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Current Issues and ActionsOn this page: Note: Reactor Facilities, in a Decommissioning status, are listed under Materials Actions. Some links on this page are to documents in our our Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). For additional information, see our Plugins, Viewers, and Other Tools. MeetingsProgram and Policy Issues
Recently Issued Significant Enforcement ActionsThese actions, referred to as "escalated," include Notices of Violation for Severity Level I, II, or III violations; Notices of Violation associated with inspection findings that the Significance Determination Process categorizes as White, Yellow, or Red; civil penalties; and orders. Escalated enforcement actions issued to Note: Reactor Facilities, in a Decommissioning status, are listed under Materials Licensees. Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Station) EA-08-192 On September 4, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White Significance Determination Finding to Southern Nuclear Operating Company, as a result of overhaul of its 1B emergency diesel generator (EDG) at the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant. The violation cited the licensee for failure to install a new exhaust header system correctly, as required by vendor documents, causing the 1B EDG to be declared inoperable. Nebraska Public Power District (Cooper Nuclear Station) EA-07-204 On June 13, 2008, a Notice of Violation (NOV) was issued for a violation
associated with a White Significance Determination Finding involving
a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Byron Station) EA-08-046 On April 1, 2008, a Notice of Violation (NOV) was issued for violations associated with a White Significance Determination Finding. The NOV involved violations of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Actions”, and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, “Design Control”. Specifically, the licensee failed to take timely corrective actions after the identification of extensive corrosion on essential service water riser pipes and failed to verify the adequacy of the methodology and design inputs in calculations that supported the decision to accept three degraded essential service water riser pipes for continued service. Luminant Generation Company, LLC (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station) EA-08-028 On February 29, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White Significance Determination Finding involving a violation of the Unit 1 Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1, “AC Sources - Operating,” which requires that while the plant is in Modes 1, 2, 3, or 4, two diesel generators (DGs) capable of supplying the onsite Class 1E power distribution subsystem(s) shall be operable. From November 1, 2007, through November 21, 2007, while the plant was in Mode 1, one of the two DGs capable of supplying the onsite Class 1E power distribution subsystem(s) was inoperable, and action was not taken to either restore the DG to an operable status within 72 hours or be in Mode 3 within 6 hours and Mode 5 within 36 hours. Specifically, Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 1-02 was made inoperable as a result of painting activities due to paint having been deposited and remaining on at least one fuel rack in a location that prevented motion required to support the operation of the EDG. This condition caused EDG 1-02 to fail to start during a surveillance test on November 21, 2007. Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station) EA-08-006 On January 24, 2008, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $650,000 was issued to Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. This action was based on a continuing SL III violation of the NRC’s January 31, 2006, Confirmatory Order to implement Section 651(b) of the Energy Policy Act (Act) of 2005. The Order required Entergy to install backup power for the Indian Point Alert and Notification System (ANS) by January 31, 2007. The NRC subsequently extended, at the licensee’s request, the implementation date to April 15, 2007. On April 23, 2007, the staff issued a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $130,000 when Entergy failed to meet the April 15, 2007, implementation date. On July 30, 2007, the NRC issued an Order to supplement the requirements of the January 31, 2006, Confirmatory Order, based on Entergy's proposed corrective actions for noncompliance with the Confirmatory Order. On August 30, 2007, the staff issued a subsequent Notice of Violation for Entergy’s failure to place the new ANS in service by August 24, 2007, as required by the July 30, 2007, Order. As of April 16, 2007, the licensee remains in violation of the Orders. On January 22, 2008, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $208,000 was issued for a Severity Level II problem consisting of (1) the licensees failure to ensure, on or about April of 2004, that each of its armed responders was equipped with a contingency weapon in accordance with an NRC Order issued on February 25, 2002, Section B.4(f); (2) the licensees failure to ensure, on or about August 2005, that each of its armed responders was equipped with a contingency weapon in accordance with the licensee Physical Security Plan; (3) a violation of 10 CFR 50.9, incomplete and inaccurate information; and (4) the failure of the licensee to make a one hour report to the NRC as required in 10 CFR 73, Appendix G, Paragraph 1.l(a)(3). Southern California Edison Company (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station) EA-07 232 On January 11, 2008, a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) was issued to Southern California Edison Company (SCE) to formalize commitments made as a result of a successful alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mediation session. The commitments were made by SCE as part of a settlement agreement between SCE and the NRC concerning the falsification, by a contract fire protection specialist at SONGS, of firewatch certification sheets on numerous occasions from April 2001 to December 2006. As part of the settlement agreement, SCE agreed to, in general terms, performing a common cause evaluation of known recent events, conducting a safety culture assessment, conducting training and communications, and developing or enhancing various programs in areas such as ethics, disciplinary process, contract programs, and oversight. In recognition of these actions, and those corrective actions already completed, NRC will refrain from further enforcement action related to this particular case, and may exercise enforcement discretion for the next six months on willful cases that meet the conditions of Section VII.B.4 of the Enforcement Policy, “Violations Identified Due to Previous Enforcement Action.” NRC will evaluate the implementation of SCE’s commitments during future inspections. Omaha Public Power District (Fort Calhoun Station) EA-07-194 On December 7, 2007, a Notice of Violation was issued for violations associated with a White Significance Determination finding involving a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, and a violation of the Fort Calhoun Technical Specifications. Specifically, the licensee failed to promptly identify and correct a significant condition adverse to quality involving high resistance across the field flash contacts of a relay in the Train A emergency diesel generator voltage regulator circuit and failed to provide a written procedure for maintenance that could affect the performance of safety-related EDG voltage regulator relay auxiliary contacts. Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Dresden Nuclear Power Station) EA-07-200 On November 27, 2007, a Notice of Violation and Exercise of Discretion for Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $65,000 was issued for a Severity Level III problem consisting of four violations involving the licensee’s failure to comply with 10 CFR 74.19 between 1959 and 2007. In summary, the licensee failed to (a) keep complete records showing the inventory (including location and unique identity), transfer, and disposal of all special nuclear material (SNM) in its possession; (b) establish, maintain, and follow written MC&A procedures that were sufficient to enable the licensee to account for SNM in its possession; and (c) conduct a physical inventory of all SNM in its possession at intervals not to exceed 12 months. This resulted in the failure to account for two fuel pellets and a number of incore detectors containing SNM. Southern Nuclear Operating Company (Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 ) EA-07-173 On October 31, 2007, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a Yellow Significance Determination finding involving a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI. Specifically, the licensee failed to promptly identify and correct a significant condition adverse to quality that resulted in the Unit 2 containment sump suction to residual heat removal pump 2A, an encapsulated valve, failing to stroke full open during testing on April 29, 2006, and on January 5, 2007. The licensee did not assure that the causes of the condition, including rust/corrosion accumulation on valve components in the valve encapsulation dating back to 2001, were determined and corrective action taken to preclude repetition. Arizona Public Service Company (Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station) EA-07-162 On October 19, 2007, a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) was issued to Arizona Public Service Company (APS) to formalize commitments made as a result of a successful alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mediation session. The commitments were made by APS as part of a settlement agreement between APS and the NRC concerning the falsification, by a qualified senior reactor operator, at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS), of a record related to a steam generator blowdown. As part of the settlement agreement, APS agreed to take a number of actions. In recognition of these actions, and those corrective actions already completed by APS, the NRC is satisfied that its concerns will be addressed. All significant enforcement actions issued to reactor licensees Materials Actions Soil Technology Associates, Inc. (EA-08-200) On August 27, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving the failure to use a minimum of two independent physical controls that form tangible barriers to secure portable gauges from unauthorized removal, when portable gauge was not under the control and constant surveillance of the licensee. Specifically, no tangible barrier existed to secure two portable gauges from unauthorized removal when the gauges were unattended and a roll up door was open at the licensee’s facility. While the gauges were stored within locked containers, the containers were not secured to prevent the containers and their contents from unauthorized removal, such that no independent physical controls that formed tangible barriers were present. Alaska Industrial X-Ray, Inc. (EA-07-325; EA-08-196) On August 20, 2008, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $20,800 was issued to Alaska Industrial X-Ray, Inc. for a willful Severity Level II problem involving (1) performing radiography at a location other than a permanent radiographic installation without the presence of two qualified individuals, in violation of 10 CFR 34.41(a), and (2) failing to provide the NRC with information that was complete and accurate in all material respects, in violation of 10 CFR 30.9(a). The NRC also issued an immediately effective Order Modifying License to require additional actions by the licensee to provide reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will be protected. Global Nuclear Fuel -- Americas, L.L.C. (EA-08-187) On August 13, 2008, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $16,250 was issued for a Severity Level (SL) III violation for circumstances surrounding an incorrect emergency action level declaration. The incorrect emergency action level declaration stemmed from an event that occurred on January 29-30, 2008, also categorized as SL III (EA-08-123), involving introduction of moisture into the Dry Conversion Process Line-2 cooling hopper containing uranium dioxide powder. At the time of this event, GNF-A instruments indicated that the cooling hopper contained uranium dioxide above the safe critical mass limit indicating a potential for criticality existed from an unsafe mass, while the system was undergoing maintenance testing. It was later determined that the cooling hopper contained a safe mass of uranium dioxide and the moisture in the powder was within normal limits. GNF-A initially declared the event as an “Off-Normal Condition” and later upgraded the event to an “Alert”, without obtaining any new information. NRC concluded that GNF-A failed to follow its own procedure. GNF-A implemented immediate and long-term corrective actions to prevent this type of event from repeating. In this case, no actual consequences resulted because an inadvertent criticality accident did not occur. BWX Technologies, Inc. (EA-08-171) On August 8, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued to BWX Technologies, Inc. for a Severity Level III problem involving three violations of their license. Specifically, the licensee did not (1) inspect Raschig ring-filled vacuum (RRVCs) cleaners on multiple occasions between January 28, 2008, and March 5, 2008 to ensure adequate levels of Raschig rings were present to prevent inadvertent criticality, (2) establish, prior to March 5, 2008, double contingency for operation of RRVCs to ensure that a criticality accident could not occur with only one change in process conditions, and (3) fill, prior to March 5, 2008, multiple RRVCs with well-settled Raschig rings in accordance with ANSI/ANS-8.5-1996 such that further settling was not likely during use. In this case, no actual consequences resulted because an inadvertent criticality accident did not occur. Westinghouse Electric Company (EA-08-165) On August 6, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued to Westinghouse Electric Company, Commercial Nuclear Fuel Division, for a Severity Level III problem involving three violations associated with the loss, on February 4, 2008, of sixteen sample vials of uranium hexafluoride. Specifically, the violations involved (1) the failure to properly document and control the transfer of sixteen sample vials of uranium hexafluoride from shipping and receiving to the chemistry laboratory as required by procedures, (2) the failure to secure from unauthorized removal the sixteen vials when they were stored in a controlled area and the failure to control and maintain constant surveillance of the sample vials when they were not in storage, and (3) the failure of an individual to annotate that he had read and acknowledged the procedure governing the disposal of empty shipping containers prior to performing that work assignment. In this case, there are no indications of any radiation or chemical exposures as a result of the licensee’s loss of control of the sixteen uranium hexafluoride sample vials. American Radiolabeled Chemicals, Inc. (EA-08-126) On July 22, 2008, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $6500 was issued for a Severity Level III problem. The violation involved multiple examples of failure to adhere to license commitments and regulations. Specifically, between January 22 and March 14, 2008, the licensee failed to: (1) secure from unauthorized removal or limit access to licensed material in an aggregate quantity greater than 1000 times Appendix C to 10 CFR Part 20 limits; (2) comply with license commitments related to management oversight of the radiation protection program, including a failure to conduct monthly meetings of the Radiation Safety Committee and a failure to implement timely and adequate corrective actions for issues identified during annual program reviews; (3) comply with license commitments related to radiological surveys; and (4) perform and document required investigations of contamination found in controlled and unrestricted areas. Ahern & Associates, Inc. (EA-08-150) On July 9, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued to Ahern & Associates, Inc. This action is based on a Severity Level III violation of 10 CFR 30.34(i) involving the licensee's failure to maintain a minimum of two independent physical controls that formed tangible barriers to secure a portable gauge from unauthorized removal during a period when the portable gauge was not under the control and constant surveillance of the licensee. Specifically, a portable gauge was left unattended inside an unlocked storage area with only one physical control (a locked cabinet container) that formed a tangible barrier to secure the portable gauge. McKinney and Company (EA-08-177) On July 9, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued to McKinney and Company. This action is based on a Severity Level III violation of 10 CFR 30.34(i) involving the licensee's failure to maintain a minimum of two independent physical controls that formed tangible barriers to secure a portable gauge from unauthorized removal during a period when the portable gauge was not under the control and constant surveillance of the licensee. Specifically, five portable gauges were found unattended inside an unlocked building with only one physical control (a locked storage area door) that formed a tangible barrier to secure the portable gauges. Morrison-Maierle, Inc. (EA-08-041) On July 9, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation. The violation involved the failure to use a minimum of two independent physical controls that form tangible barriers to secure portable gauges from unauthorized removal, when the portable gauges are not under the control and constant surveillance of the licensee. Specifically, the licensee did not have tangible barriers to secure a portable gauge from unauthorized removal while stored in a building located within a secured area. Chevron Environmental Management Company (EA-08-054) On July 8, 2008, a Confirmatory Order (effective immediately) (“CO”) was issued to confirm commitments made as result of an Alternative Dispute Resolution (“ADR”) session, held on June 5, 2008, between Chevron Environmental Management Company (CEMC) and the NRC. The parties agreed to engage in ADR following NRC’s February 29, 2008, letter to CEMC wherein an apparent violation of 10 CFR 40.7, “Employee Protection” was identified. As set forth in the CO, CEMC agreed to complete a number of actions at its Washington, PA decommissioning site, including, but not limited to: training supervisory employees regarding employees’ rights to raise concerns; communicating CEMC’s policy and management expectations regarding employees’ right to raise concerns; and distributing a questionnaire to assess employees’ willingness to raise nuclear safety concerns. In turn, the NRC agreed to not pursue further enforcement action relating to this matter On June 13, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation. The violation involved the failure to properly prepare a package containing fuel service equipment such that dose rates on the surface of the package would not exceed 10 CFR 71.5(a) and 49 CFR 173.441(a) limits. Specifically, on February 3, 2008, AREVA shipped surface contaminated equipment as an open conveyance on a flatbed trailer. On February 4, 2008, the shipment arrived at a nuclear power facility with measured contact radiation levels between 800-2000 mr/hr in a localized area on the bottom of the container. The localized area was not easily accessible and no measurable radiation exposures to workers or members of the public occurred as a result of this event. IBS of America Corporation (EA-08-031) On June 6, 2008, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $3,250 was issued to IBS of America Corporation for a Severity Level III violation of 10 CFR 30.34(c). Specifically, the licensee possessed byproduct material at a location not authorized by their license. McCallum Testing Laboratories, Inc. (EA-08-004; EA-08-086) On May 28, 2008, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $3,250 was issued for a Severity Level III problem. The violations involved the failure to control and maintain constant surveillance of material that is in an unrestricted area and not in storage and failure to block and brace packages containing radioactive material to prevent change in position during transport. Specifically, a portable gauge fell from the back of a pickup truck, after it was placed in the back of the truck without using a transport case or attaching the gauge in any way to the truck. After falling, the gauge was subsequently damaged, and was lost for approximately an hour. Global X-Ray & Testing Corporation (EA-08-008; EA-08-009; EA-08-010; EA-08-011; EA-08-013) On May 23, 2008, a Confirmatory Order (effective immediately) was issued to Global X-ray & Testing (Global) to confirm commitments made as a result of an Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) settlement agreement. NRC identified four violations during inspection and investigation involving: 1) a willful failure to provide the NRC with complete and accurate information; 2) the failure to prevent workers from resuming work after their pocket dosimeters were found to be off-scale; 3) the failure to ensure that a radiographer was providing personal supervision of the radiographer's assistant through direct observation of the assistant’s performance of radiographic operations; and 4) allowing an individual who was not wearing a personal dosimeter to conduct radiographic operations. In response to these violations, the licensee requested ADR. As part of the agreement, licensee agreed to additional management review that will include developing procedures for additional oversight of offshore radiographic operations, obtaining an agreement with lay-barge operators that will address radiographic operations, incidents, and oversight; field audits of lay-barge radiographic operations by licensee management, making arrangements for NRC inspection of radiographic activities on U.S. owned lay-barges, implementation of training on potential consequences for violation of NRC regulations, and delivering a personal letter to each employee regarding the consequences of wrongdoing. Global also agreed to obtain an NRC license with special license conditions for radiographic operations in offshore waters. In exchange for Global’s extensive corrective actions and most notably in consideration of costs associated with obtaining an NRC license, the NRC agreed to eliminate the civil monetary penalty. Hevly Technical Services, Inc. (EA-08-129, EA-08-130) On May 16, 2008, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $3,000 was issued to Hevly Technical Services, Inc. (HTS) for a deliberate Severity Level III violation of 10 CFR 150.20(b)(3) involving the transfer of a portable moisture density gauge containing radioactive material to a company in the State of Alaska that was not licensed to possess or use the gauge. Specifically, on May 17, 2003, HTS, a General Licensee under 10 CFR 150.20, transferred a portable gauging device containing radioactive material to Alaska Rim Engineering, a company that HTS knew was not specifically licensed by the NRC to receive the material. In addition, a second Severity Level III violation was issued for failure to file NRC Form 241- Report of Proposed Activities in Non-Agreement States, at least three days prior to engaging in licensed activities within NRC jurisdiction. Specifically on May 17, 2003, HTS, who held specific licenses from the Agreement Sates of Washington and Oregon, used a portable device containing radioactive material in Palmer, Alaska, during training without filing a Form -241 with the NRC. Ball Memorial Hospital (EA-08-026) On May 12, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation, involved two written directives not dated and signed by an authorized user before the administration of I-131 sodium iodide greater than 30 microcuries. Specifically, on April 30, 2007, two nuclear medicine technologists administered I 131 sodium iodide to two patients, without a dated and signed written directive. Dickinson County Memorial Hospital (EA-08-048) On May 7, 2008, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $3,250 was issued for a Severity Level III violation. The violation involved the failure to control and maintain constant surveillance of licensed material that was stored in a controlled area. Specifically, on January 25, 2008, the doors to a room which contained licensed material being packaged for shipment were left unsecured and unattended, resulting in licensed radioactive material being accessible to unauthorized individuals via an adjacent, unrestricted hallway. Westinghouse Electric Company (EA-08-057) On May 1, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation. The violation involved the failure to assure safe and compliant activities involving nuclear material. Specifically, on November 17, 2006, a safety significant control interlock was willfully bypassed by an operator who disabled an alarm acknowledgement pushbutton associated with Conversion Line 5 while hydrogen gas was flowing to the calciner in the licensee’s wet conversion process. This activity is prohibited by licensee procedures and NRC license conditions. Wang Engineering, Inc (EA-08-066) On April 18, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation involved the failure to file NRC Form 241- Report of Proposed Activities in Non-Agreement States, at least three days prior to engaging in licensed activities within NRC jurisdiction. Specifically, on numerous occasions during 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2007, Wang Engineering, Inc., a licensee of the State of Illinois, used portable moisture/density gauges containing licensed material at Department of Veteran Affairs (VA) construction sites; areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction in an Agreement State, without filing a Form-241 with the NRC. Karmanos Cancer Center (EA-07-316) On April 10, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation. The violation involved the failure to develop, implement and maintain written directive procedures to provide high confidence that each administration was in accordance with the written directive. Specifically, the licensee’s written procedures for the implementation of treatment plans with its stereotactic radiosurgery unit did not require a check of the treatment plan parameters and magnetic resonance image orientation prior to administration of the treatment. As a result, the licensee administered a single gamma knife treatment to an unintended portion of the patient’s brain. NTH Consultants, Ltd. (EA-08-002) On March 31, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving the failure to use a minimum of two independent physical controls that form tangible barriers to secure portable gauges from unauthorized removal, when portable gauge was not under the control and constant surveillance of the licensee. Specifically, licensee personnel secured the transport case containing a gauge to a vehicle with two independent cables and padlocks, but the gauge case lid was secured with only a padlock and the gauge was stolen from the vehicle. Oncology Institute of Greater Lafayette (EA-07-313) On March 31, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III problem. The violations involved the failure to instruct an Authorized Medical Physicist, a supervised individual, in the licensee’s written directive procedures with respect to the use of byproduct material and failure to develop, implement and maintain written directive procedures to provide high confidence that each administration was in accordance with the written directive. Specifically, the licensee did not verify before treatment that the treatment plan was properly input into the high dose rate remote afterloader unit and did not verify, after treatment, that the step size, a treatment parameter used for the treatments, was in agreement with the treatment plan. A medical event occurred during the licensee’s administration of three treatment fractions to a patient. As a result, portions of the treatment site received a total dose that differed from the prescribed dose by more than 20 percent. Saint Louis University (EA-07-317) On March 31, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving the failure to control and maintain constant surveillance of licensed material that is in controlled or unrestricted area. Specifically, the licensee did not secure from unauthorized removal or limit access to materials containing regulated amount of iodine-125 located in the Medical School building and regulated amount of hydrogen-3 located in the Pediatric Research Institute, both of which were controlled areas. Accurate NDE and Inspection, LLC. (EA-06-281; EA-07-289) On February 20, 2008, a Confirmatory Order (effective immediately) was issued to confirm commitments made as a result of an Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) settlement agreement. The licensee requested ADR following the NRC’s March 20, 2007, Notice of Violation and Proposed civil penalty of $13,000 for a willful violation involving the failure to secure from unauthorized removal or access licensed material that was stored in an unrestricted area; failure to wear required personnel dosimetry during radiographic operations; and failure to provide complete and accurate information on documents provided to an NRC inspector. As part of the agreement, Accurate NDE agreed to additional management review and oversight programs that will include implementation of amended procedures for offshore radiographic operations, implementation of a training program, and increased audits of the program. Accurate NDE will also submit an article in the company newsletter regarding this case and the consequences of wrongdoing. In exchange for Accurate NDE’s extensive corrective actions, the NRC agreed to reduce the civil penalty originally proposed to $500. Western X-Ray Corporation (EA-07-277; EA-07-278) On February 15, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for two Severity Level III violations. The first violation involved a failure to certify an individual who acted as the radiographer of record while performing industrial radiography. The second violation involved a failure to wear an operating alarm ratemeter by an individual who acted as the radiographer’s assistant during radiographic operations. Specifically, on April 23, 2007, the individual acting as the radiographer of record was not certified as a radiographer and the individual acting as the assistant radiographer of record was not wearing an operating ratemeter at all times during radiographic operations, while performing industrial radiography on an offshore platform in federal waters. Mattingly Testing Services, Inc. (EA-07-303) On January 23, 2008, a Demand for Information (DFI) was issued to Mattingly Testing Services, Inc. (Mattingly Testing) in response to the information obtained during November 7, 2007, inspection and investigation of Mattingly Testing’s licensed activities. While the inspection and investigation activities continue, the DFI required Mattingly Testing to provide information in order for the NRC to evaluate and determine the appropriateness of Mattingly Testing’s licensed material program at temporary job sites. The DFI also required Mattingly Testing to provide information in order for the NRC to evaluate the depth and completeness of Mattingly Testing’s work environment and its determination that it maintains an environment where employees can raise safety concerns without fear of retaliation. Specifically, the DFI required Mattingly Testing to provide additional details relative to the establishment, implementation and maintenance of a program designed to provide and support such a work environment. Mattingly Testing is required to submit the information in writing within 20 days of the date of this DFI. After reviewing Mattingly Testing’s response to the DFI, the NRC will determine whether further action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements. CTI and Associates, Inc. (EA-07-300) On January 15, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving the failure by the authorized gauge operator to control and maintain constant surveillance of a portable nuclear gauge. Specifically, the gauge, which contained NRC-licensed radioactive material, was damaged when it was run over by a bulldozer after the authorized gauge operator had left it unattended while he was preparing for another test at a temporary job site. Material Testing, Inc. (EA-07-257) On January 11, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation. The violation involved the failure to use a minimum of two independent physical controls that form tangible barriers to secure portable gauges from unauthorized removal, when the portable gauges are not under the control and constant surveillance of the licensee. Specifically, On June 19, 2006, three gauges containing licensed material were stored and left unattended without any independent physical controls to secure the devices from unauthorized removal; and, (2) on June 19, 2007, one gauge was left unattended in a personal vehicle without any independent physical controls to secure the devices from unauthorized removal. Tyme Engineering, Inc. (EA-07-276) On January 7, 2008, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $3,250 was issued to Tyme Engineering, Inc. This action is based on a Severity Level III violation of 10 CFR 30.34(i) involving the licensee's failure to maintain a minimum of two independent physical controls that formed tangible barriers to secure a portable gauge from unauthorized removal during a period when the portable gauge was not under the control and constant surveillance of the licensee. Specifically, the licensee had only a single tangible barrier in place when a gauge was stolen from an unattended licensee vehicle parked at the licensee’s business parking lot. Alpha Omega Services, Inc.- Letter; Enforcement Action (EA-07-215) On December 20, 2007, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Impostion of Civil Penalty in the amount of $19,200 were issued for a Severity Level II violation. In January 2003, the company deliberately provided materially inaccurate information to an NRC licensee and to a contractor for the licensee in violation of 10 CFR 71.8(b)(2). The company Operations Manager/Assistant Radiation Safety Officer signed a maintenance checklist indicating that a package was in compliance with the NRC Certificate of Compliance and approved for use, when he knew it was not. Additionally, in violation of 10 CFR 71.8(b)(1), Alpha Omega Services deliberately caused the NRC licensee to violate NRC requirements for a license when the licensee exported licensed material in nonconforming packages. Indiana Department of Transportation (EA-07-253) On December 12, 2007, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $3,250 was issued for a Severity Level III problem. The licensee twice failed to use a minimum of two independent controls that form tangible barriers to secure portable gauges from unauthorized removal during a period when the portable gauges were not under the control and constant surveillance of the licensee, resulting in a violation of 10 CFR 30.34(i). Specifically, a gauge was stolen from a temporary job site when the gauge operator walked away from the gauge while the gauge was on the ground behind the back of a pick-up truck. On another occasion the gauge was secured to the truck bed with only one physical control while not under the constant surveillance of an authorized user. MC Squared, Inc. (EA-07-101; 07-104) On November 30, 2007, an Order Imposing Civil Monetary Penalty was issued to MC Squared, Inc. Following the NRC’s September 13, 2007, Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of a Civil Penalty in the amount of $3,250, the licensee requested negating or significantly reducing the civil penalty. The Notice of Violation and proposed civil penalty was issued to the licensee for its failure to maintain a minimum of two independent physical controls that formed tangible barriers to secure a portable gauge from unauthorized removal during a period when the portable gauge was not under the control and constant surveillance of the licensee. This failure may have contributed to the theft of the gauge. In addition, the license failed to file NRC Form 241 at least three days prior to engaging in licensed activities in areas of exclusive NRC jurisdiction. MC Squared, Inc., did not present an adequate basis for the NRC to retract the violation or mitigate the civil penalty, and in addition, did not provide any evidence that payment of the civil penalty would create a financial hardship. Accordingly, NRC concluded that the violation remains valid and issued an order imposing Civil Monetary Penalty in the amount of $3,250 Alaska Industrial X-Ray, Inc. (EA-07-261) On November 8, 2007, a Relaxation of Order Suspending Licensed Activities (Effective Immediately- dated October 19, 2007) was issued to Alaska Industrial X-Ray, Inc. (AIX) based on the licensee’s proposal to implement several actions to provide the NRC with assurance that AIX will comply with the 2-person rule during NRC-licensed radiographic operations. Specifically, the licensee’s actions include: use of a capable, independent consultant to perform unannounced audits of AIX's radiographic activities, with emphasis on the 2-man rule and results of the audits will be reported to NRC monthly; strengthening of the controls over personnel access to the radiography location; construction of a dark room at the radiographic locations; communication of AIX's schedule for radiographic activities in advance to both the consultant and NRC; and designation of a different Radiation Safety Officer. However, this relaxation does not have any effect on the ongoing Office of Investigation’s investigation or any potential enforcement action that may be taken based on the outcome of that investigation. Universal Testing, LLC (EA-06-259; 07-230) On November 6, 2007, a Confirmatory Order (effective immediately) was issued to confirm commitments made as a result of an Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) settlement agreement. The licensee requested ADR following the NRC’s February 23, 2007, Notice of Violation and Proposed civil penalty of $6,500 for a willful violation involving the licensee’s failure to secure from unauthorized removal or access licensed material that was stored in an unrestricted area. As part of the agreement, Universal Testing has agreed to implement a comprehensive management review and oversight program. In addition, Universal Testing has agreed to write and submit an article for publication by the Non-Destructive Testing Managers Association (NDTMA) addressing the value that the new Universal Testing management oversight program adds to overall safe and effective operations. In recognition of Universal Testing’s extensive corrective actions, the NRC agreed to reduce the civil penalty originally proposed to $500. R&M Engineering, Inc. (EA-07-180; 07-181) On October 23, 2007, a Notice of Violation (NOV) and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $3,250 was issued for a Severity Level III violation of 10 CFR 30.34(i) involving the licensee’s failure, on two instances, to maintain a minimum of two independent physical controls that formed tangible barriers to secure a portable gauge from unauthorized removal during a period when the portable gauge was not under the control and constant surveillance of the licensee. In the second instance, this resulted in the loss of the gauge into the public domain. Specifically, in the first instance, an authorized portable gauge user left the portable gauge unattended and unsecured in the bed of a company truck as he returned to the office to retrieve paperwork. In the second instance, the licensee failed to use two independent physical controls to secure a portable gauge after it fell out of a company vehicle onto a public highway and until it was retrieved and returned by a member of the public a few minutes later. Alaska Industrial X-Ray, Inc. (EA-07-261) On October 19, 2007, an Order Suspending Licensed Activities (Effective Immediately) was issued to Alaska Industrial X-Ray, Inc. (AIX) based on the NRC’s determination that all AIX radiographers, including AIX’s Radiation Safety Officer, and assistants, violated 10 CFR 34.41(a) by performing industrial radiographic operations at a temporary job site with only one qualified individual present during operations. The evidence the NRC relied on indicates that these activities have occurred on numerous occasions, for a period of up to three years. Because the NRC issued a Notice of Violation on April 25, 2001, for a willful violation of 10 CFR 34.41(a) at the same client facility location, serious concerns were raised regarding AIX’s willingness to comply with the Commission’s requirements and its ability to conduct licensed activities without undue risk to the public’s health and safety, resulting in the issuance of this order suspending all radiographic operations authorized by AIX’s license. Tome & Ubinas Radio Oncology Center (EA-07-103) On October 11, 2007, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving the failure to meet the physical presence requirements in 10 CFR 35.615(f)(2) during High Dose Radiation (HDR) brachytherapy treatments. Specifically, on two occasions the licensee willfully performed HDR brachytherapy treatments without the physical presence of an authorized user and on two additional occasions the licensee willfully performed HDR brachytherapy treatments without the physical presence of an authorized user and continued patient treatments without the authorized user or a physician under the supervision of an authorized user physically present. Blakemore Construction Corporation (EA-07-174) On October 11, 2007, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation of 10 CFR 30.34(i). The violation involved the failure to maintain a minimum of two independent physical controls that formed a tangible barrier to secure a portable gauge from unauthorized removal during a period when the gauge was not under direct control or surveillance. Specifically, two portable gauges were stored in an unlocked storage room located in an unlocked building at one of the licensee’s job sites.
All significant enforcement actions issued to materials licensees
Joseph S. Shepherd (IA-08-014) On September 8, 2008, a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) was issued to Mr. Joseph S. Shepherd, a contractor for Source Production and Equipment Company (SPEC), confirming commitments reached as part of conjoined negotiations with the Department of Justice (DOJ). As a result of the plea negotiations with DOJ, Mr. Shepherd agreed to not contest the Order. The Order was issued based on Mr. Shepherd’s failure to comply with certain NRC Certificate of Compliance (CoC) requirements regarding a shipping package and his engagement in deliberate misconduct which caused SPEC to be in violation of 10 CFR 71.3. Specifically, SPEC, an NRC licensee pursuant to 10 CFR Part 110, shipped licensed radioactive material to Mexico on July 15, 2003, December 4, 2003, and May 20, 2004 while (1) the end caps were physically and dimensionally different from those approved in the CoC, and (2) the package was not inspected prior to shipment as required by the CoC. Mr. Shepherd agreed that he authorized modifications to the transportation package without prior NRC approval and that he concealed these package non-conformances from SPEC at the time of the shipments. Mr. Shepherd also agreed that he did not perform inspections of the shipping package as required by the CoC prior to the shipments to Mexico, but provided SPEC documentation which indicated that he performed the required inspections. As a result, SPEC, which relied on Mr. Shepherd’s representations that the shipping package complied with all regulatory requirements, shipped NRC licensed material without a license in violation of 10 CFR 71.3. The Order and DOJ agreement will prohibit Mr. Shepherd from participating in 10 CFR Part 71 licensed activities indefinitely. He also will (1) be subject to additional unannounced inspections for five years from the date of the Order, (2) notify and make available copies of the Order to customers, (3) attend additional regulatory safety training, and (4) prepare a presentation for an industry conference describing the circumstances of his violations. On August 20, 2008, an Immediately Effective Order was issued to an individual prohibiting him from involvement in NRC-licensed activities for a period of one year from the date the Order was issued. The Order was issued based on his engagement in deliberate misconduct which caused his employer, Alaska Industrial X-Ray, Inc. to be in violation of 10 CFR 34.41(a) and for providing the NRC with information that he knew was inaccurate or incomplete. Specifically, the individual deliberately violated 10 CFR 34.41(a) by performing radiography with only one radiographer present at a temporary jobsite, on multiple occasions over about a 3-year period. In addition, when first interviewed by the NRC’s Office of Investigations, he deliberately provided information that he knew was incomplete or inaccurate. Kenneth J. Vandiver (IA-08-006) On August 20, 2008, an Immediately Effective Order was issued to the former radiation safety officer for Alaska Industrial X-Ray, Inc, prohibiting him from Involvement in NRC-licensed activities for a period of three years from the date the Order was issued. The Order was issued based on his engagement in deliberate misconduct on numerous occasions over several years, and providing the NRC with information that he knew was inaccurate or incomplete. Specifically, as RSO he was responsible for ensuring that radiation safety activities were being performed in accordance with approved procedures and regulatory requirements in the daily operation of the licensee’s program. In this case, not only did the individual deliberately violate 10 CFR 34.41(a), he was also aware that other AIX radiographers were deliberately violating this requirement and took no actions to stop it. When questioned by the NRC, he knowingly provided incomplete and inaccurate information about the violations. On August 20, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving deliberate misconduct on the part of the individual which caused his employer, Alaska Industrial X-Ray, Inc. to be in violation of 10 CFR 34.41(a). Specifically, the individual deliberately performed radiography, on multiple occasions, without being accompanied by at least one other qualified radiographer or an individual who had at a minimum met the requirements of § 34.43(c). On August 20, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving deliberate misconduct on the part of the individual which caused his employer, Alaska Industrial X-Ray, Inc. to be in violation of 10 CFR 34.41(a). Specifically, the individual deliberately performed radiography, on multiple occasions, without being accompanied by at least one other qualified radiographer or an individual who had at a minimum met the requirements of § 34.43(c). William M. Johnston (IA-08-022) On May 23, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving a deliberate failure to provide the NRC with complete and accurate information, as required by 10 CFR 30.10(a)(2). Specifically, in a report submitted to the NRC on May 18, 2006, the individual, as the radiation safety officer (RSO) for Global X-Ray and Testing Corporation, described an event that took place during radiographic operations on board a lay-barge on April 20, 2006, but failed to include complete information regarding the radiation exposure to the radiographer involved in the event. He also failed to disclose the fact that the radiographer reported that his pocket dosimeter had gone off-scale and he did not reconcile or explain the discrepancy between the reported dose and the off-scale dosimeter reading. On January 22, 2008, a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) was issued to Mr. Luis Fernandez, a former security Project Manager for the Wackenhut Corporation, as a result of a settlement agreement entered into following the conclusion of Alternative Dispute Resolution, requested by the individual. This Confirmatory Order relates to a series of actions taken by Mr. Fernandez that resulted in the deliberate documentation of damage to a contingency response weapon in a licensee Condition Report, which was incomplete and inaccurate. The Condition Report, which is required to be maintained by the licensee, was provided to the NRC staff during an ongoing inspection and investigation. As a result, the actions of Mr. Fernandez placed the licensee in violation of 10 CFR 50.9. During the mediation session, Mr. Fernandez agreed, among other things, to: 1) he has no intention of working or seeking employment in any activities or at any facility subject to NRC regulations, and that he will not seek employment requiring his participation in NRC-regulated activities before June 30, 2008, 2) should he seek employment with an entity involved in NRC-regulated activities and requiring unescorted access authorization prior to June 30, 2010, he will provide the NRC with a letter discussing the steps he has taken to assure his understanding of the importance of completeness and accuracy of information at facilities subject to NRC regulation, 3) make himself available to participate in training to discuss lessons learned from this matter and the importance of completeness and accuracy of condition reports and other internal documents, 4) should he seek employment with any NRC-regulated entity prior to June 30, 2010, to provide to the NRC a letter discussing the steps he has taken to assure his understanding of NRC requirements in effect at the time, is sufficient to address all Agency concerns regarding his involvement in the matter discussed in the NRC’s letter of May 30, 2007. In consideration of the above, the NRC agreed to forego issuance of a Notice of Violation or take other enforcement action against Mr. Fernandez in this matter. On January 22, 2008, an Immediately Effective Order prohibiting an individual, a contract security Lieutenant with the Wackenhut Corporation, from involvement in all NRC-licensed activities for a period of five years from the date the Order was issued. The Order was issued based on activities that occurred on or about August of 2005. Specifically, Mr. Brumer deliberately removed and broke a firing pin from a contingency response weapon, rendering the weapon non-functional. As a result, Mr. Brumer caused FPL to be in violation of 10 CFR Part 73. Mr. Brumer’s actions in this regard were in violation of 10 CFR 50.5(a)(1), which states that an employee of a licensee or contractor, who knowingly provides to any licensee, applicant, contractor, or subcontractor, any components, equipment, materials, or other goods or services that relate to a licensee's activities in this part, may not engage in deliberate misconduct that causes or would have caused, if not detected, a licensee or applicant to be in violation of any rule, regulation, or order. Additionally, on or about February 19, 2006, Mr. Brumer provided a transcribed statement to an NRC Office of Investigations (OI) agent regarding his involvement in the breaking of a firing pin that was later determined to be incomplete and inaccurate. Mr. Brumer’s actions in this regard were in violation of 10 CFR 50.5(a)(2), which states, in part, that an employee of a licensee or contractor may not deliberately submit to the NRC, a licensee, or a licensee=s contractor, information that the person submitting the information knows to be incomplete or inaccurate in some respect material to the NRC. On January 22, 2008, a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) was issued to Mr. William Johns, a former security manager for Florida Power & Light, as a result of a settlement agreement entered into following the conclusion of Alternative Dispute Resolution, requested by the individual. This Confirmatory Order relates to Mr. Johns’ deliberate failure to make a one-hour report to the Commission of an event involving the interruption of normal operation of a licensed nuclear power reactor through the unauthorized use of or tampering with its machinery, components, or controls, including the security system. In this case, the tampering event involved the breaking of a firing pin for a contingency response weapon, a component of the security system. The NRC reached a preliminary conclusion that Mr. Johns’ failure to make a report was in violation of 10 CFR 50.5, in that Mr. Johns’ actions caused Florida Power & Light to not report this event to the NRC as required by 10 CFR Part 73, Appendix G.I.(a)(3). During the mediation session, Mr. Johns agreed, among other things, to: 1) not seek employment requiring his participation in NRC-regulated activities before July 15, 2008, 2) that prior to seeking future employment in NRC-regulated activities, Mr. Johns will submit to the NRC a letter explaining the steps he has taken to assure he understands the NRC’s security reporting requirements in effect at the time, 3) that prior to seeking future employment in NRC-regulated activities, Mr. Johns will submit to the NRC a letter explaining the steps he has taken to assure he understands the NRC’s security reporting requirements in effect at the time. In consideration of the above, the NRC agreed to forego issuance of a Notice of Violation or other enforcement action to Mr. Johns in this matter. On January 22, 2008, an Immediately Effective Order prohibiting an individual, a contract security officer with the Wackenhut Corporation, from involvement in all NRC-licensed activities for a period of five years from the date the Order was issued. The Order was issued based on activities that occurred on or about April of 2004. Specifically, Mr. Aguilar deliberately removed firing pins from two contingency response weapons, rendering the weapons non-functional. As a result, Mr. Aguilar caused FPL to be in violation of NRC Order for Interim Compensatory Measures, dated February 25, 2002, Section B.4(f). Mr. Aguilar’s actions in this regard constituted a violation of 10 CFR 50.5. On December 20, 2007, an Immediately Effective Order was issued to Mr. Cary Hedger, the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO), President, and an owner of Alpha Omega Services, Inc., prohibiting him from involvement in all NRC-licensed, certificate, and Quality Assurance Program Approval activities for a period of three years from the date the Order. The Order was issued because Mr. Cary Hedger violated 10 CFR 71.8, “Deliberate Misconduct.” In January 2003, Mr Cary Hedger, both the Operations Manager and Assistant RSO at the time, performed a maintenance inspection of a shipping package and signed a maintenance checklist indicating that the package was in compliance with the NRC Certificate of Compliance and approved for use, when he knew it was not. The materially inaccurate information was then provided to an NRC licensee and to a contractor for the licensee. Additionally, Mr. Cary Hedger deliberately caused the NRC licensee to violate NRC requirements for a license when the licensee exported licensed material in nonconforming packages. On November 28, 2007, a Severity Level III violation was issued for a violation involving 10 CFR 55.53(j). Specifically, the individual, a licensed operator, performed licensed activities at Vermont Yankee, while he was under the influence of an illegal substance which could have adversely affected his ability to safely and competently perform those duties. Specifically, as part of Entergy's fitness for duty testing program, Mr. Picard was randomly selected for a drug and alcohol test on July 18, 2007. The subsequent results of that test were positive for marijuana. On November 26, 2007, a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) was issued to Mr. Davis, former Senior Reactor Operator at the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES), as a result of a settlement agreement entered into as a result of Alternative Dispute Resolution requested by the individual. This action relates to an incident that occurred on June 27, 2007, when Mr. Davis reported to work and failed to report an arrest which occurred on June 19, 2007, for driving under the influence of alcohol, coincident with a single motor vehicle accident. Mr. Davis’ SRO license and site access was immediately terminated and he was assigned other duties. Subsequently, his employment at SSES was terminated. During the mediation session, Mr. Davis agreed, among other things to: (1) write an operating experience report addressing lessons learned from this violation; (2) provide a written report to the NRC for review, subsequently submitting the report to a minimum of three national organizations for possible publication, including INPO and NEI; (3) provide a written response to the NRC explaining the reasons why the NRC can have confidence in his following procedures in the future; (4) provide a training plan for licensed and non-licensed operator training at SSES regarding procedure compliance; and (5) agree to the issuance of a Severity Level III Notice of Violation. The agreement did not prohibit Mr. Davis from all 10 CFR Part 50 activities but required Mr. Davis to inform the NRC before resuming work involving NRC licensed activities. In light of Mr. Davis’ agreement, the NRC will not pursue any further enforcement action related to the incident. On October 19, 2007, a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) was issued as part of a settlement agreement confirming commitments reached during alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mediation. In this case, the NRC concluded that the individual deliberately falsified a steam generator blowdown log entry in order to cover up an error he had made. As part of the settlement agreement, the individual agreed to take a number of actions including: restricting his 10 CFR Part 55 related activities until certain specified actions were accomplished; submitting a letter to the NRC outlining why the NRC can have confidence in his future activities in the industry; and sharing his lessons learned with the industry through several venues. All significant enforcement actions issued to individuals Non-Licensee Actions Wackenhut Nuclear Services (EA-07-111, EA-07-114, EA-07-117) On January 22, 2008, a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) was issued to Wackenhut Nuclear Services, Inc., (WNS) to establish certain requirements as set forth in the Order including (1) revision to its hiring and recruitment policy; (2) a site enhancement plan for the Turkey Point facility; (3) development of an enhanced leadership program; (4) benchmarking, audits and self-assessments, (5) development of performance indicators for the Turkey Point facility; (6) focused one-on-one training between supervisors and subordinates and continuing communications with the NRC detailing progress on the above six items. The Order was discussed during Alternative Dispute Resolution, and, subject to satisfactory implementation of said requirements, the NRC will not pursue further enforcement action on this issue. All significant enforcement actions issued to non-licensees
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