at local, regional, and global scales, and how can land use and land cover be
26 projected over time scales of 10-50 years?”

27
28 “How may the dynamics of land use, management, and cover change affect the global
29 environment and national environmental and socioeconomic conditions, including
30 economic welfare and human health?”

31
32 These two questions should be revised. The 1st question is too broad and unfocused and
33 allows "fishing expeditions" of doubtful scientific consequence. Question 2 is the heart
34 of the matter: this objective in studying landscape dynamics should guide future research
35 but fails to recognize that land cover/use is a consequence of human activities as well.
36 The question should acknowledge the cyclical nature of this process and explicitly state
37 that social science is necessary to understand the drivers of land use/land cover change.

38
39 **Weber, T.**

40 Although this is not a formal comment, I suggest that the climate change staff read the
41 following article:

42
43 Parmesan, C., and G. Yohe. 2003. A globally coherent fingerprint of climate change
44 impacts across natural systems. Nature vol. 421 (2 Jan 2003), pp.37-42.

45
46 This is a recent study demonstrating the disruption of climate change on species and
47 natural communities, and the need to provide habitat reserves and migration corridors. In

1 Maryland, we have identified and designed such a reserve system (
2 <http://www.dnr.state.md.us/greenways/greenprint/>)

3
4 The Nature abstract reads: Causal attribution of recent biological trends to climate
5 change is complicated because non-climatic influences dominate local, short-term
6 biological changes. Any underlying signal from climate change is likely to be revealed by
7 analyses that seek systematic trends across diverse species and geographic regions;
8 however, debates within the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reveal
9 several definitions of a 'systematic trend'. Here, we explore these differences, apply
10 diverse analyses to more than 1,700 species, and show that recent biological trends match
11 climate change predictions. Global meta-analyses documented significant range shifts
12 averaging 6.1 km per decade towards the poles (or metres per decade upward), and
13 significant mean advancement of spring events by 2.3 days per decade. We define a
14 diagnostic fingerprint of temporal and spatial 'sign-switching' responses uniquely
15 predicted by twentieth century climate trends. Among appropriate long-term/large-
16 scale/multi-species data sets, this diagnostic fingerprint was found for 279 species. This
17 suite of analyses generates 'very high confidence' (as laid down by the IPCC) that climate
18 change is already affecting living systems.

21 **Specific Comments**

22 Page 26, Chapter 3-General Comments

23 There are many strengths in this strategic plan for the management of climate data and
24 observations. It emphasizes 1) life-cycle data management practices; the importance of
25 obtaining and maintaining decades-long time series of data; 3) the provision of
26 widespread and open access to climate data by both scientists and policy makers; 4) the
27 maintenance of global monitoring systems; and 5) support for data processing. These are
28 all important.

29
30 There are three areas in the plan, however, that still need to be addressed. First, despite
31 the frequent reiteration of the importance of making climate data accessible to policy and
32 decision makers, this strategic plan is too narrowly focused on data needs for scientific
33 research and for the reduction of scientific uncertainty. Although one of the strengths of
34 the report is its recognition that climate change data and information are needed for
35 management, policy, and decision making as well as for science, the data needs of
36 applied, non-scientific users are ignored. Moreover, the reduction of scientific
37 uncertainty can be used to drive data collection, but should not eclipse the equally
38 important policy and management need of identifying both short term and long term
39 trends in climate—from whatever cause.

40
41 A strategic plan will never be able to anticipate all the data and information needs of
42 future research and policy. What it should do, however, is establish an open and ongoing
43 process that will identify data and information requirements as they evolve and change.
44 The process should encompass data users among both research scientists and managers
45 and policy makers, recognizing that although there will be areas of overlap between the
46 two groups, there will also be some data needs that are unique to each.

47

1 Second, data rescue and reconstruction of time series, recommended in the strategic plan,
2 are difficult research tasks. Time series data are essential for understanding climate
3 change, and this plan not only recognizes their importance but also recommends data
4 rescue (which it also calls data archeology) as a means of constructing such time series
5 post hoc. Yet data obtained after the fact are likely to be incomplete or to be spatially or
6 temporally patchy. Missing values must be estimated. There may be a need to splice
7 disparate data series. These are research tasks that will require a deep understanding of
8 the properties of the data and the underlying phenomena that are being monitored. Data
9 rescue may also require the development of surrogate measures. The development of
10 new measures—indirect measures—is implied in this strategic plan, but is not discussed.

11
12 New types of data will be needed to understand human impacts and anthropogenic
13 forcing. The strategic plan calls for “comprehensive documentation about the full
14 spectrum of climate forcings, feedbacks, and responses, especially over the past century
15 when human influences have been most pronounced” (p. 27, lines 29-30). Despite this
16 assertion, however, there is little discussion in the plan of the socioeconomic,
17 institutional, or behavioral data needed to understand either the forcing functions or the
18 impacts of climate variability and change. Greater attention should be given to the issue
19 of how to identify and obtain these data.

20
21 Third, the requirements of the data and information system are not spelled out in the plan.
22 The strategic plan speaks of life cycle management without explaining what this means,
23 either now or in the future. At a minimum, life cycle management will require long term,
24 permanent archives that are able to ensure that data from climate change observations and
25 monitoring systems are not lost through technical obsolescence in the storage,
26 documentation, or dissemination media. It requires technological flexibility and an active
27 advisory structure that can articulate the changing data and information needs of science
28 on the one hand and policy, management, and decision making on the other.

29 **Roberta B. Miller, Center for International Earth Science Information Network,**
30 **Columbia University**

31
32 Page 38, Chapter 4 – General Comment:

33 Implicit in this Chapter and parts of Chapter 6 (Climate Variability and Change) is the
34 assumption that scientific research can and will reduce uncertainties and that these
35 scientific advances will clearly indicate which policy actions should or should not be
36 undertaken. Reduction of uncertainties via increased scientific understanding of
37 socioeconomic and environmental systems is, of course, desirable, but uncertainty about
38 many key decision variables will remain, including seasonal to inter-annual climate
39 variability. Uncertainty reduction is neither necessary nor sufficient for informed policy
40 debate and decision making. Basic and applied scientific research on decision processes
41 used by key decision makers is required for the development of tools and methods for
42 adaptive decision making under uncertainty. More is known on this topic (and related
43 topics of judgment and decision confidence and confidence assessment) than the report
44 acknowledged. At the same time, a lot of work remains to be done, and the issues are
45 often more complex than acknowledged. Decision support is far more (and far more
46 complicated) than the “provision of timely and useful information that addresses specific
47 questions asked by the decision maker” (p. 43, line 8). The draft does not address the fact
48 that there are different types of decision makers and different types of decisions that will

1 need to be supported. Many of these issues have been addressed in the National Research
2 Council Report, *Making Climate Forecasts Matter*. (In the interest of full disclosure, I
3 was a member of the National Academy of Science committee who wrote the report.)

4 **Elke U. Weber, Columbia University**

5
6 Page 38, Chapter 4, General Comment

7 Decision support refers to the provision of timely and useful information that addresses
8 specific questions of decision makers. The long term nature of climate change signals
9 will not be able to address the prediction requirements of decision makers – generally in
10 the 1 to 5 years range. A key contribution to addressing this gap – between the
11 expectation of decision makers and the ability of climate change science to provide
12 information – is through the seasonal and inter-annual time scale of climate variability.
13 IRI research on climate variability and its management would be of immense value in this
14 regard.

15
16 Much of the writing about anticipated future climate information use by decision makers
17 has not taken into consideration the perspective or context of the decision opportunities.
18 The shift in focus within the US, from energy policy to socio-economic development, in
19 the development of climate change science information, requires addressing the spatial
20 and time scale needs of decision makers. Seasonal to interannual time scales and state
21 level spatial scales dominate the decision making matrix in these latter sectors.
22 Addressing the climate information needs at such scales would require tapping into the
23 experience of institutions such as the IRI .

24
25 Real world demonstrations of the value of climate forecasts can be a primary mode of
26 instilling confidence amongst policy makers and decision makers – indeed this was
27 alluded to in the keynote speech of Prof. Obasi, WMO Secretary-General, noting that for
28 decision makers to better use seasonal-to-interannual information was a route to building
29 confidence for making difficult decisions on global change. It is an opportunity for
30 decision makers to recognize the inherent probabilistic nature of climate information, and
31 become comfortable with utilizing such information. Research and real-world project
32 implementation on climate variability and its management would be of immense learning
33 value in this regard. The IRI is an institute committed to such demonstrations.

34
35 In order to effectively address climate change impacts we need to harness the successful
36 experience in managing climate variability. At the IRI this aspect of research includes
37 the following perspectives: 1. Scenarios for identifying key policy arenas. In addition to
38 the climate variability other drivers include demographic change, land use, water use etc.
39 The scoping and development of the scenarios would need to include key stakeholders.
40 They also need to introduce appropriately scaled forecasts to identify key policy areas,
41 and subsequent decision support activities; 2. Identification of the most vulnerable sectors
42 and populations; 3. Identification and spatial mapping of society’s vulnerabilities to
43 climate and the opportunities for better use of climate forecast information, based on key
44 indicators. 4. Identification of existing practices and policy arrangements and their
45 potential to enhance the management of climate variability.

46
47 Incremental improvements in scientific capability, or reductions of uncertainty, are not
48 likely to lead automatically to improvements in decision capacity. That presently

1 available information is generally not utilized speaks to the misfit of anticipated
2 information needs from variable (and variably uninformed) perspectives of scientists and
3 decision makers. Learning from the present is critically important for development of
4 future what-if scenarios – especially regarding the networks that must be developed for
5 use of information, in addition to the development of the information itself.

6 **Neil Ward, Shiv Someshwar, Carolyn Mutter, IRI Columbia University**

7
8 Page 68, Chapter 6 – General Comment

9 I would highlight two shortcomings of the Plan in the general area of “Climate
10 Variability and Change” (Chapter 6):

11
12 The consideration of abrupt climate change puts too little emphasis on paleoclimate
13 research. Contrary to the impression given on page 69, comprehensive models do NOT
14 reproduce the large amplitude abrupt changes evident in the paleoclimate record. At
15 present, we have no comprehensive models that generate Heinrich events or D/O events
16 or something like the Younger Dryas period. In the latter, we now know that temperature
17 changes 2/3rds as large as the difference between the ice age minimum and present
18 values occurred in only 10 years. We have no idea why or how this happened, and no
19 model has done anything like it. This was the tail end of the ice age, so conditions were
20 quite different from the modern, so whatever happened may have little in common with
21 the earth’s immediate future. Nonetheless, it should be disconcerting that the models we
22 rely on to foretell the future seem to be so much more sluggish than the natural climate
23 system. It is important to understand why this is. It is also true that there are rapid
24 changes far larger at times within the Holocene that are quite similar to the present which
25 are not simulated in our models. Without further work on abrupt events in the
26 paleoclimate record culminating in some understanding and ability to simulate these
27 events, we should not rely on the models’ predictions of a smoothly changing future.

28
29 Though the document mentions Reanalysis, it is not given much prominence. The
30 present reanalysis products, which are flawed and limited in time, have become a
31 mainstay of climate studies. They are, arguably, the most cost effective product we have.
32 It should be a high priority to improve and extend the reanalysis.

33 **Mark A. Cane, Columbia University**

34
35 Page 68, Chapter 6 – General Comment

36 Question 2 – To what extent can predictions of near-term climate fluctuations and
37 projection of long-term climate change be improved...

38
39 There is much good discussion of climate fluctuations and climate change in this section.
40 There could be better definition given to the role of better understanding and predicting
41 climate fluctuations (seasonal to interannual timescale) for (i) genuinely improving the
42 representation of these features in global change scenarios, which most recognize is
43 needed for realistic global change scenarios, and is essential for downscaling regional
44 estimates, and (ii) by demonstrating ability at seasonal-to-interannual timescales, to build
45 confidence amongst decision makers and therefore reduce perceived uncertainties in
46 global change projections. There are examples of where this comes out (e.g. p73, lines
47 26-30, p74 line 31-32), but there is a danger of these points being lost, as they are
48 contained within broader discussions of issues that are specifically oriented at change or

1 variability. A separate section on the intersection and value of variability work to
2 reducing uncertainties in change estimates (and especially regional change estimates)
3 would be useful. The overall question might also be rephrased to reflect this.

4
5 Cross reference can be made back to Applied Climate Modeling (sub section 3 in Chapter
6 4), p48, section entitled “Enhance Model Credibility through a Formal Program of Model
7 testing”. Testing of models for their ability to simulate and predict interannual variability
8 is recognized as a valuable way to achieving enhanced model credibility. The IRI is
9 already contributing to the climate community such an activity, co-coordinating the
10 verification of model predictions from past years, and the generation of real-time 3-6
11 month ahead predictions, for a suite of state-of-the-science atmospheric GCMs. This
12 comes about through IRI collaborating with NCEP and other U.S. and international
13 institutions. This could be built upon further. Despite the fact that progress has been made
14 in the creation of operational seasonal predictions, injection of enhanced technical
15 infrastructure would further accelerate progress substantially, and IRI and others in the
16 U.S. community are well placed to take advantage of such an increase in technical
17 infrastructure and consolidate this key contribution to the international stage.

18 **Neil Ward, Shiv Someshwar , Caroln Mutter, IRI Columbia University**

19
20 Page 69, line 9 – may be better to state that global change research has significantly
21 *contributed* to our knowledge of the (along with other programs geared more directly
22 toward the seasonal to interannual problem).

23 **Neil Ward, Shiv Someshwar , Caroln Mutter, IRI Columbia University**

24
25 Page 69 between line 10 and 11- definition of climate effects – currently gives examples
26 that are mainly environmental (floods, droughts, wildfires, sea level changes) – include
27 some more specifically socio-economic, like economic recession, mass migration,
28 increased poverty, slowed economic development.

29 **Neil Ward, Shiv Someshwar , Caroln Mutter, IRI Columbia University**

30
31 Page73, line 9. What is the ‘global average characteristics of climate variability’? Global
32 coupled models still have difficulty with ENSO – this statement gives an over-optimistic
33 impression that current models used for global change scenarios can accurately represent
34 climate variability. Suggest it should be removed or reworded.

35 **Neil Ward, Shiv Someshwar , Caroln Mutter, IRI Columbia University**

36
37 Page 73 line 6-7 –“Provision of probabilistic estimates of regional fluctuations in the
38 climate resulting from ENSO extremes (5-15 years)”.

39 It is assumed that this refers to seasonal predictions with a lead-time of several months –
40 this should be clarified as some may read it to be extremes associated with global
41 changes in ENSO (our ability to provide information on which is considerably further off,
42 though the aim referred to in this bullet is an essential step toward such a capability).

- 43 - Institutes like IRI are already developing methodologies for the goals in this bullet
- 44 – arguably we are in a position to provide estimates already, and further
- 45 improvements expected.
- 46 - It should be noted that there is great value in working in regions where the ENSO
- 47 signal is higher, to develop such methodologies, rather than solely focusing on

1 mid-latitude regions like the U.S., where signals are lower and it is more difficult
2 to robustly identify the best methodologies for downscaling.
3 - In this bullet, it should be driven home that achieving this goal is critical to
4 capturing these effects in global change scenarios. Global models should be able
5 to capture this tropics-driven interannual variability, and we should be able to
6 confidently downscale it to regional scales (and testing on the interannual
7 timescale is a route to building such confidence in downscaling). Only then will it
8 be possible to attach scientific credibility to regional downscaled estimates of
9 extremes based on global change scenarios.

10 **Neil Ward, Shiv Someshwar , Caroln Mutter, IRI Columbia University**

11
12 Page 73, line 12. For this bullet, it is really not clear whether these are seasonal to
13 interannual predictions or regional predictions in global change scenarios. If it is referring
14 to seasonal-to-interannual predictions, reference can again be made to the methodological
15 progress already made by IRI and others who are addressing this problem. Again, the 5-
16 15 year timeframe seems long – these seasonal-to-interannual regional prediction
17 questions are more likely the ones where significant further progress can be delivered in
18 the next 2-4 year timeframe.

19 **Neil Ward, Shiv Someshwar , Caroln Mutter, IRI Columbia University**

20
21 Page 73, Line 37-43, page 74 line 1-2 Research Needs is very general. Needs to be
22 sharpened to deliver the products and payoffs, especially those related to variability.

23 **Neil Ward, Shiv Someshwar , Caroln Mutter, IRI Columbia University**

24
25 Page 76, Question 4. Whether and how are the frequencies, intensities and locations of
26 extreme events, such as major droughts, floods Altered by natural climate variations
27 and human-induced climate changes. Lines 10-27 – do not reflect variability – again, a
28 key point can be how successful downscaling of seasonal predictions builds confidence in
29 models and methodologies. Furthermore, since global change projections contain
30 variability – any downscaling should be able to downscale successfully the variability
31 (e.g. ENSO variability) within that global change projection. These issues are better
32 described in the Question 5 piece, e.g. p77 line37 – p78 line 4.

33 **Neil Ward, Shiv Someshwar , Caroln Mutter, IRI Columbia University**

34
35 Page 80, Chapter 7 – General Comment

36 The Water Cycle Chapter of the Strategic Plan for the Climate Change Science Program
37 identifies a large number of issues and research areas organized by two major
38 "overarching questions": 1. How do water cycle processes (including climate feedbacks)
39 and human activities influence the distribution and quality of water within the Earth
40 system, to what extent are changes predictable, and how are these processes and activities
41 linked to ecosystem and human health and the cycling of important chemicals, such as
42 carbon, nitrogen, other nutrients, and toxic substances? 2. How will large-scale changes
43 in climate, demographics, and land use (including changes in agricultural and land
44 management practices), affect the capacity of societies to provide adequate supplies of
45 clean water for human uses and ecosystems and respond to extreme hydrologic events?
46

47 In general, these are reasonable questions. While the activities sketched out in support of
48 these questions will no doubt lead to useful insights as to the role of the water cycle in

1 climate and human vitality, a clear sense of priorities for scientific enterprise or policy
2 support does not emerge from the document. Rather than dissect the document and
3 attempt to synthesize such priorities from the material therein, I offer an alternate
4 perspective with respect to these overarching questions.

5
6 1. The importance of global, regional and local water cycles to (a)
7 human sustenance, (b) ecology, (c) basic and applied science, and (d) understanding and
8 foretelling climate, is such that it would be useful to set up a separate entity that funds
9 and prioritizes Water Cycle Research including its interface to the Climate programs. The
10 Water Cycle research agenda is clearly much broader, and at least as important as that of
11 the Climate and Global change programs. Arguments in support of this recommendation
12 include:

13 i. Need for theoretical development of the integrated water cycle
14 dynamics: While theoretical climate dynamics defined in terms of circulation of the
15 atmosphere and its coupling with the ocean is reasonably well developed, the dynamics
16 of the water cycle (spanning, ocean, land, ice, atmosphere, the subsurface and the
17 biosphere) is not as well understood. The role of water vapor in the radiation balance, as
18 identified in the USGCP document, is critical, but is only one of the factors of interest.
19 Evaporation, precipitation, melt and water transport dominate the energy budget of the
20 planetary heat engine. It is well known that precipitation is intermittent in space and time.
21 There is evidence that evaporation, atmospheric water transport, oceanic flows, and land
22 water transport are also dominated by intermittent or organized fragments of movement,
23 at virtually every spatial or temporal scale of interest. Understanding the organization,
24 scaling, regimes and recurrence of such fragmentary motions is a basic scientific
25 challenge, and key to any assessment or prediction of the seasonal or longer variations in
26 global, regional or local variations in floods, droughts, biological productivity or
27 geochemical transport. To address this challenge, one needs to go well beyond the
28 representation of climate and water in existing climate models, to identify the critical
29 features that dominate water cycle organization and predictability and how best to model
30 them. At this time, we cannot offer clear scientifically and observationally supported
31 statements as to the dominant mechanisms of variations in flood or drought potential
32 across the country, or of the factors that determine the seasonality of flooding, nor
33 explanations for the severe sustained droughts that occurred in the Western U.S. in the
34 last 6 centuries, nor an ability to explain or predict the dramatic decadal rise and fall of
35 closed basin lakes (e.g., Devils Lake, N. Dakota).

36 ii. Need to extend the vision of classical "water" disciplines
37 beyond their traditional interfaces: Funding mechanisms for scientific research inevitably
38 constrain or stimulate the directions of research. Thus, a culture has evolved where there
39 is little formal thinking or interaction across the "media" (e.g., ocean, atmosphere, surface
40 hydrologic processes, riparian zones with biological activity, ground
41 water) that traditionally define the movement of water. Each group has developed
42 knowledge within its boundaries, treating water cycle dynamics or exchanges outside its
43 boundaries as essentially exogenous rather than interactive. The climate focus has been
44 beneficial in stimulating much interaction across these boundaries, and forcing the
45 recognition that it is only through an understanding of the interaction across such
46 interfaces and scales that we can understand how water and related fluxes organize. The
47 time is now ripe for a formal focus on the multi-media and multi-scale nature of the water

1 cycle and to foster an understanding of how information is communicated across scales
2 and media.

3 iii. Need for a comprehensive, integrated multi-scale hydrologic
4 observing system: Given the intermittence alluded to above, and the many scales and
5 processes intersected by the water cycle, it should be clear that there is a need for
6 specialized data sets that allow a description of the phenomena to be put together. Given
7 the concern with change, and the evidence of multi-year and multi-decadal variations in
8 regional water supply and floods, it is clear that a comprehensive paleo-reconstruction of
9 the planetary cycle is an important objective. The use of remote sensing and isotopes and
10 other technologies to better define spatial and temporal aspects of terrestrial and
11 atmospheric water movement are equally important. These are all highlighted in the
12 USGCRP document. However, no argument is made for an institutional effort to bring
13 together such efforts into a coherent hydrologic observing system (with integrated data
14 access) where key data gaps can be identified and additional focused measurement
15 programs stimulated to better identify and define specific mechanisms of water cycle
16 interest. Such an observing system would stimulate exploratory analyses of the nature of
17 hydrologic extremes, teleconnections, cascading of information from coarser to finer
18 scales (and the reverse), and the relative role of different "interfaces" in retarding or
19 enhancing organization and predictability, in addition to providing support for model
20 testing and water balance analyses. The exploratory or diagnostic analysis framework is
21 critical for the field since it will provide a definition of what it is that we need to explain
22 or understand, rather than focusing on the improvement of the resolution, calibration or
23 parameterization of existing models that may or may not translate into understanding or
24 prediction of the mechanisms of real interest. The empirical observation of the El Nino
25 Southern Oscillation is an excellent example. It took over 5-6 decades after the initial
26 observation to synthesize a formal description and provide an adequate mechanistic
27 description of the phenomena and to make a successful prediction. The process of
28 improving the parameterization or representation of this phenomena in generalized
29 models of the global climate continues. Focused field campaigns and monitoring of the
30 phenomena instituted since the specific mechanisms were understood have contributed
31 significantly to the improved predictability of the general models.

32 iv. Need for a more direct involvement of the water user community
33 in the research agenda: The USGCRP document develops the notion of improved
34 decision making with water cycle research products, and of the associated needs for
35 technology transfer. The direct involvement of users (ranging from public or private
36 sector water "managers" to scientists who rely on water cycle information) will be much
37 easier to achieve in the development and implementation of a research agenda if they had
38 a more direct role from the outset in defining a water cycle research agenda as part of a
39 program in which they had a sense of identity and ownership. The priorities of such a
40 program could differ (e.g., they may be more local or regional scale/problem focused, as
41 in overarching question 2) from those necessarily relevant to a climate science focus,
42 even though an exposure to the climate related issues is very beneficial in providing the
43 scientific and physical context. Thus, this is an issue of generating targeted and relevant
44 missions and substantial funding resources to support that mission independent of the
45 clearly important climate science mission.

46
47 2. As noted by the USGCRP, assessment/identification of change,

1 seasonal to interannual prediction and finally adaptation strategies constitute the building
2 blocks of a viable science plan. In this regard, a water cycle research agenda within the
3 existing Climate Change Science Program framework could be stated as:

4 i. Develop and document changes (trends, oscillations, regimes) in
5 floods, droughts, seasonality of flow, ground water tables, water quality parameters, and
6 their spatial organization, using historical and paleo-hydrologic (a significant effort is
7 needed to develop such data) data sources. For the spatial structures identified, describe
8 the characteristic time scales (e.g., inter-annual corresponding to El Nino Southern
9 Oscillation, decadal, multi-century or secular corresponding to CO2 induced changes),
10 and assess the importance of different causative mechanisms.

11 ii. Explore and document the synergy between the changes identified
12 above and those identified in other climatic, biotic or other bio-geo-chemical indicators to
13 robustly assess the underlying mechanisms and to describe how the "common signal" is
14 modified and transmitted to different scales and processes. For instance, one needs to
15 relate how intermittence in daily/seasonal/inter-annual/decadal/multi-century
16 precipitation in a region maps into changes in streamflow, groundwater, lakes, biota and
17 landscape changes - what aspects of the organized intermittence are emphasized and
18 what are muted, and hence what are the potentially predictable features for each
19 scale/media.

20 iii. Develop a capability to use this knowledge to generate
21 "scenarios" that can be used to explore a variety of management, adaptation, and policy
22 modification issues in the context of regional resource management, national
23 environmental policy and regulation, and global impact assessment and response to water
24 hazards. For instance, it is now well recognized that even in the absence of anthropogenic
25 climate change, climate statistics are non-stationary, i.e. a given 30 year or longer period
26 of data is not likely to be representative of the climate (and hence water fluxes) we can
27 expect in the next 30 years. However, we continue to develop and use estimates of a 100
28 year flood, or of 10 year 7 day low flows, or of the probability of a particular severity and
29 duration of regional drought under the assumption of stationarity. As a formal
30 understanding of the nature of inter-annual and decadal variation in water fluxes evolves,
31 in part from focused and improved observation and data bases, and in part from the
32 interpretation and modeling of these data, one could propose an alternate adaptive
33 management structure that replaces the prescriptive, regulatory practices currently in
34 vogue. Such institutional changes will not be easy, but are necessary en route to any
35 strategy for adaptation to anthropogenic climate change. Seasonal to interannual
36 prediction and the generation of GHG scenarios is clearly but one part of what needs to
37 be developed. A broader set of tools than the numerical models of climate and related
38 processes currently in use by researchers in these two communities is needed to facilitate
39 the integration with the social system through support for generating appropriate
40 probabilistic scenarios.

41 **Upmanu Lall, Columbia University**

42
43 Page 100, Chapter 9 – General Comment

44 It is important to dispel the myth that the natural carbon sinks discussed in this section of
45 the strategic plan can effectively solve the problem of carbon management. Fossil
46 carbon emissions of the next century are very likely to exceed all biomass carbon and
47 could easily be four to five times larger than that. The uptake capacity of the naturally
48 available carbon sinks would be overwhelmed.

1
2 Carbon Cycle research is important for carbon management. The central goal of such
3 research, however, should not be an attempt to manipulate the cycle for increasing the
4 available sinks, but to understand the dynamics of the system and the integrity and
5 stability of these sinks. The storage capacity of these active natural sinks is too small to
6 accept the fossil carbon that could easily be consumed over the course of the next
7 century. Nevertheless, natural fluxes of carbon between these reservoirs are very large.
8 Even though they tend to cancel over longer time scales, at any point in time they are far
9 larger than the rate of anthropogenic injection. It is therefore important to understand
10 how anthropogenic changes will affect the natural carbon cycle. Unintended feedbacks
11 between for example warming and carbon emissions could have severe consequences.
12 Rather than focusing on these issues, the illustrative research questions in this chapter
13 seem to be focused on sequestering additional carbon, but they reflect a very limited idea
14 of carbon management. On the scales of fossil fuel consumption, other options for
15 carbon dioxide disposal must be considered, the natural carbon sinks will fall far short
16 from solving these problems.

17
18 In this chapter the question is asked, “How will the Earth system respond to various
19 options being considered for managing carbon in the environment?” Implicit is the
20 assumption that the terrestrial carbon sink and the ocean carbon sink will play a big role
21 in solving the problem of increased concentrations of atmospheric CO₂. But the simple
22 observation that even pre-industrial Britain could deplete its biomass carbon storage,
23 suggests that terrestrial carbon storage is not going to be a big player in the attempt of
24 canceling out anthropogenic carbon emissions. Even the ocean sink falls short of what is
25 required. It certainly will not respond fast enough to accept all the carbon that will need
26 to be sequestered. If it were to take up all that carbon dioxide, the resulting changes in
27 the carbonate ion concentration and pH would lead to unacceptable changes.

28
29 This section of the Strategic Plan explicitly asks for field studies, manipulative
30 experiments, and model investigations. However, the draft leaves out all experimental
31 investigations below the open field scale. In order to gain an understanding of the multi-
32 scale complex interactions in ecosystems, experiments must be performed at any level
33 possible. While it is possible to do some manipulations under field conditions to
34 perform experiments and thus test hypotheses and models, a place like the Biosphere 2
35 Center, in Oracle, Arizona would be far better suited to do quantitative ecosystem scale
36 experiments. It would help bridge the gap between laboratory experiments and growth
37 chamber experiments on the one side, and open field observation and manipulation on the
38 other side. The Strategic plan completely omits experiments focused on smaller scales.
39 These are also necessary to begin a comprehensive approach to the problem of carbon
40 cycle science.

41 **Klaus Lackner, Columbia University**

42
43 Page 101, Lines 32-33: Question 1: What are the magnitudes and distribution of North
44 American carbon sources and sinks and what are the processes controlling their
45 dynamics?

46 —
47 In the draft of November 11, 2002, it is stated that “There is growing evidence of a
48 current Northern Hemisphere terrestrial sink averaging 1.8 billion metric tons of carbon

1 per year.” This view has been controversial and is no longer accepted. Hence, it should
 2 be deleted. This estimate is based on an older publication by Fan, S., Gloor, M., Pacala,
 3 S., Sarmiento, J., Takahashi, T. and Tans, P. (1998) [A large terrestrial carbon sink in
 4 North America implied by atmospheric and oceanic carbon dioxide data and models.
 5 Science, 282, 442-446.]. This has been superceded by a recent work by Gurney, K. R.,
 6 Law, R., Denning, S. A., Rayner, P. J., Baker, D., Bousquet, P., Bruhwiler, L., Chen, Y-
 7 H., Ciais, P., Fan, S., Fung, I. Y., Gloor, M., Heinmann, M., Higuruchi, K., John, J., Maki,
 8 T., Makyutov, S., Masarie, K., Peylin, P., Prather, M., Pak, B. C., Randerson, J.,
 9 Sarmiento, J., Taguchi, S., Takahashi, T. and Yuen, C-W. (2002) [Toward robust regional
 10 estimates of CO₂ sources and sinks using atmospheric transport models. Nature, 415,
 11 626-629], which is more extensive and reliable than the earlier work. The results are
 12 briefly compared below. The difference is primarily a result of the data selection bias in
 13 the earlier work. While the results of Fan et al. (1998) indicate a predominant sink in the
 14 temperate North America, the new results show that Eurasia forests are the dominant sink
 15 and the temperate North America is about one half the Eurasian sink, nearly proportional
 16 to their respective areas. This makes more sense than an unexplainably high sink flux in
 17 North America.

	Gurney et al. (2002)	Fan et al. (1998)
19 Boreal North America	+0.26 Gt-C/yr	-0.2 Gt-C/yr
20 Temperate North America	-0.83	-1.4
21 Eurasia	-1.75	-0.2
22 Rest of Land	+0.95	+0.2

24 **Taro Takahashi, Columbia University**

25
 26 Page 101, Line 35:

27 “Other studies suggest that elevated CO₂, nitrogen deposition ...” should be changed to
 28 “... suggest that elevated atmospheric CO₂ concentration ..”, if the author means plant
 29 growth enhancements due to increase in atmospheric CO₂ .

30 **Taro Takahashi, Columbia University**

31
 32 Page 101 Lines 32, 37 (and else where):

33 When the term “terrestrial sink” is used in the context of CO₂ flux, it means the “net
 34 terrestrial sink flux”. The author is advised to differentiate the “net ” flux from the
 35 “gross” flux for clarification. Note that the “net sink” may be intensified either by an
 36 increased carbon fixation rate or by a reduced respiration rate. From atmospheric CO₂
 37 measurements, we cannot tell which is the cause for changes in the net flux.

38 **Taro Takahashi, Columbia University**

39
 40 Page 102, Line 12:

41 Since a large expanse of the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans affects the atmospheric CO₂
 42 over the Northern Hemisphere, “adjacent ocean basins” sounds too restrictive. Replace it
 43 with “northern oceans”.

44 **Taro Takahashi, Columbia University**

45
 46 Page 104, Line 2:

47 Question 2: What are the magnitudes and distributions of ocean carbon sources and sinks
 48 on seasonal to centennial time scales, and which processes control their dynamics?

1
2 A carbon program in the Southern Ocean is introduced here abruptly without any context.
3 It should be explained very briefly why the Southern Ocean should be investigated. For
4 example, the following bridging sentences may be added: “The massive abyssal waters
5 occupying more than 75% of in the major ocean basins originate in the Southern Ocean.
6 Hence, the region represents a direct conduit for CO₂ exchange between the atmosphere
7 and the deep ocean reservoir, which contains about 50 times as much CO₂ as the
8 atmosphere. Its conditions affect the long term storage and cycle of CO₂ in the whole
9 ocean system.

10 **Taro Takahashi, Columbia University**

11
12 Page 106, Line 31:

13 Question 4: What are the effects of past, present and future land use change and resource
14 management practices on carbon sources and sinks?

15
16 It must be pointed out here that fundamental tools for investigating the below ground
17 processes, especially those for carbon in deep root systems, should be developed in order
18 to understand and enhance the long term storage of carbon in forests.

19 **Taro Takahashi, Columbia University**

20
21 Page 112, Chapter 10 – General Comment

22 This chapter is notable for its endorsement of experimental ecosystem science and the
23 importance of this in gaining understanding of the linkages and feedbacks between
24 ecosystems and global change. It is realistic in recognition that important linkages
25 among physical chemical and biological components of ecosystems are exercised over a
26 wide range of spatial and temporal scales in the biosphere. When outlining the needs for
27 ecological experimental facilities it notes that major efforts might be directed at
28 enhancing existing facilities.

29
30 The following comments are meant to strengthen the case for enhancing our
31 capability in experimental climate change science at larger scales, approaching the
32 ecosystem scale. I pick up the need for “*developing the capability to perform large-scale*
33 *(over an acre) whole-ecosystem experiments that vary both CO₂ and climate*” (NAST
34 Synthesis on Climate Impacts, Nov 2001).

35
36 The thin green veneer of terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems, together responsible
37 for the transformation of planet Earth over billions of years, remain important engines of
38 planetary sustainability. These elements of the biosphere are also among the most
39 responsive components of the Earth system to climate change. Global climate change
40 impacts, perhaps first manifest through increased frequency of extreme events, may be
41 with us already (witness El-Niño 1957-8, 72-3, 82-3, 86-7, 91-2, 97-8, 2002-3), and there
42 is now little doubt about measurable global change effects on ecosystem processes in the
43 last half of the last century (Walther et al 2002; Nature 416, 389-95).

44
45 In reviewing the ecological effects of climate fluctuations, experts now recognize
46 “*The need for proper experiments exploring the underlying causal mechanisms is clear*”
47 (Stenseth et al 2002; Science 297, 1292-6). Distinguished climate modelers realize “*The*
48 *economic stakes are very high. To attain maximum credibility we will need all of the*

1 *experimental approaches and their integration...*” (Tans and Wallace 1999; Tellus 51B,
2 526-71).

3
4 Bob May (1999; Phil Trans R Soc B 354, 1951-9) anticipated that “*our lack of*
5 *detailed understanding of the changing balance of CO₂ on land, in the atmosphere and in*
6 *the sea undercuts predictions about the effects of climate change, and could impede the*
7 *clear implementation of the Kyoto proposals for reduction of emissions*”. These
8 concerns were quickly confirmed as the United States and Australia declined to sign the
9 Kyoto Protocol because policy decisions of this magnitude must be based on sound
10 experimental evidence. The sound experimental evidence is not yet available.

11
12 We have seen that effective policy responses to previous global climate threats,
13 such as expansion of the ozone hole, came about because of sound observation and clear
14 experimental evidence (recognized by a Nobel Prize in chemistry), backed up by basic
15 research in the private sector (DuPont) that delivered alternatives to the ozone depleting
16 refrigerants then in use. Then as now, the science community accepts that the global
17 change policy debate will be turned into action only when models and predictions about
18 climate change are based on data from appropriately scaled and controlled experiments,
19 and when this evidence is translated by the private sector into opportunities for
20 innovation and mitigation.

21
22 Unfortunately, the synergies in biophysics and biochemistry that have so
23 effectively served so many emergent disciplines in the past are not being explored in
24 experimental climate change science or earth systems science (ESS). As enunciated by
25 Harte (2002; Physics Today 55, 29-36): “*Physicists seek simplicity in universal laws.*
26 *Ecologists revel in complex interdependencies. A sustainable future for our planet will*
27 *probably require a look at life from both sides*”. Harte bears witness to the
28 “*dysfunctional consequences of this biomodal legacy*” and pleads the case for seeking a
29 synthesis of Newtonian and Darwinian traditions in ESS. Foremost among his
30 ingredients for synthesis is the construction of simple falsifiable, mechanistic models.
31 Hypothesis testing will be much more efficient with simpler models applied in a context
32 where experiments and measurements render them falsifiable.

33
34 Most ESS models are derived from weather forecasting models and are designed
35 to be predictive tools. This focus has led to complex "highly tunable" models that
36 include all plausibly important processes, but the abundance of adjustable parameters
37 makes the models a poor starting point for hypothesis testing—a necessary step in the
38 discovery process. Although many of these climate models begin to rival the system they
39 simulate in complexity, their predictive capacity has been advanced by improved
40 representation of ecosystem processes (Sellars et al 1996; Science 271, 1402-1406; Berry
41 et al 1997; in van Gardingen P, Foody G, Curran P, eds. *Scaling-up, from Cell to*
42 *Landscape*, pp347-369, SEB Seminar Series 63, Cambridge University Press). Even so,
43 IPCC 2001 reminds us “*The range of uptake rates projected by process-based models for*
44 *any one scenario is, however, considerable, due to uncertainties about (especially)*
45 *terrestrial ecosystem responses to high CO₂ concentrations, which have not been*
46 *resolved experimentally...*” (IPCC 2001).

47

1 In summary, we face huge uncertainties and our understanding of climate change
2 impacts on ecosystems at present is limited and unconvincing. Present understanding is
3 largely based on observation and on (perhaps) inappropriate modeling. It is poorly
4 supported by experimental insight at appropriate scales. By analogy with the response to
5 another global threat, the HIV-AIDS pandemic, we can ask where we would be in
6 controlling the epidemic today if we had left the response to epidemiologists alone. Just
7 as the full arsenal of experimental bio-medical research has been mobilized to address the
8 pandemic, so we need now to mobilize the whole arsenal of experimental capabilities in
9 natural sciences and engineering in support of climate change science, from the molecule
10 to the biosphere.

11
12 We have to build Harte's bridge and cross Newtonian-Darwinian divide, and this
13 bridge needs to be constructed on a sound experimental basis. Only by this means can
14 we expect to reduce uncertainty, improve predictability, discover mitigation technologies,
15 gain credibility with policy makers, and strengthen political will. If we as
16 experimentalists, observers and modelers fail now to engage in this way, global change
17 may well be inexorable, and irreversible over the next 2-5 human generations.

18 **Barry Osmond, Biosphere 2 Center, Columbia University**

19
20 Page 121, Chapter 11 – General Comment

21 Governments invest in global change research out of concern about the possible effects of
22 climate change and other global environmental changes on human beings, societies,
23 economies, and other things human beings value. Social science research can help to
24 estimate the potential benefits, costs, and risks of global change and to assess the
25 potential effects of strategies to adapt to or mitigate it. Such research should investigate a
26 variety of outcome variables (e.g., economic, health) and should disaggregate these
27 outcomes (e.g., by economic sectors, regions, social groups, stakeholders, etc.). These
28 points constitute a key scientific imperative identified in Chapter 7 of the National
29 Research Council *Pathways* report. The draft strategic plan sometimes omits these
30 questions entirely or offers an unbalanced and insufficiently articulated research agenda.
31 Chapter 11, for example, covers technological change, but fails to address institutional
32 change. As another example, the social science perspective is not integrated well into the
33 Scenario development section of Chapter 4.

34 **Elke U. Weber, Columbia University**

35
36 Page 122, Line 30-33:

37 "adaptive capacity in responding to the impacts"

38 means at least, certainly, altruistic behavior, caring, willingness to take risks for
39 strangers. all of these are abetted by religious conviction, and here perhaps you might
40 want to say that.

41 **Robert Pollack, Columbia University**

42
43 Page 123 Line 11-12:

44 "Researchers who need to model human actions in order to project future conditions and
45 consequences often find the foundation for quantitative models lacking." Begs the
46 question of whether this is an absence of evidence, or evidence of an absence. that is,
47 perhaps the major driver of human action under large stress is precisely the non-
48 predictable, non-rational capacity of self-sacrifice to emerge when needed. One need not

1 model the intrinsically unexpected, one need only note that it exists and sets a boundary
2 to the certainty of any model at all.

3 **Robert Pollack, Columbia University**

4
5 Page 125 Line 22:

6 "how can society use improved information about climate change .. to adapt more
7 effectively ...? please see the application on this (re 9/11, but applies as well to battery
8 park under water) assembled by my colleague Andrea Villanti, who will send it to you
9 directly if you get back to her by email, above.

10 **Robert Pollack, Columbia University**

11
12 Page 126 Line 17: ".. private, governmental and social decision making ..." an
13 interesting use of "social" to represent anything neither governmental nor private. in a
14 world of >> 1 billion Muslims and >> 1 billion Catholics, surely one may say "religious"
15 here as well?

16 **Robert Pollack, Columbia University**

17
18 Page 127 Line 21: "illustrative research questions"
19 why not put in the intentional use of terror to disrupt water supplies?

20 **Robert Pollack, Columbia University**

21
22 Page 155, Chapter 14 – General Comment

23 International collaboration and cooperation on the SI prediction and application problem
24 can be a key contributor to the international goals of the U.S. climate change science
25 program.

26
27 An example is provided by the training institute on Climate Variability and Food Security
28 mentioned by panel member H.Virgi (START) during the panel discussion on the
29 International Chapter. This institute is being coordinated by IRI and is building capacity
30 and developing research methodologies on the use of downscaled climate information for
31 adapting agricultural strategies to enhance food security in developing countries. We
32 emphasize the combined aspect of training and collaborative research and development in
33 methodologies for using climate information. The IRI, by generally focusing on regions
34 with strong predictability on seasonal to interannual timescales, is able to participate in
35 methodological development for use of probabilistic climate information, that can
36 provide general lessons for using climate information in other contexts, such as seasonal
37 predictions and global change projections for the U.S. Thus developing such
38 collaborations and research methodologies provides a learning opportunity for adaptation
39 to climate information (p156, line 20), and this type of work could be referenced in this
40 context.

41
42 The IRI has also led capacity building and research methodology development in the
43 more specific climate science issues of downscaling of seasonal to interannual climate
44 predictions. These activities blend regional climate science expertise with international
45 perspectives (p156, line 24), and could be mentioned in this context. Downscaling global
46 change scenarios for mid-latitude regions like North America will require accurate
47 representation of the climate of tropical regions, because of the tropical-extratropical

1 inter-connectivity of the climate system, encouraging investment in an international
2 community of climate expertise.

3
4 It may be valuable to seek as wide input as possible from the stakeholder oversees
5 international institutes at the earliest time. Developing countries may be particularly
6 concerned with predicting droughts and floods on a year-to-year basis, and be more
7 motivated to enhance data availability when it contributes to this immediate goal (p155,
8 line23-24), while such data also can contribute to the global change goal. As mentioned
9 in the chapter (p159, line 37-41), the IRI is hosted by the U.S. and is an institute that
10 emphasizes cooperation with developing countries. This has led the institute to develop a
11 number of partners on the international stage and this network (and associated
12 experiences in capacity building and research methodology development) may prove to
13 be of value to the international program.

14 **Neil Ward, Shiv Someshwar , Caroln Mutter, IRI Columbia University**

15
16 Page 149, Chapter 13: We firmly support the panelist comments (Breakout Session 24)
17 by Janine Bloomfield that the climate science program's reporting and outreach
18 component should build upon existing stakeholder relationships, established educational
19 networks, existing media distribution networks and established public-private
20 partnerships.

21
22 In Chapter 13, Reporting and Outreach, we concur with the introductory remarks (p. 2 of
23 8) that call for an interagency inventory of outreach activities and we recommend that
24 this also include NGO activities in colleges and universities, utility, business and trade
25 associations, environmental organizations and other NGOs, as well as state level
26 outreach activities and resources. We concur with the intent to facilitate outreach without
27 duplicating efforts (p. 3 of 8)

28
29 In Chapter 13, under heading of Local/Regional Governments etc., (p. 4 of 8) we do not
30 understand the placement of the sentence at the end of the first paragraph in this section,
31 "Researchers need to understand how uncertainty is used in decisionmaking so that
32 uncertainties are effectively communicated."

33
34 We support the call for collaborative efforts in outreach and will follow up these general
35 comments with more specific recommendations for implementing a cost-effective
36 outreach program, based on our own experience in the areas of acid rain and climate
37 change.

38
39 Thank you very much for the opportunity to comment and for making this climate
40 science program initiative and draft strategy so accessible to the public.

41 **Center for Environmental Information, Thorndike**

42
43 Page 155, Chapter 14: The Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL) is a
44 public interest, not-for-profit environmental law firm founded in 1989 to strengthen
45 international and comparative environmental law and policy around the world. CIEL's
46 Climate Change Program supports the creation of a coherent international regime to
47 protect the climate system, consistent with Article 2 of the UNFCCC

1
2 **How Can the CCSP Benefit CIEL’s Climate Change Program?**

3 The plan for international collaboration would be greatly improved and CIEL’S program
4 would benefit by strengthening the CCSP in three areas:

- 5
6
 - 7 • Clarify US support for IPCC
 - 8 • Identify and assess international opportunities for mitigation
 - 9 • Evaluate costs and benefits of climate impacts, mitigation and adaptation

10 **Clarify Support for IPCC**

11 To ensure a coherent international scientific process, CCSP should clarify its support for
12 the IPCC. CCSP must not become an alternative to the IPCC, or worse, a competitor.
13 Emphasize refining rather than revising the work of the IPCC, for example, by focusing
14 on regional impacts and reducing uncertainties

15
16 **Identify and assess opportunities for mitigation**

17 The CCSP should put more emphasis on identifying and assessing international
18 opportunities for mitigation. This information should be readily available to policy
19 makers, who may need to act quickly in the future to avert severe impacts from climate
20 change. Identify “no regrets” actions that could be taken immediately

21
22 **Identify the *real* costs and benefits of averting climate change**

23 Identify and compare costs of climate change impacts, adaptation and mitigation at
24 global, regional and local levels. This information is essential to resolution of the policy
25 debate, which CIEL believes is skewed in favor of inaction. Policy makers have tended
26 to focus on the costs of mitigation and are insufficiently informed about the benefits.
27 Indeed, many credible studies, some by US government agencies, suggest that costs of
28 mitigation may be relatively moderate, in some cases perhaps even negative, whereas the
29 costs of adapting to the impacts of climate change may be much higher than most
30 decision makers realize.

31
32 Of course, for some communities, impacts cannot be quantified in mere dollars. For
33 example, the inhabitants of the Arctic have at risk their culture and way of life. The
34 CCSP must find a way to reflect non-economic as well as economic losses that may
35 result from climate change.

36 **Center for Int’l Environmental Law - Goldberg**