281. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, February 7, 1962.

General Clay called the Secretary at approximately 5 p.m. today on the KY-9 phone. He informed him that the Soviets had announced that the south air corridor would be closed to traffic tomorrow, February 8, from 9 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. between levels 3-7000 ft. The French had filed a commercial aircraft flight plan at 7000 ft for these hours. The Soviet controller at Basc struck 7000 and inserted 8000. The French refiled at 7000. General Clay did not know whether the French would go through with the flight but seemed to feel it inadvisable that they do so with a commercial aircraft. However he proposed to file flight plans for 2 unarmed military aircraft during the period of the announced closure to fly at 5-6000 ft. He requested authorization to do so. The Secretary agreed that these flights should be made, undertook to have appropriate instructions issued through military channels and requested General Clay to keep in touch with the French and British on this matter.

The Secretary then called Secretary of Defense McNamara and explained the matter to him. Secretary McNamara also agreed in principle.

The Secretary then went to the White House accompanied by Messrs. Kohler and Hillenbrand and discussed the question with the President. Mr. McGeorge Bundy was also present. After some discussion of the lack of precedent for the kind of complete closure reported by General Clay, the importance of the air traffic, the desirable number and altitude of flights, the President approved the 2 flights for tomorrow as recommended by General Clay./2/

FDK

Washington, February 7, 1962.

There is attached a paper suggesting a number of points which you may wish to cover during the White House meeting on Berlin scheduled for February 9./2/ It has been prepared in such a way that a copy could be left with the President if you feel this is desirable.

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE ON BERLIN?

1. To Bury or Not to Bury? If the Soviets want to bury the Berlin issue, is it in our interest to encourage this or should we push for some new arrangement which will provide a more definitive resolution of the question? The present state of indecision creates problems for the NATO and US military build-up and keeps the Western mood fluctuating from one extreme to the other on the basis of rumors and speculation as to Soviet intentions. On the other hand, no new and more or less formal arrangement which the Soviets would accept is likely to be as favorable to us as the status quo. Hence, on balance, if the Soviets give us any indication that they would like to bury the Berlin question or talk it to death, we would presumably wish to avoid saying or doing anything which would run counter to such an objective. Another possibility is that the Soviets may feel compelled at some point to go ahead with their separate peace treaty but reserve their prerogatives in the field of Allied access (a la the Bolz-Zorin exchange of letters). This, too, would be a desirable outcome from our point of view.

2. The French Problem. We have now reached the point where we must reluctantly conclude that, within the current framework of discussions with the Soviets, it will probably be impossible to meet the French prerequisite of a détente for their participation in negotiations. If such a détente can be achieved, it will presumably only be after we have gone much farther than the stage of exploratory talks. If the Soviets are willing to bury the Berlin question, formal negotiations may not be necessary or serve merely a camouflage function. At some point soon we will have to come to grips with the question of French non-participation. The legal problem can apparently be surmounted, if the French do not seek actively to prevent implementation of any agreement. On the other hand, we will probably have to make one more effort, at least for the record, to bring the French along.

3. Assuming the Thompson-Gromyko talks bog down completely and that nothing comes out of the Roberts' approach in Moscow,/4/ we seem to have the following ways of keeping discussion of the Berlin question alive either to ascertain once and for all whether the Soviets wish to bury the question or try to find some basis for a modus vivendi:

a. A fresh Summit Meeting. This can be ruled out at present, although a meeting between the President and Khrushchev should be held in reserve for a heightened crisis situation.

b. The Secretary could accept Gromyko's invitation/5/ to go to Moscow, perhaps on his way to the Geneva meetings in mid-March. This might be considered if the situation deteriorates markedly in the next few weeks, but will probably not be desirable.

c. The Secretary could meet bilaterally with Gromyko in Geneva on the fringes of a possible conference of Foreign Ministers to start off the disarmament discussions. This seems desirable and probably inevitable whatever the intervening developments. It might provide an opportunity to advance the dialogue further at a high level and to ascertain Soviet intentions more clearly.

d. Transfer of discussions to Washington. With the arrival of the new Soviet Ambassador, Dobrynin, bilateral discussions here on Berlin might be more fruitful. However, no matter what his relationship to Moscow, Dobrynin will be at the end of a long instruction line and any attempt to raise the subject directly with Khrushchev would still have to revert back to Moscow.

e. Use of the British channel including possibility of an intervention by Prime Minister Macmillan. It is unlikely that Roberts can accomplish anything which Thompson could not. Action by Macmillan cannot be excluded if there should be a marked deterioration in the situation or if the British are concerned about the development of a total impasse.

f. Bilateral talks between the Germans and Soviets. The indications are that most German officials, including Adenauer, are presently opposed to bilateral talks with the Soviets, although a reply will probably be made in due course to the Soviet memorandum handed Kroll on December 27, 1961. Apart from individual voices, such as that of FDP leader Mende, there has been little noticeable pressure exerted on the Government for such bilateral talks. From the US viewpoint, although there are many arguments pro and con, on balance there is probably more to be said in favor of than against a German effort to explore whatever possibilities may be inherent in the Soviet campaign to encourage bilateral discussions. We would certainly not wish to drive the Germans into bilateral talks against their own better judgment, but if they came to us at some point willing to try their luck, we would probably have more to gain than to lose by encouraging them, as full and trusted partners, to play a more active diplomatic role in our common cause. (A paper discussing the pros and cons in greater detail is available.)/6/ The timing and method of initiating talks would, of course, have to be carefully considered as well as their relationship to other discussions which might be going on with the Soviets. In any event, in view of the present German attitude, this does not seem to be something likely to develop in the immediate future.

4. Conclusion. Unless there is some unexpected break in the situation, the most desirable (though admittedly not completely satisfactory) course of action would seem to be:

a. To let the Thompson-Gromyko exchanges in Moscow run their course;

b. To contemplate a meeting between the Secretary and Gromyko in Geneva in mid-March;

c. To await what Dobrynin may have to say upon his arrival here in Washington this month;

d. To encourage the Germans, if the Thompson talks reach a dead end and they seem inclined to take any initiative, to try the possibilities of bilateral conversations with the Soviets.

Bonn, February 8, 1962, 6 p.m.

1838. Paris for Embassy and Stoessel. CINCEUR for Norstad. I agree fully with suggestions contained in Berlin's 1466./2/ As I assess Soviet announcements of military flights in corridors on Feb 8 and 9 and attempted preemption air space up to 7500 feet, they add up to experimentation with new mode of procedure which can later be expanded into instrument for limiting Allied air access. If unchallenged, Soviets will have achieved important capability for degrading effective use of corridors on procedural and operational grounds, without necessity of justifying harassments with "controversial" issues of principle or law. Characteristic of their past changes in procedure, Soviets seem to be trying to introduce this departure cautiously and ambiguously, as illustrated by adherence to notification rules and by choice of air space "reservation," which is below customary altitude commercial flights. I consider this is deliberate tactic aimed at minimizing our reaction.

In rough way utility of new procedure could be compared with such potential access barriers as Babelsberg maze or threats to repair Autobahn. Analogy with surface access, however, goes no further, since our rights in air corridors are unrestricted both by usage and agreement.

I therefore agree with Berlin that we must respond to new procedure vigorously and with purpose of deterring Soviets from continuing it. With this in mind we have formulated following specific recommendations for action Feb 9:

a) USG should file flight plan and fly into Berlin at 15-20,000 foot altitude in one of two affected corridors.

b) We should fly unarmed MATS flights below 7,500 feet in both corridors.

c) We should also fly commercial passenger plane flights, with military crews but without passengers, in north or south corridor, below 7,500 foot altitude.

Flight over 10,000 ft level would precisely equalize Soviet moves, which if acquiesced in will have obvious effect of pinching our traffic into tight coffin of air which today was 3000 ft in height, tomorrow will be 2500 and in future could be further compressed. This should bring home to Soviets our ability to escape their squeeze by unwelcome counteraction and hopefully could lead to abandonment of gambit. Soviets should be held responsible for safety all these flights. With respect to commercial flights with passengers, the primary consideration in determining altitude should be safety of passengers.

Crux of matter continues to be maintenance of normal civil air transportation to Berlin and for this reason I consider it particularly important that we promptly join issue, rather than avoid it, by sending through commercial planes with USAF crews.

There has been no time to discuss this proposal with British, French or Germans here and we recognize that recommendation would involve partial implementation of Cloud Caper concept. Nevertheless, we should proceed along these lines.

Dowling

Moscow, February 9, 1962, 7 p.m.

2175. Eyes only for Secretary. Gromyko opened meeting with 15-page declaration (sent by septel,/2/ original text pouched to Kohler today). I then told Gromyko I had following preliminary remarks to make and expressed general disappointment contents his declaration. Regarding the objectives of our talks, I stated our aim has been to seek agreement and to reduce tensions. "We would prefer a treaty with a reunified Germany. Since that doesn't now seem possible, we have tried to find an arrangement which would take account of existing realities and to reduce tensions." As far as procedure is concerned, I reiterated that we have made clear why we believe access question logically should be dealt with first. Insofar as other questions Gromyko raised are concerned, such as frontiers, I stated there has been no change in our position since he had talked with Secretary and President. I emphasized to him that while we are prepared to discuss such questions in due course, it would be impossible for us to achieve agreement with our Allies on these questions until we know fairly precisely the nature of agreement on Berlin.

I denied categorically Gromyko's contention that we desire retain West Berlin as a military springboard. Reminded him Khrushchev himself had once pointed out Western troops in Berlin have no military significance and in case of conflict he would prefer have as many there as possible since they would all be taken prisoner. I emphasized that our obligations to peoples of West Berlin made it necessary retain our troops there.

Regarding international access authority, I confessed could not understand incompatibility thereof with so-called sovereignty of GDR since Soviet proposal also would apparently provide access guarantees for West Berlin. Added, in our opinion, IAA would prevent tensions over access.

I stated we could not of course agree with Gromyko's claim that East Berlin was part of GDR. Pointed out that if we could reach agreement on Berlin question it would in itself reduce most of the tension there. It is because we are unable to agree, that much of the tension present exists.

I expressed surprise Gromyko again raised question of symbolic Soviet contingents in West Berlin, pointing out that my government has made its position on this question clear on several occasions. I repeated that we are unable to see how Soviets can first dispose of their part of Berlin and then pretend to have rights in the other part. Also questioned why Soviets feel it necessary place deadline on presence foreign troop contingents, even under their proposal, since troops are and would be to guarantee Berlin security. This security would remain important until a final resolution of German question.

I then stated that Gromyko had spoken of a peace treaty, even a separate peace treaty, as means reduce tension. I questioned how any action which would threaten vital rights Western powers can contribute to reducing tension. Reminded Gromyko that we have never said we would oppose mere conclusion of a peace treaty with force but that they claim this action would liquidate our rights. I again asked what then would be position of our forces there.

Gromyko expressed inability understand how, if Western powers also have aim of reducing tension, they can oppose Soviet proposals for peace treaty and free and demilitarized city of West Berlin. He insisted retention of "the remnants of WW Two and the occupation regime" is not means of reducing tension and improving relations between our two states. "Soviet Government categorically refuses agree to maintenance existing situation in Germany--absence peace treaty and maintenance occupation regime, which we are convinced are source of tensions and possible conflict." He continued, Soviet Government cannot agree procrastination present situation.

Gromyko, as in earlier meetings, then expressed regret that so far it has not been possible achieve progress due to US position.

He stated he accepted my explanation that there has been no change in USG position since his talks with Secretary and President, but he said my statement that agreement with Allies impossible until access agreed attests to fact we are trying to impose a plan on these talks to effect that they must revolve around access question. While this is Western position, he continued, Soviet position differs. "We consider it necessary that all questions including peace treaty and West Berlin problem be discussed." He reiterated that Soviet Government, including Khrushchev himself, does not reject discussion access question which he had already discussed with me.

Gromyko then turned to my reference to Khrushchev statement regarding Western troops in Berlin. He agreed Khrushchev had made such statement to President in Vienna, but, he said, that is exactly why we are doubly surprised West attempting maintain occupation regime in West Berlin, and so opposed to their withdrawal or addition Soviet contingents if troops have no military significance. "They do, however, have significance because they turn West Berlin into serious center of danger by their presence." Gromyko claimed my statement that forces present in Berlin in response obligations to defend West Berlin population is simply an argument to support US desire retain our troops in West Berlin. He declared "we have no relationship to these obligations." Western troops came to West Berlin under entirely different obligations--those assumed by the alliance against Hitler Germany. He insisted alleged obligations Western powers to West Berlin population are not legitimate and are without any international legal force. "They also do not reduce tension, but run contrary to the aims assumed by alliance after defeat Hitlerite Germany, that is, the establishment of a peace-loving democratic state of Germany." Leaving aside fact no one intends disturb West Berlin order, Gromyko stated, such obligations do not arise in Potsdam Agreement or any other agreement we have participated in. He added afterthought, "which you have broken."

Gromyko then turned to my question, which he described as "variant," why deadline necessary on troops in West Berlin since purpose is to guarantee security. He stated Soviet Government considers indefinite retention Western forces and Soviet forces in West Berlin quite impossible. Such situation does not meet interests of our two states or of peace and security.

Gromyko criticized my statement USG not so much concerned with Soviet peace treaty with GDR, as with its effect on position of Western powers in West Berlin. "Such a situation unthinkable since conclusion peace treaty is not simply formality, but a major step from which would flow important measures." He concluded by reiterating Soviet Government prefers agreed solution but again said, "Unfortunately, so far position of USG offers no hope for success."

I replied with: Regard question of free city, I had already expressed my views and my government undoubtedly will comment further; regarding question of agreement with our Allies, I pointed out I had not referred just to access, but to nature of the whole settlement of Berlin problem; regarding his remarks on our obligations to population of Berlin having no legal force with Soviets, I pointed out this might be, but he had said Soviets could not consider all-Berlin solution because East Berlin is the capital of GDR. We did not agree with this and "this claim has no legal force with us"; I repeated that US attaches importance maintenance our troops in West Berlin until resolution German question, but denied any intention create a "springboard". Gromyko began to develop his previous arguments that basic social differences which have emerged between West and East Berlin are basis [omission in the source text] but he apparently thought better of it, and we closed the meeting with my reiteration assurance I would transmit his declaration soonest.

Thompson

Paris, February 9, 1962, 1:30 p.m.

The following message is being dispatched by normal means to several addressees, including the USJCS; however, I am sending this by special means so that you will have this as early as possible.

"From General Norstad.

"1. In spite of statements of the Soviet Controller in the Berlin Air Safety Center on the evening of 7 Feb concerning Soviet use of the southern corridor, a.m. 8 Feb, normal civil air schedules were maintained on that date and in that corridor, with 20 flights into Berlin and 19 out. US military transports flew 8 flights in and 9 out. The operations were uneventful, neither civil nor military aircraft meeting with any interference.

"2. Today, 9 Feb, a total of 19 civil flights in and 20 out are scheduled in the northern and central corridors during the critical period 0750Z to 1150Z and, in addition, the US and UK are each flying a total of 3 military flights in and 3 out over these same corridors.

"3. Up to the time this message is dispatched the Soviet action has not stopped nor inconvenienced movement of either civil or military transports. It is possible, however, that the Soviet action over the last two days is only preliminary to more positive measures on their part which would actually interfere with our rights of air access, particularly the movement of civil air transport. If this should happen it is essential that our plans permit us to counteract promptly and effectively.

"4. Should the Soviets declare intentions which would lead to interference or significant inconvenience to normal Allied civil air schedules (for example, if by declarations similar to those made on the 7th and 8th of Feb, they should attempt to restrict the entire air space below 10,000 feet or to limit operations to such a narrow band that it would become impracticable for civil air to carry out their normal functions in a normal manner), I propose to take the following action:

a. To direct military air transports to fly in the corridors concerned at the critical altitudes and the critical times in accordance with the general practice of the 8th and 9th of Feb.

b. To arrange for the execution of that part of the Jack Pine plan which calls for civil air transport with military crews (military-sponsored air service) also to fly in the corridors concerned at the critical altitudes and at the critical times, but initially without passengers.

c. To encourage normal civil air schedules to fly at altitudes between 10,000 ft and 25,000 ft. If this is unacceptable to any civil airline, to arrange for military crews to fly civil aircraft at these altitudes, initially without passengers.

d. To direct a limited number of military transports to fly in the corridors concerned at altitudes above 10,000 feet.

"5. Action taken under par 4 above would be carried out strictly in accordance with established procedures except that flight plans covering the initial flights in each category will be submitted to BASC a minimum of two hours before each flight in order to insure complete awareness on the part of the Soviets of our intentions. To the extent practicable other flight plans will also be filed two hours in advance.

"6. Under the circumstances considered in this message, I would maintain an increased number of fighters on ground alert. In the event that these fighters must be employed as contemplated in Jack Pine plan, they would be under the control of the Jack Pine Command Post and the recently revised Jack Pine air-to-air rules of engagement would apply."/2/

Belgrade, February 9, 1962.

Dear Tommy: Perhaps you have seen the Department's circular airgram CA-909,/2/ summarizing certain views--whether of our Berlin Mission or of its local acquaintances is not clear--concerning Soviet intentions and probable reactions on the Berlin problem. You probably saw, in fact, the original messages from which it was prepared. Let me--since I would not know where better to turn--pour out to you some of the concern and misgiving which this communication inflicts upon me.

The basic assumption underlying the views set forth in this airgram appears to be that the Russians are bluffing over Berlin; that if confronted with a flat no, they can be depended upon to back down; that there is thus no reason to discuss the problem of Berlin with them at all, much less to come forward with any constructive ideas of our own about it; and that no seriously undesirable consequences are to be feared from so passive and negative an attitude. It is of course true that this assumption might appear to be sustained by the experience of the three and a quarter years that have passed since Khrushchev inaugurated the present phase of this problem. The West, generally, has followed a course of action which, whether actually based on this assumption or not, is certainly not in conflict with it. Yet no war has ensued; nothing worse has occurred to Berlin itself than the building of the wall; and the possibility that Khrushchev's personal position might have suffered in a manner detrimental to western interests is one which responsible western circles have found it possible to view, up to this time, either with incredulity or indifference.

But whether even this seemingly happy picture would justify the assumptions about the future reflected in the Berlin view seems to me another matter. The very weakness of the Ulbricht regime must surely continue to prevent the Russians from accepting with complacency an indefinite continuation of the present situation in Berlin. Moscow cannot realistically be expected to acquiesce happily and passively for any length of time in a situation which permits the western powers and the West Germans both to hold West Berlin as a defensive bastion of political freedom and at the same time to use it as a forward device for keeping alive hopes of eventual unification, for encouraging the East German population in this way to continue to refrain from making their peace with the Ulbricht regime, and thus for perpetuating weakness and instability in the GDR. So long as the present state of affairs exists, the Russians must be expected to continue to agitate the Berlin problem, and the German problem generally, in any way they can, with all the dangerous implications this bears for world peace.

These reflections do not support the hope that Moscow, confronted with frustration in the present phase of the exchanges over Berlin, will simply desist and subside into passivity. And there could, it seems to me, be no greater frivolity on our part than to assume that there could never come a point, in the further tilting and maneuvering over this problem that is bound to follow, where Soviet prestige would become involved to a degree that would make it impossible for Moscow to withdraw empty-handed. I would know of nothing in the historical record to substantiate the thesis that Russians can be counted upon to be always bluffing. Nor do I see any reason to suppose that the aversion they undoubtedly feel to another major war could always be depended upon to keep them from getting into positions where even war, with all its horrors, would appear as the lesser of two monstrous evils. Yet this is the supposition which, to my mind, our Berlin Mission seems to be espousing; and the ease with which it seems to find acceptance in Bonn and Washington fills me with foreboding.

In general, I have never been able to go along with the tendency of some people to look to the populace of Berlin as an unfailing source of sound instinctive wisdom about the realities of the cold war. I yield to no one in my admiration for the Berliners, among whom I spent at least five years of my life, and whom I had opportunity to observe, in particular, under all the strains of wartime hardship. Yet I would certainly not regard them as an unfailing oracle of wisdom about the Russians.

Sound as may be their judgment about political realities in their own city, their tendency to draw inferences from this for the relationship of forces in the world as a whole, and for Russian reactions in given international situations, can hold great dangers for themselves and everyone else, if it is allowed to become a source of inspiration for western policy. Allowing that the communists of the eastern sector find themselves in so weak a situation that in the absence of Russian support they could easily be blown away by a show of fearless and aggressive militancy on the western side--this still does not constitute adequate reason for believing that the Soviet Government, if similarly challenged on a world scale, would react the same way. Berlin is not the world; and nothing could be more misleading, in application to world events, than the heroic and romantic approaches which, due to a favorable constellation of external factors, proved so effective in the case of the Berlin blockade, and to which so many Berliners continue to look as the panacea for all political ills.

Well, forgive me this outburst. Whether or not you agree with it, I think you will understand the concern from which it flows.

My clients here seem to be continuing, despite all setbacks and frustrations, to give priority to their effort to make themselves agreeable to Mr. Khrushchev; and there is a feeling in some quarters here that they have recently had somewhat greater success than previously. I shall be more inclined to attach importance to this when a date is named for Mr. Gromyko's return visit to Belgrade. It seems, however, to be a sad truth that if the Soviet leaders were only to cast one inviting smile in this direction, Uncle Sam, with all his bouquets and food baskets, would be promptly forgotten by Tito and some of those who are now his closest advisers, and they would almost swoon in their eagerness to bask in this eastern sunshine. What the result would be for Yugoslavia's economic situation, I shudder to think. I suspect that if our economic help were to be wholly withdrawn there would actually be a secondary reaction here which would shake the regime, and the society in which it lives, to the foundation.

Warmest regards.

Sincerely,
George K.

Washington, February 10, 1962.

SUBJECT
Soviet Intentions With Respect to Berlin

A group of senior policy officers of the Department and intelligence officers from both INR and the CIA met yesterday to discuss Soviet intentions with respect to Berlin.

It might be helpful for you to have a brief summary of that discussion.

1. It was generally agreed that the U.S. military reaction last summer to the Berlin crisis, plus evidence within the Soviet Union of popular anxiety over the possibility of war, led to a decision not to risk a military confrontation with the U.S. by a radical sealing off of access to West Berlin.

2. Within the framework of that decision, it was judged that Moscow had not yet made up its mind whether it would:

--Let the crisis drift off, while maintaining limited harassing tactics designed to increase uncertainty among West Berliners and lead to the attrition of the city's life;

--Sign a peace treaty which would provide a basis for heightened pressure on West Berlin, without actually forcing a showdown;

--Pursue more seriously than the Thompson-Gromyko discussions would thus far indicate, an effort at a negotiated Berlin settlement;

--Use the Berlin crisis as a platform for wider East-West discussions and negotiation.

3. The Soviets in choosing among these alternatives will probably be influenced by the way in which the Gromyko-Thompson talks go. We did not feel that at this stage we had sufficient information to guess which of the four options they would adopt. We recognized that Khrushchev has a strong personal commitment "to do something about Berlin" and that this will place him under strong pressure to sign a separate treaty if he finds that he cannot get anything better. On the other hand, he may be loath to go ahead with a treaty because it will use up major ammunition; i.e., the threat of a separate treaty is worse than the reality will probably be.

4. Whatever course they may choose, it was agreed that the possibility of draining away the life of West Berlin was high in the consciousness of authorities in Moscow, and that the greatest urgency attached to putting into effect measures of the kind suggested in William Jorden's report./2/

5. Aside from this point, three general views were expressed about U.S. policy:

--That we should persist with the status quo and not press for a negotiated settlement;

--That, in view of the cost to West Berlin and the Alliance of uncertainty and harassment, we should take a more forthcoming position than we have thus far taken with respect to a Berlin negotiation;

--That we should seek a negotiation with the USSR on other matters (for example, nuclear arms, a European non-aggression pact, etc.) as cover for a deflation of the Berlin crisis, without a definitive resolution of it.

6. There was, perhaps, some movement within the group in the general direction of the third choice, mainly because it was judged that the minimal degree of recognition for the GDR compatible with Soviet agreement would not command assent in Bonn.

7. The possible relation between other elements in the Communist position and the Berlin situation was explored. With respect to the Sino-Soviet crisis, it was thought likely that this would lead Moscow in the broad direction of relaxation of tension elsewhere. With respect to the Soviet domestic scene, popular pressure for peace and for increased consumption might also press somewhat in this direction. It was finally noted that there appeared to be a recrudescence of Khrushchev's impulse to improve bilateral U.S. and Soviet relations. This was attributed to a mixture of motives, including a desire to constrain the U.S. military budget and to sustain the image of the two giant powers on the world scene. None of these was judged to be a controlling factor in Soviet policy towards Berlin, although they might help determine its direction.

8. My personal reflections on this discussion are:

--It is extremely urgent that we signal to both West Berliners and to Moscow by concrete actions that we do not intend to permit West Berlin to become a shell, despite the unwillingness of Moscow to negotiate a Berlin settlement which would meet our terms;

--It remains crucial to a successful transiting of this crisis that Moscow remain convinced that serious interference with access risks nuclear war;

--The possibility of shifting the focus of U.S.-Soviet negotiations from the Berlin issue to other matters and permitting the Berlin crisis to be deflated in the context of such negotiations deserves urgent exploration.

--The possibility should also be explored of floating the following notion, if the West Germans could be brought to agree: While it is impossible to force GDR recognition on the West in a context of crisis and threats, we are prepared to encourage widened contacts and de facto relations with the East Germans if tranquility is restored and maintained in and around Berlin, and if the East German regime assumes a less repressive, rigid, and aggressive stance.

Moscow, February 12, 1962, 5 p.m.

2186. Eyes only Secretary. Document on Berlin which Gromyko gave me obviously drafted with eye to publication and suggest we should reply with similar document./2/ Dept will have noted greater emphasis given Oder-Neisse line than internal borders. Also using only border question as example of "other questions" may indicate particular significance Soviets attach to this although this may merely be due to fact that desire to settle this problem is one of their best arguments for peace treaty. Presume that we could meet his argument about impossibility holding plebiscite while our troops in occupation by offering to substitute UN troops until after plebiscite since Soviets would certainly not agree. On other hand imagine such offer would disturb West Berliners. If we wish to seek means to keep conversations going we might put forward my suggestion of a confederation of all Berlin. Unless some new element introduced difficult see how conversations can be kept going much longer on present basis although Gromyko certainly gave me impression Soviets not yet ready for break and in any event would want to put onus for break on us. This problem obviously also related to possibility of Foreign Ministers' meeting on disarmament which would give opportunity for higher level discussion Berlin problem.

Thompson

Washington, February 13, 1962.

SUBJECT
Tripartite Meeting, February 13: Soviet Intentions; Soviet-German Bilateral Talks; Geneva Disarmament Talks

PARTICIPANTS

French
Ambassador Herve Alphand
M. Claude Lebel, Minister
M. Jean-Claude Winckler, Counselor
M. Pierre Pelen, Counselor

British
Ambassador Ormsby Gore
Lord Hood
Mr. J. A. Thomson, First Secretary

US
The Secretary of State
Mr. Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary, EUR
Mr. William R. Tyler, Acting Ass't. Secretary, EUR
Mr. Johannes V. Imhof, EUR/WE

The Secretary met with the French and British Ambassadors at his office from 4:00 to 5:45 p.m. on February 13. One of the topics discussed was:

The Secretary suggested an exchange of views on what the Soviets were really up to in Berlin. He noted that Soviet gestures were ambiguous. Some of their actions conveyed the impression that they were prepared to put the Berlin question on ice for the time being while others, for example recent Soviet actions on the air corridors, served to increase tension.

Ambassador Alphand said the French did not believe that the Soviets were satisfied with the status quo in Berlin. Much more was at stake than merely Berlin. The Soviets did not appear to have made any significant concessions during the Moscow talks. Lack of progress in Moscow was accompanied by some friendly gestures toward the US (the Adzhubei visit/2/ and the invitation to Robert Kennedy to visit Moscow/3/) and also by some tough gestures, notably continued pressure on Western use of the air corridors and the negative Soviet position in disarmament negotiations. Ambassador Alphand felt that the Soviets might have in mind one of two possibilities: direct conversations with the Germans or a summit meeting between Khrushchev and President Kennedy.

Ambassador Ormsby Gore distinguished between long term Soviet objectives and what the Soviets might be prepared realistically to settle for. Soviet long term objectives no doubt went beyond Berlin but the Soviets were probably aware that they could not obtain their kind of German settlement at this time. The controversy within the Soviet bloc on peaceful coexistence was probably responsible for the ambiguous Soviet posture and for the tendency to keep the door open for a conciliatory as well as for a tough course. Khrushchev must prove to the Chinese that peaceful coexistence is possible but significant Soviet concessions on Berlin might render Khrushchev's position more difficult. Ambassador Ormsby Gore noted that the Soviets had not seized opportunities in the Moscow talks to extend the conversation beyond Berlin.

The Secretary said the Soviets had probably not extended the Moscow discussions because they realized they would have to meet first the problem of Western interests in Berlin. The need to stabilize Eastern Europe plays undoubtedly an important role in Soviet thinking. The ambiguous courses the Soviets were following resulted partly from their own problems and partly from their uncertainty about Western intentions. With regard to the first set of problems the Secretary referred to the state of Soviet agriculture, the effects of de-Stalinization, the Sino-Soviet dispute and set backs with regard to Soviet policy toward the under-developed countries. The Secretary said that Soviet uncertainties regarding Western intentions culminate in the question whether the West would really fight a nuclear war over Berlin. Also, as indicated by the NATO strategic briefing, the Soviets might be aware that the West now knows their weaknesses in the nuclear weapons field. It was difficult to predict which course the Soviets would follow. Probably they would not sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany but the possibility cannot be ruled out. Perhaps they may decide to ease tensions. On the other hand, Khrushchev's response to Western disarmament suggestions was not serious but rather constituted a propaganda exercise. However, the Soviets must be aware that the West grows stronger under pressure, as it did during the Korean War. The allocation of an additional $8 billion to our defense budget must concern the Soviets who might also feel that if tension mounts it would be difficult to withhold nuclear weapons from the Germans.

Ambassador Alphand referred to the Secretary's remark that the Soviets were uncertain regarding our intentions. He wanted to know what are the indications the Soviets have that would lead them to conclude that there are uncertainties on the Western side. The Secretary said he had been referring only to the conclusion drawn by Soviet intelligence from Western military preparations. These military preparations, by their very nature, were ambiguous. As to Western political objectives, the Soviets could not have any doubts regarding Western intentions.

Soviet-German bilateral talks. Ambassador Alphand asked what the US position would be if the Soviet-German bilateral talks took place. The Secretary said that provided Western interests in Berlin remained protected and Germany remained an integral part of the Western Alliance, Soviet-German bilateral explorations might not be undesirable. He mentioned, as an example, the Oder-Neisse line. Ambassador Alphand agreed but said that France would be suspicious of any direct German-Soviet talks because these talks would necessarily involve Berlin and Germany's role in NATO. The Secretary agreed that there might be a discussion of these problems in direct Soviet-German talks but did not think this was necessarily dangerous unless the Germans were prepared to make concessions. Naturally, if there were any indication that Western interests in Berlin or Germany's role in Western defense might be affected we would be opposed.

The Secretary wondered why the West Germans did not show greater confidence in their dealings with the East Germans. After all, West Germany was a going concern whereas East Germany was in very bad straits. Ambassador Alphand thought that the reasons were legalistic and that the West German Government wanted to avoid any action that could be interpreted as recognition of the East German regime.

The Secretary asked whether there were any indications of direct Soviet-German conversations. Ambassador Alphand said that there were none at this moment and that Chancellor Adenauer had denied any intentions to enter into such conversations.

Geneva Disarmament talks. Ambassador Ormsby Gore took the position that Khrushchev's reply to Western proposals for a disarmament conference in Geneva, while admittedly of a propaganda nature, was nevertheless more positive than it seemed./4/ His reply had not been controversial. For instance, there had been no reference to the Christmas Island tests. Perhaps it was simply Khrushchev's dislike of bureaucrats which was responsible for his suggestion that the Geneva meeting should be on the Chief of State level. The Secretary said that the Soviet reply contained no openings on substantive matters and had not been preceded by any soundings whether a summit conference on disarmament would be acceptable to the West. He therefore considered it a negative gesture. Ambassador Ormsby Gore thought the proposal for a conference on the Chief of State level was perhaps simply Khrushchev's way of seizing the initiative.

February 14, 1962, 2:50 p.m.

SUBJECT
Air Access to Berlin

General Clay opened by reporting to the Secretary the Soviet notice in Basc reserving the south corridor from 0900 to 1315 up to 7500 feet on February 15.

After pointing out to General Clay that contingency plans existed which were the basis on which General Norstad had to act, the Secretary asked General Clay for his specific recommendations. General Clay replied that he thought tomorrow there should be four military transport flights laid on instead of two and that at least two of these should be escorted by fighters./2/

Referring again to the tripartitely approved contingency planning, the Secretary asked General Clay whether he had checked his suggestion with General Norstad. The Secretary received no clear reply to this point but then went on to point out that since this was a tripartite matter he could not as he did the other day give an immediate response to General Clay./3/

General Clay then expressed his serious concern that this series of actions on the part of the Soviets threatened to erode access, making the point that while the civil airlines were still flying above the reserved altitudes, passengers were becoming increasingly apprehensive about taking them. The Secretary told General Clay that we appreciated and shared his worries on this and informed him of the tripartite démarche being made direct to Moscow.

In conclusion the Secretary assured General Clay that we would consider urgently how we could bring an end to these Soviet moves or alternatively how we could demonstrate to them that this was not a useful procedure.

Washington, February 14, 1962.

SUBJECT
Berlin Air Corridors

Confirming and supplementing my oral report to you I have now talked (3:10 p.m.) with both General Wheeler and General Lemnitzer who had talked with Norstad about the situation in the Berlin air corridors with particular reference to General Clay's recommendation (Berlin's 1513)/2/ to introduce fighter escort. In brief they report the following from General Norstad.

(1) Norstad has the same knowledge of the situation in the air corridors at the same time as General Clay.

(2) In today's operations he had deliberately decided not to introduce fighter escorts.

(3) With respect to the south corridor exercise tomorrow, General Norstad will not introduce fighter escort in the first instance.

(4) However for tomorrow Norstad has increased the American fighters on alert from 4 to 12 and he will plan to orbit some or all of them at the entry to the corridors if there is a recurrence of Soviet traffic comparable to today. (I believe General Norstad is fully aware that he needs a French governmental decision but there was no mention of this.)

(5) General Norstad is aware that he has no authority to introduce fighter escorts either from the US or the other two powers unless there is physical harassment. However if there is any harassment he intends to give the harassed planes fighter protection.

Finally General Lemnitzer told me that he had discussed the foregoing with Secretary McNamara who had approved Norstad's actions and plans.

Washington, February 14, 1962.

TO
The Secretary of State

SUBJECT
Response to Soviet Action Regarding Air Corridors

The President has approved the recommendations in your memorandum of February 14th/2/ on Response to Soviet Action Regarding Air Corridors. Since there has been a little confusion in the White House with respect to the precise meaning of your recommendations, I wish to restate what the President understands that he has approved, as follows:

1. That the State Department is authorized to seek Ambassadorial Group agreement to delegate to General Norstad authority

(a) to urge the civil airlines to fly over 10,000 feet if the Soviets seek by declaration to prevent all flights below 10,000 feet, and if, as a result, the civil airlines are unwilling to fly below that limit; and

(b) to fly civil aircraft (initially without passengers) with military pilots over 10,000 feet, if the civil airlines decline to fly either above or below 10,000 feet. (General Norstad already has authority also to fly civil aircraft with military crews below 10,000 feet, if the civil airlines decline to do so.)

2. That U.S. approval of this authority is being communicated to General Norstad, although his exercise of the authority will be dependent upon British and French concurrence, since in these matters he is acting as a Live Oak commander under tripartite instructions.

McGeorge Bundy/3/

Berlin, February 14, 1962, midnight.

1526. Paris for Embassy, USRO, Live Oak, Stoessel and McGuire. Following is tentative Mission analysis of mounting Sov pressures in air corridors. After exercising last Thursday and Friday relative restraint re Allied aircraft "intruding" on "reserved" flight levels, Sovs today have heated up situation considerably, both with menacing statements and fighter activity in corridors. Announcement of similar exercise for tomorrow would indicate Sovs may well intend keep up pressure for prolonged period of time.

One of Sov objectives undoubtedly is to test Allied reactions. They have already learned that airlines will not fly at "reserved" altitudes irrespective of public statements that civilian flights proceeding as usual. They may also have reached corollary conclusion that any refusal by them to guarantee flight safety will not be defied by commercial carriers. They thus able conclude if this not already clear, that they can disrupt normal civilian traffic even below 10,000 foot level through refusal of flight safety guarantee. They have used occasion offered by "trespassing" of Allied military aircraft on preempted flight levels to harass commercial aircraft flying above critical altitudes and on basis of approved flight plans. Intimidation of airlines and air passengers, and creating nervousness in Berlin by pressure on Berlin's only completely free lifeline is obvious important Sov objective in this gambit.

On technical side, Sovs obviously attempting to establish at least three points:

(1) That flight plan is not validly filed and has no status unless initialed by them (cf, their protest re aircraft flying in corridors without flight plan).

(2) That Sovs in position clear or not clear Western flights, grant or withhold guarantee of air safety. Second point is not new. Sovs have also in past stated they could not guarantee safety of given flight, but they have not before gone this far to translate this into action to prevent Western flights. They could expand scope of this operation by "refusing guarantee of flight safety" for whole battery of reasons, such as, for example, that Western aircraft had not complied with GDR air radio law.

This contrasts with Western position that flight info is passed to Sovs for their information, and that it solely up to them maintain separation of their aircraft from ours and ensure against other controllable hazards to our aircraft, since they file no plans for own aircraft.

(3) Third point Sovs attempting to establish in principle is one they have long followed in practice: that corridors are under Sov jurisdiction and they can fly in them at will without reference to quadripartite procedures. Allies continue maintain in principle that quadripartite procedures apply to all four powers.

Basic Sov aim may be to undermine principle of their responsibility for safety of any Western flights, reducing their role in BASC to that of observer who receives information from West but assumes no obligations therefrom. This could turn corridors into lawless no-man's-land for civil aircraft, with Sov and GDR aircraft cutting in and out at will.

We believe that creation by Sovs of potentially explosive situation in corridors so shortly after fourth Gromyko-Thompson meeting is designed to impress West that Sovs intend to carry out their Berlin policy come what may and that threats in Gromyko memorandum are meant seriously. All of this may be part of Sov effort to soften us up for summit.

While we have not had opportunity analyze situation with British and French it obvious that French here take serious view of situation. British, though they appear to have modified relaxed thinking such as that presented only recently by Ledwidge (London's 85 sent Dept 2857 rptd Bonn 168)/2/ nevertheless tend to play down corridor developments.

Secondary but nonetheless important result of this difference of view has been difficulty re coordinating press releases. Ultra-restraint practiced by British and French problem in having to refer even factual "on query" statements to French Embassy Bonn has resulted in fuzzing over of facts and in unconscionable delays in making most simple statements. While we realize sensationalism is not in our interest and may play into Sov hands by creating increasing public nervousness re air corridors, Dept nevertheless may find it desirable to fill more glaring gaps in information given to public so far.

Lightner

Assistant Secretary of State Kohler had informed the other members of the Washington Ambassadorial Group on February 11, 1962, that the United States favored a protest to the Soviet Ambassador in the German Democratic Republic concerning traffic in the air corridors to Berlin. (Telegram 2196 to Bonn, February 10; Department of State, Central Files, 962.72/2-962) Coordination of the protest note was done in Bonn, and it was delivered on February 13. (Telegram 1865 from Bonn, February 12; ibid., 962.72/2-1262)

In view of the continued Soviet exclusionary use of the air corridors, on February 15 the three Western powers addressed an additional protest to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For text of this note and the Soviet reply of February 17, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pages 687-689.

Washington, February 15, 1962, noon.

SUBJECT
Berlin Air Access and Fighter Escorts

PARTICIPANTS

France
Ambassador Alphand
Mr. Lebel, French Embassy
Mr. Winckler, French Embassy

US
Mr. Kohler, EUR
Mr. Holloway, GER

Ambassador Alphand prefaced his remarks by stressing the determination of the French Government to re-affirm Allied rights in the Berlin Air Corridors. He then referred to the differences in the past between the French and the US/UK positions on the introduction of fighter escorts into the air corridors. While the incidents now taking place on the air routes to Berlin are not exactly those envisaged in our past planning (in that blockage is not complete), the French would like to revert to the idea of governmental declarations prior to the introduction of fighter escorts. To that end, he wished to introduce a draft declaration which, he felt, could be coordinated here rapidly in case of an incident which would call for introduction of fighter escorts and would then be issued by the three governments. Fighter escorts would not be introduced until some hours after this declaration was issued.

Mr. Kohler replied that he felt coordination of such a declaration would require a 24-hour delay which would be unacceptable to the US. He referred to the Jack Pine operation of February 9 when the French insistence on prior governmental approval resulted in a 24-hour delay in the availability of French transport planes for a probe. As General Norstad had US/UK authority to use their transports immediately, he was able to order a prompt and effective response. In the type of serious incident which would call for escorts, a delay of 24-hours would weaken a Western response appreciably. Mr. Kohler also referred to the Soviet demands at BASC this morning at 2:45 a.m. Washington time which might have required immediate action that could not have been taken had we been under obligation to prior governmental approval for a response. Mr. Kohler said we would, however, be prepared to review the declaration in the Contingency Coordinating Group but with no commitment on the US part to delay any reaction which General Norstad might now be authorized to take immediately.

The Ambassador asked if we would consider a declaration if incidents arose which were outside the scope of our present contingency planning. Mr. Kohler said we would consider the response to such an incident to be a new governmental decision for which we would be prepared to consider a declaration, particularly if time would permit.

The French Ambassador asked if the declaration proposal should be raised tripartitely or quadripartitely. Mr. Kohler replied that German participation (air fields, radar, etc.) thus far in Jack Pine made the Quadripartite forum more appropriate; the Ambassador agreed.

Mr. Lebel asked if General Norstad had authority to orbit planes at the end of the air corridors. Mr. Kohler said he did, but that he had not used this authority as yet because the situation in his judgment did not warrant it. Mr. Kohler pointed out that the Jack Pine command post had been activated and that we were to all intents in a war situation as far as communications went. It was no longer a question of telegrams reaching desks, but rather of fighter aircraft being deployed by command posts directly. In such a case, the judgment of the man on the spot must be the decisive factor. This was especially true for any definitions of what constituted physical interference with access. Here, General Norstad had to have the decisive decision.

Ambassador Alphand then referred to a message of General Norstad's/2/ which indicated that if the latter lacked authority to commit French fighter escorts at the time of an incident requiring this, he would use US fighters as escorts for French transports as well. This, the French could not accept without a prior French government decision. However, the French position did not take into account the possibility posed by Mr. Kohler that General Norstad would authorize US fighters to perform a rescue mission of a French plane caught in a corridor incident prior to any French suspension of flights or governmental decision to introduce fighters. Mr. Kohler said we would authorize such a mission without question; the Ambassador agreed to present this contingency to Paris.

In response to Ambassador Alphand's question on Soviet motivation in the air, Mr. Kohler said he was inclined to think the Soviets were engaging in a tactical exercise in reply to our insistence throughout four talks with Gromyko that access is the main issue. They may be attempting to demonstrate to us that air access, our only uncontrolled means of access, is really a tenuous matter and that we would be wiser to settle for what the Soviets offer us in the way of guarantees rather than attempt to maintain or improve (through the International Access Authority proposal) the status quo. Beyond that, the Soviets might also be attempting to increase tensions for other purposes, particularly an effort to push us to a summit.

Mr. Kohler concluded that we were satisfied with our response thus far; it has been firm, prompt and appropriate. We were also convinced from this that our delegation of authority to General Norstad had been correct and should not be diminished.

Washington, February 15, 1962.

Dear Mr. Chairman: In order to permit the further development of the conversations between Ambassador Thompson and Foreign Minister Gromyko, I have not answered directly your letter of December 13, 1961,/2/ nor the message which you sent me through my brother./3/ I had hoped that these conversations might lead to some more positive note on Germany and Berlin that could be further developed in this more direct and confidential channel.

It appears, however, that neither that series of conversations nor this channel is bringing our positions any closer together. The talks between Messrs. Thompson and Gromyko are tending to become more and more formal, with each side exchanging diplomatic messages restating their positions. Your communications to me still refer to the policy of "positions of strength" as though the West were in some way threatening the Soviet Union--and inasmuch as I am quite aware of the strength and determination of the Soviet people, and you, I am sure, are equally aware of our qualities, I would hope that we could dispense with this kind of exchange which is reminiscent of an earlier period in our relations.

It would seem today that neither of us knows very much more about the prospects for accommodation than we knew many months ago--i.e., you know that the West will not withdraw its troops from West Berlin or accept the stationing of Soviet troops there, and we know that you will not accept any arrangements for the city of Berlin as whole.

While these changes are thus not on the list of possible agreement, I should state again in this regard that it is not the Western powers who are seeking a change in the status of Berlin. While we do not consider the situation in Germany today to be satisfactory, we recognize that there is very little likelihood of effecting any basic change in the direction of Western aims, inasmuch as we exclude the employment of force to this end, and certainly prefer not to initiate any unilateral action that might provoke increased tension or fear. On the other hand, the Soviet Union also recognizes, I am sure, that it cannot unilaterally bring about a change in the existing situation which would result in damage to the rights, obligations and interests of the Allied powers and the people of West Berlin.

Both of us, therefore, however differently we may view the issues, are confronted with the same basic question: how to deal with the present state of affairs in a manner which will (1) avoid any shift favorable to one side and detrimental to the other, and (2) ensure a greater degree of stability and tranquility in the entire German situation. I believe that if we take these two principles as a starting point, we might be able to see some light at the end of the tunnel.

Nevertheless it is increasingly clear that we hold wholly different views on what kind of solution would be best in the long run; and equally clear, therefore, that we must patiently expect the negotiations, exchanges and conferences required before agreement is reached to extend over a considerable period of time. Look how many months and years, for example, were spent in the talks on nuclear tests which, though as yet unproductive, covered an area where a potential agreement was no more urgently in the common interest of both sides. Fortunately, both you and I--or so I strongly believe--are able to take the long view, and to recognize our joint responsibility for patiently continuing the search for a joint solution--instead of taking some precipitate unilateral action that might endanger the peace that prevails in Germany now. While our negotiations should make whatever progress is possible and avoid undue delays, we should bear in mind, as I said to Mr. Adzhubei,/4/ that world conditions will look very differently to us three or five or seven years from now, as the result of evolutionary changes, or progress in disarmament or other areas.

For this reason I would hope that we would both take special pains to adhere to that principle, included in the disarmament principles on which we agreed at the UN last fall, which enjoined both sides to refrain, as the disarmament talks began, from any actions in the international field which might tend to increase tensions. As Ambassador Thompson has made clear, we view the recent acts of harassment in the Berlin air corridors with very grave concern; and it does not seem likely that serious progress could be made on these or other talks as long as one side is increasing tensions in this fashion.

I had understood, from my conversations with Mr. Adzhubei as well as my earlier talks with Mr. Gromyko, that both sides recognized the desirability of doing nothing which would increase the difficulties of peaceful negotiation. As you have stated in your letter, in politics just as in physics every action causes counteraction, so that every danger or pressure you place upon us is in effect adding to the dangers or pressures which the increased prospects of conflict signify for you. Moreover, the prospects for alleviating the other concerns which you have expressed and which I fully understand--a future excess of German nationalism and the proliferation of nuclear weapons, for example--are certain to be increased rather than diminished by each new increase in tension and pressure. I am certain that these concerns could be satisfactorily met if an understanding could be achieved--but further pressures on the West in Berlin only increase the pressure within France and the Federal Republic of Germany to build a greater military force, to secure an independent nuclear capacity and to adopt a more rigid attitude on any accommodation.

Another way to improve the prospects of an advance in these discussions would be to instruct our two representatives in Moscow to concentrate on concrete matters and avoid further generalized and repetitive statements of position. For example, Mr. Adzhubei, during our very interesting conversation of last January 30 here at the White House,/5/ suggested there might be some variation in the possibilities of an International Commission supervising access with East German participation. If further details on this possibility and other variations are forthcoming, they might be further explored by Ambassador Thompson and Foreign Minister Gromyko. This is the sort of fresh and concrete subject matter to which their time should be devoted.

I have written frankly of these matters in the hope that you will respond in kind. I can assure you that I will continue to hold in the utmost secrecy any message or proposal sent through this channel, for I have always regarded it as a private and confidential means of communication, without all of the pressures which public communications bring to any question of this kind.

I realize that such an exchange, if successful, would represent a considerable departure from normal diplomacy. But, surely we both recognize that new situations require new methods of procedure. And I feel very strongly that we must make every effort and explore every possibility to avoid the development of a major crisis over Berlin, replete with all the dangers of war. To avoid such a development is, I know, your basic desire as well as mine; and I am convinced, as I believe you are, that if we can either find some modus vivendi in regard to Berlin or a more solid long-range agreement, this will open up the possibility of agreements on many other questions, including those mentioned in your communications through my brother--including the question of German frontiers, respect for the sovereignty of the GDR, prohibition of nuclear weapons for both parts of Germany, and the conclusion of a pact of non-aggression between NATO and the Warsaw powers.

I was particularly glad to read in your letter that you share our hopes for peace. It was in that spirit that I was pleased to talk again with your son-in-law, Mr. Adzhubei, and stress to him the importance of avoiding any threats to the peace in this area. I enjoyed meeting with him on this occasion, and I was very pleased to see your lovely daughter. I hope she enjoyed her visit, and that there will be an opportunity for similar visits in the years to come.

Sincerely,/6/

Berlin, February 17, 1962, 11 a.m.

1553. Paris for Embassy and Stoessel. From Clay. Reference: Paris 3894 Dept, 419 Bonn, 239 Berlin; and Paris 3901 Dept, 421 Bonn, 240 Berlin./2/

Now that there is a temporary relaxation of Soviet actions in the air corridors I believe that we should completely re-examine our position with respect to the actions that we will take to protect our rights. The safety of the air corridors has provided the relief valve for West Berlin, and while only a few of its people ever use the air corridor its existence gave to them assurance of a secure way to move from West Berlin to West Germany. In point of fact, it is equally a relief valve for the Americans living in Berlin. Therefore, threats to the air routes can have a most serious effect on morale in Berlin. I agree that the flights in the pre-empted altitude zones during the last several days did prove our determination to keep flying. However, I cannot see this as a victory nor do I believe that it has left us in a good tactical position. While we have proved that we will continue to fly unarmed aircraft without passengers, the Soviet actions have also established their right to use any portions of the corridors at will and without filing flight plans.

It would seem to me that if the pre-emption effort continues the flying of unarmed aircraft without passengers becomes a rather futile exercise and eventually would look ridiculous. It is almost certain that Soviets will resume their actions possibly to pre-empt greater altitude ranges for longer periods of time, thus making civilian transport more difficult.

At present our plans call for the use of armed aircraft only if one of our planes is damaged or forced down. I submit that a continuation of Soviet activities will jeopardize the free use of our airways if carried on over a continued period, whether or not one of our planes is ever forced down. Thus, I would urgently recommend that we re-examine our contingency position with a view to stronger measures if and when the Soviet pattern is repeated or increased. I am very much of the view that a strong position now is far less dangerous than to permit gradual build-up of the pressures to so engage national prides and prestiges as to make retreat impossible. To my mind, these measures should include not only the use of armed escort but also periodic flights of armed aircraft in the corridors.

I cannot agree that meeting any additional Soviet requirement such as the filing of border crossing times to be an issue which we should accept. While this kind of reasoning seems logical in as far as a single event is concerned, it has led over the last twelve years to the constant erosion of our position which makes our government's job so difficult today. The procedures and agreements with respect to the air corridors have been in effect since 1945 and for us to permit any single Soviet change in these procedures would simply be an open invitation to further changes. From the day we arrived in Berlin the right to freely use our air corridors has been the basic and most important right which has been stressed time and time again by our government. Any retreat in the air corridors would, in my opinion, be a mortal blow.

Lightner

Bonn, February 17, 1962, 2 p.m.

1935. Kissinger and I had valuable talk with Chancellor February 16./2/ Conversation lasted over two hours and became progressively more cordial as it proceeded. It was ended by us because we were already half an hour late for luncheon engagement with Mende.

Kissinger began conversation by telling Chancellor that he understood latter was concerned about vulnerability of the United States retaliatory force. He was only part-time consultant to US Government, under no obligation to defend American policies, and Chancellor should therefore understand that everything presented to him in endorsement of these policies reflected Kissinger's personal views.

Kissinger began by saying that American strategic planning was based on premise that even after a Soviet first strike US would have more weapons and delivery vehicles remaining than Soviet Union.

Chancellor interrupted somewhat impatiently and said he had already heard this in Washington and it did not mean a great deal to him then or now. Kissinger then went over some of figures contained in our military budget with respect to our strategic forces. He explained concept of a mixed force. He also explained nature and significance of hardening of bases and role of Polaris forces. He explained why combination of these factors would permit significant percentage of US retaliatory force to survive. He gave some indication of kind of forces which would survive and damage these could inflict on the Soviet Union.

Chancellor grew progressively more interested and cordial as exposition progressed. He explained that he had never understood degree of thought that went into our planning. He stressed repeatedly how enormously reassuring this exposition was.

Kissinger then turned to question of whether United States planning involved making United States and Soviet Union a sanctuary and causing burden of conflict to fall on western Europe and satellites. He explained in percentage terms degree of overlap between SACEUR and SAC targeting. SACEUR had targets in the USSR and SAC had targets within the satellite areas. He suggested that it was extremely important in any future planning to leave no doubt about availability of total force for retaliation. United States recognized that a political requirement might conceivably exist for a NATO force but it did not think that there was a military requirement. United States concern about multiplication of national forces was not designed to keep Europe in a second class status. Rather it reflected conviction that national forces were bound to be ineffective compared to the kind of forces Kissinger has just described. Solution was not a fragmentation of NATO but welding together of Atlantic Community following course Chancellor has so wisely chosen in relations of European nations among each other.

Chancellor agreed enthusiastically. He said in defense of French national effort that United States had not adapted NATO as rapidly to new conditions as had been desirable. In particular, Norstad's proposal for MRBM forces had been before American Government for two years without being acted upon.

Kissinger stressed that objections to Norstad's proposal in Washington concerned not principle but particular technical conclusions Norstad drew from it. United States was in principle prepared to proceed with creation of a multilaterally controlled, multinational NATO force if it seemed to our NATO partners to be desirable. Particular nature of that force was still open for discussion, but he thought that Strauss at discussion yesterday/3/ saw matters in a very similar light to that of many of our people.

Chancellor again indicated that he was very pleased. He then mentioned that impressed as he was he would like to raise a number of points. He said it was in his nature to be mistrustful and Kissinger should therefore forgive him. He said that he still had some concern about what would happen if the President were assassinated or if there were some other interruption in communication. Kissinger stressed that he could not conceive any failure of communication of this kind. We were, however, prepared to consider any proposal that would reduce this concern.

Chancellor then turned to quadripartite planning. He said that he had read the papers of Ambassadorial group and found them both boring and superficial. In particular, he was concerned about the process of clearing proposals through all of NATO. Kissinger asked him to be more specific. Chancellor referred to the idea of economic countermeasures, specifically his proposal for a naval blockade, as well as to military contingency planning. Chancellor stressed that he disagreed with intelligence estimate about Soviet conventional strength in eastern Europe. His own estimate was that rather than 26 divisions, Soviet Union had closer to 80 divisions in this area, including Russian border regions. He therefore thought that conventional action was bound to lead to disaster or to humiliation or to nuclear war. This is why he had proposed a blockade, an important stage along way to ultimate confrontation. He added that American conventional forces were far less well equipped than Soviet conventional forces. This made a conventional action particularly foolhardy.

Kissinger replied that after his conversation with German Defense Minister last May he had looked into the question of equipment of conventional forces and our best military judgment was quite different from what Chancellor had just stated. In any case our conventional forces were being substantially modernized. Kissinger also pointed out that Chancellor had neglected to mention one possible outcome of a conventional conflict in central Europe, and one that was most likely: That if the United States committed substantial forces to a conventional action, risk of general war would become too great for Soviet Union and it would agree to a negotiated settlement. This was particularly true in view of the relation of strategic forces that Kissinger had outlined earlier. Kissinger added that concept of a conventional build-up was designed to prevent Soviet Union from obtaining hostage such as Hamburg or Munich and holding it while nuclear retaliation was taking place.

Chancellor said that this concept put a different complexion on things. He still wondered, however, whether it would not be better to begin with a sea blockade, a field which utilized a source of western strength, rather than with ground action. Kissinger replied he wanted to be quite frank and perhaps somewhat undiplomatic. It was possible to construe this proposal of Chancellor's as an attempt by Federal Republic to shift burden and risk of any countermeasures to other members of the Alliance. It might indicate that Federal Republic was unprepared to fight for Berlin if ground action or a nuclear war might result.

The Chancellor denied this vehemently. He said that the Federal Republic was prepared to accept any burden and run any risk. However, one should not engage in a conventional action without being prepared for a nuclear war. And consequences of nuclear war were incalculable. Therefore every other measure should be tried before resorting to a nuclear war. If a blockade failed, however, the Federal Republic would support both conventional ground action and whatever results might flow from it.

Chancellor then turned somewhat philosophical. He spoke of historic accomplishment of United States in helping its defeated enemies to regain self-respect. As good friend of United States he had to add, however, that he was deeply worried by the decline of prestige of United States. It was noticeable in Europe, in Latin America and in Asia. In many parts of world, America seemed to lack an ideology in the name of which to fight Communism. Kissinger said that Americans were a pragmatic people whose values were more likely to be expressed in deeds than in words. However, he had never seen a greater unanimity among Americans that future of freedom depended on cohesion of west. Speaking as a friend and admirer of the Chancellor, he wanted to say that an historic opportunity now existed to weld Europe and the United States together by concrete measures. Chancellor asked whether Kissinger's observations were held at highest level of State Department as well. Kissinger emphatically confirmed this.

Kissinger also stressed that choice before us was very similar to that faced by the Chancellor himself in 1949. We had chance of affirming a general theoretical goal or else we could take specific steps together with our European friends to create a framework for common action whenever this was possible. It was Kissinger's opinion that wiser course was one charted by Chancellor himself with respect to European integration, namely, to work on specific measures for common action rather than to use up energies in theoretical dispute. This was spirit which animated our proposals within NATO.

Chancellor indicated his enthusiastic support for this approach. On two occasions when Kissinger and I sought to leave he asked us to stay in order to give him another opportunity to express his gratitude for what had been said and his strong concurrence with it. He said he was relieved to see that strength existed to defend freedom and that main task was to see to it that there would be no human failings. Upon leaving, Kissinger said that he wanted the Chancellor to understand that when we spoke of our power and our dedication to Atlantic Community these were not simply idle phrases. Chancellor replied, "Thank God for this!" On this note the meeting broke up.

Dowling

Bonn, February 19, 1962, 5 p.m.

1944. CINCEUR personal for Gen Norstad. Paris for Emb, USRO, Stoessel, McGuire. Reference: Moscow's 2229 and Berlin's 1553./2/ Resumption by Soviets of preemption of air space in corridors and general tenor of their govt's reply to our protest/3/ indicates that we may be moving rapidly toward a climax in problem of air access to Berlin. Soviets are in my estimation now building up a fully documented public case that existing procedures in BASC are no longer able to assure flight safety. Consequently they could argue that BASC should be dismantled and entire procedure for controlling flights to and from Berlin be turned over to the "sovereign German Democratic Republic."

I regard the Soviet actions in preempting space, denying guarantees of flight safety in south corridor and buzzing of Allied planes as most serious problem we have faced up to this time in maintaining access to Berlin. Their actions in past ten days are bringing about a massive erosion of Western position. In my view positive action must be taken now to demonstrate effectively that we will not accept interference in air corridors or the creation of any risk for our flights by unilateral Soviet action. If we do not demonstrate this effectively the Soviets can, as General Clay points out, at any time prescribe a more restricted air space and for longer periods of time. As long as current situation prevails both Soviet and Allied actions tend to become matters of prestige thus making it extremely difficult to change. The current situation also serves to sharpen residual differences between us and British on many issues such as practice of giving information concerning border crossing time which may now be in process of becoming a fixed govt position.

To meet this situation I propose that we should anticipate a good deal of our contingency planning and take further measures to show our determination to maintain free access. Sending of civil planes through preempted space without passengers and with military crews has served its purpose. We should now, in my view, send regularly scheduled civil flights with passengers, either with or without military crews, into Berlin at preempted altitudes. Removal of civilian flights with passengers from space preempted by Soviets to approved altitudes, which we have already done for four flights, is simply an act of self-denial which serves their purpose. Finally we should be prepared to provide fighter cover for our civilian flights to Berlin in order to insure flight safety. We should then tell Soviets again in formal govt reply that Allied Powers must reserve right to take all appropriate measures to assure safety of their aircraft unless the Soviet Union can assure us that they will abide by established procedures in air corridor.

Our determination to take these measures could be demonstrated in two ways. First, we could orbit fighter aircraft at entrance of corridors, leaving Soviets in doubt whether our planes would actually enter it, but demonstrating that we are prepared to do so. If necessary we could either escort our planes in corridors or provide fighter cover, although as I understand problem, effectiveness of such an operation would entail lifting 10,000 foot level and modifying our rules of engagement.

Secondly, we should move immediately to active countermeasures outside of Berlin area. We are unfortunately limited in effective air countermeasures by narrow confines of Berlin and corridors. In counteraction outside Berlin area we could:

a) Begin fighter "investigation" air escort of bloc flights transiting Western Europe, or at any rate FRG, France and UK or over North Sea. This should definitely include Czech, Polish, Bulgarian and Hungarian, as well as Aeroflot flights to Paris and London.

b) If USSR continues harassment of our planes in corridor by fighters, we should thereafter begin precisely correlated fighter tactics on bloc flights.

Critical question is whether such action will escalate affair to our disadvantage. As things stand, however, it is mainly our caution which seems to be feeding Soviet escalation. Essence of our reaction is to stay within bounds of accepted practice, whereas USSR is introducing major departure and may be on way to capitalizing on it. I believe foregoing proposals would lead to reversing process. As soon as possible we must demonstrate to Soviets that their excesses affecting normal travel to Berlin are reciprocally creating likelihood of their own air isolation particularly from Africa and Latin America with incalculable accompanying damage to their prestige.

In view of Brit and French positions, tripartite agreement cannot be reached in Bonn on these recommendations. In any event, I consider that divergent tripartite positions already evident require high level representations to UK and France before situation becomes more difficult through further Soviet actions.

Dowling

Washington, February 19, 1962, 4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT
Berlin

PARTICIPANTS

Germany
Ambassador Grewe
Dr. Schnippenkoetter

United States
The President
Secretary Rusk
Mr. Hillenbrand

Ambassador Grewe said he had just returned from twelve days in Bonn and had had the opportunity to see the Chancellor prior to his departure for Washington. The Chancellor had told him to express his gratitude for the information given him by Dr. Kissinger during their recent talk./2/ The President commented that our reports also indicated that they had a good conversation, but that he was concerned that we did not seem to be able to get our position across clearly. The Chancellor had expressed certain concern about matters which we thought had previously been completely clarified, and there always seemed to be a necessity to provide reassurances. We had been trying to make the points stressed by Kissinger since last June. Referring to the Chancellor's remarks about the decline of US prestige, the President said he could not understand what the basis of this observation was. We were carrying the major burden of the struggle against the Communists by providing economic assistance on a major scale throughout the world, and we were making every effort to strengthen both our nuclear and conventional military capacity. Yet there was this constant need to reassure the Germans.

Ambassador Grewe observed that he sympathized with the President's point but there were special circumstances. The President again asked why it was so hard to obtain understanding of our position. The Secretary observed that Dr. Kissinger had gone to Germany without any special instructions. He had covered matters which we took for granted, and yet the Chancellor had found his remarks reassuring as if they contained new information. Ambassador Grewe said a source of misunderstanding was that the Chancellor was inclined too much to listen to narrow advice from the military, who did not think in terms of the political implications of US strategy within the framework of Berlin contingency plans.

The President stated that the situation which might develop over Berlin deserved serious thought. We wanted to convince the Soviets, in the event of a major confrontation, that the US was prepared to go all out and that this deserved a last thought on their part. No one expected to fight a conventional war in Europe, which we could not do without being overwhelmed. While the naval blockade favored by the Chancellor had a role to play in the context of Allied contingency plans, by itself it would not suffice and would certainly cause the Soviets to react with military force elsewhere. The President again expressed concern that it seemed necessary to reiterate repeatedly clarifications of US policy and of our strategic position which we thought had been fully explained during the November visit of the Chancellor. We were accordingly concerned that our effort to communicate with the Chancellor in the past had not seemed to make the desired impression.

Ambassador Grewe said that the basic agreement reached during the November meetings with the Chancellor in Washington still existed./3/ We had come much closer together in our military concepts than at the time of the August crisis. Mr. Nitze's explanation of the four-stage approach was close to German thinking.

/3/See Documents 216-219.

The President said we were aware that German estimates of Soviet conventional strength and availabilities in Europe were greater than ours. We have stated that, if we face a major defeat in Europe, then nuclear weapons will be used, but we must exhaust the full battery of other possibilities before pressing the button. The Secretary said he hoped one point at least had been cleared up. Although NATO plans at the time of the Adenauer visit contemplated a fallback to the Weser-Rhine Line, we were talking in terms of a conventional force which would permit a forward strategy. Ambassador Grewe again referred to the fact that the Chancellor was old-fashioned in his thinking and was influenced too much by the views of the generals. The President observed that 30 divisions was not too much to expect of Europe and the Western countries could afford to raise them. The US took this question quite seriously. We felt our survival was tied up with that of Western Europe. We should all start with this common premise and not have to restate it and to reassure the Chancellor all the time. We will go as far as any and farther than most in the defense of West Berlin. The Ambassador said he believed that as a result of the Kissinger conversation, the Chancellor was now convinced of the military superiority of the US over the Soviet Union.

The President then referred to the Chancellor's somewhat derogatory remarks about the product of the Ambassadorial Group in Washington, and asked what Grewe's view was regarding the discussions which had been held in this forum. Ambassador Grewe said he did not feel such remarks should be taken too seriously; the Chancellor generally tended to be disparaging about such activities. The President observed that the Soviets certainly had not given us much reason for hope. He believed that, with the present stalemate in discussions with the Soviets, we were moving into a difficult spring and summer during which Khrushchev might feel impelled to move ahead with his signature of a separate peace treaty. If such a treaty brought with it the consequences which the Soviets had threatened, a confrontation between the Soviets and Western Powers would result. The Secretary asked what the German view was as to the next steps to be taken. Ambassador Grewe said his Government felt that the Thompson-Gromyko talks had come close to an impasse, but should be extended as long as possible. His Government did not feel, however, that the substantive scope of talks with the Soviets should be expanded at the present time since they were apparently not prepared to negotiate seriously but merely wanted one-sided Western concessions which they could pocket for the future.

After reiterating his belief that the Soviets might feel impelled to move ahead with their signature of a separate peace treaty in the spring or summer, the President said that the conversations with the Soviets had been useful in demonstrating their intransigence so far on two critical points: their insistence on the presence of Soviet troops in West Berlin if Western troops were to remain, and their insistence on the termination of the Allied presence in Berlin after a temporary period. Before a confrontation on this issue we wanted to be sure that we had covered the entire range of possibilities with the Soviets and had confirmed their intransigence in other areas as well. Then we could move into a crisis with the assurance that we had done all we reasonably could do, and would thus have greater certainty of the support of our public opinions and of other countries. The President said he did not have particular points in mind about "the range of possibilities", but he thought all of us should be thinking about them.

Ambassador Grewe said he was not so sure that the Soviets would move ahead with their signature of a separate peace treaty. They had taken the position that such a peace treaty would have serious consequences, and these consequences would inevitably lead to a crisis. Bonn was not certain that Khrushchev wanted this. The developments since August 13, particularly the US military build-up, had convinced Khrushchev that a dangerous situation was developing. The President observed that the military build-up had done this more than de Gaulle's refusal to negotiate, but he felt we must still look forward to a difficult spring and summer for the reasons he had stated.

In the exchange which followed, the President reiterated his point about the desirability of making sure that we had exhausted all reasonable possibilities with the Soviets before moving into the stage of crisis, while the German Ambassador reaffirmed the German view that talks with the Soviets should continue to be restricted to the narrow front so far observed by Thompson in his talks with Gromyko.

In response to the President's query as to whether there was much pressure in the Federal Republic in the direction of bilateral talks with the Soviets, Ambassador Grewe said that such pressure did not exist on any significant scale. No major segment of German public opinion supported a bilateral initiative.

Referring to a talk which Mr. McCloy recently had with the Chancellor,/4/ the President wondered whether the Bonn view was that West Berlin was essentially a tripartite problem. Grewe said this was true only in a formal sense. The Federal Republic obviously had a great substantive interest in Berlin but felt that the basic principle of over-all Four-Power responsibility had to be maintained. The President said he understood this, but that the maintenance of Western rights in Berlin was not essentially a legal problem. It was the threat of force which deterred the Soviets. Ambassador Grewe said the Germans accepted this, and had indicated that they stood together with the three Western Powers in the common cause and were not seeking an escape clause.

The President again returned to the Chancellor's emphasis on the role of a naval blockade which had been reported by Dr. Kissinger, and repeated his point that while this obviously had a role to play in Allied contingency planning along with economic countermeasures, it was important that Khrushchev not get the wrong idea that this was all the Allies would do. What was important was the impression given the Soviets.

After the President had once again mentioned the need to explore all reasonable possibilities, Ambassador Grewe said he agreed with the need to explore, but his Government had difficulty in extending the field of exploration to so-called "broader questions". It knew perfectly well that this meant "European security", and discussions of this subject would not improve the Western position. Before the Geneva talks start in mid-March, his Government felt the need for a common reassessment of the present situation. It considered it inevitable, if the Soviet Foreign Minister and the Secretary were in Geneva at the same time, that the subject of Berlin would arise. The President observed that this would be true even if Khrushchev went to Geneva and the Secretary were there. He agreed that there should be a complete exchange of views before the Geneva meetings using the mechanism of the Ambassadorial Group.

Bonn, February 19, 1962, 7 p.m.

1951. Because of change in his schedule, Chancellor asked to see me today instead of February 20. Purpose of visit appeared to convey his assurance that FedRep had no desire to become involved in direct talks with Soviets. Chancellor said he had had talks with Mende and other FDP leaders in this sense, pointing out to them his view that Soviets were unlikely to make any concessions to Germans which they were unwilling to make to three Western powers.

In response to my query whether he thought Soviets really desired direct talks, he said he doubted they were greatly interested, and again expressed view Soviets had no concessions to make to Germans. When I speculated that one Soviet gambit might be offer to improve lot of East Germans in response to more forthcoming attitude on part of FedRep, he said this would be spectacular development, but felt it would be difficult for Soviets to come up with.

In response to my query whether he had any thoughts re present course of Thompson-Gromyko talks, Adenauer was somewhat reserved. He remarked that de Gaulle had told him at Baden-Baden/2/ that talks merely proved he (de Gaulle) had been right, and there was some slight implication that Chancellor was now inclined to agree. He went on to say, however, that it was important in further conversations to make Soviets aware West was not afraid, and at same time to convey as great a sense of Western unity as was possible.

Dowling

Moscow, February 20, 1962, 1 p.m.

2236. Eyes only Secretary. At Nepalese reception last night Gromyko initiated discussion of our Berlin talks. Both of us repeated standard arguments but following differences in emphasis may be of interest. Gromyko reproached me for insisting upon prior discussion of access and listed all of the points in which Soviets are interested. He pointed out he had discussed access and that if access agreement was reached and accepted by GDR such agreement would be carried out. It was only necessary to respect GDR sovereignty and Soviets would never conclude an agreement which did not do so. I said we were not attempting to demonstrate disrespect for GDR sovereignty but we were not prepared to reach an agreement which tended to perpetuate division of Germany. I said it was not clear what they meant by respect for GDR sovereignty and asked if this meant that in exercise of its sovereignty GDR would have possibility of changing traffic rules, arbitrarily closing highway under pretext road repairs, etc. As usual Gromyko ducked clear answer but stated GDR would carry out any agreement. When Gromyko emphasized that Soviets did not want a single brick of West Berlin I observed that this did not seem to be true of his friend Ulbricht and said Ulbricht had indicated that either agreement or peace treaty would enable East Germany to exert pressure on West Berlin. Gromyko asked me to be specific and I cited Ulbricht's statements regarding use of Templehof and RIAS. Gromyko said he was familiar with Mr. Ulbricht's statements and did not think any of them justified conclusion I had drawn. Gromyko said that if we were not prepared to respect GDR sovereignty then outlook was very gloomy. He made no reference to timing of continuation our talks nor in any way indicated desire to bring matters to a head. On contrary his concern appeared to be how we could keep talks going in view of current impasse.

Thompson

Bonn, February 20, 1962, 5 p.m.

1962. Paris for Stoessel, info copies for Embassy, USRO and McGuire. Paris' 3901 to Dept./2/ At request British Ambassador (who had left Bonn for brief holiday) we met Feb 19 with British and French, to consider British Embassy recommendation that before Norstad institutes new measures in response to Soviet action re air corridors Allied Missions in Bonn and Berlin if possible be given opportunity to comment. British proposed tripartite recommendation to Live Oak, referring specifically to introduction last week of civilian aircraft, flying at prohibited altitudes and carrying no passengers, and expressed opinion that this Live Oak action of questionable wisdom, in view likely adverse effect on morale of both Berlin population and air travelers.

I informed British Embassy this morning that I could not agree to transmission of tripartite recommendations, on grounds that Norstad's ability to take action in accordance with existing Live Oak plans, particularly at this time when quick responses are so important, should not be undermined by requesting him to submit proposed action to Allied Missions in Germany for comment. I informed British that, while they are of course free to take this up at governmental level, presumably in Ambassadorial Group Washington, I would not be party to such recommendation from here, since I believed it would make effective Allied operations re air corridor even more difficult than they already are.

Our views also conveyed to French Embassy who, at yesterday's meeting, did not appear to have strong views either way re making above recommendation to Norstad.

Against background of what we already know of Ambassador Steel's opposition to introduction of Cloud Caper, together with other divergencies between US and British thinking on current air corridor problems, I cannot help suspecting that this gambit by Steel is aimed at providing additional British veto over Live Oak operations.

Dowling

Washington, February 21, 1962, 9:30 a.m.

Bi-Partisan Congressional Leaders--Off The Record

[Here follows a list of participants, which included the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Vice President, and 20 other Senators and Congressmen.]

The President opened the meeting with an outline of the briefers and the items he wanted them to cover. He indicated that Secretary Rusk would cover Berlin, including the Gromyko/Thompson talks, and the buzzing of our planes in the corridors. Secretary McNamara, who was just back from Hawaii, would discuss Viet-Nam and Laos, assisted by Mr. Harriman and General Lemnitzer.

Mr. Rusk indicated that he would discuss Berlin in three stages. The first stage was mid-summer, which was a period of the Soviets making threats against us, and the other allies. After eight weeks, the Soviets finally faced the fact that this was not going to get them what they wanted in Berlin.

The second stage began when the President made his July 25, 1961 speech, and with the support given by the Congress, we changed the atmosphere. There was no war, and the Soviets lifted their deadline on the signing of a peace treaty with East Germany. Gromyko came here to visit and both the President and Secretary Rusk talked to him. Out of this period came a general feeling of agreement that the Soviets and the Western powers must talk.

The third stage of these developments was highlighted by the discussions between Thompson and Gromyko. Secretary Rusk reported that, as a result of this series of talks, there is still no significant progress. He said that the Soviets are staying with their same position that World War II must be liquidated and West Berlin must become a de-militarized and neutralized city, with access to it to be settled with the East Germans. This is a position which the West cannot accept. All the West is agreed on the fundamental position on Berlin, which is clearly known (Secretary Rusk reiterated our position).

Secretary Rusk reported that these talks have been useful. We firmly established with the Soviets that the U.S. is not going to give up, and that the Soviets cannot share in West Berlin as long as they are going to be the grabbers of East Berlin. We have also made clear that no three-to-five year agreement on Berlin would be an acceptable compromise, because at the end of that time the whole matter would be wide open again and we would have the same problems all over. In the talks, we have also made it clear that there are no gimmicks or gadgets, but that this is a straight-forward searching for substantive agreement. The Soviets have made it clear that they have absorbed East Berlin, and having done so, East Berlin is not negotiable nor to be discussed. They have set about trying to discuss with us the future of West Berlin without the unification of East and West Germany.

Turning next to the problem of the air corridors, Secretary Rusk made it clear that the air access to West Berlin was the most sensitive of the various means of access because so far it is the only "uncensored" method of access.

The Secretary then summarized the actions of the past few days, including the Soviet techniques for preempting the corridors. The Secretary made clear that we do not accept their reserving of an entire corridor up to 7500 feet because that would be the first step toward eventual taking over of one whole corridor, and perhaps the prelude to a more complete interruption of our access. He explained briefly the types of missions we had flown to keep the corridors open.

The President said that they had already set a ceiling of 10,000 feet, and Secretary Rusk agreed, but said that we had never admitted that we were limited to a 10,000 foot ceiling, and that our actions had been designed to make sure that we did not give up any part of the corridors below 10,000 so that we would finally be confined to an altitude of 7500 to 10,000 feet. The U.S. rejected these demands and we put our planes through daily. The Soviets have been flying very close, as close as two meters to our aircraft, trying to get our pilots to land, but our pilots have shown great skill and nerve and have not given in. Their latest gambit is to file flight plans in accordance with the rules. In a sense, it is a legal way of preempting the air space, and we are not now sure of their purpose in this.

In summary on the Berlin problem, we are not convinced that the Soviets themselves are sure of what course of action they are going to follow. There are indications that they are talking it over and thinking it over among themselves. We haven't had any indication from the Soviet Union in the past four weeks of whether they intend now to press forward with their peace treaty or, on the other hand, choose the course of sitting down and having some serious talks. We just don't know. They are convinced now, we believe, that what they want cannot be had. We don't know whether their alternative to this is seeking a modus vivendi with no crisis, or whether they want to push this thing on to a crisis. We expect Thompson to have some more talks, seeking to clarify some of these things, but right now we cannot report that we are moving toward an agreement. None of their movements or actions indicate that they are getting ready for an intensification or a military action of any kind over Berlin. There are instruments of harassment in their hand which they can use against us, but we don't intend to sit idly by and watch them. We expect to react sharply and immediately so that they have no false conception of our position in the matter. After more talks with Gromyko, we may know whether there is any chance of a settlement of this matter. We are going to keep the way open for settlement while making the West position utterly clear. The West is convinced that the best way of preventing a war is to make it absolutely plain that we won't be pushed.

The President then said there would be time for questions later. Meanwhile, Secretary McNamara would go ahead with his part of the briefing.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

Secretary Rusk then added a comment on the Berlin matter. There have been stories emanating from across the Atlantic about allied disunity, and Secretary Rusk pointed out that we have been acting with complete unity on the Berlin issue. We are sitting down daily with the four who are involved in Berlin and more than once a week with our NATO friends, and the only point of difference is that General de Gaulle has a question about what kind of negotiations we should enter into with the Soviets. He added that the negotiating problems with the Russians were not because of the rigidity of the allies. Some have said that the Germans have been so rigid that we have no basis of discussions with the Russians. The problem at this time is the rigidity of the Russians. The allies pose no problem.

Senator Russell/2/ asked that if the planes which have been harassing in the corridors were Russian or planes with East German markings. Secretary Rusk confirmed that they were Russian fighters. Senator Russell then made the comment that the Russians have been insisting that we observe the sovereignty of the East Germans all the time, including the checkpoint, and that this intervention by Russian fighters was highly inconsistent. [3 lines of source text not declassified]

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

Bonn, February 23, 1962, 11 a.m.

1995. Eyes only for the President and the Secretary. Re Deptels 2282 and 2283./2/ When I called on Chancellor late yesterday I found him perturbed by Grewe's report of conversation with the President./3/

Chancellor said, however, that first he wished to clarify press confusion about his remarks to CDU Parliamentary group on Feb 21 re Foreign Ministers Conference. What he had said, he contended, was that if, after one or two more sessions, Thompson-Gromyko talks were still on dead center, four Western Foreign Ministers should perhaps meet to assess situation; he had not said anything about possibility of East-West Foreign Ministers Conference, as press had reported. Indeed, he added, he was of opinion there might well be "pause" in East-West talks if Soviets continued merely to reassert their maximum positions. He asked specifically that I clarify this matter for the President and the Secretary, and explain that his purpose in all this was to make another effort to bring French more into line with US-UK-FedRep thinking. He added that he had not discussed this idea with de Gaulle at Baden-Baden since such blunt approach would have been unproductive, but would write him in this sense if it transpired that Foreign Ministers meeting might be useful.

I then took opportunity to read from reftels our views on discussions with Soviets. Chancellor said he agreed in general with our assessment, and went on to say that while he was grateful for expression of US confidence in FedRep, he had no thought of opening bilateral talks with Soviets at this stage. He reiterated his view that Soviets could not be expected to make concessions to Germans which they were not prepared to make to Western Allies.

Adenauer then read to me extract from Grewe's telegram quoting the President's remarks re apparent necessity to reiterate clarification of US policy and strategic position to him, and referring to press reports of German doubts thereon. There was obvious misunderstanding, he said, exclaiming "The President is being unfair to me". Referring to Kissinger briefing, he said it was not correct that he had been given this information before; most complete briefing on military strategy which he had had heretofore had been in Washington, and that was in general terms, whereas Kissinger had been much more specific, had dealt with concrete facts, and was thus much more informative and reassuring. I reminded him of press reports from Bonn of German doubts, some general, some attributed to Strauss and even to him, and said I thought point was these problems should be taken up with us if they existed, since the President had regard for his views, but Chancellor seemed to find it incredible that we could doubt his fundamental confidence in US policy generally and his particular trust in the President's leadership. He admitted his worries about Western Alliance as whole, and said he was most concerned re Western unity. This brought him back to Grewe's report re the President's comments on naval blockade. I quoted the President's comments from Deptel 2283, to which he replied this might well be so, but his position was simply that naval blockade should precede military moves foreseen in current contingency plans. He went on to say he was aware of problem of agreement on economic embargo and naval blockade in NATO, and spoke bitterly of British and Canadian resistance in these fields.

Chancellor did say he was again optimistic re European integration. He seemed confident agreement could soon be consummated on political unity, and said once European integration was accomplished fact West could face Soviets with far greater confidence. He came close to saying this would be time to take up solution of German question with Moscow.

At this point conversation turned again to stalemate in discussions with Soviets. Chancellor had not seen report on Soviet reaction to German memo,/4/ but he read to me telegram from Kroll which in general did not differ from Washington assessment, but which did attribute to Ambassador Thompson an opinion that talks with Soviets could not succeed unless West adopted more flexible attitude, and implied that Thompson favored less rigid attitude on part of FedRep toward Soviet Zone regime. I replied that if this was meant to suggest that Thompson was advocating concessions beyond those agreed by four Western Allies in concert, then I must question Kroll's accuracy or his veracity. Adenauer said he accepted this, and commented that in fact it had just come to his attention that in his press conference on leaving Bonn Kroll was alleged to have made remarks favoring greater degree of recognition of DDR; he was looking into this, and if it proved to be true, Kroll would be out of Moscow "in no time at all".

Chancellor then dwelt at length on iniquities of Ulbricht and his regime, describing how much worse conditions were in East Germany than in Poland and other satellites, and explaining how impossible this situation made it for FedRep to try to deal with East German Communist authorities. He went on to say that were Soviets to get rid of Ulbricht and ease conditions for East Germans, this would of course create entirely new situation, and indicated that in this case he would welcome bilateral talks with Moscow.

Conversation, which lasted about hour and half, was frank and cordial exchange, and ended with brief review of Iranian Prime Minister's visit, with which Adenauer is pleased, and other local events.

In spite of Chancellor's protestations, I believe the President's remarks to Grewe have served to make him appreciate just how far he seems to have gone in private conversations in voicing doubts re US policies. I would guess that he will behave most correctly for a while, although I do not mean to imply that he is corrigible or that his worries can be laid to rest unless some solution can be found for Berlin and German question, or at least until FedRep is firmly anchored in Western Community.

I was struck anew in this conversation by fact that Chancellor is aging more rapidly, with emergent quality of frailty. I was not surprised therefore when Osterheld, Chancellor's aide who was present during conversation, commented on my way out that his doctor was most anxious to get him away for a holiday, and meanwhile was trying to protect him, even refusing consent for him to meet Iranian Prime Minister at airport yesterday despite sunny, mild weather. He went on to say Adenauer is finding it difficult to run coalition government, and wondered aloud how much longer he could hold out, saying test would be whether Chancellor could regain his strength during rest at Cadenabbia beginning March 18.

Dowling

As part of an around-the-world tour Attorney General Kennedy visited Berlin February 22-24, 1962, Bonn February 24-25, and Paris February 27. In Berlin Kennedy made several addresses and met with Mayor Brandt and other city officials. The texts of his addresses were transmitted as enclosures to despatches 389 and 396 from Berlin, February 27 and March 1. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.1100-KE/2-2762 and 033.1100-KE/3-162)

In a letter to President Kennedy on February 23, Brandt thanked him for sending his brother to Berlin, and wrote that the Attorney General had stated once more that "the American position in West Berlin will be fully maintained, the close relationship between Berlin and Western Germany will be maintained, no interference of the traffic from and to Berlin will be tolerated, agreements about Berlin will not take place without the knowledge and consent of the population concerned, and that the United States will not forget the people in East Berlin and in the Soviet-occupied Zone." (Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Germany)

For three other accounts of the visit to Berlin, see Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, pages 401-402; Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy and His Times, pages 599-600; and Begegnungen und Einsichten, pages 93-94. Extensive documentation on the Attorney General's tour is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2044-2048, and Central Files 033.1100-KE.

Berlin, February 28, 1962, 6 p.m.

1625. Bonn for Ambassador. From Clay for Rusk. Ref Deptel 1099 Berlin, 2340 Bonn./2/ I had not intended to make any further comment on the air corridors as I have already placed my views on record. However, we did not refuse to give further information to Soviet controller until the Secretary of State personally approved a policy not to give information which had not been required in the past. To yield now after refusing to do so is just another step in the long series of concessions which have placed us in our present position. For years, we have done this in the interest of Allied unity, never obtainable except at the lowest common denominator. Perhaps I am influenced because these are the air corridors which have carried as many as 1200 flights in a day for us. These are the air corridors where for years we flew armed aircraft at will, something we have not done in so long that we even think ourselves that to do so now is provocative; a corridor in which again because of Allied unity we have accepted in fact if not in principle a 10,000 foot ceiling. Of course this is a minor concession. However, is there anyone who really believes that the Soviets will not move further in attempting to control the corridors and that even a minor concession now will not lead to further demands? They will claim to have established their right to know when we enter GDR territory if we give our flight time over the last beacon prior to entering this territory, and we may be sure it will be so publicized. Moreover it is a concession which we would make without anything in return. Allied unity is desirable, but not always at the lowest common denominator.

Lightner

Bonn, February 28, 1962, 5 p.m.

2075. Paris for Emb, USRO, Stoessel and McGuire. Deptel 2356 to Bonn, Moscow's 2290 and Embtel 1889 to Dept./2/ Sov actions affecting access can assume many permutations, most predictable element of which is that they rarely take form we anticipate. Unless access authority is established, Allied traffic can eventually only be checked either by GDR or USSR. As Emb understands it, Allies could presumably postulate response to two "possibilities" raised by French on extant agreed guidelines and contingency plans. Generally speaking, first action would hardly be exceptionable as final outcome so long as Allies are concerned not about pretensions but about consequences of USSR-GDR separate "peace treaty." Second action would be unacceptable under current contingency plans which provide that we would accept East Germans at checkpoints if they introduced no procedural changes. Certainly in latter and presumably in first case we would continue to hold Sovs responsible.

German touchiness about "reverse agent" role for Sovs, as explained in Emb's reftel, does not seem to derive from logical examination of alternatives, since principal alternative would be for GDR to check Allied traffic, but rather appears to reflect concern that comfortable accommodation on Allied access would leave German civil traffic out in cold. Today's Frankfurter Allgemeine carries Am Ende story from Berlin about Allied proposal for access authority which typifies German anxieties. Story cites "political circles" and Senat reps as objecting to idea of such authority since Sovs could "sabotage it."

There is no evidence known [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] here that German intelligence has received any reports that USSR is on verge of declaring itself GDR agent re Allied access. Indeed it is characteristic of this topic that German FonOff floated it in press, and French are now raising rumor quadripartitely without pretext it derives from intelligence data. In fact, French here attribute rumor to German newspaper report, and FonOff rep in quadripartite committee meeting today expressed surprise that matter was raised at all in Wash and professed ignorance of source of rumor. Emb nevertheless suspects possible French/German coordination on this, although their working level reps may be unaware of it. Aim of exercise may be to ascertain either (1) what US/UK would do in such contingency, or (2) whether US/UK have received any private assurances (beyond Gromyko proposal) from USSR that Sovs would act as agents. In latter connection Wolf of FonOff Sov Referat on Feb 24 told Emb off FonOff was interested to have learned from courtesy copies of correspondence that Khrushchev in Dec letter to Macmillan/3/ anticipated Gromyko's offer to let Sov personnel control Allied access and that Macmillan had replied that fact of access was of more importance than formalities. Wolf commented privately this seemed to indicate Brit would go pretty far.

Fact that French subject is basically only hypothetical construct does not mean that USSR could not at any moment make move on Autobahn controls. Shifting field is essence of Sov tactics, and they have now let surface access alone for some months.

Emb is inclined to speculate, however, that as long as Thompson-Gromyko talks are continuing and still open-ended, it seems likely USSR will refrain from introducing radical procedural changes on access based on political reinterpretations or new principles without some sort of warning. In view of present Sov actions in corridors, it seems more likely that any immediate Sov harassments on Autobahn would be of practical and technical nature, such as closing lanes for repairs, slowdown of clearance procedures, etc., with avoidance of clear political issues in favor of technical ones.

Dowling

Washington, March 1, 1962, 6:01 p.m.

1998. Paris pass Finletter--eyes only. Eyes only for Ambassadors and Lightner.

1. Although your exchanges with Gromyko seem to have reached stage of formalistic ritual we believe that you should request further meeting with him both to put our further comments on record and to link discussions with possible talks at Geneva.

2. You already have text of memorandum, as amended to take account of British and German comments, to be handed Gromyko./2/

3. If prior to your next session arrangements have been completed for convening of Foreign Ministers in Geneva in connection 18 power disarmament talks and you make no progress with Gromyko, you should towards end of conversation indicate that you will shortly be going to Geneva to assist Secretary in forthcoming discussions. Secretary is looking forward to opportunity which presence in Geneva will provide to meet privately with Gromyko in effort to see whether some way towards mutually acceptable accommodation on Berlin cannot be found. Although present series of talks in Moscow has given little cause for optimism, perhaps break during which both sides can reflect on arguments presented may be a good thing. In meantime it will be, of course, incumbent on both sides to avoid any unilateral acts which would only further exacerbate situation.

4. If Geneva situation is still unclear when you see Gromyko, you should instead say that US Government is hopeful that Soviet Foreign Minister will be in Geneva for opening of disarmament talks and that, under such circumstances, Secretary would look forward to opportunity to discuss with him other subjects of mutual concern such as Berlin. You might then pick up line in balance of preceding paragraph. In event that Gromyko says he is not going to Geneva and will not therefore be seeing Secretary, you should say that your government will no doubt wish to give consideration to other ways of resuming contact and that you suppose Soviets will be doing same.

5. In view of recent air corridor harassments, you should begin by observing that Soviet attempts to alter established procedures in Berlin air corridors threatened to create a highly dangerous situation. You might refer in this connection to protests submitted by three powers to Soviet Foreign Ministry on February 15,/3/ making particular reference to passage stating that attempt to force changes in established procedures is incompatible with Soviet Foreign Minister's apparent agreement in talks with President Kennedy and Secretary Rusk that both sides should refrain from "actions which might aggravate international tensions" and with explicit commitment to this effect in joint statement of September 20, 1961 on principles for disarmament negotiations./4/ To degree necessary you may draw on factual contents of note plus subsequent reporting telegrams from Berlin and Live Oak, but it would not be purpose of present meeting to engage in prolonged debate on situation in air corridors. Discussion this subject might be terminated by comment that highly volatile situation in air corridors underlines essential correctness of Western emphasis on access problem as requiring primary attention. This is area of activity where both sides might most quickly find themselves in escalating situation involving grave risks.

6. Apart from foregoing and necessary refutation in memorandum of certain points made by Gromyko during your last session, meeting should be directed primarily towards emphasizing desirability that progress be made in direction suggested by President to Adzhubei, i.e., that since final solution of Berlin problem seemed impossible, both sides should seek to find accommodation which would prevent tensions from mounting.

7. With reference to Gromyko's claim that US Government apparently does not have any intention of discussing seriously matters under question, you should observe that we are indeed very serious about these matters. "Discussing seriously" in Soviet definition apparently means accepting their formulation of the problem and their proposal for a solution. For various reasons, including those stated in memorandum handed Soviet Foreign Minister during your third meeting,/5/ US proceeds from assumption that discussions between Great Powers must start with admission by both sides that neither one can expect other simply to accept either its formulation of problem or proposed solution. Serious discussion means finding some ground which is consistent with professed intentions and basic interests of both sides, and, if that is not possible, at least finding some modus vivendi which will avert grave risks of war inherent in dispute.

8. Exchanges so far between Soviet Foreign Minister and American Ambassador have created impression that no basis for systematic negotiation yet exists. We find it difficult to believe that Soviet Government is so unaware of US position, or so unwilling to take it into account, that it can expect us to accept claims and proposals which American leaders have repeatedly stated are clearly unacceptable. Point has now apparently been reached where Soviets seem unwilling to follow up earlier indications that some procedural formula might be found within which possibility of an arrangement on Berlin could be further explored, and that this formula envisaged that basic arrangement must be between Soviet Union and Western Powers and not between latter and "GDR". Does this mean that Soviets have given up idea of finding an accommodation on Berlin? We trust this is not the case, and therefore once again suggest that most practicable way to begin would be to try to find some solution to access question. Soviet Foreign Minister has criticized US concentration on access. We have stressed this problem precisely because it seems to us that possibility of conflict between USSR and US is likely to arise over misunderstanding regarding access. Soviets have said they do not like idea of International Access Authority which we believe most useful approach to problem and practicable way of avoiding confrontation over it. We would, of course, be glad to discuss any variations in Access Authority proposal which Soviets have in mind. Incidents of kind we have had recently in air corridors would be avoided under International Access Authority proposal. We would appreciate having specific ideas from Soviets as to how they think confrontation over access might be avoided which go beyond generalities about "respect for GDR sovereignty".

9. You might take up Gromyko's words as quoted in your 2100/6/ regarding Soviet intention never to sign any document which would back occupation rights or favor retention of occupation regime in West Berlin, noting that this is not what we are proposing Soviets should do. As pointed out in our earlier memorandum, our rights in Berlin do not derive from Soviets and we are not asking that they sign their name to a document containing a term which seems to have acquired unpleasant associations for them. What we are asking is that they accept fact of Western presence in Berlin and draw appropriate conclusions from that fact without engaging in debate over differing legal views. They, on their side, are asking us to proceed on basis of what they call "facts" of the situation where these facts are to their liking.

10. In this connection, you might observe, we have come to reluctant conclusion that Soviets have not addressed themselves directly to a number of important points made by American Ambassador or in US memorandum handed him at meeting before last. We hope that Soviet Foreign Minister will carefully reexamine this document.

11. You might conclude opening remarks by handing Gromyko memorandum which, you may point out, is intended to deal with a number of points made by Soviets in documents they have given us.

12. In unlikely event that Gromyko unveils any new element of flexibility in Soviet position, you should endeavor to draw him out to extent possible, and at appropriate point, indicate that you will report his statement back to your Government where it will be promptly considered.

13. During course of discussion you may, as appropriate, draw on memorandum or previous instructions in commenting on Gromyko's arguments which, we assume, will follow their stereotyped course. End verbatim text.

Rusk

Washington, March 1, 1962, 6:48 p.m.

2001. Eyes only for Ambassador from Secretary.

1. You will be receiving agreed tripartite instructions in separate cable,/2/ and should now request early meeting with Gromyko. This message contains my supplementary instructions.

2. I continue to be in some doubt about present Soviet intentions and tactics, and have found disturbing their willingness to agitate air access situation--area which they must know to be delicate and highly volatile. At same time they have so far shown disinclination to go beyond limited point of threat and harassment thus reducing risk of escalation. I must assume that Soviets are at least partially motivated by desire to pressure us in present discussions by underlining fragility of existing access arrangements and their capacity to harass us at will. Presumably action has also been related to campaign for mid-March summit meeting in Geneva. It is clear that we must not permit Soviets to obtain impression they can soften our negotiating position by threats and actions against Berlin access. At same time we have had certain objectives in your discussions with Gromyko at least some of which, to extent they remain pertinent, we still hope to pursue.

3. In light of current situation our objectives now seem to be:

a. to warn Soviet authorities of serious implications of harassments in air corridors;

b. to avoid break-off of discussions before Secretary has opportunity to see Gromyko at Geneva (on assumption Soviets will eventually accept idea of meeting at Foreign Ministers' level);

c. to continue to probe for any flexibility in Soviet position, notably in regard to variations in Access Authority proposal and willingness to treat issue of legal status sub silentio;

d. to try to turn their thinking to kind of arrangement President suggested to Adzhubei, which would meet immediate problems we face in Berlin without purporting to settle issue for all time and which would open way for progress on other issues.

4. It seems evident that French intransigence will continue, and we have now reached point where we must realistically conclude that, within current framework of discussions with Soviets, it will be impossible to meet French prerequisite for their participation in negotiations. This dilemma is one to which we are now giving consideration; it obviously presents serious difficulties if we think of any subsequent negotiations with Soviets in terms of conventional Four-Power meetings of the past.

5. Another pertinent factor at this point is need to maintain maximum public support for our position. We consider it likely that Soviets will eventually publish various documents they have handed you in course of talks, and we are prepared to do same with documents you have given Gromyko. In considering problem of creating public understanding our position, we have concluded that all Berlin solution does not have appeal of International Access Authority proposal in terms of inherent plausibility and appeal to world opinion. We are accordingly planning to launch campaign of public statements and publicity through available media about virtue and necessity of International Access Authority. This publicity campaign would take into consideration desirability of not destroying any vague possibility that Soviets would be willing to consider some modification of Access Authority. It would also be directed to possibility that, if Soviets will have nothing to do with Access Authority, they might decide, in face of growing Western demand for improvement in status quo, their interests would be best served by reciprocal abandonment of Free City and Access Authority proposals.

6. You will have noted general reference in para 5 of basic instructions to point made by President to Adzhubei. We have not fully informed other countries of details President's discussion as contained in Deptel 1780 (memcon dated January 31, 1962, pouched Moscow)./3/ If, in your judgment, however, occasion seems propitious to probe on question posed by Adzhubei on access, you may note that on personal basis Adzhubei did seem to imply there might be some Soviet interest in having question of access supervised by International Commission. You would be willing to explore this matter further if Soviets wish to develop their thinking on subject.

7. With respect to point contained memorandum handed Gromyko on February 1/4/ and in para 8 of new basic instructions, if you deem it useful, you may amplify our meaning by observing that what we are asking Soviets is that they pursue course they have projected, namely access issue. We do not want to get into legalistic discussion with them as to differing views of both sides on status. We want merely to deal pragmatically with factual problems arising out of announced Soviet intentions.

8. For reasons given para 15 Deptel 1616/5/ we are somewhat reluctant at this time to have you raise question of all-Berlin confederation as suggested your 2186./6/

9. In view of approach your next meeting outlined in basic instructions, and above, do not believe you should use contingency instructions contained Deptel 1768./7/

10. The President is concerned that these clear restatements of our position should not be read as an indication that the US is uninterested in a reasonable Berlin settlement. Unless you perceive overwhelming objections, you should add that our insistence upon the discussion of access has been based upon our conviction that this is the issue without which no other can be usefully worked out. The Soviet Government's position so far has raised in our mind a serious question whether that Government is itself seeking any agreement, but if the Soviet Government is in fact interested, we would be glad now to pursue informal bilateral conversations on wider subjects, subject always to the need for a strong and clear settlement on access and preservation of basic rights in West Berlin. While we cannot say that the position taken by the Soviet Government in Thompson-Gromyko talks has been encouraging, either on narrow or on wide questions, we ourselves are still determined to leave no method of discussion untried in seeking a sensible accommodation of the rights and interests of both sides. In making the point of this paragraph, you should emphasize its importance and the high authority from which it directly proceeds.

Rusk

Washington, March 3, 1962, 7:16 p.m.

1128. Paris pass USRO, Stoessel, McGuire. Question has been raised here regarding US policy, if, as a result of disturbances in West Berlin, West Berliners should become involved in incidents at wall or just inside East Berlin. Particular concern has been expressed lest Allied soldiers find themselves battling West Berliners in order to prevent crowd from assaulting wall (for example, in connection with May 1 rally normally held near Brandenburg Gate).

Department has pointed out that US and its allies in Berlin, in coordination with West Berlin authorities, have taken steps to guard against crowds getting out of hand and precipitating incidents along sector/zonal or sector/sector border. Department has noted in particular: (1) West Berlin policy instructions dated October 12, 1961, which provide for prevention incidents and control of crowds, (2) instructions to US forces for their role in supporting West Berlin police, contained in annex to Berlin Command Internal Security Directive, and (3) instructions issued on December 6, 1961 to US military forces in Berlin concerning actions along sector/sector and sector/zonal border (similar instructions were subsequently issued by British and French)./2/

In unlikely event that allied forces and West Berlin police were not able to control a crowd and this led to incidents along border or just inside East Berlin, we believe USCINCEUR's implementing instructions issued as a result of BQD-EG-2,/3/ as well as December 6, 1961 instructions, should apply. Together, these provide: (1) Allied forces should not go into East Berlin, (2) They should, however, return fire in certain specified circumstances, (3) They should prevent incursions by Soviet or GDR personnel into West Berlin, and (4) They should not furnish arms or ammunition to individuals or groups in East Berlin, although an exception might be made for food and medical supplies.

If situation became sufficiently grave, three Commandants would presumably agree to appointment single allied commander. He would be responsible for dealing with situation within scope of his guidance. If he required further guidance, he would request it from General Norstad.

Request your comments, including indication whether you believe guidance you now have is adequate. If you desire further authority in order to deal with any incidents at wall or just inside East Berlin, please make specific recommendations./4/

Rusk

Washington, March 4, 1962.

Dear Lucius: This is the letter I spoke about on the phone today./2/ Incidentally, I shudder to think we might have to rely on such technically fragile communications as that "green" phone if something really important comes up.

I have not taken up your letter of January 30,/3/ the receipt of which I acknowledged to you by phone, for several reasons.

First, we have been involved in a touchy air corridor situation, in which you played a most important and helpful role.

Second, I was aware that a nuclear test decision was in the offing (the nature of which was known only to about five people) and the possibility of a sudden increase in tension made it especially important for you to be where you are. Mr. K. has just today replied--and you will have the text by the time you get this letter./4/

Third, was the Attorney General's visit.

Fourth, the Central Committee is meeting in Moscow on March 5 and it is entirely possible that some far-reaching decisions may be taken. Against the background of Ulbricht's visit to Moscow,/5/ this could be a period of increased pressures on Berlin. Mr. K's reply about the Geneva meeting and the possibility of a somewhat later "summit" seems to indicate (for what it's worth) that no red-hot crisis is in the making for the immediate future. But we can't be sure.

Meanwhile I have asked my colleagues to work out with the Pentagon better answers about the command situation in Berlin. One of our difficulties has been that our policy directives are translated, through the several echelons, into increasingly detailed directives and we have had some difficulty in knowing what comes out at the other end. I do think we must find some way to establish policy guidance which will at least be helpful to a commander who faces a situation not covered by instructions and without an opportunity to check with the higher chain of command. The contingency you mentioned to me (of a massacre of fleeing people) is a case in point. We consider that this contingency is covered by the political guidance if properly implemented by the military instructions.

Two comments about our Allies. The one is that we must go to considerable length to assure their solidarity, else the western position could crumble in a crisis under the most calamitous circumstances. At the present time, given some special problems of personalities in various capitals, this is not easy. In general, however, I am encouraged by the degree of unity we have achieved about Berlin.

The matter of a single allied commander in Berlin is a bit complicated. My own impression is that we could probably get one appointed in advance only if we tied his hands to London and Paris. In fact, under crisis conditions, the U.S. Commandant would have to be the "take charge" man. I have resisted the pleadings of London and Paris that, even under present arrangements, the Commandants must act in unison--which would give each a veto on all three. We'll continue to give this thought and see whether anything can be done to clarify.

With specific reference to our telegram 1128,/6/ this had been prepared as a summary of the present status of our contingency planning on Berlin on which we hoped you would comment. Specific recommendations from you would be most helpful in guiding further efforts in this field.

Your presence there is symbolic but goes far beyond that role. Your ability to monitor the "feel" of the situation in Berlin and advise us on what our policy or directives look like at the other end of the line is of enormous help in a tight situation like that one. The President and I both are aware of the anomalies in your position outside of somewhat complex military and civilian channels worked out among three allies over a period of years.

Let me urge you to "sweat it out" for a time longer, giving us your views as to how we ought to improve the arrangements and as to specific problems which the other side might throw at us. I can assure you that your views count for a great deal back here and the President is grateful for them.

We may have some clearer indications during the course of this month as to what is ahead. But I do hope you can continue to help us during what will certainly be a tense period.

Cordially,
Dean Rusk/7/

Bonn, March 5, 1962, 4 p.m.

2118. SHAPE for Norstad and US Element Live Oak. Deptel 2358./2/ In preliminary quadripartite discussions, Embassy has assessed corridor situation along following lines:

Apparent aim of Sov tactics since Feb 8 has been to introduce new procedures and flight practices designed to hamper and ultimately to deny Western use of the corridors. No single technique has been exhausted and abandoned, but rather several are being tried. USSR apparently plans to achieve interruption of air services to Berlin essentially by process of intruding Soviet flights into corridors. Governing characteristic of past practice for 16 years has been for Western powers to utilize corridors almost exclusively through system of BASC notifications based upon supposition and fact that Communists adjust their flights to Western convenience. Present moves seem to aim at providing completely new frame of reference which will a) replace prevailing Soviet accommodation by Allied adjustments to Soviet flights; b) complicate flight schedules in corridors and landing patterns in Berlin control zone; and c) change present character and role of BASC by altering conditions for which its present capability and functions are adequate.

If acquiesced in, Soviet practices obviously can be intensified to point of seriously affecting flights and landings and takeoffs in Berlin.

Major political aim of exercise is to degrade Western capability of air access, with effect of inducing popular nervousness as to safety of air link and of frightening civil airlines. Additional but perhaps even more visible goal is to establish flight regimen over East Germany which will establish or fortify GDR "sovereignty". By establishing new unilateral criteria for flights, and withholding agreement to Western flights which do not conform to criteria, USSR is also creating prerequisite situation which could later be used as pretext for quitting BASC, or reducing Soviet function there to that of observers. This trend of action, therefore, points to ultimate intention to transfer control of Allied flights to the "GDR". Other isolated demands converge toward same end, such as potential request for communication with GDR radio, and Stromov's three requirements, including variation that USG should furnish Mansbach beacon time. It is this appreciation which has led Embassy to emphasize importance of withholding passage time over Mansbach (Embtel 2009)./3/

Soviet tactics so far have been gradualist, as evidenced by primarily technical instead of political approach, staying below 7,500 feet so as to avoid interference with routine traffic, efforts to conform to BASC proprieties by filing flight plans, stopping fighter harassments just short of what might have provoked equal response, and offering compromises on procedural demands. Low-key procedure reflects realization of dangers in introducing major change and probably is designed to reduce Allied reaction. Although moves give impression of experimentation, they are more than probe, since flights are continuing, and Soviets have introduced changes in BASC procedure which could remain as residuals even should flights stop. Considered as probe, however, they have revealed certain limits of Western reaction.

Serious recent development is scheduling of Soviet flights through Berlin control zone. Although it would be difficult for USSR physically to "saturate" corridors to unusability for Western military flights, this could be achieved with lesser effort for civil flights. Control zone could also be blocked even easier, particularly if USSR gives imprecise flight data and declines to adjust to local traffic control patterns.

Soviet moves face Western powers with two general sets of alternatives, either to make determined effort to stop Soviet flights in corridors and control zone, or to adjust to flights.

Possibility of effective Western adjustment to Soviet flights depends largely on level of Soviet activity. Adjustment can take two forms, first of which is present ad hoc scheduling of flight patterns and altitudes not in conflict with Soviet flights, thus recognizing sort of Soviet primacy in air. In long run it would be unworkable. Even if method could be maintained without yielding to Stromov's three demands, it would require more accurate exchange of and adherence to flight data than is now customary in BASC. Outcome would probably be increasingly anarchical flight conditions with progressively greater dependence on radar and visual observations to ensure flight separations.

Trend of second type of adjustment would be through increased correlation of Eastern and Western flight information toward more effective integration of procedures than is possible through BASC and present rival ATC systems at Tempelhof and Schoenefeld. End result could be single unified ATC for all Berlin flights, which Communists would insist should be located at Schoenefeld.

Since both variants of second alternative are politically unacceptable, we conclude that means must be found to halt Soviet flights in their present form. We are now reviewing data and hope to be able to make specific recommendations in near future.

Dowling

Moscow, March 6, 1962, 4 p.m.

2350. Eyes only for Secretary. At meeting with Gromyko this morning I read opening statement composed from points 5, 7, 8, 9, and 10 of my instructions, Deptel 1998./2/ However, in opening paragraph, in addition referring to September 20 joint statement regarding need refrain from actions aggravating international tensions, I added we are surprised Soviets have attempted to disrupt existing arrangements in air corridors just at time when we are discussing possibility of new arrangements. "This is certainly not calculated to inspire confidence in any such new arrangements." I softened somewhat section in point 8 of instructions on Soviet intentions, stating it "now appears to be in doubt" whether procedural formula can be found.

I then presented memorandum/3/ which was read by interpreter.

Gromyko responded first on air corridors. He insisted that the tensions in the air corridors, which "lie in the air space of the GDR," have not been created by Soviets, but by Western side. He said Soviet actions are not in contradiction to existing understandings and that they correspond to the established practice. It was vain for Western powers to claim these were unexpected as if they fell down from the skies. It is clear, he continued, from your statement that Western side holds rather different views on this. "But we deny to Western powers the right of arbiters in that question and cannot agree that only one side--the Western side--will establish the truth." He added Soviet position is laid down in their note (February 17) and Soviet Govt will continue act in accordance with this position. Warned that if attempts are made aggravate situation, Soviet side will duly reply to them.

Gromyko then turned to my remarks that both sides should refrain from actions likely aggravate tension. He claimed in Central Europe, and Berlin in particular, tension has arisen. This fact, he claimed, only underlines necessity resolve present danger situation involving existence abnormal occupation regime. He continued that Soviet proposals were designed precisely to normalize this problem in the interest of reducing tension in Germany, Europe, and whole world.

Gromyko expressed hope that agreement between us will be reached on all matters related to conclusion German peace treaty. Again warned that if this is not done Soviet Union and other states will sign peace treaty with GDR. "This is absolutely inevitable." Gromyko said it would be a good thing if Western powers would appropriately evaluate fact Soviet Union has not yet signed peace treaty. This is being done in order facilitate agreement. However, position USG and statements made today, he continued, indicate that the Soviet position is not properly understood. Gromyko then repeated that Soviet Govt will never agree to any arrangement which will perpetuate maintenance occupation regime West Berlin or the abnormal situation in Europe characterized by absence peace treaty. He emphasized a peace treaty would not be merely slip of paper with signatures, but would be an action by which appropriate questions would be solved.

Gromyko then stated Soviet position West Berlin already quite clear. Free city proposal in Soviet view would violate interest of neither side. That is, if these interests are understood correctly, namely the interest of reducing tension and strengthening peace. Sometimes, however, people speak of interest only in a very narrow way. He complained dossiers of Western powers appear to be full of unfounded suspicions which would be better eliminated.

Gromyko restated earlier point that Soviet position specifically includes possibility of reaching agreement on access which would respect GDR sovereignty together with resolution of a number of other questions which he had mentioned many times. Also said some Western civil and military leaders continue to use strong words against Soviet Govt, others contributing to exacerbation tensions.

He then characterized US memorandum in general as attempt to balance discussions held to date in such a way as to support US positions. This did not facilitate agreement, but rather constructed a trench dividing our positions. Added he would not again repeat Soviet positions on all-Berlin solution, plebiscite proposal, or IAA. Concluded that it is clear we have different approaches to negotiations on this question and expressed difficulty in reconciling assertions in memorandum with statement US seriously seeking agreement. He explained the above were his reactions on basis of having listened to hasty translation of memorandum, implying that this might not exhaust Soviet reaction to the memorandum.

I responded by first taking up Gromyko's references to air corridors. I stated surprise at his contention situation results from Western actions, pointing out that Soviets had suddenly changed procedures which had existed 16 years and in such a way as to disturb our access. I noted his reference to Soviet February 17 note and stated we had found this response unsatisfactory. I explained I did not intend to take this up in detail today but added I had no doubt my government would pursue the matter further. I pointed out that the air corridors were established to provide free access to West Berlin and that recent Soviet actions clearly seemed designed to interfere with this free access. I warned that we take a most serious view of such actions.

I emphasized our desire avoid legalistic discussion while dealing pragmatically with factual problems which would arise from announced Soviet intentions. I reiterated our conviction that resolution problems in question is impossible without satisfactory agreement on access. I stated it is my understanding you would expect to have discussions with Gromyko on Berlin in Geneva and, further, that you would be prepared to discuss wider subjects on an informal and bilateral basis. I emphasized that discussion such problems would remain subject to the need for a strong and clear settlement on access and preservation rights in West Berlin. I pointed out that this does not represent any change in our position on the question of access as the key problem which must be taken up first but explained that the President personally is determined to leave no method of discussion untried in seeking a sensible accommodation of rights and interests both sides.

Regarding Gromyko's remarks about necessity respect GDR sovereignty, I complained of their vagueness and fact we have never clearly been able understand what this involves. I pointed out that whenever we seem to reach point of achieving some agreement, Gromyko returns to question GDR sovereignty in such a way as to negate what seemed to have been an agreement.

I then expressed concern over Gromyko's statement they would never agree to any accord which would result in perpetuation occupation regime or "abnormal situation, i.e., absence peace treaty." This position, I stated, is the most serious and discouraging statement from Soviet side if it refers to questions of fact. I pointed out we have emphasized we were not asking for any formal Soviet action connected with occupation regime, but if any agreement between us would be impossible if after it the occupation regime in fact continued to exist, then we would seem to have really reached an impasse. I concluded that Western powers have made it abundantly clear that their presence in Berlin will not be given up until the German question is finally resolved.

Gromyko did not pursue this last point but returned briefly to question air corridors, stating he would not repeat himself with restatement Soviet position. It was well known and they intended to act in conformity with it. As to my one-sided assertions that the Soviet Union had taken new action violating agreed four-power regulations, they have studied agreements existing since WW II and their actions do not conflict in any way with the conditions existing there. He repeated, "we do not agree that the only arbiters in this situation shall be the Western powers."

Regarding my comments on GDR sovereignty, Gromyko recalled that we often refer to Soviet use of the phrase concerning necessity respect GDR sovereignty. He stated that is not only a phrase, it was an important condition. He claimed that Soviet proposals were in complete accord with "international practice baptised by years of international usage." He repeated that any agreement on air, land, or water access must be in accord with respect for GDR sovereignty. "To underestimate this would be a big mistake which we hope Western powers will avoid." He reiterated that Soviet Govt believes it is possible to reconcile agreement for "unrestricted access" with GDR sovereignty.

Gromyko was obviously preoccupied and pressed for time and I therefore did not probe further. I anticipate no further meeting before Geneva although way is open for him to comment further on our memorandum if he so desires.

Thompson

Bonn, March 7, 1962, 3 p.m.

2131. SHAPE for Norstad. Berlin's 1650 to Dept./2/ In current situation and in light developments over past several months, I agree with Berlin reftel that we should reconsider basic question of accepting East Germans in place of Soviets on surface access checkpoints. We are now in a situation featured by Soviet harassment of unrestricted Western air access to Berlin, by severe limitations on Allied circulation in East Berlin, and by rumors that the Communists may impose passport and visa controls on West Germans traveling to East Germany and West Berlin.

The implications of Soviet actions re air access as seen from here are contained in Embtel 2118./3/ If Soviet actions develop and become public knowledge they will have very adverse psychological effects even if we maintain air link to Berlin. However, were we to submit while under pressure in the air corridors to what would publicly appear as East German control of Allied ground access, I submit that the adverse public reaction would be extremely serious and greatly undermine confidence in our willingness or capability to maintain our commitment to sustain Berlin's viability. In such a situation, moving to the garrison airlift to supply Allied troops and applying economic countermeasures might be preferred course of action to submitting quietly to East German checking of Allied access. If German access to Berlin should simultaneously be interfered with in an unacceptable fashion causing the invocation of IZT countermeasures, we would naturally be rapidly approaching another Berlin blockade. We should then have to choose between implementing QBAL and seeking to reopen ground access by military probes.

I can conceive of situation developing in such manner that it would be politically unacceptable to accept East Germans at checkpoints for this would represent accepting another whittling away process on access which would make sustaining West Berlin's viability extremely difficult. At that point, it might well be better to move rapidly with firm determination toward full crisis over Berlin at an early stage, rather than see climate for viability siphoned away by lack of response to Communist actions.

I understand that we decided originally in our contingency planning to accept East Germans at checkpoints provided they instituted no changes in procedures on assumption access would be turned over to them upon signature separate peace treaty. We agreed further to accept them at checkpoints if they appeared without warning again provided they instituted no procedural changes. This course was accepted on grounds that we could not use serious military measures or explain their use to public opinion on issue of who stamps documents. My fear, however, is that if we accepted East German control at the checkpoints while suffering Soviet efforts to impair air access, we might lose that confidence which is necessary to our purpose and find soon that in any case we would have to probe Soviet and East German intentions on the ground through appropriate military measures.

Dowling

Bonn, March 7, 1962, 9 p.m.

2137. General Clay and I had long talk with Chancellor prior to luncheon which he gave for former yesterday. Adenauer opened conversation by thanking General Clay for visit and then turned to problem of lack of Western unity, which still disturbs him. He expressed uneasiness that France would not be represented at Geneva Disarmament Conference, where he expected talks on Berlin and German question would take place between US and Soviets as well as UK and USSR. He then read from paper before him, which he subsequently identified as telegram from German Ambassador London, reporting that British had in mind broadening Berlin talks to include discussion of Oder-Neisse Line and "respect for GDR sovereignty", with idea that Soviet concession on access might be bought by more forthcoming Western attitude on these two points. General Clay commented that quadripartite consultations would seem to be in order before these items were raised with Soviets, and Adenauer asked if we had seen any report similar to his regarding British intentions. Receiving negative answer, he mentioned Home's speech of February 24/2/ which contrasted with firmness of Attorney General's Berlin speech,/3/ and was obviously pleased and reassured to hear from General Clay that the President had personally approved the latter. General Clay and I expressed confidence that US would want to consult FedRep prior to talking with Soviets on points he had mentioned.

Chancellor then raised subject of Berlin morale, asking if General Clay could confirm that situation was again calm, with West Berliners having regained their confidence. General Clay concurred with Chancellor's assessment, pointing out Berlin spirit was good and economy again showing growth, and mentioned favorable impact of Attorney General's visit. Adenauer agreed, and expressed gratitude for reassurance which Berliners had derived from General Clay's presence in city.

In conclusion, Chancellor reverted to his arguments favoring naval blockade, and again assured us that this was not intended as substitute for military measures in contingency planning, but rather as step on road to eventual confrontation if this should prove necessary.

Dowling

Berlin, March 8, 1962.

Dear George: Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter of February 9/2/ to Tommy Thompson, expressing your misgivings over the Berlin Mission's views on the Berlin problem. I have not seen the airgram that led you to write that letter but your summary of the basic assumption behind this airgram sounds closer to the views of some Berliners than to the views of the U.S. Mission or of responsible city leaders. However, the Mission's thinking is so far apart from yours that it seems hardly necessary to point out wherein the assumptions you ascribe to us are inaccurate. We do not, for example, oppose discussions of the Berlin problem and we do not look with unconcern on the developments that might follow if it proved impossible to reach agreement on some kind of modus vivendi on Berlin. At the same time--and this is a basic difference between us--we believe it would be most harmful to United States interests to want a modus vivendi so desperately that we might be led to make concessions to the Soviets that would have the effect of selling out this part of the free world. We also believe that free Berlin can only be preserved if we counter firmly every act of aggression or local harassment even on minor matters.

It is not localitis that supports these judgments. The Mission reports on local attitudes and opinions and worries from time to time about Berlin morale and confidence, which are important to the present and future viability of this city, but this has never led us to regard the Berliners as our political counselors on Soviet policy. Nor are we conscious of any insidious sentimentality toward the Berliners. The Berliners can, perhaps, be forgiven for believing that they live at the hub of the universe, but the Mission is well aware that Berlin is a mere pawn in the game and that what we are really talking about is United States policy towards the Soviet Union and towards the Ulbricht regime, as it pertains to Berlin and to Germany. We also know that there is no simple formula to help chart the right course in the days and weeks ahead. The Western Allies must be alert and flexible and ready for any opportunity for any settlement that might avert the catastrophe of an atomic war. And we must not be bound by preconceived ideas or blind to changes within the Communist orbit.

Conditions are not static within the orbit, but we see no sign that Soviet goals have changed. Khrushchev may be an improvement over Stalin, but the assumption that his continuance in power should be an objective of Western policy is unproven, despite Yugoslav efforts to sell that idea. I hope United States policy is not based on any such assumption. Even if it were accepted, what constructive ideas could we propose to the Soviets on Berlin that have not been proposed many times before? Short of abandoning Berlin and ultimately all of Germany, what have we not done that we still could do to further peace with honor on the continent of Europe?

You dismiss our endorsement of firmness and strength in this local situation as a "passive and negative attitude", but I ask you, what more would you have us relinquish? In the post war years, we have gradually reduced our access routes to one autobahn, one railway line, and the three air corridors; our freedom of movement within the city has been reduced to Western Berlin itself as a result of unilateral action by the Communists in erecting the Wall. We have on record, as you know, a long series of proposals, for a Berlin-Germany settlement. They have not been acceptable to the other side because they would have preserved Berlin's freedom.

You imply that a weak Ulbricht regime in East Germany is dangerous for us as it prevents the Russians from "happily and passively" accepting the situation. You imply that our objective should be to strengthen the Ulbricht regime in order to stabilize East Germany; and that the best contribution we could make in that direction would be to meet the Communist demands regarding West Berlin. In short, your thesis seems to be that we can have peace only if the Soviets are made happy and content; that the existence of free Berlin makes them unhappy in central Europe; and hence we should give the Soviets what they want in order to preserve the peace.

What historical or psychological experience leads you to believe that further accommodation to the present regime in the Soviet Union would help pave the way to peace? When indeed have concessions to totalitarianism ever succeeded? If Khrushchev's totalitarianism is of a different kind, what evidence do we have aside from the whispered advices of the Russians and the satellites, that this is so? I have uneasy memories of the years before World War II when the responsible statesmen threw Czechoslovakia and Austria on the sacrificial altar in a vain effort to feed the insatiable appetites of Nazi Germany to win "peace in our time".

As a long time admirer and friend of yours, I find this a most difficult letter to write, but you have attacked the integrity and judgment of the United States Mission in Berlin. You have furthermore refrained from suggesting any alternative course of action except, by inference, a policy that, if adopted by our Government, would lead us to the infinitely greater danger of total capitulation to the Communist system. We cannot permit the threat of a thermo-nuclear war to blind us to the dangers of sacrificing freedom and security through erosion and weakness. Within this century we have seen the catastrophe caused in part by appeasement and conciliation of a totalitarian regime, and that lesson is just as valid in the thermo-nuclear age.

Sincerely yours,

E. Allan Lightner, Jr./3/