July, 1996 Operation REACT Targeting Violence in Chicago By Matt L. Rodriguez, M.P.A. and William D. Branon _________________ Superintendent Rodriguez commands the Chicago, Illinois, Police Department. Mr. Branon is the former Special Agent in Charge of the FBI's Chicago Office. _________________ (The Chicago Police Department and the FBI's Chicago Field Office joined forces to combat a surge in shootings in two police districts.) The task force is not a new concept in policing. Task forces involving municipal, county, state, and federal law enforcement agencies have been used widely and with considerable success during the past 25 years to address drugs, gangs, and other serious crime problems that cross jurisdictional boundaries. In their traditional application, however, task forces sometimes can become static and narrowly focused. In such cases, the very reason for creating a task force--to provide a dynamic and flexible response to a specific crime problem--may be forgotten as the task force becomes more established and entrenched. Recognizing the potential pitfalls of the task force approach, the Chicago, Illinois, Police Department (CPD) and the FBI's Chicago Field Office devised an innovative alternative to the traditional task force strategy. This approach--code-named Operation REACT--used the combined resources of the two agencies in a flexible manner for a limited period of time to tackle a pressing community need. The problem that precipitated Operation REACT was an out-break of primarily gang-sponsored violence in a select few neighborhoods on Chicago's South Side. To foster maximum impact, the operation pooled the resources of several distinct task forces. However, the primary innovation, establishing a finite lifespan for the operation, proved to be a simple but effective way to ensure that the task force's efforts did not dissipate over time. THE PROBLEM During the first 6 months of 1994, Chicago recorded 476 homicides, the highest number of homicides for the first half of any year in the city's history. While several of the city's neighborhoods saw an increase in homicides, two police districts on the South Side--the 3rd and 4th, both in police area 2-- experienced an exceptional outbreak of violence, including not just homicides but also drive-by shootings and other aggravated assaults. The 3rd and 4th police districts are home to approximately 233,000 residents living within a 32-square mile area. The area's population is largely working class, with large pockets both of poverty and crime. These two districts experienced a 27-percent increase in homicides and a 21-percent increase in shootings between April and July 1994, when compared to figures for the same months in 1993. The primary cause for this increasing violence could be traced to an escalation in drug-related gang warfare. Much of this was directed by leaders of the Black Gangster Disciple Nation, the city's largest and most violent organized street gang, which was attempting to gain control of the illicit drug trade in various parts of the city's South Side. In response to the outbreak of violence in the 3rd and 4th districts, the CPD initiated a number of short-term tactical responses using existing department resources. Precinct patrol officers and tactical units stepped up enforcement efforts in the highest crime neighborhoods, while department administrators reassigned detectives from other parts of the city to concentrate on solving violent crimes in the two target districts. Because much of the crime occurring in the two districts was being committed by offenders from surrounding districts, officers from the department's Special Operations Section and the Enhanced Drug and Gang Enforcement (EDGE) Program supplemented and expanded these efforts to provide an enhanced presence throughout police area 2. Under EDGE, teams of officers from the area's five precincts, along with personnel from other specialized units, saturated specific neighborhoods for short periods of time, identifying and arresting offenders and serving outstanding warrants. While these efforts helped to contain some of the violence in the targeted districts, the shootings and killings continued. In addition, the overwhelming growth in caseloads taxed the ability of detectives to solve violent crimes as they occurred. By the summer of 1994, it became clear that a more dynamic response was necessary to address the rising level of violence on the city's South Side in general, and in districts 3 and 4 specifically. THE RESPONSE: OPERATION REACT In July 1994, the command staff of the CPD and the executive management of the FBI's Chicago Field Office developed a plan that had never before been attempted in the city: A cooperative effort in which federal agents would operate out of one of the police department's detective facilities. As part of the plan, FBI agents would team up with police detectives, gang crime specialists, and patrol officers to attack violent crime in a single, concentrated high-crime area. The joint police-FBI effort also would be supplemented by new, more intensive tactics established within the police department, along with support from several existing FBI-sponsored task forces. In addition to personnel, the FBI contributed equipment and other resources that would be committed to area 2's detective commander for the duration of the initiative. On August 2, 1994, Operation REACT began. Originally envisioned as a 3-month operation, the cooperative effort continued for 4 months, due to the number of largescale investigations launched. The operation primarily involved the work of three specially formed task forces. While each of the three task forces operated with some autonomy, the overall effort was directed by the deputy chief of the area 2 patrol division. This marked the first time an operation of this scope and magnitude had been directed by area leadership within the police department's patrol division. Violent Crime Task Force As part of Operation REACT, six FBI agents and six police detectives were assigned full-time to area 2's detective commander. The members of the Violent Crime Task Force focused their efforts solely on investigating homicides and other violent crime in the targeted neighborhoods of districts 3 and 4. Fugitive Task Force Composed of investigators from the police department, the FBI, the Cook County Sheriff's Police, and the U.S. Marshal's Service, the Fugitive Task Force concentrated on locating and apprehending those fugitives wanted for violent crimes who resided or were being harbored within police area 2. This allowed permanently assigned police detectives to focus on the escalating number of homicide cases. Joint Task Force on Gangs Composed of FBI and CPD personnel, as well as personnel from the Chicago Housing Authority Police Department, the Illinois State Police, and the Cook County Sheriff's Police, the Joint Task Force on Gangs targeted high-ranking members of the Black Gangster Disciples Nation for investigation and prosecution. The task force used sophisticated investigative techniques, including court-authorized electronic surveillance, to disrupt the gang's extensive drug trafficking operations in the target area. MOBILIZATION OF DEPARTMENT RESOURCES Several specialized tactical mission teams within the police department complemented the efforts of the Operation REACT task forces. These mission teams worked closely with the task forces to maximize resources and impact. Special Gang Mission Team The Special Gang Mission Team was established specifically to support Operation REACT. Made up of 2 sergeants and 20 officers, the team saturated the streets in the two targeted districts during the operation. It also provided high visibility enforcement, gathered intelligence, and monitored street-level activity at known drug locations. In addition, the team conducted aggressive street-stops of vehicles for traffic and regulatory violations. In doing so, they made extensive use of Chicago's vehicle impoundment law, which allows police officers to seize vehicles in which firearms are recovered. Detective Area Mission Team During Operation REACT, one police officer from each of the five districts in area 2 was assigned to assist detectives in investigating the growing caseload of violent crimes. The officers' familiarity with the criminal element in their districts provided detectives with valuable information for investigations. Gang, Drugs, and Prostitution Units The department's permanent gang, drugs, and prostitution units increased their efforts in the two districts to support the work of the task forces and mission teams. The assistance of these centralized units--especially their strong administrative support--enabled members of the task forces and mission teams to devote the majority of their time to street work rather than paper work. Court Advocacy To help galvanize the community's support, the police department also worked with the city to expand court advocacy efforts in the targeted districts. Area residents fed up with rising levels of lawlessness quickly identified high-profile cases and turned out in large numbers to follow these cases through the court system. RESULTS From the beginning, planners designed Operation REACT as a high-impact, but short-term, operation. On November 30, 1994, Operation REACT did something task force initiatives rarely do_it officially ended. While high-level gang and drug ring investigations begun by the task forces still continue, the joint task forces disbanded, and the personnel assigned to Operation REACT resumed their regular duties when the operation came to an end. Enforcement and investigative initiatives undertaken during the 4 months of the operation had a profound impact on the crime problem in the target area. Results were impressive. Between August and November 1994, the police department's Special Gang Mission Team made 417 arrests, including 7 arrests for murder and 50 for drug violations. The team also recovered 157 firearms. Other specific successes included a sweep on August 25th that resulted in the arrest of 35 fugitives from area 2. More than 50 FBI agents--along with sheriff's police, state police, and personnel from the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, the Internal Revenue Service, and the U.S. Marshal's Service--assisted area commanders in this 1-day operation. Perhaps the most significant outcome of Operation REACT, however, was a notable decline in the level of violence in the 3rd and 4th districts. In the months between August and November, these two districts recorded a 13-percent reduction in shootings, from 276 in 1993 to 240 during the same months in 1994. In addition, the homicide rate in the two districts leveled off considerably during the 4 months of the operation. Although the number of homicides in the August-November period still increased slightly (from 34 in 1993 to 35 in 1994), this small increase was in marked contrast to the 27-percent rise recorded for the April-July period. Despite the short-term nature of the initiative, Operation REACT proved to have a continuing impact on the crime problem in the targeted districts. The number of aggravated assaults for the first 6 months of 1995 dropped to 288, down from 432 during the same period in 1994. From January through June 1995, districts 3 and 4 recorded 48 homicides, down from a record high of 74 for the same 6 months in 1994. CONCLUSION Law enforcement agencies faced with a sudden increase in violent crime in a concentrated geographic area generally rely on their own resources to mount a short-term tactical response. To do this, agencies typically redeploy or assign additional personnel to the high-crime area and use specialized tactical, gang, and drug units to provide high visibility enforcement action. When the Chicago Police Department confronted an outbreak of gang warfare and drug-related violence in two police districts, the agency responded in the traditional way. However, the severity of the crime problem and the limited impact of the department's response demonstrated the need for a more dramatic and concentrated effort. Department leaders joined with the executives of the FBI's Chicago Field Office and developed a task force approach that would focus sufficient resources on the problem to produce significant results in a limited period of time. Operation REACT produced immediate, positive results. Entrenched drug distribution operations were disrupted. Homicides that may have remained unsolved were cleared, and violent offenders were arrested. Career criminals and fugitives who had committed crimes with little fear of retribution were identified, apprehended, and removed from the communities that they had once victimized at will. Although only 4 months in duration, Operation REACT proved to have a lasting impact on the crime problems facing the community. Following an unprecedented surge in violent crime during the first 6 months of 1994, the task force contributed to a leveling of the homicide rate and a significant reduction in the number of shootings. The reductions in violent crime have provided welcome relief for communities beset with violence and in desperate need of solutions. The immediate, short-term relief brought about by Operation REACT, in turn, has presented an opportunity--and a strong foundation--for longer-term, crime-reduction strategies to take hold in the communities. Perhaps as important, the effectiveness of this more flexible and dynamic approach to the traditional task force strategy has paved the way for similar efforts involving the Chicago Police Department and other federal, state, and local agencies. _______________________