

- How do we improve effectiveness of the one-call system and what is the role of technology?

- How can we apply the Virginia experience in other areas (*i.e.*, distribution integrity management)?

2. High Consequence Area (CCA) Pilots

- Is there a way of using partnerships to expand damage prevention, emergency preparedness and response?

- Are there key partners missing? If so, how do we enlist them, such as in the areas of emergency preparedness, encroachment, etc.?

- Should this best practice model be introduced to all States?

3. Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG)

- Is PHMSA/OPS doing all it should to educate communities about LNG?

Show Video Clip—*Liquefied Natural Gas*

Pipeline Information Planning Alliance (PIPPA)

- How do we approach home builders and insurers?

Improving Our Stewardship in Environmental and Energy Projects

The OPS is the Federal pipeline safety expert and recognizes how important it is to share its expertise with other government and State agencies responsible for supporting our government's national energy policies. OPS also provides information and assists other government and State agencies responsible for protecting our Nation's pipeline system.

1. Permit Streamlining

- How do we introduce our concepts to State and local agencies?

- What is the most efficient way to develop best practices?

- How could we effectively use and improve on developing best practices during implementation of the second pilot program?

2. Alaska

- Are OPS's current pipeline safety regulations aligned and applicable for the new technologies and materials being proposed for the Alaska North Slope gas transmission pipeline?

- What changes need to be made to ensure the optimum delivery rate from Alaska, through Canada, and into the lower 48 States?

3. Security

- How can OPS ensure continuing pipeline security in the current environment?

- What is OPS doing for pipeline security?

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Theodore L. Willke,
Deputy Associate Administrator, Office of Pipeline Safety.

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

Pipeline Safety: Planning for Coordination of Emergency Response to Pipeline Emergencies

AGENCY: Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Notice; issuance of advisory bulletin.

SUMMARY: This document alerts pipeline operators about the need to preplan for emergency response with utilities whose proximity to the pipeline may impact the response. Coordination with electric and other utilities may be critical in responding to a pipeline emergency. Preplanning would facilitate actions that may be needed for safety, such as removing sources of ignition or reducing the amount of combustible material.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Robert J. Hall by phone at (202) 366-8860, by fax at (202) 366-4566, or by e-mail, robert.hall@dot.gov. General information about the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration's Office of Pipeline Safety programs may be obtained by accessing the home page at <http://ops.dot.gov>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

Existing regulations for both gas and hazardous liquid pipelines require operators to have emergency procedures to address pipeline emergencies. The key element of these requirements, which are located at 49 CFR 192.615 and 195.402(e), is to plan response before the emergency occurs. Because pipelines are often located in public space rather than in controlled access areas, planning emergency response must include more than internal plans. The regulations explicitly require that operators include procedures for planning with fire, police and other public officials to ensure a coordinated response. It is also important to plan a coordinated response with owners of other utilities in the vicinity of the

pipeline. The operations of these utilities may provide sources of ignition for the product released from a pipeline, may increase the burning time of fires that have already started, or may delay responders who are attempting to make the situation safe rapidly.

In the evening of April 7, 2003, a breakout tank exploded and subsequently ignited in Glenpool, Oklahoma. The fire continued to burn and increased in the early morning of April 8 when electric lines affected by the previous day's explosion and fire fell into a dike. The diesel fuel being contained in the dike ignited, expanding the fire. This resulted in a temporary suspension of firefighting and damaged additional facilities. While there were no injuries or fatalities, the fire burned for over 20 hours; the cost of the accident exceeded two million dollars; residents were evacuated; and schools were closed. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) conducted an investigation of the accident. In its report, the NTSB found that lack of a coordinated emergency response contributed to the severity of the accident. The NTSB noted that the existing pipeline safety regulations on emergency procedures do not explicitly require that operators have procedures for preplanning with electric and other utilities.

A previous accident also points to the need for better coordination of emergency response. On March 1, 1998, a pipeline failure occurred when a raven landed on a power line. This resulted in a fault current that impacted a gas pipeline in Anchorage, Alaska. The situation very quickly developed into an explosion at the public electric company's plant. Although preplanning was required by regulation, the pipeline operator did not coordinate emergency response well with the fire department resulting in delays in shutting off the flow of gas. This resulted in additional fire damage. Inadequate coordination with the electric company also contributed to this delay.

These accidents point to the need for operators to plan with utilities on how to coordinate actions needed in responding to a pipeline emergency. This preplanning will result in better coordination when an emergency occurs.

II. Advisory Bulletin ADB-05-03

To: Owners and Operators of Natural Gas and Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Facilities in the Vicinity of Electric and other Utilities.

Subject: Preplanning with owners of electric and other utilities for

coordinated response to pipeline emergencies.

Purpose: To advise operators of pipeline facilities located near electric and other utilities of the need to preplan emergency response with the owners of those electric and other utilities to ensure better coordination of response, and reduced damages, when a pipeline emergency occurs.

Advisory: Operators of pipeline facilities are required to plan emergency response before an emergency happens. The regulations include required elements of emergency plans and procedures. In planning emergency

response, an operator should carefully look at the environment surrounding the pipeline facility and the risks that the environment will pose in the event of a pipeline emergency. Electric and other utilities may pose sources of ignition or may provide additional fuel for fires. The operations of these utilities may make response to a pipeline emergency by firefighters or the pipeline operator more difficult. Preplanning with these utilities will help the operator identify issues that may arise in responding to pipeline emergencies and plan effective response before there is an emergency.

This will improve the coordination of emergency response and reduce delays.

OPS advises pipeline operators to include within their emergency response planning outreach to owners of electric and other utilities in order to preplan and coordinate response to pipeline emergencies.

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Theodore L. Willke,

Deputy Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.

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