



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
SAM NUNN ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER
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July 25, 2001

Mr. J. A. Stall
Senior Vice President, Nuclear and
Chief Nuclear Officer
Florida Power & Light Company
PO Box 14000
Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420

SUBJECT: TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION
REPORT 50-250/01-04, 50-251/01-04

Dear Mr. Stall:

On June 30, 2001, the NRC completed an inspection at your Turkey Point Units 3 and 4. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on July 11, 2001, with Mr. R. Hovey and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

No findings of significance were identified by the NRC inspectors.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's document system (ADAMS). Adams is accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Leonard D. Wert, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 3
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 50-250, 50-251
License Nos. DPR-31, DPR-41

Enclosure: Inspection Report 50-250/01-04, 50-251/01-04
cc w/encl:

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

Docket Nos: 50-250, 50-251
License Nos: DPR-31, DPR-41

Report No: 50-250/01-04, 50-251/01-04

Licensee: Florida Power & Light Company (FPL)

Facility: Turkey Point Nuclear Plant, Units 3 & 4

Location: 9760 SW 344th Street
Florida City, FL 33035

Dates: April 01 - June 30, 2001

Inspectors: C. Patterson, Senior Resident Inspector
J. R Reyes, Resident Inspector
G. Kuzo, Senior Radiation Specialist (Sections 2PS1, 2PS3)
S. Rudisail, Project Engineer (Sections 1R01, 1R06)

Approved by: L. Wert, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 3
Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000250-01-04, IR 05000251-01-04 on 4/1 - 6/30/2001, Florida Power & Light, Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 & 4. Integrated inspection report.

The inspection was conducted by resident inspectors, a regional senior radiation specialist, and a regional project engineer. No findings of significance were identified by NRC inspectors during this inspection. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at <http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html>.

A. Inspector Identified Findings

None

B. Licensee Identified Violations

A violation of very low significance which was identified by the licensee was reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee appear reasonable. The violation is listed in section 4OA7 of this report.

Report Details

Summary of Plant Status: Both units operated at full power during the report period except for short periods of operation at reduced power for turbine valve testing and heat exchanger cleaning.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity (Reactor-R), and Emergency Preparedness (EP)

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's preparations for the hurricane season. The inspectors verified the actions completed as required by Emergency Preparedness Administrative Directive EP-AD-009, Hurricane Season Preparation. The inspectors verified actions such as review of procedures, walkdowns of the areas around the plant for potential missile hazards, and other actions specified in EP-AD-009. Plant procedures O-EPIP-20106, Natural Emergencies; and O-ONOP-103.3, Severe Weather Preparations were also reviewed.

a. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors verified by partial walkdown inspections, the alignment of redundant trains/systems when the other train/system was out-of-service. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's flow path verification procedure, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) system description, and system drawings to determine the system was correctly aligned.

The inspectors performed a detailed walkdown and reviewed the electrical line-up prints with the electrical engineering supervisors to verify the correct alignment and identification of breakers on the four safety related direct current busses and batteries while the 4B Battery was out of service. Equipment clearance orders were reviewed with plant operators to verify that electrical power was maintain as required by Technical Specification. The inspectors performed a walkdown on the 4B Battery with the responsible system engineer and reviewed the corrective maintenance that was performed on the batteries. The inspectors verified the licensee entered identified issues into the corrective action program. The inspectors reviewed battery material deficiencies during cell pressure testing with the vendor representative to verify that battery operation was not adversely impacted.

On June 4, 2001, auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump "A" was removed from service to perform corrective maintenance. The inspectors performed a partial walkdown on Unit 3 and Unit 4 and verified that the AFW "C" swing pump was correctly aligned to train one and the "B" pump was correctly aligned to train two. AFW system valve alignment procedures and drawings were compared to the actual found alignment for the dual train operation.

- 4B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) while 4A EDG was out-of-service
- 3A, 3B, 4A, and spare battery, and their respective busses while the 4B battery was out of service.
- AFW "B" and "C" pump and train alignment while the "A" pump was out of service.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors toured the below-listed plant areas to evaluate, on a sampling basis, conditions related to licensee control of transient combustibles and ignition sources; the material condition and operational status of selected fire protection systems, equipment and features; and the condition of selected fire barriers used to prevent fire damage or fire propagation. The inspectors verified the operational lineup of halon systems in the cable spreading room and inverter room. The inspectors verified the operability of the plant fire watch camera station and reviewed applicable procedures with the security officers monitoring the cameras.

- Inverter room behind Control Room
- 4A EDG Room
- 4B EDG Room
- 4A EDG Fuel Storage Room
- 4B EDG Fuel Storage Room
- Cable Spreading Room

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R06 Flood Protection Measures

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed UFSAR Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, including related figures and drawings, Procedure 0-ONOP-103.3, Severe Weather Preparations; and Emergency Preparedness Administrative Directive, Hurricane Procedure

Preparation, to identify areas that may be affected by internal or external flooding, design flood levels, and protection features for areas containing safety-related equipment. The inspector then verified that flooding mitigation structures and equipment were consistent with the design requirements. The inspector walked down various areas protected for flooding, and verified that the requirements of 0-ONOP-102.1, Flood Protection Stoplog and Penetration Seal Inspection, were being met. The inspector reviewed flood protection measures for the 4160 Volt switchgear rooms and the EDG rooms. The inspector reviewed Condition Reports (CRs) related to flooding events and flood protection and verified the issues were being addressed adequately.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification

a. Inspection Scope

On April 12, 2001, the inspectors observed Operator training in the Unit 3 Simulator. Prior to the training, the inspectors reviewed the planned transient scenario with the training instructor. Additionally, applicable procedures and operator response actions, such as expected entry into specific Emergency Operating Procedures and TS action statements which were to be identified by the crew, were reviewed. The inspectors also verified implementation of corrective actions requiring specific training on TS action statements relating to dropped control rod transients. The inspectors verified that lessons learned from the past dropped rod transients were included in the training for the entire crew and technical support personnel.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of maintenance on selected structures, systems, and components scoped into the maintenance rule, and verified procedural requirements specified in procedure 0-ADM 728, Maintenance Rule Implementation. The inspector reviewed the characterization of failures, safety significance classifications, and the appropriateness of performance criteria and corrective actions. The inspectors attended the Plant Nuclear Safety Committee (PNSC) meeting that discussed the generic aspect and corrective actions for CR 01-0935 to verify issues were properly addressed.

- CR 01-0456 4D 4 kilovolt Bus Breaker Failed to Open
- WO 3104019 E16D Inverter Room Air Conditioning
- CR 01-0935 3B EDG Lockout
- CR 01-0783 3B Component Cooling Water (CCW) Pump Breaker
- CR 01-1045 4A EDG Failure to Start
- CR 01-1021 Failure of Unit 4 Boric Acid Control Valve

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following emergent items, as described in the referenced CRs or work orders (WOs). The inspectors verified that the emergent work activities were adequately planned and controlled, as described in O-ADM-210, On-Line Maintenance/Work Coordination and O-ADM-225, On Line Risk Assessment and Management. The inspectors verified that, as appropriate, contingencies were in place to reduce risk, minimize time spent in increased risk configurations, and to avoid initiating events. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's review and corrective actions associated with the motor operated valve problems discussed in CR 00-2164. This issue is also addressed in Section 4OA7 of this report.

The inspectors reviewed emergent issues associated with the Unit 3 diesel driven instrument air compressor failure to stop during a surveillance, and the failure of the same compressor during a subsequent surveillance. The instrument air system probabilistic risk assessment and UFSAR descriptions were reviewed. The risk significance associated with cross-tying the two instrument air systems, thus defeating the individual unit isolation feature, and the impact of the online risk monitor, was reviewed with engineering.

- CR 01-0935 3B EDG Lockout
- CR 01-0925 "C" AFW Pump Overspeed Trip Below Acceptance Test
- CR 01-1045 4A EDG Failure to Start
- CR 00-2164 Motor Operated Valves
- CR 01-1021 Failure of Unit 4 Boric Acid Control Valve
- CR 01-1206 Dropped Mobile Crane
- CR 01-1249 Unit 3 Diesel Driven Instrument Air Compressor Failure

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R14 Personnel Performance During Non-routine Plant Evolutions and Events

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed operator performance during planned weekend downpower maneuvers for Unit 4 during April 27-29, 2001, and Unit 3 during May 4 - 6, 2001. The inspectors verified that adequate planning and preparations were made for the evolutions and that the activities were accomplished in accordance with applicable procedural controls. Reviews of logs and corrective action program documentation confirmed that problems encountered were entered into the licensee's corrective action program.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed selected operability evaluations affecting mitigating systems and barrier integrity to determine that operability was justified and no unrecognized increase in risk had occurred. The inspectors verified procedural requirements as described in 0-ADM-518, Condition Reports.

The inspectors reviewed the design limit criteria with systems engineering and verified completion of selected corrective actions for the letdown isolation valve which failed an Inservice Test (IST) (CR 01-1140).

- CR 01-0925 "C" AFW Pump Overspeed Trip Below Acceptance Criteria
- CR 01-0764 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Manual Alignment During IST
- CR 01-0843 Unit 3 RHR System Broken Reach Rod
- CR 01-0783 3B CCW Pump Breaker
- CR 01-1140 CV-3-200B Let Down Isolation Valve failed IST
- CR 01-1234 Unit 4B Emergency Containment Cooler CCW Inlet Valve
- CR 01-1197 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications

The inspectors evaluated Plant Change/Modifications (PC/Ms) to verify that the modified systems had not been degraded, and that the modifications had not left the plant in an unsafe condition. Additionally, on PC/M 00-042, Emergency Diesel Generator Governor Control Circuit Enhancement, the inspectors reviewed the relay change work in progress with the field supervisors and reviewed the details of the Post Maintenance test results with the responsible system engineer.

The inspectors attended a reactivity management review board review of the primary water flow meter modifications to verify that potential reactivity issues were addressed. The inspectors observed the "Just-In-Time" training provided to the Operating crew which operated Unit 3 during the flow meter modification. The inspectors verified that the simulator plant configuration and reactivity changes simulated the planned configuration during the modification. The following PC/Ms were reviewed:

- PC/M 00-042 Emergency Diesel Generator Governor Control Circuit Enhancement
- PC/M 01- 032 Primary Water Flow Transmitter

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

For the post maintenance tests listed below, the inspectors reviewed the test procedure and witnessed the testing and/or reviewed test records to determine whether the scope of testing adequately verified that the work performed was correctly completed and demonstrated that the affected equipment was operable. The inspectors verified that the requirements of procedure O-ADM-737, Post Maintenance Testing, were incorporated into test requirements. The inspectors observed the vibration testing of the 3B RHR pump which was in an alert status due to high vibration. The inspectors reviewed the specifics of maintenance request authorization (MRA) 31010798-03 and the vibration test results with the responsible mechanical engineering supervisor to ensure the results were adequately evaluated.

- WO 30020524“ B” AFW Pump PMT
- 3-OSP-023.2 3A EDG Rapid Start and Load Rejection
- WO 31011100 Electric Fire Pump Outlet Check Valve Replacement
- MRA 31010798-03 Vibration Testing Of The 3B RHR Pump
- TP 01-013 Testing of Unit 4B EDG after Implementation of PC/M 00-042
- 0-OSP-075.11 AFW Pump “A” Inservice Test

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors verified by witnessing surveillance tests and/or reviewing test data, that the selected testing met the TS, the UFSAR, and licensee procedure requirements and demonstrated the systems capable of performing their intended safety functions.

The inspectors reviewed the tendon surveillance test data with the responsible system engineer. The inspectors observed the pre-evolution brief for the Standby Steam Generator Feedpump Surveillance and reviewed the surveillance test data with Operations management.

- 4-OSP-023.1 Diesel Generator Operability Test
- PSC N748-275 Tendon Surveillance
- 0-OSP-074.3 Standby Steam Generator Feedwater Pumps Availability
- 3-OSP-050.2 Residual Heat Removal System 3B Pump Inservice Test
- 3-OSP-030.1 Component Cooling Pump Inservice Test
- 4-OSP-040.8 Reactivity Deviation From Design Calculation
- 0-OSP-025.1 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Operability Test

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

IR23 Temporary Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed temporary modification 3-00-50-09, Mechanical Valve Stem Lock on RHR Valve 3-758. The inspectors verified that the modification did not affect the safety function of the risk significant RHR system, the modification was installed as required by plant documents, and the 10 CFR 50.59 screening evaluations appropriately considered the UFSAR information. Plant documentation such as Off Normal Operating procedures and drawings were reviewed and verified to correctly describe valve configuration and the required operator actions for shutdown cooling as a result of the installed temporary modification. The inspectors verified that any operator work around created as a result of the temporary modification was appropriately evaluated. The inspectors walked down the completed modification with the responsible system engineer.

The inspectors attended a PNSC meeting that performed a quarterly review of all open temporary modifications to verify that configuration control documents for risk significant systems were being maintained and updated.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP6 Drill Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

On May 22, 2001, the inspectors observed the quarterly plant emergency planning drill from the technical support center and the operations support center. The inspectors verified that all emergency classifications and notifications were performed properly. The inspectors attended the drill critique and verified that all noted deficiencies were discussed.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

2. RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety (PS)

2PS1 Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Monitoring Systems

.1 Effluent Release Processing Observations and Quality Control Activities

a. Inspection Scope

During the week of May 7, the inspectors directly observed and evaluated chemistry and operations staff proficiency in conducting pre-release processing, sampling, and gamma spectroscopy analysis tasks conducted in preparation for a "B" Monitor Tank (MT) liquid release. The tasks and related procedures were examined in detail to verify pre-release sample representativeness, radionuclide concentration lower limits of detection (LLD) and achieved analyses accuracies, pre-release dose calculation completeness, and the liquid effluent radiation monitor (RM)-18 set-point determination adequacy. The liquid effluent release path piping, valves, and associated RM equipment were walked-down and observed for material condition. During the May 10, 2001 "B" MT release, the

inspectors observed and discussed with the responsible operations personnel, the local radioactive waste control panel and main control room activities and readouts, system valve alignments, and resultant release pathway flows. Post-release dose calculations were reviewed and evaluated for accuracy.

Both the licensee in-house and vendor laboratories quality control (QC) program activities for liquid and airborne sample radionuclide analyses were evaluated. The inspectors discussed and reviewed, as applicable, current gamma spectroscopy and liquid scintillation detection equipment calibrations and daily system performance results, preparation, processing and storage of composite samples, radionuclide concentration LLD capabilities and achieved accuracies, and results of the quarterly cross-check spiked radionuclide samples analyzed during calendar year 2000.

Conduct and results of Quality Assurance (QA) audits were evaluated. The inspectors reviewed and discussed audit report QAO-PTN-01-002, Chemistry and Effluents Functional Area Audit, conducted February 5 - April 9, 2001.

The in-place liquid effluent release equipment, observed task evolutions, and offsite dose results were evaluated against 10 CFR Part 20 requirements, Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50 design criteria, Technical Specifications (TS), Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) details, and the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM), Revision (Rev.) 8, dated 3/3/99. Laboratory QC activities were evaluated against Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.21, Measuring, Evaluating and Reporting Radioactivity in Solid Wastes and Releases of Radioactive Materials In Liquid and Gaseous Effluents from Light-Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plant, June 1974; and RG 4.15, Quality Assurance for Radiological Monitoring Programs (Normal Operation) - Effluent Streams and the Environment, December 1977. Audit program activities were evaluated against UFSAR details and Florida Power and Light's Topical Quality Assurance Report 18.0 Audits, Rev. 10. The following effluent processing and monitoring procedures were reviewed for adequacy and implementation, where applicable, during the onsite inspection:

- 0-Operating Procedure (OP)-061.10, Waste Disposal System Laundry Drain System, Revision Approval Date 05/10/00
- 0-OP-061.11, Waste Disposal System, Controlled Radiological Liquid Release, Revision Approval Date 04/22/01
- 0-Nuclear Chemistry Analytical Procedure (NCAP)-216, Radiochemistry Quality Control Samples, Revision Approval Date 06/08/98
- 0-Nuclear Chemistry Operations Procedure (NCOP) -003, Preparation of Liquid Release Permits, Revision Approval Date 05/05/99C
- 0-NCOP-308, Operation of the Gamma Spectroscopy System, Revision Approval Date 05/02/97
- 0-Nuclear Chemistry Sampling Procedure, 046.2, Monitor Tank Sampling, Revision Approval Date 01/23/96

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Airborne Effluent Vent Flow and Air Cleaning System Surveillance

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed current surveillances for calibration of the auxiliary building vent stack monitor flow element (FE)-6584 and associated equipment, and for determination of the Unit 3 Spent Fuel Pool Exhaust flow rates. In addition, completion and adequacy of the results of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Cleanup System Performance Tests were evaluated.

Program activities were reviewed against TS, UFSAR, American Nuclear Institute Standard N510, 1975, Testing of Nuclear Air-Cleaning Systems; and RG 1.52, Design, Testing and Maintenance Criteria for Post Accident Engineered Safety-Feature Atmosphere Cleanup System Air Filtration and Adsorption Units of Light Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants, Rev. 2. The following procedures were reviewed and discussed during inspection of this program area:

- 0-Preventative Maintenance Instruction (PMI)-067.9, Process Radiation Monitoring System SPING Calibration Procedure, Revision Approval Date 03/07/01C
- 3-Operations Surveillance Procedure (OSP)-034.2, Spent Fuel Pit Ventilation System Air Flow Test, Revision Approval Date 04/19/95C
- 0-OSP-025.2, Control Room Emergency Ventilation Filter Performance Test, Revision Approval Date 03/08/99C
- 0-OSP-025.3, Control Room Emergency Ventilation Filter Charcoal Sample Analysis Revision Approval Date 02/21/00

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

2PS3 Radiological Environmental Monitoring and Radioactive Material Control Program

.1 Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP) Implementation

a. Inspection Scope

During the week of May 7, 2001, REMP sampling quality control (QC) activities for selected sample types listed in the 2000 Annual Radiological Environmental Monitoring Report were reviewed and evaluated. Evaluated QC activities included assessment of trends for reported inter-laboratory comparison results; verification of LLD capabilities for selected gamma emitting radionuclides in fish, gross beta analyses for particulate sample filters, and tritium analyses for surface water analyses; collection and preservation of surface water samples; and verification of pump flow calibrations and airflow determinations for selected particulate and charcoal airborne sampling systems.

On May 9, 2001, the inspectors toured and evaluated locations and verified in-place sampling/ monitoring equipment at selected REMP sampling locations. Monitoring or

equipment material condition, or sampling processes implemented at selected airborne, direct radiation, and surface water REMP locations were discussed. Change-out of particulate and charcoal filters were observed, and flow rate determinations verified for airborne sampling equipment located at sampling stations T-41, T-52, T-58, T-71, and T-72. Thermoluminescent dosimeter placements were verified for eight offsite locations.

The REMP QC activities were reviewed against RG 4.1, Programs for Monitoring Radioactivity in the Environs of Nuclear Power Plants, Rev 1, April 1975, and RG 1.21, Measuring, Evaluating and Reporting Radioactivity in Solid Wastes and Releases of Radioactive Materials In Liquid and Gaseous Effluents from Light-Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plant, June 1974. Program implementation and sample monitoring activities were verified against TS, ODCM Rev. 8, and the CY 2000 Annual Environmental Monitoring Report details. The following licensee and vendor procedures were reviewed and discussed during the inspection:

- Nuclear Business Services, Nuclear Plant Services, HP, WP-002, Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program Turkey Point - Unit Nos. 3 & 4, St Lucie Unit Nos. 1 & 2., Rev. 2
- Sampling Procedure 1, Collection of Air Particulates and Radioiodines, Rev. 4
- Sampling Procedure 4, Collection of Surface Water, Rev. 4
- Sampling Procedure 7, Collection of Shoreline Sediment, Silt, Soil, or Beach Sand, Rev. 4
- Quality Control Procedure B, Analysis and Reporting of Interlaboratory Quality Control, Rev. 5

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Unrestricted Release of Material from the Radiologically Controlled Area (RCA)

a. Inspection Scope

Licensee guidance and program implementation for monitoring potentially contaminated material for unconditional release from the Radiologically Controlled Area (RCA) were reviewed and evaluated. The evaluation included current direct monitoring activities and recent licensee initiatives to evaluate hard-to-detect radionuclide. Availability and accuracy of survey instruments used for release, e.g., friskers, proportional counters, small article monitor (SAM)-9, were verified for RCA control points at the main entry, turbine building, and truck monitoring facilities. In-service Instrumentation calibration records and alarm setpoints were reviewed and discussed. The inspectors observed conduct of routine release survey activities for the main and turbine building control points. Detection capabilities of SAM-9 instrumentation at each of the control points was verified using a National Institute of Science and Technology traceable source.

Licensee activities were evaluated against 10 CFR Part 20 requirements and UFSAR details. Established detection limits were reviewed against guidance provided in NRC Circular 81-07 and Information Notice 85-92. The following procedures were reviewed and discussed during the inspection:

- 0-Health Physics Surveillance-021.3, Identification, Survey and Release of Material for Unrestricted Use, Revision Approval Date, 06/22/99
- 0-HPT-016.11, Calibration and Operation of the Small Article Monitor (SAM)-9, approval Dated 04/28/99

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Identification and Resolution of Problems

a. Scope

Quality Assurance audit reports and CRs associated with current REMP and material release activities were reviewed and discussed with licensee representatives. The inspectors evaluated the licensee's prioritization, documentation, and resolution of problems for the following identified issues:

- QAS-ENV-99-1, Radiological and Non-radiological Environmental Monitoring, May 3, - June 30, 1999
- CR 00-0841, Former Turkey Point Worker Processing In at Surrey Power Station Identified with Contaminated Clothing
- CR 00-1176, Environmental Airborne Sampling Station Electrical Failure
- CR 01-0211, In-processing worker clothes found contaminated
- CR 01-0233, Meteorological Tower Ten Foot Elevation Wind Direction
- CR 01-0239, Meteorological Tower Outage Notification Issues
- CR 01-0389, Receipt of Contaminated Signs

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4 OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification

.1 Initiating Events Cornerstone

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors verified the accuracy of the performance indicators for Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours, Scrams with Loss of Normal Heat Removal, and Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours. The inspectors reviewed data for the third and fourth quarters of 2000 and the first quarter of 2001. The inspectors reviewed monthly operating reports, Licensee Event Reports, plant procedure 0-ADM-032, NRC Performance Indicators, and NRC inspection reports.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA6 Meetings.1 Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on July 11, 2001. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.

The inspectors asked the licensee whether any of the material examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

4OA7 Licensee Identified Violations. The following finding of very low significance was identified by the licensee as a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600 for being dispositioned as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV).

If the licensee denies this non-cited violation, a written response with the basis of the denial, should be provided, within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Turkey Point facility.

NCV Tracking Number
NCV 50-251/01-04-01

Requirement Licensee Failed to Meet

10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criteria II, Quality Assurance Program, requires that a program be established to verify the skills and training of personnel performing activities affecting quality. During the Unit 4 refueling outage conducted in October 2000, verification of training was inadequate for personnel conducting work on several safety related motor operated valves. This issue was described in CR 00-2164. (Green)

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTEDLicensee

E. Avella, Work Control Manager
S. Franzone, Licensing Manager
R. Gil, Acting Maintenance Manager
G. Hollinger, Protection Services Manager
R. Hovey, Site Vice-President
T. Jones, Plant General Manager
J. Kirkpatrick, Training Manager
M. Lacal, Operations Manager
D. Lowens, Quality Assurance Manager
E. Thompson, License Renewal Project Manager
D. Tomaszewski, Site Engineering Manager
S. Wilsa, Health Physics/Supervisor
A. Zielonka, System Engineering Manager

Other licensee employees contacted included office, operations, engineering, maintenance, chemistry/radiation, and corporate personnel.

NRC

L. Wert, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3
B. Mallett, Deputy Regional Administrator

ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED

Opened and Closed

50-251/01-04-01	NCV	Inadequate Verification of Skills and Training for Personnel Working on Safety Related Motor Operated Valves (Section 40A7)
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