



**UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 400
ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-8064**

October 25, 2001

S. K. Gambhir, Division Manager
Nuclear Operations
Omaha Public Power District
Fort Calhoun Station FC-2-4 Adm.
P.O. Box 399
Hwy. 75 - North of Fort Calhoun
Fort Calhoun, Nebraska 68023-0399

SUBJECT: NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-285/01-04

Dear Mr. Gambhir:

On July 1 through September 29, 2001, the NRC completed an inspection at your Fort Calhoun Station. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on July 13, July 27, and October 1, 2001, with you and other members of your staff.

This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selected examination of procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.

Since September 11, 2001, Fort Calhoun Station has assumed a heightened level of security based on a series of threat advisories issued by the NRC. Although the NRC is not aware of any specific threat against nuclear facilities, the heightened level of security was recommended for all nuclear power plants and is being maintained due to the uncertainty about the possibility of additional terrorist attacks. The steps recommended by the NRC include increased patrols, augmented security forces and capabilities, additional security posts, heightened coordination with local law enforcement and military authorities, and limited access of personnel and vehicles to the site.

The NRC continues to interact with the Intelligence Community and to communicate information to Omaha Public Power District. In addition, the NRC has monitored maintenance and other activities which could relate to the site's security posture.

Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC has identified issues that were evaluated under the risk significance determination process as having very low safety significance (Green). The NRC has also determined that a violation is associated with these issues. The violation is being treated as a noncited violation (NCV), consistent with Section VI.A of the Enforcement Policy. The NCV is described in the subject inspection report. If you contest the violation or significance of the NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region IV, 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400, Arlington, Texas 76011; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Fort Calhoun Station facility.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Kriss M. Kennedy, Chief
Project Branch C
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket: 50-285
License: DPR-40

Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report
50-285/01-04

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R:_FCS\FC2001-04RP-WCW.wpd

RIV:SRI:DRP/C	RI:DRP/C	C:DRS/EMB	C:DRS/PSB	C:DRP/C
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ENCLOSURE

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV

Docket: 50-285
License: DPR-40
Report: 50-285/01-04
Licensee: Omaha Public Power District
Facility: Fort Calhoun Station
Location: Fort Calhoun Station
FC-2-4 Adm., P.O. Box 399
Hwy. 75 - North of Fort Calhoun
Fort Calhoun, Nebraska
Dates: July 1 through September 29, 2001
Inspectors: W. Walker, Senior Resident Inspector
L. Willoughby, Resident Inspector
D. Carter, Health Physicist, Plant Support Branch
C. Paulk, Senior Reactor Inspector, Engineering and Maintenance Branch
C. Clark, Reactor Inspector, Engineering and Maintenance Branch
Approved By: Kriss M. Kennedy, Chief, Project Branch C
ATTACHMENT: Supplemental Information

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Fort Calhoun Station NRC Inspection Report 50-285/01-04

IR 05000285-2001-004; on 07/01/2001 through 09/29/2001, Omaha Public Power District, Fort Calhoun Station, Integrated Resident & Regional Report; Emergency Preparedness.

The inspection was conducted by resident inspectors, a region-based health physicist, and two region-based engineering reactor inspectors. The inspection identified one finding. The significance of issues is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) and was determined by the Significance Determination Process in Inspection Manual Chapter 0609. Findings for which the significance determination process does not apply are indicated by No Color or by severity level of the applicable violation. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at <http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html>.

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems, Barrier integrity, and Initiating Events

There were no findings of significance identified during this inspection.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

- Green. The inspector identified three occasions when radiation protection personnel failed to follow procedures during the filling of emergency response self-contained breathing apparatuses (SCBAs). The first occurrence was the use of expired test tubes to determine the water vapor and carbon monoxide concentrations of respirator air. The second occurrence was the failure to properly set the air flow rate prior to the water vapor test. The third occurrence was the failure to use current revision test tube instructions for sampling oil mist concentration. The failure to follow procedures is a violation of Technical Specification 5.8.1. These occurrences are being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Reports 2001-2377, 2001-2387, and 2001-2425.

The safety significance of this violation was determined to be very low by the Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process. The failure to adequately test the air quality of respirator air has a credible impact on safety and is a failure to meet a regulatory requirement. However, there was no failure to meet an emergency planning standard or risk significant planning standard (Section 20S3).

Report Details

The Fort Calhoun Station began this inspection period at 100 percent power and maintained that level throughout the inspection period.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity

1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)

a. Inspection Scope

- The inspectors performed a partial inspection of the containment spray system on August 16. The inspectors used "Safety Injection and Containment Spray System Flow Diagram DWG E23866-210-130 SH. 1," Revision 81, to verify the lineup of containment spray Train A.
- On August 17, the inspectors performed a partial inspection of Diesel Fire Pump FP-1B to independently verify that all valves were in their required positions to ensure operability of the pump. The inspectors compared the position of the valves to the required position as specified in Operations Procedure OP-ST-FP-0001D, "Fire Protection System Inspection and Test," Revision 10. The diesel fire pump and support equipment were located in the intake structure.
- The inspectors performed a partial inspection of the diesel-driven auxiliary feedwater pump on August 29 to verify that all valves and controls were in their required positions to ensure operability of the pump. The inspectors compared the as-found position of valves to the required position as specified on the drawing, "Steam Generator Feedwater and Blowdown Composite Flow Diagram DWG 11405-M-253 SH. COV," Revision 26.
- The inspectors performed a complete equipment alignment inspection on the high pressure safety injection system on September 18. The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the system and verified that the system lineup was in accordance with "Safety Injection and Containment Spray System Flow Diagram DWG E-23866-210-130 SH. 3," Revision 12. The inspectors also reviewed open work orders, work requests, preventive maintenance, and conditions reports to determine the condition and operability of individual components and the overall system.
- The inspectors performed a complete equipment alignment inspection on the safety injection refueling water tank cleanup system on September 18. The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the system and verified that the system lineup was in accordance with "Operating Instruction OI-WDL-6," Revision 0. The inspectors also reviewed condition reports to determine the condition and operability of the system.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following areas to determine if the licensee had implemented a fire protection program that adequately controlled combustibles and ignition sources within the plant, effectively maintained fire detection and suppression capabilities, and maintained passive fire protection features in good material condition. The following areas were reviewed:

- Component cooling water pumps in the auxiliary building on August 7, 2001
- Diesel Generator 1 room on August 10, 2001
- Intake structure, raw water pump rooms, and fire pump areas on August 17, 2001
- Emergency feedwater storage tank room on August 28, 2001
- Cable spreading room on September 17, 2001

The inspectors assessed these areas and verified that combustibles that were noted were being controlled in accordance with the following:

- Updated Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 9.11, "Fire Protection System"
- Standing Order SO-G-28, "Station Fire Plan," Revision 47
- Standing Order SO-G-58, "Control of Fire Protection System Impairments," Revision 29
- Standing Order SO-G-91, "Control and Transportation of Combustible Materials," Revision 15
- Standing Order SO-G-102, "Fire Protection Program Plan," Revision 3

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification (71111.11)

a. Inspection Scope

On September 10, 2001, the inspectors observed a licensed operator simulator exercise. The simulator exercise evaluated the operator's ability to recognize, diagnose, and respond to equipment problems. The simulator scenario included a leaking power-operated relief valve which exceeded the capacity of the charging system, a fault on both safety-related 4160 volt electrical busses, and the loss of both emergency diesel generators which placed the plant in a station blackout condition. The inspectors evaluated operator performance using the following: Abnormal Operating Procedure AOP-22, "Reactor Coolant Leak," Revision 9; Emergency Operating Procedure EOP-00, "Standard Post Trip Actions," Revision 15; Emergency Operating Procedure EOP-20, "Functional Recovery Procedure," Revision 6; and Technical Specifications.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation (71111.12)

a. Inspection Scope

During the inspection period, the inspectors reviewed licensee implementation of the maintenance rule. The inspectors verified structure and component scoping, characterization, safety significance, performance criteria, and the appropriateness of goals and corrective actions. The inspectors compared the licensee's implementation of the maintenance rule to the requirements outlined in 10 CFR 50.65; Maintenance Rule Implementing Instruction MR11-6, "Placement of SSCs Into Category (a)(1) or (a)(2)," Revision 6; Regulatory Guide 1.160, "Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Plants," Revision 2; and meeting minutes from various expert technical panel meetings. The inspectors reviewed the following components:

- Heater Drain Pump FW-5A
- Condenser Off Gas Radiation Monitor RM-057
- Circuit Breaker 1B3B-4 for Component Cooling Water Pump AC-3A
- Raw Water Strainers AC-12A and -B backwash floor penetration
- Pressurizer Spray Valve PCV-103-1

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's risk assessment for equipment outages as a result of planned and emergent maintenance to evaluate the licensee's effectiveness in assessing risk for planned and emergent activities. The inspectors compared the licensee's risk assessment and risk management activities against requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4) and the recommendations of NUMARC 93-01, "Industry Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 2. The inspectors also discussed the planned and emergent work activities with planning and maintenance personnel. They reviewed and observed emergent work on the following systems/components/activities:

- September 11-18, 2001 Activities performed in response to Removal, Repair and Reinstallation of Letdown Heat Exchanger Component Cooling Water Inlet Relief Valve AC-258
- July 30, 2001 Troubleshooting and repair of Loop Temperature Indication A/TI-122H
- August 28, 2001 Activities performed in response to an instrument air line leak, just upstream of Main Steam Isolation Valve Actuator HCV-1041A
- August 23, 2001 Troubleshooting and isolation of packing leak off line from Low Pressure Safety Injection Discharge Valve HCV-2938

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the technical adequacy of several operability evaluations to verify they were sufficient to justify continued operation of a system or component. The inspectors verified that, although equipment was degraded, the operability evaluation provided adequate justification that the equipment could still meet its Technical Specification, Updated Safety Analysis Report, and design bases requirements and that any potential risk increase which contributed to the degradation of equipment was thoroughly evaluated. The following evaluations were reviewed:

- July 6, 2001 Delay in restart of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump FW-10 during the restoration phase following successful completion of quarterly surveillance test
- August 29, 2001 Component Cooling Water Pump AC-3A, pump performance test data in the high required action range per the pump curve in the surveillance procedure
- Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R16 Operator Workarounds (71111.16)

a. Inspection Scope

On September 26, 2001, the inspectors performed a programmatic review of the September 24, 2001, operator workaround/control room deficiency list. The inspectors focused their inspection on the cumulative effects of operator workarounds on the reliability and availability of mitigating systems. There were 14 operator workarounds reviewed. The inspectors focused their inspection on the seven workarounds that had some impact on emergency operating procedures or abnormal operating procedures. The inspectors reviewed and evaluated the workarounds using criteria documented in PRA-PR-34, "Assessment of OWA's, CRD's and SSC's in Category (a)(1)," Revision 0; Nuclear Safety Review Group Review of Operator Workarounds, 01-QUA-017, dated December 31, 2000; and OPD 4-17, "Control Room Deficiencies and Operator Workarounds," Revision 8.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications (71111.17B)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed procedures governing plant modifications to evaluate the effectiveness of the programs for implementing modifications to risk-significant systems, structures, and components, such that these changes did not adversely affect the design and licensing basis of the facility. The inspectors also reviewed 11 permanent plant modification packages and associated documentation, such as review screens and safety evaluations, to verify that they were performed in accordance with regulatory requirements and plant procedures. Procedures and permanent plant modifications reviewed are listed in the attachment to this report.

The inspectors interviewed the cognizant design and system engineers for the identified modifications as to their understanding of the modification packages.

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the licensee's corrective action process to identify and correct problems concerning the performance of permanent plant modifications. In this effort, the inspectors reviewed corrective action documents (listed in the attachment to this report) and the subsequent corrective actions pertaining to licensee-identified problems and errors in the performance of permanent plant modifications.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Postmaintenance Testing (71111.19)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors verified that postmaintenance tests were adequate to verify system operability and functional capabilities. The inspectors verified that testing met design and licensing bases requirements, Technical Specifications, the Updated Safety Analysis Report, inservice testing, and licensee administrative procedures. The inspectors verified testing results for the following components tested on the dates indicated below:

- August 1, 2001 Loop Temperature Indication A/TI-122H
- August 10, 2001 Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer Pump FO-4A-1
- August 15, 2001 Charging Accumulator CH-22A
- August 15, 2001 Air filter cartridge for Emergency Feedwater Pump FW-10
- August 29, 2001 Instrument Air Compressor Rebuild CA-1B
- September 17, 2001 Radiation Monitor RM-057

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed or reviewed the following surveillance tests to ensure the systems tested were capable of performing their safety function and to assess their operational readiness. Specifically, the inspectors verified that the following surveillance tests met Technical Specifications, ASME Section XI test requirements, the Updated Safety Analysis Report, and licensee procedural requirements.

- July 6, 2001 Operating Instruction OI-AFW-4, "Auxiliary Feedwater Startup and System Operation," Revision 37

- July 11, 2001 Operating Procedure OP-ST-FO-3001, "Diesel Generator 1 Fuel Oil System Pump Inservice Test," Revision 14
- July 18, 2001 Operating Procedure OP-ST-AFW-0004, "Auxiliary Feedwater Pump FW-10 Operability Test," Revision 21
- August 14, 2001 Surveillance Test OP-ST-RW-3011, "AC-10B Raw Water Pump Quarterly Inservice Test," Revision 22
- August 14, 2001 Surveillance Test IC-ST-IA-3009, "Operability Test of IA-YCV-1045-C (steam inlet instrument air accumulator check valve) and Close Stroke Test of YCV-1045 (steam inlet valve for turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump)," Revision 10
- August 17, 2001 Surveillance Test OP-ST-FP-0001D, "Fire Protection System Inspection and Test," Revision 10
- September 20, 2001 Surveillance Test OP-ST-ESF-0009, "Channel A Safety Injection, Containment Spray and Recirculation Actuation Signal Test," Revision 35
- Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications (71111.23)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a detailed review of the following temporary modifications:

- EC#28362 modification that temporarily capped the packing leak-off line on Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump SI-1B Discharge Isolation Valve HCV-2938
- EC#28349 modification that temporarily installed a restraint on the instrument air piping to Main Steam Isolation Valve Actuator HCV-1041A
- EC#27661 modification that temporarily reversed the annunciator alarm logic for detecting reactor vessel flange leakage

The inspectors reviewed the detailed modification packages and compared them to the installed configuration in the field. This included reviewing the 10 CFR 50.59 screening against the design basis as specified in the Updated Safety Analysis Report and the Technical Specifications. The inspectors also verified that drawings and procedures were properly updated to reflect the modified configuration of the systems.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

2. RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety

2OS3 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector interviewed cognizant licensee personnel and compared the following items to regulatory requirements:

- Calibration, operability, and alarm setpoint, when applicable, of selected portable radiation detection instrumentation (procount gamma spectroscopy system, SAC-4 alpha counter, and BC-4 beta counter), continuous air monitors, whole-body counting equipment (fastscan and accuscan counters), electronic alarming dosimeters, personnel contamination monitors, area radiation monitors, containment high range monitors, and main steam line monitors
- Calibration expiration and source response check currency on radiation detection instruments staged for use
- The status and surveillance records of SCBAs staged and ready for use in the plant
- The licensee's capability for refilling and transporting SCBA air bottles to and from the control room and operations support center during emergency conditions
- Control room operator and emergency response personnel training and qualifications for use of an SCBA
- Radiation protection department Self-Assessments CHP-00-032
- Selected corrective action documents (2000-1561, -1681, -1697, -1752, -1775, -1783, -1848, -1948, -1969, -2042, -2129, -2381, -2533, 2001-0216, -1436, and -2285) that involved radiation monitoring instrument deficiencies or SCBAs since the last inspection in this area

b. Findings

A noncited violation with very low safety significance (Green) was identified for three examples of the failure to follow procedures involving the filling of SCBA bottles.

On July 10, 2001, during a tour of the warehouse that contains the Baron II air compressor used to fill emergency response SCBA bottles, the inspector identified that two different types of Drager sample tubes, used to determine the quality of the compressor air, were expired. The water vapor tubes expired in August 2000 and the carbon monoxide tubes expired in April 2001. The licensee performed two monthly checks of the compressor air quality in May and June of 2001 with the expired sample tubes. 10 CFR 20.1703(g) requires that respirators be supplied with respirable air of Grade D quality or better. Station Procedure RP-513, "Baron II SCBA Fill System," requires monthly air samples of the air compressor discharge to verify this requirement. Section 7.5, "Operation of the Air Test Unit," describes the steps to analyze the compressor air using Dragar test tubes. However, using expired Dragar tubes does not meet this requirement. The failure to adequately analyze SCBA air quality to Grade D specifications is the first example of a violation of Technical Specifications 5.8.1.

On July 11, 2001, during the performance of air quality testing of the Baron II air compressor, the inspector identified two instances where the radiation protection technician did not follow Procedure RP-513 while sampling the compressor air. During the water vapor test, the technician failed to set the required air flow rate as stated in Steps 7.5.6 - 7.5.11. When questioned by the inspector, the technician adjusted the flow rate during the test. The technician was instructed by his supervisor to repeat the test. The failure to follow this step of the procedure could have affected the sample result and is a second example of the above violation. In addition, during the oil mist portion of the test, the technician used an out-of-date revision of the Dragar test tube instructions (Revision 6, dated 1986 versus the current Revision 7, dated 1998). The new revision uses a different process to determine the oil concentration. It requires the use of a sample pump to draw air through the Dragar tube after the tube is removed from the air test instrument. This sample pump does not exist. The failure to perform the test as required by procedure could affect the sample result and is a third example of the above violation. The licensee had an outside third party analyze two SCBA bottles that verified that onsite emergency SCBA bottles met Grade D quality air specifications.

The safety significance of these occurrences of this violation were determined to be very low by the Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process because there was no failure to meet an emergency planning standard or risk significant planning standard. The issue was more than minor because the failure to adequately test the air quality of respirator air has a credible impact on safety and is a failure to meet a regulatory requirement.

10 CFR 50.54(q) requires the licensee to follow its emergency plan. Emergency plan Section J, 1.4.4, requires SCBAs be maintained on site and that the site have the capability to refill bottles with a compressor/air bank unit. Technical Specification 5.8.1 requires procedures as described in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A. Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, Section 7(e)5, requires procedures for respiratory protection. Station Procedure RP-513 details steps to sample and analyze the quality of respirator air. The failure to follow procedures is a violation of Technical Specification 5.8.1. These occurrences are being treated as a noncited violation consistent with

Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Reports 2001-2377, 2001-2387, and 2001-2425 (50-285/0104-01).

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)

b. Inspection Scope

The inspectors verified the accuracy and completeness of data used to calculate and report selected performance indicators. Specifically, a sampling of control room logs, maintenance logs, and corrective action reports were reviewed for the following performance indicators:

- Low pressure safety injection system unavailability
- Safety system functional failures
- High pressure safety injection system unavailability
- Heat removal auxiliary feedwater system unavailability
- Emergency ac power unavailability

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA6 Meetings, including Exit

- .1 The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. S. Gambhir, Division Manager, Nuclear Operations, and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspections on July 13, July 27, and October 1, 2001.

During each meeting, the licensee management acknowledged the findings presented. Additionally, the inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

ATTACHMENT

Supplemental Information

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee

G. Cavanaugh, Supervisor, Station Licensing
R. Clemens, Plant Manager
M. Frans, Manager, Nuclear Licensing
S. Gambhir, Division Manager, Nuclear Operations
S. Gebers, Corporate Health Physicist
J. McManis, Manager, Design Engineering Nuclear
R. Mueller, Supervisor, Design Engineering Nuclear
R. Phelps, Division Manager, Nuclear Engineering
R. Reno, Supervisor ALARA and Radiation Equipment
D. Bannister, Manager, Operations

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened and Closed During This Inspection

50-285/0104-01 NCV Three examples of failure to follow procedures (Section 2OS3)

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

The following documents were selected and reviewed by the inspectors to accomplish the objectives and scope of the inspection and to support any findings.

Modification Packages:

NUMBER	DESCRIPTION
DCN 10066	FW-10 Speed Control Loop Components; TM Made Permanent
MR-FC-89-19	YCV-1045 Relay Modification
MR-FC092-30	CCW RCP Seal Cooler Header Relief Valve
MR-FC-92-40	Diesel Generator Starter Air Upgrade
MR-FC-92-46	MCC-4C2 Feeder Cable Sizing Deficiency
MR-FC-94-07	Undersized Power Cable for HCV-348, HCV-1103, HCV-1104, HCV-1385, HCV-1386, HCV-1150A, HCV-1150B, HCV-1150C

Modification Packages:

NUMBER	DESCRIPTION
MR-FC-95-25	Increase TSP Inside Containment
MR-FC-97-28	Potential Nitrogen Voiding in SI System
MR-FC-98-02	Redundant Indication for HCV-347/348
MR-FC-98-08	FW-10 Discharge HDR Over Pressure Protection
MR-FC-98-18	FI-1112, FW-54 Suction Flow Indicator

Drawings:

NUMBER	TITLE	REVISION
B120F07001, Sh. 1	Starting Air System Schematic DG-1 P & ID	27, 28
B120F07001, Sh. 2	Starting Air System Schematic DG-2 P & ID	17, 18
E-23866-210-130, Sh. 2A	Safety Injection and Containment Spray System Flow Diagram P & ID	8

Condition Reports:

199701532	199901922	200000970	200001459	200100425	200101239	200101443
199901002	200000593	200001394	200002520	200101104	200101275	

Procedures:

NUMBER	TITLE	REVISION
MD-AD-0007	Bolting	2
NSRG-6	SARC and Required NSRG Reviews	14
NOD-QP-3	10 CFR 50.59 Reviews	23

Procedures:

NUMBER	TITLE	REVISION
PED-GEI-3	Preparation of Modifications	27
PED-GEI-29	Preparation of Facility Changes	10
PED-GEI-35	Preparation of Minor Configuration Changes	6
PED-GEI-51	Design Document Correction Request Evaluation	4
PED-GEI-52	Preparation of Field Design Change Requests	4
PED-GEI-62	P&ID/EM Drawing Contents and Component Tag Numbering Guidelines	8
PED-QP-2	Configuration Change Control	13
SO-G-21	Modification Control	68
SO-G-30	Procedure Changes and Generation	87
SO-O-25	Temporary Modification Control	60

Miscellaneous Documents:

NUMBER	TITLE/DESCRIPTION	REVISION/DATE
99-QA/QC-077	Emergent Quality Assurance Surveillance Report E-99-2 PED-GEI-35 Minor Configuration Change	July 13, 1999
99-SARC-040	SARC Audit Report No. 72 Engineering Configuration Management	December 20, 1999
00-QA/QC-003	SARC Audit Report No. 72, Engineering Configuration Management Notification of Entry Error	January 19, 2000
00-QA/QC-018	Emergent Quality Assurance Surveillance Report E-00-1 Substitute Replacement Item Design Changes	February 24, 2000

Miscellaneous Documents:

NUMBER	TITLE/DESCRIPTION	REVISION/DATE
00-QA/QC-069	Quality Assurance Surveillance Report E12-00-1	November 29, 2000
01-QUA-047	Emergent Quality Assurance Surveillance Report E-01-2 Refueling Outage Modification Activities	May 39, 2001
EA-FC-90-006	Maximum MCC Loading Calculation	2, 4
EA-FC-96-002	Revised Quantity of TSP	1
FC06088	MOV Overload Protection Evaluation	4
MWR 9501133	HCV-1150C Failed to Stop On Backseat	April 1, 1995
MWR 9501155	HCV-1106 Failed Stroke Test	April 2, 1995