......September 15, 1999

Mr. Oliver D. Kingsley President, Nuclear Generation Group Commonwealth Edison Company ATTN: Regulatory Services Executive Towers West III 1700 Opus Place, Suite 500 Downers Grove, IL 60515

SUBJECT: NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-254/99017(DRS); 50-265/99017(DRS)

Dear Mr. Kingsley:

On August 27, 1999, the NRC completed the pilot baseline annual inspection of Changes to the Safety Analysis Report and the biennial Permanent Plant Modifications inspection at your Quad Cities Nuclear Station. The results of these inspections were discussed on August 27, 1999, with Mr. J. Dimette and other members of your staff. The enclosed report presents the results of these inspections.

The inspections were an examination of activities conducted under your license as they relate to changes to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59 and changes to the facility via permanent plant modifications to verify compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of a selected examination of procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.

One minor issue regarding the failure to retain a post modification test was identified. This issue was categorized as Green. In addition, several previously identified issues were evaluated and one additional example of a previous violation was identified regarding updating of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. Enforcement discretion was applied to the previous violation and no additional actions are necessary for this new example. However, if you contest the addition to the violation, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III and the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

O. Kingsley

We will gladly discuss any questions you have concerning this inspection.

Sincerely,

Original /s/ John M. Jacobson

John M. Jacobson, Chief Mechanical Engineering Branch

Docket Nos. 50-254; 50-265 License Nos. DPR-29; DPR-30

- Enclosure: Inspection Report 50-254/99017(DRS); 50-265/99017(DRS)
- cc w/encl: D. Helwig, Senior Vice President, Nuclear Services C. Crane, Senior Vice President, Nuclear Operations H. Stanley, Vice President, Nuclear Operations R. Krich, Vice President, Regulatory Services DCD - Licensing J. Dimmette, Jr., Site Vice President G. Barnes, Quad Cities Station Manager C. Peterson, Regulatory Affairs Manager M. Aguilar, Assistant Attorney General State Liaison Officer, State of Illinois State Liaison Officer, State of Illinois State Liaison Officer, State of Iowa Chairman, Illinois Commerce Commission W. Leech, Manager of Nuclear MidAmerican Energy Company

# U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

# **REGION III**

Docket Nos: License Nos:	50-254; 50-265 DPR-29; DPR-30
Report No:	50-254/99017(DRS); 50-265/99017(DRS)
Licensee:	Commonwealth Edison Company
Facility:	Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Units 1 and 2
Location:	22710 206th Avenue North Cordova, IL 61242
Dates:	August 23 - August 27, 1999
Inspectors:	David Butler, Reactor Inspector Patricia Lougheed, Reactor Inspector Roger Mendez, Reactor Inspector
Approved by:	John M. Jacobson, Chief, Mechanical Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety

### SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

#### Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2 NRC Inspection Report 50-254/99017(DRS); 50-265/99017(DRS)

This report covers the pilot baseline inspections for the annual review of changes to the safety analysis report and the biennial review permanent plant modifications.

Inspection findings were assessed according to potential risk significance, and were assigned colors of GREEN, WHITE, YELLOW, or RED. GREEN findings are indicative of issues that, while not necessarily desirable, represent little risk to safety. WHITE findings would indicate issues with some increased risk to safety, and which may require additional NRC inspections. YELLOW findings would be indicative of more serious issues with higher potential risk to safe performance and would require the NRC to take additional actions. RED findings represent an unacceptable loss of margin to safety and would result in the NRC taking significant actions that could include ordering the plant shut down. No individual finding by itself would be indicative of either acceptable or unacceptable performance. The findings, considered in total with other inspection findings and performance indicators, will be used to determine overall plant performance.

#### **Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems**

**Green**: The inspectors identified that the Unit 1 post modification test for a design change package on the fuel transfer pump was not retained by the licensee. The licensee had retained the Unit 2 test and had signature evidence that the Unit 1 test was performed.

#### **Cornerstone: Barrier Integrity**

No findings were identified in this area.

# **Report Details**

### 1. REACTOR SAFETY Cornerstones: Mitigating Systems and Barrier Integrity

- 1R02 <u>Changes to License Conditions and Safety Analysis Report</u> (IP 71111, Attachment 2)
- .1 Review of 50.59s Evaluations for Changes to the Safety Analysis Report
- a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed five evaluations done pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59, one of which pertained to the barrier integrity cornerstone. All five evaluations related to changes to the updated final safety analysis report. The inspectors also reviewed three changes to the updated final safety analysis report where the licensee had determined that a 50.59 evaluation was not necessary. In regard to the three changes where no 50.59 evaluation was performed, the inspectors verified that the changes were minor editorial clarifications that did not meet the threshold of a "change to the facility as described in the safety analysis report." For the 50.59 evaluations, the inspectors confirmed that prior NRC approval was not required for any of the changes.

b. Observations and Findings

No findings were identified in this area.

.2 (Closed) URI 50-254/98201-18; 50-265/98201-18: Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Discrepancies. This unresolved item was previously closed in Inspection Report 98019 with the exception of one item dealing with Tables 8.3-2 and 8.3-3 regarding emergency diesel generator loading. The licensee acknowledged that the information in Tables 8.3-2 and 8.3-3 had changed, that the emergency diesel generator loading information was design basis information, and that an updated final safety analysis report revision was necessary. The cognizant regulatory assurance engineer revised the unresolved item action tracking item (000156) to track this issue. The licensee also reviewed other Section 8 updated final safety analysis report tables to determine if those tables contained design basis information. In one case, the licensee discovered that the information presented in the updated final safety analysis report table was not available in the load tracking database, despite a note that referenced the reader to that database. Therefore, the licensee expanded the action tracking item to address whether these tables needed to remain in the updated final safety analysis report and whether the reference to the load tracking database was necessary in all cases. The inspectors reviewed the current load tracking database and determined that the emergency diesel generators loadings were within their design basis values. Therefore, the inspectors had no further technical questions.

10 CFR 50.34(b)(2) requires, in part, that the final safety analysis report contain a description and analysis of the structures, systems and components of the facility, with emphasis upon performance requirements, the bases upon which the requirements were established, and the evaluations required to show that the safety functions will be accomplished. 10 CFR 50.71(e) requires, in part, that each licensee periodically update the final safety analysis report to assure that the information included in the final safety analysis report contains the latest material developed.

The loading on the emergency diesel generators following a loss of coolant accident and/or a loss of offsite power are performance requirements that are necessary to understand the emergency diesel generator system design and safety evaluation. Therefore, they are required to be in the updated final safety analysis report by 10 CFR 50.34(b)(2). The failure to update the design performance requirements for the emergency diesel generator loadings is a violation of 10 CFR 50.71(e). However, this item was identified as part of a larger unresolved item for which enforcement discretion was already granted (VIO 50-245/264-98201-07). Therefore, it will be considered another example of that violation and no separate enforcement action will be taken.

.3 <u>(Closed) Unresolved Item (URI) 50-254/97013-02; 50-265/97013-02:</u> Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Discrepancy Regarding the Residual Heat Removal Service Water Pumps. In 1997, the NRC identified a discrepancy among the pump surveillance test requirements, the design basis document and the updated final safety analysis report regarding the required residual heat removal service water pressure. The inspectors confirmed that the pumps were capable of meeting their design function of removing heat from the residual heat removal system following a design basis accident. Therefore, the inspectors had no further technical questions.

The inspectors also reviewed the approved updated final safety analysis report change (UFSAR-97-R5-016) and associated 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation. The actual change was to add a footnote denoting the information as being the "original manufacturer's specification of the size of the pumps chosen." The wording implied that the pumps were no longer capable of meeting their original design specification or function. Additionally, the updated final safety analysis report did not address the pumps functional requirement (to provide water to the residual heat removal heat exchanger at a specified flow and pressure) which was different than the pump design information. Therefore, the licensee revised the planned corrective actions for problem identification form Q1999-02345 to ensure that the design basis of the pumps was adequately captured in the updated final safety analysis report. This item is closed.

- 1R17 <u>Permanent Plant Modifications</u> (IP 71111, Attachment 17)
- .1 Review of Recent Plant Modifications
- a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed seven plant modifications which were installed since August 1998. The packages were chosen based upon their affecting systems that had high Maintenance Rule safety significance or high risk significance in the licensee's Individual Plant Evaluation. Five of the modifications involved changes to mitigating systems, while the last two affected barrier integrity. The inspectors reviewed the modifications to confirm that the changes did not affect any systems' safety function. Design and testing aspects were verified to ensure the functionality of the modification, it's associated system, and any support systems. Walkdowns were conducted to ensure proper installation of the modifications.

### b. Observations and Findings

The inspectors identified that the Unit 1 post modification test for a design change package on the fuel transfer pump was not retained by the licensee. Retention of the post modification test would have provided evidence that the test was adequately performed. The licensee had retained the Unit 2 test and signature evidence that the Unit 1 test was performed.

The post modification test to demonstrate operability of the fuel transfer pump was outlined in the design change acceptance testing summary and was to be performed in accordance with surveillance procedure QCOP 4100-16, "Manually Filling the Design Fire Pump Day Tank," Revision 2. However, the procedure was not considered a quality document and, therefore, the completed test was not retained for the life of the plant when the design change package was microfilmed. The licensee subsequently produced a copy of the signed cover sheet and the work request form that required the test. In addition, the system engineer stated that the test was adequately performed. This assured the inspectors that the test was performed. The licensee committed to review the requirements for retaining post modification test records for surveillances that were not required to be retained.

The inspectors verified that there were adequate assurances that the fuel transfer pump would operate as modified. The inspectors performed a Phase I screening of this issue under the significance determination process and the issue screened out as "Green".

# 4 OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA4 <u>Other</u> (IP 93902)

- .1 (Closed) URI 50-254/97022-02; 50-265/97022-02: Breaker Coordination Issues. The inspectors reviewed the Station's position paper (White Paper) prepared for this item and the 250 Vdc system licensing basis. The White Paper provided additional information demonstrating that partial breaker coordination existed. The lack of breaker coordination occurred in the breakers instantaneous tripping region. This mis-coordination would only result from faults that occurred at the breaker load side terminals or by a cable fault within close proximity of the load breaker. Since cables are highly reliable and a failure at the breaker load terminals is highly unlikely, the most likely fault condition would be at the load. Due to cable length, load fault currents would be limited allowing the load breaker to clear the fault without tripping the upstream feed breaker. In addition, the licensee indicated that breaker coordination during the design process. Therefore, the inspectors determined that there was no technical concern with the licensee's approach. This item is considered closed.
- .2 (Closed) Violation 50-254/98019-04; 50-265/98019-04: Inadequate Corrective Action. In Inspection Report 50-254/265-98019, the inspectors noted that the licensee had taken adequate corrective actions to the violation and that no response was necessary. Therefore, this violation is closed.
- .3 (Closed) Violation 50-254/98019-05; 50-265/98019-05: Inadequate Design Control. In Inspection Report 50-254/265-98019, the inspectors noted that the licensee had taken adequate corrective actions to the violation and that no response was necessary. Therefore, this violation is closed.

# 4OA5 Management Meetings

# .1 Exit Meeting Summary

The inspector presented the inspection results to members of licensee management in an exit meeting on August 27, 1999. The licensee acknowledged the information and findings presented. No proprietary information was identified.

# PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

#### <u>Licensee</u>

- G. Barnes, Station Manager
- J. Dimmette, Site Vice President
- M. McDonald, Operations Manager
- C. Peterson, Regulatory Assurance
- D. Wozniak, Engineering Manager

### <u>NRC</u>

- J. Caldwell, Deputy Regional Administrator, Region III
- L. Collins, Resident Inspector
- J. Jacobson, Chief, Mechanical Engineering Branch, DRS
- S. Reynolds, Deputy Division Director, Division of Reactor Safety
- M. Ring, Chief, Branch 1, Division of Reactor Projects

## **INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED**

IP 71111.02 (draft)	Changes to License Conditions and Safety Analysis Report
IP 71111.17 (draft)	Permanent Plant Modifications
IP 93902	Followup - Engineering

### ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

### **Opened**

None

<u>Closed</u> (254/265)

97013-02	URI	Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Discrepancy for Residual Heat
		Removal Service Water Pumps: Two Issues
97022-02	URI	Breaker Coordination Issues
98201-18	URI	Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Discrepancies
98019-04	VIO	Inadequate Corrective Action
98019-05	VIO	Inadequate Design Control

#### Discussed

None

# LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

The following is a list of licensee documents reviewed during the inspection, including documents prepared by others for the licensee. Inclusion on this list does not imply that NRC inspectors reviewed the documents in their entirety, but, rather that selected sections or portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection effort.

Evaluation of Bore Diameter of Unit 2 Restricting Orifices RO 2-3924 and 2-3925, Revision 0
Cable Tray Loading Calculation, Revision 7 Seismic Qualification of CP 2940 Switch Addition to Diesel Generator
<ul> <li>Panel, Revision 0</li> <li>Seismic Qualifications of TD2 Time Delay Relay and Mounting of Enclosure and Conduit, Revision 0</li> </ul>
Schematic Control Diagram of the Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer Pump 1 and 2 Feed Controls, Revisions K & M
Schematic Control Diagram of the Engine Control and Generator Excitation for the Standby Diesel Generator 1/2, Revisions AG, AK, & AL
Schematic Diagram Electro-Hydraulic Control System, Revision K
EHC Alarm and Trip Schematic, Revision K
Turbine EHC Pressure Switches, Revision K
EHC Cabinet No. 902-31 Alarm and Trip Wiring Diagram, Revision D
Wiring Diagram of the 4160V Switchgear Bus 23-1 Cubicle 8, Revision J
EHC Power-Load Unbalance Demodulator Schematic, Revision G
EHC Power-Load Unbalance Circuit Schematic, Revision H
Wiring Diagram of the Exterior Cable Tray Layout Station Blackout Sections and Details, Revision C
Wiring Diagram of the Station Blackout 4160 Switchgear Bus 71 Cubicle 3, Revision A
4 Environmental Zone Maps
Diagram of Core Spray Piping, Revision AU
Diagram of Residual Heat Removal Service Water Piping, Revision AP
Diagram of Residual Heat Removal Piping, Revisions BC, AW, & B
Diagram of Reactor Building Equipment Drains, Revision BJ
Diagram of High Pressure Coolant Injection Piping, Revisions BN & F
Diagram of Reactor Water Cleanup Piping, Revision
Diagram of Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Piping, Revision BA
Diagram of Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water Piping, Revision B
Diagram of Nuclear Boiler and Reactor Recirculating Piping, Revision AN
Diagram of Control Room Heating, Ventilation, and Air-Conditioning System, Revisions K, K, & E
Turbine Control Diagram Units 1 and 2, Revision A

### **Electrical Standards**

EM-29105	600 Volt Power Cable for Nuclear Generating Stations, September 1,1992
EM-29115	600 Volt Control Cable for Nuclear Generating Stations, June 1, 1994
EM-29116	5KV Ethylene Propylene Insulated Chlorosulfonated Polyethylene
	Jacketed Power Cable for Stations and Substations, December 14, 1990
EQ-GEN029	3M Scotch Tape Splices, Revision 4

N-C-0008	Cable Pulling Guidelines, Revision 5
N-EM-0035	Cable Standards, Revision 6
N-EM-0048	Low Voltage Tapes, Revision 2

#### **Engineering Requests**

ER9805134	Revise General Electric Specification (GEK) No.11367C Steam Turbine Instruction Manual for Electrical Alarm and Trip System (Pressure
	Switches PS-101A and 101B)
ER9900536	Revise Procedure QCIPM 5610-31, Revision 3, "EHC Low Hydraulic
	Pressure Turbine Trip Functional Test"
ER9805001	Revise General Electric Specification GEK No. 11367C Steam Turbine
	Instruction Manual for Electrical Alarm and Trip System (High Head
	Temperature Bypass above 30 Percent Pressure)
ER9804426	Revise Procedure No. QOA 5600-03, Revision 5, "Turbine Hood Spray
	Regulation Valve Failure"
ER9804425	Revise Procedure No. QOA 5600-04. Revision 12. "Loss of Turbine
	Generator"

#### **General Electric (GE) Specifications**

GEH 3626	Pressure Switch Model CR127A
GEK 11365A	ElectroHydraulic Contros
GEK 11354A	Power/Load Unbalance Circuit and Relays

### **GE Technical Service Letters**

1212-2 Plant SCRAM Frequency Reduction Features for BWR and PWR Nuclear Turbines with MKI and MKII EHC Controls, January 27, 1997

#### Miscellaneous

Control Room Habitability Study, Revision 2, 6/14/1982 Licensed Operator Continuing Training, "Mods and Lessons Learned 99-1," January 12, 1999

wouncations
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Modify Turbine Trip Logic (EHC Low Power) to Reduce the Probability of
a Spurious Trip
Enlarge Bore Sizes of Reducing Orifices 2-3924 and 2-3925
Modify Turbine Trip Logic from Low Pressure Turbine Exhaust Hood High
Temperature to Bypass the Trip Above 30% Turbine/Generator
Power
Replace Emergency Diesel Generator Time Delay Relay TD2
Splice Station Blackout Diesel Control Cables and Reroute Power Cable
to Switchgear 23-1
Modify the Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Transfer Pump Logic
Modify the 24 Volt Circuit Powering the Unit 2 Scram Discharge Volume
Instruments

#### **Nuclear Design Information Transmittals**

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QDC-99-071	Desigr	n Input - ECCS	<b>Room Coolers</b>

#### Part Evaluations

NEP-18-04 Equipment Dynamic Qualification Test Review of Time Delay Relays

## **Problem Identification Forms**

Q1997-04066	High Pressure Coolant Injection High Steam Flow Switch Logic and
Q1999-02345	updated final safety analysis report Wording, 10/26/1997 Residual Heat Removal Service Water Pump Testing and Safety Margin of Pumps, 7/19/1999
Procedures	
ECTP-19	Control Circuits. Revision 2
ECTP 24	Operational Analysis Department Electrical Construction Test Procedure for Modifications at Nuclear Stations, Revision 2
NFP 04-01	Plant Modifications, Revision 6
NEP-04-05	Design Change Acceptance Testing Criteria, Revision 0
NEP 14-03	Control and Tracking of Electrical Load Changes, Revision 1
NSWP F-02	Electrical Cable Termination and Inspection, Revision 5-1
PMID 154086	VC2A15 (A15-VC2) Voltage Comparator Calibration
QCAP 0200-15	High Risk Activity Mitigation Plan, Revision 9
QCAP 1100-13	Procedure Field Change Request, Revision 8
QCEM 700-1	Cable Pulling Procedure, Revision 0
QCEPM 0700-18	Calibration of Diesel Generator Time Delay Relays, Revision 7
QCOP 4100-16	Manually Filling the Diesel Fire Pump Day Tank, Revision 2
QCOP 5750-09	Control Room Ventilation System, Revision 15
QCOS 0010-07	Equipment External Leak Test, Revision 1
QCOS-0201-12	Class One ASME Section XI Post-replacement Pressure Test at Power
	Operation, Revision 0 (also completed procedure 3/1/1999)
QCOS 1000-04	Quarterly Residual Heat Removal Service Water Pump Operability Test, Revision 12
QCOS 5750-09	ECCS Room and DGCWP Cubicle Cooler Monthly Surveillance,
0005 6600-03	Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Monthly Operability Revision 6
QCOS 6620-01	SBO DG 1(2) Quarterly Load Test. Revision 3
QCIP 0100-05 Instrun	nent Maintenance Department Administrative Drift Limits Guidance,
	Revision 2
QCIPM 5610-30	EHC Low Hydraulic Pressure Turbine Trip Functional Test, Revision 3
QCIPM 5610-33	Turbine Exhaust hood High Temperature Turbine Trip Functional Test, Revision 2
QCTS 0220-02	Unit 1 and 2 24/48 Vdc Battery Performance Test, Revision 4
QCTS 0220-05	Unit 1 and 2 24/48 Vdc A Battery Service Test, Revision 2
QCTS 0220-08	Unit 1 and 2 24/48 Vdc B Battery Service Test, Revision 1
QIP 0100-18	Refuel Outage Balance of Plant Calibration Schedule, Revision 12
QOA 900-7 C-4	901-7 (902-7) Row C Annunciator Procedures, Revision 2
QOS 0005-S01	Operations Department Weekly Summary of Daily Surveillance,
SPP-VT-2-1	VT-2 Visual Inspection Performed for Section XI, Revision 7

## **QC Engineering Transmittal Letter**

Addition of a Nominal 3 Second Time Delay to EHC Low Pressure Turbine Trip Logic, September 9, 1998

# **System Planning Operating Guides**

1-1

Generating Stations Operating Voltage Levels, Revision 2

1-1-A Operating Nuclear Stations at Reduced Excitation Levels, Revision 2

# 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluations and Screenings

SE-97-151	Clarify updated final safety analysis report Description of the Residual
SE-98-088	Remove and Install New Type of Time Delay Relays in the Unit 1, Unit 2
	and 1/2 Diesel Rooms
SE-98-098	Modify the Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Transfer Pump Circuit to Allow Operation at Both Diesel Rooms
SE-98-099	Modify Turbine Trip Logic from Low Pressure Turbine Exhaust Hood High
SE-98-100	Modify Turbine Trip Logic (EHC Low Power) to Reduce the Probability of a Spurious Trip
SE-98-108	Modify Power Supply to the Scram Discharge Volume Level Switches
SE-98-110	Splice Station Blackout Control Cables and Reroute Power Cable
	Between 4 kV Switchgear 71 and 4 kV Switchgear 23-1
SE-98-151	Revise updated final safety analysis report Discussion on the Control
	Room Emergency Ventilation System, 12/2/1998
SE-99-015	Voltages and Location of Information 2/26/1999
SE-99-016	Revise Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Section 5.3.2.2 to Allow
	ASME Section XI Pressure Testing of Non-Welded Components Using
	Nuclear Heat, 2/25/1999
SE-99-031	Correct Equipment Configuration Description Errors for the Station Blackout Diesel Generator System 6/3/1999
SE-99-056	Revise Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Table 6.2-7 to Reflect
	Correct Primary Containment Isolation Valves, 7/21/1999
SS-F-99-157	Enlarge Bore Sizes Of Reducing Orifices 2-3924 and 2-3925
SS-H-99-45	Revise Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Section 5.3.2.2 to Allow
	Pressure Testing at Power, 3/29/1999
SS-U-98-10	Correct Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Typographical Error on
	Product Name/Number, 2/11/1999
SS-U-98-11	Minor Wording Changes to Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Section 9.4.5.B. Page 9.4-8. 11/26/1998
SS-U-9902	Clarification of High Pressure Coolant Injection Steam Flow Switch Logic, 3/9/1999

# **Technical Specifications**

3.8.C Ulti	mate Heat Sink

# Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Change Packages

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97-R5-016	Clarify Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Description of the Residual
	Heat Removal Service Water Pumps in Table 9.2-1, 11/12/1997
97-R5-101	Minor Wording Changes to Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Section
	9.4.5.B, Page 9.4-8, 11/26/1998
97-R5-103	Revise Updated Final Safety Analysis report to Show Technical
	Specification Allowed Range on Control Room Ventilation System Air
	Intake Value and Discuss Necessary Manual Operations, 12/2/1998
97-R5-115	Correct Vendor Product Name/Number, 2/13/1999
97-R5-118	Revise Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Section 5.3.2.2 to Allow
	Pressure Testing at Power, 3/29/1999
	-

97-R5-119	Revise Updated Final Safety Analysis Report on Minimum System Voltages and Location of Information, 4/8/1999
97-R5-121	Clarification of High Pressure Coolant Injection Steam Flow, 3/11/1999
97-R5-130	Revise Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Sections 8.3.1.9.4.3, 8.3.1.9.4.4 & 8.3.1.9 to Correct Station Blackout Diesel Information, 6/7/1999
97-R6-005	Revise Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Table 6.2-7 on Containment Isolation Valves, 7/23/1999

## **Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Sections**

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Section 6.3.2.1.1	Core Spray Subsystem Interfaces with Other ECCS Subsystems
Section 6.3.2.1.2	Subsystem Characteristics
Section 6.3.2.2.1	LPCI Subsystem Interfaces with Other ECCS Subsystems
Section 6.3.2.2.2	Subsystem Characteristics
Section 6.3.2.3.1	HPCI Subsystem Interfaces with Other ECCS Subsystems
Section 6.3.2.3.2	Subsystem Characteristics
Section 6.4	Control Room Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning
Section 7.2	Reactor Protection System
Section 7.2.3.1	Single Failure Criteria
Section 8.3.2	DC Power Systems
Section 8.3.3	AC Power Systems
Section 9.5.5	Diesel Generator Cooling Water System
Section 10.2	Turbine-Generator
Section 15.2.2.2	Load Rejection With Bypass
Section 15.2.3 Turbin	e Trip
Section 15.6.5.5.3	Control Room Dose Rates

### Vendor Manuals

Barton Model 227A Differential Pressure Indicator

### White Papers

DG99-000135 Conduct of ASME Section XI Testing Following Replacements with Core Criticality at Boiling Water Reactors, 2/19/1999 254-100-96-01004 120VAC, 125VDC and 250VDC System Fuse/Breaker Coordination

### Work Requests

980028462 01 Modify EHC Low Pressure Turbine Trip Logic ECTP #19
980044304 01 Perform Load Test for 24/48 Volt Battery
980075137 03 Perform Pre-fabrication Shop Work Required for Installation of New TD2 Relay
980083679 01 Low Pressure Turbine High Temperature Bypass Above 30% Power Per the Design Change Package
980084210 01 Manually Fill the Diesel Fire Pump Day Tank
980084652 06 Determinate/Terminate and Install Cables at Switchgear 71 in Station Blackout Building
980087963 02 Manually Fill the Diesel Fire Pump Day Tank
980087964 01 Modify Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Logic
990005621 02 Revise Power Feed to Scram Discharge Volume Level Instruments