or (7) taking of other compulsory or restrictive action."
The original draft of section 9 (a) limited the imposition of sanctions to
those "as specified and authorized by statute." Senate Comparative Print, June 1945, p.
17 (Sen. Doc. p. 159). The change of the word "statute" to "law" was inten-
tional so as to recognize that an agency may impose a sanction or issue a substantive rule or order
if such power is authorized not only by statutes but by treaties, court decisions, commonly recog-
nized administrative practices, or other law. See United States v. MacDaniel, 7 Pet.
(32 U.S.) 1, 13-14 (1833). Both the Senate and House reports recognize that the source of authority
for the imposition of a sanction or the issuance of a substantive rule or order may be either specific
or general, as the case may be. Sen. Rep. p. 25, H.R. Rep. p. 40 (Sen. Doc. pp. 211, 274).
The purpose of section 9(a) is, evidently, to assure that agencies will not
appropriate to themselves powers Congress has not intended them to exercise. Section 9(a) merely
restates existing law. Sen. Rep. p. 43 (Sen. Doc. p. 229). Many agencies' powers
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are very clear; they are set forth specifically in the act creating the agency. Still other powers may
be readily inferred from the framework of the act creating the agency or may be logically necessary
for the conduct of the powers granted to the agency. But whether an agency's powers are express
or implied, in either case they may be exercised. Particularly pertinent in this connection is the
language of the Supreme Court in Phelps Dodge Corp. v. National Labor Relations
Board, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941):
- A statute expressive of such large public policy as that on
which the National Labor Relations Board is based must be broadly phrased and necessarily
carries with it the task of administrative application. There is an area plainly covered by the
language of the Act and an area no less plainly without it. But in the nature of things
Congress could not catalogue all the devices and stratagems for circumventing the policies
of the Act. Nor could it define the whole gamut of remedies to effectuate these
policies in an infinite variety of specific situations. Congress met these
difficulties by leaving the adaptation of means to end to the empiric process of
administration. * * * the relation of remedy to policy is peculiarly a matter for administrative
competence. [Italics supplied].