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Risk Evaluation for a General Electric BWR, Effects of Fire Protection System Actuation on Safety-Related Equipment: Evaluation of Generic Issue 57 (NUREG/CR-5791)

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Publication Information
Abstract

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NUREG/CR-5791 (PDF - 6.57 MB)

Publication Information

Manuscript Completed: October 1992
Date Published: December 1992

Prepared by
J. Lambright, S. Ross, E. Klamerus*, S. Daniel

Sandia National Laboratories Albuquerque, NM 87185

Prepared for
Division of Safety Issue Resolution
Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555
NRC FIN L1334

*Science and Engineering Associates, Inc.
6100 Uptown Blvd. N.E. Albuquerque, NM 87110

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Abstract

Nuclear power plants have experienced actuations of fire protection systems (FPSs) under conditions for which these systems were not intended to actuate. They have also experienced advertent actuations with the presence of a fire. These actuations have often damaged nearby plant equipment.

A review of past occurrences of both types of such events on nuclear power plant safety has been performed. Thirteen different scenarios leading to actuation of fire protection systems due to a variety of causes were identified. These scenarios range from inadvertant actuation caused by human errors to hardware failures and include seismic root causes and seismic/fire interactions. A quantification of these thirteen scenarios, where applicable, was performed on a BWR4/MKI. This report estimates the contribution of FPS actuations to core damage frequency and to risk.