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Implementation Evaluation Panel

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| 4 | REACTOR OVERSIGHT PROCESS |
| 5 | INITIAL IMPLEMENTATION EVACUATION PANEL |
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| 8 | TUESDAY, |
| 9 | JANUARY 23, 2001 |
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| 11 | BETHESDA, MARYLAND |
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| 13 | The Panel met at 8:00 a.m., in the Embassy |
| 14 | III Conference Room of the Four Points Sheraton Hotel, |
| 15 | 8400 Wisconsin Avenue, Bethesda, Maryland, Loren R. |
| 16 | Plisco, Chairman, presiding. |
| 17 | |
| 18 | PRESENT: |
| 19 | LOREN R. PLISCO Chairman |
| 20 | A. RANDOLPH BLOUGH Member |
| 21 | R. WILLIAM BORCHARDT Member |
| 22 | KENNETH E. BROCKMAN Member |
| 23 | MARY A. FERDIG Member |
| 24 | STEVE FLOYD Member |
| 25 | DAVID F. GARCHOW Member |
| | |

JILL LIPOTI

DENNIS ZANNONI

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P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

| 2 | (8:14 a.m.) |
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| 3 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Good morning. Welcome |
| 4 | to the second day of our third meeting of the Reactor |
| 5 | Oversight Process Initial Implementation Panel. This |
| 6 | is a public meeting. Again, anyone that is observing, |
| | |
| 7 | I request that you sign-up on the sign-up sheet. The |
| 8 | meeting will be transcribed. Today's agenda this |
| 9 | morning, we have three groups of invited stakeholders. |
| 10 | The New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection |
| 11 | and we have a group of NRC Senior Reactor Analysts and |
| 12 | Inspectors. |
| 13 | The first presentation is the New Jersey |
| 14 | Department of Environmental Protection. We do have |
| 15 | copies of the letter I think it was in December, |
| 16 | Jill, you sent that to us? |
| 17 | DR. LIPOTI: December 11. |
| 18 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: And we provided it to |
| 19 | the members last month. We do have copies on the table |
| 20 | too for anyone else. Any administrative business, |
| 21 | John, before we start? |
| 22 | MR. MONNINGER: No, I don't think so. |
| 23 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Jill? |
| 24 | DR. LIPOTI: Well, I had the opportunity |
| 25 | yesterday on the train to read all of your comments |

that you submitted. And I was really pleased at the diversity of comments that were raised, and I think this is a really good group.

I want to comment on a few of the I thought Mr. Borchardt's comment about needing an independent review by people not involved in the development or the implementation of the ROP was a very significant one. And if I could make a suggestion, I know that the Department of Energy has National Association of the Public called on Administrators, NAPA, to give them some feedback on regulatory structure and changes in regulatory since all public programs. And they are administrators, it is good group а very independent group to get that sort of feedback. DOE used them on the stewardship issue. So that might be a suggestion for that kind of independent group. Because I do see redundancy among the people who have developed the program and are now called on to implement it.

I thought Dave Garchow made a good point yesterday when he said you need to make sure the process can gauge performance and that the process is accurate. And that is what you need to keep in mind as you develop your report.

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Ray Shadis's comment about a regulatory oversight program is more than just maintaining adequacy. It is about encouraging improvement. It is about rewarding excellence and not rewarding mediocrity. Absolutely important and excellent comment.

Commissioner Laurie's comment about investing in an open process. An open process is what will inspire the public confidence. Because really in this program, the public, the regulators and the utilities are all partners in ensuring safety of the facilities.

Loren Plisco's comments. He honed in right away on the PRA as a very important issue, and I am sure you will hear from experts today. Because without those common standards and methods and requirements in the PRA, there is always going to be some refiguring of the PRA. Some what I call negotiations, which I guess is blue. You don't say negotiations. But there is some challenging of the scientific basis because you don't have common standards, methods and requirements.

It is similar to what I think of when we are trying to clean up a contaminated site and there are multi-agencies involved. Those agencies got

together and they wrote a Multi-Agency Sampling Manual, MARSM. And a laboratory analysis manual, MARLAB. And they may someday work on a modeling manual, MARMOD. And maybe someday there will be a multi-agency PRA description that gets to a consensus on what goes into the PRA and how it is done.

Both Loren Plisco and Bill Dean talked about cross-cutting issues, and that is extremely important. I understand the dilemma you are in with the problem identification and resolution inspection and whether that inspection should be annual or at some lesser frequency. But I think that that particular inspection is relevant to the leading indicator. I think Randy Blough made that comment yesterday.

Without some check on the system, without some check to make sure that PIs and inspection reports are capturing all of the issues, then you can get a false sense of security. And that particular inspection, problem identification and resolution, gives you a kind of check on the total system. So I think it is a good idea. And inspection frequency is something states wrestle with a lot.

I can give you an example from a totally different regulatory arena, mammography. The

Mammography Quality Standards Act initially required that facilities which provide mammograms must be inspected annually. It said so right in the law. But in the reauthorization of that Act, there was a requirement for a pilot program for inspect at a lesser frequency and to determine if the inspection itself is important to maintaining quality or whether the facilities can maintain quality without that inspection oversight. It came to the states to figure out metrics for determining whether annual inspection was as important as many of us believed.

So I am sure that you can work out a similar kind of thing with inspection frequency, where you have some level of inspections or some number of inspections which are performed at a lesser frequency, and you compare the data.

I thought Loren Plisco and Bill Dean's staff member -- I can't remember which one talked about risk-based PIs -- really had an important point where NRR and research are examining the feasibility of risk-based PIs. I think they are critical to the success of this program.

I'll say a word about thresholds. I keep saying a word about thresholds. I really think the colors only work if crossing a threshold has some

deeper meaning and a risk-based meaning. Otherwise, if the process really doesn't produce any colors other than green, why don't you drop the colors and just report the absolute value. I think the colors remain a deterrent to encouraging excellence and are in fact a way of encouraging mediocrity.

I will answer any questions that you may have on the letter that I sent in. I took your matrix of issues and I matched them against all of the issues that I raised in my letter, and I think you got them all. So I noted which one matched up with P5, O4, P8, P4, and I believe that you captured everything that I was trying to tell you. So in your deliberations, I am sure that you will discuss that. But if you have questions, I am certainly open to that.

What I am interested in is what happens to your work as a committee. And what kind of time frame are you working in. I see a real disadvantage in the fact that you have so little data at this point to look at trends or draw any conclusions from. I think in particular when I look at your ROP performance metrics, MO1, you are going to need a statistician. You are going to need statistics. You are going to need some results in order to work the statistics before you can come up with something. So you may need

more time to draw conclusions than is your time frame in the FACA Register Notice. But I really think you shouldn't rush your conclusions and try to be meaningful. You have an opportunity to really improve this process. You should take the time.

And speaking of metrics, there are two metrics that I believe are insufficient in this metric; U01, where it discusses whether the ROP is understandable. And C01, where it discusses whether the ROP enhances public confidence.

Now when I use the words focus group, I have a completely different meaning than Bill Dean's To me a focus group is a group of focus group. private citizens who are convened by a facilitator, who are paid for their time and asked to give an a product. product opinion on That could deodorant. That product could be of а suite performance indicators, that product could be voluntary plan for siting a low-level rad waste site, that product could be a reactor oversight process. A focus group is not bringing a whole bunch of people from one agency together and focusing on an issue, although that is a very important thing to do. focus group has a specific meaning in social science, and I fear that it hasn't been utilized properly. I

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think when I look at these metrics and I say that the way that you are going to tell us something is understandable or enhances public confidence is based on the replies you get to the Federal Register Notice. It really skews the results, and Dave Garchow picked up on that yesterday. You are just relying on the stakeholders that choose to respond, and those are the people that aren't sick of responding already and sending in letters. For utilities, you could certainly skew it by having 100 top executives in 101 plants sent in letters that say everything is fine and public confidence is great. That isn't going to tell you what the public is really thinking. You need to look to a focus group in my sense of the word.

Having even environmental groups who respond to the Federal Register Notice send in comments is not going to get to everyone. The person at CVS who waited on me, the school teacher, the -- I don't know, the dry cleaners. You need -- what is the public's confidence in NRC and their ability to regulate nuclear power plants?

The other area where I differ a bit from Bill Dean's impression of what this group is chartered to do is where he says he is going to give you the results of his focus groups, which are comprised of

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NRC people, and if there are discontinuities in the recommendation, he is hoping you will help them work it through and help find a consensus. Because as he sees it, you represent all of the stakeholders. I represent my state, but I would not -- I would not say I represent all states. I am sure each of you represents your agency or your group or your role, but you can't possibly represent all stakeholders. I look around the room and I say, okay, who is representing my mother? Would you please stand up? You are not a representative sample.

So what you need to do -- you have to integrate the reactor oversight process with the values of society. That is what your role is. But you can't do that without some better communication. You need some tools for providing the technical information to a non-expert audience. And you need to listen to what they have to say.

The last point that I am going to make is one that I think can help you look at the overall process. It is a recommendation for each of you to participate in an inspection, one inspection, from beginning to end. Now I know that I have an inspector here, so obviously he has done this. To verify that the indicators and the SDP and the inspection findings

| 1 | all match the reality that you get when you walk |
|----|--|
| 2 | through that utility. To determine if the resource |
| 3 | allocation in your own mind is adequate for doing a |
| 4 | good job of inspecting. And then for you to try |
| 5 | communicating your findings to the public and see if |
| 6 | you can do it with the restrictions that are placed on |
| 7 | you through the ROP. Try it. I know that some of you |
| 8 | have staff that have done this or you have watched |
| 9 | other people do it or you have supervised people who |
| 10 | do it. Try it once on your own and see how you feel |
| 11 | as part of the process. And I think you will find |
| 12 | some interesting insights, particularly in the |
| 13 | resource allocation area. |
| 14 | My colleague, Dennis Zannoni, has sat |
| 15 | through all of your meetings and listened. |
| 16 | MR. ZANNONI: Well, just yesterday. |
| 17 | DR. LIPOTI: So if you have anything you |
| 18 | would like to add. We independently wrote down |
| 19 | observations. |
| 20 | MR. ZANNONI: Thanks, Jill. Before I |
| 21 | comment, does anybody have any questions to Jill |
| 22 | directly or also about the memo that we wrote, so we |
| 23 | could talk about that and maybe that will trigger some |
| 24 | more thoughts that I wanted to bring up as well. |

Because I am not a morning person, so I am just kind

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of getting wound up. But I don't want to take up too much time.

MR. TRAPP: I was curious of your objection to colors. I mean, I think we have related colors to numbers, and if you have that correlation, I guess I don't understand. If I say it is 10⁻⁶ to 10⁻⁷ delta CDF and that is going to be a white, then I just -- if you could expound on your objection to calling it.

DR. LIPOTI: I would like you to explain 10^{-6} or 10^{-7} CDF to a dry cleaner.

MR. TRAPP: I agree it is impossible.

DR. LIPOTI: It is just -- it is so far from experience that it is just -- people in the real world don't always make decisions based on core damage frequency. So I think you need to explain a bit about how you chose those colors. And as far as I can tell, there are some of the performance indicators that have a risk-based threshold, and then there are some that are just based on the metric 95.5 percent. And that if you try and compare a PI green to an SDP green, you are not comparing greens that are the same. And so the green -- the colors are misleading to the public. It seems to me also that if your threshold between green to white is the real threshold that gets to the

economic issues about how well your utility is seen on the stock market and so forth, that you are going to be very careful about crossing the threshold from green to white. And that the thresholds for any other color, white to yellow or yellow to read, become almost meaningless because the green to white is so clearly important.

We are embarking on a regulatory program for medical doctors to look at their image quality and their radiation dose in administering x-rays people. And there are bell-shaped curves that describe how much radiation a doctor gives to a patient, a typical patient for a typical examination. have chosen thresholds that say 95 percent interval. We want to take all of the people who give more radiation than that and tell them that they have to bring it down. We chose not to. We chose to give the physician their information on that examination and say, here is what your colleagues can do and you are over here. By not giving them a threshold, encourages them to excellence. It doesn't make them stop right at the 95 percent level. And what I am worried about is that the thresholds will encourage what I call not a continuous improvement. And I think Ray Shadis picked on this in his comments. It is a

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maintenance of adequacy floor is what you come up 1 2 with, although it is very difficult for you to 3 describe maintaining adequate in terms of numbers. And you have not given the utilities the ability to excel 4 and to be rewarded for that excellence. 5 6 There is also not in my mind a clear path 7 to red or to shut down. Column 5, yes. It is not 8 MR. ZANNONI: 9 talked about very much, but it is one of those things 10 that is out there. 11 MR. TRAPP: It just seems to me, though, 12 if I have given my 13-year-old a green matrix and said, here is one plant and here is one with reds, 13 whites and yellows, which do you think is the worst 14 15 performer, I am sure she would probably choose the one with the reds, yellows and whites. Where if I gave her 16 17 just -- you know, this is a 10^{-6} or this is a 10^{-5} and 18 stick numbers in each one of those slots, I am sure 19 she wouldn't --20 MR. ZANNONI: Well, you need to separate 21 out the two. I mean, we have got the performance 22 indicator thresholds we are talking about in SDP. Getting to the performance indicator thresholds, we 23 24 heard yesterday that there is a lot of uncertainty.

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| performance indicators and maybe changing the |
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| definitions or dropping some and adding others. So by |
| you making or determining the threshold, you guys are |
| making judgments. While we are more prone to look at |
| the data because the data could reveal something about |
| performance, and that is helpful because it is |
| something new to the utilities. Supplying data that |
| may or may not be helpful. But we interpret that data |
| on our own. We don't think the thresholds really have |
| any meaning and the colors then are just kind of a way |
| to fit the program and make it look nice in the big |
| picture. But quite frankly, it really doesn't add |
| anything to assessing performance at the plant. The |
| data itself is a good start. I think that they really |
| have to move toward if you want to go to sensible |
| thresholds, you have got to really engage research to |
| come up with some risk-based performance indicators |
| that are more appropriate. But until then and all the |
| changes that I see occurring now, I could argue just |
| as strong not to have the colors in the performance |
| indicator world. Now SDP, again the question is, okay, |
| the colors work in the system, but I think that is a |
| different discussion for using the colors in that part |
| of the program. |

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| 1 | DR. LIPOTI: And I think one thing that |
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| 2 | you have not talked about is the uncertainty with |
| 3 | which you have named those risk numbers. And the |
| 4 | uncertainty bars are not shown on any of the diagrams |
| 5 | that I have seen, and I think you need to do a |
| 6 | sensitivity analysis and uncertainty analysis on how |
| 7 | you came up with the CDFs. |
| 8 | MR. SCHERER: I have a question for you. |
| 9 | Could you explain the process that you used to come up |
| 10 | with appendix B to your letter? |
| 11 | DR. LIPOTI: Yes. Appendix B |
| 12 | MR. ZANNONI: What is appendix B, just to |
| 13 | remind us. Are they the grades of the plants? |
| 14 | MR. SCHERER: Yes. |
| 15 | MR. ZANNONI: It was pretty simple. You |
| 16 | take the mid-cycle plant review and you read the cover |
| 17 | letter and then you say, all right it says this plant |
| 18 | is licensee response band, that is column A in the |
| 19 | interpretation. And if it added a little of |
| 20 | inspection, even though it was designated A, then I |
| 21 | would say, you know, it is maybe A to B. I mean, it is |
| 22 | self-explanatory. What is your question? |
| 23 | MR. SCHERER: I'm trying to understand the |
| 24 | process. You were making the point pretty strongly |
| 25 | that you don't agree with green and white and yellow |

| 1 | and red, but you seem to be trying to develop a |
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| 2 | process here of giving grades. I am trying to |
| 3 | understand the difference between the process you used |
| 4 | and |
| 5 | MR. ZANNONI: Well, what is the difference |
| 6 | between column designation and grade designation? I |
| 7 | mean, I was just that is just the data that was |
| 8 | produced by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. |
| 9 | DR. LIPOTI: Yes, we are just looking at |
| 10 | your data. |
| 11 | MR. BLOUGH: It is just columns he has |
| 12 | just given a letter to each column. We have this |
| 13 | slide from, I think, Alan Madison yesterday that |
| 14 | showed which plants were in which I guess that was |
| 15 | Bob Pascarelli. |
| 16 | DR. LIPOTI: Yes, this slide. |
| 17 | MR. BLOUGH: Which plants were in which |
| 18 | column. That is all they have done. And then they have |
| 19 | given minuses and pluses depending on whether there is |
| 20 | some qualifier on whether they are really in that |
| 21 | column. |
| 22 | MR. GARCHOW: What was your purpose in |
| 23 | doing this? Just to try to give your own self another |
| 24 | pictorial way of discriminating plant X from plant Y? |

| MR. ZANNONI: No, I just well, I think |
|--|
| it is common sense. I mean, the first mid-cycle review |
| came out. This is a global look at what the NRC had to |
| say to the public about the performance of nuclear |
| power plants at their first cut. So this is what it |
| said. You know, maybe some of them are wrong. But |
| this is a little easier for me to understand and the |
| people that I discuss this with than the columns. I |
| mean it is just I think it is pretty self- |
| explanatory. But the point, though, that I think I am |
| hearing between the lines is are we making the |
| judgment about the state of nuclear power in the |
| United States. And I am saying, no, this is just NRC's |
| data that we interpreted that is outlined on here. And |
| then we could see, well where do the plants fit. |
| Obviously, we would like to have it just provides, |
| I guess, a baseline on where the first results of the |
| mid-cycle review by the NRC is. I mean, I don't is |
| there another question that |
| DR. LIPOTI: Remember, we wrote this |
| letter on December 11 before you had the presentation |
| that put them in columns for you. |
| MR. ZANNONI: And we did say that the NRC |
| should confirm this data because this is just a small |

staff trying to get a handle on what is the NRC

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communicating about the nuclear power plant performance in this country. This is the NRC statement to the country about how the power plants are performing. So this is just one way of looking at it. I mean, that is the purpose, I think, of the midcycle review, unless it isn't.

MR. BROCKMAN: Just one more question. Let's start on the document we are talking about right here. When we put out the mid-cycle reviews, I am interested in your all's perception as a stakeholder there in your state, are those documents adequate in communicating a semi-annual state of the health of the utilities in your area of concern? Do they meet the needs of you as a state and do you feel they meet the needs of your constituency?

DR. LIPOTI: I have to answer that by saying that I do not rely on them solely for the information that I receive about nuclear power plants operating in our state. We have a staff and they supply me with much more information than is in the mid-cycle review. And so I am probably not a good one to ask that question of because I don't only have that piece of data. I have people come into my office and tell me, well guess what happened last night, Jill. This happened and this happened and we got a 50.72 and

here is what happened and here is how we are going to ask questions and this is the kind of thing we want to know and is there a problem with failing to follow procedures and do we need more retraining. There is so much more depth to the information I get. It isn't my only point --

MR. ZANNONI: If you are asking me if I just read the inspection reports and the mid-cycle review and went to the Website would that be enough for me, the answer is no. I mean that is it.

MR. BROCKMAN: Okay. Now let me try to You have got a different job and a separate this. different need and I have got to ask you to do something that I am going to apologize that you said it would be very difficult for you to do. But you are the one who can help me here. Try to put yourself -you are now the guy that runs the dry cleaning shop, which is one of the people you are saying we need to be able to reach out and communicate to. This would be the vehicle. You are going to get the couple of reports that come out, be they on a six-week or quarterly basis or what-have-you. Semi-annually you will see this and be able to got to the Web. the key things we are trying to do is provide an adequate amount of information for those people to

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stay informed. But then the converse to that is quickly you can send someone an information overload and they just turn it off because you have just overwhelmed them. And finding that balance is the task we are striving for.

MR. ZANNONI: It is a challenge.

DR. LIPOTI: It is a challenge. And that is why you need to have a focus group where you talk to the folks at the dry cleaner instead of talking to me. I can't represent that position.

MR. GARCHOW: So, Jill, can you compare and contrast? I mean, I can understand where you are coming from and I agree with a good portion of it. guess the dichotomy that exists for me, especially in the State of New Jersey, is that, you know, the dichotomy of the standard that we hold for nuclear power versus the standard we hold for other industries that have as significant or close to as significant potential impact to the public. Especially in our area I am referring to some of the large chemical complexes that are within miles of the plant. I mean, the dry cleaner -- I mean, they are living ignorance in that industry. There is no standard. They have no information. So I think we should try to get as best as we can and reach out. So I agree with you.

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But relative to the standard that is applied and then what society expects in general, this far exceeds anything that I see in a regulatory arena that has been attempted. I mean, I was cruising through the FAA site trying to say, okay, how would I find out about American Airlines. There is nothing that is as easy -- you know, five clicks and you are right into an inspection report on maintenance of an aircraft. Where we have struggled a little bit, but we got to that point in this industry through some of the information. So I would like you to comment a little on why -- the differences that you see. And I would say given that balance, maybe your position would be a little different.

DR. LIPOTI: I understand the idea of balancing chemical risks and radiation risks and to find some sort of harmonization between those kinds of risks. And certainly that is something that many federal agencies and state agencies are working on is harmonization of chemical and radiation risks. And, no, we have not achieved that yet. But I also think that society does not make decisions based solely on risk. That they consider many other factors and they have many other values that they use. And so I don't see it as a fair judgment to say that nuclear power

| 1 | plants have to strive for a different standard than |
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| 2 | airplane safety as long as we keep making the |
| 3 | comparison to airplane safety. I think Ray Shadis had |
| 4 | an interesting one. Would you allow a fire watch on |
| 5 | an airplane. So you are sitting in the airplane and, |
| 6 | excuse me, I am the fire watch and there is a fire |
| 7 | under your seat, please move. It is just not the same |
| 8 | kind of thing. It is comparing apples and oranges. |
| 9 | You want to try to draw these conclusions and it |
| 10 | doesn't work. There is plenty of data on chemical |
| 11 | risk that is much different from the data on radiation |
| 12 | risk. Right to know data, toxic catastrophe |
| 13 | prevention data, those kinds of things. |
| 14 | MR. GARCHOW: I was more coming from the |
| 15 | fact of I was going back to your mother or the dry |
| 16 | cleaners. |
| 17 | DR. LIPOTI: Right. |
| 18 | MR. GARCHOW: Living in the vicinity and |
| 19 | the attempt to reach out and the public outreach. I |
| 20 | wasn't more going onto the technology, although that |
| 21 | would be an interesting discussion for another day. |
| 22 | MR. ZANNONI: We don't think that that is |
| 23 | happening in the chemical community in New Jersey. I |
| 24 | mean, the state is much more involved with the large |
| 25 | chemical companies on a state level because they have |

a lot more regulatory authority than we do with the 1 2 nuclear regulatory -- with power plants. 3 MR. GARCHOW: I was just trying to look for a compare and contrast. 4 5 DR. LIPOTI: Yes. 6 MR. GARCHOW: We need to get as good as we 7 can. I think everybody recognizes that. But I think we lose sight of the big picture on how far we came 8 relative to what is available in other industries and 9 10 even what was available in this industry three years 11 ago or five years ago. And all 12 DR. LIPOTI: of the other 13 industries have come also. 14 MR. ZANNONI: Dave, what would you 15 suggest? I was just trying to get 16 MR. GARCHOW: 17 your insight on how the recommendations for this 18 panel, whether they -- you know, whether you are 19 drawing from what is happening in your other worlds. 20 You bring an insight because you regulate numerous 21 industries in your position. And we don't see that 22 necessarily on this panel. You know, somebody doing something better or different. I mean, how are they 23 24 reaching out to your mother or the dry cleaner? That

was where I was sort of going with the question.

MR. ZANNONI: Okay.

DR. LIPOTI: All right.

3 MR. KRICH: Could you give me an example

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DR. LIPOTI: Ray had his hand up.

MR. KRICH: I am sorry, go ahead.

MR. SHADIS: That is all right. I just -we are also way ahead of the Russians when it comes to our regulation, but so what? It is sort of not the charge of the agency to compare itself to other agencies. Every time that you talk about communicating to the public, the only thing you talk about is communicating your idea of comparative risk levels. And I am speaking to everyone. I am not just picking on David here. It is the way it falls in, you know, from the NRC and also from the industry. Let's compare risk numbers. Well, the fact is your risk numbers are not very good. And I think that if you take a very hard self-assessment on the risk numbers, they are not good. I am wondering in communicating to it, your experience with you see constituency if you will in New Jersey communicating a clear idea of how the process works something that would be of value to people in being able to accept what is being done to protect them?

DR. LIPOTI: Yes. In some ways, yes. But whenever I try to communicate process to groups like Norm Cohen and Unplug Salem, he gets the impression that I am saying, well, the Federal Government does this and, you know, they get the information from the utilities and the state only has this portion. And he feels that I am neglecting my responsibilities for not giving a well-rounded viewpoint. So I find that in communication that the process has to include a broad range and a wide range of individuals and not just my responsibility begins here and ends here. Because actually I have very little authority and it begins here and ends here.

MR. SHADIS: My -- I raise this because my experience in talking to different members of NRC and its various compartments is that many of them are confused about the process within their own agency. How is this generic issue now going to be handled. When and how are we going to issue guidance and on what basis for something that is cutting edge, dry storage of fuel or whatever it may be. And that of all of the things that gives me pause with respect to the ROP, it is that I really, even after reading the material and interviewing any number of NRC people, I still don't have a very clear idea of how the process

works. Where do we step from identifying an issue to its resolution? I guess what I am offering is that may be as important as trying to communicate some very subtle risk levels. The guy that is up to his elbows trichlorethylene in every day probably interested in knowing that there is only a one in a million chance that you are going to have a reactor It doesn't carry over. I am offering core damage. that and maybe at some point you might reflect something back on that.

I think if we can DR. LIPOTI: Yes. communicate about the reactor oversight the broadest possible terms and relate it the individual situation, that is the best of all worlds. It is a very difficult task and it is taking technical information and making it accessible to a non-expert. It hasn't been done yet, but that makes us strive for excellence.

MR. KRICH: What I was going to ask was if you could give us an example of an agency, a federal agency, that regulates excellence as opposed to regulating meeting a certain standard so that we could maybe look into it and get some idea of how that is done.

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| 1 | DR. LIPOTI: I think that perhaps the |
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| 2 | Mammography Quality Standards Act is a good example of |
| 3 | the way that they encourage excellence. And the two |
| 4 | performance indicators that they have chosen to |
| 5 | measure in that case were entrance skin exposure and |
| 6 | image quality as measured by a phantom. And in doing |
| 7 | that, they collected data from 1992, 1995, 1998 and so |
| 8 | forth. So you can see an improvement in image quality |
| 9 | a dramatic improvement in image quality, which gets |
| 10 | to the fact that you could have had misdiagnoses |
| 11 | because the images weren't of quality where you could |
| 12 | see a cancer. And so that is one area where you can |
| 13 | really yes, there are violations and, yes, there |
| 14 | are enforcement actions. But in general, they |
| 15 | encourage excellence. |
| 16 | MR. KRICH: Which agency is this? |
| 17 | DR. LIPOTI: It is the Food and Drug |
| 18 | Administration, Center for Devices and Radiological |
| 19 | Health. But if I think of other agencies, I |
| 20 | MR. KRICH: Yes, I would be interested. |
| 21 | DR. LIPOTI: Yes. Because that agency |
| 22 | also has to deal with there is not unlimited funding |
| 23 | and there are a lot of constraints on the agency, |
| 24 | similar to the constraints on NRC. I guess all |
| 25 | government has to deal with that. |

MR. BROCKMAN: You mentioned that each of us ought to try to get out and accompany an inspection and reach our own decision with respect to resources available and then the ability to communicate the results and what have you. I am interested if you could share some insights. Obviously, you have developed this off of a couple of examples and what have you where you feel that some have been adequate and some have been inadequate. We didn't communicate what we should. We gave them data overload. I don't know which direction. So I am interested in getting a

little more clarity on that.

DR. LIPOTI: Right. A number of our staff members have participated in inspections. And when they come back, they write me a report about it. And I am thinking of the inspection that Ariadne went on recently where she said, well, we didn't exactly stick to the inspection procedure because we ran out of time and they felt that the resident could do some things to fill in instead of this particular inspection. She had a number of comments that were -- well, they tried. They tried using the inspection procedure, but it didn't exactly match what they needed -- they felt they needed to do her impression was. In other cases, the exit interviews have been excellent. I have gotten

feedback that there was a lot of communication at the exit interview. But then when I read the inspection report, that communication, of course, was not there. And although the public, I guess, is invited to go to the exits, it is not always possible for them to be there. So the information that is provided for the public is the documentation in the inspection report, and it lacked the give-and-take that occurred at the exit interview.

MR. BROCKMAN: And that is an excellent insight as to what should the role of regulators' communications be. Addressing those issues that are the regulatory thresholds that you deal with? Or should the report carry itself on into suggestions or enhancements and what have you? Especially with your role where you all do it at the state. I am interested in your thoughts there as to what should that threshold of the official communication be.

DR. LIPOTI: When our inspectors -- and this is in x-ray again, I will use that as an example. When our inspectors are at a facility, they provide a field notice of violation to the physician who is in charge of the facility. It is a checklist that shows where the violations have occurred. KVP is off or what have you. Timer accuracy is off by 110 percent, minor

things like that. And that way, the physician can call in service and get it fixed right away. also have an opportunity to put down recommendations. It is kind of a free-form part of the form where they can say, look, I noticed that one of your problems is development of the film. It isn't taking the film, it is the development. You have a dirty darkroom and you have light leakage and your safety light doesn't work. And, yes, that is outside of the radiation protection purview but, you know what, it is affecting the quality of that image and I am going to tell you about it. I think that that is essential. And in our bottom line, which is to protect public health. MR. BORCHARDT: Jill, do -- going back to the striving for excellence idea, I take it you would take issue with the Agency goal of maintaining safety? DR. LIPOTI: Yes. I agree with Ray on that comment where he said maintenance. The problem with maintaining safety is it is very hard to maintain something. It is easy to improve. And when you wind up trying to just maintain, sometimes you decrease. MR. BORCHARDT: Now there were a lot of faults with the previous assessment programs, which this new program attempts -- and I think in a lot of

respects does a good job of improving on those. But I

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think one of the criticisms of the old process, SALP 1 2 and others, was that it was an ever-changing standard. 3 So from that narrow aspect, you would prefer the old 4 process over the current? 5 DR. LIPOTI: From that narrow aspect, yes. 6 BORCHARDT: Okay. Can I 7 subjects and go to your idea of focus groups? DR. LIPOTI: 8 Yes. 9 MR. BORCHARDT: The idea of trying to 10 relay information to the average citizen -- I am not talking about the activist or the nuclear industry 11 12 insider, but the average citizen in the vicinity. would suspect they don't have the time or really the 13 14 interest to go to our Website and read inspection reports and all the rest of that documentation. But 15 what they do get is -- what they will do is read a 16 17 newspaper article or listen to the radio news clip. So 18 would it be in your view a reasonable surrogate as a 19 focus group to focus on the press? Because they are 20 really the vehicle with which the average citizen --21 in my view of the average citizen -- gets their 22 information? 23 DR. LIPOTI: Ιt is funny that you 24 mentioned that because I serve on the New Jersey's Low

Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Facility Siting

Board. And we have similar kinds of things. How do we get to the people who are going to vote? We are going to a voluntary siting process. And we determined that the press was a very key audience for us. And so we convened -- we went to a number of editorial boards and talked to the editors of the newspapers saying this is what we are trying to do and what do you think and can you give us some feedback, and they were very open and honest and gave us feedback. And then the stories that ran in their newspaper written by the reporters really bore no resemblance to what we had heard when we went to the editorial staff. So I offer that as an example of perhaps failed communication. It doesn't always work when you choose your audience like think you need to try for I а categorization of audience. And the reason that I am suggesting focus groups is that those individuals are paid to come participate and give you feedback. And so they give you good feedback.

MR. SCHERER: I'd like to get your input in a couple of areas that I have been struggling with. The surveys that I have seen on public perceptions of risky industries -- not just nuclear, but airplanes, toxic waste facilities, et cetera -- is that the public has been interested in receiving simpler

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answers to complex questions. Is that airplane safe? Is that nuclear plant down the road safe? Is that oil Is it or is it not safe? refinery safe? trying to struggle with the comments in your letter in giving more details. Going away from the green/white to numerical numbers. How does that respond to the dry cleaner that may say, well, what I want to know is is that plant safe or is it not safe? The example I use is my mother, who wants to know should I get on that airplane, yes or no. Is the plant that you are working at, is it safe or is it not safe? And 10⁻⁶ is just not an answer I would ever give to my mother and try to be able to explain to her in terms of core damage frequency.

DR. LIPOTI: Right. There are two kinds of surveys that I have seen done of the general public. One of them is a survey based on what kind of confidence do you have in the regulators of those facilities. Are federal regulators good? Are state regulators good? Do you trust your local government? And trust in government kinds of things. And the feds generally come out on the bottom and states don't come out much better, I am afraid. So we have a long way to go in building trust. And one of the first places that we have to do that is with better communication.

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Not only -- it is very hard for a scientist to say anything is safe. Even answering a parent's question about should my child have this x-ray. It is very difficult to say that is safe. Yesterday a Columbia University professor came out and said CT scans of kids will add 1,000 deaths to our population, and it is very important that you minimize radiation exposure.

So, okay, now you want to answer the question that the person has in their mind. Not necessarily the survey question. And that is the difference between a survey or poll or focus group and talking to a person. And your mother wants to know should I get on the plane. But is she visiting her other son and that is so important to her and she needs to see those grandchildren? You know, the plane is minor compared to her desire to live as a part of the family. Every single risk has to be placed in perspective, and that is the difficulty.

MR. SCHERER: A second philosophical question. I appreciate your input. I think everybody will be in favor of excellence and moving to excellence. And the analogy I made at the last meeting was I want to make absolutely sure the airline I take when I fly back home not only had a mediocre pilot,

but the top in his class. And I wanted the mechanic to be the best. But when we look --

DR. LIPOTI: At least they weren't drinking before they got on the plane.

MR. SCHERER: Absolutely. My question is one of where does the Nuclear Regulatory Commission or the state or any other regulatory agency -- I fully understand their authority in their acts to prevent unacceptable performance.

DR. LIPOTI: Right.

MR. SCHERER: Where do they get -- and where do they find that underpinning that says they are to encourage excellence? I am certainly in favor of excellence. But where do you -- it is sort of a derivative of Rod's question that I was going to ask, which is where do I find a model or even the underpinning in a regulation that says the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is charged or has the authority to cause utilities and operators of plants to move towards excellence. Once they have demonstrated that they meet the test of the Act, the reasonable assurance of the protection and health and safety of the public. Where do they get that authority?

DR. LIPOTI: I understand the difference between an enforcement authority -- you have crossed

a regulatory barrier and we must now take enforcement action -- and a recommendation. You could improve your operation with this recommendation. Nuclear Regulatory Commission must take enforcement action when you cross the regulatory line. oversight program is much more than simply checking to see that you have obeyed that law. An oversight program is a partnership with you to protect the public and to bring efficiency and effectiveness to the operation. Enforcement is a different animal. Enforcement is you've crossed that -- you have broken that law. You have crossed that regulatory line. I think the Agency would be remiss if it did not give you the benefit of its inspectors who have been at numerous plants and told you what they know about operations and how it could be improved. Similar to having my inspectors tell a physician that he has got to change his safe light. It means something in terms of public health. And that is the NRC's real requirement, it has to protect public health.

MR. SHADIS: Just on the issue of trust in the regulator. When your department went after loose radioactive sources in New Jersey, it went after radioactively lit -- lit is the wrong word, but in any case, signs and so on.

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1 DR. LIPOTI: The exit sign issue, yes. 2 MR. SHADIS: Yes. That was pointing to a 3 problem. It was saying that there was risk involved. Did that -- do you think that lent to the credibility 4 of your Agency in terms of the public perception of 5 6 your agency? 7 To those people who were DR. LIPOTI: interested enough to follow it, I think it did. 8 9 it lent to our credibility in coming before the 10 Commission and testifying as to our thoughts. I think it lends to our credibility, yes. And probably has 11 12 consequences beyond the ripples that I know about. 13 MR. SHADIS: I have never heard NRC -- any 14 of its officials or spokesmen -- ever advise people 15 that a situation is worse than the licensee has represented it or worse than their perception of it 16 17 might be. It has always been a statement that would 18 mollify and minimize any potential perception of risk. 19 And I just -- I am again offering that. If there were 20 ever a statement going in the other direction, it 21 might improve the credibility of the NRC. 22 think that is a possibility? 2.3 DR. LIPOTI: I am not going to speak for 24 the Agency.

MS. FERDIG: Jill, I have a question about your experience of this process. And since the initiative began several years ago now and your interest and involvement in this process and that of your colleagues. To what extent have you felt hurt and how does that -- is that similar to or different from your experiences that might have occurred prior to the initiation of this process? What can we learn from your experience?

DR. LIPOTI: I think we felt frustrated at times that maybe our message wasn't getting through -we weren't being understood. I think we felt tired at times because we would keep bringing the message. There is a different group of people in the room, that is true. But we keep saying it. But I think we feel that it is so important that we can't give up. this change in the way we regulate is a much broader question than just the NRC or FDA or EPA or DOE. Ιt is the way that government does business. In our state, our commissioner of the Department of Environmental Protection put an emphasis on a goal for open and effective government. And I support that entirely and have striven to incorporate those goals in the way that we conduct our public meetings, the way that we react to e-mails, letters and

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communications from representatives of the community. And we found that we can improve our program if we listen to the public. And I think the NRC can improve also if they listen to the public. And so we keep trying to bring that message. But I don't think I feel hurt. I just get tired of that message after awhile.

MR. ZANNONI: I mean, there is decisions. We can attend many different meetings at different locations and we have to decide where to spend our We have given this a lot of attention. Jill asked me to come. Personally, I didn't want to come to the panel meeting because I have attended other meetings. And our message is different and it may not be incorporated and we understand that. But we feel that, you know, there are certain things that have to be looked at in a different way that may improve the process longer term. Jill was very effective in communicating, I think, our current sentiments. It is not about being hurt, I don't think. I think it is about doing your best and maintaining a commitment that this is very important. Power plants are going to be around for a long time. Management comes and goes, but those plants stay in that state and that location maybe 40 or maybe 60 years. So the decisions made now,

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| I think, are going to bear fruit long term. So if you |
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| keep in my opinion, if you keep out there |
| improving, because technology changes and different |
| management comes in. I have seen it because I was |
| there long before Dave was there and I will probably |
| be there after Dave. And that is constant. Okay, why |
| select the nuclear industry? Well, until the |
| perception or the reality changes that the |
| consequences aren't going to be as big as what a lot |
| of people think if an accident happens, I mean this is |
| what we are going to live with. And I will continue to |
| get hundreds of calls a year from citizens who aren't |
| sure whether or not they want to live near a power |
| plant. Or letters from legislature or letters from |
| Senators or referrals from the Governor's Office. |
| Because right now that is just the way it is in our |
| state. And it is different in other states. So, again, |
| I don't speak for other states, but that is the |
| reality that we are dealing with. So I am thinking |
| longer term. And we are here because of the |
| commitment. We believe that it has got to be always |
| out there and the constant improvement is kind of part |
| of it. I don't know, we talked about the regulatory |
| foundation. I think the industry should just say that |

is their -- they should demand it of themselves. It shouldn't be a regulatory requirement.

I think I understand your MR. BORCHARDT: comment that the assessment program would be optimized it had an element in it that strove toward if excellence. But to challenge that just for a second, it -- would it be as effective to have an assessment program that was structured the way this one is, which is more toward some adequate protection level, and then have a separate regulatory aspect of the Agency's activities that strove towards excellence? Because frankly I think part of this is a reaction to the criticism from previous programs.

DR. LIPOTI: I understand.

MR. BORCHARDT: So there has been a very -- it was a very difficult decision to come up with this maintain safety goal that the Agency has. I mean, it went through a lot of debate. It wasn't a frivolous decision. So with that in mind, could you see an effective regulatory scheme that was more separated?

DR. LIPOTI: I don't see an effective regulatory scheme that is separated. Because as soon as you separate the recommendations from the enforcement, you are subject to budget cuts from

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Congress on the recommendation side and you are left 1 2 with enforcement. And I think that that makes your 3 Agency extremely vulnerable as soon as you separate those. That is a personal opinion. Simply a political 4 musing perhaps and not a regulatory answer. 5 6 MR. SCHERER: I am particularly interested 7 in that answer. Could we pursue it just a second? Because one of my job functions is to do oversight 8 9 interim to the utility, independent of the NRC. we are still independent of the line organizations. So 10 if you eliminate the budget issue, do you still see an 11 answer to Bill's question? Because that is always a 12 13 challenge that we have. 14 DR. LIPOTI: Right. 15 MR. SCHERER: I have stop work authority, which is the regulatory part. 16 17 DR. LIPOTI: Right, yes. 18 But I am also trying to MR. SCHERER: 19 encourage excellence, but encourage excellence by the 20 line organizations that are independent of my 21 oversight function. Do you see a role to accomplish 22 Bill's goals independent of that budget? DR. LIPOTI: You are asking me, though, if 23 24 I see a role of a private sector independent analysis

versus a regulatory agency independent analysis.

I am afraid that I have to separate private sector from regulatory agency.

MR. SCHERER: I am not talking about private sector versus -- excuse me. Not private sector versus regulatory -- it is how do you regulate to excellence as opposed to regulate to prevent unacceptable performance? Taking out the constraint of, well, that would become a budget issue. If I took out that constraint and Congress passed a law that said you will get the funding. Now how do -- I am struggling with how do you regulate excellence as opposed to regulate to prevent unacceptable performance.

MS. FERDIG: Or do they need to be separated? It gets back to the question initially of how are they integrated.

DR. LIPOTI: Yes. I don't think they should be separated because the individuals take their regulatory experience and build upon that. I don't think it is a separate function. I have difficulty separating them in my mind because I would expect that the inspector sees the larger picture and doesn't just see .05 or .06. That they see more than that. And to restrict them to only talk about is it .055 is really constraining that inspector, and I don't think that is

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a good idea. But you will hear from the inspectors later this morning. I fear I am taking up too much of your time. But it is a fascinating discussion. Your group are just wonderful.

MR. BLOUGH: Yes, I just did have a question. And I don't think you are taking up too much of our time. This is very interesting. You spoke, Dennis, about the calls and letters from the public and stakeholders, and I wanted to ask really both of you how that interaction has changed based on the changes that we have made to our program. In other words, has -- you know, has that demand on you or the way you go about servicing it changed since we have changed our program?

MR. ZANNONI: Very little. I mean, I have a concrete example of a very practical thing that occurred, and that was what Jill was inferring about the steam generator inspection that occurred down at Salem Unit 2, and the limited information that was in the inspection report didn't do justice to the amount of effort that the -- that PSE&G put into that inspection for two reasons. Number one, it was an important inspection. But number two, there is very close similarity between those steam generators and Indian Point 2. So there was fallout from that. And

I don't think the process was sensitive enough to pick that up. So the outcome was, New Jersey, what are you doing? Where is the information? And I was in the position where I had to write a response as oppose to I believe the NRC's responsibility was to take that issue up. But that is just one example.

I think -- no phone calls about the process. This is a very difficult process for people to understand. And as I told Bill Dean at the last meeting at the region, like SALP, it is going to take years before people understand the nuances and understand what is really taking place and understanding, I think, what is really happening and what the process really means. We are a little ahead of the curve, even though I still find it very difficult to understand that. I have been to all the training. I have some kind of capacity to figure out some of the SDPs, but boy they are tough when it gets right down to it. But, no, not a whole lot of additional calls or interest based on the new process.

MR. BLOUGH: But I guess you are implying that it was more difficult to answer questions about the Salem steam generators because there was less information on our inspection report?

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MR. ZANNONI: It wasn't difficult for me to respond because I had all the information that I needed based on what I do. But it was difficult for the public to understand what was being done because it wasn't communicated effectively in a report that should have covered that information in more detail.

MR. BLOUGH: Okay. And I know that you were also involved in the case at Oyster Creek where the new fuel bundles fell over and there was a lot of interest in that. Is there any insight from that one as well?

MR. ZANNONI: Well, that did make it to the press and we did get some inquiries and we had to also respond to that in a separate letter. Because, again, if you looked at the inspection report, the risk was green from that. But we took it -- we have just a different viewpoint. When you have a staff that is handling such an expensive commodity as new fuel and it is not secured properly and it happens to fall and almost injured an individual, number one, and number two, it is a very expensive commodity, and number three, there wasn't proper supervision. And so, yes, it is a green per the process that the NRC has established, but it is to me a very valuable indicator of are there some things not being done.

| over which are doing a very effective job. But to me that is more of an indicator and more of a valuable piece of information than a lot of other things. So we had to follow up. We responded and the utility was very aggressive in handling the event. The NRC was very aggressive in doing what they needed to do. all I am saying is that there is some stuff lost. And applying it generally across the country I think is difficult and it is going to be a challenge. But I think we have a pretty good process in place to handle those deficiencies information deficiencies if they pop up or if people want further and more detailed information. So I think we are doing what we need to do. MR. BLOUGH: Okay, thank you. CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Any more questions? We appreciate you coming. DR. LIPOTI: Thank you very much. CHAIRMAN PLISCO: And giving your thoughts. Thank you. MR. ZANNONI: Thank you. CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Let's take a 10-minute | You know, there is a new management that has taken |
|---|--|
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| CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Let's take a 10-minute | thoughts. Thank you. |
| | MR. ZANNONI: Thank you. |
| lance also | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Let's take a 10-minute |
| Dreak | break |

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| 1 | (Whereupon, at 9:22 a.m., off the record |
|----|--|
| 2 | until 9:37 a.m.) |
| 3 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Our second group of |
| 4 | stakeholders that we have invited is a group of NRC |
| 5 | senior reactor analysts. Jim Trapp has been kind |
| 6 | enough to organize a panel, and I will turn it over to |
| 7 | Jim. He changed seats now from being a panel member |
| 8 | now to |
| 9 | MR. TRAPP: Now you can grill me. I am |
| 10 | Jim Trapp and I am an SRA in Region 1. |
| 11 | MR. JONES: Bill Jones. I am a branch |
| 12 | chief in Region 4, formerly a senior reactor analyst. |
| 13 | MS. BURGESS: Sonia Burgess, an SRA in |
| 14 | Region 3. |
| 15 | MR. TRAPP: And what I did here is just |
| 16 | put together a couple of quick slides. And this is a |
| 17 | collective thought of the SRAs. And certainly if Bill |
| 18 | or Sonia have any comments, they can speak up. But I |
| 19 | wanted to give you some of the strengths and what we |
| 20 | perceive as some of the weaknesses or some of the |
| 21 | areas that need improvement from an SRA perspective. |
| 22 | This is kind of a point/counterpoint to what you heard |
| 23 | last time. |
| 24 | We think the significance clearly |
| 25 | articulates significance of inspection findings. And |

we find -- as I stated before, I find the colors kind of a useful way to express what the significance is.

Repeatability of the process. Previously with the enforcement process, it wasn't as clear and repeatable. Ιt was harder to articulate the significance. We feel that the process is repeatable and we think that is a real strength. In that what Region 4 does with an issue is the same thing as Region 1 does for an issue. Inspection reports now clearly articulate how we reach the significance of the issue. And now we sort of have a nationwide common understanding of what is significant and what isn't. And it also gives the opportunity of the reader of the inspection report to see how we reached conclusions.

The Phase 1 screening tool -- we talked a little bit yesterday about the three phases. Phase 1 would be the widest mesh screen of issues. And that is a very simple tool, as was stated yesterday. Inspectors can use that, and they do. At least in Region 1 -- speak up if I am wrong -- but we haven't found a lot of problems with the application of the Phase 1 screening tool.

We talked yesterday a little bit about

Phase 2. Phase 2 really hasn't been implemented

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because we haven't had the worksheets. So that is kind 1 2 of a big gap right now. We have three phases and a 3 third of the program really hasn't been tested. And we think there is going to have to probably be some 4 changes when we do get the Phase 2 worksheets. But 5 6 right now we have had a limited number of Phase 2 and 7 Phase 3's, and that is probably a positive that Phase 1 is really screening out the majority of the issues. 8 9 And the other advantage of the new program 10 now is that certainly inspectors are getting more risk-informed, and they are focusing their inspections 11 on the more risk-significant systems. It is rare that 12 13 a team -- in Region 1, anyway, no team goes out 14 without discussing with the SRA what systems they 15 should be looking at and what components are important. And we see a real focus on risk. 16 17 So those are the -- certainly you guys can 18 add any --19 MR. JONES: Yes, I would agree with that. 20 We should add in all of our problem identification and 21 resolution inspections and the engineering application 22 inspections, for outage work and so forth. So we have seen that across the board. 23 MS. BURGESS: The one comment I did want 24

to make on the bullet of Phase 1 is a simple screening

tool. Region 3 is running into some challenges with the engineering inspections. What do you do with findings that deal with inaccurate calculations. That screen out as being minor, but you have numerous examples of inaccurate calculations. And we are finding that those are screening out as no color. And right now we are struggling with well is no color really an assessment that we want to give? Should there be -- should they be characterized as green? And so right now we are struggling with that aspect of the ROP.

MR. BORCHARDT: Are you going to talk about performance issues? The definition of what is a performance issue? Does that weigh into your application of Phase 1?

MR. TRAPP: I can give you my opinion. That is that we are not really struggling anymore in the region. Inspectors are fairly clear. And the senior residents are probably another good group to ask. But I don't find a lot of problems with inspectors not coming to me with things that aren't performance issues. They know that that goes into the process. In the beginning we had a lot of stuff where lightening would hit an off-site power line and the guy would go, oh, well that is going to be a risk-

| 1 | significant issue. And they would bring it to us as, |
|----|--|
| 2 | well here is your issue, here is a white issue. And |
| 3 | now I think through going through that process, the |
| 4 | inspectors really understand that they develop the |
| 5 | issue and then they come into the SDP. And we |
| 6 | haven't visioned that as a problem. |
| 7 | MR. SCHERER: In this slide are you |
| 8 | talking about all the SDPs or just reactor operation? |
| 9 | MR. TRAPP: Well, there is another |
| 10 | there is a follow-up slide that will get into it is |
| 11 | kind of a good thing that our weakness is that there |
| 12 | is a lot of weaknesses that are similar to what we had |
| 13 | talked about yesterday on our list. And I think we |
| 14 | will get into more fire. |
| 15 | MR. SCHERER: I am talking about the |
| 16 | strengths. Did those apply to all the SDPs or just |
| 17 | the reactor operating event SDPs? |
| 18 | MR. TRAPP: I think the strengths would |
| 19 | apply to all of them. I mean, we are having problems |
| 20 | with say, for instance, fire. It is a struggle. It is |
| 21 | hard to do. Yet, I think the strengths when we |
| 22 | actually get the whole thing worked out or hammered |
| 23 | out, the strengths of the process are still there. |
| 24 | MR. SCHERER: To you these are strengths |
| 25 | for all the SDPs? That is just my question. |

MR. TRAPP: Right.

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CHAIRMAN PLISCO: And I have one more question. I just wanted to make sure I understood what you are calling success and strength in a limited number of Phase 2 and 3. This is my interpretation. Here it is. That you see the success as really an effectiveness and efficiency. It is effectively screening out things that aren't risk significant, so we are not expending resources doing Phase 3? That is what you are saying?

MR. TRAPP: That is correct.

I think we are comfortable MR. JONES: with the Phase 1 screening process at this point. Where we have the concerns is with the Phase 2, the worksheet aspect of the significance determination That is requiring a lot of involvement by Because right now those worksheets are the SRAs. draft. They have not been validated. And so although the inspectors can use them in the field to kind of assist them in their inspections on where they need to focus and kind of give them an idea up front as to the risk significance, those worksheets still need to come before an SRA for review. So that is an area that looks like it is still several months away before we actually get the next revision to those worksheets out

and then whatever verification or validation we do of those worksheets that follows from that.

And that is the first bullet MR. TRAPP: up here on weaknesses. And it has almost been a Because licensee -- we have some detriment for me. worksheets out there for loss of off-site power. These are rev zero minus maybe. But we have a loss of off-site power worksheet that doesn't include diesels. So licensees will go through this worksheet and they will have a diesel problem and say, hey, it is green. You know, your worksheet doesn't even include diesels. So what is out there is extremely a rough draft that really can't be applied. And at some points we are even almost wasting time on explaining that we have something that is not useable out there. And the next rev is significantly different. So I think to us that is key. Because every time we get through Phase 1 now, we are into Phase 3. And we really can't apply the worksheets. And some of the other aspects of the weaknesses in the program with PRA quality and that kind of thing, you know this is one of the stop-gaps that we can point to when we have them.

We talked -- and this was one of the questions that popped up yesterday that I know you said you wanted to talk to the SRAs about. But the

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quality of PRAs and the NRC PRA tools currently available to us. And there is a variability. I think I mentioned yesterday that we would have possibly a similar plant in the region to another plant in the baseline CDFs region and the are considerably different. Some of it certainly can be attributed to But in this case, a lot of it is plant design. contributed to the assumptions that are made and that such things -- you know, there is a procedure to do a step that the human has no error probability. So, I mean, there are just some significantly different So there is a couple of things here. assumptions. One is that the NRC has only asked for the IPE information. So technically what we have available to us is 10-year-old IPE information. It is not current So oftentimes when you engage with a licensee, they will say, well, that was 10 years ago. This is Yet, the NRC and the docket what we have got now. doesn't really have what they have now.

MR. JONES: There has been a lot of effort by the different senior reactor analysts in the regions to obtain the more recent PRA information. I know Region 4 and the other regions have gone out to the sites and obtained that updated information. As Jim was speaking, we have a stop-plants, where the

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| original IPEs that came out, the core damage frequency |
|--|
| and the important action sequences in there differed. |
| And part of it was due to the human reliability |
| analysis that was done and so forth. If we look at the |
| updated information, those PRAs fall more in line with |
| each other. And you start to see the same type of |
| things fall out. The information that is currently |
| available to the public through the IPE submittals and |
| the IPEEE submittals would indicate that there is a |
| vast difference in the analysis techniques. Where at |
| this point it really doesn't speak to some of the |
| change and where they actually come together and some |
| of the techniques that have improved. I think that is |
| an area that has improved but is transparent to the |
| public because of this. And our SDP worksheets don't |
| bring that out. |
| MR. KRICH: Let me ask a question. Have |
| licensees been generally cooperative in providing the |
| updated PRAs? I know we have. |
| MR. JONES: In Region 4, they have all |
| provided updated information to us. |
| MR. TRAPP: I think it is probably more of |
| a public it is more of a process issue in that |
| technically we shouldn't be requesting PRAs for the |

SRAs. You know, it should be more of a policy issue.

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And the other disadvantage is that it doesn't offer the public -- you know, it is not on the docket. There is no way that the public can access the information that we would need for Phase 3's.

MR. BORCHARDT: I am sorry, why do you say we shouldn't be asking?

MR. TRAPP: Well, I have been -- I mean, this is a personal thing, but I have been criticized personally going out and asking licensees for their PRA documentation because of the Paperwork Reduction Act, which I am not all that familiar with. But evidently it is something I was informed that I shouldn't be doing.

MS. BURGESS: Many of the utilities licensees that I have run into are very hesitant to give us anything that is not on docket. Or afraid that now we have something that could be FOIA-able. So in our region, it has been a mixed bag of what we get --what kind of detail we get. We get some licensees who have just sent us their entire updated PRA system, notebooks, the whole thing, just by e-mail. Other licensees who are just only willing to give us summaries. Other licensees who aren't willing to give us anything.

1 MR. BORCHARDT: Well, their concern, I 2 quess, in a way is valid. If we have it, it is FOIA-3 able. That is correct. 4 MR. TRAPP: There is no doubt about 5 MR. BORCHARDT: 6 that. 7 MR. TRAPP: Right. MR. BORCHARDT: But I think there is also 8 9 no doubt that if they want us to use it in our 10 assessment, they have to be willing to give it to us. 11 MS. BURGESS: Right. 12 MR. GARCHOW: So I come at the question a little differently from yesterday, Jim. 13 And I think 14 this is an important distinction that we got into a 15 little bit yesterday. These quality of licensee NRC PRE tools vary. I don't think anyone would argue with 16 17 that as a factual statement. Right? I mean, let's 18 take it for what it is. The impact of that to this 19 process, which is I think important for the panel, is 20 is it an efficiency, time-intensive, you know adds to 21 the delay in making a decision? Is it more towards 22 that is the impact? Or is it causing you to believe that you are coming up with -- I hate to use this --23 24 I'll say the wrong answer after you get through the

differences in the PSA. So the question is are you

still able to get to the right answer -- right being technically defendable, you know well within a good risk assessment, at the expense of just efficiency, or is this causing a quality in the output of the level 2 and level 3's?

MR. JONES: Well, clearly there was a quality problem with the first revision of the SDP worksheets in that it required all of the SRAs to go out to each of the sites and with assistance from headquarters to go out and essentially do an initial validation -- or at least to pick up on the additional equipment that had been installed -- blackout diesels and things of that nature, gas turbines. Those are -for somebody that has station blackout sequences, those additions that have occurred since the IPEs came out are very important. And without that -- without considering that type of information, we do have a problem. And, of course, that plays later into the PRA analysis as to what sequences or what action classes are important and so forth. So it changes the whole core damages frequency profile as to percentages and the overall CDFs. So those things, I think, did play to the overall quality.

MR. GARCHOW: But you worked through them, right? So when you got engaged with the licensee, it

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wasn't like somebody was hiding a gas turbine and it came out in the conversation. Eventually, you worked through --

MR. JONES: No. Clearly those type of things -- improvements helped to improve the core damage frequency. Those are the kinds of things that need to be considered. Because when you do your maintenance activities and so forth, that is pertinent to what type of equipment you can take out and for how long and so forth. So all that plays into areas outside of our -- just the significance determination process -- risk-informed tech spec changes and so forth. All of that plays in there.

MR. GARCHOW: Was it relative to when you were evaluating an issue that may have came up in an inspection? Were you able to work through those given that it took time and it was resource intensive? But in the end, when you worked through an issue to get to its significance determination, do you believe that the process allowed you to get to a technically defendable answer given the shortfalls of bullet 2?

MR. JONES: I would have to say -- I need to qualify this because the inspectors, the senior resident inspectors and others, would send in their worksheets because of the state that they were in.

| The senior reactor analysts would then at least in |
|--|
| Region 4 would take that information and look at |
| the worksheets and then also look back to what the |
| changes were in the plant and the licensee's PRA and |
| understanding how that was all determined. And to |
| make sure that the assessment that was performed was |
| correct. And this is even for green issues. Because we |
| wanted to make sure that we didn't have any findings |
| out there that were coming out green when in fact they |
| would have been a white or yellow type issue. So we |
| had to use that type of backstop. And we have found |
| cases that are being addressed in later revisions |
| where had we relied on these were examples that we |
| kind of made up just to see if we took this component |
| out for this period, what would the Phase 2 SDP have |
| come up with? We found cases where they would have |
| been non-conservative. We would have had green |
| findings when in fact they should have been classified |
| as white, at least initially by the worksheet process. |
| So those type of findings have been incorporated into |
| the next revision. But to say that the IPEs and the |
| SDPs as they were initially developed were adequate, |
| I would say no. |

MR. GARCHOW: You had a process in place. It sounds like you are sensitive to the shortfall and

therefore you were working through those shortfalls in a way to make sure that the final -- the final determination was technically defendable, although it may have taken a long time to get there due to that shortfall. I mean, that is what I -- I don't mean to put words in your mouth, but that is what I think I am hearing you say.

MR. JONES: I would say for the findings
-- the SDP worksheets that came in as green -- as a
green finding -- we were able to actually work through
those fairly quickly. Some of the other non-green
findings or potential non-green findings have taken a
lot longer. And that is just part of the give-andtake. The Phase 3 evaluations can become quite
extensive. No two are exact or alike, so you can't
fall back on one that you did last week to try and do
an evaluation for a different site.

MR. TRAPP: In Region 1, I think one of the interesting things is that the licensees with the more detailed PRAs that have done external events, done fire, you know put a real effort into their PRAs have given me feedback that they are feeling penalized now. Because obviously the more you model and the more you put into the model, the higher your numbers are going to be. And if we are basing our colors on

numbers, obviously their number is -- they are going 1 2 to come out a little higher. And we are getting some feedback now that if you go down the street and look 3 at their PRA, which is in their opinion of less 4 quality -- came up with a lower number. So I think it 5 6 is interesting that there is some feeling now in the 7 licensees that the PRA can impact how we assess issues. 8 9 MR. REYNOLDS: I don't know if I can ask 10 leading questions as well as Dave can, but I can try. For your two plants in Region 1 that have similar but 11 have, the way I understood, different PRAs by orders 12 of magnitudes, would it be in your opinion correct to 13 14 say that when they operate their plant if they use 15 those PRAs that one plant may be putting their plant in a more risky situation based on that PRA if they 16 17 did it differently? Do you understand what I mean, 18 Jim? 19 MR. TRAPP: Do you mean with like 20 maintenance rule, that kind of A-4 kind of --21 MR. REYNOLDS: Say they are taking -- they 22 are doing on-line maintenance and they use their PRA 23 to determine what systems they can take out at one

time or not.

1 MR. TRAPP: Sure. I don't think that is 2 out of the realm of possibility. A vague answer for a leading question. 3 MR. GARCHOW: You did a good job too. 4 5 MR. REYNOLDS: I was listening to you very 6 intently, sir. 7 MR. GARCHOW: As a follow on yours just ask the Rod question, right? Because we are dancing 8 9 around it. We talked about it at length yesterday, 10 right? I mean, is this in your mind a significant issue relative to the difference 11 in using 12 oversight on different licensees? 13 You know, I think Phase 2 is MR. TRAPP: 14 going to help us a lot. Because with Phase 2 now you 15 have a standard -- sort of a standard approach. if it comes out in Phase 2 as white, now you are going 16 17 to have to do a lot of explaining in Phase 3 to make 18 it green. So I think that is going to sort of 19 standardize risk assessment, I think, better than what 20 we have now. When you get into Phase 3, we have a 21 couple of choices. We can use licensee information. We 22 can use NRC PRA information. And the second, I think, is under development. We have two different revisions 23

of models. Some are very rudimentary and others are

getting pretty sophisticated. So as we get better models, our models have standard failure probability standard human failure probability, standard equipment failure probabilities, and I think that is going to give us a lot of information when we get The plants -- and research has been very The plant that I really have responsive to us. problems with their PRA, they have bumped that one up to the front of the list to do the rev 3. So now we will have our own tool that will give us a lot of information. So I mean there is a lot of cooperation with NRR and with research and with the regions. And I think we are moving in the right direction. For this little -- the last year maybe, the program got a little ahead of the availability of the tools to do the job.

MR. JONES: I think it is important to point out that the licensee's PRA is not the final answer. Because there is a lot of analysis that goes in and understanding of how they came to the results they did. And we have found cases where we did not agree with the licensee's analysis. This is particularly earlier on before we got to the ROP or actually got into the revised oversight process. But we had examples where we disagreed with the licensees

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and how they took into account human reliability and so forth that caused us to come up with a higher delta CDF than what the licensee did and we stuck with our analysis at that point. Because we will consider the information. It takes the risk training to really understand the kind of information you are getting. But the NRC is the one who comes down with the answer. And we have had cases where we have differed.

MS. BURGESS: And I don't think that has changed from our old process. In all cases when a licensee had come in say for a red conference or an enforcement conference and presented an engineering calculation and the NRC has simply not agreed with it. So that has never changed from the old to the new As Bill stated, the NRC evaluates process. analysis, whether it be PRA engineering calc or what have you and makes determination on its acceptability.

MR. BORCHARDT: What criteria do the SRAs use for verifying the accuracy of the licensee's PRA or being the basis for whatever disagreements may arise? You know, in the purely design basis aspect we have branch technical positions, we have SRPs, new regs. But there is a well documented regulatory

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foundation for those. What do the SRAs use as the 1 2 basis of a foundation for a disagreement? MS. BURGESS: Well, I think it comes from 3 4 experience. There are many new regs that talk about reliability of equipment and of certain components and 5 6 things like that. As Jim said, we have a tremendous 7 pool of NRR staff, research staff, regional other SRAs to bounce off ideas and questions and concerns. 8 9 think that is how we get a lot of the information and 10 just give a sanity check to a licensee's calculation 11 or PRA assumptions. MR. BORCHARDT: Well, would you agree then 12 -- I mean, I think the short answer of what you said 13 14 is you use your professional judgment as a group 15 relying on other experts. And would you agree that until there is an industry PRA standard that there 16 17 will always be a vulnerability? 18 MR. JONES: Yes. 19 MS. BURGESS: Yes. 20 MR. TRAPP: I think there will be a 21 vulnerability after the PRA standard. But I think it 22 is a step in the right direction. But we did rely on -- during 23 MR. JONES: 24 the initial IPE reviews, there were staff evaluations 25 that were performed by specialists

reliability, equipment reliability and so forth. And those reviews are actually beneficial in seeing what kind of conclusions they came to and what they felt the licensees needed to address and to see whether or not those issues were actually addressed. We talked about the two SNUPPS plants. If you go back to the staff evaluation reports that were developed, it speaks clearly to some of the human reliability problems, and those are areas that we focused in on when we have looked at analysis regarding those two SNUPPS plants.

Let me just go a little bit MR. KRICH: further then on the vulnerability. Maybe I missed this, but how would you quantify that? Or what would you say about that vulnerability? This is a difficult the State of Illinois, question. In executing people who they found out were in fact not guilty of the crime, and so they stopped executing people. Do you have a vulnerability that you think should cause us to stop using the SDP or the PRA? is this a vulnerability that if you take it together with the uncertainty -- because we have raised the question of uncertainty here also. Is it understood enough that you feel comfortable going forward with this?

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| MR. JONES: I think that the PRA provides |
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| us sufficient insight and is sufficiently accurate |
| that we can come up with essentially a range. In |
| other words, this is the kind of issue that falls into |
| this order of magnitude. You know, you start getting |
| into three significant figures and then clearly that |
| is not something that I would even try to defend. But |
| I think that we are to the point now where we can sit |
| down and say this is a 10^{-6} type issue, 10^{-7} or 10^{-4} , |
| those type of things. And I think that we are now to |
| the point where we can make those kind of assertions, |
| recognizing the fact that we need to go into certain |
| areas and validate or at least look at some of the |
| important assumptions that drive that number. So I |
| would say, yes, we can use it. We have, of course, |
| our own as Jim was mentioning, our own internal |
| models that we are continuing to develop. We have the |
| safeness determination process worksheets that are |
| being developed that also are licensee. And those do |
| actually mesh together fairly well. |
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| MR. KRICH: Sonia, has that been your |
| MR. KRICH: Sonia, has that been your experience also? |
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MR. FLOYD: Jim, for these two plants in 1 2 Region 1 that you say have a similar design but widely different PRA results, is that at the IPE stage or is 3 4 that at the current stage? Well, it has --5 MR. TRAPP: 6 MR. FLOYD: It has narrowed? 7 MR. TRAPP: Yes, it has come together a bit. 8 9 MR. FLOYD: I guess the bigger question 10 would be do you think you have a good understanding as to why the results are different and are you able to 11 factor that into your analysis? 12 13 Definitely. And like I said, MR. TRAPP: where we do have questions, that is the top of the 14 15 list for developing our own models. So we are getting additional information. But there is other aspects. 16 17 You know, some people will give you internal events 18 only. Some people will always give you internal and 19 external events. The internal/external event people 20 are obviously -- you know, they are saying, hey, how 21 come you are giving these guys a break. And the guys with just the internal models say, well, we can't 22 really run the external event model. We did screening 23 24 fire and we did screening seismic and we don't really

have numbers, so we can't give you a number.

there are issues out there that people are aware of and we are aware of. I mean, if we have to -- if you are not considering external events, then when we do our evaluation, somehow we have got to factor that in and that process and how to do that isn't all that straightforward sometimes.

MR. FLOYD: That was really going to be my next question. For those plants that have a more complete PRA with more modeling like external events and shutdown and low power and whatnot, if a licensee doesn't have that and you think that is a relevant issue, do you think you have adequate tools at this stage to at least put it in the ballpark, or do you think there are some really big gaps out there right now?

Let me answer that in two MR. JONES: First is the guidance that is provided parts. internally to the inspectors when they enter into the worksheets, into the Phase 1 and Phase 2 worksheets, as to does your finding potentially affect an external event? Is it a fire? Could it affect seismic and things of that nature? Once you determine that, then of course you can either stick with internal events through the SDP worksheets and analysis. But in many cases, it does involve some external aspect. And we do

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| get into difficulty in trying to analyze those. Take |
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| the San Onofre station, where seismic is clearly an |
| issue, but they have a detailed external events |
| evaluation that is factored right in up front with |
| their internal also. So you have those together. I |
| would say that from my experience, where the external |
| events do play are a significant contributor, that |
| we have seen that those events have been incorporated |
| in. But I can see I could see where there would be |
| a fair amount of difficulty trying to consider |
| external events given the current state of the SDP |
| guidance. Because you do have to go out and look at |
| other plants for similarities and try to rely on other |
| PRA calculations that have been performed. I know that |
| we have had Mr. Trapp down for a couple of weeks to |
| assist us in Region 4. He had to look at an external |
| aspect to an issue we had. And it required him looking |
| at several other plants to pull together those |
| aspects. To pull it all together to make sure that we |
| appropriately considered internal and external events. |
| So they are being considered and some of them do take |
| a fair amount of time to try to get through. |
| MR. TRAPP: For instance, for this one |

what we would say is well Diablo is maybe on a fault, so I am going to take -- and they have a pretty good

| 1 | this is just throwing out names. I am not sure |
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| 2 | I don't think we can use these cases. But if they had |
| 3 | a good external event model, then we might apply that |
| 4 | risk to you. That is the best we can do and too bad. |
| 5 | You know, unless you give us something better, you get |
| 6 | Diablo's higher seismic probability. So these are the |
| 7 | kind of things we have to do. |
| 8 | MR. JONES: But at least we have bounded |
| 9 | it that way. Did it push us over into another area |
| LO | where we need to look further? Or can we say, yes, we |
| L1 | have taken an area that we know it is important and |
| L2 | now how does it apply to an area where it is not as |
| L3 | significant? |
| L4 | MR. TRAPP: But you know as a risk analyst |
| L5 | deep in your heart that there is a lot you know, |
| L6 | you are adding a lot of uncertainty when you are |
| L7 | making those kinds of assumptions. |
| L8 | MR. KRICH: But typically I mean, I |
| L9 | understand about that. But you try to get certainties |
| 20 | on the positive side. |
| 21 | MR. JONES: Yes. |
| 22 | MR. TRAPP: Hopefully. |
| 23 | MR. KRICH: I may be asking leading |
| 24 | questions. |

MR. REYNOLDS: One thing that Jill Lipoti 1 2 mentioned this morning was that the PRAs and the SDPs 3 don't include error bars or error bands. MR. JONES: Yes, uncertainty. 4 5 MR. REYNOLDS: Uncertainty. She said 6 error bars, I believe. 7 MR. JONES: Either way. Could you comment on the 8 MR. REYNOLDS: 9 extent of that? For example, would it be -- do we 10 have errors out there or error bars or uncertainties for a plant that has a baseline core damage frequency 11 of 10^{-6} , the uncertainty would go from 10^{-2} to 10^{-6} ? 12 13 How significant are those uncertainties? 14 MR. TRAPP: One thing you have 15 understand -- you know, we are kind of the rubber meets the road kind of people. But uncertainties are 16 17 developed -- I will just give you a simplistic 18 approach. I am sure there are people that can do a 19 better job. But there is an assumed distribution on 20 failures, and that is an assumed distribution. 21 know, everybody gets a here is your distribution for 22 failure of diesels and here is your distribution for failure of pumps, and they all look pretty much the 23 24 same. And then when you go through the PRA, you take

those distributions and you multiply them together

based on the number of components in your failure sequence. So there is -- this is a kind of stupid thing to say, but there is a lot of uncertainty in the uncertainty. You know, it is a pretty simplistic method to determine the uncertainty. So when you get the bands, you can take them for what they are worth. There would be variability. But on CDF, they are not all that significant. They are not all that broad. On LERF, they can be huge.

MR. JONES: You take the external events on LERF and so forth. Those uncertainties do become or can become fairly large. And we really don't have a good way of analyzing that uncertainty at this time.

MR. REYNOLDS: Because I have heard unsubstantiated that you may have a plant that has a higher baseline risk of CDF, let's say 10⁻⁵, but their uncertainty is less than maybe a plant that has a 10⁻⁶ core damage frequency, but their uncertainty is much larger. So they may in fact have -- it may be worse or better, whatever way you look at it. Is that true or is that not true, that statement? Or do you know enough to --

MS. BURGESS: Yes, I would say that it is true. And it is going back to the quality of the PRA, what is used, generic data and sometimes specific data

and things like that. And I don't think we have a real good idea as far as the uncertainty factors for every plant or every plant's PRA. Certainly when a plant gives a core damage frequency number, they do not have an uncertainty band. And in our SDP process it is the same way.

MR. REYNOLDS: Okay.

MR. TRAPP: Yes, we use means. When we do it, it is wherever your mean falls out. Sometimes you do get that uncomfortable feeling when you are at 1.2 e to the mine or 1.1 e to the mine of 6 on the mean, and you know if you put the distribution around it, you are either green or you are white. Certainly, I think what we have been doing is we have been using the means, so we haven't considered that.

MR. FLOYD: Of course the SDP is not looking at baseline numbers. It is looking at delta changes and core damage frequency. Do the uncertainties become more or less important if you are looking at deltas as opposed to baseline or no difference?

MR. TRAPP: Well, using the baseline is a big part of the equation. You know, to figure out the delta. It is the delta from the baseline. So if you are at 10^{-5} , a 10 percent change would be 10^{-6} . So the

higher your CDF is, the easier it is for you to get a delta -- I mean, if you are a plant -- we have a plant that is nearly 10^{-7} , so for them to get a delta CDF of 10^{-6} would be a considerable -- you know, a huge amount of risk.

MR. JONES: That is where our internal worksheets and so forth, understanding those, are important. And being willing to challenge the licensee's results in some cases. Do we really believe what drives that number up to 10⁻⁷. So those are clearly challenges.

MR. HILL: Do you have some ability then

to modify your answer based on how valid or how much inaccuracy you believe there is in the licensee's PRA?

MR. JONES: Yes. Clearly the NRC's determination, although there is appeal processes involved, if it were to be determined that the licensee said this was a green issue and the NRC said this was a yellow or white issue and we had an opportunity to review the licensee's calculations and still thought it was a yellow or white issue, then the final determination as we would present it would be either yellow or white. I know that we have had some cases or at least we have been working on some that

that may actually be a case.

We have got some

potential -- we have got a potential yellow issue out 1 2 there right now where the licensee initially doesn't 3 -- believes it is a green issue. So that is one that we are having to work through. 4 MR. REYNOLDS: And that is based on their 5 6 uncertainty or just that difference in number between 7 the --It has to do with the 8 MR. JONES: 9 assumptions used and so forth. There is a --10 MR. **REYNOLDS:** is their That not uncertainty. It is the different numbers they come up 11 12 with? You are comparing --MR. JONES: It has to do with -- well, it 13 certainly, of course, plays a role in any of the 14 15 calculations. But it is driven by the assumptions that are used, the analysis process. In other words, we 16 17 used our SDP, which considered both our internal 18 models as well as the licensee's models. And then also 19 looking at what their specific plant models provided 20 for also. And like I said, our process is assumption You have to clearly identify what are the 21 driven. 22 assumptions going into the process. just differences in that can lead to difference in answers. 23 24 MR. TRAPP: And I guess I don't want to be 25 too negative. I mean that is an area -- this should

| 1 | be nothing new. The industry is putting together |
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| 2 | standards and PRA quality has improved and the SDP is |
| 3 | coming. The NRC has got models that are being |
| 4 | developed as we speak. So there is really a lot of |
| 5 | effort. I mean, our complaints have been heard and I |
| 6 | think there is a lot of stuff going on in this area. |
| 7 | So I think it is just going to improve. |
| 8 | MR. KRICH: Jim, so let me ask you. Is |
| 9 | there anything that you are not getting from the NRC? |
| 10 | And that may be a difficult question for you to answer |
| 11 | with NRC management in the room. |
| 12 | MR. TRAPP: Yes, we always want more. |
| 13 | MR. KRICH: I understand. But is there |
| 14 | anything that you are not getting that you feel really |
| 15 | impacts your ability to do an objective or an |
| 16 | independent job on the licensee's PRA? |
| 17 | MR. JONES: Right now we have some SDP |
| 18 | worksheets still in development that are very |
| 19 | important to us containment, fire what is that? |
| 20 | MS. BURGESS: Shutdown. |
| 21 | MR. JONES: Shutdown. I mean, there are |
| 22 | several worksheets out there that speak to risk, |
| 23 | external, that are still being developed. And those |
| 24 | are important. So those are any findings that |
| 25 | reflect on those areas kind of take away from the |

| inspector's ability to analyze and put it into the |
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| realm of the senior reactor analyst and we end up |
| relying on headquarters for a lot of help also. But |
| I have to say that we have had excellent support when |
| needed from headquarters. If you have an issue that |
| speaks to questions with human reliability you |
| know, how did they do this analysis, how did they come |
| up with their numbers. We have clearly resources |
| available to us at headquarters to review that. And |
| what that also does is it provides consistency. If |
| you have one analyst looking at an issue and then you |
| go to the same type of resource at headquarters, then |
| you are working through the same thought process. So |
| that speaks to the ability to have consistency and |
| addresses to some degree uncertainty, because at least |
| we are working through the same process. |
| MR. KRICH: Good. Thanks. I noticed that |
| you didn't include security in that and you have it |
| included on your slide. |
| MR. TRAPP: Yes, I had that. And Sonia is |
| probably the best one to talk about the security. |
| Because a lot of the issues are in her region. But I |
| had it. |
| MS. BURGESS: And I think it probably is |

not up there because I think the SRAs internally have

agreed that we disagreed that the internal events SDP should be used for security. We had our say. I mean, we had our position heard from NRR and I think the outcome is that we are still going to use the internal events. So that is probably why it is not up there.

MR. HILL: At one of the workshops I heard a comment that there is now an expectation coming up that if you had an event that to have an evaluation done within about four hours to know how the NRC should respond. Is that something you are seeing across all the regions?

It is a desire. I mean, yes, MR. TRAPP: we have moved toward risk-informed. Everybody likes numbers because you can sort of say, well okay, I've got the number now and I can run. It is kind of an interesting thing because usually when events come up, the information is vague. And the reason you send a team out is to collect the information you need to do the risk analysis. So there is a cart and a horse kind of thing. It is like, well, if you give me the information, I will give you a number. But what they want is well we want the number so we can go out and see what kind of information we should collect. So we are trying to do that, but it is a challenge and we usually default conservatively.

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| 1 | MR. JONES: I'd like to speak to that one |
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| 2 | just for a minute. I think it is important for the NRC |
| 3 | and a licensee to understand when you have an event |
| 4 | what are the things that what are the components |
| 5 | and what can go wrong and what mitigation system |
| 6 | barriers are still in place that are very important. |
| 7 | Those are the kind of things that I think that we |
| 8 | that get recognized up front. When you speak to the |
| 9 | four-hour analysis, what we are doing in Region 4 |
| 10 | because I have been involved in a couple of events |
| 11 | where I have had to provide that type of information |
| 12 | within about three to four hours, just to get an |
| 13 | initial assessment of what is the significance of the |
| 14 | event and what barriers are in place and mitigation |
| 15 | systems are important because of the ongoing event. |
| 16 | What we utilize is to really just get kind of a rough |
| 17 | idea of where we think the event is going to fall out |
| 18 | from a conditional core damage probability. In other |
| 19 | words, do we think it is a 10^{-2} or do we think it is |
| 20 | a 10^{-6} type event. Just to have an idea of where this |
| 21 | falls out. Is this something where we need to be |
| 22 | providing additional assistance to the resident |
| 23 | inspectors immediately, or do we have time to sit back |
| 24 | and evaluate it further? And that is really where |
| 25 | that four hours three or four hours comes in. It |

| is not our intent to involve licensees up front when |
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| they are trying to deal with an event. I mean, we are |
| not going to call up somebody in the control room and |
| tell them, hey, we are reviewing this event as it is |
| ongoing and we want to understand this. What we do do |
| is try and make contact with the cognizant risk |
| people, problem risk assessment people, to kind of get |
| a feel for are you doing any kind of analysis, and if |
| you are, what kind of significance are you applying to |
| it. And then it is really an iterative process and |
| understanding that occurs over the next several days. |
| We are not trying to come to this is a $3\mbox{E}^{-4}$ event |
| within four hours. That is not our intent. This falls |
| in the -4 area or this falls in the -5 area and things |
| like that. And that is really what we are trying to |
| do up front. And it plays into our we have a |
| management directive, 8.3, that speaks to the NRC |
| response to events. And that speaks to whether or not |
| we look at like an augmented inspection team going |
| out, a special inspection, or if we decide it is going |
| to stay within the realm of the resident inspectors. |
| And the risk is an input into that. But we are not |
| trying to, one, come up with a final determination or |
| really what is the absolute number within the first |
| four hours. And we are not going to try and draw the |

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licensee in within the first four hours to take them away from their assessment and response to an event to come up with a number.

I have heard that before and I could see how that may have gotten out that way, but that is not our intent and I will speak -- we had that event at Diablo Canyon, and actually the process worked exceptionally well. We were able to come up with a bounding idea of what an event was. We got involved early-on with their risk analysis. He was actually looking at the event also. And then over several days we actually kind of worked through where we actually thought it fell out, after the event had been concluded.

MS. BURGESS: I would also add though that in our region, we have had experience where the licensee has called us first, within the first two, three or four hours, telling us what they are doing. Telling us what they are looking at and that they are doing an assessment and things like that. So it has been in some cases very beneficial that they have just contacted us.

MR. HILL: I think the way I heard it was along the lines of the licensees would be expected to have input like within 24 hours, but that you were

going to be asked for the first -- to have something within the first four hours is kind of a strain.

MR. JONES: And that is -- I think that is true. We are asked to provide what risk insights we can. And they can be qualitative and they can be quantitative.

MR. TRAPP: That is a key. Sometimes we have risk ranking of systems. So if the diesel is the number one system risk-wise and it is a diesel issue, you might just -- that might be your risk insights at that point. That is an important piece of equipment at that plant.

Moving on, containment and shutdown. We talked about that a little bit yesterday. Containment -- you know, you are trying to determine large early release frequencies, LERFs. You are now at the next level of complexity and certainly there is more diversion, I would say, in models and licensees' abilities when it comes to LERF. So that is an area that is still being improved. The SDPs that we have now, as Doug mentioned yesterday, there is a lot of efforts now to improve those. And security, I guess, we would throw in the same bin. Fire -- difficult to apply. We talked about that a bunch yesterday. I don't know if you guys have any experiences.

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CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Jim, I'd be interested.

I know we have heard your view. But for Bill and Sonia. I know we wrestled in our discussion yesterday on these other SDP, shutdown and containment in particular. Relative to priorities and how important it is to get those out and corrected. Do you see it as something you have to have today or do you have work around someplace now that you can get an answer? What kind of priority -- you know, if you were the director of NRR, what kind of priority would you place on getting those out?

I'll start. Yes, I would MS. BURGESS: put a priority on these SDPs. We are seeing -- these issues are being addressed during this implementation phase of the ROP, but they are going from a Phase 1 screening directly to Phase 3. So there is more guidance that is needed. There is more guidance in understanding exactly what we are looking for and what the inspector should be looking for to get a better screening tool. A shutdown -- I know in our region and in the other regions, shutdown risk is extremely high on our radar screen. And I think that the shutdown SDP, of course, lacks guidance and we need to do a better job and we need to do a job in improving this guidance on a more timely basis.

On containment issues in our region, we have had a few of them but they have taken less priority as far as being significant and realizing that they really aren't significant, but we do have to work through the Phase 3 process to make sure that our assumptions and that our initial cut at the issue is truly accurate.

I would couch it to say that MR. JONES: from a priority standpoint to develop those SDPs that are integral to each other. In other words, we have the internal event SDP and we have to go outside and consider the external events in addition to that to really evaluate a finding. With the containment and the shutdown SDPs, we have essentially a barrier type review that we can look at. And then if we meet those certain thresholds, then we go on to a Phase 3. At least that way we know what the boundaries are. haven't left out an integral piece of an analysis up front that the inspectors are trying to use. wish would be to -- or if I could have it would be to develop the one internal/external modeling together. Get that piece done so that that can be used by all the inspectors and then we will fall back onto the Phase 1 reviews that we do for the containment and the shutdown, for example, and then continue to rely on

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the SRAs. Otherwise, we are going to have the SRAs involved in all aspects of the SDPs for whatever time it takes to get them all developed.

Yes, I think it is very MS. BURGESS: important, like Bill said, to get a product that is useable by all inspectors and get out of this black box magic type thing. That doesn't give a lot of credibility for the inspectors and it doesn't give them a lot of comfort. I think with any new process like the internal events, the inspector is learning and is getting more comfortable and understands that they are able and have the capabilities to do that kind of assessment. With these containment shutdown issues, it has given the appearance of I don't even have the capabilities and you just take care of it. And once we get the tools in place and give them the confidence and the credibility of I can do these things and I do understand what is important, I think the process will move on much better.

MR. JONES: We currently have a SPAR models users group development that is out there to help prioritize the development of shutdown risk, containment, large early release frequencies and so forth. I haven't quite seen, at least from my perspective, a total integration of the model

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development with the revised oversight process and so forth -- a total integration with some of the work that has been ongoing between research and the NRR. I think that when those priorities actually get melded together and get all the risk expertise working towards -- at least from my perspective working towards the same goal and focused in on the same areas, they will be able to get through some of these areas maybe a little quicker.

MR. TRAPP: Yes, I think this is key. I mean, when you look at the old program and the new program, we inspected before and we wrote reports before. What is the key difference? The key difference is now we are doing the SDP. We are assessing risk findings. In my opinion, scrutable, good quality information in doing this part of the process is key to the success. You know, if we don't do this right, then we really haven't changed anything.

MS. FERDIG: In getting it right, are there conversations that are taking place not only between you folks, NRR and research, but also taking knowledge that the utilities have that have developed some of the more sophisticated -- those that are more developed?

1 I would say at least in our MR. TRAPP: 2 region we are on a first name basis with risk analysts and there is constant communication with lots of 3 parties. You know, we use the national labs. If we get 4 5 into a hot short issue, we use experts from all over 6 -- anybody we can get. 7 MS. FERDIG: You cross over regions as well? 8 9 MR. TRAPP: Oh, definitely. 10 Yes. And we have had the MR. JONES: contractors who have been doing a lot of these model 11 12 developments for us out at the sites looking at how the licensees have performed their modeling techniques 13 and so forth to consider that aspect also. And these 14 15 contractors go to all the regions and all the sites, so we are getting that cross-fertilization all the way 16 17 through. We take experiences that they may have gained 18 in Region 1 for certain licensees, and in talking with 19 them and going out to the sites, we have been able to 20 pick up on that also. 21

MR. KRICH: Do you have a process where the contractors are, as you say, going out and developing models -- do you have an internal process for checking that? Like we have -- in the industry, we now have a certification process that some of us

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1 use in the owners' groups. Do you have some process 2 internally? 3 MR. TRAPP: There is. MR. KRICH: So it is not just the NRC 4 doing NRC work without somebody else looking at it? 5 6 MR. TRAPP: Well, it is a national lab 7 doing the work. I don't know the explicit part of how to benchmark, but 8 they are going there is 9 benchmarking versus the licensee's model and then 10 there is benchmarking internally. I know they have a 11 -- you know, they are working on a whole process to do 12 that. 13 MR. JONES: I think you hit on a very 14 important aspect of the SDP process. Some sort of 15 benchmarking that takes the licensee's results that we would get and what we come out with on our SPAR models 16 17 as well as the SDP worksheets. And that is not to say 18 that the licensee's answers are correct. What it says 19 is we need to understand any differences and come to 20 resolution on that. And when they show up, to me that 21 is an important benchmark that we need to work 22 through. 2.3 MR. KRICH: Right. So you go back and look 24 to see what was the cause of that?

| 1 | MR. JONES: You have to understand when |
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| 2 | there are differences, you have to understand why |
| 3 | those differences occurred. And that doesn't and |
| 4 | like I say, the licensee's model may be better or it |
| 5 | may not be. They may have considered a human |
| 6 | reliability that skews the results. Those type of |
| 7 | things are important. |
| 8 | MR. TRAPP: The other positive thing is |
| 9 | the model is publicly available. And when we get the |
| 10 | models done, most of the PRA folks are very interested |
| 11 | in getting access to that. So there is some sort of a |
| 12 | peer check, I imagine, going on there as well. |
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| 13 | MR. FLOYD: I've got a question on that. |
| 13 14 | MR. FLOYD: I've got a question on that. I would be interested in your perspectives on what you |
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| 14 | I would be interested in your perspectives on what you |
| 14 15 | I would be interested in your perspectives on what you see as maybe a checklist of the things the industry |
| 14 15 16 | I would be interested in your perspectives on what you see as maybe a checklist of the things the industry could do better on their PRAs, when you do see |
| 14 15 16 17 | I would be interested in your perspectives on what you see as maybe a checklist of the things the industry could do better on their PRAs, when you do see differences and you disagree with the way the industry |
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| 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | I would be interested in your perspectives on what you see as maybe a checklist of the things the industry could do better on their PRAs, when you do see differences and you disagree with the way the industry has done something. Do they fall in any broad categories, like you have mentioned HRA a few times, common cause and initiating events? Is there anything that you see as any pattern? |

MR. FLOYD: Extent of modeling.

| 1 | MR. JONES: There are a lot of |
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| 2 | certification groups out there. I know that GE has |
| 3 | one. Westinghouse has one. Combustion Engineering is |
| 4 | working with two different groups. We have been |
| 5 | fortunate to work with a lot of the people who have |
| 6 | who are leading up those efforts. So there are a lot |
| 7 | of efforts out there to bring out the quality of the |
| 8 | PRAs. And I think the industry is actually doing |
| 9 | themselves a disservice by not bringing that |
| 10 | information forward. Because the IPEs are what is on |
| 11 | record. And although we see it, from a public |
| 12 | perception you don't see the effort anywhere where the |
| 13 | work is ongoing. Where you have individuals from |
| 14 | multiple utilities coming out and from the different |
| 15 | vendors coming out and looking at the PRAs and saying |
| 16 | these are areas that need to be improved. And those |
| 17 | groups are picking up on generic type issues that are |
| 18 | being addressed overall. But you just don't see that |
| 19 | from the public. And I could understand that just |
| 20 | looking back on the IPEs how you could be concerned |
| 21 | with some of the information that is out there. |
| 22 | MS. FERDIG: So what is the solution to do |
| 23 | about that? |
| 24 | MR. JONES: Personally I believe that the |
| 25 | latest PRA information should be updated and provided. |

Because it is integral to the decision-making process by both the utility and the NRC. I think there is an important element that is not available to the public at this time.

MS. FERDIG: Do you think the assumption is just the complexity of the nature of PRA methods and all the --

MR. JONES: It has a lot to do with the control. I mean, it is an engineering calculation and so forth. We are putting out information and you've got all the control issues associated with it. There are groups of -- a relatively small group of people in some of the utilities that are dealing with the PRA. That may be somewhere between 4 to 8 people. And they are the ones who are doing the PRA updates. And then you have got the is it treated as an engineering calculation or is it treated as an information document. All those type of things I think need to be addressed.

MR. TRAPP: I think up to recently too the economic benefits of keeping your PRA up-to-date really wasn't there. There wasn't really -- you know, they spent a lot of money to do the IPE and then there wasn't -- I am not sure how you -- I mean, the utilities could speak better for themselves, but there

didn't seem like there was a lot of economic benefit 1 2 to keep funneling a lot of money into the PRA. And 3 when the new program came along, now there is a good reason. So I think that is why we are seeing things 4 5 changing. 6 MR. JONES: Clearly, I have seen the PRA 7 staffs have increased by several people at several of my utilities. 8 9 MR. TRAPP: We have PRAs that they didn't 10 bother modeling feedwater. You know, they just didn't 11 think it was necessary. They went through the IPEs. So that could make a huge impact on their risk. They 12 might be a lot higher because they just didn't bother 13 14 and until recently they saw no real reason to go back 15 and revise it. The next bullet was Phase 3 evaluation --16 17 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: One more question. 18 Well, it may fit at the end MR. SHADIS: 19 of this, I don't know. Please forgive me if this is 20 simplistic. But I have heard the criticism that the 21 design basis issues and aging issues are given short 22 thrift or glossed over in the PRAs. Could you speak to that? 23 24 MR. TRAPP: I mean, I can tell you what I 25 know about it, which is limited. I mean Dave Lochbaum

| issued a letter, and maybe that is what you are |
|--|
| referring to, where if your plant isn't operated in |
| accordance with tech specs and if your plant isn't in |
| accordance with the design basis, then the PRA is no |
| longer valid. And I guess in my opinion, I agree with |
| that. I mean the whole basis of the PRA is that you |
| are going to operate within the rules and that your |
| design basis is valid. I think there is a position out |
| there that most of the design errors that are found |
| really probably wouldn't have a huge impact on the |
| PRA, and I don't have any firsthand knowledge of that |
| being the case. I haven't personally evaluated it. I |
| know there have been some efforts at Cook I think |
| there is a new reg out on Cook that looked at a number |
| of design basis issues and reflected that on PRAs. So |
| I think that is something that is being developed. |
| But certainly if you are at Cook and certain things |
| were never working, then obviously the PRA is just |
| wrong. |
| MR. SHADIS: And I am just wondering if in |
| the initial implementation of the ROP if there has |
| been some movement or initiative on the part of NRC to |
| concentrate on those shortcomings or incorporate them. |
| MR. TRAPP: By the inspection program? I |

mean, there is a design inspection to go out and

specifically make sure that they are operating within the design. But I don't know if I am answering your question.

MR. SHADIS: Yes. You know, we have been talking here about the quality of the PRAs. So I am just wondering if within the system, you know, if some group has been assigned -- so me focus group or whatever has been assigned to look at that aspect of the PRAs. Does that question make sense? I am trying to replay it in my own mind here.

MR. JONES: Yes. You touch on a very good issue. And it is -- having grown up in the senior reactor analyst process for five years or over five years, you know coming from somebody who was a field inspector and then trying to apply PRAs to the risk, I have seen that the design basis is important in the development of the PRA. In other words, that is what gives us a lot of the redundancy and the margin that has resulted in the kind of core damage frequencies that we have seen because of all the things that are going through the design basis. There are design basis issues that come up that truly don't reflect on the risk of the plant. I mean, they just aren't important. But yet when you start to take those away, you start to take away at the foundation of how that PRA was

developed. So you start to have to question what is the real validity of the PRA now, given that you have started to pull away some of the basics. You look at environmental qualification. That is one of those basic assumptions that you use to build -- you build equipment reliability on given an accident. So now you take a little bit away from that, so where are you? Those type of things are very difficult to analyze -- to try to really sit down and quantify. Those things offer challenges. I don't know if I caught all your questions or not.

MR. TRAPP: The other thing is there is a degree of accuracy necessary for the job, and I think you have to kind of look at that. If we are hitting the right decade, then we are probably putting the right colors on it. If we are uncertain in that decade, it really doesn't make any real difference. So you kind of have to look at the application of the PRA and say, hey, it is not perfect. I mean, as engineers, we like perfection and we like getting into every little sequence and getting down into the dirt. But when it really comes down to it, after we do all of this effort, are we in the same place anyway? And if the answer is yes -- you know, oftentimes it is yes,

and I think in this case, it would probably be, yes, that it really doesn't matter.

MR. SHADIS: Our experience in New England -- now we have got four plants under decommissioning. of them just prior to the decision decommission, we had a flurry of design considerations that surfaced and aging issues that surfaced. The design basis things, there were many of them that were in the mitigating system. Questions as to whether or not these things would have worked. questions in LOCA analysis is one of the things that Yankee Rowe, there was a great deal of popped up. stir about issues and reactor aging vessel embrittlement and so on. And if these kinds of things -- this is just our local perspective -- but if these kinds of things are really not being addressed and integrated into the PRAs, then we would have to say that the overall risk levels being assigned have got to have a huge band width -- you know, error band width.

MR. JONES: Right. The basic PRA analysis techniques takes into consideration aging and so forth. You've got these bathtub curves, they are called and so forth, that look at the life of components and so forth and how they degrade. But

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when you start to speak about aging issues as they are actually affecting components that are in the field and their reliability and availability, that really speaks -- in my opinion that is a finding. And that is the kind of thing that you can evaluate. are starting -- if you see conditions that are coming out due to aging or whatever and they are affecting reliability, then that is something that you can and need to analyze. So my answer without knowing the specifics on it would be that if I have a high pressure safety injection pump that is failing because of aging, then clearly I am not sitting with the same reliability of that component that I assumed earlier And that subsequent analysis needs to reflect on. that. So I would say that with that respect just very superficially that you would need to look at that and that would have to be considered. Because you miss something very important.

MR. SHADIS: I am sorry I interrupted you.

MR. JONES: That is all right.

MR. SHADIS: Have there been any recent trends in component failures that have played into the program concurrent with, you know, the initial implementation?

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MS. BURGESS: I think the only thing I can 1 2 think of is the new regs that come out with component 3 reliability and there is comparisons of different turbine-driven pumps and things like that. And I think 4 the numbers or the results of their studies is showing 5 6 that it is either -- you know that somewhere within the band of all the licensee's PRA numbers on that 7 component in their particular PRA. I don't think we 8 have seen too much of a difference. 9 10 MR. SHADIS: One of our correspondents was 11 tracking LERs and other notices on motor-operated 12 valve failure. And he was drawing an accelerating 13 curve here. Over the last several months this is what 14 he has been looking at. And I don't know the accuracy 15 of that and I won't stand behind what he brought to us. It is an example of the kind of thing and I am 16 17 wondering if you are tracking that sort of thing and 18 if it is feeding into --19 MR. TRAPP: Yes, the NRC really has a lot 20 of effort in that area. And motor operated valves is 21 probably one I can give you because I think they 22 recently completed a study. 23 MS. BURGESS: They just came out with a

draft, yes.

1 MR. TRAPP: Yes. But thev look 2 historically and they look versus the PRA. And almost 3 every component now has a reliability study that is ongoing as well. It is a living study. So there is a 4 lot of work in that area. Most of the trends have 5 6 shown improving reliability. I don't think I have seen 7 anything to the contrary. 8 So with implementation at MR. SHADIS: 9 some subtle level that is going to show up in scoring 10 these things? It won't even be subtle. 11 MR. TRAPP: 12 mean, that is the whole idea of the PRAs. You update 13 the data with the reliability of your equipment and it goes right in there. I mean, that is part of the whole 14 15 living PRA idea. That if the component keeps failing, the reliability goes down and it goes right into the 16 17 PRA and it is reflected. MR. BROCKMAN: One of the key things you 18 19 have got to realize must go into those is sometimes a 20 component could go -- its number could go out in the garbage and your PRA final number, your CCDF or CCDP 21 22 or whatever may not change boo because of the other backups and what have you and the assumptions you wind 23 24

up going in there. Just when you get some component

or two that go bad doesn't necessarily when you get to the integrated plant response have an impact.

MR. JONES: But we have seen examples, and I was personally involved in evaluating one where the reliability of a component had slightly degraded, but because of its importance it did affect the overall delta CDF. And that was an area that was picked up by their maintenance both rule process. Ιt incorporated into their PRA. And then of course their corrective actions were addressed to address that. It does show up in the better PRAs that those type of -that failure information is picked up quickly and its importance is recognized. And it is important. I think motor operator valves, pumps or whatever, if their reliability is not what is stated in the PRA, then the PRA needs to somehow reflect that or at least it needs to be recognized.

MR. FLOYD: Our plants were, of course, licensed on the basis of deterministic safety analysis, where we credited certain systems that were in the design with the assumption that those systems would work. I know a lot has come out about the importance of maintaining the design basis for the PRA. But do you think it is more important that the design basis -- are the impacts of having weaknesses

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in the design basis more significant to PRA than they are for the deterministic analysis, or are we really just saying it is something that is important for both areas? But is it really more important in one than another? I mean if a system is not available for your deterministic analysis that is credited in your accident analysis for a LOCA response and it doesn't work, is it more significant for the deterministic analysis or for the PRA analysis? I don't really know.

MR. JONES: That is yours, Jim.

is different MS. BURGESS: Ιt different situations. And a lot of -- that is a big struggle that our inspectors have is the design basis says this and then you are telling me it doesn't matter. And in many cases, I say it is like comparing apples and automobiles. Not even apples and oranges. It is apples and automobiles. And, yes, the design basis clearly needs to be maintained -- the rules and regulations -- so that you will maintain it. Certain aspects of it are important to the PRA and certain aspects of it are not. If your design basis says you need two out of three pumps but your PRA can show that one pump is sufficient, you still need to maintain two out of three. But in an analysis in a PRA of how risk

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significant is it, one pump has demonstrated that it is capable and is able to perform the safety function. So I think it is a mixed bag. Some things are very important. Reliability of components or availability of components. In other aspects, though, it was deterministic and not risk-related. And so sometimes they don't just -- they don't fit. There are different rules and different rules apply. But in other cases, the same one feeds the other.

MR. TRAPP: And the deterministic architecture of the whole process hasn't changed an iota. If you violate tech specs, we don't care what it is. You still get a violation and you still have to fix it. So I don't think that part of the program has really changed. It is just that our response to those violations is now based on the significance.

MR. JONES: Clearly large break LOCA, from a design basis, there was a lot of margin established as one of the assumptions and it shows up when you do the PRA analysis. But then you look at station black-out. That turned out to be a very important risk. So that was a benefit of PRA is the addition of additional diesels and back-up batteries and those type of things. So I think it depends on what type of issue we are really talking about. One design basis

gave us a large margin in some areas and didn't pick up on others. PRA has said, hey, you have a large margin in large break LOCA, but station black-out, that is an area that needs to be addressed and they were.

MR. SHADIS: Can you give some sense of the time that it takes for either a given event or a series of events to feed in to be incorporated in the PRAs as you are working on them? Have you had anything in this implementation period that has happened that has caused you to readjust your PRAs at any point?

I guess if we talk about our MR. JONES: PRAs, I would say how we -- we would take a finding. And that is real time as the findings occur. Our SPAR models that we have, those are long-term actions. They lot generic type information, are based a on reliability and availability numbers. That is really the reason for the SPAR is to really provide a consistent approach across all the plants. Using their design but using generic HRA, human reliability numbers and so forth. So from that standpoint, when the studies are complete and they appear in the new regs and so forth, that type of information is incorporated in ours. From a plant-specific model, it

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is really the SDP process that looks at the importance of a specific finding and then questions, has this been incorporated. For example, you have a concern with the availability of a component, of an important pump, and is that reflected in your PRA. And questions like that. And I would say there are cases we have seen. I will go back two years. We have seen that those numbers were put in fairly quickly. And a lot of it had to do with the timing of their PRA update.

MS. BURGESS: The maintenance rule also on

MS. BURGESS: The maintenance rule also on the licensee's standpoint accounts for reviewing reliability of equipment, of a component, and factoring that back into their PRA. Does it make a difference? Should we adjust our numbers?

MR. SHADIS: I guess I was asking if under the new regime here if that feedback loop, if you will -- the feedback of information into your probabilistic risk assessment, if there are any signs that you see that it is accelerating or improved.

MR. JONES: I would say that we get the updated PRA information -- that that will reflect those new numbers. But there is a time lag from when failures do occur. And they look at whether or not they are maintenance preventable functional failures

and how they affect. It takes time to evaluate each of those. A single failure may not change the reliability of the components appreciably. It is evaluated over time. So I wouldn't say that the PRAs are updated in a real time manner based on just single failures because there is a lot that goes into it.

MR. TRAPP: Phase 3 evaluations I think we kind of discussed a bit. But, you know, resources are limited and these are pretty big efforts and some of them have dragged on for long durations. So because of the complexity of the issue and the developing of the science, I think we have discussed that a bit. Public availability of information -- we talked a little bit about negotiating findings. And I guess from my point of view, we don't really negotiate. have an exchange of technical information. But in my opinion, anyway, negotiation is really the wrong word. And the other part is we really need to document our basis for our conclusions. So it is certainly not a negotiation at all. You have to -- you end up by writing down the facts of why you reached But it is kind of a new conclusion you reached. process where we do solicit input from several areas.

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MR. BORCHARDT: Is there any difference in your interactions comparing pre-inspection report issuance and post-inspection report issuance?

 $\label{eq:ms.burgess: Could you clarify what that --} \\$

MR. BORCHARDT: Well, I mean, up until the inspection report is issued, you could argue that you are really part of the inspection process. You know, that you are interacting with the licensee and trying to get information. And once the report is out and you are getting ready to go to a regulatory conference or even post-regulatory conference, is there any difference in the way you interact with the licensee between those two segments in time? The analogy would be for licensing activities. You know, at some point all of the exchange of information is on the docket like for a licensing amendment or something like that. And some would suggest that that point in time ought to be the issuance of the inspection report. then on, if the licensee wants to submit something for consideration that could impact the your determination, the significance determination, that that ought to be on the docket. While others would argue that really it is just an extension of the inspection program. Like Jim said, as long as the

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final basis for your determination is in whatever the final document is or the document set that that is okay. So what I was asking is now as we have established some practice and some experience, is there any difference between how you interact with the licensee depending where you are in the process?

MR. TRAPP: I think yes. I think the wall goes up a bit when the inspection report goes out. I think there is more free-flowing information in the beginning because there are more unknowns. And then as you reach a decision, you know there is just a natural tendency that now we have decided and now there is a higher degree of proof.

MR. JONES: Because once that inspection report goes out and there has been a -- we have determined it to be a green finding, which is in the licensee's band, and that is the issue as it goes out, or it is a non-green finding, white potential -- white, yellow or red or whatever -- then there is the SERP panel that is the significance -- or excuse me, the Safety Enforcement Review Panel that comes up, the Significance Enforcement Review Panel that comes up. And that is clearly a definitive line. I mean when the inspection report is being developed, all that information is being incorporated into the basis for

the finding in the inspection report. You know, any calculations that are reviewed and all that included in there. Then we go to what is referred to as the SERP. Once that occurs, then the letter to the issued and so forth and subsequent licensee is correspondence is on the docket. mean, Ι response and so forth appears on the docket. So the answer to your question is, yes, there is -- there is a definite change in how we do business from the time we issue the inspection report with a potential nongreen finding up to the evaluation that goes into making that determination in the report itself.

One of the things that I MR. BROCKMAN: know we are trying to deal with, especially in the public communications aspect or public confidence aspect is the dilemma you've got between timeliness results and accuracy of results. And the SRAs definitely get involved with that, especially since the practice is becoming basically anything that is above a green gets to a Phase 3. I am interested in your all's insights as to where the challenges are with respect to being able to strike that balance. Are they internal things that we need to look at within the agency that are the dialogue that goes back and forth over an extended period of time between the

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SRAs and the licensees? What are the key drivers that are pulling this -- the timeliness of this out?

MS. BURGESS: It is a very difficult balance to come to resolution with. And I see the biggest dilemma is credibility. Do you try to get the most -- the best information during the Phase 3, which perhaps means a longer time period, but to come up with a conclusion that is not going to be overturned or the licensee is going to come up with additional information later on, and take that time to do that. Or do you come up with what the NRC feels is the best information given the time constraints and issue that then the and licensee comes back with better information that the NRC agrees with and then we change from a white to a green because of that better information and the time constraints when we did our analysis.

Some of the challenges are simply that some of these issues are very complicated. I can think of during the pilot program an issue came up at Prairie Island. And it required the licensee to redo their high energy line break analysis. It took a tremendous amount of time. The NRC couldn't do it or didn't do it, and so we waited for the licensee's evaluation to be complete, which threw the timeliness

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numbers right out the window. I think that was the right thing to do in that particular case. think we do struggle with that as far as credibility from the public's perception, the licensee's perception, our own inspectors' perception. Do we get the best that we can and have the process do its job and the licensee come back with their rebuttal to our answer? Or do we try to do and take the time to do the best analysis so we know that the licensee will have similar analysis and that it won't change colors? I don't know. And we have struggled with that in our region. Every issue has -we have come out different. Some of our issues have taken a tremendous amount of time and some of them we have turned around in 30 days.

MR. TRAPP: It is kind of a fear of the bar chart for me because when you look at the bar charts, you see data and management reacts to data and they don't necessarily know the issue behind that blip on your bar chart that says Region 1 is higher than everyone else. It might be the Indian Point tube rupture that required a new state of the art PRA that caused a delay, but they don't much care. Every bar chart should have a whole slew of footnotes.

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MR. GARCHOW: But on that, what we talked about at the last meeting when we were in Atlanta, do you think there is a disproportionate amount of effort by the utilities and the NRC in resolving green to threshold white issues and what would your recommendation be? I mean, to some extent you spend days or weeks or months where the only thing that would happen in the action matrix is maybe the senior resident would follow up on the corrective action that the licensee took. So we just spent all this gnashing over something that the end result of or the impact is, besides the public impact of having a white, which is a whole other issue, but the real regulatory impact is really whether you are going to decide to have

MR. TRAPP: Yes, there is a whole public perception -- avoid whites at all cost. Just white is the end of the world. And we see it from our counterparts, or at least I do from PRA analysts. They are just told, we don't want them and it is your job to get rid of them. If you want to bring in experts from England or whatever you've got to do, do it. And you are right, I mean that first one is hard to swallow. And hopefully as this program goes on, people will realize the dollars they are spending to

somebody follow up on a corrective action.

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fight down a white that is -- like we are talking uncertainty, there is a lot of uncertainty and you are never going to really get the definitive answer. It just isn't worth the effort.

I think one of the things we MR. JONES: have seen is that we have had some cases within the last two years that would have been potentially white issues before we got into the oversight process outside the pilot program, where all that analysis, had it been performed during the oversight process, we would not have accepted. We had one case involving a low pressure pump where there were numerous technical experts brought in to analyze the risk. And bottom line was -- and it appeared in the cover letter of our report -- was there is a large uncertainty involved and we don't believe the analysis. So you can have cases where you could come out and spend a large amount of dollars and still not accomplish what you think you are going to accomplish, even though you come up with what would be a green finding. It does not have to be accepted. And you can look back in cover letters where you will see that some of those issues may have come out the other way even after spending all that money.

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| 1 | MR. TRAPP: Because you come to regulatory |
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| 2 | conferences and we just get hit with these volumes |
| 3 | sometimes of, well, we have done all of this and they |
| 4 | have this Bayesian analysis and all this stuff that |
| 5 | they are throwing up on charts and everybody is sort |
| 6 | of sitting there blurry-eyed by the time it is over |
| 7 | and it is just not very you are asking my opinion, |
| 8 | but it is just not very useful resources on either |
| 9 | side. |
| 10 | MR. GARCHOW: So how would you propose |
| 11 | fixing that if you were king for a day? |
| 12 | MR. TRAPP: I guess it is like I said, |
| 13 | I think it is education. I think you have got to |
| 14 | realize that a white can be as little as 16 hours of |
| 15 | inspection. And if you feel you know, if you have |
| 16 | a diesel break and you think the NRC you know, you |
| 17 | don't have an SBO source, you have a diesel break and |
| 18 | you think it is reasonable that the NRC come in and |
| 19 | look at that issue for 16 hours, don't get caught up |
| 20 | into the 10^{-6} . Just say, yes, that seems reasonable |
| 21 | to me. They are not looking at my hydrogen |
| 22 | recombiners, I am happy, and move on. So I think it is |
| 23 | an education thing. |
| 24 | MR. JONES: It is a business decision. If |
| 25 | you think that your analysis can be well supported and |

that the individuals that come in can truly offer an argument that speaks to the issue and that the equipment was operable in all cases and that the issue is green or should come out as green, that is fine. But if it is based on -- you know, if there is a potentially large uncertainty band in there and you are arguing at the far end of it, you may be spending money that is going to be wasted.

MR. BLOUGH: I tried to explore this same question at our public meeting in December and also at our inspector seminar in Region 1 earlier in December. And I guess my theory was that one of the reasons licensees are so adverse to having a single white issue, be it a PI or a finding, is not it in itself, but the fact that if you have two white issues in a cornerstone, that constitutes a degraded cornerstone. So I tried to explore that with our inspectors and with people at the public meeting. I guess the message I got back is, no, that really hasn't hit home with the senior management of most companies yet. could expect that once that is a realization and that becomes a factor, we could expect maybe this problem to get worse, where there is even more of an effort to spend time avoiding the first white issue, knowing that now you are right next to one other in the

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cornerstone would call a degraded cornerstone, which
I think people would very --

MR. TRAPP: But that response isn't even very excessive. If you read the procedure and you understand what we do for a degraded cornerstone. You know, it is not loading up the bus with 15 inspectors and putting the light on the roof and coming out. You know, it is a limited inspection that focuses on the corrective actions and it focuses on extended conditions. So it is kind of a reasonable response.

MR. BLOUGH: Right. But that is the real
-- a degraded cornerstone is a real name tag, though.

If you are wearing that, that sticks out, I think.

MR. SCHERER: Before we lose the panel, I have a question to pose in a somewhat different direction. We have been talking a lot about false positives. An overly conservative call and the process for dissolving it. I would like to reverse that and ask your individual opinions as to how robust a process you think exists today to identify false negatives, that is, something where the current SDP process, Phase 1, Phase 2 or Phase 3 might miss or non-conservatively interpret the safety significance of a finding. And the question is really a process question. How robust a process do you feel exists in

identifying it, recognizing we will never prove the negative. You will never be absolutely sure something won't slip through the process. But how robust a process do you feel exists. And to the extent you are willing to, each member of the panel, I would like to get your individual opinion.

MR. TRAPP: I guess I would have less fear for the -- I mean, there is different levels of SDPs. I guess I would have a more -- I think there is probably a higher probability of missing a containment fire or a shutdown issue that would -- I mean, the thresholds are extremely low. And I would think where we have less information there is obviously a higher chance. I am pretty confident, I think, in the reactor SDP that I don't think we are going to have false negatives. I think we are going to catch everything. And given that the thresholds are -- I mean, it is one in a million. You know, if you increase your CDF by one in a million, that is a white finding. So the thresholds are sufficiently low that the catastrophic event of missing one of those that is right at that threshold really isn't the end of the world. I mean, we missed those kind of things in the old program.

Right now clearly the senior reactor analysts

MR. JONES:

said.

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Yes, I agree with what Jim

are serving as the backstop to the process in the regions. They have got a lot of help from headquarters when we need it. I think that right now there is a fairly good backstop, recognizing that the inspectors out in the field need to fully recognize that some of these SDPs aren't fully developed yet either. And in some cases, we actually have additional assistance from the licensees who evaluate each of the condition reports and findings as they come up. And that is not true across the board but in several utilities that I have dealt with, they do do that function. And that is -- and we have been fairly consistent with at least the initial cut on an issue and then of course it requires further review. But we haven't seen where they have come up with one finding and we came up with -- for example, they had a white and we had a green type issue. But there is vulnerability in particularly those other areas as Jim mentioned.

MS. BURGESS: I think that there is always a chance of vulnerability. But we do have a plan to benchmark the SDP worksheets. I think it is imperative that we do do that benchmarking. I do know that in my region there are PRA staffs at the utilities who are doing their own benchmarking and calling me and saying where they think some of the vulnerabilities are. Or

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feeding it back to the process, back to the program office at NRR. So I think that has been a very positive input up front before the SDP worksheets even were issued. But I do want to make sure that we do do the benchmarking to make sure that we have done everything that we can up front to make sure that we haven't missed something. And then the process, I think -- like Jim said, if we do find something, I don't think that it is going to be so catastrophic that it is going to make that big of a difference.

MR. JONES: But I think the credibility of the revised oversight process lies on our ability to detect those. We need to be thorough and diligent to make sure that we evaluate each of these issues thoroughly. Until we have confidence in the process we have, we need to use all the resources available to us -- licensee PRAs, the PRAs that we have developed and the SRAs. Because the way I perceive it is it is only going to take one example where we miss what I consider to be an important finding. And even if we caught 100 others, if we miss the one, then our credibility is seriously in question as to whether or not the oversight process really can work. So I think that is an important message, at least from my standpoint, that we need to consider when we are doing

all this benchmarking and so forth. The public's perception of do they have a process in place that is viable. Can I believe it? Can they make risk-informed decisions based on this?

MR. TRAPP: I guess in summary too -- one of the things I think is really positive about this is the interaction between the regions and headquarters. Doug Coe and Bill Dean are sitting back there and there is nothing on this list that they haven't heard before and there is probably a few things that Doug is biting his tongue saying, you know, I am doing this for you and I am doing that for you. And I am not aware of anything on our list that isn't on his list and I am not aware of anything on our list that he isn't diligently working on. As an end-user, we are obviously never happy with the progress and the speed of getting the product that we want. But that is just the way of life.

CHAIRMAN PLISCO: We appreciate it. We have got to move on. I hate to cut off on a good discussion, but we have another group and they have planes to catch and I think we want to talk to them too. Having the advantage of having Jim on the panel, we can keep asking him questions. But I appreciate,

Sonia and Bill, both of you coming out. Thank you.

Let's take a five minute break while we change chairs.

(Whereupon, at 11:12 a.m., off the record until 11:25 a.m.)

CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Our next invited stakeholders -- we have a panel of senior resident inspectors that Jim has pulled together, and we have provide their asked them to perspectives and viewpoints on how the reactor oversight process is going and answer some of the panel's questions. Do you want to give introductory remarks, Jim?

MR. MOORMAN: Well, I was given an excuse not to go up there. Yes, we are very fortunate to have this group come talk to us today. Steve Jones from Millstone at the far left, Joe Brady from Plant Harris in Region 2, Steven Campbell from Fermi and Jeff Clark from Cooper representing each of regions. And prior to this, I sent these guys some topics to talk about and they picked out particular areas of interest that they could provide the panel some information on. Things like does the ROP get to the important issues? Does the ROP allow identification document of cross-cutting issues at the proper level? Do we adequately assess the corrective action program? Do we adequately interpret the groups

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1, 2 and 3 questions? Does the ROP blend well with the enforcement policy? Is the time allotted for conducting inspections and plant status, is that about on target? And are we getting value from our inspection effort? And each of these guys has kind of gone through and taken some of those areas, and they are going to bring you their perspective on that based on their inspection experience. So if you want to start, Steve? They all have some pretty short deadlines for flights today, so we have got to move through that. They will be crisp.

MR. JONES: My name is Steve Jones. I am the senior resident at Millstone Unit 2. Just by way of introduction, we have had a few issues at Millstone Unit 2 -- four that involved Phase 3 SDP analyses in addition to about 10 or so other findings that ended up green. Right now, Millstone Unit 2 has a white performance indicator for high pressure safety injection and a white inspection finding related to inadequate corrective actions for turbine-drive auxiliary feed water. That placed them in the degraded cornerstone for mitigating systems.

Currently, we are going through the problem identification and resolution inspection. And

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separate but concurrently, supplemental inspection for the degraded cornerstone. That is all I have.

MR. BRADY: I am Joe Brady. I am the senior resident at the Harris Plant, as Jim said. Harris was a pilot program plant, and I was personally involved in the writing of the inspection procedures. So I kind of predated the pilot program. Naturally, I think all the procedures work just fine.

Harris, because they were in the pilot, were coming up on completing the entire inspection cycle. And out of all of the inspections, there is one issue related to fire protection, which has been pending since the identification of it during the pilot program. It has been about a year and a half related to fire barrier issues. There is currently one white -- potentially white inspection finding, and there is one white PI that is associated with that finding. The inspection finding is not finalized. There is a regulatory conference that is yet to be accomplished.

MR. CAMPBELL: I am Steve Campbell. I am the senior resident at Fermi Plant outside Detroit. The licensee is basically a green plant that receives baseline inspection. The reactor oversight process was implemented on April 2. We had an outage April 1, so

we had the opportunity full bore to get the shutdown SDPs and use those several time. They lost shutdown cooling on two occasions. They had MSIVs and drywall purge valves leaking. They had put the wrong oil in the emergency diesel generator. They also had some failed linear transformers on their emergency diesel generator. So we had some opportunities to run the in the early phases of the outage. Those basically screened out to be green. But, however, what is important to note is that all those issues were attributed to basically human performance problems. That would be my concern coming here to talk to the panel at least, is human performance, and also issues that you had talked about in age-related equipment. That is the concerns that we have out at Fermi right now.

MR. CLARK: I am Jeff Clark, senior resident at Cooper. Just to give you a perspective, Cooper also was a pilot plant. We have been working now for approximately a year-and-a-half in this process. During that time, there have been numerous identified issues. Things that are out there on the docket already. Cooper has been through a problem identification and resolution inspection already. During that inspection, it was identified that there

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| were numerous systemic problems with the problem |
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| identification and resolution activities at Cooper. |
| Cooper also has a white finding on the docket in |
| emergency preparedness. It also has a preliminary |
| yellow finding in the area of mitigating systems. |
| This is this issue that you have been hearing about a |
| little bit in the panel, the environmental |
| qualifications issue. That is going forward toward a |
| regulatory conference next month. So we have had the |
| chance to let's say stretch the envelope a little bit |
| with the inspection process. We have also had to work |
| with Bill Dean's group. We were one of the first |
| plants to actually do a special inspection for the |
| environmental qualifications issue outside of the |
| Revised Reactor Oversight Process but meld the |
| inspection process in with it. So my particular |
| aspects to talk about in the group are going to be |
| more if you would like to ask us questions about it. |
| We have been involved in the cross-cutting issues. |
| Again, human performance as Steve is addressing and |
| how we can get to those types of issues that are not |
| strictly routine in the Revised Reactor Oversight |
| process. |

MR. BRADY: At this point, I guess we would open up for questions. We had kind of decided

because of the short time not to give lengthy presentations. So we will respond to what your concerns are.

MR. HILL: I have got a question. I guess it was at Fermi where you said you had a number of shutdown events that screened out green, but they were all related to human performance and that concerned you. What do you think should be done different that would have been done previously that is not now? What do you see as the different effects or the end result?

MR. CAMPBELL: The human performance items that we have reviewed for since the outage has decreased quite a bit. That is based on part that they recognized that there are human performance issues at Fermi. And also the NRC being on them quite a bit about the issues that came up during the outage. What I show the licensee a lot is a page out of my PRA training manual that says that human performance has the highest — is the greatest risk to core damage and plant risk. And that is what is of concern to me. Because you could have a good piece of equipment and good programs, but if they don't implement it right or if there is errors, then the plant will put itself at more of a risk. What I believe should be done is to

1 probably develop some type of PI tracking on human 2 performance itself. 3 MR. MOORMAN: Steve, would it be worthwhile to capture human performance issues at a 4 different threshold than the inspection report so that 5 6 -- or provide them feedback in some way so that 7 whatever human performance numbers that the licensee would use in their PRA could possibly be adjusted? 8 9 MR. CAMPBELL: Well, generally this new 10 inspection process is more indicative rather than predictive. And what we would be doing is reacting to 11 a number of human performance errors. 12 If they did 13 something on a HPSI system risk significant, we would 14 have to react to what they did. I think basically we 15 need to really pick and choose what we are going to be looking at. See if there are any indicators. If there 16 17 is a threshold that they meet on the number of human 18 performance errors that are occurring, then that would 19 be a performance indicator hit for human performance. 20 But it would have to probably be restricted to a risk-21 significant system. 22 MR. JONES: I had a comment. We have just experienced several findings that ended up being green 23 24 but that involved actual failures of safety systems.

And from that perspective, it seems like we could

develop like a hybrid performance indicator based on human performance or problem identification and resolution type issues that result or that manifest themselves as failed trains and use that as some type of little bit indicative indicator of performance. Rather than waiting for just the right system to have problems, which is the case at Millstone. Eventually, the problems did manifest themselves with high risk systems, but we had indicators early on that we were having problems dealing with their systems, maintaining them operable due to either maintenance practices or just not addressing degraded conditions. MR. HILL: Let me ask you a question following up on the human performance. Over the last number of years, there has been a significant emphasis on getting equipment reliability and dependability up such that almost everything that is left is just human performance. So how do you see that fitting in that if you get the equipment reliable, most of the events you are going to have are human performance issues. Because you will never get the humans perfect or as

MR. CAMPBELL: Yes, it is a hard subject to really deal with. I have been grappling with it for a long time. Not only trying to think of it

reliable as you want.

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philosophically, humans will be humans and they will make mistakes. I guess what we have to do is monitor management and see how they react to human performance errors. Do they have stand-downs? Do they have event-free clocks, which is what they have implemented at Fermi? Putting the wrong oil in the diesel, which did happen, was a human performance. It probably was a good piece of equipment, very reliable, but they degraded the equipment and now it was inoperable for over a month. So they had unavailability time that they racked up because of the human error that they had. You can say that the equipment is reliable, but it is really two separate issues there.

MR. HILL: Is there any way to tie the consequences to the human performance? In other words, if you accept that you are going to have human performance problems, but you build your system so that the human errors that you have don't result in a consequential event, then that would be the area you would want to go in and kind of tracking by the level of or how much of a consequence did it have or was it mitigated because you have systems in place.

MR. CAMPBELL: But the lower level human performance issues that are occurring could be indicative of a cultural problem, which is a precursor

to -- I mean, if you could look at a plant, it could be really good equipment and really running well, but if the culture is not there to be correcting problems, then the plant can go down. You can look at all the plants that have been shut down, Clinton and Cook -- Cook was a lot of equipment issues there. But if the managers aren't paying attention to the problems that they are having or the culture is bad, then you can take a plant -- you know, the plant will be shut down if there are enough safety issues that arise.

MR. HILL: I guess that depends on whether they are self-identifying these personnel errors and doing something with them at a low level or not.

MR. CAMPBELL: Well, a lot of them are self-revealed too.

MR. HILL: Yes.

MR. CLARK: Let me also chime in on what Steve's comment is. Another perspective, there is a spectrum on human performance. everything from BUPS clear down to a failure to follow procedure type of thing in performance there. currently in our process identify those as crosscutting issues. And we generally identify it with a particular issue and you give a, yes, this is crosscutting. Ιt involves problem identification

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resolution. Ιt involves safety conscious environment or something like this. And we make a tie. So now there is a nexus to human performance along those lines. But I still don't think we have either a policy decision in place or the mechanisms in place, i.e., the SDP, to say what does that involve. start seeing, as we have seen in several instances at Cooper, repetitive problems in failure to follow procedures or repetitive problems in training issues which manifest themselves in not translating design basis information out into the facility itself and systemic type of human performance issues which now impact those mitigating systems. Now do you go back and say, well, yes we have numerous issues here. Do we bound those together? Do we look at the underpinnings and say that we have a number of green issues here, but those also have ties to more significant issues? Are there cross-cutting themes, so to speak? So there is a broad spectrum there when you start talking about human performance.

MS. FERDIG: Jim, I have a question -- and I get to ask ignorant questions because I am the non-technical public here. So bear with me. But one of the things that I am confused about with regard to these cross-cutting issues is the extent to which you

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and others who are aware of this program and its application are confident that the concerns that are implied in some of the cross-cutting issues that you mentioned will show up in the reactor oversight process in other ways, or does there need to be an added element of the program to get at those things? And I guess I am right now assuming that they will show up one way or another and that we want to try to stay within what are the defined parameters of the program. Would you agree?

MR. CLARK: Ι guess to answer question, Mary, right now we are within defined parameters of the program. We are identifying them as the program has us do so. I guess at the same time I express to you a concern that what does that present. Again, docketed information with Cooper. already documented several substantive, which is a grouping of like cross-cutting issues. So you have information there that you have substantive crosscutting human performance issues already in inspection reports. What now do you do with that information? the policy and in our performance, we tend to gear that towards problem identification and resolution type inspections. Which again already at Cooper, we have identified that again as systemic problems in the

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problem identification and resolution. So it is almost a spiral type effect. And the question comes out or the concern on my part is where is there a threshold like the SDP that says where does that become a concern agency-wide and when does that predicate initial inspection or activities?

MR. BROCKMAN: Jeff, would it be safe to say that thus far issues which have reached final resolution at Cooper on problem identification and resolution have not been associated with an event of a white or higher significant color thus far?

That is safe to say, Ken, but MR. CLARK: I guess that brings up another concern that I have. You are feeding good questions. The other concern that I would have is we have a meshing philosophy program here in that we identify that as long as the items are below a threshold that they are in the licensee's control band. We have identified that as the green area and that is the licensee's control band. But on the other hand, if you are identifying that the licensee is not incorporating those things properly or performing those things properly in identification and resolution or is missing particular aspects of it or has human performance characteristics with that, I guess the fundamental assumptions that

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the well-working problem identification and resolution program is going to take that through is questionable. Do you have that there and is that fundamental underpinning going to manifest itself when they come up with a more significant condition or more significant finding? And that would be my concern.

MR. GARCHOW: So how would you -- what would you recommend if you were king for a day on how you might aggregate -- because what you are talking about is how you can aggregate maybe some of these diverse human performance issues in a way that has some scrutability and some process base so it is predictable. How would you suggest that we would aggregate those issues?

Well, one of the things that MR. BRADY: I commend Bill Dean for that they have done with the new 0610 is that they have allowed us to use licensee identified violations in the report under 40A7 to capture those things that the licensee identifies as well as those things that we identify. When we went through the pilot program, essentially we were limited. And when we talk cross-cutting issues, we are really talking trending. That is what we are doing. limited to those issues which we But we were identified. We have now added this aspect where we can

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look at the licensee's program, capture those issues that we have identified along with those issues that they have identified, and then identify that trend. The trend is going to tell you if you don't fix this, here is where you are likely to hit. Now in our particular case and in the case of Harris, we had a trend going when we went into the pilot program. stopped. thought we it had But this potentially white issue has the exact same aspects as the previous trend. So it will eventually manifest itself if the opportunity is given with the particular risk-significant equipment.

MR. GARCHOW: So that would be the do nothing --

MR. CLARK: Potentially.

MR. GARCHOW: That would be the basis of the current program, which is it will pop out somewhere else and then you will go white or yellow and you get the Agency response. I mean, that is the assumption that we are operating under today. I am saying to your concern, how would you construct something where you could aggregate those if you -- as your examples at Cooper, so that you would somehow get into a different Agency response. Because I sense that is what you are frustrated with.

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| 1 | MR. CLARK: To go back to your comment, |
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| 2 | king for the day, and that is the only way I would |
| 3 | predicate this I am in favor of aggregation under |
| 4 | certain circumstances certain controlled |
| 5 | circumstances. Part of my background is PRA as well |
| 6 | as that, and I also have had a significant amount of |
| 7 | time with the licensee doing PRA type analysis. One |
| 8 | hundred independent green findings totally |
| 9 | independent should mean that that is just 100 |
| 10 | findings out there. One hundred that have a |
| 11 | collective theme or a collective significance to them |
| 12 | presents themselves as instead of 10^{-6} , 10^{-4} or 10^{-5} , |
| 13 | you know it is an aggregate effect. You do see |
| 14 | increased numbers. If the theory is that they are not |
| 15 | connected, so you just see a partial dispersion, low |
| 16 | significant findings, so be it. You know, you |
| 17 | shouldn't say, well they had three human performance |
| 18 | issues over the last year. One in the maintenance |
| 19 | group and one in operations or whatever. Those are |
| 20 | totally disconnected. When you start seeing common |
| 21 | themes running through operations and maintenance as |
| 22 | recurring human performance issues in that they don't |
| 23 | follow procedures and they don't have proper training, |
| 24 | which are manifesting themselves in these number of |

identifications, I would be a proponent for a collective significance of those.

MR. BLOUGH: And how would you accomplish that? Would you go to the -- an SDP or would you rewrite the action matrix to accomplish it. Because it sounds like basically what you are saying is you are in a position where you believe that probably the collection of human performance issues sums up is at least a white threshold, but you have got to wait for the single issue that trips the threshold right now. What would be your next step now that you are proposing? Is it the SDP or the action matrix or something else?

MR. CLARK: I'd like to see an entry into the SDP. As I said, you see a common theme approach. You have seen -- and let's say it manifests itself in mitigating systems. And you are saying there is a commonality because of the cross-cutting nature of it. You sum those together and now see if you have a significant issue.

MR. CAMPBELL: I recommend a performance indicator. I keep going back to the PRA statement where human error has the most contribution to plants, and I think that this is something that needs to be addressed and it needs to be somehow put into our

program. And the way to do that, to be more proactive about it, is to put a little bit of pressure on the licensee to perform well. That would be through a performance indicator. If they cross a number of errors on risk-significant equipment or if there are so many minor errors, then it is indicative of a cultural concern. If they cross that, then they are in another response band with us.

MR. JONES: At Millstone, I guess we were it did eventually -- performance issues did eventually propagate to white findings or a white PI. But I think we certainly could have had an earlier indicator based on inspection findings from the old program and also the new program where there were -these issues were showing up in actual inoperable equipment in one way or another that could be tracked by some kind of PI. Now I grant that that would be difficult to extrapolate to some type of risk perspectives in terms of yellow and red, but it seems certain that you could develop and identify outliers such as a lot of the white levels on the performance indicators are based. Just looking at situations where licensees accept that this condition existed, they didn't correct it and it recurred and that resulted in an inoperable train of equipment.

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now that doesn't get captured anywhere other than a green finding typically in the inspection report. Unless it happens to be one of a very select set of components that has high risk value at a particular site. At Millstone 2, it happens to be a pretty small set for conditions that last up to a week. Typically only when you get out to a month or so or more do you get a large number of systems that can actually drive a white -- that can go to a white SDP finding.

MR. SCHERER: I have a question. Somebody mentioned that, you know, we will always have human performance issues. And certainly as long as we staff the plant with humans, we are going to have that. I am trying to get a grasp on the issues that you are raising. How has the new reactor oversight process versus the old process that was in effect before -has that exacerbated or frustrated your ability to address the issues that you raise? Because that is what I am trying to get a handle on. With the new oversight process -- we had problems before -- we had human performance problems and cross-cutting issue problems, PINR problem. Those issues need to be addressed. But how has it changed between the old process and the new oversight process? Has that in some way frustrated your ability to address these

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issues? And if so -- that is what I am trying to understand.

MR. JONES: I guess early on, mentioned, we had several green findings during the first two quarters of the inspection period. And that -- the licensee took note. They have a PI tracking, even NCVs and things like that. And they were noticing that that was at a very high level. However, wasn't until -- when you start getting a white PI and then followed shortly thereafter by a white inspection finding. Then at that point there is a dramatic change in licensee perspective. I guess I unfortunately don't have a lot of background under the old program in that Millstone was an 0350 plant for most of the time I was there and then shortly thereafter came into the revised oversight process. But I would think that it would be a little bit easier to feed those type of issues that were green findings into the SALP process and in that way get a little bit earlier attention from site management.

MR. SCHERER: What about the other plants?

MR. CAMPBELL: I think it has limited us more because we don't document it. And we have had to end up doing it more informally during a plant manager meeting after we have finished our formal exit and

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told them the observations that we have had. We couch it with it is low level items that we have found but it is a concern because it could be indicative of a cultural concern at the plant. However, we have that we discussed from documented the ones refueling outage as a no color finding, and licensee has come back to us and asked us what does So there was no real clear meaning. that mean. gave them something that was -- it really wasn't described and we came up with a new process of what a no color finding is. It has been asked to me a couple of times and also to my managers. I think -- so in short, I think it has limited us more than what we used to do. But I really believe that we need to be more proactive and not so indicative on how they are We need to get to a point where this performing. could be a problem coming up and tell them somehow. We used to be able to document this stuff and we are not doing it because it is screening out. That is the difference I have experienced.

MR. CLARK: The only other thing I would add is we did in the old regulatory process aggregate some common findings together for making an issue or even going to escalated enforcement for some issues. We particularly saw that again, as Cooper was a pilot

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We closed out many of the old inspection plant. activities that were out there. One of the processes that we went through for that aspect was to look at the open items and put them through the SDP. both surprising and later understandable. Some of the previous escalated enforcement actions screen out as green. It is because of the way that you looked at them before, packaged some of them together, and again some of the assumptions on past SDPs. But I would say that what it has done is narrowed our focus on what we look at for the findings. MR. KRICH: Is that -- I'm sorry, ahead, Steve. MR. FLOYD: The inference I am getting is that if you can document it in the inspection report, the licensee pays more attention to it. presume if you find these issues, even if they are green, you are still telling the licensee about them. That you think human performance is contributing to this issue. Is the sense that I am getting right that you think the licensees are blowing it off if it is given verbally? There is a difference between verbal response and written response? MR. CAMPBELL: No. We have two audiences,

though. I mean, actually three. We have the NRC, the

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licensee and also the public. Us and the licensee know what they are doing about human performance errors no matter what level they are at. But how does the public know? I mean, we are just screening them out as green.

MS. FERDIG: How does what the public knows in your view affect what the licensee is doing to fix the problem? I guess what I am hearing you say is that you feel restricted in being able to identify early enough to perhaps prevent what is a problem that emerges later that shows up through the system with the color change and so on. If you were able to identify it sooner, that may be -- or if they were responding to it sooner, that may change. So how does the public knowing that or not affect the licensee's decision about action around your identified concern?

MR. CAMPBELL: Well, it probably doesn't matter, but still we have customers out there. And we still have to -- I mean, they pay us to inspect the plant. And they are part of what we need to inform on how they are performing. If you give them a mid-year review saying everything is fine and you get the baseline inspection, there is no real justification for what you are saying.

| 1 | MS. FERDIG: But what about Steve's point |
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| 2 | that I mean, is it a question then of the licensee |
| 3 | not acting? |
| 4 | MR. CAMPBELL: At my plant, they are |
| 5 | acting. I don't know what is going on at the other |
| 6 | sites partly because I haven't read the other reports. |
| 7 | But I think in part it is also that we are not putting |
| 8 | down on paper what is going on. |
| 9 | MS. FERDIG: And what would be different |
| LO | if your observations were aggregated and somehow |
| L1 | factored in? |
| L2 | MR. CAMPBELL: I think I am trying to |
| L3 | shoot more for being more predictive and proactive |
| L4 | than being indicative. There could be a lot of minor |
| L5 | problems going on from a human performance level and |
| L6 | then all of a sudden the plant is a trouble plant on |
| L7 | a trouble list. |
| L8 | MR. MOORMAN: Steve, that is a good point. |
| L9 | Isn't there a concern that a lot of inspectors have |
| 20 | that, well, these issues will show themselves with |
| 21 | some color, but it may not be white. It may be yellow |
| 22 | or red. And then at some point the question gets |
| 23 | asked where were we. |
| 24 | MR. CAMPBELL: Right. |

| MR. BRADY: Let's see if we can back up |
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| just a little bit. I want to go back to the question |
| that was asked over here. What is different between |
| the old program and this program? If you go back to |
| the old program, there was a level 3 violation or |
| programmatic breakdown and that is basically where we |
| aggregated this stuff. And when you looked at those |
| things that each of them individually probably |
| wouldn't have been a level 3 or a level 2 violation |
| they were probably down in the level 4 space. When we |
| moved into the new program, what we had from a cross- |
| cutting issue standpoint limited us, the inspectors, |
| from the standpoint of we had to use only those |
| findings which we had identified. That has recently |
| been fixed. In allowing us under 40A7 to use those |
| things that are in the licensee's program along with |
| those things that we have found to now identify in the |
| report those things. So there may be a different |
| flavor to this in the months to come. That has been |
| only recently implemented in the October revision of |
| 0610*. So some of this may change, but a lot of it |
| has been in response to the concerns that the |
| inspectors have had in relation to cross-cutting |
| issues, problem identification and resolution. What |
| do these things really mean? Are you going to let us |

really look at them? Are you going to let us trend them? So things are changing. But going back to what's -- where were we, where are we, we lost something, we kind of got it back but there is no level of significance associated with this trend in this program. That is what is different.

MR. BLOUGH: And that is where I sense a little different slant from Steve Campbell than say from Jeff. Where Steve is finding that there is a level of frustration about the level of documentation, but there is not a level of frustration regarding what the licensee does with the information. Whereas -and he would like to be more predictive. Whereas I think Jeff is telling us that he believes if we had a good measure of significance of the human performance area that it might be driving us to a different indication -- you know, a white indication on human performance. Whereas right now, you have more of a situation where you have either green findings or no color findings. And then if those are -- if the licensee's corrective action doesn't deal with those well, you have more green findings but you never have really an escalation out of that cycle, if you will.

MR. CLARK: I think there is also a tie back to Steve's comment on the documentation that I

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| have a concern as well. It was brought up by Jim. And |
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| that is in the old process, we used the inspection |
| report as a police keeper. The inspection report would |
| document what the inspector saw throughout the period |
| and it is like everything that the inspector saw |
| throughout this period. Then you would use that as a |
| reference for any kind of future activity or future |
| findings. Here, we may be placing ourselves in a |
| situation where in August I see an item that is a |
| finding and I say and oh yes, by the way, we saw |
| precursors to this in March, but those weren't |
| documentable. Those were not you know, they |
| screened out in the SDP and were not in the inspection |
| process. And that leaves I would say it leaves the |
| Agency, it leaves the licensee and it leaves the |
| public in a position where you have undocumented |
| issues out there. |
| MR. BORCHARDT: Are you keeping two sets |
| of books now? |
| MR. CLARK: Officially or unofficially? |
| MR. BORCHARDT: Well, the one that is not |
| in the report is I mean, it would be your own |
| personal inspection notes or whatever you would want |
| to call it. But it is not something that goes on the |

docket.

MR. CLARK: That is correct. And that is what I am concerned with the use of.

MR. HILL: There seems to be a little bit of a disconnect too on the fact that you talked about you were glad that you could now start documenting findings that basically were licensee identified. I know there is a feeling -- I just heard it a few days ago. There is a terminology of inspectors mining the corrective action programs for findings just to have findings. So there seems to be some disconnect with what is the purpose of what you are doing with them and what the view is, I think.

MR. CAMPBELL: What is your question?

MR. BLOUGH: The only use of those is part of developing a trend. For example, if you see a trend in a cross-cutting area, then you can -- as I understand it, the inspector first has to have green findings that are NRC identified. And anything below a green threshold cannot be brought to bear on trying to evaluate a trend. But licensee identified issues can be used to fill in part of that trend. So, therefore, if you have a licensee who is very good at identifying everything and gets it into the corrective action system but nonetheless there is still a trend there despite their ability to identify just about

everything, the inspector can at least make -- use that as part of the pattern mixed in with at least some NRC identified green findings.

MR. CAMPBELL: We have an opportunity being independent to be able to see the forest while the licensee sees the trees. They just see one human performance error, but we can stand back and see the whole picture. That is a benefit to both the public, ourselves and to the licensee. We point out, hey, you have got a number of these. Our SDP doesn't mean much, but to us it is a concern that maybe the culture may be starting to dip here.

MR. FLOYD: And you communicate that to the licensee, I hope.

MR. CAMPBELL: Yes, we have to. And I do keep a separate inspection notes. What we have is an H drive on our computer where both me and the secretary or anybody who accesses our computer -- we keep observations of every inspection period. And what we do is we sit down and print them out and throw out the ones that don't mean anything and then tell the ones that mean something to the licensee and pull that 0610 and see what can make it to the report and put them in the report.

1 MR. GARCHOW: So when you say informally, 2 it is informally relative to not being in the 3 inspection report. But at least the practice is, at least at the three units I go to routinely, all of 4 those are formally discussed both in pre-exit meetings 5 6 with our licensing folks and then in our formal NRC 7 senior management exit. So it is at least formally discussed with the licensee. 8 9 MR. CAMPBELL: Our resident meetings give 10 the -- what we are going to put in the report. 11 finish that exit and say now here is our observations. 12 So it is -- you finish with the formal and then you tell them what the observations are. 13 These aren't 14 going to make the report, but these are what our 15 concerns are. This is what we saw during inspection. 16 17 MR. GARCHOW: So from the viewpoint of the 18 licensee -- I mean, I don't split that meeting into 19 compartments. To me it is the whole package that I am 20 getting from the insight from the residents. 21 MR. CLARK: Let me bridge over here too. 22 I mean, a lot of comments you hear from inspectors, we are kind of paid to be critical, right? We are also 23 24 -- I want to emphasize a positive aspect here as well.

I think an important feature that was lost was the

| positive comments in the inspection report. I |
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| continually hear that it was an industry request that |
| those positive comments not be shown in the inspection |
| report and it is now our policy that those positive |
| comments do not show up in the inspection report. I |
| would have to say for a strong performing licensee |
| that those comments probably don't do a whole lot. |
| But for a licensee that has some issues or that has |
| some struggles, that actually shows improvement. And |
| I think that can actually instill public confidence in |
| both our inspection process with them and the |
| licensee's performance with the public. I recently had |
| a member of the public you know, actually I was |
| surprised. They were looking through the Website and |
| they were reading the inspection reports. And they |
| said we have noticed that there has not been anything |
| positive come out about Cooper in the last like six |
| months. So I had to go through the process to explain |
| to them that there is a reason for that. That we |
| don't do that anymore. And that member of the public |
| actually stated to me that they thought that was a |
| great disservice. |

MR. BORCHARDT: Earlier this morning there was some discussion about the sensitivity to white findings and I suspect there is a sensitivity to even

some green findings, but we talked about white findings. Now on the panel, you represent plants that were both pilot and non-pilot. Do you have a sense amongst yourselves that have the pilot plants -- has their sensitivity lowered because they have been with the process longer or is this likely to be a long-term issue?

I'll go ahead and answer for MR. BRADY: the plant that I am at. I don't think the sensitivity has lowered. In fact, I think it has continued to increase. The comments that we have gotten from the management at this utility are we continue to be ahead of their staff in risk -- being risk informed. One of the things that we have done because the Phase 2 sheets were not in the usable form that we thought they were going to be is we have gone back to the thumb rule that we have gotten from the SRAs that say take the risk achievement worth minus 1 times the base CDF and you can come up with a rough figure of what delta CDF is. And the licensee where we are has a table of those risk achievement worth values. And what we, the residents, did is we solved that equation backwards to say what does a raw value need to be to get greater than 10^{-6} . What does a raw value need to be to get greater than 10^{-5} . And so we have those

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| laid out on our board. You know, 1.02 is above |
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| that is white. Above 1.2 is and so forth. So by |
| doing that, we are continually as issues come up, |
| we can make a rough estimate of, hey, this is a |
| potential something or other. Now obviously those |
| things don't factor in recovery. But it gives you a |
| quick idea of where does this thing fall from a risk |
| standpoint. So we see things that happen and we can |
| quickly say, hey, this looks like a potential so-and- |
| so and we need to follow that. I notice one of your |
| concerns in here was about plant status. That is |
| where you pick those things up. That is the reason |
| that plant status is so important in doing this |
| inspection program. Because when you plan all of these |
| inspections out in advance and you go in to do them, |
| if you are doing plant inspections looking for |
| hypothetical problems and ignoring the real problem |
| that is right there while you are at the plant, you |
| are not doing the right thing. So we are continually |
| looking from a plant status standpoint at what are the |
| real issues that are going on and do we need to move |
| over from the planned inspection program break our |
| plan and do the risk significant item. Because of |
| that, we focus on risk significant issues quickly, |
| identify the risk significance a lot faster than what |

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the licensee does. I don't know if that answers your question, but for us that is what we do.

MR. CLARK: I would say at Cooper recall increased. sensitivity is Ι early in, especially in the pilot process, we were explaining to the licensee why we were inspecting. And we would walk them through the SDP and we would say because you had a diesel out or because you had HPSI out or whatever. We see this as potentially a risk significant event, so we are going to inspect this on this attachment. And then we get an okay. As the inspection program has progressed, it is now the relationship of we give somewhat the same explanation. You know, you just had HPSI fail because of this, therefore we are going to inspect it. And we get an immediate response back and it is green because of this. So we are getting that immediate argument up front now as to why the licensee views it as green.

MR. BRADY: The other thing that I have seen is when the licensee begins to focus on the risk significance of the issue, the words that are beginning to come out is as the delta CDF goes up, their staff need to recognize that the level of uncertainty needs to go down as far as how they analyze what is going on in that particular item. So

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| 1 | that has changed the licensee's approach to things by |
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| 2 | early on attempting to do the same thing that we are |
| 3 | doing. Saying, hey, this could be a potential green, |
| 4 | white or yellow, and therefore, if it is a potential |
| 5 | yellow, we need to have this thing really nailed down. |
| 6 | If it is a low level green or something like that, you |
| 7 | may use more engineering judgment and make more |
| 8 | assumptions and so forth because the risk isn't as |
| 9 | high. |
| 10 | MR. CLARK: Steve, I think we are going to |
| 11 | have to take off. We are going to abandon these guys. |
| 12 | MR. BRADY: Yes, Steve and I will stay for |
| 13 | whatever additional questions you have. |
| 14 | MR. CLARK: Thank you. |
| 15 | MR. GARCHOW: Is there anything in the |
| 16 | program from I'll say you are right at the point of |
| 17 | attack, right? So from right at the point of attack, |
| 18 | is there anything in the program that you see causes |
| 19 | it to be unworkable or causes you to question its |
| 20 | ability to move forward? Or are the issues able to be |
| 21 | identified and are they being worked and you see |
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| 22 | improvements in the process? What concerns you the |
| 22 | |
| | improvements in the process? What concerns you the |

| gotten to. Maybe four or five months ago, I was |
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| asking myself the question, well, how important are |
| the new procedures versus the old ones? And the |
| conclusion I came to was we could go back to the old |
| procedures and not miss a beat, but please don't take |
| the SDP away from me. That is the thing that when you |
| talk about the new program and you talk to the public, |
| those risk-informed decisions are based on the risk to |
| the public. It used to be you would see the clipping |
| in the paper that said we have fined so-and-so |
| \$50,000.00, and your neighbors would say should we |
| evacuate or what should you do. And we would end up |
| saying, no, we are just mad at them. And when you now |
| look at this new program and you look at, okay, you |
| had a white finding, what does that mean? Oh, well, |
| that is a decade increase in risk to you. That means |
| something to those folks as opposed to we are just mad |
| at them. And that is the real positive, I think, of |
| this new program. So when you look at where do we go |
| from here, I think it is more and better SDPs. There |
| are still some areas such as spent fuel. You know, |
| there is potentially four or five cores sitting in a |
| cool. There is four or five cores sitting in an |
| independent spent fuel storage facility. There is risk |

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associated with those. I don't know what they are 1 2 because the SDP doesn't cover that. 3 MR. REYNOLDS: I have to say one thing. I don't think the NRC takes action on a licensee just 4 because we are mad at them. We don't do that. 5 6 I disagree with you there, Joe. And I never have. 7 think -- that is fine, Steve. I am just telling you the Agency's position on that. And I think if you talk 8 9 to Bill Borchardt in enforcement -- enforcement doesn't let us -- that office doesn't let us take 10 11 actions because we are mad at people. MR. GARCHOW: I think I heard his response 12 13 in the spirit he gave it. MR. SETSER: But it helps ease the pain. 14 15 MR. KRICH: Joe, let me ask you something. I may have missed something. I'm sorry, did you have 16 17 more, Steve? 18 MR. REYNOLDS: Me or this one? 19 MR. KRICH: You. MR. REYNOLDS: No, I am fine. 20 21 MR. KRICH: Let me make sure I understand. 22 Can you reconcile -- and I may have missed this. I was out of the room and I apologize. You like the SDP. 23 24 MR. BRADY: Yes.

| 1 | MR. KRICH: But you said just before that |
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| 2 | that the licensee is using risk significance before |
| 3 | you even have a chance to get into something. They |
| 4 | will come to you and say well MT is out of service but |
| 5 | it has low risk significance. |
| 6 | MR. BRADY: Potentially. |
| 7 | MR. KRICH: Yes. How do you I mean, |
| 8 | using SDP as well, how do you rectify |
| 9 | MR. BRADY: That is fine. I don't see a |
| 10 | problem with that. |
| 11 | MR. KRICH: Okay. |
| 12 | MR. BRADY: I think it is important that |
| 13 | they look at risk just like we do and decisions should |
| 14 | be based on risk. And that is one of the things that |
| 15 | we look at when we go to do the PINR inspection. Are |
| 16 | they properly prioritizing corrective actions in |
| 17 | accordance with risk to the public. |
| 18 | MR. KRICH: Okay. I misunderstood. I |
| 19 | thought you were looking at that as that was not a |
| 20 | good way to use the process. |
| 21 | MR. BRADY: No, I think that is good. |
| 22 | MR. CAMPBELL: I think the program has got |
| 23 | us more focused. It is more structured. But there is |
| 24 | it limits you. That is what I feel about the new |
| 25 | program. And I think it is risk-based, but I think |

| 1 | there is always room for improvement. I will give you |
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| 2 | an example. I was going through 0609, appendix G, |
| 3 | which is a shutdown inspection manual where they had |
| 4 | issues, and we found that that inspection manual said |
| 5 | that there was four diesels for every site in the U.S. |
| 6 | And that is just a blatant error. But there is always |
| 7 | need for improvement. And I think that residents have |
| 8 | to continue to use PRA and that should be second |
| 9 | nature to them. We have good courses on taking PRA and |
| 10 | using it, but we have got to make sure that our |
| 11 | residents are out there using it frequently. |
| 12 | MR. KRICH: And if I understand, the |
| 13 | limiting part of it is that as you explained you are |
| 14 | unable to put down what you see as a trend or some |
| 15 | performance issue that |
| 16 | MR. CAMPBELL: Latent issues that can't |
| 17 | make it to the report. |
| 18 | MR. KRICH: Right. |
| 19 | MR. CAMPBELL: But we can discuss it with |
| 20 | them and monitor and see if they are putting it in |
| 21 | their corrective action program. |
| 22 | MR. SHADIS: I would think that would be |
| 23 | of value to your successor should you leave that |
| 24 | position and move on to another position. Your |
| 25 | professional discretion or observations under |

professional discretion are preserved to the benefit, whether they are discarded or not for the next person that steps in to look at that plant. And I just would have to presume you agree that that is the case.

MR. CAMPBELL: Yes. There is always -- I think when we had TMI, we went one way in terms of the way we inspected. It was very hard and a little bit more conservative and had a lot of TMI action items. Now there is a request for a change in our program, which is good too. But we have to be balanced. We can't go the other direction all the way. We need to get -- we need to find a happy middle where we can still identify problems that are risk significant and make sure that the licensee is fixing them and not be so much indicating how they are performing real time. We have to have the ability to be able to say you look like you are going this way and if you don't fix it, in more problems you will be than what performance indicators say. Because you can actually have a plant in the green and all of a sudden end up in the red. How did they cross all those thresholds? If you don't have some way of, you know, feeding it back to them on how they are performing.

MS. FERDIG: As I understand this program, one of the characteristics used to describe it is that

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objective, risk it informed is more identifying problems. And so what that implies to me it tries to narrow out some subjectivity or the kinds of things that went into what were perceived to be inconsistent judgments from to plant across regions and so ultimately began to encroach upon what many might refer to as management kinds of issues outside of the regulatory space. So given what you have said and given what seems to be the obvious advantage to have someone from your perspective offer what it is you see that might have an impact on how things get done to avoid problems down the road, what are some ways to think about how to do that that keep it as objective as possible? To keep it from getting out of control? To keep it from enabling you with well-intentioned efforts to encroach upon what would be management space in running its utility?

MR. CAMPBELL: Particularly after our report in the outage -- I keep talking about that report because since then we have screened out all issues to be no findings. But even during that time of the outage, they spent our inspection reports for review. And NRR would actually sit down and see were we actually implementing the program consistently and

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then take out issues that they don't feel to be consistent with the way other plants have been doing it.

MS. FERDIG: NRR would be kind of check and balance?

MR. CAMPBELL: Yes. There was a time when screening reports to see if we were they were implementing the program consistently. We even had one issue that was taken out where an operator didn't perform a surveillance correctly. We thought that that was a human performance issue, but they took it out because they didn't feel it reached the threshold for being risk significant, which is true. But they don't have the advantage of being at the site understanding what our concerns are. And we have told -- we have relayed to them that our concern here is not so much risk significance, but it is a human performance error that is recurring. So I think to answer your question would be the screening probably good. It opens up a pretty healthy dialogue between us and NRR to make sure that we have consistent reports. Ιt seems like the process, although it is good for being structured, tries to narrow it down where the rubber meets the road, right at the inspector office. We are trying to whittle --

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you know, get rid of them now. If we put them in our report and send them to NRR and they screen it and they say, well, these aren't risk significance but we see what you are saying because it looks like you have a trend here. I mean, we will keep it in. So I think the screening part is a good idea. Because we don't have the advantage of knowing what is going on at the other sites. We are only at Fermi. We don't know what is going on at say Hatch, for example. Whereas NRR has that advantage. They read all the reports and then they put out reports that are trying to be consistent. But we are trying -- I think we are kind of limited where we are at in the field. We are just getting rid of the issues on the field instead of presenting it to NRR and let them screen it out. I don't know if that is going to be a way to make it objective.

CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Last questions?

Resources. We have heard -- we have got a lot of input all over the map. Some people think that there is too much in the program. Some people think there is too little in the program. Some of those comments are specific to specific parts of the program. But if you can speak to the inspection procedures that you complete. In general, how do you feel about the

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estimated resource allocations and what you are given to do the program.

MR. BRADY: Let me try and answer it this When we originally put the procedures together, the numbers that were there were based on performing the procedure and not finding a problem. Now if you start adding in problems, that runs the numbers up. And a problem at his plant may take longer to resolve than a problem at my plant or vice versa. So when you begin to mix those in, it skews the numbers. And how do you average those. But if you took performances of each of these procedures where they were done without a problem being found and you averaged those, I think that would be a reasonable number to say this is how much -- this is how many resources it should take without a problem. Okay, now what happens if you have a problem? Okay, you go longer. The idea being you've got to complete the procedure. Everybody gets the same amount of inspection. That doesn't mean hours. That means completing the line items of the procedure. Now a plant that is having a lot of problems is going to end up with more inspection hours. A plant that doesn't have many problems is going to have less because it is going to take less time to do the procedure. So if you are talking about the hours,

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estimated hours in the procedure, you have to be very careful in what you are putting in to calculate those hours. You can raise the hours or lower the hours. But based on accomplishing every line item in the procedure, it is going to depend on the performance of the licensee to a certain extent.

CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Have you felt any constraint as far as your resource allocation and getting the inspections you think that need to be done at the site?

MR. BRADY: No, I haven't felt any restraint.

MR. CAMPBELL: To be more specific, I think the inspection procedures that really doesn't mean too much to me personally would be probably the operator workarounds. We found issues where they weren't putting in operator workarounds, but it didn't anything, least from enforcement mean at an standpoint. We said okay and they wrote a card and that was it. I am not really -- I don't know why that one is there. I know you probably get that from a plant status point of view. Temporary mods is another one. One hour for fire protection. How thorough a fire protection inspection can you do in an hour? What I do is mainly to try to get more out of that

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inspection would be to spend several hours preparing 1 2 it, reading the USAR and reading the fire 3 protection plan and then going out and looking and then charging all those hours I did for preparation 4 under baseline prep. I think it is just right. You 5 6 have to do the accounting on it. You have to say to 7 do a thorough inspection, I need to prepare for it very thoroughly and then charge the hours I need to do 8 9 to fulfill the inspection program. But like I said, operator workarounds I can't justify. I do it, but I 10 just really don't see any benefit in that. 11 12 So do you have a process MR. GARCHOW: 13 how robust is the process from perspective of that kind of feedback getting rolled up 14 15 and acted upon and communicated back to you that, you know, we got it and here is what we are doing about 16 17 I mean, is there a process for your feedback to 18 impact the process? 19 MR. CAMPBELL: For us at the NRC or the 20 licensee? 21 MR. GARCHOW: No, you as the senior 22 You just had a concern to say, hey, this doesn't quite make sense, an operator workaround. 23

am using your example.

1 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes, we use a feedback 2 form. 3 MR. GARCHOW: So you use the feedback forms. And how timely is your -- do you get feedback 4 that somebody has got it and they looked into it? 5 6 mean, is that satisfactory in your opinion? 7 MR. CAMPBELL: Specifically for me it has been effective. 8 9 MR. BRADY: It has been slow, I think, to 10 I think that has certain extent, and been 11 recognized, both by the regional management and by To a certain extent, when we went through the 12 NRR. pilot program, some of the forms were accumulated. So 13 14 it -- I think it is changing. I think Bill is staffing 15 to try to get the backlog down. But we are, yes, beginning now to hear, yes, we have got the forms and 16 17 we are doing something with it and it will be in the 18 next revision and you get an e-mail back in not too 19 long a period of time that says, yes, they got it. 20 MR. CAMPBELL: One last comment I want to 21 make I think would be we have good SRAs in the region 22 and I think they are a good idea. I think we should use them as much as we can. But we need to give them 23 24 the tools to be really effective. The issues that I

call them up about, they like to know what the

| 1 | licensee how the licensee is coming up on their |
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| 2 | assessment in terms of risk. We need to be able to be |
| 3 | independent of them and not ask them how you came up |
| 4 | with where you are on risk in terms of this issue. We |
| 5 | need to have our SRAs with the right tools to be able |
| 6 | to independently come up with their own risk numbers. |
| 7 | There has been a couple of occasions where I called |
| 8 | the region and talked to them about an issue and the |
| 9 | first question is did you find out what the licensee |
| 10 | has in terms of risk. I think we are lagging there to |
| 11 | give the SRAs what they need to do their job to be |
| 12 | effective and independent. |
| 13 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Any more questions? We |
| 14 | appreciate your time coming to talk to us. |
| 15 | MR. BRADY: Well, thank you for having us. |
| 16 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: I think everyone is |
| 17 | ready for a lunch break. Let's go ahead and take an |
| 18 | hour until 1:30. We will start at 1:30. |
| 19 | (Whereupon, at 12:31 p.m., the meeting was |
| 20 | adjourned for lunch, to reconvene this same day at |
| 21 | 1:41 p.m.) |
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(1:41 p.m.)

agenda is to do some additional initial prioritization of issues and then do some agenda planning this afternoon. I think our practice at the last couple of meetings at this point is let's talk dates for our meetings so that during our next break if people need to check back on calendars and things like that then we can confirm those this afternoon. We will do that first.

MR. GARCHOW: Didn't we put the same date for that last meeting? Didn't we go two ahead?

CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Yes, that is what I was going to do this time. We have got February 26 and 27 for our next meeting. After that, there is a couple of options. One that has been proposed, because I know a number of people here plan to go to the External Lessons Learned Workshop, and one option is just to tack on to the Thursday and Friday of that week and do it. That makes a long week.

MR. KRICH: When was that?

CHAIRMAN PLISCO: That is the last week in March. The External Lessons Learned -- the 26, 27 and 28 is the External Lessons Learned.

| 1 | MR. GARCHOW: Where does that fall in | |
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| 2 | relative to the Reg Info Conference? Is that the week | |
| 3 | prior? | |
| 4 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Two weeks later. The | |
| 5 | other option is to go ahead and do it the week after | |
| 6 | that. That is the first week in April. We could do | |
| 7 | it like ACRS and do a Saturday. No. | |
| 8 | MR. FLOYD: I vote week after. That is a | |
| 9 | bit much, five days of this. | |
| 10 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: I thought so too, but | |
| 11 | that was proposed and I just wanted to put it on the | |
| 12 | table. That is a long week. | |
| 13 | MR. GARCHOW: Prior to April 7 I need | |
| 14 | because we go into a refueling outage in that early | |
| 15 | April, so I need to be there for that. | |
| 16 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: I have to plan on two | |
| 17 | full days. | |
| 18 | MR. BROCKMAN: In some ways getting out of | |
| 19 | the second half of the retreat is not necessarily a | |
| 20 | bad deal. | |
| 21 | MR. SCHERER: No, I can't do that. Sorry. | |
| 22 | MR. GARCHOW: What does that Monday and | |
| 23 | Tuesday look like the first week in April? What dates | |
| 24 | are those? | |
| 25 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Second and third. | |

| 1 | MS. FERDIG: Second and third. |
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| 2 | MR. GARCHOW: That seems to work. I mean |
| 3 | it would work for me. I don't know if everyone else |
| 4 | Monday and Tuesday is probably the least impactful for |
| 5 | me. |
| 6 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: What do the 2nd and 3rd |
| 7 | look like? |
| 8 | MR. REYNOLDS: The 3rd and 4th are bad for |
| 9 | me. And I already told you I am going to miss |
| 10 | February. |
| 11 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Anyone else have a |
| 12 | problem? |
| 13 | MR. SCHERER: The beginning of the week is |
| 14 | difficult for me. |
| 15 | MR. SETSER: If we make it more attractive |
| 16 | to you depending on where we are going to have it, |
| 17 | would that make a difference on your retreat or not? |
| 18 | MR. REYNOLDS: It makes it more attractive |
| 19 | for me, but my ability to go is still the same or |
| 20 | lack of ability to go is still the same. |
| 21 | MR. BROCKMAN: What are we backing up |
| 22 | against? When are we |
| 23 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Our original target to |
| 24 | try to get our report out is April 29. Now based on |
| 25 | looking at some ability in schedule, we have a little |

| 1 | more flex than I thought we had initially because they |
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| 2 | backed their date out now to the 29th. |
| 3 | MR. BROCKMAN: Is the 5th and 6th a better |
| 4 | option? We didn't look at the last two days of the |
| 5 | week. And that is still before the 7th. |
| 6 | MS. FERDIG: That would work for Steve. |
| 7 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: But it sounds like it is |
| 8 | a problem for Dave. |
| 9 | MR. BROCKMAN: No, Dave is okay. He has |
| 10 | just got to be back the 7th. Is the 5th and 6th okay? |
| 11 | MR. GARCHOW: Is that a Thursday and |
| 12 | Friday? |
| 13 | MR. BROCKMAN: Thursday and Friday. |
| 14 | MR. GARCHOW: That probably won't work for |
| 15 | me. I mean, if I am not there I can catch it from |
| 16 | Steve or plug in later. Earlier in that week is |
| 17 | better than later. I mean Monday and Tuesday, I could |
| 18 | commit to, but I can't commit to Thursday and Friday. |
| 19 | MR. BLOUGH: Should we look at did we |
| 20 | the External Lessons Learned is Monday, Tuesday and |
| 21 | Wednesday of the previous week. It sounds like we |
| 22 | have problems that next week. Did we eliminate the |
| 23 | Thursday and Friday of the same week? |
| 24 | MR. GARCHOW: The week before you are |
| 25 | talking about? |

| 1 | MR. BLOUGH: Wiping out the whole week. |
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| 2 | MR. BROCKMAN: There are a few who said |
| 3 | that their productivity may be limited. |
| 4 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Yes, after three days of |
| 5 | the workshop. |
| 6 | MS. FERDIG: And a few who can't come. |
| 7 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Mary can't come on the |
| 8 | 30th. |
| 9 | MR. BLOUGH: So we did eliminate the week |
| 10 | before? |
| 11 | MR. KRICH: What about the week of the |
| 12 | 21st? The 19th and 20th of March? |
| 13 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: I thought there was some |
| 14 | benefit to having it after the External Workshop too. |
| 15 | Hopefully by the end of our February meeting, we will |
| 16 | have at least put on the table most of the issues, and |
| 17 | I think it would be worthwhile to hear those at that |
| 18 | external workshop and the other discussion of similar |
| 19 | issues I think will help us. |
| 20 | MR. TRAPP: If we move it up a couple of |
| 21 | weeks too, we are getting real close to the February |
| 22 | one. |
| 23 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Yes, and that runs into |
| 24 | practical problems for John as far as getting his |
| 25 | minutes out and meeting notices out and Federal |

| 1 | Register notices out because of the timeliness |
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| 2 | requirements. |
| 3 | MR. GARCHOW: I think if one or two of us |
| 4 | are not going to be able to make it is just going to |
| 5 | be a fact of life. We are trying to herd 17 diverse |
| 6 | people that have other jobs besides supporting this |
| 7 | one. So I would not feel offended if you had it that |
| 8 | end of that week in April and I wasn't there. I will |
| 9 | just catch up. I have got contacts. |
| 10 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: But it sounds like the |
| 11 | 2nd and 3rd I thought what I heard is all we have |
| 12 | is Steve on the second day. |
| 13 | MR. KRICH: I for one think Steve is very |
| 14 | important. |
| 15 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: We'll just let him do |
| 16 | all his talking the first day. |
| 17 | MR. SCHERER: Kissing up always pays off. |
| 18 | MR. FLOYD: Ed, is Thursday and Friday any |
| 19 | better for you than Monday and Tuesday? It is? |
| 20 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Say it again? |
| 21 | MR. FLOYD: I was just asking Ed if |
| 22 | Thursday and Friday is better for him than Monday and |
| 23 | Tuesday, and he said it was. |
| 24 | MR. SCHERER: I might be able to I'll |
| 25 | make some calls. I might be able to move some things |

| 1 | around. But right now, the 2nd and 3rd is a tough day |
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| 2 | and the 5th and 6th is better for me. But I can make |
| 3 | some calls to see if I can move some things around. |
| 4 | MR. GARCHOW: So it sounds like a good |
| 5 | executive decision opportunity for the chairman and we |
| 6 | can move on to a meaningful discussion. |
| 7 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Why don't we look at |
| 8 | those two and we will revisit this later this |
| 9 | afternoon. Ed is going to check and see if he can |
| 10 | shuffle things around. We are looking at April 2nd |
| 11 | and 3rd or the 5th and 6th. |
| 12 | MR. BROCKMAN: And Ed holds the keys. |
| 13 | MR. SCHERER: What was that, Ken? |
| 14 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Anything else on that? |
| 15 | MR. GARCHOW: Did we finalize the location |
| 16 | of the February meeting? |
| 17 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: We didn't, but John and |
| 18 | I were talking last night. I know some of the |
| 19 | attendees that we had talked about |
| 20 | MR. MONNINGER: The past meeting we talked |
| 21 | about for the February meeting hearing from public |
| 22 | interest groups such as UCS and Public Citizen, NEI, |
| 23 | representatives of the press and/or media, |
| 24 | representatives of the financial community and members |
| 25 | from PPEP. |

| 1 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: 90 percent of that list |
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| 2 | are located here. I was going to get to that later |
| 3 | this afternoon. But based on that list |
| 4 | MR. MONNINGER: I guess you could ask if |
| 5 | it is still a good list? |
| 6 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: And if we invite them, |
| 7 | obviously the likelihood of them coming would increase |
| 8 | if we have it here in this area. So that was going to |
| 9 | be my proposal to stay in the D.C. area. Any other |
| 10 | suggestions? I guess we don't know if it will be this |
| 11 | place. We give it to our contracts people and they |
| 12 | bid it out. We can't ask for a particular location. |
| 13 | Anything else on that? |
| 14 | MR. GARCHOW: As long as it is close to a |
| 15 | Metro stop. That is helpful to some of us in here. |
| 16 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Yes, we can put some |
| 17 | criteria. |
| 18 | MR. MONNINGER: Is this close to a Metro |
| 19 | stop? |
| 20 | MR. GARCHOW: Not as close as I thought. |
| 21 | But it was okay. |
| 22 | MR. MONNINGER: Because we clearly put in |
| 23 | close to it and this is what they got back. |
| 24 | MR. GARCHOW: Well, close is a relative |
| 25 | term, John. |

| 1 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Okay. And we'll talk a |
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| 2 | little bit more about some of the agenda items later. |
| 3 | But for the rest of the afternoon, what I would like |
| 4 | to do is continue through our prioritization of the |
| 5 | issues with Chip's assistance. What I was going to |
| 6 | propose in the order that we do this is to do the |
| 7 | assessment and enforcement area and the inspection |
| 8 | area. |
| 9 | MR. SCHERER: Before we do that, we ran |
| 10 | out of time when we were doing the significance |
| 11 | determination process and I don't think we went back |
| 12 | to that to revisit. And one of the issues that at |
| 13 | least I had that I didn't see there yet was the |
| 14 | process for identifying and resolving false negatives. |
| 15 | So I feel |
| 16 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: That is captured in the |
| 17 | overall. We put that John and I have that under |
| 18 | the feedback and lessons learned process. |
| 19 | MR. SCHERER: Okay. |
| 20 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: I think it is in an |
| 21 | overall |
| 22 | MR. SCHERER: But until we get to the |
| 23 | overall, I would like to at least leave a place holder |
| 24 | in the SDP process where I think the vulnerability |
| 25 | lies more than any other area. |

1 Maybe I should go through MR. CAMERON: 2 these parking lot issues and see if that is captured and add that on. 3 MR. SCHERER: If it is at least in the 4 parking lot, that would be find with me. 5 6 MR. CAMERON: All right. Let me just go 7 through these quickly. Is that okay with you, Loren? CHAIRMAN PLISCO: 8 Yes. 9 MR. CAMERON: These are just sort of a 10 reminder of things that may be outstanding that the 11 panel needs to agree on. And you may have agreed on 12 some of these but some of them are a little squishy and some of them are still unsettled, I think. 13 Criteria for prioritization. First of all, you were 14 15 talking about are we doing the priorities against all eight objectives or only against the maintain public 16 17 health and safety? The fact is that when we went 18 through the SDP area, we did it against all of the 19 objectives. So I guess by implication, that is what we 20 are going to be -- what you are going to be doing. But 21 that was one issue that was raised yesterday. 22 The second one in terms of the criteria were criterion 1. We had the S word -- I think that is 23 24 the S word, showstopper. We had fatal flaw.

serious. There was a long-term versus short-term issue

that played into this. And I think what we decided to do there was to go through some of the specific categories and see how that shook out and maybe revisit these later. And if any of you think that these have been solved, let me know.

We need to review the major categories and the summary table of issues. I think Ed brought that up after we are done to see if that categories still make sense. Review issues in individual categories to see what should be pulled into category 02, need for public access to information, or category 05, need for timely and clear public communications. We identified a couple of those in the SDP area.

We talked about this. How much should ongoing staff work to fix an issue, influence the priority determination of the issue? Another suggestion from Ed, a periodic and systematic review of all SDPs should be reflected in the overarching issues. I think we are going to make Ed the king of the parking lot actually. He has come up with a lot of these. Need to incorporate any new issues raised by the presentations yesterday and today. And I imagine, Loren, you and John will be looking at that for the next time.

| 1 | And identify any other issues in each |
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| 2 | category that need to be added. I don't know if this |
| 3 | goes to your point, Ed, or not. But we did add 10 and |
| 4 | 11 onto the SDP category yesterday. Loren, do you want |
| 5 | to finish that out with other issues or do you just |
| 6 | want to jump into assessment? |
| 7 | MR. GARCHOW: I have a suggestion, Loren. |
| 8 | We had two issues yesterday on SDP. We specifically |
| 9 | said let's listen to the SRAs and then come back and |
| 10 | assign the score. And I think the questions we asked |
| 11 | I mean, the ones I asked were right towards those |
| 12 | because I knew we had to come back and close that out. |
| 13 | MR. CAMERON: And that was threshold and |
| 14 | use of colors, right? Those were the two issues? |
| 15 | MR. GARCHOW: It was the impact of the TSA |
| 16 | models not being consistent on the process. That was |
| 17 | the first one. |
| 18 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Right, S-6. |
| 19 | MR. GARCHOW: So those may or may not be |
| 20 | able to be closed out quickly, but while it is fresh |
| 21 | on our mind I suggest we at least talk about it. |
| 22 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Why don't we do that. |
| 23 | The first one was S-6 on PRA quality and consistency. |
| 24 | It looked like we were undecided between a 1 or a 2 |
| 25 | where we were on that. What do we think now? |

MS. FERDIG: Part of our indecision had to do with the fact that there were checks and balances in place and they are working toward it, which gave it a twoish sound. And yet others were thinking that the degree to which it is consistent standards and so on.

MR. BROCKMAN: Until we deal with that one parking lot issue, that action could affect things. This is going to continue to come back and bugaboo us all day long. Until we deal with the parking lot issue concerning do we take into consideration as our rating whether there are actions ongoing already.

Well, relative to the MR. GARCHOW: inconsistent PSA, I was trying to get them to answer the question. Even though it is an efficiency issue, a lot more dialogue. Maybe it affects timeliness. mean, I didn't hear any of them tell me that that was causing them to come up with whatever a wrong answer would be when I asked them directly. So I think that was -- at least for my personal money, the answer to that was whether this was a very major issue that would get a 1, or is it something we can allow to be a priority issue and keep working on the level 2 action sheets and wherever the industry effort and NRC effort is in standardizing PSA, can those trains just sort of keep chugging along independent of

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process. That is what I was trying to get them to talk about.

And I think the other thing MR. FLOYD: that I heard was that they felt like the differences were narrowing in the PRAs. If you look at the IPE results, then there are some significant differences. But they talked to most of the licensees and got updated information and the results are much more consistent. And I also heard where differences, they feel like they have understanding of why those differences are there and they are able to factor that into their decision such that they are not reaching the wrong conclusions.

MR. SHADIS: Yes, but do you gentlemen think that all eight of those objectives can be met if these PRAs aren't trued up -- if this isn't taken care of? I mean the statement for category 1 here is if it is not corrected, it could threaten meeting one of the goals of the ROP. So essentially if any one of the goals of the ROP is threatened, that is the language we have. If the issue isn't corrected. Does it meet that?

MR. CAMERON: Someone did raise the issue of is it understandable. In other words, has it been explained and has it been articulated? Just a --

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besides the checks and balances and we are fixing the issue business, this issue of is it a 2 because even though the differences are -- the inconsistencies are less and they know why there are inconsistencies, is that being clearly communicated?

MR. SCHERER: Well, we are getting -- we are mixing two subjects in my mind. The subject and parking lot of what is a 1 and what is a 2. I tend to have -- still from yesterday, I tend to have the higher definition. Not a potential threat but a very real and imminent and cause the program to fail. And I have a problem giving it a 1 in my mind because the SRAs indicated that they were comfortable that it may be burdensome and it may be a problem and it may cause them some extra effort until we get the process further along, but what I was hearing is that they were comfortable they were coming to the right answer. They were addressing the issue and they were able to address the issue in a clear and explainable manner after the fact. So that they could justify what it is they decided and clarify it for the public and for the other stakeholders. So I believe it is a high priority subject, but I don't see that the lack of that would cause the staff to be unable to implement the program.

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MR. SHADIS: But what we have written down 1 2 -- I mean, the language that we have to work with is whether or not it threatens meeting one of the goals. 3 So do you think that if one or two or three of the 4 5 goals were not met that that would threaten the 6 program? 7 MR. SCHERER: One or two of the eight goals that we have? 8 9 MR. SHADIS: Yes. I mean that is what we 10 are coming to. Yes. But I don't think it 11 MR. SCHERER: 12 does. I can't find a goal that at the end of the process we will fail to meet. 13 I think a good example of 14 MR. FLOYD: 15 maybe what Ed was just talking about -- again, I would urge people to look at the Indian Point-2 16 qo 17 inspection report. Because in there, it does talk 18 about how that was initially a proposed red. It talks 19 about the licensee came in and they had dialogue and 20 it explains the rationale for how the Agency factored in the information from the licensee and concluded 21 22 that it was still a red finding. So I think it is understandable. Now it does require a member of the 23 24 public to go to the inspection report level. But I

would think if they see a red on the Website and were

| 1 | concerned about it that they would go click on it and |
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| 2 | read the inspection report, for those that get to the |
| 3 | Website. |
| 4 | MR. BORCHARDT: I think we have a problem |
| 5 | with the definition of 1, though, and it is that word |
| 6 | could. Because it places a bunch of hypotheticals |
| 7 | into play. And I think we need to agree on perhaps a |
| 8 | new definition for number 1, and then we can get to |
| 9 | whether or not the issue at hand impacts. |
| 10 | MR. SCHERER: I thought we did that |
| 11 | yesterday, but we didn't reach agreement. |
| 12 | MR. BORCHARDT: I think our official words |
| 13 | are as originally proposed. I don't think we actually |
| 14 | did |
| 15 | MR. CAMERON: Yes, I don't think we closed |
| 16 | on that because we weren't really getting anywhere. |
| 17 | And so we said let's go through a bottom-up routine |
| 18 | and see if that helped us out any. |
| 19 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: I think we decided to |
| 20 | come back to this after we tried out one area and then |
| 21 | see what we thought about the definition. |
| 22 | MR. MONNINGER: It would seem like a |
| 23 | starting point would be just to take out the word |
| 24 | could and throw an S on the word threaten it |
| 25 | threatens meaning. So it is more of a |

| 1 | MR. SCHERER: Well, threatens bothers me |
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| 2 | too because that is a potential. Everything can be a |
| 3 | potential. I my suggestion yesterday was that we |
| 4 | take out the word "could threaten", and it has to pose |
| 5 | a real problem to the process. The process essentially |
| 6 | won't work unless this is fixed real and imminent |
| 7 | danger, not potential not threaten not could or |
| 8 | might. |
| 9 | MR. BORCHARDT: Would you go so far as to |
| LO | put the word prevents? |
| L1 | MR. FLOYD: Right. That is what I would |
| L2 | say. |
| L3 | MR. SCHERER: Fine. |
| L4 | MR. FLOYD: That is a strong statement of |
| L5 | the goal. |
| L6 | MR. SCHERER: Yes. |
| L7 | MR. FLOYD: If the issue is not corrected, |
| L8 | it would prevent meeting one of the goals. |
| L9 | MR. SCHERER: And if I was king, would I |
| 20 | stop this process until that was fixed? |
| 21 | MR. SHADIS: That is a whole other ball |
| 22 | game. |
| 23 | MR. FLOYD: Yes, that is a different |
| 24 | question. |

| 1 | MR. SHADIS: We were arguing yesterday |
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| 2 | about whether or not all these goals had equal value |
| 3 | and what the weight of each goal was. People were |
| 4 | saying, well, you will never convince the public, et |
| 5 | cetera. So that you know, let's set that one aside |
| 6 | and deal with the remaining 7. I don't know how long |
| 7 | that process can go on before you are down to just |
| 8 | relieving regulatory burden or wherever it would go. |
| 9 | So I just would like to know you know, come to some |
| 10 | understanding of what the basic groundrules are here. |
| 11 | You know, where we are going. And then |
| 12 | MR. CAMERON: Can we just put to get to |
| 13 | that point, can we identify what the major issues and |
| 14 | controversy are? One of them is this potential versus |
| 15 | real threat. Okay? Another is are all goals equal? |
| 16 | MR. SHADIS: What Ed introduced here was |
| 17 | the notion that that first category should be a I |
| 18 | can't use the word should be a something that would |
| 19 | prevent the whole process from going forward. |
| 20 | MR. CAMERON: That is the third issue. In |
| 21 | other words, there is two ways to read this. It would |
| 22 | prevent a goal from being met, which are one of those |
| 23 | eight goals. Or it would prevent the program from |
| 24 | being successfully implemented. Those may be I |

mean, you might give a different priority to an issue

depending on whether you said prevents a goal from being implemented versus prevents the program from being successfully implemented.

MR. SHADIS: Yes, but Chip, if you used your terminology -- if this thing would prevent the program from being successfully implemented, I can't think of anything that would -- you know, it is of course conditional, if it is corrected. Do you know what I mean?

MR. GARCHOW: Let's fly up -- go up about 5000 more feet where you can get out of the details a little bit for a second. We are hearing evidence -- I won't say evidence. We are hearing getting information and I think there are two standards. One, have we heard anything that has a factual basis through the first year of initial implementation that would suggest that the issue, whatever it is we are talking about, has actually caused one of the objectives not to be met? So I think we have to answer that question. If the answer is no, then that answer is no. Then maybe another standard -- I think this group was collected together because of its diversity. So I think we do owe the NRC our collective judgment that did we hear anything in our questioning or reading the material that we at least could surmise that we could

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prioritize the issue saying that if left unchecked, this issue has a greater potential impact than this other issue. So that is two separate things. I mean, if we haven't seen any indication after a year and we have heard that and reviewed the data, I think we —— I think that is valid. That is actually using facts to help make the conclusion. And then use the second test to be collective judgment of trying to prioritize what are probably a whole sackful of open issues that have surfaced after a year.

MR. BROCKMAN: Why are we prioritizing these? What is our expectation from prioritizing them?

MR. GARCHOW: That is what Bill Dean asked us to do when we asked him what would be the biggest thing we could do to help. He said use your collective judgment.

MR. FLOYD: Quite honestly we wanted to establish -- I thought one reason was to see if there were any S-word issues that would say, hey, we are on the wrong track here and we ought to cease and desist until we fix this stuff. And then the second purpose was to help prioritize the issues for the staff to work on on some timetable. I would say prioritizing is strictly the latter. It is to give the staff our insights as to in what order or how to group the

allocation of their resources. It may be something totally separate to say that is broke. This thing can't go forward without that. It obviously gets resources, but it is really a different thing than giving a prioritization. And if we use that as our overall thought -- we want to bend these, and you need to work on it right now. And if you can't fix it, at least get some immediate compensatory action in place. This one is high priority. It needs to get fixed. You need to work on it, but it could take a while. The other one, when you get around to it, do it. And if you just try -- we are trying to be engineers and create a formula, and I would suggest maybe in this thing if we just took a more global approach to that philosophy, we might come into an agreement a lot easier.

MR. GARCHOW: I would agree with you, but I think there is a place for the facts to help make a conclusion. So if we are going to say it is significant or use any other word -- I mean, we have chosen to have the NRC come in and tell us what they are doing and working on. We had the seniors. We had the State of New Jersey. So all these people are coming in and giving their views to help us decide is any of these issues right from the point of attack,

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| 1 | the people that are dealing with it, causing any |
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| 2 | concern. And I think if there is objective evidence |
| 3 | yes, we have to say that. If we couldn't find any |
| 4 | evidence, we ought to say that as well. Because I |
| 5 | think from my PPEP experience, we are going to get |
| 6 | asked that by the commissioners. |
| 7 | MS. FERDIG: What happens if we ask the |
| 8 | question, what is most critical for the continued |
| 9 | success of this program? |
| 10 | MR. SHADIS: We are going to fight until |
| 11 | we die. What about if we |
| 12 | MS. FERDIG: No. I want an answer to that |
| 13 | question. |
| 14 | MR. SHADIS: Well, I am trying to answer |
| 15 | it. What about if we just get rid of priority 1 and |
| 16 | just do 2 and 3? High priority issue for |
| 17 | consideration or first and second priority or |
| 18 | something, and not try to scale something to the |
| 19 | absolute. |
| 20 | MR. CAMERON: You don't like the word high |
| 21 | or is there another |
| 22 | MR. SHADIS: No. I am just suggesting that |
| 23 | we are going to be going around a long time about what |
| 24 | are the things that the staff should immediately jump |
| 25 | on. That is going to be in fact, I would just |

| 1 | challenge the whole gathering here to go ahead and |
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| 2 | pick one. I don't think if you comb through there all |
| 3 | day you could pick one that most of us would agree |
| 4 | needs to be addressed right away and is something that |
| 5 | can't be done without. |
| 6 | MR. CAMERON: Mary put a suggestion on the |
| 7 | table. Was there any you were reacting to that |
| 8 | saying that that is not going to work. Does anybody |
| 9 | else have an opinion on Mary's suggestion? |
| LO | MR. SHADIS: Do you want to restate that, |
| L1 | Mary? |
| L2 | MS. FERDIG: Well, I don't know. I mean I |
| L3 | am just saying we are saying what are the things that |
| L4 | are going to keep it from happening. I am just saying |
| L5 | half glass full or half glass empty. What are the |
| L6 | things that are most critical to continue this program |
| L7 | to create the to achieve the goals? |
| L8 | MR. GARCHOW: So, Loren, can you read us |
| L9 | the charter again? I mean, not to bring |
| 20 | MR. SCHERER: I have the charter. I just |
| 21 | finished reading it. And |
| 22 | MR. CAMERON: You know, it is about this |
| 23 | time on the second day of every meeting that someone |
| 24 | says let's read the charter again. |
| 25 | MR. GARCHOW: It is kind of helpful. |

1 MR. SCHERER: What about Ray's suggestion? 2 I can go along with that. Just delete category 1 and 3 -- yes, high and low. Just for the rule-based 4 MR. GARCHOW: people in here, can you read the -- the charter had 5 6 one paragraph which might be good to refresh what that said. 7 "The IIEP will function as 8 MR. SCHERER: 9 a course disciplinary oversight group to independently 10 monitor and evaluate the results of the first year of the initial implementation of the reactor oversight 11 12 process and provide advice and recommendations to the Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 13 14 on reforming and revising the reactor oversight 15 process." The next paragraph then talks about some other issues. "The IIEP will evaluate the ROP results 16 17 against performance measures. The IIEP will provide 18 a written report containing an overall evaluation of 19 the ROP to the Director of the Office of Nuclear 20 Reactor Regulation." 21 MR. GARCHOW: So Ray's suggestion sounds 22 to me like it is well bounded by the charter. 23 High priority reform issues MR. FLOYD: 24 and low priority reform issues.

| 1 | MR. SHADIS: I don't know about low |
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| 2 | priority. I just want to suggest that category 2, the |
| 3 | second category those that are of you know, we |
| 4 | see as a lower safety significance or lower immediacy, |
| 5 | let's call them valid for consideration. These are |
| 6 | valid items for consideration. And then take your |
| 7 | other category, the upper level category, and call it |
| 8 | either priority consideration or subject for focused |
| 9 | consideration or enhanced or |
| LO | MR. SCHERER: What about the current |
| L1 | definition? Issues that should receive high priority |
| L2 | and issues for consideration? |
| L3 | MR. CAMERON: Okay. You have 2 and 3 as |
| L4 | the only priority criteria now? Just let me ask you |
| L5 | so that we don't have to go back and do this again |
| L6 | perhaps. |
| L7 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: I think the beauty of |
| L8 | keeping the same definition is that I don't think we |
| L9 | need to go back and redo the ones we have done already |
| 20 | because the definitions have stayed the same. |
| 21 | MR. SHADIS: I just sensed we were not |
| 22 | going to come to agreement about what were super |
| 23 | important. |

| 1 | MR. CAMERON: So what is the consensus of |
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| 2 | the group that you just reached now? Do you want to |
| 3 | restate it? |
| 4 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: The consensus as I |
| 5 | understand it is category 2 is now category 1 and |
| 6 | category 3 is now category 2. |
| 7 | MR. SCHERER: For purposes of this |
| 8 | meeting, let's just leave everything as is. The |
| 9 | definition of 2 stays the same. The definition of 3 |
| 10 | stays the same. And after we adjourn, everybody can |
| 11 | renumber it for the record. |
| 12 | MR. SHADIS: There is no 1. That is all. |
| 13 | One is gone. |
| 14 | MR. SCHERER: That way we don't have to go |
| 15 | back. What we called 2, afterwards you can correct to |
| 16 | be a 1. |
| 17 | MR. CAMERON: Are you still looking for |
| 18 | things forget the priority. Going back to Ken's |
| 19 | point about there is priorities for staff work and you |
| 20 | are looking for things that he called it are broken. |
| 21 | Are you still going to be looking for things that are |
| 22 | broken? Is that the broad fatal flaw, Bill's |
| 23 | showstopper or Jim's serious? |
| 24 | MR. SHADIS: I don't think we need to get |
| 25 | that particular. I think if the group senses that this |

| 1 | is important and should receive some priority |
|----|--|
| 2 | attention, that is all that I think we need to do. |
| 3 | MR. GARCHOW: That is good. |
| 4 | MR. SHADIS: Without arguing about even |
| 5 | the eight goals or whatever they are the goals or |
| 6 | objectives or whatever they are. |
| 7 | MR. GARCHOW: Good idea, Ray. |
| 8 | MR. BORCHARDT: So S-6 is a 2. |
| 9 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: So I hear S-6 is a 2. |
| 10 | MR. MONNINGER: I have already renumbered |
| 11 | them. |
| 12 | MS. FERDIG: And S-6 is a 1. |
| 13 | MR. GARCHOW: I'd say S-6 is a 2. |
| 14 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: And S-9? |
| 15 | MR. GARCHOW: So we are saying S-6 is |
| 16 | are we saying that |
| 17 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: S-6 is now a new 1. |
| 18 | MR. BROCKMAN: Okay. We agreed we have |
| 19 | gone from 1, 2 and 3 to 1 and 2. So we have got |
| 20 | terminology together. All right. We are all consistent |
| 21 | on terminology. |
| 22 | MR. GARCHOW: What was 2 is now 1 in this |
| 23 | standardization. |
| 24 | MR. BROCKMAN: Yes. Anything that was a 1 |
| 25 | or a 2 is now a 1. |

1 MR. GARCHOW: Got it. 2 MR. CAMERON: But, David, do you agree 3 under the new priorities or new numbering, do you agree with Mary's assessment of what it is or are you 4 saying it should be lower? 5 6 MR. GARCHOW: I still -- I see this as 7 something that isn't a priority -- that isn't a priority issue for the industry to have the reactor 8 9 oversight process drive the industry to having a 10 consistent PSA tool. I heard nothing when talking to the SRAs that said that this was not workable, even 11 12 though there is an efficiency issue, in the current structure. And they have the final decision. 13 The 14 licensee's PSA, if it is inadequate, they have ways 15 around that. And I think there is an effort separate from the oversight process forcing this issue. But to 16 17 use the reactor oversight process to drive that on the 18 basis that it is a big deal in this process I think is 19 -- has -- no one has presented that evidence here. 20 MR. FLOYD: Can we hear from our one SRA 21 member on the panel? What is your perception up there 22 on this one, whether it would be a high priority issue or an item for consideration? 23 24 MR. TRAPP: The high priority issue to me

is just that we need good tools in whatever form that

is and make it broader. If it is a cover letter issue 1 2 or an overriding issue -- I think what you heard from 3 three of us is you've got to give us good 4 worksheets or you've got to give us good PRA or you've got to give us some models. You know, there is a need 5 6 for something to fill the void. 7 MR. GARCHOW: Now the worksheets already covered in S-3. So I was sort of splitting 8 9 those out in my conversation. So this was just the 10 licensee PSA consistency and quality. I think we rated 11 the S-3 as very high yesterday, correct Loren? So 12 that was --13 MR. BLOUGH: Yes, we were arguing a 1/2 when there were three of them -- three priorities. 14 15 Now we are --MR. CAMERON: We are still arguing a 1/2. 16 17 MR. BLOUGH: We are still arguing 1/2 when 18 there is -- but yesterday Jim said that one of the 19 things he is starting to get is licensees who have 20 done a more detailed PRA are beginning to say they 21 feel penalized because they have considered more 22 things and whatnot. And we also heard that Phase 3 is resource intensive and we spend a lot of NRC time on 23 24 it. So it seems to me that this gets worse.

isn't made, this gets worse. Because you

progress

start getting -- losing cooperation on the part of the 1 2 industry that has the better PRAs. And you start --3 MS. FERDIG: From the point of view of the 4 public, if we assume that this whole new way of 5 monitoring power plants is based upon this 6 methodology called PRA -- which is true, right? We 7 wouldn't be doing this if it weren't for that capability not available to us and the data to get 8 9 here. Then it needs to be consistent, it needs to be 10 standardized and it needs to be understood by not only the regulator but the licensee and the public. It is 11 like fundamental to the success of this program. 12 And that is why you would 13 MR. CAMERON: make it a 1, high priority. 14 15 That is just a humble point MS. FERDIG: knowing anything 16 of view from not about PRA 17 methodology. 18 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: And I would make it a 1 19 for different. Looking at efficiency 20 effectiveness and the resources that are expended by 21 the senior risk analysts. Because of the 22 inconsistencies, I think their time could be used in a lot better places for more important issues than 23 24 trying to resolve some of these kind of discrepancies

that they have to deal with on a day-to-day basis.

Because as we talked before, there is only 10 of them and their input into the process is very valuable. And I think a lot of times they are working on things in the priority screen that aren't that important because of these inconsistencies. I mean, Jim can answer that question too as far as whether -- but don't you think -- I mean, that takes a lot of your time to do those kind of reviews where in the end there isn't anything there and you could have been doing something else.

MR. GARCHOW: If you had the Phase 2 worksheets accurate, which was the previous one that I heard you say when I asked you the question. mitigates a lot of the time you are struggling through not so much the inconsistency in licensee PSAs, although you were when asked. You are also struggling with the fact that your Phase 2 forms aren't correct. And in the conversation with the person that was sitting in the middle, he was sort of arguing both points. I mean, he is frustrated because the level 2 forms aren't out and up-to-date and is frustrated with some of the licensees not having the most up-to-date PSA tools in their own shop. But it was sort of a mixture of both that I sensed was the frustration. And I may be splitting hairs I don't have. I will move on in the essence of time.

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MR. SHADIS: I can see your reasoning. But what I am doing right now is I am contrasting. We only really have two categories here. Stuff that can really be put off or stuff that ought to be addressed at some time soon. And I am contrasting it to our findings for like S-4, which had to do with the facts. And that was the bottom category. So this really doesn't fall to that level. This is somewhere more important than that. And I think if you look back through the other findings that we made here -- not findings but the prioritizations, my guess is you would find it would fall on the high side of that line.

MR. CAMERON: Ed, do you want to add to this?

I tend to agree that MR. SCHERER: Yes. it is a 1 to the extent that the PRA is used in the regulatory process is part of the and discussion. And as it is used by the NRC. And I don't extrapolate that to say that every plant has to have an identical PRA for its own use. But to the extent that it is used in the public process for deciding findings, I tend to agree that just as we made the determination in S-3, it is almost impossible in my mind to come up with a different answer in S-6 as it

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is worded. So I tend to believe that it should be a category 1 and I would support that.

MR. CAMERON: Keep in mind that yesterday you said that this was going to be sort of a rough idea and that you would be able to revisit these later on when they were written up. And I was going to ask if there is anybody -- is there anybody who could not -- this is a different way of looking at consensus. Is there anybody around the table, for example David, who could not live with this being a 1?

Actually, I just went back MR. GARCHOW: and carefully reviewed the words and listening to Ed speak, it was talking more to the consistency of the NRC tools as opposed to the licensee PSAs. I have my own drivers driving me to keep my PSA up-to-date and accurate and well-modeled. But that is different than being driven into that point as a result of the reactor oversight process, which I find sort of contrary to the regulatory process. But given the words of this as written, should the NRC have consistent tools, and hearing Jim talk about the work being done by research and those tools that provided for the SRAs are getting better every time an update comes out, I could support a 1 in this category

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if the focus remains on the tools that the NRC is 1 2 utilizing, which is how it is worded. 3 MR. CAMERON: Anybody have a problem with that? 4 I agree with that. But I just 5 MR. FLOYD: 6 question, based on what I heard this morning, whether 7 all of the statements that are under S-6 are actually still valid or not. That the variations could lead to 8 9 similar plants ending up with different significance 10 outcomes for identical findings. I thought I heard the 11 SRAs say pretty much that they go to great lengths to 12 understand the differences and make sure that that 13 doesn't happen that they have and reasonable confidence in the outcomes. 14 15 MR. SCHERER: I would agree we would have to revise these words to reflect what we heard today. 16 17 MR. BORCHARDT: I'm little more cautious. I think they have confidence in their 18 19 abilities. But to the extent that there 20 differences, it introduces that possibility. I mean --21 MR. TRAPP: It could. If you get a PRA 22 that is not of good quality, we could reach the wrong conclusion. 23 24 MR. HILL: I think you'd be more likely to 25 when it is cross regions.

| 1 | MR. CAMERON: Can we add this to the |
|----|---|
| 2 | parking lot that we should revisit the narrative for |
| 3 | each of these? |
| 4 | MR. TRAPP: It already is a high priority |
| 5 | for the Commission too for the PRA implementation |
| 6 | plan. So we are not really we are not reaching way |
| 7 | out there. |
| 8 | MR. SHADIS: We are hearing now that this |
| 9 | already is a high priority in NRC. So it just |
| 10 | verifies our wisdom here. |
| 11 | MR. TRAPP: We could straighten the |
| 12 | Commission out and tell them that they should be |
| 13 | prioritizing this, but I don't know if they would |
| 14 | listen to us. |
| 15 | MR. SHADIS: The feedback loop is |
| 16 | complete. We are ready to roll. |
| 17 | MR. SCHERER: Is that equivalent to |
| 18 | drawing a bulls eye around a bullet hole? |
| 19 | MS. FERDIG: There you go. |
| 20 | MR. CAMERON: David, we were going to go |
| 21 | and see if anybody had issues. The question was |
| 22 | should we go ahead and see what issues people wanted |
| 23 | to add to S. David said there is two issues that were |
| 24 | undecided based on the presentations. We just spent |
| 25 | some time on that first undecided issue. I mean, you |

might as well close out the other undecided and then, 1 2 Loren, wherever you want to go from there. CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Well, the other one was 3 S-9. Actually, we broke that into two parts. Let's 4 talk about the first part. It had to do with the need 5 6 for SDPs in other areas -- shutdown, containment and external events are the specific ones that we talked 7 about. So S-9 --8 9 MS. FERDIG: What was S-10? 10 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: S-10 was really a subset of an issue that came out of that is having a feedback 11 12 process to relook at the SDPs. 13 MR. CAMERON: You were going to ask them 14 specifically -- we have in the parking lot this 15 systematic and periodic relook at all the SDPs. But I think that the reason this issue was tabled was 16 17 specifically for the three examples that you had in 18 there. Did you get information on that that would 19 lead you to any conclusion? 20 MR. SCHERER: I didn't see anything that 21 they said that would expand that list of S-9. That is 22 what I think we were holding off to see if they raised anything other than. 23 24 MR. CAMERON: Shutdown, containment or --

| 1 | MR. SCHERER: Well, fire security is |
|----|--|
| 2 | already on the list. Shutdown and containment and |
| 3 | external events we put on and we said we will wait and |
| 4 | see if they added any. Jim, I don't recall your adding |
| 5 | anything to this list. |
| 6 | MR. TRAPP: No. But I think from the |
| 7 | discussion, we thought that was pretty significant to |
| 8 | us to get those tools straightened out. |
| 9 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: You highlighted the |
| 10 | external events as the most important. That is sort |
| 11 | of what I heard from Bill. |
| 12 | MR. TRAPP: Yes. You know what it is, it |
| 13 | is kind of the last problem you have had. If your last |
| 14 | issue was containment if you were Walt, shutdown |
| 15 | would be his the thing that would pop in his brain. |
| 16 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: But your view is that it |
| 17 | is a high priority? |
| 18 | MR. TRAPP: Yes. And I know from our |
| 19 | experience in Region 2, we have had some difficulty |
| 20 | getting some answers on these issues through the |
| 21 | process. |
| 22 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: And it has caused some |
| 23 | time and problems getting the issue characterized. So |
| 24 | we have a 1 for that piece of S-9? The other part was |
| 25 | the feedback process to look at SDPs, and we are |

| 1 | calling that S-10. Can you expand on that a little |
|----|--|
| 2 | bit? |
| 3 | MR. SCHERER: That was I think mine. The |
| 4 | idea is to create a closed loop process to go back and |
| 5 | revisit the SDPs as we learn how to use them so that |
| 6 | there is a closed loop learning process. Because as |
| 7 | we gain experience with them, we will want to make |
| 8 | changes to the screening criteria. |
| 9 | MR. SHADIS: What do you mean the closed |
| 10 | loop process as opposed to just an institutionalized |
| 11 | learning process? |
| 12 | MR. SCHERER: A learning process that |
| 13 | actually affects change as opposed to going out and |
| 14 | taking data and not doing anything with it. |
| 15 | MR. CAMERON: Is that basically this |
| 16 | S-10, I guess if this is S-10, then we can take it |
| 17 | out of the parking lot. All right? |
| 18 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Yes. It is now S-10. |
| 19 | MR. SHADIS: As an author of this thing, |
| 20 | how would you rate it in terms of is that something |
| 21 | that needs to happen right away? |
| 22 | MR. SCHERER: No. I would say that is a |
| 23 | category 2. |
| 24 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Anyone don't agree with |
| 25 | that? S-10 is a 2. |

| 1 | MR. KRICH: We can't hear a lot of what |
|----|---|
| 2 | goes on down that end. |
| 3 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: All right. We will speak |
| 4 | up. |
| 5 | MR. CAMERON: Okay, S-10 is a 2. |
| 6 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: S-11 was the ALARA SDP. |
| 7 | MR. FLOYD: The biggest concern that I see |
| 8 | in this one is the very likelihood of unintended |
| 9 | consequences of people making unrealistic dose |
| 10 | estimates so as not to trip the SDP. And I think that |
| 11 | is counter to safety. I think it is a 1. |
| 12 | MR. KRICH: I have to agree with Steve. |
| 13 | Since this issue came up at Qaud Cities, and in fact |
| 14 | we are going to the Regulatory Conference on it next |
| 15 | month. And one of the things the principle things |
| 16 | we want to point out to the NRC is the unintended |
| 17 | consequence. If in fact you follow the SDP according |
| 18 | to their interpretation, it is going to cause people |
| 19 | to overestimate dose, which is contrary to, I think, |
| 20 | what the objective is. |
| 21 | MR. FLOYD: It works counter to the |
| 22 | objectives of the SDP. |
| 23 | MR. SHADIS: Can you explain from your |
| 24 | point of view how does that happen? |

| 1 | MR. FLOYD: Yes, the way that happens |
|----|--|
| 2 | the way the criteria is written in the SDP is if you |
| 3 | exceed your ALARA estimate by a certain percentage and |
| 4 | you have then that turns into a white indicator. So |
| 5 | the way to prevent from doing that is to have |
| 6 | unrealistically high estimates so that you never |
| 7 | threaten the threshold. |
| 8 | MR. SHADIS: Which actually would |
| 9 | effectively allow higher doses? |
| 10 | MR. FLOYD: Yes, exactly. |
| 11 | MR. SHADIS: Okay. |
| 12 | MR. FLOYD: A job that I had great |
| 13 | confidence we could probably do in 20 RIM. But if I |
| 14 | go to 45 RIM, I would trip the threshold and I will |
| 15 | now set it at 45. |
| 16 | MR. SHADIS: So do you want to list that |
| 17 | as ALARA SDP unintended consequences? Would that do |
| 18 | it? |
| 19 | MR. FLOYD: We could. Yes, that is really |
| 20 | what it is. That is the bottom issue of it. There is |
| 21 | other issues associated with the ALARA SDP, but that |
| 22 | is the most significant one. |
| 23 | MR. CAMERON: We are not saying how to fix |
| 24 | it, but it would be a number 1? |
| 25 | MR. FLOYD: Right. |

1 MR. MONNINGER: Do you agree with the 2 characterization up there? 3 MR. FLOYD: Yes, that captures all of the issues. 4 5 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: All right. You had one 6 more you wanted to add? 7 MR. MONNINGER: Was there a 1 score on that? 8 9 MR. FLOYD: Yes. Does anybody disagree 10 with a 1 on that? MR. SCHERER: The one issue that I still 11 12 had is -- and we can take it up later, but at least in the parking lot I would like to put this concern that 13 14 I continue to have of a false negative. That is that 15 the process will somehow fail to conservatively or accurately measure the significance of an issue or 16 17 underestimate the significance of an issue as it goes 18 through the SDP process. Since I believe the SDP 19 process is the most vulnerable part for missing it. 20 And I continue to have that as a high priority 21 because, one, you will never prove the negative. In 22 other words, you will never be sure that there is no such thing as a false negative. And I believe that as 23 24 many false positives as we have, they will be irksome,

but the process will manage them out. There will be

appeals and there will be discussions or there might be extra inspections that occur. But it only takes one false negative -- one even that occurs that become self-revealing that the process underestimated the safety significance that will cause the entire oversight process to lose any credibility it has earned over the way. So I think there needs to be a looking for this robust process to keep false negative. Now I asked the question --

MR. BROCKMAN: This was beyond what was described to us yesterday.

Well, beyond what MR. SCHERER: described, which is anecdotal and screening and a systematic review. But I think there needs to be a formal, periodic, robust review. I had asked the question of the SRA panel, and I got one answer. But then when I questioned them after their presentation, evidently my question wasn't clear because I was getting a different reaction one on one that they -the comments that I received off the record were that there is no formal process that they to periodically review the SDPs to determine whether or not there is a potential for underestimating the significance of an event or finding.

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| 1 | MR. FLOYD: I thought I heard them say |
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| 2 | yesterday that what they would do and I don't know |
| 3 | if this scratches your itch totally or not but I |
| 4 | thought I heard them say that any event that exceeded |
| 5 | the accident sequence precursor criteria would be |
| 6 | evaluated to go back and see if there were issues that |
| 7 | should have been able to have been identified and run |
| 8 | through the SDP to help predict whether or not that |
| 9 | event should have occurred. |
| 10 | MR. SCHERER: That may be the answer, but |
| 11 | I didn't hear a formal process. What I heard yesterday |
| 12 | was, well, we have levels of review. We have the |
| 13 | inspector, the SRA reviews that, and then headquarters |
| 14 | reviews that. And to me |
| 15 | MR. BROCKMAN: Research has the task to |
| 16 | review everything at an ASP threshold and will also |
| 17 | conduct the old AEODPIs, and that is part of the AARM. |
| 18 | MR. SCHERER: I am not trying to solve the |
| 19 | issue. I am trying to get |
| 20 | MR. BROCKMAN: That is what I was putting |
| 21 | up. If that is not adequate and we have got an issue |
| 22 | that we don't think that is adequate, then it is most |
| 23 | appropriate to go forward. |
| 24 | MR. SCHERER: Well, I am not here to judge |
| 25 | whether or trying to judge whether I am saying that is |

| adequate. I am saying that it is important that an |
|--|
| adequate and robust process be in place. It may be |
| that the staff is doing everything that it should. |
| That doesn't change my opinion that it is an important |
| element of the program that something like that be in |
| place and that tomorrow the staff doesn't stop doing |
| it because they have now checked it and they found |
| MR. TRAPP: It is part of their ROP |
| performance metric to go in and do an audit. And that |
| is part it is the metric MS1 that they are |
| periodically going to go in and sample all the green |
| or sample greens and see if we underestimated risk. |
| That is one of the things they are going to try. |
| CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Yes, that is what Bill |
| Dean talked about yesterday. There is a formal audit |
| they are going to set up. It has not gone |
| MR. TRAPP: Right. The purpose of that is |
| just to go out and hunt for false negatives. |
| MR. BORCHARDT: But if it is not underway |
| yet, and if this is a concern with the program as it |
| has been implemented to date and will be implemented |
| by the time that you get out a report, then I think |
| CHAIRMAN PLISCO: It will. It is one of |
| their metrics that |

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| 1 | MR. SHADIS: Well, then it is an issue |
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| 2 | that needs to be addressed. I wouldn't we had that |
| 3 | question of whether, you know, the staff is working on |
| 4 | it and do we not include it? Do we presume that it is |
| 5 | going to be taken care of? But I think maybe we ought |
| 6 | to include all of these things and then later on |
| 7 | revisit them to see if you want to drop them out |
| 8 | because it is such an overwhelming evidence that this |
| 9 | is going to be taken care of or it is almost there or |
| 10 | whatever. |
| 11 | MR. CAMERON: At this point what you are |
| 12 | suggesting is to focus on the nature of the problem |
| 13 | rather than |
| 14 | MR. SHADIS: The concern or the problem, |
| 15 | yes. |
| 16 | MR. CAMERON: From that standpoint, this |
| 17 | problem of false negatives, would everybody agree that |
| 18 | that is a serious concern? |
| 19 | MR. GARCHOW: I come at it a different way |
| 20 | going back to the consistency of the PSA. I get |
| 21 | concerned with our and I am speaking for myself, |
| 22 | not necessarily the industry and Steve. I get |
| 23 | concerned with forcing a consistency to where we all |
| 24 | agree on the same PSA model and the same terms, so we |
| 25 | are all working off the same code. To me, that |

| introduces the possibilities of false negatives. I |
|--|
| mean, the PSA "expert" that I have who is well trained |
| from MIT, he believes that the value in working with |
| Jim is in the intellectual discussion and the fact |
| that Jim is coming at the problem if we have an issue |
| at Salem or Hope Creek from a different set of models |
| than our set of models. That the real value of the |
| process is in the conversation. And if we get into |
| the PSA meter where you just dial it in and you are |
| waiting for green or red, I mean I don't like that at |
| all. That is why I am opposed to this consistency that |
| was in that other diagram. I like the conversation. |
| And after the end of the day, even if it takes a |
| conversation. In some of the interactions we have had |
| with Jim, both sides benefit from that and the |
| collective understanding of the risk is probably more |
| deep and robust after the conversation than if we were |
| just plugging and chugging off of our identical code |
| that we agreed on some input parameters that we were |
| going to force to be the same so we always got the |
| same answer. So I come at it from a whole different |
| approach on why this difference between the NRC tools |
| and the licensee tools are actually very helpful. And |
| |

Because in that conversation, both parties come up 1 2 with a much richer insight on risk. 3 MS. FERDIG: I am with you. MR. FLOYD: The other problem perhaps even 4 5 more significant than that is suppose we all did use 6 exactly the same model and approach a data base for a 7 PRA and we all did them wrong, we would have no differences upon which to challenge ourselves whether 8 9 who was doing them right. 10 MR. TRAPP: Ιt is all in the word 11 consistency and how you interpret that. I was looking 12 at consistency more that some people external events and some people model this sequence. And I think we 13 14 would all agree that that kind of consistency needs to 15 be resolved. I think what you are saying --It is going to render the 16 MR. SHADIS: 17 inspection findings the ultimate scoring 18 meaningless to the public -- to the general public. 19 Because you are going to wind up having plants with 20 identical problems getting way different scores. And 21 if your PRAs are --22 MR. GARCHOW: I don't see that happening, 23 nor did I hear any evidence of that. 24 MR. TRAPP: Actually, the Region 2 ox feed 25 pump issue I believe is now consistent with Region 1.

1 MR. SHADIS: From the public point of 2 view, that sucks. They leveled it up, you know. The 3 guys got on the phone and they said, hey, what is 4 going on. But you wanted consistency. 5 MR. TRAPP: 6 MR. SHADIS: The consistency should have 7 been there from the beginning. What that said -- the message to the public at the beginning was there is 8 9 something wrong with this program. The fact that they 10 trued up the results doesn't cure the program in the 11 public's view. It only cures the symptom. It doesn't 12 say --13 MR. CAMERON: Let me ask you so we can try to move on from this. Does -- recognizing that there 14 15 is a potential for false negatives -- recognizing that as a problem that needs to be addressed, is that 16 17 necessarily in conflict with the benefits of the 18 interchange that David was talking about? I mean, is 19 there any necessary conflict there? 20 MR. GARCHOW: No. I was supporting that. 21 MR. HILL: The only problem with the 22 benefit that David is talking about depends on the ability of those two different people to be able to 23 24 communicate. You go and take Jim out and you put

somebody else in who is unreasonable and isn't willing

2 that case if you have a different person there that 3 won't. Then it becomes people-dependent. MR. SCHERER: Yes, but I would rather have 4 that -- I think David raised an excellent. 5 That is a 6 common mode failure. If everybody is using the Mark 1 tool and therefore it is blind because it has some 7 defect or oversight or simplification in it 8 9 everybody is using it, we as both the industry and the 10 regulator and the regulated and the other stakeholders are all putting blinders on for some issue that no 11 12 matter how the communication works or fails to work. At least if we are using diverse tools -- diversity 13 14 and redundancy is the way we design the plans. I would 15 rather see a diverse and redundant process with its flaws and with its communication difficulties than a 16 17 standard Mark 1 tool that everybody is using and 18 therefore everybody gets similar results. I hear what 19 you --20 MR. REYNOLDS: So you are okay with 21 different standards to how we give exams and different standards to how we do enforcement? 22 I mean that is 23 what you are saying. 24 Not at performance criteria MR. FLOYD: 25 levels.

to listen, now you are going to have a real problem in

| 1 | MR. REYNOLDS: But you are saying you |
|----|--|
| 2 | don't want to have a different standard |
| 3 | MR. SCHERER: Who said different |
| 4 | standards? |
| 5 | MR. REYNOLDS: Well, you don't want a |
| 6 | standard so you can be inconsistent. |
| 7 | MR. SCHERER: No, I support the standard. |
| 8 | MR. SHADIS: It is understandable that you |
| 9 | get some variation in what the licensee comes up with. |
| LO | But when you start getting out to the second order of |
| L1 | magnitude and the third, it begins to push credence |
| L2 | altogether it begins to push credibility. |
| L3 | MR. CAMERON: Can we make this a 1 and |
| L4 | have this discussion about what this formal process |
| L5 | might be or whatever revisited later on? So that you |
| L6 | can maybe finally move out of the S's? |
| L7 | MR. HILL: I guess I don't agree that that |
| L8 | is a 1. That if it is not corrected it could threaten |
| L9 | meeting one of the goals. |
| 20 | MR. SCHERER: That is not our definition. |
| 21 | MR. CAMERON: You might have missed it. |
| 22 | They have reordered the criteria. A 2 is a 1 and a 3 |
| 23 | is a 2 and there is no more. The old one is gone. And |
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| 1 | MR. SHADIS: We degraded the whole |
|----|---|
| 2 | prioritization. |
| 3 | MR. CAMERON: Are there any more S issues? |
| 4 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Periodically review SDPs |
| 5 | to evaluate for underestimation of risk. Is periodic |
| 6 | necessarily it? Can it be an ongoing process? |
| 7 | MR. SCHERER: Underestimated significance. |
| 8 | MR. SHADIS: How about develop a process |
| 9 | or develop a program? |
| 10 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: The main bullet is need |
| 11 | for formal process to review for false negatives. |
| 12 | MS. FERDIG: Good eyesight. |
| 13 | MR. SHADIS: What about the periodically |
| 14 | part? |
| 15 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: That is a sub-bullet. |
| 16 | MR. SHADIS: Does it have to be |
| 17 | periodically, though? Can it be an ongoing thing? |
| 18 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Yes, actually that is |
| 19 | almost giving them an answer again, trying to solve |
| 20 | the problem rather than |
| 21 | MR. CAMERON: That is not really a |
| 22 | description of what the problem is. It is the answer. |
| 23 | So maybe the narrative, when you go back, can capture |
| 24 | that. Is there any more S issues that you want to put |
| 25 | up? |

| 1 | MR. KRICH: Yes, there is. No actually, |
|----|--|
| 2 | I did talk with the panel afterwards, a couple of |
| 3 | people on the panel, and I just want to throw this |
| 4 | out. They mentioned something during the presentation, |
| 5 | Jim, about the fact that they had all agreed that |
| 6 | there should be that the core damage SDP should not |
| 7 | be used in security. They got overruled. |
| 8 | MR. TRAPP: That was Sonia. |
| 9 | MR. KRICH: Yes. |
| 10 | MR. TRAPP: Yes, she had an issue a |
| 11 | security issue. |
| 12 | MR. KRICH: And my question is should that |
| 13 | be something the panel should address or is that we |
| 14 | don't need to get into that? |
| 15 | MR. TRAPP: The only thing I would say is |
| 16 | maybe we could get more information about that. I |
| 17 | don't think that is a well understood issue. |
| 18 | MR. KRICH: That is fair enough. |
| 19 | MR. FLOYD: Right now as I understand it |
| 20 | I mean, they haven't shared the SDP with anybody |
| 21 | outside of the staff. It is up to the Commission. So |
| 22 | we don't even know what is at stake. |
| 23 | MR. KRICH: I agree, Steve. But at the |
| 24 | same time, if it is an issue that is appropriate for |
| 25 | this panel, we should address it. |

| 1 | MR. SCHERER: I think didn't we cover |
|----|--|
| 2 | that by having a security SDP? |
| 3 | MR. KRICH: We have already captured the |
| 4 | thought. |
| 5 | MR. CAMERON: You have something on the |
| 6 | hot list |
| 7 | MR. SCHERER: And getting into that level |
| 8 | of detail to me would be part of trying to engineer |
| 9 | the solution as opposed to identify the |
| 10 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: If you go back and look |
| 11 | at S-7, we said to relook at the interface between the |
| 12 | physical protection SDP and the reactor SDP. |
| 13 | MR. SHADIS: The one issue that a couple |
| 14 | of those |
| 15 | MR. CAMERON: This was a number 2 last |
| 16 | time, so it would be a number 1 now. |
| 17 | MR. KRICH: That is fine. Okay. That |
| 18 | answers the question. |
| 19 | MR. SHADIS: Well, Chip, the one issue |
| 20 | that a few of those inspectors raised and I don't |
| 21 | know if it goes under this category or not. But they |
| 22 | were talking about those things that didn't meet the |
| 23 | threshold to be entered in as items for SDP that were |
| 24 | nonetheless things that caught their attention or |
| 25 | even items in the green where there was some trend |

| 1 | that caught their attention, but there was no way at |
|----|---|
| 2 | this point for having them recognized or preserved or |
| 3 | put in the box for future reference. I don't know how |
| 4 | I don't know a short way to say that. |
| 5 | MR. FLOYD: Can I direct I think it is |
| 6 | captured if I can direct you to page 13, item I-4. I |
| 7 | think it has got all of the elements you just |
| 8 | mentioned. |
| 9 | MR. SHADIS: Let me just have a quick |
| 10 | look. |
| 11 | MR. GARCHOW: It is almost like they wrote |
| 12 | the words. |
| 13 | MR. FLOYD: If you identify an adverse |
| 14 | trend, what do you do? The threshold for raising and |
| 15 | documenting issues? |
| 16 | MR. SHADIS: Yes, I agree. My sense, |
| 17 | though, was that they were talking about something |
| 18 | that was before you really could nail a trend. They |
| 19 | were talking about those |
| 20 | MR. GARCHOW: Aggregation. |
| 21 | MR. SHADIS: Yes, aggregations or |
| 22 | accumulations or whatever down in the green or even |
| 23 | stuff that didn't make the green. |
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| 1 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: And that is under I-2 I |
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| 2 | think as well, the threshold for documentation. That |
| 3 | is where those kind of issues fall. |
| 4 | MR. CAMERON: Are you going to go into I |
| 5 | next? |
| 6 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: I was going to do |
| 7 | assessment enforcement. |
| 8 | MR. CAMERON: Okay. But Ray, you might |
| 9 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Because there is some |
| 10 | linkage with SDP. That is why I wanted to do that |
| 11 | next. |
| 12 | MR. CAMERON: But, Ray, keep your |
| 13 | thoughts. |
| 14 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: But it should be under |
| 15 | I anyway. |
| 16 | MR. CAMERON: Okay. All right. |
| 17 | MR. MONNINGER: Can I make a |
| 18 | recommendation? Up there is all your S's, if you want |
| 19 | to take one last look at them to see if overall they |
| 20 | look consistent. |
| 21 | MR. GARCHOW: Loren, while he is adjusting |
| 22 | that, it may be possible for this group, now that we |
| 23 | understand the categories, for what we don't get done |
| 24 | to actually provide we may end up having consensus |
| 25 | to our new categories without having a lot of |

laborious conversation. And then I think you would be set up for the next meeting. To just talk about those where it looks like you've got some 1's and 2's. And many of these, based on our judgment, we could comment on a little bit of the words and what our score is and we could probably move this right along. Now that I think our criteria got to be such that it becomes much quicker.

MR. SHADIS: David, are you suggesting

MR. SHADIS: David, are you suggesting that we could slam through the rest of these in the next two hours?

MR. GARCHOW: No. I'm saying that if we didn't that we could take a homework assignment and provide them back to John so that those issues that we all sort of agreed upon are sort of off the table with maybe some clarification without spending hours going through these. And then we might have five or six that have some contention and we can maybe get some quality air time or call somebody back in for more questions to get some insight or whatever it might take to get the consensus.

MR. SHADIS: I'd like to make a suggestion and maybe add to that. I am not real tight certain on the value, but we have these eight objectives or eight goals. And if this list as we develop it were

reformatted so that there were eight boxes or eight columns down at the end in addition to -- or even just --

CHAIRMAN PLISCO: John and I have talked about that. That is why I am laughing.

MR. SHADIS: All I am saying is we could then -- when we looked at this, we could say, now this is a priority 1 or 2 or whatever it may be that we have assigned it. Which ones of these objectives does this affect or most affect? And if we just penciled those in, it might be useful for whoever is going to use this to see -- to get an idea of where we were coming from. Some of these things may only be out there in enhancing the public's confidence It may not be that tight as a safety something. issue. So that may be of value to whoever is reading it. And it would not add an awful lot of time if we did indeed take these things home to go ahead and --

MR. GARCHOW: The reason I came to that is we have heard the inspectors and we have heard the SRA and we have heard the State of New Jersey and we went through the PIs, limited as they were. We know what were being collected. So we could probably take a good first cut and then as a group just be refining that as we hear from the rest of the stakeholders next time.

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The NRC will come back one more time now with two and three data points on some of these PIs that either will or won't change our impression. Some of them will and some of them won't. And I think we could probably then have a pretty clear path to the end if we took this point in time to do the homework assignment and make a commitment to get that back to John. MS. FERDIG: But we are going to do a runthrough now before we leave? CHAIRMAN PLISCO: As far as we can get. MR. GARCHOW: I'm not saying to stop or go now. MR. CAMERON: It should go faster because of David's reasoning -- his rationale for that. We should be able to go fairly quickly. MR. GARCHOW: But I'd rather have a chance to ponder and think not in a rush mode. Because I did get the PIs and I want to look at those. I did take notes from the presenters. I think there is some reflection. I am worried about the speed of just trying to slam through these to get done as opposed to -- you know, if we took a week where we could carve out some time to reflect on these, I think we would get to some broader insights from all of us and then

get them back electronically to John.

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| 1 | MR. SCHERER: Plus, we are going to hear |
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| 2 | some additional input at the next meeting that I would |
| 3 | like to be able to factor into it instead of making |
| 4 | the decision ahead of time and then listening to |
| 5 | the |
| 6 | MR. GARCHOW: Right. That is what is |
| 7 | starting to bother me and just the methodology we are |
| 8 | using. |
| 9 | MR. BROCKMAN: You guys are saying we are |
| 10 | done? |
| 11 | MR. GARCHOW: Pardon? |
| 12 | MR. BROCKMAN: You are saying we are done? |
| 13 | MR. GARCHOW: I am saying I am worried |
| 14 | about going trying to slam through these. |
| 15 | MS. FERDIG: So slow down. Do what we do |
| 16 | well before we leave and then finish according to what |
| 17 | you have just suggested? |
| 18 | MR. GARCHOW: Or resolve the parking lot |
| 19 | issues. I mean, stop this process and make sure we |
| 20 | clearly understand beyond a shadow of a doubt what a |
| 21 | 1 and a 2 is and what the deliverables are to get back |
| 22 | to John and get some clarity around that. Because I |
| 23 | think when we started on February 26, if we did that, |
| 24 | John could provide us then with a summary of where we |
| 25 | are at and we either will or won't be very far, but at |

| 1 | least we won't be discussing in detail things that |
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| 2 | there really is no disagreement if we buy into our new |
| 3 | rule that Ray put on about cutting these up into two |
| 4 | categories. |
| 5 | MR. CAMERON: Do you want to revisit as |
| 6 | suggested, revisit the parking lot to make sure that |
| 7 | we understand what the criteria are? How the fact that |
| 8 | it is being fixed relates to prioritization? |
| 9 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Well, I thought I |
| 10 | mean, this parking lot as to prioritization, we |
| 11 | settled that, I think. I mean John has got the new |
| 12 | words up there for the categories 1 and 2, and I think |
| 13 | we have agreed to that. |
| 14 | MR. CAMERON: Do you want to add in this |
| 15 | idea about this so that you capture whatever way |
| 16 | you want to characterize it. Ken said what is broken |
| 17 | and Rod said fatal flaw. Is that something we need to |
| 18 | be looking for as we go along? |
| 19 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: I think let's stick with |
| 20 | these two criteria we decided on. I think once we have |
| 21 | gone through the whole list, if something jumps out |
| 22 | that everybody thinks is major, I think it will become |
| 23 | self-evident as we go through the discussion. |
| 24 | MR. CAMERON: Okay. |

1 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: And then that might 2 cause us to revisit that if that kind of issue comes Let's stick with these criteria. 3 I am just worried about 4 MR. GARCHOW: premature finalization without hearing all of the 5 6 information. We could all probably go back and get 7 some general where we are leaning towards and get those to John. But recognize if we are going to make 8 9 our decisions, then why would we even listen to the 10 next presenter? CHAIRMAN PLISCO: That is why we have been 11 very careful to say initial priority. 12 13 MS. FERDIG: I do think there is a lot of 14 learning that goes on in this exchange. If we can get 15 as far as we can now before we break, I think there is something to gain in this conversation. 16 17 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Yes, I think there is 18 something to be gained. I think every time we have 19 discussed these issues, I think there have been other 20 pieces that have come out and I think a different 21 perspective that we all may not have heard before. So 22 there is that value in that discussion. we understand what the issue is in the first place. 23 24 But the words on the piece of paper may not fully

describe.

1 MR. CAMERON: But it does look like you --2 David, you got your clarification. Everybody seems to 3 agree on these criteria. MR. GARCHOW: I am just worried about --4 5 I mean, I will go with the group. I mean, I said my 6 piece and I will consent and plow through these. 7 Because we are wasting time. If that is how we are going to do this. I see an indication --8 9 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Well, I think we are 10 going to plow through, but I think we are really doing both. We are going to plow through as far as we can 11 12 and what we don't finish today, we will send those 13 sheets out and collect that information and continue the discussion the next time of what we didn't get to. 14 15 But use what you have already sent in to maybe save time the next time. I think we are going to do both. 16 17 Does that sound good? 18 MR. GARCHOW: I wonder the value of what 19 we make -- whatever we are going to talk about 20 different in that format. Sort of particularly on 21 consistency, and maybe foolishly as Emerson would say. 22 But if we are going to slug through all of them, then I say we slug through all of them. If we are going to 23 24 try to reach some other way of getting consensus, I

we try to reach some other way of getting

consensus. But slugging through and then switching to 1 2 another way sort of intellectually for me doesn't quite work. I am fine slugging through all of them and 3 taking the meeting as necessary. I was just offering 4 up a way to get to a quicker consensus. But the values 5 6 of slugging through them, I say start slugging. Which 7 one are we on? We are going to slug. 8 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: 9 Assessment enforcement, A-1. This issue had to do 10 with the need for clear communications with the public regarding the action matrix rigidity, flexibility and 11 I don't think there was any other 12 adherence. 13 supporting information we got on that. 14 MR. SCHERER: That is an interesting way 15 to phrase it. Where did they come up with that? We copied that from 16 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: 17 someone. 18 MR. SCHERER: Rigidity and flexibility or 19 rigidity versus flexibility. 20 MR. FLOYD: Well, I think what the issue 21 is is to make sure the public understands when you are 22 allowed to take exceptions to the action matrix, so it doesn't look like every time you don't get the answer 23 24 you want, you change it.

| 1 | MR. GARCHOW: That was actually Dave |
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| 2 | Lochbaum's issue. |
| 3 | MR. FLOYD: Yes. |
| 4 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: You say it's a 1? |
| 5 | MR. FLOYD: I'd give it a 1. |
| 6 | MR. GARCHOW: Did we see any we only |
| 7 | saw that one data point, right? Where there was a |
| 8 | deviation from the action matrix? That was a PI that |
| 9 | they brought forth yesterday. So then the issue would |
| 10 | be once you do that appropriately through the process, |
| 11 | how is it communicated? So we are saying it is a 1 to |
| 12 | figure that out quickly. |
| 13 | MR. FLOYD: I think it is more at least |
| 14 | my recollection was it was more making sure that the |
| 15 | process is defined up front. So when you exercise the |
| 16 | discretion, there is a basis for it that is well |
| 17 | understood and it doesn't look like you are playing |
| 18 | games with the action matrix. |
| 19 | MR. GARCHOW: That is not how these words |
| 20 | say |
| 21 | MR. FLOYD: That was my recollection. |
| 22 | MR. GARCHOW: I heard there is a process |
| 23 | for taking the deviation and they exercised it once |
| 24 | and approved it and had that as a PI. Now whether the |

public understands that process, that is a different issue.

CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Yes, and I think that was this issue. There is a process now. There wasn't in the beginning. But there is a process now. Now the next piece is to make sure that that is communicated and people understand how that process works. And then when there are deviations that it is explained clearly what happened.

MR. SCHERER: I guess if we look at the facts, and there has only been one so far, and it seems that it is a difficult and a high hurdle to make changes, I am having trouble understanding why that is a high priority if for 101 units there has been one event so far. Why is it we think that is a high priority?

MR. FLOYD: I guess in my view, the reason why I would give it a high priority is because it only takes once or twice to do it wrong and the public loses all the confidence in the program. Because it is only going to happen when you've got a non-green finding. I mean, nobody is going to challenge the action matrix if you are all green. So it is going to happen when there is a "significant" issue. And if the results start being different than what the program

defines them to be normally and the public doesn't 1 2 understand that process and you mess that 3 communication up a couple of times, all the confidence goes away. I don't know, Ray, I am probably speaking 4 5 for your constituency. 6 MR. SHADIS: don't know. You 7 communicate with the public too, don't you? Just a different public 8 MR. FLOYD: 9 probably. MR. SHADIS: Yes. I don't understand this 10 item at all. I was hoping the conversation would go 11 around enough so that it could be explained to me. 12 I know one of the issues 13 MR. REYNOLDS: that Mr. Lochbaum had as far as the action matrix was 14 concerning the regional administrator's attendance at 15 meetings that the action matrix were not called for. 16 17 For example, you have a plant that is in the licensee 18 response band and they do their end of cycle review 19 meeting and he attends, and Mr. Lochbaum said that is 20 confusing because it is not in accordance with the 21 action matrix. Why would a regional administrator 22 attend that if there is no regulatory response needed? There is lots of reasons for why he may attend not 23 24 associated with the action matrix. But that was Mr.

Lochbaum's concern. And I think that is why he wanted

2 still think that is a 2 and not a 1. 3 MR. CAMERON: Steve, do you want to -- can you just briefly articulate what you said before? 4 Maybe that -- in terms of --5 6 MR. FLOYD: What I thought David's concern was we have said that the action matrix is what we are 7 really relying on to provide the predictability of the 8 9 actions that the Agency is going to take. And Dave's 10 early on concern was, all right, it is inevitable that eventually some situation is going to come up where 11 you are going to deviate from the action matrix for 12 maybe good reason. But if you don't communicate what 13 14 that criteria is clearly to the public up front, when 15 you do it, you lose the credibility with the public. Because they will read whatever they want into it. 16 17 That you took a different -- if you take a more 18 relaxed response than what the action matrix calls 19 for, then it looks like you are not really taking the 20 right action. 21 MR. GARCHOW: That is how I recall Dave's 22 concern as well. And he said it is okay to 23 MR. FLOYD: 24 deviate, but you have got to define up front what is 25 the criteria for it and make sure that that has been

some explanation on flexibility. But that said, I

communicated so that you can defend it if and when you 1 2 need to use it. 3 TRAPP: That sounds like a good program enhancement. That sounds like a 2. It seems 4 5 like a good thing to do, but I don't see it being a 6 high priority. 7 MR. SHADIS: That looks understandable, Chip. 8 9 MR. FLOYD: I can live with a 2. As long 10 as it doesn't receive a low enough priority that it happens and we don't have it developed yet because we 11 haven't given it a high priority. Because it would 12 13 only take once to destroy it. 14 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: I think we are going to 15 revisit this when we come back to the overall categories. There are some overall categories related 16 17 to some of these communication with the public on how 18 the process works, And this may fold up into that one. 19 MR. BROCKMAN: I think you have got a 20 point, Steve. With it being a 2, that could very 21 easily happen. That you could get an occurrence 22 before it has been corrected. I mean 2 is going to get corrected, but I look at issues that are 2 issues that 23 24 are going to be resource driven, and a 2 could easily 25 be a year before you get to it.

| 1 | MR. GARCHOW: Looking at that, that would |
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| 2 | be a good issue for what would be called the ongoing |
| 3 | implementation evaluation panel. The next panel could |
| 4 | pick that up. |
| 5 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Are we still at a 2? |
| 6 | MS. FERDIG: Were you bidding for a 1? |
| 7 | MR. BROCKMAN: I think we have got a |
| 8 | procedure there and everything. So I don't think it |
| 9 | needs to be. I am just challenging the statement of |
| 10 | using 2 to say when you are looking at it from the |
| 11 | aspect of you still have got to come to grips with it. |
| 12 | The 2's you are prioritizing things and they are in |
| 13 | the second bin. |
| 14 | MR. SHADIS: If you did a 2 and tagged it |
| 15 | in some way you know, we are going to take a look |
| 16 | at this as we get more information. |
| 17 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: We are going to revisit |
| 18 | this to see how |
| 19 | MR. CAMERON: A 2 with a vector moving to |
| 20 | 1? |
| 21 | MS. FERDIG: Yes. I mean I could be great |
| 22 | if I sat with these two guys. |
| 23 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: A-2. Reevaluate the |
| 24 | time period for an inspection finding being included |
| 25 | in the action matrix. |

1 MR. MONNINGER: You changed the definition of the last one also, the write up, correct? 2 3 MR. GARCHOW: MR. REYNOLDS: What did you say, Dave? 4 We didn't get to consensus 5 MR. GARCHOW: 6 is what I heard, right? He said he was going to come 7 back to that. Because I thought I heard one --CHAIRMAN PLISCO: In general, the majority 8 9 is for 2, but we can come back and revisit. Like I 10 said, I think when we get to some of the other 11 categories, this is one that could get rolled up into one overall category on communications. A-2. 12 is a couple of different spins on the issue here. One 13 14 had to do with whether there should be a graded time 15 for different colors instead of the fixed one year for all colors as far as entry points into the action 16 17 matrix. 18 MR. SCHERER: If I recall correctly, this 19 was raised by a regional administrator at the Reg 4 20 Conference. And it was as a result of the discussion 21 on the push-back on whites and having a white finding. 22 And I thought it was an interesting idea and I added it at least to my list because I thought that while I 23 24 wasn't in a position yet to support it, I think that

it ought to be at least looked at and given some

thought as to its potential consequence. And it was at least a unique approach that I thought was worthy of further consideration by the staff as a relatively high priority because it might resolve some of the issues with everybody pushing back and arguing about a white finding, if in fact it only stayed a white finding for a relatively short period of time instead of the one year that it now stays. And it was — it had the benefit of being a risk-based argument that a red finding would have to have a longer period because of its risk significance, a yellow somewhat shorter and a white as somewhat shorter still.

MR. GARCHOW: I read that a little differently. Because the white could be just around until the NRC inspection comes in and says your immediate corrective actions have got you safe or mitigated whatever the immediate problem was. Your corrective action plan is sound and committed to on the docket. Once that was in place in the next quarter and the NRC had assured themselves that the corrective actions were sound, which was the intent of what happened when you drove white, then it could go back to green. I guess I would differ when you get up into yellow and red. If it was graded, probably for red you would have to pretty much have the corrective

| 1 | actions done. I mean, my brain would tell me if it is |
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| 2 | significant enough to do red, just a review of your |
| 3 | corrective action and some we will fix it on the |
| 4 | docket probably isn't going to work for a red. |
| 5 | Whatever the issue is is going to have to be fixed. |
| 6 | MR. SCHERER: But that would make sense |
| 7 | and it would be better than an arbitrary one-year |
| 8 | period or whatever. Even if you haven't fixed the |
| 9 | issue or the staff hasn't been satisfied that the |
| 10 | underlying issue has been resolved. |
| 11 | MR. TRAPP: We are getting close to |
| 12 | solutions. |
| 13 | MR. SCHERER: I understand. I am not |
| 14 | trying to come up with the answer. I am trying to at |
| 15 | least outline the concept as I understood it. Because |
| 16 | for those of you that weren't at the Region 4 workshop |
| 17 | |
| 18 | MR. TRAPP: It seems like a good thing to |
| 19 | look at. |
| 20 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: The real point is to |
| 21 | reevaluate it and just look at it. |
| 22 | MR. GARCHOW: I propose this as a 1. |
| 23 | MR. SCHERER: I think it is a 1. |
| 24 | MR. GARCHOW: Because right now the whites |
| 25 | hang around until the corrective actions are complete, |

setting you up then for multiple whites degrading a cornerstone which has no basis on real risk since the initial white had an issue that probably in most cases was corrected immediately, but there are longer term corrective actions to get it to work through the SDP process to come back out non-finding. We have an example of that at our utility. And keeping the white around, I think, is disproportionate to the real level of risk.

MR. SHADIS: I can see the value in removing whatever onus or burden there is to it. But in the sense of presenting this as information to the public or even for quick review by the regulators, there is value, I think, to leaving it visible. I don't know what that does when you put it up in that matrix.

MR. GARCHOW: It has to stay for some period of time. A quarter -- it has to stay until that inspection occurs that validates the corrective actions. Because that is all the action matrix was intended to drive when it went from green to white. But now it is being interpreted as the corrective actions have to be totally completed, so the white hangs around until the issue is completely resolved, which was never the intent.

| 1 | MR. BROCKMAN: But the issue that Ray is |
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| 2 | bringing up is, hey, there is an issue that was a |
| 3 | green issue back there or a white issue back there. |
| 4 | I mean, that is easily we can correct that. That is |
| 5 | easily fixed. I mean you just have the thing that you |
| 6 | see up on the Web go back two or three quarters too. |
| 7 | So you can see, oh lookie there, there was something |
| 8 | out there to be fixed. |
| 9 | MR. SCHERER: It would still be |
| 10 | historical. I just wouldn't be current. |
| 11 | MR. BROCKMAN: That is right. And that is |
| 12 | what he is saying. It is still visible so everybody |
| 13 | could see what happened and what have you. Right now |
| 14 | it carries on and it perpetuates. But you don't want |
| 15 | to lose the aspect of, hey, there was a problem there. |
| 16 | That has been fixed. And that should be available to |
| 17 | people. It gives you insight. |
| 18 | MR. SHADIS: Not just available if you |
| 19 | have to go hunting for it. I mean, it should be |
| 20 | obvious. |
| 21 | MR. BROCKMAN: I am with you. |
| 22 | MR. SHADIS: So I just want to put that |
| 23 | cautionary note in. Yes, if the problem has been |
| 24 | addressed, fine. Scrub it off. However |

MR. FLOYD: Scrub it off for consideration 1 2 for Agency actions in the action matrix, but keep it 3 visible that there was an issue that was identified. MR. SHADIS: 4 Sure. So this is a 1? 5 MS. FERDIG: 6 MR. GARCHOW: Without being redundant, the 7 issue in the action matrix wasn't that you had to have the issue solved dead dead. The issue was the action 8 9 matrix was pointing you to an inspection to validate 10 that satisfactory the root cause was and corrective actions would fix the problem. 11 12 intended at green and white to hold you to have the absolute problem fixed. I remember the discussions 13 14 when we developed it. But it has been interpreted 15 that way, so the whites hang around forever, which has the unanticipated consequence of causing the other 16 17 issue that we talked about of why people are avoiding 18 or trying to avoid whites. It is all sort of tied 19 together. 20 MR. SHADIS: Okay, my mistake. But when 21 does the flag go up that says that the problem has 22 been fixed? The corrective action has been completed. MR. GARCHOW: So help me out with the NRC 23 24 process, right? But the way I would envision it, the

first inspection report for the special inspection,

either done by the residents or a team, depending on how you chose it -- but the inspection related to the white would validate in an inspection report that we reviewed the licensee's root cause and corrective actions and that they are sound and it will mitigate the problem. That special inspection gets documented in a report. That triggers the white back to green for that issue. Then there is an open issue. I am on the docket in an LER to solve a problem. So there is a regulatory hook relative to a commitment to solve the problem that is on the docket.

MR. SHADIS: Yes, the hook is there, but not the information readily available to the public, at least not in the same place. And what I am asking for is not real complicated I don't think. I mean in terms of like implementing it. But, yes, I would like to be able to pull up the screen on your plant and say, yes, that problem they had three months ago, here is where they addressed it and there is an indication, and here is where it has been put away. The reason -you know, we followed issues dealing with Maine Yankee. We followed issues that it was discovered and there was a notice on it and there was a meeting on it. There was an agreement between NRC and the licensee that certain actions would be undertaken and

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the company did an evaluation. They proposed some kind of remedial action. NRC agreed to it. It never got done. It never happened. It just disappeared in the back and forth.

MR. CAMERON: This sounds like an important communication issue, but does it really get to the crux of the problem about whether this time period issue should be a 1 or a 2?

CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Let me make sure I understand this. I think the answer to your question is that even in the new process that can happen. the supplemental procedure -- I am just talking white. For white issues, once the root cause analysis is done, we do the inspection. All we look at is what is proposed for corrective action. Because of them may be a modification and may be long-term. We just look at the reasonableness of that. We don't verify completion of the corrective action in the 95001 inspection that we call. It may be looked at as a sample in the PINR inspection, the annual inspection, or it can be a sample in one of the routine baseline inspections if the inspectors decide to pick that as Because they are required to look at -a sample.

MR. BROCKMAN: So look on the H drive.

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| 1 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Right. To go back and |
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| 2 | pick a sample. So if that issue and if it is a |
| 3 | white issue, it is likely it would be picked as a |
| 4 | sample and they would go back and look at the |
| 5 | corrective actions. And that would be documented in |
| 6 | a report. |
| 7 | MR. SCHERER: I think we are engineering |
| 8 | the solution again. |
| 9 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Well, I was just trying |
| 10 | to answer his question. |
| 11 | MR. BROCKMAN: To put it in context right |
| 12 | now, you are saying there is no way for the public to |
| 13 | be able to know that other stuff that is going on. |
| 14 | They see the one thing get closed. At this stage, |
| 15 | even at four quarters it goes off the books. We know |
| 16 | that the issue has not been completed yet or what have |
| 17 | you. We have an item on it or something like that. |
| 18 | But there is no way for you unless there is |
| 19 | something ticklered out there with an open item as the |
| 20 | old system would do, there is no way for you to be |
| 21 | able to follow up on it. |
| 22 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: And that is still true. |
| 23 | It would be difficult for them to find. |
| 24 | MR. SHADIS: And if you would be willing, |
| 25 | if it doesn't fit under this category, I would like to |

include it as another item under the general category that this particular quality is missing from the action matrix as you would bring it up if the public went to access this information. It is not there.

CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Closure.

MR. BROCKMAN: I would suggest we put that in the parking lot. I don't think this is the right spot, but let's figure out where the right spot is because the issue is a good issue.

MR. CAMERON: Let me put this in the parking lot. And I guess I would just pose the question to the group. You have heard the rationale for A-2 being a number 1. Jim and Loren have said well number 2. Does anybody else have a comment on whether it should be a number 1 or a number 2?

MR. BLOUGH: First of all, I think it is a 2. And secondly, I think we are talking about engineering solutions as opposed to identifying issues. I think reevaluate the time period for an inspection finding being included in the action matrix is a solution in itself. So we are talking about a solution to an issue, not an issue. So I have problems with it because I kind of disagree with the premise. You know, I think there may be other solutions. For example, it may be inappropriate if a licensee has a

white issue every quarter -- every single quarter -for them to always stay in that second column. Because we look at every one and the root cause and corrective action make sense. I think the assessment process was set up to try to get an integrated picture of when a licensee's performance is deviating from the norm. even if -- even if when we went out and did the very narrow 9501 inspection it looked good, if another one happens in a certain period of time, we should do a broader inspection. Even if the first one is fixed. You know, if they keep happening. But maybe the degraded cornerstone threshold should not be just two issues but three issues. That would be another way of solving the problem of aversion to the licensee of white issues. So I have problems with A-2 just because, one, I think it is a solution. And secondly, I kind of -- I disagree with the premise, so it is hard for me to put a priority on the Agency doing something I disagree with.

MR. CAMERON: This may be phrased -- it may not be phrased the right way, but it says reevaluate the time period. Does the fact that there is all this discussion about this means that it is an issue that should be addressed. I mean, you may not decrease or do whatever, but it sounds like you --

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MR. TRAPP: One of the important things I think is the data that Bill gave us yesterday shows that three percent of the plants have a degraded cornerstone. I guess my opinion, if I saw all sorts of plants over on the right-hand side of the action matrix, I would say well gee there might be something wrong with the duration of findings. What I see here seems relatively reasonable. That is why I reached the conclusion that I don't think it is a high priority. If we had a bunch of multiple degraded cornerstone plants, then maybe their thresholds are incorrect. But the way it looks doesn't look so bad to me.

MR. GARCHOW: But take a specific example, Jim, from our plant. We have a design issue that was there since day one. We are on the docket as a restart issue to fix it. We are fixing it. Our immediate corrective actions are keeping the plant safe as acknowledged in an inspection report. And I am sitting here until the end of 2002 with a white finding in the design issue from 1971. That isn't indicative of current performance and I am sitting here — much like Rod said — sitting here with a gun loaded waiting for another maybe current issue in the

| Τ | mitigating event cornerstone. We are on the docket to |
|----|--|
| 2 | fix this by 2002. |
| 3 | MR. TRAPP: For a white issue, that gets |
| 4 | closed. If you've got a white finding, all you have |
| 5 | got to do is ensure the corrective action is in place. |
| 6 | MR. GARCHOW: Maybe then I mean I took |
| 7 | a note here to go explore that. Maybe we have |
| 8 | something to work out on why that is hanging around |
| 9 | quarter to quarter when all the information is known. |
| LO | MR. FLOYD: The words I have heard from |
| L1 | staff is minimum four quarters until the issue is |
| L2 | corrected. |
| L3 | MR. GARCHOW: Even for a white? |
| L4 | MR. FLOYD: Minimum four quarters or until |
| L5 | it is corrected. |
| L6 | MR. GARCHOW: For a white? No, the action |
| L7 | matrix just said clearly until the root cause is |
| L8 | reviewed. So we need to straighten that out. |
| L9 | MR. BROCKMAN: I must admit I still don't |
| 20 | have the 2 four-inch binders that I have of |
| 21 | documentation memorized. |
| 22 | MR. GARCHOW: I'll take that on for our |
| 23 | own utility separately. But there is some confusion |
| 24 | about how long whites stay on. |

1 That is the way it has been MR. FLOYD: 2 characterized to us in our biweekly meetings. 3 MR. GARCHOW: So that is the issue. Maybe we didn't word it right, Mandy. Because it is more 4 solution oriented. But there is a knowledge gap even 5 6 in this room and we were a pilot plant. 7 MR. SCHERER: I would be open suggestions, especially from Randy, so that it is less 8 9 prescriptive of the solution. Perhaps just referring 10 to grading or something else. Whatever it takes -- I don't want to be prescriptive that the only solution 11 12 But I do think the issue should be posed. Just the fact that it is getting this much debate and the 13 14 fact that it goes back to the previous couple of 15 meetings as we talk about the pejorative nature of being white and whether or not utilities will, in 16 17 fact, push back to prevent from being white. I think 18 it all goes together in terms of the findings and how 19 long the findings last. So however it is phrased, I 20 think it should be revisited. I am not trying to 21 prescribe an answer. Ι only gave least at 22 intriguing thought. 2.3 MR. CAMERON: But revisit it as a number

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| 1 | MR. SCHERER: Yes, in terms of grading |
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| 2 | white, yellow and green, white, yellow |
| 3 | MR. TRAPP: We can revisit it and make a |
| 4 | quarter's difference. |
| 5 | MR. SCHERER: Right. Whatever the solution |
| 6 | is, I am trying to avoid my natural desire to get in |
| 7 | and solve the problem. I am trying to define the |
| 8 | issue. And I think it is, just from the amount of |
| 9 | time we have spent on it, an important issue. |
| 10 | MR. SHADIS: May I suggest language? How |
| 11 | about criteria for an inspection finding remaining in |
| 12 | the action matrix is problematic. |
| 13 | MR. REYNOLDS: I am not sure it is |
| 14 | problematic. |
| 15 | MR. SHADIS: Well, it is to some of these |
| 16 | people. |
| 17 | MR. REYNOLDS: Well, they want it looked |
| 18 | at. |
| 19 | MR. SHADIS: All right. Is unclear how |
| 20 | about is unclear? |
| 21 | MR. BROCKMAN: Reevaluate it and the |
| 22 | answer you may come up with is no change needed. It |
| 23 | may go up and it may go down. Reevaluate it. |

| 1 | MR. TRAPP: Four quarters was a guess. |
|----|--|
| 2 | Now you have got data. Look at it and see if it is |
| 3 | reasonable. |
| 4 | MR. BROCKMAN: But reevaluate does not |
| 5 | promulgate a solution. You have got to get rid of all |
| 6 | the 10 lines underneath it where we have presented the |
| 7 | solution. |
| 8 | MR. CAMERON: Does anybody from what |
| 9 | you are saying, can you are saying that nobody |
| 10 | should have a problem with the way it was originally |
| 11 | stated? |
| 12 | MR. BROCKMAN: I personally don't. If you |
| 13 | don't go into all the great detail with the examples |
| 14 | and everything else. Reevaluate the criteria for some |
| 15 | type of I have got no problem with the original |
| 16 | wording. |
| 17 | MR. CAMERON: Randy, Jim, do you what |
| 18 | do you think about just stating it like that? And |
| 19 | keep in mind that Ray has tried to pose another way of |
| 20 | saying it. |
| 21 | MR. SHADIS: Well, I don't much care. I |
| 22 | was just trying to restate it as an issue, a concern |
| 23 | or a problem instead of an action item, which evaluate |
| 24 | is an action item. So that is all. But if you like |

it like that, that is fine by me. I don't have any 1 2 personal investment in it. 3 MR. BROCKMAN: It is an action word but it doesn't promulgate a solution because it allows status 4 quo. That is why I didn't have trouble with that. 5 6 MR. CAMERON: You've heard some of the 7 reasons why it should be -- might be reevaluated. Randy, Jim, Loren -- and I saw Bill was sort of 8 9 agreeing with it too before. Is it -- with reevaluate 10 being a sort of neutral word in terms of solution, would you go for a 1? Any objection to having a 1 for 11 12 that? 13 I would still change CHAIRMAN PLISCO: time period because I heard there are some issues 14 15 about corrective action. I would say just reevaluate the criteria. Because there were some other issues 16 17 other than just time period I think that we wanted 18 them to look at. MR. CAMERON: Ed, is that okay with you? 19 20 MR. SCHERER: I don't mind taking out time 21 period, but I would like some way of at least 22 capturing the thought under the banner of reevaluate graded approach or something. 23 24 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: I think we want to be 25 careful telling them what we think the answer is.

| 1 | That sounds to me like a solution rather than |
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| 2 | explaining what the problem is and that they need to |
| 3 | look at it. |
| 4 | MR. CAMERON: And when you guys write |
| 5 | again, you can take a rough accept a rough |
| 6 | approximation at this point because you are going to |
| 7 | go back and see how it is written up. |
| 8 | MR. SCHERER: That is fine. Okay. |
| 9 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Because I am not sure we |
| 10 | will reach consensus that that is the best approach to |
| 11 | answer the question. |
| 12 | MR. SCHERER: The problem I have with A-2 |
| 13 | as it is being reworded is I don't know what it means. |
| 14 | If I hadn't sat through this discussion. It just |
| 15 | says |
| 16 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: We are going to add |
| 17 | narrative, yes. |
| 18 | MR. FLOYD: The final report will have to |
| 19 | explain what these comments mean. |
| 20 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: What the problem is we |
| 21 | are talking about. |
| 22 | MR. SCHERER: Okay. |
| 23 | MR. KRICH: You are talking about on the |
| 24 | Web and not on the action matrix, right? On the Web |
| 25 | Page? |

| 1 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: No. My understanding is |
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| 2 | the real concern is what is on what is essentially |
| 3 | effective as far as entry point for the action matrix. |
| 4 | MR. KRICH: Right. That is what I am |
| 5 | saying. |
| 6 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: All the findings will |
| 7 | remain on the Web Page for four quarters as the |
| 8 | quarters roll up. No matter what the action matrix |
| 9 | entry point is. They will all it shows four |
| 10 | quarters of findings. |
| 11 | MR. SHADIS: I only mentioned the Web |
| 12 | because that is where the public accesses this. |
| 13 | MR. REYNOLDS: I think another thing you |
| 14 | need to do here, Chip, is we ought to take out the |
| 15 | proposed solution. This for example in the bullet |
| 16 | below there. Because I am not sure we agree with |
| 17 | that. |
| 18 | MR. CAMERON: I guess I am not looking at |
| 19 | the narrative. |
| 20 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: This is for our use |
| 21 | right now. So we understand what the issue is. |
| 22 | MR. REYNOLDS: It is still publicly |
| 23 | available and I don't think that is the only one I |
| 24 | know we have for example. |

| 1 | MR. BROCKMAN: It was given to us. It is |
|----|--|
| 2 | already publicly available. |
| 3 | MR. REYNOLDS: We have evaluating it and |
| 4 | we have been rewording some and I propose we take it |
| 5 | out. I understand where it came from. |
| 6 | MR. MONNINGER: There are two tables. This |
| 7 | is the summary table. And in the back is the detail |
| 8 | table. It is still in the detail table. |
| 9 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: We are going to continue |
| 10 | to reword that. As I mentioned before, this is a |
| 11 | living document that we are going to have |
| 12 | MR. CAMERON: Can we have a common |
| 13 | understanding and agreement that that narrative for |
| 14 | any of these is going to be reworked consistent with |
| 15 | the discussion that is had around the table? |
| 16 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: This document is already |
| 17 | a public document. |
| 18 | MR. REYNOLDS: Right, but we are |
| 19 | evaluating it. |
| 20 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Yes. |
| 21 | MR. REYNOLDS: I would like to see it come |
| 22 | out. I am not sure we want to propose solutions. We |
| 23 | have been talking about that. And here is a proposed |
| 24 | solution. I don't see why it is that hard to take out? |

| CHAIRMAN PLISCO: We are going to take it |
|---|
| out. |
| MR. FLOYD: As I see it, nothing gets |
| proposed until we agree on the final report that goes |
| out. that is our recommendation. |
| MR. GARCHOW: This is essentially the |
| paper trail along the way and we did that during the |
| pilot panel and nobody seemed to object to having |
| these work in progress documents slowly building over |
| six or eight meetings. |
| MR. MONNINGER: Do you want it out right |
| now? |
| MR. REYNOLDS: Yes. |
| MR. CAMERON: And leave your hand off the |
| undo button. |
| MR. MONNINGER: I already saved it. |
| CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Are you ready for A-3? |
| That is a 1 with the reword. Okay, A-3. Clarify the |
| purpose of the regulatory Conference. |
| MS. FERDIG: One. So the problem is that |
| the Regulatory Conference still retains some of the |
| format of the Enforcement Conference and therefore it |
| loses its potentiality for exploration and discovery. |
| CHAIRMAN PLISCO: No. Well, I |
| |

MR. BROCKMAN: Nothing prevents the Enforcement Conference not to go into exploration and discovery. I think there was plenty of that at the Enforcement Conference.

CHAIRMAN PLISCO: The issues that I heard as far as feedback from -- most of it has been from the utilities -- is that this is one part of the process that hasn't caught up to the change in the new risk-informed process. That there are still elements of a focus on the enforcement issue rather than a focus on the risk significance issue that occurs during the Reg Conference because of the structure, the people involved in the conference, the words that are used and I think -- I mean, Bill can probably He has probably heard some of these issues relate. it smells like an Yes, Enforcement Conference, but we call it something different.

MR. SCHERER: But isn't that -- part of my concern about that issue is the way I heard the issue is it was a -- it is a legacy issue. In other words, the fact that people are familiar with what Enforcement Conferences were, they go to a Regulatory Conference and it looks and smells and tastes like an Enforcement Conference. My concern is I heard nothing that said that time wouldn't just resolve that issue.

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| 1 | As people forget about or people haven't been to an |
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| 2 | Enforcement Conference and go to a Regulatory |
| 3 | Conference, it will seem like a Regulatory Conference. |
| 4 | But I didn't see anything that required change other |
| 5 | than people's memory, which will fade. |
| 6 | MR. BROCKMAN: As long as the same people |
| 7 | go to an environment where they are expected to behave |
| 8 | in a certain manner, they will behave in that manner. |
| 9 | Time will not change their behavior. |
| 10 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: And I have heard some |
| 11 | regulatory burden issues about from utilities. They |
| 12 | are not sure what to prepare you know, what are |
| 13 | they supposed to prepare for? What questions should |
| 14 | they be prepared to answer? What is the focus? |
| 15 | MS. FERDIG: Please change the frame of |
| 16 | that meeting and what proactive can be done to make |
| 17 | that happen? |
| 18 | MR. CAMERON: Bill originally raised this |
| 19 | issue. Do you want to articulate it again? |
| 20 | MR. BORCHARDT: No, I don't think I did |
| 21 | raise this. I have a I guess personally I don't |
| 22 | really see it. I see it more maybe I am agreeing |
| 23 | with Ed as initial people unwilling to adjust to a |
| 24 | new mindset. I mean, the comment that I hear most |
| 25 | frequently is the fact that a person who for several |

years has been the Enforcement Coordinator in the region is attending this meeting, let's everyone else in that room know or believe that this is really an Enforcement Conference. Even though they have a new aspect to their job, which is to facilitate regulatory conferences. And we have made some changes recently to make sure that we don't put a draft notice of violation up on the overhead early in the meeting. I there are some things that are the Enforcement Conferences used to be conducted, but I think a lot of it is really just getting used to this new way of doing business. You know, utility management and NRC management just need to keep trying to remind themselves that we are under a new process. procedures the guidelines talk about The and Regulatory Conferences with very strict guidance. I think it is an adjustment thing. I really don't think this is a huge issue to be honest with you.

MR. GARCHOW: But there are some structural things that having been to a couple of these already -- you know, the press comes, right? And the states come. To your comment, they think they are coming to see a duck. So the posting goes up and the newspapers come and they get to the meeting. I think the structural piece that would be very easy -- you

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that think genesis this is know, I just rudimentary introduction and education at the beginning of these. Because the press and the public who come or choose to come really have not got the word yet that they are not coming to an Enforcement Conference.

MR. BROCKMAN: There is a whole lot of things. Because some of the words in here are very significant. The Enforcement Conference very much went into the enforcement and corrective actions associated with the non-compliance. Whereas this is very much -the Reg Conference is supposed to focus on risk But I have had more than one utility significance. that wants to make sure -- I want the RA there because I have got to show him what are all of our corrective actions and we have taken this seriously and they want to change the entire dynamic back to something they are familiar with. They don't want the enforcement officer there because it looks like enforcement. But everything else, we would still like to do in the old venue. So there is whole sides of the street that have kind of come to grips with this one as to what you are really looking for and getting a good clarification. I think it is a good topic and I like the word clarify. I think that is an exceptionally good word.

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| T | MS. FERDIG: I think now you frame now |
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| 2 | you set up that conversation is symbolically important |
| 3 | for what it is that you are wanting to have happen. |
| 4 | And to assume that it will happen eventually as |
| 5 | people's memories fade or shift I think is perhaps a |
| 6 | false presumption. And I don't know maybe the I |
| 7 | don't know what needs to happen, but I think it is |
| 8 | symbolically more important than you realize given |
| 9 | that the language that is spoken in that context sets |
| 10 | the tone for the continued relationship around |
| 11 | whatever that issue is and subsequent relationships. |
| 12 | So just don't underestimate the importance of it. |
| 13 | MR. CAMERON: So, Mary, you would make it |
| 14 | a 1? |
| 15 | MS. FERDIG: I can go with a 2. I just |
| 16 | don't want it to be one of those things that is under- |
| 17 | valued or underestimated in terms of the criticality |
| 18 | of influencing the effects. |
| 19 | MR. BORCHARDT: I just want to go back to |
| 20 | we have changed the language. |
| 21 | MS. FERDIG: Yes, but |
| 22 | MR. BORCHARDT: But if I walk into the |
| 23 | room, Dave is going to say, oh, this is an Enforcement |
| 24 | Conference. |

1 MS. FERDIG: Well, then his language 2 hasn't changed in his head. It is not --3 MR. BORCHARDT: So we need to exclude a portion of the NRC staff now from attending this 4 I mean that is kind of the feedback I am 5 meeting. 6 getting. Because if I walk in the room, it is no 7 longer a Regulatory Conference. It is an Enforcement Conference. Because that is the way it always used to 8 9 be. 10 MR. GARCHOW: What kind of an issue is this relative to the whole oversight process? 11 12 MR. BORCHARDT: And I don't think it is a big one at all. That is what I mean. 13 I am not sure that this 14 MR. BROCKMAN: 15 isn't one of the fundamental, philosophical types of This is a change management issue. It is not 16 17 relevant to this, but it is critical to the change 18 management on the whole process. And part of what you 19 are saying is in fact true. If you are going to 20 affect these changes, you have to do it in all of the 21 aspects. And no, Dave, you are ready to give this 22 thing and Ellis won't be there. Great, Ellis won't be there. We are not going to delay the schedule three 23 weeks until we can get on Ellis's calendar. Ellis is 24

not critical to a Regulatory Conference. And you have

got to go that -- that is what I am saying, both sides 1 2 of the street if we are going to look to make some limitations to affect this philosophical change have 3 got to change their philosophies. 4 MR. KRICH: So I think it is a valid issue 5 6 Because we have been to Regulatory to raise up. 7 Conferences and we had some difficulty on our side as well as we noticed some difficulty on the side of the 8 9 NRC in terms of what their understanding was, at least 10 it seemed to us. So I think the issue is simply the purpose of the Regulatory Conference and what it is 11 supposed to accomplish just needs to be clarified to 12 us and to the NRC and to the public. 13 So that 14 everybody is clear as to what is going on here. And I 15 was rate it as a 2. CHAIRMAN PLISCO: I think 2. 16 17 MR. CAMERON: All right. 18 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Okay. The next is A-4. 19 A-4 is -- there was one proposal to extend the PI 20 enforcement discretion. 21 MR. BORCHARDT: Could I maybe just cut 22 this one off at the pass? The policy is due to expire by policy on the 31st of this month. I have got 23 24 something before the Commission now which in February

maybe we can revisit it if you don't like what the

| 1 | Commission decides. But it is really not productive at |
|----|--|
| 2 | this point to I don't think to discuss it. |
| 3 | MR. BROCKMAN: You are saying this one is |
| 4 | of such a short duration and so focused that it will |
| 5 | be overtaken way before the report is out in early |
| 6 | May? |
| 7 | MR. FLOYD: Is your new policy |
| 8 | specifically getting at how to do deal with pilot |
| 9 | program deficiencies? Because that is what this one |
| 10 | is really related to. |
| 11 | MR. BORCHARDT: Well, they are talking |
| 12 | about the discretion for PIs. |
| 13 | MR. FLOYD: But it says specifically |
| 14 | during |
| 15 | MR. BORCHARDT: I just think the language |
| 16 | isn't quite right because pilots are long gone, right? |
| 17 | MR. FLOYD: No, no. We have new pilots. |
| 18 | Every time we get what the issue is is we have a |
| 19 | new PI, which we have two under evaluation right now. |
| 20 | MR. BORCHARDT: And it addresses that as |
| 21 | well. |
| 22 | MR. FLOYD: Will there be discretion |
| 23 | applied to a new pilot? |
| 24 | MR. GARCHOW: Would you get volunteers for |
| 25 | a new pilot without it? I would say probably not. At |

| 1 | least in our utilities point, I would say definitely |
|----|--|
| 2 | not. |
| 3 | MR. BORCHARDT: So why don't you wait |
| 4 | until February and see |
| 5 | MR. CAMERON: This was be a pass. |
| 6 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: We will revisit it. |
| 7 | MR. SCHERER: Are you going to be at the |
| 8 | February meeting, Bill? |
| 9 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Okay. |
| 10 | MR. BORCHARDT: I am sure you will let me |
| 11 | know before the February meeting if you don't like it. |
| 12 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: A-5. A-5 we have kind |
| 13 | of talked around a bunch of times the last few days. |
| 14 | The use of no-color findings. |
| 15 | MR. FLOYD: I personally think this is a |
| 16 | priority 1 in the program from many aspects. First of |
| 17 | all, no color findings show up in a blue box on the |
| 18 | action matrix. So the public is now calling these blue |
| 19 | issues. So we now have a no color blue issue. |
| 20 | MR. BROCKMAN: So we are supposed to put |
| 21 | it in a no-color thing and they are secret. Nobody |
| 22 | can read them. |
| 23 | MR. GARCHOW: So when that comes up, I |
| 24 | refer them to the NRC public information officer to |
| 25 | explain the blue no-color finding. |

| MR. FLOYD: I think this one really we |
|--|
| think it is a big issue because we think it goes to |
| the heart of what was trying to be done under the new |
| program, and that was only have issues show up that |
| have some defined level of significance. And |
| originally I think this is what we got out of our |
| discussions with the staff and the development of this |
| one was that this was really supposed to be |
| capturing the findings that were in the enforcement |
| exceptions okay, the level 4 exceptions or higher |
| level of significance the willfuls, the impeding |
| the regulatory process, the failure to abate the |
| condition. Those would be tagged and that is where you |
| would capture the fact that you had those violations |
| that were occurring but that could not be evaluated |
| using an SDP. That was the original purpose of this. |
| And it seems to in our view have expanded to, oh good, |
| here is a good place to put observations and minor |
| violations and all the other things the program says |
| we can't capture but now here is a good place to |
| capture them. And we actually have a lot of data that |
| says that is exactly what has happened. |
| MR. TRAPP: It doesn't say the program |

doesn't say you can't capture them. It just says that

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| 1 | the SDP doesn't apply and we don't know how to color |
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| 2 | things where SDP doesn't apply. |
| 3 | MR. FLOYD: Well, it specifically says |
| 4 | don't document minor violations and observations. But |
| 5 | we have seen a number of no-color findings that I |
| 6 | would have to characterize as observations. |
| 7 | MR. TRAPP: See, we don't. If we put a |
| 8 | no-color in a report, we believe it is more than that. |
| 9 | MR. CAMERON: A no-color finding carries |
| 10 | a perception that something is wronger than an |
| 11 | observation? |
| 12 | MR. GARCHOW: Another issue that needs to |
| 13 | get brought forward and resolved. Somewhere between |
| 14 | white and light green. |
| 15 | MR. TRAPP: I think that somehow got |
| 16 | construed to be blue. So there is no logic. |
| 17 | MR. GARCHOW: Mint green and hunter green. |
| 18 | MR. TRAPP: We can't explain it. |
| 19 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: I think we do need to |
| 20 | look at the wordings. I mean there are basically, |
| 21 | the way the program is set up I would think you |
| 22 | would agree, some of those no-colors are valid issues. |
| 23 | MR. FLOYD: Are valid, absolutely. |
| | |

1 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Like I know there are some recording issues like 5072 and 5073 that fall 2 3 into that category. MR. SCHERER: A minimum number of no-color 4 findings. 5 6 MR. BLOUGH: You can either abuse it, put 7 stuff in there that shouldn't be there at all or you can abuse it by putting stuff there that is a valid 8 9 that you can't really figure 10 significance based on the tools we have today. In 11 either case, it seems like it is a priority 1. 12 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Is everyone have 13 consensus on a 1 there? A-6, use of traditional enforcement. 14 15 MR. BORCHARDT: This item, I think, came out of my input. And I was surprised to be very 16 17 honest with you of the reaction that I got. Because I 18 thought this was a point of confusion between the 19 staff and the industry. And the feedback that I got at 20 the last meeting was that in fact that there wasn't. 21 That the industry acknowledges that there could be a 22 severity level violation issue, which would be one of these non-color findings that Steve mentioned. But 23 24 then there could also be an associated technical

finding that would get colored that would then work

| Τ | its way into the action matrix. And with that |
|----|--|
| 2 | understanding, which still exists today, I think we |
| 3 | can just delete this item. I would withdraw it. |
| 4 | MR. SCHERER: I am not sure because maybe |
| 5 | it goes into no-color findings or maybe it belongs |
| 6 | here. But there seems to be an expansion of what is |
| 7 | the definition from my original understanding of |
| 8 | impeding the regulatory process to some of the |
| 9 | discussions that are occurring and findings that I am |
| 10 | seeing in Region 4, at least, where definitions of |
| 11 | impeding the regulatory process seems to be growing. |
| 12 | MR. FLOYD: I don't think that is really |
| 13 | the issue that is captured here, though, is it? |
| 14 | MR. BORCHARDT: No, that wasn't it. |
| 15 | MR. FLOYD: I think that is more the A-5 |
| 16 | issue. |
| 17 | MR. SCHERER: Okay. So that is part of A- |
| 18 | 5? |
| 19 | MR. FLOYD: About what is the threshold |
| 20 | for that that is resulting in maybe a disproportionate |
| 21 | number of no-color findings. |
| 22 | MR. BORCHARDT: Fine. |
| 23 | MR. CAMERON: I want to make sure that we |
| 24 | remember that that is included under A-5. |

| 1 | MR. GARCHOW: So, Bill, your issue was |
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| 2 | making sure it was understood by all that the |
| 3 | technical issue that may have been, for your example, |
| 4 | willfully somehow not disclosed to the NRC, once it is |
| 5 | disclosed, that technical issue is riding through an |
| 6 | SDP wherever it may land while the 50.7 or 50.9 issue |
| 7 | is riding down the enforcement trail, wherever it may |
| 8 | end up? And you were just wanting to make sure |
| 9 | that |
| 10 | MR. FLOYD: So it gets documented as a no- |
| 11 | color finding and maybe a finding of color. |
| 12 | MR. BORCHARDT: Right. Because I was |
| 13 | anticipating a concern that isn't that double |
| 14 | counting? Isn't that a double hit for the same issue? |
| 15 | And I always saw them as separable and since you agree |
| 16 | there is no issue. |
| 17 | MR. CAMERON: So delete? |
| 18 | MR. BORCHARDT: Yes. |
| 19 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: We are done with the |
| 20 | A's. |
| 21 | MR. CAMERON: I would like to ask Ray if |
| 22 | I captured his |
| 23 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Why don't we I know |
| 24 | those that wanted to recheck schedules. We will take |

a short break so they can do that and we can firm up 1 2 our meeting dates. 3 MR. CAMERON: Did I capture here -- if I put this in the parking lot, the issue that you were 4 raising about how long something stays on the action 5 6 matrix and how the public can find out about it after 7 it is off, et cetera? I am not sure I captured it Add somewhere an issue on clear and 8 correctly. 9 accessible information to the public on the history 10 and status of a finding on the action matrix? Does 11 that do it at least to remember what we are talking about there? 12 MR. SHADIS: Put the word removed in there 13 somewhere. 14 15 MR. CAMERON: Okay. MR. SHADIS: Because we are talking about 16 17 popping them off of there. 18 All right. MR. CAMERON: 19 MR. SHADIS: Once corrective action is 20 underway. But the public interest doesn't stop there. 21 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Okay, break. (Whereupon, at 3:50 p.m., off the record 22 23 until 4:07 p.m.) 24 Okay. CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Let's wrap up. 25 As far as the remaining items, what we will do is give

| 1 | you a homework assignment. Actually, we will go ahead |
|----|---|
| 2 | and update first what we have done so far so you can |
| 3 | see what we have done and send out the updated list. |
| 4 | If you can mark that up on your view of the what |
| 5 | category it should be, category 1 or 2. And forward |
| 6 | that back to John and we will compile that for the |
| 7 | next meeting and then we should be able to see where |
| 8 | the areas we need to focus our discussion on at our |
| 9 | next meeting. |
| 10 | MR. FLOYD: When would you like that back? |
| 11 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Let's see. When can we |
| 12 | get it to them? |
| 13 | MS. FERDIG: You will tell us when you |
| 14 | send it, right? |
| 15 | MR. MONNINGER: I guess it would depend |
| 16 | upon how you want to do it. If you want to stick with |
| 17 | just one column, initial priority, or if you want to |
| 18 | do it on all eight. You can have a lot more time if |
| 19 | you just stick with one column. But if you have to do |
| 20 | all eight, it would take more time. |
| 21 | MR. FLOYD: Could I propose something |
| 22 | maybe a little bit different? |
| 23 | MR. MONNINGER: Sure. |

MR. FLOYD: Give it initial priority of 1 1 2 or 2 and then just maybe put a quick X or a check in 3 the boxes that you think are driving that. 4 MR. MONNINGER: Right. Okay. 5 MR. FLOYD: Rather than having to rank all 6 eight boxes. 7 MR. MONNINGER: Okay. And then --CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Just the primary -- what 8 9 you see as the primary. 10 MR. FLOYD: Yes, primary. MR. MONNINGER: 11 I would give you just the 12 summary table and not the tables with all 13 individual comments. You already have the tables with the individual comments. So the summary table is just 14 15 about three pages. Does that make sense? And then you would give the three pages back. And I would tally 16 17 them up. And the thought was I wouldn't include the 18 members' votes. Similar to how we did here. We didn't 19 identify names with the comments. You know, if you go 20 back in the record, you can do the cross-tracing. But 21 when we do to the -- if you want to call it the voting or your X's and your 1's and 2's, I would just have 22 columns down and I would know. Is that how you want 23

it?

| 1 | MR. KRICH: So you would just have two |
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| 2 | boxes, category 1 and category 2, with votes in each |
| 3 | box? |
| 4 | MR. MONNINGER: Yes, we can do that. We |
| 5 | could say seven 1's and I guess eight minus seven, 11. |
| 6 | MR. FLOYD: I think for the voting process |
| 7 | that individual names aren't needed. Because each |
| 8 | person will have the opportunity to dissent if the |
| 9 | group ends up going in a different direction. |
| LO | MS. FERDIG: I do like Dave's suggestion, |
| L1 | though, that if we can in our next agenda allow for |
| L2 | continuing I mean, I learn a lot from these |
| L3 | conversations, but it is because I don't know I |
| L4 | don't have the context that most of you bring to the |
| L5 | table. So I |
| L6 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Yes, we will plan to |
| L7 | continue to go through those. But I think it will |
| L8 | speed up |
| L9 | MR. CAMERON: One of the parking lot |
| 20 | issues is to revisit the narratives. How much does the |
| 21 | existing narrative on some of these issues drive your |
| 22 | voting? Do you need to revise the narratives or can |
| 23 | you do that later? |
| 24 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Well, I think the |
| 25 | importance at least from John and my perspective |

is the revision of the narrative after we have the discussion to make sure we have accurately captured what we are trying to convey as we get closer to putting our final report together. What the issue is. Right now, we are just trying to capture individual thoughts and suggestions to give you a better understanding of what the issue is. But we are going to go through and rewrite those as we finish the discussion.

MS. FERDIG: But in the meantime, you are going to trust us to draw on our memory of what we have learned that would lead to the rewriting of the narrative to do our evaluation?

CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Yes. And I would say two things too. If there is additional items you think need to be added, forward those to John. Just as we did in the couple of categories we already had. If there is additional items that you think need to be included that we have left out. Or in the bullets already, if you think there is some clarification or another point you think that would help the panel understand that issue or if there is a different perspective that you want to add than what we already have in there, send that to John too so we can get that included.

1 MR. CAMERON: So someone may disagree with 2 the narrative but say as I understand -- I think there 3 is another problem here and I am voting -- I am ranking based on my substitute narrative? 4 Well, I would expect two 5 MR. SCHERER: 6 things to occur. At least as far as I am concerned. 7 One, we are going to hear some additional information which will obviously change some of my perspective and 8 9 might change some of my positions that I am giving as 10 tentative position. might And Ι change understanding of the priority I assign, 1 or 2, and my 11 12 perception of what the issue is for the narratives. So I would assume that we will be given a chance after we 13 14 finish hearing input from others to either revisit our 15 vote or perhaps revisit some of the narrative that goes with it. 16 17 MR. CAMERON: So just accept the narrative 18 as it is at this point. 19 MR. SCHERER: To me, the narrative -- its 20 value remains in trying to understand what the issue 21 is, and we will work on the language of the narrative 22 after we hear the rest of the information we have asked for and have a discussion and try to reach some 23 24 collegial opinions on what the issue is and how to

phrase it.

1 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Any other questions on 2 the homework assignment? The next thing is --3 MR. SCHERER: Is it going to be graded? CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Our goal will be -- I 4 5 guess the answer to the original question is once we 6 get this pulled together, we will give you a deadline 7 when we send it out. And we will pick a deadline so that we can compile your input and get it back to you 8 9 before our next meeting so you can see that to help 10 you prepare for the next meeting. 11 MR. GARCHOW: With respect to green, yellow, red PI for the members here and whether we 12 I don't know 13 have some suitable access matrix. 14 exactly what we will do for the reds. 15 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: And it will remain for 16 a year. 17 MR. GARCHOW: You will get assigned to the 18 ongoing panel. 19 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: The other business item 20 we need to talk about before we close is the agenda 21 items for our next meeting. At our last meeting, what 22 was proposed is that we invite Mr. Lochbaum and Mr. 23 Riccio to present their views to the panel. 24 going through the list here. NEI, we were going to 25 ask for a presentation on their views.

MR. KRICH: Could you speak up a little bit?

CHAIRMAN PLISCO: I am sorry. The first was presentations rom Mr. Lochbaum and Mr. Riccio was what was proposed at our last meeting. The second was a presentation by NEI. The third was a presentation by a or a number of press media representatives to provide their perspective. The next was an investment community representative.

MR. GARCHOW: I question the value of the investment community relative to the -- I mean, I know the value relative to my job. But I am questioning it relative to the work of this committee or any words in 10 C.F.R. that would tend to somehow get you into the investment community.

MR. BROCKMAN: If in fact the investment community is using the outputs of the ROP and the outputs -- that should be noted. And if it is appropriate, fine. If it is not appropriate, fine. But you have got to have your eyes open as to what all are the various stakeholders and uses that are being made and that should be shared and then a determination made as to whether it is appropriate or not. There may be something that you could modify in it that would make it perfectly valid for that and not effect any

| 1 | other stakeholder. I mean, it is just a bit of |
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| 2 | information that I think is relevant. We may not do |
| 3 | anything with it, but to ignore it as an information |
| 4 | source I think would be wrong. |
| 5 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: But if they have some |
| 6 | issues, which objective are we talking about? Which |
| 7 | goal are we talking about? |
| 8 | MR. BROCKMAN: I don't know until their |
| 9 | MR. GARCHOW: It will be an interesting |
| 10 | conversation. I am not opposed to it. I am just trying |
| 11 | to wonder how that looks when the |
| 12 | MR. SHADIS: I think we are really |
| 13 | reaching there. I know I couldn't avoid criticizing |
| 14 | NRC for dragging in the money people. Because |
| 15 | everybody else here is concerned with safety. And |
| 16 | excluding no one |
| 17 | MR. BROCKMAN: Since California is in |
| 18 | Region 4, I am overly sensitive at the moment. |
| 19 | MR. SHADIS: Well, yes. But, you know, |
| 20 | that is not allowed as a consideration in formulating |
| 21 | any kind of action or |
| 22 | MR. BROCKMAN: Not in the safety aspect or |
| 23 | what have you but in how you present information it |
| 24 | could be appropriate. I mean, we are reaching a lot |
| 25 | of wave to try to make gure it is in an amendable it |

is in an understandable, it is in a usable format, and 1 2 that is my concern with that community is the 3 presentation. It is something that is in the way. If there is some negative 4 MR. SHADIS: financial impact on the licensee and it can be avoided 5 6 without interfering with anything else, fine. But I 7 don't know how much energy or interest you can expend there before it gets sticky. 8 9 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: I think I agree with 10 Ray. The other issue too is if there really is some financial impacts that could impact the operation of 11 the facility, I would hope the utility representatives 12 could tell us what their views are and whether they 13 14 see real impact. 15 MR. KRICH: Let me take the opposite tack. These guys -- these financial guys are members of the 16 17 public. And if it is not understandable to them, then 18 it is not -- you know, we have a problem. Whether it 19 has a financial impact on us or not down the road, 20 that is our problem and not the NRC's and not this 21 panel's. But I think it is just as important that they understand what is going on here as it is for 22 23 people like Ray or Ray's -- you know, the people that 24 Ray represents to understand.

MS. FERDIG: Or the press.

MR. KRICH: Because we are asking the press. That is right. The same thing with the press. I mean, I think that we would get a good cross-section of how this is coming across to the public. Because these are people who pay attention. People like Ray -- you know, people who Ray represents pay attention, the people in the press pay attention and the financial community pays attention. If we are getting across to those people, there is a good chance we are getting across fairly well. And if we are not --

MR. GARCHOW: I think you have to couch it that way. I was worried about the optics of how this looks in the public record that we are going out of our way. I mean, have the financial communities responded to any of the Federal Register notices? Have they taken an opportunity to weigh in? I mean, I am not aware that they have taken an opportunity to weigh in, Steve. Maybe you would.

MR. FLOYD: Yes.

MR. GARCHOW: But I am just worried about the optics. If we couch it in the way Rod says and make sure the meeting minutes reflect it and that is the conversation, my concern is probably abated. I just think it has the wrong optics unless you put some controls on it.

MR. BLOUGH: The only purpose would be to evaluate how understandable it is, right?

MS. FERDIG: Which is one of our objectives.

MR. BLOUGH: Which is one of our objectives, but we are getting that through other means as well. So I guess the question is do we really need that perspective to evaluate whether it is understandable to the public.

SHADIS: I think we have got the MR. Chairman of the Commission now going to the National Academy of Science looking for some determination on the release of contaminated material for recycling, and he is saying that the -- I forge the exact words, but in essence the survival of the nuclear industry depends on getting rid of this crap. And I just want tell that the public advocates and to you environmental community is very, very sensitive to the NRC's responding to any kind of pressure regarding the financial end of this. And I would have to -- I mean, you do what you will, but I would have to register a grave objection to this. I really think you would be causing yourself harm. And I know that my constituency would expect me to jump up and down and yell about

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this. Although in the end, in fact, there may be no harm at all to getting their input.

MR. KRICH: I think we would be missing -I think, Ray, that we would be -- I understand your
position and I respect that. I just think that we
would be missing a very interesting source of feedback
on how understandable this is to a group of people who
do pay attention to it, just like you pay attention to
it.

MR. FLOYD: One of the small -- very small segments of the general population which are actively trying to understand the new process. There is very few people to sample outside of the people around this table.

MR. KRICH: If we don't do that, then I would make a suggestion that we ask -- and we may have discussed this before and if we have, I apologize. But two summers ago, I went and talked to the staff of the Illinois delegation in the U.S. Congress, and they are also very interested in this and had lots of questions about the new process. So I would suggest that if we don't do somebody from the business community, from Wall Street, that we might want to consider having somebody from the staff of somebody in Congress.

MR. GARCHOW: Who has an interest in nuclear power?

MR. KRICH: Yes. Staffers from lots of states have interest in nuclear power.

MR. SCHERER: I guess my reaction is a lot of -- and I think we have discussed this in the past. There is a lot of stakeholders. Just like the financial community and the Congress, we can go on and on. I don't -- I don't feel that strongly that we need to reach out and invite the financial community i. We certainly hear -- in California, we hear a lot from the financial community and there is a lot of discussions going on.

MR. KRICH: This isn't California.

MR. SCHERER: I understand. And I agree that the advantage of the stock analysts are that they spend a lot of time dissecting what used to be the cell process and now dissecting the current process and trying to understand it. And I have had the advantage or disadvantage of trying to explain to them what a no-color finding is or failing -- more accurately failing to explain to them what a no-color finding is or is not. I probably would say if we could find somebody that was interested in coming and discussing it with us, that they come during the

public portion of the meeting and that would, in my mind, obviate any issue of us inviting them. They could always join us as any member of the public and give this input.

You know, at some point we have to stop and figure out where do we draw the line? invite Congress? Do we invited the State legislature? Do we invite the Governor's Office from the State of California. At what point do we stop testimony. And I would tend to hold to the primary stakeholders, the licensees, the NRR, the community that has been active in intervening in the processes. I think the press is a good outreach where most of the public gets their information. But at some point, we have to start drawing a line and saying, okay, that is enough testimony. And I don't feel that strongly that we have to reach out to the financial community, because it gets to a side of the -- it gets to the other side of what I would consider a bright line of The community being regulated. financial isn't interested in -- at least in my experience, in the regulation. It is the impact of the regulation. they want to understand the impact of the regulation. They don't care how we get regulated. They want to know what the financial impact of that regulation is.

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So that is their effort and that is what they are trying to interpret.

Again, I think it would be an educated audience, and if they came in as part of the public, I wouldn't mind listening to what they had to say and factoring that in. But it is just not critical to me in terms of what we are trying to achieve as a panel.

MR. BLOUGH: Yes, I would prefer not to call them just because of some concern on the panel of whether it is appropriate. And if we make the program understandable to other external stakeholders, it should be more understandable to the financial community as well. So we have other ways of getting the information we need and what we need to do.

CHAIRMAN PLISCO: I was going to ask is there another alternative, Steve. You nodded your head as far as it sounds like the financial community does have interactions with you and provide their views. And maybe if there are views as far as understandability and if it impacts some of the goals that we are looking at, if there are any things that you can pass on in your presentation when you come, maybe that is one way to get some of that. If it impacts one of our goals that we are looking at.

Those kind of issues. Understandability is I think the one.

is MR. FLOYD: Ιt definitely the understandable one. I mean their obvious concern or interest in the oversight process is how do I get information and is it understandable and credible and objective such that if I am going to make a financial evaluation and give a company a financial rating that I am doing it on a sound basis. From that standpoint, they want to understand the new oversight process. Because you know what they did with the SALP process. They averaged the three SALP scores or four SALP scores together and came up with an arithmetic average and ranked everybody. And if you called them up and said I want to buy such and such a stock, they would say, well gee, that is a 1.89 plant and you might want to consider this 1.65 stock.

MR. SHADIS: Steve, if there is a financial penalty to having white findings or whatever it may be that these people are basing their bond ratings on and that sort of stuff, does that fit in under regulatory burden? I mean, is that a --

MR. FLOYD: No, I don't think so. I think it is more -- I think it is more just the understandable objective. We don't mind them using

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| 1 | the information coming out of the oversight process as |
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| 2 | long as they understand what the information means. |
| 3 | MR. KRICH: They are members of the |
| 4 | public, Ray, just like everybody else. They have a |
| 5 | right to understand what is coming out just like you |
| 6 | do. |
| 7 | MR. FLOYD: And it is important that they |
| 8 | understand it and don't misuse it due to a |
| 9 | misunderstanding. |
| LO | MR. KRICH: And also it is real world that |
| L1 | the financial community pays lots of attention to what |
| L2 | goes on at nuclear plants. Whether you like it or |
| L3 | not, that is real world. |
| L4 | MR. FLOYD: Sure. |
| L5 | MR. KRICH: And so I would like from my |
| L6 | perspective, I would like to see make sure that |
| L7 | they understand this. |
| L8 | MR. SHADIS: At different times in the |
| L9 | past, the public interest community has watched what |
| 20 | the financial people are doing to try to get an |
| 21 | indication of what is going on in the nuclear |
| 22 | industry. So, true. |
| 23 | MR. BROCKMAN: The purpose of this |
| 24 | committee is not to teach to them what the process is. |
| 25 | If we have a purpose with that stakeholder, it is to |

identify do they have insights as to how the information for that segment of the public would be more useful. And that is the extent of what the communication should be. It is an entirely different initiative for somebody else to do it, but it is educating that part of the community. And everything we have been talking about for the last ten minutes is what we need to make sure they know about. That is not our job.

MR. FLOYD: No, no. It is not to make sure they understand it. What it is -- I don't see them as any different than the public. They use the information and we want to make sure that we have a process that is understandable to them. If there is something in our process that is not understandable and could be clarified without jeopardizing the safety objectives of the program, then we ought to consider that just like we are doing for the general public or other stakeholders.

MR. BROCKMAN: And that is the only --

MR. KRICH: Ken, you put it best in that we may get -- they could give us an insight into understandability that we might not get someplace else.

| 1 | MR. FLOYD: Or they may have some |
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| 2 | recommendations on how to make it more understandable. |
| 3 | MR. BROCKMAN: It is certainly a fine line |
| 4 | that you are walking at that stage. Is this a you |
| 5 | know, when you go out and buy a house, they say, okay, |
| 6 | give me your musts and give me your wants and give me |
| 7 | your like-to-have's. This is in my like-to-have list. |
| 8 | It is not even in my must or my wants. |
| 9 | MS. FERDIG: As far as I see it, they are |
| LO | stakeholders, just as much as I am a stakeholder. And |
| L1 | if they choose to come, then |
| L2 | MR. BROCKMAN: We are not holding it on |
| L3 | Wall Street, which makes it very |
| L4 | MS. FERDIG: It just makes us smarter. |
| L5 | MR. SHADIS: It is a matter, Mary, of |
| L6 | soliciting that input and that perspective. We did |
| L7 | have a representative in Atlanta from Morgan Lewis, |
| L8 | the law firm which represents a lot of industry folk |
| L9 | and there is a legal perspective on this also. And one |
| 20 | would think if anybody was canny enough to understand |
| 21 | the nuance of regulation, it would be the legal guys. |
| 22 | So there is another constituency or another |
| 23 | stakeholder group. |
| 24 | MR. KRICH: This is not a legal issue. |
| 25 | There is really not a legal issue here. I guess I |

1 disagree. I don't think there is any legal issue going 2 on here. The point that I think he 3 MR. GARCHOW: was making is that there is a couple of law firms that 4 I will say make their living around the nuclear 5 6 industry and pay attention to the regulatory process. 7 We didn't solicit their input as to what it is about the oversight process and communication that either 8 9 impedes or makes their job easier or better. They are 10 a stakeholder. I heard Ray saying that there is other groups of stakeholders like the financial community 11 that we chose not to solicit. 12 MR. KRICH: There is a little difference. 13 14 MR. FLOYD: I see a big difference. They 15 are only involved if we choose to hire them, at which point they become our agent and they are really an 16 17 industry stakeholder at that point. That is how I 18 view the lawyers. 19 MR. GARCHOW: Well, we choose to issue bonds at certain financial houses, so you could make 20 21 that --22 MR. SHADIS: But I just thought about it in terms of the communication thing. If I ever submit 23 24 a clear letter here, it will be because my wife, who 25 is an attorney, edited it. So there you have it.

| 1 | MR. GARCHOW: So, Loren, what is the |
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| 2 | privilege of the committee here? |
| 3 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: I am trying to get a |
| 4 | feel for the consensus here. |
| 5 | MR. GARCHOW: I will defer to the group. |
| 6 | I have an optics issue, but it is a minor thing. I can |
| 7 | certainly see Rod's point and I for one will defer to |
| 8 | the group. |
| 9 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: I am sort of where Ken |
| LO | is. I don't see it as critical. It would be |
| L1 | interesting but I am not sure it is critical to what |
| L2 | we are doing. |
| L3 | MR. BROCKMAN: If other people really feel |
| L4 | and I am going to choose a moral compass type of |
| L5 | issue, which I think is what I hear from you. Then I |
| L6 | am not strong enough to override that on any |
| L7 | individual at all. |
| L8 | MR. BORCHARDT: And I think we have a |
| L9 | reasonable middle ground getting an NEI |
| 20 | representative. Some of the issues that have been |
| 21 | raised here. |
| 22 | MR. SCHERER: What if any financial firm |
| 23 | were to show up and speak as a member of the public? |
| 24 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: How could we? |

| 1 | MR. SCHERER: So perhaps the middle ground |
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| 2 | is that we invite the other groups and if some member |
| 3 | of the financial community were to show up, we would |
| 4 | be happy to hear them as a member of the public during |
| 5 | the time allotted. |
| 6 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Sure. |
| 7 | MR. GARCHOW: Steve, you have the |
| 8 | contacts, right? |
| 9 | MR. FLOYD: How would they even know about |
| LO | it if no one calls them up and tells them. |
| L1 | MR. SHADIS: Well, the chairman won't call |
| L2 | them up. |
| L3 | MR. FLOYD: The chairman won't call them |
| L4 | up? |
| L5 | MR. BROCKMAN: I can't imagine that |
| L6 | anybody in the industry may not make sure that the |
| L7 | financial community knows about this meeting. Thank |
| L8 | you. Moving on. |
| L9 | MR. SHADIS: Nothing prevents any of the |
| 20 | members of the panel from expressing their opinion to |
| 21 | anybody. |
| 22 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: And I was going to |
| 23 | propose for the press representative is I will work |
| 24 | with our NRC public affairs and see what they propose. |

I'll talk to our public affairs office and look for 1 2 some suggestions. MR. GARCHOW: So, Loren, where did we end 3 up on the financial community? 4 That Steve can represent their views the best he knows because he 5 6 deals with them and we will call that good enough? 7 MR. BROCKMAN: We are not giving them a special invitation. They have a spot on the docket. 8 9 MR. SHADIS: Does NRC employ a clipping 10 service? You could gain insights as to how well you are communicating this by taking the local press from 11 those areas where you had your public meetings to 12 explain the ROP and seeing what they reported. 13 I also think it would be 14 MR. TRAPP: 15 interesting to have one of our public affairs officers in the region come in and give us a talk. Because they 16 17 are trying to explain this thing all the time and they 18 are not technical and they might give some pretty good 19 insights on this. 20 MR. BORCHARDT: If you have some press public affairs person out of the region, a utility 21 22 public affairs person. You'd have the surrounded. 23 24 MS. FERDIG: That would be interesting.

| MR. FLOYD: Loren, I will make the offer. |
|--|
| You can avail yourself of it or not. But I know our |
| public our communications folks at NEI get I |
| won't say a lot of calls from the press, but there is |
| a select few and I can't name them all. But there are |
| a select few numbers of newspapers across the country |
| that have shown an active interest and some individual |
| reporters that have shown an active interest in the |
| oversight process and have asked a lot of questions |
| about the development of it and what it means. If you |
| want, I could have one of our communications folks |
| call you and give you the names of those publications. |
| MR. SHADIS: I'd be glad to contribute to |
| that list too. |
| MR. FLOYD: It is a fairly limited set. I |
| mean, it is not a lot. |
| CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Okay. The other thing |
| we had talked about is input from previous PPEP |
| members. But we have |
| MR. GARCHOW: I would question the value |
| of that. I thought Alan did a good job closing out the |
| major issues of the last report. And to the extent we |
| have been living through it there is three of us on |
| the panel here that have enjoyed the gift that keeps |
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1 MR. FLOYD: I don't think we could add 2 anything to be honest with you. I couldn't. I agree 3 with Dave. MR. BROCKMAN: Probably the key things 4 that we could do is the dynamics that we have really 5 6 evolved over the last couple of meetings. The issues 7 came out of it as to where they were. But just the interactions. I think the value we brought -- we 8 9 probably haven't done it. It is just a natural the 10 way the group has coalesced in its discussions. 11 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Any other groups that we 12 need to talk to? 13 MR. MONNINGER: You had -- someone had mentioned a Congressional staffer? You said financial 14 15 investment and then Congressional --CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Well, the Congressional 16 17 I am not sure, especially right now, how much interest 18 we would get. I have had some preliminary discussions 19 with our Congressional Affairs Office, and they were 20 skeptical of whether we could find anyone that had a 21 detailed view on the program at this point. 22 they have been getting briefings on what is going on. But as far as getting their opinion, they weren't sure 23 24 we would find anyone that was willing to do that right

now.

| 1 | MR. BORCHARDT: But should we ask? |
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| 2 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Well, I did ask our |
| 3 | Congressional Affairs Office and that is the answer I |
| 4 | got. |
| 5 | MR. SCHERER: I would suggest that |
| 6 | Congress would my reaction is we ought to at least |
| 7 | ask Congress if they want to come. And if they say, |
| 8 | no, they are busy, that is fine. |
| 9 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Who? |
| 10 | MR. FLOYD: I would think you might want |
| 11 | to call the maybe the staffers for the committees |
| 12 | that have oversight over the NRC. |
| 13 | MR. SCHERER: The Oversight and |
| 14 | Authorization Committees in the House and Senate. |
| 15 | Speak to the staff director in each of those. |
| 16 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: And that is what I had |
| 17 | suggested before. As I said, I can go back to the |
| 18 | Congressional Affairs. But their perception was at |
| 19 | this point |
| 20 | MR. SCHERER: They are changing and the |
| 21 | Senate will have ranking members that have equal |
| 22 | staff. |
| 23 | MR. BROCKMAN: But what do you I really |
| 24 | think there is a lot to be said for many different |
| 25 | reasons to say we wanted you to know you were invited. |

| 1 | Tell us no. That is fine. But then when they that |
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| 2 | could be a wonderful hold card to be able to pull out |
| 3 | at some future date. |
| 4 | MR. GARCHOW: Where do you stop? I mean, |
| 5 | the guy that came and interviewed me two years ago for |
| 6 | the GAO report. I mean, they weighed in and they |
| 7 | wrote their reports. I would say where do you stop? |
| 8 | MR. SHADIS: It is really not that big of |
| 9 | a list if you shook it out. It wouldn't be more than |
| 10 | a couple dozen from which you would get a response of |
| 11 | maybe one. |
| 12 | MR. GARCHOW: Gore has a lot of time on |
| | |
| 13 | his hands. |
| 13 | his hands. MR. SHADIS: Stop. |
| | |
| 14 | MR. SHADIS: Stop. |
| 14 15 | MR. SHADIS: Stop. MR. MONNINGER: I guess in addition to NRC |
| 14 15 16 | MR. SHADIS: Stop. MR. MONNINGER: I guess in addition to NRC oversight, you have some that are just critical of the |
| 14 15 16 17 | MR. SHADIS: Stop. MR. MONNINGER: I guess in addition to NRC oversight, you have some that are just critical of the NRC in general and maybe some in the New England area. |
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I quess I am reacting very MR. SCHERER: positively to the committees not the members of jurisdiction. And because I tend to put them in the same category as a primary stakeholder. They clearly this process have an influence over with Regulatory Commission and the industry. This is not a secondary stakeholder. And I agree very much and I tried to make the point earlier that David was making that at some point you've got to cut this off. certainly my list of primary stakeholders, Congress certainly is ahead of the press in terms of its impact on the acceptability of this process.

MR. GARCHOW: So we are hearing consensus maybe that you go back to on your Congressional Affairs Office and say -- just tell them Make a couple of calls and either to humor you. somebody comes or they don't. We have made the good faith effort. We can put it in the meeting minutes that we did that. If somebody comes, we will listen to them. If they don't, we made the attempt and we are on the record of making the attempt.

MR. SHADIS: I'd like to suggest a check in the PDR and see what activity there has been from the Congressional offices or Senate offices in the last short period of time. See who has written a

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| 1 | letter on behalf of their constituents with respect to |
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| 2 | anything that would apply and let them know. It would |
| 3 | be an easy place to get actually, they actually |
| 4 | have the return addresses right on there. |
| 5 | MR. FLOYD: Another way I don't know. |
| 6 | I believe there is a way that you can can't you |
| 7 | backtrack through the URLs on the Website and see who |
| 8 | has actually queried the Web to look at the results |
| 9 | thus far? You may see some Congressional office that |
| 10 | has queried that, I don't know. We have been told that |
| 11 | some of the staffers do call that up. |
| 12 | MR. MONNINGER: I guess one last one would |
| 13 | be the State of Pennsylvania. They have put us off the |
| 14 | past two meetings, but they did express an interest in |
| 15 | coming to our February meeting. |
| 16 | MR. GARCHOW: I would say active in that |
| 17 | they have been following it quite regularly. They |
| 18 | were active at several of the workshops as well. |
| 19 | MR. SCHERER: I've got a handout here. |
| 20 | Initial Implementation Evaluation Panel Information |
| 21 | Request. I am not sure who put it together or what it |
| 22 | is we are supposed to do with it. |
| 23 | MR. KRICH: It is from me and this is the |
| 24 | list of positives. If you remember at the last |
| 25 | meeting, this is the list of positives unintended |

| 1 | positive consequences from the implementation of the |
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| 2 | new oversight process. And since I had only give a |
| 3 | table of the issues, we put together a table of |
| 4 | positives. |
| 5 | MR. FLOYD: You may have been the only one |
| 6 | who did his homework assignment. |
| 7 | MR. KRICH: That was the homework |
| 8 | assignment from the last meeting. |
| 9 | MS. FERDIG: Good for you. Thank you. |
| 10 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Any other comments? The |
| 11 | last thing, April 2nd or 3rd or 5th or 6th? 2nd and |
| 12 | 3rd? |
| 13 | MR. SCHERER: 2nd and 3rd. |
| 14 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: 2nd and 3rd. |
| 15 | MR. SCHERER: Oh, oh. I am in trouble now |
| 16 | with my region. |
| 17 | CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Okay. Anything else? |
| 18 | Thank you. We are adjourned. |
| 19 | (Whereupon, at 4:43 p.m., the meeting was |
| 20 | concluded.) |
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