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Contents of Main Volume | Contents of Supplement
DISCLAIMER: The Longshore Benchbook was created solely to assist the Office of Administrative Law Judges as a first reference in researching cases arising under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, and extension acts, as amended. This Benchbook does not constitute the official opinion of the Department of Labor, the Office of Administrative Law Judges, or any individual judge on any subject. This Benchbook does not necessarily contain an exhaustive or current treatment of case holdings, and should, under no circumstances, substitute for a party's own research into the statutory, regulatory, and case law authorities on any given subject referred to therein. It is intended to be used as a research tool, not as final legal authority and should not be cited or relied upon as such.
PDF Version: Volume I (Topics 1-21) | Volume II (Topics 22-90)
Description |
Topic |
Res Judicata, Collateral Estoppel, Full Faith and Credit, Election of Remedies |
85 |
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Res Judicata, Collateral Estoppel, Full Faith and Credit, Election of Remedies--Introduction and General Concepts
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85.1 |
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85.2 |
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85.3 |
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85.5 |
TOPIC 85
Topic 85.1 Res Judicata, Collateral Estoppel, Full Faith and Credit, Election of
Remedies—Introduction and General Concepts
Kirkpatrick v. B.B.I, Inc., 38 BRBS 27 (2004).
The Board affirmed the ALJ's finding that the claimant was covered by the OCSLA
although the claimant was not directly involved in the physical construction of
an offshore platform. The parties had stipulated that the worker's
"primary job function was supervising the ordering and transportation of
materials necessary to the construction of the Conoco platform complex, upon
which he was injured." As the claimant's purpose for being on the platform
was to procure supplies necessary to construct the platform, and his injury
occurred during the course of his duties, his work satisfies the OCSLA status
test.
The Board also found that Sections 12 and 13 apply to a claimant's notice of
injury and claim for compensation due to his injury; these sections do not
apply to a carrier seeking a determination that another carrier is responsible
for claimant's benefits. The Board stated, "There is, in fact, no
statutory provision requiring a carrier seeking reimbursement from another
carrier to do so within a specified period."
Here INA claimed that it relied on Houston General's 12 year acceptance of this
claim and, to its detriment, "is now facing a claim for reimbursement
approaching three-quarters of a million dollars, without the opportunity to investigate
contemporaneously, manage medical treatment, engage in vocational
rehabilitation, monitor disability status, etc." The Board rejected this
argument "as there was no representation or action of any detrimental
reliance, there can be no application of the doctrine of equitable
estoppel."
Further, the Board noted that the doctrine of laches precludes the prosecution
of stale claims if the party bringing the action lacks diligence in pursuing
the claim and the party asserting the defense has been prejudiced by the same
lack of diligence. Additionally the Board noted that because the LHWCA contains
specific statutory periods of limitation, the doctrine of laches is not
available to defend against the filing of claims there under. "As the
claim for reimbursement is related to claimant's claim under the Act by
extension of OCSLA, and as the Supreme Court has stated that the doctrine of
laches does not apply under the OCSLA, the doctrine of laches does not apply to
this case.
The Board found that neither judicial estoppel or equitable estoppel applied
and noted that "jurisdictional estoppel" is a fictitious doctrine.
The Board vacated the ALJ's ruling that he did not have jurisdiction to address
the issue of reimbursement between the two insurance carriers. "Because
INA's liability evolved from claimant's active claim for continuing benefits,
and because its responsibility for those benefits is based entirely on the
provisions of the Act, as extended by the OCSLA, we vacate the [ALJ's]
determination that he does not have jurisdiction to address the reimbursement
issue, and we remand the case to him…."
Topic 85.1 Res Judicata,
Collateral Estoppel, Full Faith and Credit, Election of Remedies
Porter v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co.,
36 BRBS 113 (2002).
In contrast to the facts in Jones v. Newport News Shipbuilding &
Dry Dock Company, 36 BRBS 109 (2002), supra, the Board here notes
that "[E]ven where a document on its face states a claim for modification,
the circumstances surrounding its filing may establish the absence of an actual
intent to pursue modification at that time."
Here, unlike in Jones, the Board found that the context of the filing
established that the claimant lacked the intent to pursue an actual claim for
nominal benefits at the time she filed the petition for modification. The Board
noted that the claimant's August 12, 1999 letter was filed only 18 days after
the last payment of benefits and that while "it is conceivable claimant's
condition could have changed in that short period of time, providing a basis
for her assertion that she anticipated future economic harm, there is no evidence
of record to support such a conclusion." It went on to note that the 1999
letter was filed well in advance of the December 2000 evidence of any
deterioration of her condition and, thus, constituted an anticipatory filing.
The Board found further evidence of an anticipatory filing in the claimant's
actions. After receiving the 1999 letter, OWCP sought clarification of its
purpose, asking the claimant whether the letter was to be considered "a
request for an informal conference and/or Section 22 Modification so that we
can [determine] what additional action needs to be taken by the office."
The claimant responded stating that she did not want OWCP to schedule an
informal conference, and, in so responding, she deliberately halted the administrative
process.
The Board found that because the claimant intentionally acted in a manner
contrary to the pursuit of her claim, her actions were merely an effort at
keeping the option of seeking modification open until she had a loss to claim.
"[S]he did not have the requisite intent to pursue a claim for nominal
benefits, but rather was attempting to file a document which would hold her
claim open indefinitely." The total circumstances surrounding the filing
of the 1999 letter establish that the application did not manifest an actual
intent to seek compensation for the loss alleged. Because the 1999 motion was
thus an anticipatory filing, it was not a valid motion for modification.
While the Board found moot the claimant's argument that the ALJ erred in
applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel, it nevertheless addressed it
"for the sake of judicial efficiency." The Board found that,
"Although, it was reasonable for employer to have relied on the statement
that claimant did not wish to proceed to informal conference at that time,
there was no detrimental reliance by employer. While employer may have thought
the issue was abandoned or resolved in some manner it suffered no injury
because of the letter: it took no action in reliance on the letter and it did
not pay any benefits or place itself in a position of harm.
Topic 85.1 Res Judicata, Collateral Estoppel, Full Faith and Credit, Election of
Remedies–Generally Concepts
Holmes v. Shell Offshore, Inc., 37 BRBS 27 (2003).
The Board held that a claimant was not in privity with her stepmother and was
not bound by the prior finding that her father’s death was not
compensable. Although the two claims arose out of the same death, raising
the same question of compensability, and the same attorney prosecuted both
claims, under the law of the circuit, the claimant was not adequately or
virtually represented in the prior claim and was free to bring her own claim.
Here, a widow’s claim for benefits after the apparent suicide of her husband
was summarily dismissed when the ALJ found that the decedent did not suffer any
work-related injury or illness prior to taking his own life. The ALJ had
found that the widow had failed to invoke the Section 20(a) presumption and
that the decedent had willfully intended to take his own life, and therefore
Section 3(c) barred the claim for compensation. The widow had failed to
respond to the employer’s motion for summary decision and to the ALJ’s motion
to show cause. Thus, the ALJ deemed such failure as a waiver of rights
and denied the widow’s motion for reconsideration. One year later the
decedent’s daughter by his first marriage filed a claim for death benefits and
the employer filed a motion to dismiss based on the principle of collateral
estoppel. Finding the now adult child to stand in privity with her
stepmother, the same ALJ dismissed the claim.
On appeal, the Board noted that, in order to determine whether collateral estoppel
and res judicata applied, the Board had to determine whether the claimant stood
in privity with her stepmother, the decedent worker’s widow. The Board
found that according to the Fifth Circuit and Louisiana law (case arises
within Louisiana), “privity,” exists only in three narrowly-defined
circumstances. The Board found that of the three concepts of privity,
only “virtual representation” would be applicable in the instant case.
The Board noted the, according to the jurisprudence, to be “closely aligned,”
so as to be one’s virtual representative, it is not enough to merely show that
the party and the nonparty have common or parallel interests in the factual and
legal issues presented in the respective actions. It further noted that
both the state courts and the Fifth Circuit have narrowly interpreted
virtual representation, and that even close familial relationships, without
something more, are insufficient to invoke virtual representation.
The Board stated that the concept of privity attempts to define how one party
stands, legally, with respect to another. As the concept of virtual
representation in the Fifth Circuit requires either express or implied
consent to legal representation, and as there was no evidence of either in the
instant case, the Board found that virtual representation could not apply, and
thus, the claimant could not be held to be in privity with her stepmother.
Topic 85.2 Effect of Prior
State Proceeding on a Subsequent Federal Claim
Hennessey v. Bath Iron Works Corp., (Unpublished) (BRB
No. 01-0872) (Aug. 7, 2002).
Here the worker filed claims under both the LHWCA and the Maine Workers'
Compensation Act. The Board affirmed the ALJ's determination that the doctrine
of collateral estoppel does not bar his reaching the merits of the case since
the state board's decision regarding the extent of disability was not final at
the time the ALJ issued his decision. (The state board decision had been
appealed and thus was not a final decision.)
Topic 85.3 Election of
Remedies—Federal/State Conflicts
Gorman v. Garlock, Inc.,
Wash. App. (No. 52188-8-I (consolidated w/52329-5-I)
(May 3, 2004).
Noting that Washington State law precluded a claim under the Washington
Industrial Insurance Act, when a worker qualifies for compensation under the
LHWCA, the appealant court upheld the trial court's dismissal of actions
brought against maritime employers as a result of asbestos-related injuries.
While the court found that the LHWCA does not preempt Revised Code of
Washington (RCW) claims, the RCW itself preempts them. "Because they have
the right to compensation under federal law, they cannot state a claim under
the Washington statute."
Topic 85.5 "Law of the
Case" Doctrine
Ravalli v. Pasha Maritime Services, 36 BRBS 91 (2002).
This is a denial of a Motion for Reconsideration. Previously the Board adopted
the construction of Section 22 given by the Second Circuit in Spitalieri
v. Universal Maritime Services, 226 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 532 U.S. 1007 (2001) (Termination of benefits is a
"decrease" of benefits; held, effective date of termination could be
date of change in condition.). The Board found Motion for Reconsideration of
several issues not properly before it as these issues had not been addressed at
most recent appeal and there was settled "law of the case."
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