UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 400
ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-8064

October 27, 2000

Mr. J. V. Parrish (Mail Drop 1023)
Chief Executive Officer
Energy Northwest
P.O. Box 968
Richland, Washington 99352-0968

SUBJECT: WNP-2 INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-397/00-13

Dear Mr. Parrish:

From August 27 through October 7, 2000, the NRC completed a safety inspection at the WNP-2 facility. The enclosed report presents the results of this inspection. The permanent plant modifications inspection results were discussed on August 31 with Mr. G. Smith and other members of your staff. The emergency preparedness and resident inspector inspection results were discussed with you and other members of your staff on September 15 and October 10, respectively.

The inspectors examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and to compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. Within these areas, the inspectors examined a selection of procedures and representative records, observed activities, and conducted interviews with personnel.

No findings of significance were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.

Sincerely,

/RA/

William B. Jones, Chief
Project Branch E
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No.: 50-397
License No.: NPF-21

Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report No.
50-397/00-11

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Dale Thatcher **(DFT)**
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ENCLOSURE

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV

Docket No.:	50-397
License No.:	NPF-21
Report No.:	50-397/00-13
Licensee:	Energy Northwest
Facility:	WNP-2
Location:	Richland, Washington
Dates:	August 27 through October 7, 2000
Inspectors:	G. D. Replogle, Senior Resident Inspector, Project Branch E, DRP M. S. Peck, Project Engineer, Project Branch E, DRP L. E. Ellershaw, Senior Reactor Inspector, Engineering and Maintenance Branch, DRS W. M. McNeill, Reactor Inspector, Engineering and Maintenance Branch, DRS W. A. Maier, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector, DRS P. J. Elkman, Emergency Preparedness Inspector, DRS S. M. Schneider, Resident Inspector, River Bend, DRP
Approved By:	William B. Jones, Chief, Project Branch E, Division of Reactor Projects

ATTACHMENTS:

Attachment 1: Supplemental Information

Attachment 2: NRC's Revised Reactor Oversight Program

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

WNP-2
NRC Inspection Report 50-397/00-13

IR 05000597-00-13; on 8/27-10/7/2000; Energy Northwest; WNP-2 facility. Integrated Resident and Regional Report; Personnel Performance during Nonroutine Plant Evolutions. No findings identified.

The inspection was conducted by two resident inspectors, a regional project engineer, two regional reactor inspectors, and two emergency preparedness inspectors during a 6-week period from August 27 through October 7, 2000. There were no significant findings identified during this reporting period.

Report Details

Summary of Plant Status:

At the start of the period, operators maintained the plant at 60 power, after securing the Train A recirculation pump because of a seal failure. Operators shut down the plant on September 1, 2000, to repair the seal. Operators transitioned the plant to Mode 2 on September 5, synchronized the main turbine to the grid on September 6, and attained 100 percent power on September 8. On September 18, operators manually scrammed the plant in response to degrading condenser vacuum. Following condenser repairs, operators placed the plant in Mode 2 on September 21, synchronized the main turbine to the grid on September 22, and achieved 100 percent power on September 23. Power essentially remained at 100 percent for the remainder of the inspection period.

1 REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency Preparedness

1R04 Equipment Alignments (71111.04Q)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a partial equipment alignment verification for the Division II hydrogen/oxygen monitoring system while the Division I unit was out of service. The inspectors verified that operators maintained a correct alignment for the plant conditions.

b. Issues and Findings

There were no findings identified during this inspection.

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation (71111.12)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed equipment failures associated with the:

- Reactor core isolation cooling system keepfill pump
- Reactor core isolation cooling system pressure control Valve 15
- Division I, service water pump breaker
- Compressed air system, Compressor 1C
- Unit differential relay trip circuitry (cause of June 26, 2000, scram)
- Division II emergency diesel generator motor-operated potentiometer

The inspectors reviewed the following documents during this inspection

- Maintenance Rule Status Report for the First Quarter, 2000

- Maintenance Rule Status Report for the Second Quarter, 2000

- Problem Evaluation Requests:

  200-0659 - Reactor core isolation cooling system keepfill pump failure

  200-1198 - Reactor core isolation cooling system pressure control Valve 15 failure

  200-1121 - Division I service water system failure

  200-1272 - Control air system compressor failure

  200-1043 - Unit overall differential relay short circuit caused reactor scram

  200-1432 - Division II diesel generator failed to pickup load during surveillance

- Maintenance Rule Program, Revision 3

b. Issues and Findings

There were no findings identified during this inspection.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following work prioritization, risk evaluation, and control activities to evaluate the effectiveness of licensee risk management efforts:

- Division I emergency diesel generator maintenance
- Division III emergency diesel generator maintenance
- Emergent Division I reactor vessel level switch work (MS-LS-61B), which affected containment isolation functions and time delay relays for the low pressure core spray system and the Train A residual heat removal system.

b. Issues and Findings

There were no findings identified during this inspection.

1R14 Personnel Performance During Nonroutine Plant Evolutions (71111.14)

a. Inspection Scope

On September 8, 2000, the inspectors observed operator response to degrading condenser vacuum. Ultimately, operators manually scrammed the plant in accordance with plant procedures to protect the turbine. The inspectors also reviewed operator logs

and discussed the event with plant personnel. The inspectors verified that operator actions were consistent with procedural requirements and that human performance errors did not complicate event response.

The inspectors reviewed the following documents:

- Work Orders NCL5, NCL6, and NCM3, condenser work, including condenser closeout inspections
- Problem Evaluation Request 200-1611 - Reactor scram because of a loss of condenser vacuum
- Problem Evaluation Request 200-1625 - Slop drains assembled without attaching two u-clamp supports
- Procedure 2.5.7, "Main Turbine Generator," Revision 36

Plant personnel identified that a slop system piping failure caused the event. The slop system traverses through the condenser and drains small amounts of moisture and oil from turbine housing low points.

The licensee attributed the failure to cyclic fatigue. The original piping penetration design called for a socket weld but, in 1986, workers installed a threaded fitting with a seal weld instead. The threaded fitting was more susceptible to fatigue failure. A March 1999 condenser close-out inspection failed to identify the missing support, which contributed to the failure.

The licensee evaluated other slop system lines to verify the presence of supports and to inspect for signs of fatigue. Workers reinforced a weld on one penetration and installed a missing pipe support at one other location. In addition, the licensee planned to add additional piping supports and perform additional inspections during the next refueling outage.

b. Issues and Findings

There were no findings identified during this inspection.

1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following operability evaluations affecting mitigating systems and barrier integrity. The inspectors verified that the licensee properly justified operability and that other components/systems remained available, such that no unrecognized increase in risk had occurred:

- Problem Evaluation Request 200-1592 - Recirculation system operated with mismatched drive flows that can cause increased vibration in jet pumps

- Problem Evaluation Request 200-1570 - Control room envelop unfiltered in-leakage exceeded the maximum allowed in design basis documents

- Problem Evaluation Request 200-1432 - Division II diesel generator did not pick up load during surveillance testing

b. Issues and Findings

There were no findings identified during this inspection.

1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications (71111.17)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed procedures governing plant modifications to evaluate the effectiveness of the programs for implementing modifications to risk-significant systems, structures, and components, such that these changes did not adversely affect the design and licensing basis of the facility. The inspectors also reviewed 20 permanent plant modification packages to verify that they were performed in accordance with plant procedures. Procedures and permanent plant modifications reviewed are listed in Attachment 1.

The inspectors interviewed the cognizant design and system engineers for the identified modifications as to their understanding of the modification packages.

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the licensee's corrective action process to identify and correct problems concerning the performance of permanent plant modifications. In this effort, the inspectors reviewed problem evaluation requests and the subsequent corrective actions pertaining to licensee-identified problems and errors in the performance of permanent plant modifications. Problem evaluation requests reviewed are listed in Attachment 1.

b. Issues and Findings

There were no findings identified during this inspection.

1R19 Postmaintenance Testing (71111.19)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the following postmaintenance testing activities to determine whether the tests confirmed equipment operability:

- PMT-RRC-P-1A - Reactor Recirculation Pump Seal Replacement

- Work Order 01003692 01, RCIC-RO-9 (lube oil cooler line orifice), Inspect Orifice

- Work Order 01016632 01, RICI-PCV-15 (lube oil cooler line pressure control valve) Failed Full Open, Troubleshoot and Repair

b. Issues and Findings

There were no findings identified during this inspection.

1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following surveillance tests to verify that the testing adequately demonstrated system/component capability:

- Procedure 3.1.10, "Reactor Building Auxiliary Operator Rounds, Operating Data and Logs," Revision 22
- Procedure OI-18, "Equipment Operating Rounds," Revision D
- Procedure OSP-RICI/IST-Q701, "Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Operability Test," Revision 13
- Procedure ISP-APRM/RRC-S302, "Control Rod Block and Recirculation Flow Upscale Inop and Comparator Channel B," Revision 5

b. Issues and Findings

There were no findings identified during this inspection.

1R51 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed performance indicator data covering "Unplanned Power Changes" for the previous 4 quarters. The inspectors reviewed operator logs, corrective action program records, and monthly operating reports and verified that the data was accurate.

b. Issues and Findings

There were no findings identified during this inspection.

1EP1 Exercise Evaluation (7111401)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the objectives and scenario for the 2000 exercise to determine if the exercise would acceptably test major elements of the emergency plan. The scenario included a simulated earthquake, equipment and electrical power failures, an

unisolable main steam leak, core damage, and a radiological release to support demonstration of licensee capabilities to implement its emergency plan.

The inspectors evaluated exercise performance by focusing on the risk-significant activities of classification, notification, protective action recommendations, and assessment of offsite dose consequences in the following emergency response facilities:

- Simulator Control Room
- Technical Support Center
- Operations Support Center
- Emergency Operations Facility

The inspectors also assessed personnel recognition of abnormal plant conditions, the transfer of emergency responsibilities between facilities, communications, and the overall implementation of the emergency plan.

The inspectors attended the post-exercise critiques in each of the above facilities to evaluate the initial licensee self-assessment of exercise performance. The inspectors also attended a presentation of critique items to plant management.

b. Findings

There were no findings identified during this inspection.

1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes (7111404)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following emergency plan and emergency action level changes to determine whether these changes decreased the effectiveness of the approved emergency plan:

- Emergency Plan, Revisions 25 and 26
- Procedure 13.1.1, “Classifying the Emergency,” Revisions 27 and 28
- Procedure 13.1.1A, “Classifying the Emergency - Technical Bases,” Revisions 5 and 6

b. Findings

There were no findings identified during this inspection.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)

.1 Drill and Exercise Performance

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors verified a sample of the reported results of the Drill and Exercise Performance indicator by reviewing notification worksheet records for licensee site-wide drills and simulator training scenarios conducted during the first 2 quarters of calendar year 2000. The inspectors also interviewed four licensee evaluators who provided input to the Drill and Exercise Performance indicator to determine how the licensee determined that a notification was accurate.

b. Issues and Findings

The inspectors were unable to verify the accuracy of offsite notifications reported in performance indicator data. Four factors contributed to this inability. First, the licensee did not proceduralize the definition of accuracy in Procedure 1.10.10, Revision 0, “Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Reporting." Second, different drill evaluators applied different criteria for accuracy. Third, the licensee did not provide for recording the accuracy of oral notifications. Fourth, the governing document for determining drill and exercise performance indicators did not provide guidance to support the definition of notification accuracy.

During interviews, licensee staff provided inspectors three sets of criteria for determining accurate notifications. The corporate emergency preparedness officer stated that the notification following a classification was accurate if it contained only the correct emergency classification and (if applicable) the correct protective action recommendation. An emergency preparedness staff member stated that a notification was accurate if the following elements were all correct:

- Emergency classification
- Status and type of radiological release
- Protective action recommendations (if applicable)

Two simulator instructors stated that a notification was accurate if the following elements were all correct:

- Type of classification, date, and time of classification
- Emergency classification
- Protective action recommendations (if applicable)
- Status and type of radiological release
- Meteorological data
- Prognosis of situation

The corporate emergency preparedness officer stated that the recognized official notification to offsite authorities was the oral communication via the dedicated ring-down

phone system and that the printed classification notification form was provided to offsite authorities as a convenience. However, the licensee archived copies of classification notification forms generated during site-wide drills and simulator scenarios and presented these to inspectors as evidence of timely and accurate notifications. The licensee was unable to provide evidence that oral communications associated with classification notification forms were accurately represented by the recorded information. The inspectors were also unable to determine which of the above licensee criteria for accuracy had been applied to particular classification notification forms.

In later discussions, the corporate emergency preparedness officer stated that the accurate notification was limited to the following items listed in Evaluation Criterion E.3 of NUREG-0654, "Criteria for the Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants."

- Class of emergency
- Whether a release is taking place
- Potentially affected population and areas
- Whether protective measures may be necessary

The inspectors reviewed NEI 99-02, Revision 0, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," and determined that its guidance did not provide evaluation criteria for determining notification accuracy. The inspectors discussed the various interpretations of notification accuracy with the licensee, noting examples of additional information whose accuracy could affect the ability of offsite agencies to respond [e.g., event declaration time and certain meteorological parameters (wind direction)]. The licensee entered the issue into its corrective action program as part of Problem Evaluation Request 2000-1581. This issue is considered an unresolved item (URI 50-397/00013-01) pending a determination through the frequently-asked-question process of whether the licensee's definition of notification accuracy was appropriate.

.2 Emergency Response Organization Readiness

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors verified the reported results for the Emergency Response Organization Drill Participation performance indicator by reviewing the emergency response organization drill participation database results for the previous 8 quarters. The inspectors reviewed drill participation attendance records for a sample of 10 key emergency responders to determine if database records for these responders were accurate.

b. Issues and Findings

There were no findings identified during this inspection.

.3 Alert and Notification System Reliability

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors verified the reported results for the Alert and Notification System Reliability performance indicator by reviewing offsite siren test results performed in the first 2 quarters of calendar year 2000.

b. Issues and Findings

There were no findings identified during this inspection.

4OA6 Management Meetings

Exit Meeting Summary

The reactor inspectors presented the Permanent Plant Modifications inspection results to Mr. G. Smith, Vice President - Generation/Nuclear Plant General Manager, and other members of licensee management on August 31, 2000. In addition, the emergency preparedness inspectors presented the emergency preparedness related inspection results to Mr. J. Parrish, Chief Executive Officer, and other members of licensee management on September 15. These inspectors also conducted a followup exit interview with the licensee, via telephone, on October 4 to recharacterize one inspection finding. Finally, the resident inspectors presented the remainder of the inspection results to Mr. J. Parrish and other members of licensee management at an exit meeting on October 10. During each meeting, the licensee acknowledged the inspection results. The inspectors also asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspections should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

Attachment 1

Supplemental Information

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee

J. Parrish, Chief Executive Officer
D. Atkinson, Acting Vice President - Operation Support
B. Boyum, Assistant Manager, Engineering
D. Coleman, Acting Manager, Engineering
D. Feldman, Acting Manager, Operations
P. Inserra, Acting Manager, Regulatory Affairs
C. King, Manager, Design Engineering
T. Messersmith, Corporate Emergency Preparedness, Safety and Health Officer
A. Mouncer, Vice President and General Counsel
W. Oxenford, Plant General Manager
D. Poirier, Maintenance Manager
M. Reis, Acting Manager, Regulatory Affairs
R. Sherman, Acting Manager, Licensing
G. Smith, Vice President - Generation/Nuclear Plant General Manager
R. Webring, Vice President - Operation Support

ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED

Items Opened, Closed, and Discussed During this Inspection

Opened

50-397/00013-01 URI Licensee definition of notification accuracy (4OA1.1).

Opened and Closed During this Inspection

None

Previous Items Closed

None

Previous Items Discussed

None

PARTIAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

PROCEDURES

Administrative Procedure 1.4.1, “Plant Modifications,” Revision 24

Engineering Directorate Manual, Document E.I. 2.8, “Generating Facility Design Change Process," Revision 15

Site-Wide Procedure SWP-CAP-01, “Problem Evaluation Requests,” Revision 1

Procedure 1.10.10, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Reporting," Revision 0

Procedure 13.10.9, "Operations Support Center Manager and Staff Duties," Revision 27

Procedure 13.10.10, "Health Physics, Chemistry, Operations Support Center Duties," Revision 14

Procedure 13.10.12, "Repair Team Duties," Revision 14

Procedure 13.14.4, "Emergency Equipment." Revision 32

Procedure 13.14.8, "Drill and Exercise Program," Revision 15

DESIGN SPECIFICATION DOCUMENTS

Section 308, “High Pressure Core Spray System,” Revision 1
Section 311, “Residual Heat Removal System,” Revision 2
Section 322, “Reactor Closed Cooling Water System,” Revision 0

MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS

Engineering Standards Manual EER-5, “General Fuse Selection Criteria and the Electrical Protection of 460 VAC and 125-250 VDC Motors,” Revision 2

Inservice Testing Program Plan, Revision 1 with Change Number 6

Procurement Evaluation Number 5731, Revision 2

Columbia Generating Station 2000 Exercise Controller Manual

Energy Northwest Emergency Plan for Washington Nuclear Project 2, Revisions 26 and 27

TRAINING SYSTEM DESCRIPTIONS

82-RSY-0900-T3: “High Pressure Core Spray System,” Revision 8
82-RSY-1300-T1: “Reactor Closed Cooling Water System,” Revision 8
82-RSY-1300-T4: “Plant Service Water,” Revision 7

82-RSY-1300-T3: Residual Heat Removal, Revision 9

PLANT MODIFICATION RECORDS

91-0071-10, Modify the Connection Configuration of RHR-V-606/631

91-0137-0, RCC Filter, Demineralizer, and Coupon Stations

92-0120-0, MOV Fuse Change Out

92-0178-2, Diesel Air Start System - Air Compressors

92-0287-0, Removal of Unused Air Valves on Non-ADS Main Steam Relief Valves

93-0150-1, Remove Plant Service Water Dead Leg Piping to OG Charcoal Vault Chiller Units

94-0043-2, Pressure Locking Bypass Modification

94-0043-3, Pressure Locking Bypass Modification

94-0128-00, Reactor Feedwater-HX-6A Heater Drain Dump Line

94-0290-0, Deactivation of RCC-EHO-72A

96-0139-0, Wetwell Strainer Performance Improvement

96-0139-1, Wetwell Strainer Performance Improvement

96-0210-0, Install Spectacle Flange Upstream of DW-V-156 for Isolation of DW System

97-0017-0, RCC Return Line Vent

97-0059-0, Plant Service Water Radwaste Building Load Sectional Isolation Valves

97-0060-0, Plant Service Water TO-HX-1A(1B) Load Sectional Isolation Valves

98-0081-0, Replacement of the 125 to 24 Vdc Power Supplies DG-E/S-DG1/A7 and DG-E/S-DG2/A7

98-0082-0, Main Steam Relief Valve Seat Modification

99-0044-0, Relocate Reactor Water Cleanup Pump Seal Purge Line in Control Rod Drive System

99-0081-0, DC Coordination of E-DP-S1/HPCS Protective Devices

PROBLEM EVALUATION REQUESTS

297-0038 Two penetrations may experience overpressure conditions

297-0206	Linear indication found in plant service water line
297-0468	Cobalt activity found in the reactor closed cooling water system
297-0658	Operability assessment process not followed
298-0379	Foreign material controls requirements not followed
298-1085	Linear indication fund in plant service water piping
299-0308	Control rod drive system containment boundary inconsistent with licensing basis
299-0353	Configuration discrepancies between plant service water drawing and procedure
299-0590	Inadequate Operations involvement in plant modification
299-0591	Secondary containment bypass leakage path identified
299-2047	Molded case circuit breaker instantaneous trip was out of tolerance
299-2532	Top tier drawing not consistent with plant configuration
200-1571	Recommendation for administration of potassium iodide made without proper authorization during exercise
200-1574	Problems with notification forms during exercise
200-1586	Security dosimetry packets expired, identified during exercise
200-1588	Simulator radiation model failed during exercise
200-1589	Crash system partially failed during exercise
200-1590	Step-off pad not established for technical support center during exercise
200-1593	Inappropriate worker simulations observed during exercise
200-1594	Failed to document potassium iodide recommendations on accountability log during exercise
200-1595	Error in controller data caused higher than expected dose projections during exercise
200-1596	Several problems associated with one repair team, during exercise
200-1597	Work team dispatched to steam tunnel without appropriate respiratory protection during exercise

ATTACHMENT 2

NRC's REVISED REACTOR OVERSIGHT PROCESS

The federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) recently revamped its inspection, assessment, and enforcement programs for commercial nuclear power plants. The new process takes into account improvements in the performance of the nuclear industry over the past 25 years and improved approaches of inspecting and assessing safety performance at NRC licensed plants.

The new process monitors licensee performance in three broad areas (called strategic performance areas): reactor safety (avoiding accidents and reducing the consequences of accidents if they occur), radiation safety (protecting plant employees and the public during routine operations), and safeguards (protecting the plant against sabotage or other security threats). The process focuses on licensee performance within each of seven cornerstones of safety in the three areas:

Reactor Safety	Radiation Safety	Safeguards
● Initiating Events	● Occupational	● Physical Protection
● Mitigating Systems	● Public	
● Barrier Integrity		
● Emergency Preparedness		

To monitor these seven cornerstones of safety, the NRC uses two processes that generate information about the safety significance of plant operations: inspections and performance indicators. Inspection findings will be evaluated according to their potential significance for safety, using the Significance Determination Process, and assigned colors of GREEN, WHITE, YELLOW or RED. GREEN findings are indicative of issues that, while they may not be desirable, represent very low safety significance. WHITE findings indicate issues that are of low to moderate safety significance. YELLOW findings are issues that are of substantial safety significance. RED findings represent issues that are of high safety significance with a significant reduction in safety margin.

Performance indicator data will be compared to established criteria for measuring licensee performance in terms of potential safety. Based on prescribed thresholds, the indicators will be classified by color representing varying levels of performance and incremental degradation in safety: GREEN, WHITE, YELLOW, and RED. GREEN indicators represent performance at a level requiring no additional NRC oversight beyond the baseline inspections. WHITE corresponds to performance that may result in increased NRC oversight. YELLOW represents performance that minimally reduces safety margin and requires even more NRC oversight. RED indicates performance that represents a significant reduction in safety margin but still provides adequate protection to public health and safety.

The assessment process integrates performance indicators and inspection so the agency can reach objective conclusions regarding overall plant performance. The agency will use an Action Matrix to determine in a systematic, predictable manner which regulatory actions should be taken based on a licensee's performance. The NRC's actions in response to the significance (as represented by the color) of issues will be the same for performance indicators as for inspection findings. As a licensee's safety performance degrades, the NRC will take more and increasingly significant action, which can include shutting down a plant, as described in the Action Matrix.

More information can be found at: http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html.