Moscow, January 12, 1962, 11 p.m.

1936. Eyes only for Secretary. Gromyko opened our meeting by reading lengthy written declaration/2/ prior to handing me drafts for proposed statute for free city West Berlin and protocol embodying guarantees therefor./3/ (Translations documents reported Deptels and documents pouched Department for Kohler January 12.) Declaration reiterated that talks have brought to light certain indications agreement is possible on Berlin and other questions. It stated that although Soviet Government believes best solution would be conclude peace treaty and granting UN membership both German states, Soviet Government ready conclude agreement on status West Berlin prior to peace treaty. Stressed however that questions of formalization of existing German borders, respect for sovereignty GDR, prohibition nuclear arms for both German states, non-aggression treaty between NATO and Warsaw Pact must be considered simultaneously. Other problems such as strengthening European security by withdrawal or reduction foreign troops, establishing atomic free area are all vital points to be dealt with by negotiations after conclusion of West Berlin agreement. Declaration rejected concept international authority Berlin Autobahn as violating GDR sovereignty and in effect establishing a state within a state. In response my questions in first talk it stated Soviets by "free access," mean completely free access in accordance with accepted international standards for such communication. Also repeated demand for participation of Soviet troops in event Western troops remain in West Berlin on temporary basis and proposed UN membership for West Berlin.

Interpreter then read statute and protocol.

I opened by reading almost verbatim from para 1 instructions/4/ but pointed out that I was not so sure initial talks had clarified issues after Gromyko's remarks today. I omitted para 3 and presented para 4, 5, 6 and 7 (with exception of first sentence) in toto. Omitting para 8 and 9 I continued beginning with the third sentence of para 10, but omitted penultimate sentence referring to "numerous cases of transit across territory."

I told Gromyko that on basis his remarks it would seem that we have come full circle and in some respects have taken a step backwards. I pointed out that now it even appeared that an agreement between us on access would have to be followed by an access agreement between GDR and proposed free city. (I made it clear that free city proposal is not acceptable to us.) I noted that he even reiterated Soviet insistence on introducing Soviet troops into West Berlin although it has been made clear on highest level that this would be unacceptable to us. I expressed regret his reaction to international authority for West Berlin access to avoid friction and tension.

Referring to remarks in declaration re Soviet prestige, I reminded Gromyko US prestige also involved and such things as construction of wall in Berlin constitute serious violations our rights. I informed Gromyko I would of course transmit documents he presented but desired stress this does not mean we are prepared consider Soviet concept of free city.

In response Gromyko's criticism occupation rights I pointed out Allied troops in West Berlin do not interfere in life of city. I added only two areas in which they have intervened were to prevent inclusion of West Berlin into West Germany and to preclude appearance of West German troops in West Berlin. I added they also could act to prevent break [outbreak] of provocative actions in West Berlin.

I then read from para 14 of instructions, before concluding with statement Gromyko had stated Soviets would not be traffic policemen and our proposal international authority would have removed this difficulty. I added hope that Gromyko would keep open mind and consider this proposal further.

Gromyko responded with discussion of GDR sovereignty stating we can only reach agreement on basis which would not prejudice GDR sovereignty. He added, "when we speak of this we have in mind genuine respect for GDR sovereignty not just words." He criticized Western powers as ready to reach understanding ruling out interference in GDR sovereignty, but at the same time trying to exempt access from this understanding. He could not agree to concept of excluding access from rights of GDR. He regretted I had again raised international authority because "we cannot agree establish a state within a state and this idea is unacceptable to USSR."

Gromyko then restated Soviet agreement against contention that access is key question, repeating that it is only one of many questions and cannot be resolved independently.

He then reacted sharply to reference to plebiscite (instructions para 7) rejecting proposal as serving no useful purpose. Stated Germans not asked when troops entered and will not be asked about their withdrawal. Plebiscite he stated "is not logic it is sophistry."

Gromyko then repeated his January 2 arguments declaring any consideration all-Berlin solution unacceptable. He stated East Berlin is organic part of GDR as well as its capital and introduction of this issue is artificial.

Gromyko also responded to my reference to Berlin wall, denying Ulbricht had virtually admitted wall was to prevent West [East] Germans from fleeing. He added that in Soviet view August 13 measures constitute legitimate action to protect GDR borders.

Regarding relationship GDR sovereignty and West Berlin access, Gromyko explained Soviets striving for understanding which would meet interests of both sides. He stated "In our opinion it is possible combine right of unhampered access with respect for GDR sovereignty". However, he warned, "If you believe we will sign agreement improving and perpetuating your occupation rights you are wrong and all talk will be in vain." He claimed GDR already has made concessions involving its sovereignty. Pointed to "permission" for West Berlin, "which is located on GDR territory", to become an independent political entity, and GDR agreement to an arrangement to cover military access for those troop contingents temporarily remaining West Berlin as guarantors for free city. He pointed out this usually included the issuance of visas.

Gromyko then recalled Soviet decision withdraw peace treaty deadline. "We took that step only in order to facilitate agreement on logical basis. If this were understood in any other sense, we would regret it very much".

Gromyko then shifted to criticism of Allied reluctance request East German permission for access to Berlin, "just because US was one of Allies which defeated Germany". He cited Soviet example in requesting transit rights from FRG, France, Denmark, et cetera, and recalled reports US intended to establish relations with Outer Mongolia. "Do you intend then to request corridor to reach Outer Mongolia?" Gromyko concluded with statement he wanted only to emphasize free city status and unhampered access to Berlin "are proposed on basis of respect for GDR sovereignty rights and not at expense thereof."

I expressed regret at apparent change reflected in Gromyko's statement regarding access and GDR sovereignty. I said I had understood access agreement between USSR and West would be accepted by GDR "which you regard as sovereign, and this would fulfill requirements of sovereignty." I continued, it now seems that even after agreement between us GDR would decide whether access in accord its sovereignty rights. I said we assumed Soviets were sincere in stated intention of permitting a viable and supportable existence for West Berliners. Soviets must realize that this requires continuation of their relations with outside world on really free basis not subject to control of any third party and particularly not one which had showed itself hostile to their interests.

I stated best solution German problem in our view would be reunification and peace treaty with one Germany. Since this apparently is not possible, I continued, we had hoped agreement between us on access would avoid future friction. I said we can see no reason why GDR could not agree to West Berlin having unhampered communication with the West, since it is in everyone's interest to remove friction over this problem. One of the rights of sovereignty is to make derogations from it and the current situation certainly justifies special arrangements. I concluded that US Government regards main point is not to draw a technical line under World War II but to avoid World War III.

There was considerable discussion of buying a horse twice when in reply to his question as to who owned it I said that "we did". He took it that I was referring to West Berlin but I explained that I was talking of access which was a right we already enjoyed.

Gromyko ended by stating that he hoped that when documents and his remarks studied I would realize I had been hasty in saying they constituted a step backward.

Thompson

Washington, January 12, 1962, 10:55 p.m.

912. Eyes only for Clay from Secretary. No other distribution. Reurtel 1322./2/ I am glad you reported your reactions to Stockwell's approach in Paris because this gives me an opportunity to make a few points clear as seen from Washington:

(1) To begin with you can be absolutely certain that British observations of this nature are completely without influence on our evaluation of officers like General Watson or anyone else connected with Berlin Mission. We base our judgments of personnel on appropriate qualified American sources including yourself. I have talked with Secretary McNamara and this goes for Defense as well as State.

(2) I do want to say however that it was Stoessel's duty to report information of this kind coming to his attention since it obviously has considerable bearing on problem of our relationship with British. We have noted that British have taken considerable pains both during Home's visit to Berlin/3/ and in Bonn to deny that any rift exists. However Stockwell's report makes it seem clear that despite these denials British officials in field have actually reported to London highly critical views. While we see no profit in disclosing this knowledge on our part either in Berlin or Bonn, probability that such critical reports have been sent is pertinent to general problem of trying to bring British along on the whole range of Berlin preparations and contingency planning.

(3) I have not repeated your cable to Norstad but am sending him by pouch a copy of your telegram together with copy of this reply. I cannot of course speak for him but my own impression is that his remarks were addressed not to an evaluation of Watson but to an understanding of Stockwell's concern in the light of reports which appeared to be reaching Stockwell from British sources in Germany. We'll undoubtedly be getting his comments.

(4) We have not had in Washington any approaches from the UK that reflect Stockwell's line. At Bermuda/4/ Lord Home asked me whether I was personally in touch with the situation in Berlin and cited the amount of military traffic on the Autobahn as an example. I told him that I was following it very closely indeed. His only remark was, "Well I just wanted to be sure that you are keeping an eye on it personally." My guess is he had been receiving local British reports but wanted to satisfy himself that the situation on the spot was being handled in terms of governmental policy. He did not offer objections.

Rusk

Bonn, January 15, 1962, 11 p.m.

1671. As seen from here, and on basis brief summary of second Thompson-Gromyko talk given Deptel 1921,/2/ most significant aspect of Soviet move to make obvious the firmness of their position on Berlin appears to be tactical relationship of this action to December 27 memo on Soviet-German relations./3/ As we have reported, Germans were unimpressed by memo, and would undoubtedly have maintained their relaxed attitude had Gromyko spun out slow-paced and low-key talks. But Soviet return to hard line seems designed to emphasize that December 27 paper is a realistic bid for bilateral Soviet-German negotiations to settle Berlin problem and improve relations. It may also have consequence of persuading Germans of correctness of their initial assessment re Rusk-Gromyko and Home-Gromyko talks (Embtel 843),/4/ i.e., that Soviets are seeking only temporary solution for Berlin issue--perhaps indeed only separate treaty and not agreement with West--in order to continue to use it and German question as leverage to improve their power position in Central Europe. In other words, Soviet move seems calculated to face Germans with choice of maintaining their present foreign policy--with risks to German national interests which Soviets insist this entails--or of "realistic" acceptance of Soviet dominance in Europe as basis for best possible deal and future cooperation of "two greatest states in Europe."

In my estimation, immediate problem is to assure Germans of our resolute rejection of Gromyko's ideas. We think best way to accomplish this would be to encourage Germans to reply promptly and vigorously to December 27 memo; this would have additional advantage of being good instrument for setting forth publicly maximum Western positions. Following a first initial inclination to ignore Soviet memo, FonOff is now considering advisability of reply, and I fear hesitation on our part would only encourage those elements of German opinion favorable to an independent initiative to argue against foreclosing any avenue for protection of German interests.

In brief, initiative lies with us. I am confident Germans will follow our firm lead.

Dowling

Moscow, January 15, 1962, 7 p.m.

1959. Eyes only Secretary. In further discussion with British Amb today of my last talk with Gromyko he advanced idea that possibly Soviets felt necessary to shock West into revealing more of their position, particularly in view interpretation they probably place on Macmillan-Adenauer meeting./2/ I pointed out Gromyko made no real effort to probe our position on "other questions" and Roberts inclined agree with point 5 mytel 1933./3/

In further study of my talk, almost only new point I can find is indication of Sov willingness continue man (temporarily) checkpoint GDR border after conclusion free city agreement. I find it somewhat curious that Gromyko asked no questions about international authority idea even for purpose of being in better position to knock it down.

I find it difficult make recommendations next step. While can see advantage to continuation of talks, any disposition on our part to explore further Sov thinking could be misinterpreted by them in view of rigid position they have taken. They have tabled free city proposal even though already told it was unacceptable and we could of course table paper on international access authority even though they have rejected it. Am inclined believe we should state that their proposal does not form basis for negotiation since their thinking clearly is to leave Berlin to mercy of East Germans and that perhaps we should turn to discussion of what will happen when they sign separate treaty in order to avoid highly dangerous situation.

I should think that when present Sov position becomes known public opinion in France and US would be satisfied that we have made reasonable effort find basis for negotiations. Should think this probably also true of West Germans. Some problem would probably remain however for British. Assuming Soviet position would not depart very far from that taken by Gromyko, particularly on key point of access, it seems to me there is something to be said for Macmillan-Home visit to Moscow since failure of such mission should enable us present really united front. Point on which British themselves most likely be soft, namely recognition GDR, would probably itself not be enough to get Soviets to agree to adequate arrangements for access and I would doubt that British would risk in present circumstances break in policy with other Western powers particularly US.

Alternative might be Adenauer invitation to Khrushchev. At our last Ambassadors' meeting Kroll said Adenauer personally disliked negotiating with Khrushchev and much preferred deal with Mikoyan. Kroll explained to him this would not be meaningful, from which I take it that quite possibly Kroll had advocated Khrushchev-Adenauer meeting. Adenauer-Khrushchev meeting, which would almost certainly fail, would still leave us with problem of British opinion.

Meeting between President and Khrushchev in present circumstances seems to me out of question and should be held in reserve.

Dept may wish consider calling me home for consultation following my next talk with Gromyko as a way of gaining time, depending on nature that conversation.

Thompson

Washington, January 15, 1962.

RE
Berlin Negotiations

1. I have read Thompson's reports of the second Gromyko-Thompson talk and I think it is time for a hard look at our next steps. I assume the Department will be preparing a third formal instruction, and clearing it with the British and Germans. But I think something more is needed.

2. Should we not pretty soon allow Thompson to open up the discussions a little more? There is a good deal in our own position that cannot be communicated if the British and Germans have to clear it first. We might ask Thompson what he would suggest as the tactics of such a two-way talk--and perhaps we ought to consider also whether Thompson himself is the right channel.

3. I also think we need to decide what to do if the next formal Gromyko-Thompson talks get nowhere. Should we move to more formal talks, or keep trying in this channel? I begin to think we may be having the disadvantages of both types of talks at present: we are unable to talk frankly to the Russians, and yet we cannot really pull our Allies into a position of responsible participation.

John Kennedy

Washington, January 15, 1962, 6:15 p.m.

TELEPHONE CALL TO MR KOHLER

The Sec referred to Berlin's 1338/2/--is there anything in the wind in withdrawing troops. K said it is in the budget thing. He has not seen that one but asked if the Sec saw the one from Dowling to CINCEUR/3/ to plan beginning perhaps in Feb the return of 21,000 troops. This is the '63 budget situation. This was discussed with Nitze et al. in the Berlin Task Force Mtg this a.m. They are aware of the problems and will try to come up with some answers. The Sec thinks at this time it would be frightful. K thinks it is for planning and he told them the assumption they could start in Feb was not valid. The Sec said to get a message for Clay and we should check it with the WH. K said the Pentagon is doing a first draft and are sympathetic to our warning of the political consequences./4/

Berlin, January 17, 1962, 2 p.m.

1349. From Clay to Rusk. Request distribution to Secretary only. Ref JCS 0109 62./2/ I realize hindsight criticism of 13 August cannot be stopped although its continuing agitation does not help us here.

While I feel immediate action on ground here might have succeeded in bringing up Soviet troops thus fixing responsibility such action to have been successful had to be undertaken immediately. It could not have awaited, even if it had been recommended, approval from Allied capitals. Thus, if taken here, it would have had to be unilateral in American Sector only. In my opinion, even if it had stopped wall at exact border in American Sector only it would not have stopped closing of border a few blocks further back. Ulbricht had to seal border to stop exodus which was bringing about collapse of his regime. To have stopped this we would have had to be prepared to move in force across the border unilaterally and indeed with probably complete Allied disapproval. Such a movement might indeed have had far-reaching consequences.

I believe criticism of President most unfair in this instance and if any investigations are instigated by Congress I would be glad to so testify.

However, for the future, I would like to point out this is why I continue to ask for greater discretionary power here in event of emergency. If we fail to exercise it properly, we here are at fault. If we exercise it improperly, almost any error of judgment here can be corrected immediately by the prompt removal of the responsible official. I can only say that as long as I am here and an emergency does develop I am prepared to fully accept instant responsibility for proper action and summary recall if it backfires. I feel strongly President is entitled to this protection if future emergency does develop.

Trivers

On January 17, 1962, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Bundy sent the President a 7-page outline for a talk to the National Security Council on the following day. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, NSC Meetings, 1962) In discussing Berlin Bundy presented two alternatives. In the first, after stressing that Berlin was the "greatest issue of all," Bundy discussed the crisis as a conflict of wills and emphasized: "Our will is strong, and our will, not that of our Allies, is what counts." In the second alternative Bundy wrote that he expected a long and difficult struggle ending in a compromise settlement. Under this scenario it was essential to prevent the Germans from blaming the United States for it. He concluded with the sentence: "At the moment the talks in Moscow are getting nowhere, but we think it wise to keep talking."

At the NSC meeting at 10:15 a.m. on January 18, President Kennedy began with a general review of U.S. worldwide responsibilities before turning to West Irian, Vietnam, Laos, Cuba, and Berlin. A summary of the President's remarks on Berlin reads as follows:

"There had been no progress in the negotiations up to this point. If that situation persisted, the Soviets could be expected to proceed with a separate peace treaty and there might be a direct test of nerves in the Spring. At such a point the responsibility on the military would be increasingly great. We have to control the developing situation from Washington and a heavy responsibility would rest on the President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the military commanders. The President believed it was important to have prompt and careful study of our contingency plans and to think hard about the ways and means of making decisions that might lead to nuclear war. If there were to be any such war, we must know what it is for, and know what other steps we can take before such war comes." (Ibid.)

Moscow, January 18, 1962./2/

N.S. Khrushchev, the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, received a communication from Robert F. Kennedy/3/ that President John F. Kennedy is concerned by a discouraging beginning of contacts on the German problem and on other problems which should be solved in the interests of the improvement of the international situation, the strengthening of peace and the development of normal relations between our countries.

/3/Not further identified.

N.S. Khrushchev fully shares the President's concern. He was discouraged even in a greater extent than the President when the USSR Foreign Minister had reported on the results of his first talks with the US Ambassador in Moscow.

The position of the American Government on a number of issues, as set forth by the US Ambassador, actually repeats what had been said many times by former President Eisenhower, Chancellor Adenauer and by other Western statesmen. It proceeds from completely wrong basis and therefore is absolutely unacceptable. In fact the Soviet Union is urged to immortalize by its signature that temporary, by its nature, situation which exists now, that is contribute to the preservation of the occupation regime in West Berlin.

But this is unthinkable. It would be not a step forward, but a step backward. It is understandable that the Soviet Union cannot agree to this. So far as one can judge by the statements of the US Ambassador in Moscow in his talks with the USSR Foreign Minister the United States would like nothing less than to preserve the unhealthy and rather dangerous situation in West Berlin which has been and remains a source of tension in Europe, causes friction among dozens of states, including the USSR and the USA. The Soviet Union is pursuing quite different aims. It wants to remove that hotbed of international tension and create conditions for the development of good friendly relations among nations.

What the United States Government is proposing now would in effect not only throw us all back to the days of Vienna but would have created even worse prospectives. In this respect N.S. Khrushchev agrees with the President. That is why the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers is also discouraged. Yes, discouraged and distressed.

N.S. Khrushchev does not consider it necessary to explain again the aims and position of the Soviet Government since they were stated fully enough at the meeting with the President of the United States in Vienna and also in his private messages to Mr. John F. Kennedy.

On the part of the head of the Soviet Government everything possible has been done to convince the President of the United States that drawing a final line through World War II and solving on this basis the question of changing the status of West Berlin by declaring it a free demilitarized city corresponds equally to the interests of all powers, to the interests of peace. The Soviet Government is not seeking any other aim. It is only deplorable that the US Government and the President are still searching for some hidden motives in the Soviet Union's position on this question. But those motives simply do not exist and therefore there is no need to search for them.

Yet, what should be done now is, of course, to seek an agreement but not to push the events towards a collapse of the renewed exchange of opinions between the Governments of the USSR and the USA and towards new complications?

Now that the parties have already familiarized themselves with each others' positions it would be useful to work out jointly the bases on which a future agreement on West Berlin as well as on other questions which it is necessary to solve with the conclusion of a German peace treaty should be built. Proceeding from that the Soviet Government has worked out a draft of the main provisions of the status of a free demilitarized city of West Berlin and a draft of the protocol on guarantees which is an enclosure to this status.

These documents were given to the US Government by A.A. Gromyko, USSR Foreign Minister through Ambassador Thompson on January 12. The US Ambassador was also given a statement in which the Soviet Government's position on the question of concluding a German peace treaty and normalizing on its basis the situation in West Berlin is explained and where it is emphasized that simultaneously such questions should be solved as appropriate legalization and confirmation of the existing German borders, due respect for the sovereignty of the GDR, non-arming of the two German states with nuclear weapons and barring them from producing those weapons, conclusion of a nonaggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw treaty member-countries.

Having familiarized himself with those documents the President will see that neither the Soviet Union nor the GDR are encroaching upon West Berlin and demand more than the establishment for that city of an international legal status corresponding to the conditions of the peace time. The Soviet proposals--and it is not difficult to realize--guarantee for the population of West Berlin the right to live under the social system they choose and to have free access to the outer world.

N.S. Khrushchev would like very much the President to consider with understanding the concrete proposals which are in the drafts of the main provisions of the status of a free demilitarized city of West Berlin and the protocol on the guarantees. Those proposals do not make harm to anyone, do not discriminate against anybody.

The policy which the Western powers continue to stick to might somehow have been understood in the times when it was originated. That is a policy of diktat, a policy "from the position of strength". The late Dulles did not make bones about it. But one wants to conduct this policy even now ignoring the enormous changes that have taken place in the world.

The President of the United States has himself said and everybody knows it that now the balance of power is equal. How, then, is it possible proceeding from the equal initial conditions to attempt to conduct a policy of encroachment on the interests of the USSR and its allies--socialist countries? But what the US Government is proposing is aimed precisely against our interests.

It is known that the policy "from the position of strength" with respect to the USSR has proved bankrupt. The establishment of the military bases around the Soviet Union, the discontinuance of trade with it--all that was aimed at the isolation of the USSR and other socialist countries, at undermining their economy. Such policy has suffered a defeat.

And this is clear to every sober-minded man if he does not deliberately close his eyes to it. It is bound to go bankrupt in the future as well if one resorts to it.

The USSR economy is striding forward and prospering. Science and technology are rapidly developing. The Soviet Union has scored great successes in the exploration of outer space. The entire world including the President of the United States recognizes the achievements of our country.

Then how under these conditions one can continue to pursue the "policy from the position of strength"? It is hard to reconcile one with the other. Therefore if the Soviet Union had not complied with and rebuffed this policy in the past, the more so will not it consent to a humiliating agreement now. The USSR will struggle with all available means against any attempt to impose upon it the conditions that do not correspond to the interests of consolidating peace and it will never sign such agreements. If on its part the United States does not display an understanding of this, some time will pass and the world will witness that this policy is suffering the same and even greater defeat as before. If in the past Dulles threatened the Soviet Union relying on the atomic weapons monopoly, now there is no trace of such monopoly. The USSR and the US are equal. Therefore it would be senseless to threaten one or the other side with war. The USSR is threatening nobody, it does not want war, and all its efforts are aimed at excluding war. It is senseless to threaten war on the Soviet people which is seeking only the normalization of international situation and liquidation of the vestiges of the war. The one who tries to frighten the Soviet people and threaten them will get in response the same that he is threatening with and not in a lesser degree.

Therefore the best thing now, if to proceed from common sense and sober consideration of all facts, is to spare no effort to normalize relations, and first of all among major powers, and not to preserve the hotbeds of tension.

N.S. Khrushchev hopes that the President of the United States will display a correct understanding of the situation. N.S. Khrushchev is under the impression that the President has difficulties and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers understands that. But every leader has his difficulties. Therefore it is necessary to undertake joint efforts to overcome those difficulties and reach such agreements which would be beneficial to peoples of the Soviet Union and the United States as well as all other peoples that long for peace and tranquil life.

Washington, January 18, 1962.

PRESENT
President
Secretary Rusk
Under Secretary Ball
Mr. Kohler
Mr. Bohlen
Mr. Hillenbrand
Secretary McNamara
Secretary Dillon
Attorney General Kennedy
Mr. Kaysen

There was some discussion of pen-pals./2/ The President indicated to the group that he thought that German self-denial on grounds of visas or the like was not an appropriate basis for the U.S. to take over responsibility for German traffic. Mr. Kohler indicated he would convey this point to the Ambassadors in an appropriate way.

The President asked whether there was any sentiment in Germany supporting more recognition of the DDR. Mr. Bohlen indicated that he thought there was. Mr. Kohler was somewhat more reserved on this.

Mr. Kohler commented that the British judgment as indicated in the Ambassadorial meeting was the Soviet Union was not in a hurry, and that we ought to pace the Thompson-Gromyko talks accordingly./3/ The President approved the instructions./4/

Carl Kaysen/5/

Washington, January 29, 1962, 7:39 p.m.

1767. Paris pass Finletter--eyes only. Eyes only for Ambassadors. Following are agreed instructions for your next meeting with Gromyko which you should request for early date. You will note minor amendments in text contained Deptel 1681,/2/ to take account of points made by you and British and Germans.

Instructions contemplate that you will leave with Gromyko text of memorandum as well as text of all-Berlin proposal (proposal for reunification of Berlin) and summary of International Access Authority transmitted to you Deptel 1617./3/ You will receive separate cable regarding amendments to be made in these texts./4/

You will have noted that text of memorandum to be left with Gromyko while consistent with instructions in present cable, also contains certain arguments and language from basic instructions for first two conversations with Gromyko. While we assume you will wish to read entire memorandum, we leave it to your discretion to omit any portions in your oral remarks which might seem advisable in light of possible interruptions by Gromyko or any exchanges which might take place between you before you have finished. Hence use of expression "record and amplify the opening remarks" in first para of memorandum.

1. We are, of course, disappointed that your last round with Gromyko led to nothing more than restatement both orally and in writing of standard Soviet position on Berlin. We also note that you are inclined to consider that Soviets wish to break off Moscow talks so that they may proceed with signature of peace treaty. Whether this view correct or whether hard Soviet position can be explained at least partly in terms of negotiating tactics, we can all agree that West has no over-riding interest in accelerating pace of talks or in pushing them towards breakdown. Although present indeterminate position creates difficulties in terms of required US decision on military build-up, those are not governing at present stage. On other hand time seems to have come in this round to present Western case strongly and to put certain questions which may cause movement in one direction or another.

2. You might begin by stating that Soviet Foreign Minister, in last discussion, put forward position known to be unacceptable to Western Powers. In presenting para 4 of previous instructions contained in Deptel 1615,/5/ you have already laid groundwork for elimination of further discussion of Western role in peace treaty. You should reiterate this point, adding that we are refraining from putting forward Western position in all-German field because we continue to assume that Soviets recognize that no meeting of minds is possible on peace treaty and that they are prepared to take this into account. As to free city proposal contained in Soviet memorandum,/6/ you should say that you will be giving Soviet Foreign Minister paper setting forth Western views on subject of appropriate arrangement for Berlin.

3. It is obvious, however, that between points of view set forth in US and Soviet documents no apparent basis exists for agreement. We assume that Soviets proceed from principle that great power cannot be expected simply to accept position of other side. If Soviets are not prepared, as seems to be the case, to discuss seriously an all-Berlin arrangement, they cannot believe that US should be expected to discuss Soviet proposal for free city which, despite verbal assurances, would represent substantial repudiation of position which Western powers have consistently maintained during numerous exchanges and discussions with Soviets since November 1958. Having attempted to dispose of East Berlin without Western concurrences, Soviets appear to be seeking basis on which they could interfere in affairs of West Berlin. Proposal would deprive West Berliners of essential protection they now enjoy and make their contacts with outer world subject to whims of East Germans. There can be no question but that people of West Berlin oppose concept of free city. If there is any doubt in anyone's mind on this point, Western Powers would be glad, as previously stated, to have properly supervised plebiscite held in West Berlin. It would be difficult enough to establish entity comprising all Berlin as a viable, independent city, but this would be almost impossible for a portion of city.

4. It follows that unacceptable positions of both parties should be set on one side for the present and attention should be directed towards finding a common ground on practical matters. US is prepared to continue explore this possibility. Our belief is that appropriate place to begin, since this obviously critical point at issue, would be means of assuring free access to and from West Berlin. In this connection, Western Powers put forward suggestion for International Access Authority. Soviet Foreign Minister has said this unacceptable as inconsistent with "sovereignty of GDR". Perhaps there is element of misunderstanding here. Soviets seem to be overlooking some basic facts:

a. West Berlin and our access thereto were not subject to any Soviet occupation rights.

b. There is no way by which Soviet Union can confer on GDR rights which it does not have.

c. Any attempt to confer "sovereignty" must therefore be limited by fact of Western position in Berlin.

d. We are prepared to discuss how Western rights can be exercised so as not to interfere with GDR authorities but not how these rights are to be handed over to those authorities. (In pursuing this line of argument you may as you see fit draw on paras 6 and 10 of Deptel 1615, as well as US note of July 17, 1961.)/7/

5. Moreover, International Access Authority would not run counter to procedure which Soviet Foreign Minister in first talk described as consistent with GDR "sovereignty", namely, that agreement between four occupying powers should subsequently be respected by GDR in arrangement between it and Soviet Union. Access Authority would provide solution to problem which would be compatible with interests of all parties concerned and remove standing source of disputes between them. It need be no more inconsistent with "sovereignty" than any international transit arrangements such as those established under Montreux Convention or overflight provisions International Air Service Agreement are with "sovereignty" of areas concerned. You might at this point hand Gromyko paper summarizing concept of International Access Authority noting that if Soviets wish to pursue matter further we would be glad to provide draft of possible agreement.

6. In event that Gromyko shows no interest in International Access Authority or continues to argue that entire concept is unacceptable as inconsistent with GDR sovereignty, you might point out that, just as Soviets say they cannot discuss idea of International Access Authority, or apparently of all-Berlin solution, we find it impossible to discuss Soviet proposal for free city as contained in draft statute. Where does this leave us? Purpose of present talks is to establish whether basis for negotiations exists. Such basis clearly does not exist in terms of talks so far.

7. After pointing out that we would want to explore further whether there is, therefore, any intermediate point which might provide a basis for negotiations, you might try to ascertain from Gromyko whether Soviets insist on discussion of their free city proposal as prerequisite for further discussion of access question. You should stress point that one great power simply cannot expect another great power to capitulate in face of demands which are clearly unacceptable. We have left certain documents with Soviets presenting our views. If these are not acceptable to Soviets, we are willing to discuss possible modifications or general subject of West Berlin arrangement further.

8. If Soviets have problems with respect to West Berlin, they can raise them. They have said they cannot be expected to confirm Western occupation rights. We are not asking for confirmation of occupation rights because they require no such confirmation, but acceptance, as one of the facts of situation, of presence of Western forces in Berlin, and we are prepared to work out new arrangements to deal with problems involved. If we can assume, as seems to be the case, that both sides have over-riding interest in avoiding collision course on Berlin, then it is only reasonable to expect that both sides will be willing to concentrate on those areas where at least some working arrangement might be possible.

9. You might then go on to point out that, lest there be any misunderstanding as to how we see present situation in West Berlin, status of Western sectors is as set forth in para 12 of Deptel 1615.

10. You might conclude by saying that you will report to your Government and after receiving further instructions, will ask for further meeting during which you hope Soviet position will reflect more appropriately importance of arguments which you have presented. If you consider it feasible, in rounding out response to Gromyko declaration at previous meeting to deal with his emphasis on "broader questions", you may repeat language along lines para 14 of Deptel 1615.

11. To degree desirable in meeting specific points made by Gromyko or in spelling out US views, you may draw on previous instructions. Since Soviets show no hesitation in repeating stale arguments over and over again, you should feel no inhibitions in this regard. Purpose of exchange would not, however, be to lead to break in discussions but, hopefully, to encourage Soviets to accept that it is in common interest of both great powers to find a Berlin settlement, that they share responsibility for avoiding an impasse and that there is necessity for some give on their part if any progress to be made. End text.

Ball

Washington, January 29, 1962, 7:43 p.m.

1768. Eyes only for Ambassador. This telegram deals with three aspects of your next meeting with Gromyko:

(a) General purpose of next round (paras 1-3);

(b) Contingency instructions in event discussion goes very badly (paras 4-7);

(c) Comments on your telegram 1988 (para 8)./2/

1. We have given thought to your suggestion that we should now state to Soviets that their proposal does not form basis for negotiation and that perhaps we should turn to discussion of what will happen when they sign separate "peace treaty" in order to avoid highly dangerous situation. Although under any realistic assumption our purpose in trying to make an arrangement with Soviets is to provide for situation after signature of their "peace treaty", we are inclined to believe that, for next meeting at least, we should still keep discussion within broader framework and not yet indicate we have come to conclusion that all hope of arrangement other than for in extremis situation has been abandoned. This is intent of basic instructions which you will be receiving in separate telegram./3/

2. We see purpose of next round, therefore, as essentially to impress on Soviets that rigid maintenance of their present position will prevent agreement but that some flexibility on their part may provide basis for progress. Moreover, meeting will provide occasion for us to get certain documents on record which will be helpful in building public case in event of continuing deadlock and Soviet decision to publish their declaration together with Free City Statute and Protocol of Guarantees./4/

3. As you are aware, there has been considerable speculation that Soviets really want to bury Berlin issue and that their seemingly unhurried approach to Gromyko's exchanges with you reflects desire to talk subject to death. We know you do not share this view and evidence is certainly lacking to substantiate it. If anything Gromyko says or which comes to your attention from other sources tends to confirm such an intention, report it immediately.

4. We would, therefore, want to avoid at present stage, if at all possible, any implication that we considered talks had reached complete impasse and that only thing left was to proceed to improvisation for crisis situation after peace treaty. Should, however, your discussion with Gromyko on basis of instructions go very badly and should he clearly indicate that Soviets desire to break off talks so that they may proceed to signing of peace treaty, you may, if you consider it essential, observe that perhaps differences are so great between two positions that only practical course seems to be to focus on situation which will arise when Soviets sign separate "peace treaty". Highly dangerous confrontation would inevitably result if effects of that "treaty", without prior understanding, were to be what Soviets allege.

5. You might then raise question of status of West Berlin after signature of "peace treaty" between Soviets and GDR. Soviets claim that effect will be to terminate occupation and that arrangements for access to city must be made directly with GDR. As Soviet Foreign Minister well knows, Western Powers do not accept premise from which this description of events derives, namely, that Soviets by an agreement with East German regime can dispose of Western rights in Berlin which was never part of GDR. Soviets have implied, however, that as a matter of procedure, a prior agreement between four occupying powers might be envisaged which would be subject of subsequent agreement between Soviets and GDR. Soviets have indicated what they think should be content of such prior agreement. This initial Soviet position on content is clearly unacceptable to West. Since we cannot agree on status of West Berlin, or on guaranteed form of access such as International Access Authority would provide, and since Allies cannot negotiate with GDR, it would seem important to avoid dangerous situation that we attempt to find agreement on how access to Berlin will be administered after peace treaty. If we can agree that this would be useful subject for discussion, we would be prepared to proceed on this basis.

6. You might then reiterate point contained in para 8 of basic instructions that, if Soviets have other problems with respect to Berlin they can raise these. You might also note that they have said they cannot be expected to confirm Western occupation rights. We are not asking for confirmation of occupation rights which do not require such confirmation but for acceptance, as one of facts of situation, of presence of Western forces in Berlin, and we are prepared to work out new arrangements to deal with the problems involved. If you consider it useful, you may also wish once again to briefly review how we see present situation in West Berlin lest there be any misunderstanding on part of Soviets as to status of Western sectors (para 12 of Deptel 1615)./5/

7. You might then conclude by again making point about avoidance of collision course in Berlin contained in para 8 of instructions and expressing hope that Soviets will reflect upon situation which their position is creating along lines para 10 of instructions.

8. Following are comments on specific points raised in your 1988:

(a) Since your discussions with Gromyko do not purport to be on behalf of French and since we are showing them your instructions only for information at same time they are sent to you, see no reason why summary of International Access Authority proposal and all-Berlin proposal should not be put forward, as provided in instructions, as proposals for purposes of discussion in same way as you originally raised question of International Access Authority. Although distinction between exploratory talks and negotiations at times seems metaphysical, Soviets presumably aware that neither side is making binding commitments to other at present stage. As you are aware, all-Berlin proposal in form suggested for presentation to Soviets is agreed Four-Power document and is Annex in Washington Working Group Report as approved by Foreign Ministers in September 1961./6/

(b) Text of proposed statement to be made by you and left in writing with Gromyko is being sent in separate telegram./7/

(c) As you will note, language in paras 2 and 3 of draft instructions (which also being sent you in separate message) has been modified to play down emphasis on "extreme" positions. However, logic of argument being put to Soviets is precisely that we are being more reasonable than they by not advancing positions which we believe to be correct but which other side maintains is totally unacceptable; this shows sincerity of our desire to reach agreement. You will note that arguments against free city have been expanded along lines suggested by you.

(d) We wonder whether our point on compatibility of International Access Authority and of overflights with "respect for GDR sovereignty" is not relevant. As we understand their position, Soviets have maintained that need for such "respect" might be met by prior Four-Power agreement which Soviets would then undertake to have GDR accept. However, they appear also to have made additional argument to you that very concept of International Access Authority, with its excision of area of sovereignty from GDR control, is incompatible with that sovereignty. Similar argument has been made in attacking unregulated air access to West Berlin. Purpose of argumentation in para 5 of present instruction and on overflights in previous instruction was to make point that, even judged by existing practices elsewhere, such Authority or overflights are not per se incompatible with sovereignty. This fact, combined with Soviet agreement with GDR on basis of prior Four-Power understanding, should, therefore, presumably take care of all aspects of "respect for sovereignty of GDR". While we believe foregoing argument is persuasive, and would be effective in oral statement if this subsequently published, we would not want insist on its inclusion if you believe this would really be counterproductive. Please advise us urgently if this is your conviction.

(e) Language along lines suggested by you regarding discussion of "other problems" has been inserted.

(f) If Gromyko should attempt to pin you down on composition Board of Governors Access Authority, you are authorized respond along lines suggested para 5 your 1988.

9. We are commenting separately on your 2026./8/

Ball

Berlin, January 30, 1962.

Dear Dean: Having now been in Berlin for a little over four months, I believe a review at this time to be timely.

At the time of my arrival West Berlin morale was still low, although definitely recovering from the extreme low point. Confidence in Allied determination, rightly or wrongly, was badly shattered by the wall. However, the restoration of confidence was started by the Johnson visit and by the arrival of reinforcements. Today, morale has definitely improved. The flight of capital has not only stopped, but indeed has reversed, and the outward movement of persons from the city has become only a trickle. Still, there can be no question but that the tension in West Berlin remains high and very little would be required for it to erupt into a mass exodus of both capital and persons.

It seemed essential to me when I arrived to take a few measures to demonstrate American intent to be firm on the ground in Berlin. It would not have occurred to me that I would have been sent here for any other purpose. Examining these few measures now, it is incomprehensible that anyone should regard them as bold or, indeed as some of our Allies do, as dangerous. Herewith are these "bold" measures and their status today:

a. Helicopter flights were undertaken into Steinstucken and a military police patrol was stationed in this American exclave. Both continue, and so far have not developed into the dreaded escalation which had been predicted by some. They have made possible the evacuation of over thirty refugees. Our recommendation to replace the helicopter flights with movements on the ground was not approved.

b. Our recommendation to keep Friedrich Strasse open by force if necessary was approved enough to permit us to maintain the right of entry of our officially licensed vehicles until confronted by Soviet forces. I believe this action to have done more than any other action on our part to convince not only the population of West Berlin, but also the East German and Soviet governments of our determination to be firm in West Berlin. However, any further action to this end has been disapproved.

c. We inaugurated armed assistance patrols to stop harassments on the autobahn. These patrols did effectively stop harassments by East German police and bring about the resumption of control on the autobahn by Soviet military forces. When our patrols were stopped by Soviet military intervention, we countered with the increased movement of armed convoys on the autobahn. Due to pressure from our Allies, these movements have now been substantially decreased.

d. Tanks kept on the alert near Friedrich Strasse were withdrawn to Tempelhof which was immediately followed by Soviet withdrawal of tanks from East Berlin, although it seemed clear that the presence of the Soviet tanks in East Berlin was embarrassing both to them and to the East German government. This withdrawal was not ordered by higher headquarters, but was undertaken in response to the desire of our government that every effort be made to avoid incidents during the period of probing.

e. When our Political Adviser, and later General Watson accompanied by civilian aides, were stopped at Friedrich Strasse, we countered with a ban on their opposite numbers. Our Allies objected to the identification procedures designed to enforce this ban. To meet their objections, in the face of an insulting letter, we now seek the restoration of the procedures formerly in existence. We have agreed to give up our position with respect to the Political Advisers and have not as yet decided our position with respect to continuing the identification procedures. In my opinion, while not relatively important, this approach does indicate a weakness in our determination which we may be sure will be exploited.

Any examination of these measures other than the rather hysterical belief that an incident in Berlin can cause war will indicate that the measures and the remnants thereof which remain have very little of either bold or dangerous characteristics.

On the night the tank barricades were erected it was clear that the East German forces were nervous. I asked General Watson to get permission to move tanks up if it seemed desirable to have a show of force, but this permission was refused unless and until General Watson was prepared to give a specific reason for their use. In my opinion, a movement of tanks that night would have caused consternation in East Germany and in any event could have done us no harm.

Some weeks ago I pointed out that in case of attack there would be no time to then establish an Allied Command. Steps to minimize the time delay have recently been taken. However, no Allied Command not functioning prior to an attack can ever be formed in the time available if an attack does develop. To date, my recommendations for a specific and separate plan for American action have failed to receive any comment.

Also for some weeks conduct to be followed in case of an uprising has been under discussion. If such an uprising should occur and we based our conduct on tentative draft instructions, it could result in my opinion in situations which would be almost intolerable for our position here in the free world. We can depend neither on telephonic communications nor on detailed instructions in the event of a real emergency.

There have been too many who have interpreted the relative quiet of the past several months as an indication of a Soviet desire to negotiate. This I doubt, as the Soviet pattern of pressure has always been a period of application of extreme pressure to the point of risk, followed by a period of quiet. Since as soon as they relieve the pressure we accept it and discontinue any aggressive actions which we may have initiated, they prepare, as they are certainly doing now, their next move. It seems clear to me that our lack of firmness on the ground has made the East German and Soviet governments confident that they can take many additional steps to destroy the morale and economy of West Berlin without risk. I realize that for many years our representatives in West Berlin have been charged with having developed "localitis". I can only say that it is as clear to me in 1962 as it was in 1948 that we can save Berlin without war only if we refuse to yield further at any point.

However, since we have no specific policy to guide our activities here, I find we must fight each particular case through almost every echelon of government. Obviously, the majority of the actions we could take here do not require such prompt action as to prevent telephonic recommendation, even though the time lag for instructions to return here can often make it impossible to associate counter-action with action. Moreover, some of these actions which we should take are too insignificant to warrant telephonic recommendation although their accumulative effect can be most damaging.

In any event, the instructions under which General Watson must operate are much too rigid for any advice I may give to him to have any value. Hence, I would like to be relieved from this specific responsibility. It has not been clearly understood here that I have neither responsibility nor authority, and this must be made completely clear. Of course, if an emergency develops I will do my best to communicate by telephone. However, I can not accept any responsibility for failure to act in Berlin if there is no time for such communication. Moreover, I have done all that I can do to change our policy in Berlin. I do not believe I am helpful to you or to anyone else in continuing to press my views on individual cases, knowing that they are not consistent with our policy in Berlin even though it is a policy I can not accept.

However, I would be negligent in my duty if I did not specifically recommend once again and for the last time that pursuant to the general policies of the United States and under the general instructions which he has received, our Commandant be authorized and held responsible for taking those measures in an emergency which he deems necessary to support and maintain our position in West Berlin. I believe that the next moves against West Berlin will start soon, possibly with the new East German customs law as it is applied, and that we must meet each move head-on when it occurs. I want to make it very clear that I am not asking for any further authority for myself. Nevertheless, as the senior American representative in Berlin I can not see our position lost by default without clearly reporting to our government that this could happen under our present instructions.

I am fully aware that this makes my presence in Berlin symbolic only. I am also aware of the obligation to the people of West Berlin which I assumed by coming here voluntarily, and of the firm commitment which I made to the President. However, I would rather be here for the remainder of my stay merely as a symbol than to participate in an advisory capacity in a course of action which I do not believe can be successful, or to accept the outward aspects of a responsibility which has no meaning since those I would advise have no authority to act.

I did not discuss these matters at any length with you when I was in Washington as our meetings were beclouded by the publication of a secret cable which obviously made it a bad time to discuss what may be basic differences./2/ While we may not differ at all in basic principles, it is very difficult for me to reconcile our strategy and tactics with these principles.

Please be assured that my commitment still stands, and the timing of my departure rests in the President's hands. Nevertheless, I could not stay here even in this role without making it very clear that I believe our actions here to be so timid and cautious as to vitiate our policy.

I am deliberately expressing my views in a period of relative calm because I expect the strangulation process to start anew soon. If it does not develop, then it will soon become apparent that I am not needed here. If it does develop, I do not believe it can be stopped either with timidity here or with case by case decision in Washington. Since my viewpoint as to our course of action here differs from our apparent intent, I must so advise you before a situation develops which could be embarrassing to both of us. This might well influence the decision as to how long I should remain. While I am here, I shall try to play my symbolic role as best I can and to avoid actions which would be embarrassing to you and to our policy. However, I am out of character.

Sincerely yours,
Lucius
General, Retired
U.S. Army

Washington, January 31, 1962, 6:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.
The President
Mr. Akalovsky, ACDA/IR

USSR
Mr. Alexei Adzhubei, Editor-in-Chief, Izvestiya
Mr. Georgi Bolshakov, Editor-in-Chief, USSR Magazine

Mr. Adzhubei inquired whether, before the President started the actual conversation he could clarify the term "arrangement", which he had used in a conversation yesterday./2/

The President replied that he thought it might be quite impossible to find a final solution of the Berlin situation at this time and that therefore an accommodation should be found which would prevent tensions from mounting. How such a mutually acceptable accommodation could be found is another question which should perhaps be examined later. The President stressed his belief that no final conclusions could be formed as to what the situation would be some years from now. He stressed that the expectations on which both sides had acted in 1945-6-7 had obviously changed since then. However, the President said, he believed that an arrangement could be found which could stand for a certain period of time. Citing the examples of Laos and the Congo the President reiterated that situations change and that it is quite impossible to look far into the future.

Mr. Adzhubei wondered whether he had understood the President correctly that there would be a final solution after a certain period of time.

The President replied that on the basis of present positions of the two sides he could not see how a final solution could be found. The Soviet Union insists on maintaining the division of Germany and on formal recognition of East Germany. He recalled that he had stated that the United States could not accept this and that he had said why. The President then expressed the view that both sides must avoid reaching the breaking point. He noted that the positions of the two sides are at present quite incompatible. While we cannot find a perfect solution sitting here in the winter of 1962 and cannot foresee how the situation would change some years from now, we must make every effort to reach some mutually acceptable accommodation which would minimize the hazards of the present situation. This, however, may not be satisfactory to the USSR and the question is whether it is going to sign a peace treaty and then see what happens. In any event no final solution seems to be possible on the basis of the present positions of the two sides and no compromise seems to be possible. The President observed that Mr. Gromyko and Ambassador Thompson, who are scheduled to meet tomorrow, might discuss the subject. However, he would be prepared to give Mr. Adzhubei some general thoughts on the problem.

The President went on to say that at the last Gromyko-Thompson meeting Ambassador Thompson had talked about an all-Berlin solution--something the USSR would not accept, while Mr. Gromyko had talked about stationing Soviet troops in West Berlin and about establishing a border--something the US cannot accept. Reviewing the recent conversations in Moscow, the President said he had gained the impression that the positions of the two sides were becoming more and more formal, and more and more incompatible. He stressed that failure to reach an accommodation could be fraught with serious consequence. Thus the question is whether both sides can reach accommodation in the light of what is acceptable to them or whether the USSR is simply going to sign a peace treaty and attempt to apply a squeeze with all of its hazards to both sides. The President asked Mr. Adzhubei for his view as to whether it would be preferable for the Soviet Union to sign a peace treaty without accord on matters where agreement is possible and see what happens then, or, alternatively, to seek agreement on the basis of give and take. The President noted that on this the two sides seemed to have opposite positions.

Mr. Adzhubei replied that first he would like to state that it would be best if an all-German solution could be found. The search for an all-German solution should not be abandoned. He expressed the view that the President should continue contacts with Mr. Khrushchev on the subject. Mr. Adzhubei said that he felt that before the issue of international autobahn was raised there had been some possibility in this respect. He recalled Mr. Gromyko's remarks about the possibility of an accommodation on the question of aircraft safety, and he also referred to the idea of placing the UN Headquarters in U.S. Berlin. He continued by saying that, in his personal view, the U.S., having sensed the USSR's "loyalty" and desire for agreement, decided to put pressure on the USSR. The USSR is doing the same. But, as the saying goes, the worst peace is better than a good war. Perhaps a third solution is possible. Mr. Macmillan had spoken some time ago about suspending things in mid air. That suggestion met with some objections. Some people felt that resistance to change was tantamount to weakness. However, the President had suggested at least some accommodation. Mr. Adzhubei then said that both the President and Mr. Khrushchev carry a tremendous burden on their shoulders and that he would therefore prefer to listen to what the President had to say rather than to talk himself.

The President said that he recognized that the Soviet Union was concerned about remilitarization and the revival of nationalism in West Germany as well as about the possibility of West Germany's acquiring nuclear weapons. He said that all this would not be in the interest of peace. However, on all this some accommodation might be found. Referring to his earlier statements about U.S. policy with regard to proliferation of nuclear weapons the President emphasized that any increase in tensions in Berlin would seem to increase the very dangers in Germany which the Soviet Union says it fears.

With reference to the Gromyko-Thompson talks the President said that Mr. Gromyko and Ambassador Thompson should speak in specific terms rather than simply reiterate the well-known general positions of the two sides. For instance, the U.S. would like to know whether the Soviet Union insists that the U.S. recognize the GDR as a national entity and then negotiate with it or whether some other arrangement is possible. Likewise, we would like to know whether the Soviet Union insists on having its troops stationed in West Berlin and if so, why. These are the things Ambassador Thompson and Mr. Gromyko should be talking about. Otherwise, the positions of the two sides become more and more formal, the two sides exchange diplomatic messages restating their positions, and nothing happens. The President expressed his concern that so far the talks have not produced anything and observed that the French are saying that the talks are useless.

The President went on to say that the Soviet Union is in a good position as far as applying a squeeze is concerned. However, he pointed out, neither he nor Mr. Adzhubei could tell what may occur on Friedrichstrasse or on the access routes tonight. Incidents may occur there without either side being able to control them. The President then stated that perhaps Mr.Gromyko and Ambassador Thompson should attempt to make progress on details. In the event that there should be no progress he would see the new Soviet Ambassador after his arrival and also write to Chairman Khrushchev. The President stated that he viewed the situation as unsatisfactory to both sides, although the Chairman may feel that the situation is better to the Soviet Union in view of the geography. In any event, each side knows what is unacceptable to the other, and it is important to seek accommodation on what is acceptable to them.

Mr. Adzhubei said that he would talk with Moscow on the telephone tonight and express the belief that Mr. Gromyko would talk about the points mentioned by the President. Noting that he did not wish to complain about Ambassador Thompson, Mr. Adzhubei said that Ambassador Thompson had not started the talks along the lines suggested by the President. Ambassador Thompson had bluntly said that the conversation should be about access. This is not the correct way to proceed. On the other hand, the President seems to have in mind concrete issues.

Noting that Ambassador Thompson had already received his instructions, the President said that he would also be sent a report on this conversation, so that he would know what had been said here. The President stressed, however, that there is no point in talking about such questions as free access when we do not know what the Soviet Union means when it says that access to Berlin would be free in accordance with accepted international standards for such communication. The President said that there was need for clarification as to the exact meaning of this statement by the USSR.

Mr. Adzhubei said that he wished to attempt to think along the lines suggested by the President. Noting that he was merely thinking out loud, he said that, for example, recognition of East Germany by some Western states would be a big step forward. It would make it possible to resolve other questions in a more conciliatory manner. For instance, the question of access would be easier to resolve if GDR were recognized by some Western states.

The President stressed that this would require a change in our position from reunification to formal division of Germany. The U.S. could not make such a change.

Mr. Adzhubei said that he did not have in mind the U.S. Nor did he have in mind that all Western states should recognize the GDR. It would be helpful if at least some Western countries extended recognition to the GDR.

At this point the President requested Mr. Akalovsky to prepare a summary of the main points covered, a copy of which he wished to be given to Mr. Adzhubei./3/

After Mr. Akalovsky had left the room, Mr. Adzhubei inquired as to what the President's attitude would be toward East Germans controlling access under the supervision of an International Commission. The President did not respond to the question but indicated that this question would have to be studied in the light of details.

Moscow, February 1, 1962, 9 p.m.

2100. Eyes only for Secretary. I opened meeting with Gromyko with brief summary my instructions./2/ I then turned over the text of our memorandum/3/ which was translated in full by the translator. On completion of translation I presented text of the all-Berlin proposal and the summary proposal for an international access authority,/4/ the latter of which I also had orally translated. In presenting document on access authority I read para five my instructions.

Gromyko responded that he would comment on the documents and my statements but reserved the right to comment further at a later date. He added, "this, however, does not signify our attitude is in any degree favorable to the documents or what you have said today."

Gromyko stated he must assume that the USG apparently does not have any intention of discussing seriously the matters under question. This is confirmed, he said, by the fact that the documents presented concern access and propose creation of an international authority responsible for access. These proposals, he continued, are not at all realistic and Soviet attitude toward them is well-known. "The Soviet Government is strongly opposed to creation of any international policeman, gendarme, fee collector, traffic regulator, or any kind of servant of the Western powers to regulate traffic to West Berlin." Gromyko then also rejected any all-Berlin proposal as completely unrealistic, and expressed regret negative attitude USG toward proposals which Soviet Government had put forth in order to facilitate progress toward agreement.

Gromyko criticized what he called US concentration on access question. "You and your government and your Allies in NATO may think and consider this the most important issue, but the attitude of the Soviet Government differs basically. Such approach offers only a very narrow area for understanding and in fact precludes agreement on negotiations." He added, access is only one question. I had not touched on the other questions he had raised such as frontiers and European security. There are many other questions and issues which will arise inevitably when a peace treaty is concluded with the GDR. Making the first of several references to a separate peace treaty Gromyko said, since this treaty will inevitably be concluded, these questions will come up. This attempt to concentrate on access is one-sided, he complained, and does not offer a chance for negotiations.

Gromyko continued by re-stating point which he emphasized in first meeting regarding access. He said we have spoken of access many times. We consider it is possible agree on question of unlimited and unrestricted access providing agreement is simultaneously reached on respect for sovereignty of the GDR. Such agreement would be in accord with centuries old international law. However, he charged, "all your arguments focus on a fear your occupation rights will be given to--or conferred on--the GDR". Gromyko rejected the use of "confer" in this case, insisting that the rights in question was not the issue and did not pretend that these were a suitcase which can be simply handed over from one to another. He declared that a new situation must be established in West Berlin and that the communications routes from and to West Berlin which are located on GDR territory or in air corridors which go over its territory, or canals which run through its territory cannot possibly exist while ignoring GDR sovereignty. "It is impossible to sign an agreement on this question which is not in accord with GDR sovereignty."

Gromyko then addressed himself to question of occupation status. He stated it was essential to replace old situation which existed under occupation status and which resulted from capitulation which took place 17 years ago. He insisted it was not Soviet Union which initiated practice violating Allied agreements. The fact is, he stated, occupation rights are completely divorced from life today. He took issue with US charge Soviets desire Western powers give up their rights while Soviets retain theirs. Everything we suggest, he stated, is in conformity with facts of situation today and directed toward improvement relations and peace. Displaying sensitivity he said, "you say Western powers never spoke of giving up their occupation rights, but only of exercising these rights. This is your position, Mr. Ambassador, but not ours." He claimed US proposals aim at maintaining and improving Western position and retaining occupation rights. "We shall never sign, and I mean this figuratively as well as literally, any document which backs these occupation rights, nor agree to sign any document favoring retention of occupation regime in West Berlin."

Gromyko then referred to US profession we do not desire interfere internal affairs GDR and are prepared organize international body handle access. Gromyko claimed this represents very narrow understanding GDR sovereignty and stated "the very establishment of such an international authority would constitute interference in internal affairs GDR". Gromyko also referred to Western reluctance depend on "whims" of GDR. He complained such formulation constitutes attitude of "looking down on GDR" and is basically improper. He continued, under peace treaty with German states, GDR as well as Allies will assume certain obligations including question of access. Such assumption of obligations by GDR has nothing to do with whims. Referring to our statement responsibility rests with Soviet Government to insure interests of Western powers will not be violated following conclusion peace treaty, Gromyko stated if interests of Western powers are broad and include interests of people, normalization relations between GDR and FRG, liquidation occupation regime West Berlin, interests of Europe, then Soviet proposals are in accord with these interests. However, if your interests are narrow, in other words mean the retention of occupation rights, maintenance West Berlin as source of tension and unrest, and they oppose drawing a line under WW II, then it is true our interests differ.

Gromyko then complained that my statement and recent statements by certain American statesmen suggest "that if no agreement reached and Soviet Government takes certain actions, in other words, concludes a peace treaty with the GDR--and a peace treaty will be concluded--in this case the West would stop short of nothing, including force." Gromyko warned that if the West is seeking a test of strength and trying to get war, they may very well succeed. Such language, he stated, should not be spoken when negotiating with the USSR, and will not frighten the Soviet Union. He concluded with statement it unfortunately seemed clear US does not intend discuss seriously matter in question. "However, I repeat I retain the right to comment further, as I said earlier. We can arrange a date later."

I responded regretting very much that Gromyko's preliminary remarks had been so negative. I then took up his reference to the international authority as an employee of the Western powers, emphasizing Soviets, as well as Western powers would participate and stated we were prepared work out arrangement for some participation of East Germans and East Berliners, as well as West Germans and West Berliners. (When interpreter used expression "representatives" of East Germany etc. I corrected him.) Authority would not be employee of anyone, but an impartial international organization. Regarding recognition of the GDR, I pointed out that while we are not prepared to recognize it, it is not our purpose demonstrate that we don't recognize it, and we have framed our proposals with this in mind. I then recalled the reference to the international air service agreement and pointed out that this international agreement is subscribed to by some 60 countries which have committed themselves to permit over-flights and emergency landings in their countries. I reminded Gromyko of his earlier statements and added we had thought it might be possible reach agreement with the Soviet Union on access under procedure which he had indicated and that this agreement would then be recognized by the GDR which would cover the question of sovereignty.

I also stated that these proposals were devised in order to avoid friction between us and to prevent any temptation of East Germans to bring pressure on West Berlin or interfere with its access. This was in interest all parties concerned.

I stated that we have made clear the unacceptability of Soviet free city proposal but that if Soviets had problems regarding West Berlin we were ready to discuss them. I pointed out that it is the Soviet side which raised this whole problem. While we do not consider situation in Germany and Berlin completely satisfactory we had been able to live with it. I continued that, since Soviets raised this problem we have tried to find ways deal with it by agreement, and our proposals represent such efforts.

Regarding Gromyko's remarks about the use of force, I stated, "you and your government have said after the conclusion of peace treaty with East Germany Western rights would be ended. We had to take account of these statements and consider what position of our West Berlin troops would be. Apparently you consider they would be there illegally." I asked Gromyko what would happen to these troops, and stated "we did not believe it would be in interest of peace if you did not understand what our troops would do if anyone tried to throw them out. The same applies to their access to and from Berlin." Certainly, I continued, it cannot be considered a threat to state that if our troops were attacked they would defend themselves. I agreed we should fix another meeting when mutually convenient. I added hope Gromyko would further consider our proposals which we believe would be in the interest of all those concerned.

Gromyko at this point reiterated his disappointment in our proposals, claiming they are not realistic and apparently the USG is not serious about trying to reach agreement at present time. He then returned to peace treaty question, repeating standard position that best solution would be conclusion treaty with both German states. He insisted Soviet Government not pursuing selfish Soviet interest in West Berlin. "We don't want West Berlin, not one West Berlin street, not one house in West Berlin." What we do want, he said, is solution in accordance with facts of life in existing situation. "If you don't agree to treaty with both German states, Soviet Union will sign a treaty with the GDR."

Gromyko then turned to question West Berlin plebiscite. He repeated earlier denunciations of proposal and argument that troops stationed in West Berlin were not invited into Berlin following a German vote. In fact, he said, they arrived even against the will of those who were running the Hitler government.

I recalled that Gromyko claimed present conditions demanded change. However, I said, one fact of life today is people of West Berlin want us to remain. Our offer regarding a plebiscite, I explained, was made in case there is any doubt on the Soviet side about this fact. Gromyko insisted question of West Berlin does not depend on will of West Berliners because it is an international question and the interest of several states are involved. I agreed this was international question but pointed out that when we decided on this matter the wishes of the people should be taken into account and reiterated that if there is any doubt on the Soviet side about the wishes of West Berliners, a plebiscite could resolve those doubts. Gromyko then concluded stating he was sorry we had made no progress in our work and, on the basis of what is known about the US position, it seems clear it is not designed to permit agreement. I concluded that I had to agree with the first half of his comment, but of course could not accept the last half.

Thompson

Washington, February 1, 1962.

Dear Mr. Secretary: One of the measures actively under consideration in the North Atlantic Council in the context of the Berlin crisis is the U.S. proposal for a NATO-wide boycott of the Leipzig Fair in East Germany, to be held March 4-13, 1962. The Berlin Task Force, on which your Department is represented, has closely followed developments in the Council on this measure.

The Federal Republic of Germany--heretofore the principal western exhibitor--has already adopted an effective policy of informal discouragement and dissuasion of West German firms from participation in the Fair. Accordingly, it appears that the steel and chemical industries of West Germany, which have previously been represented in depth in Leipzig, will be virtually unrepresented in the spring event.

While it is understood that the United States Government cannot prohibit private participation in the Leipzig Fair, there is much that can be done to discourage U.S. businessmen and firms, including foreign subsidiaries, from exhibiting in the Fair. I would hope that in particular your Agency would undertake to contact those U.S. firms, either directly or through the Chamber of Commerce or appropriate trade associations, which have exhibited at the Leipzig Fair in the past or which you have reason to believe may wish to exhibit at the forthcoming Fair, and that they be discouraged from taking part.

The Foreign Commerce Weekly would presumably be an effective instrument for making known generally the U.S. policy in regard to participation in the Leipzig Fair.

I am sure I can count on your cooperation in this endeavor.

Sincerely yours,
George W. Ball/2/

Moscow, February 2, 1962, 6 p.m.

2103. Eyes only Secretary.

1) I suggest we wait for Gromyko to call next meeting. Possible that he might do so shortly. While I could stay within framework present instructions and merely state I would inform my govt his remarks, would be helpful to know promptly whether I should do this or use contingency instructions which were prepared for my last meeting in event discussion went badly./2/

2) I believe Gromyko will take practically same line as he did in his preliminary reaction. We are unlikely to get any real reading of Soviet policy until return of Khrushchev now rumored to be in Sochi.

3) I am somewhat concerned that Soviets may conclude that under pressure from Adenauer and de Gaulle our position has hardened since Rusk-Gromyko talks and that any agreement involving "other questions" can be ruled out. Therefore suggest in our next encounter I might say to Gromyko that our unwillingness discuss these questions in advance of knowledge general outline Berlin settlement does not mean any change in our position but that it would be obviously impossible for us to get full agreement of our Allies on such matters until we know fairly definitely the shape of a possible Berlin agreement particularly with regard to access.

4) When I briefed my German, French, and British colleagues today all appeared think Soviets unlikely accept international access authority in absence major concessions on our part. Kroll thought Soviets had more interest in peace treaty with West Germany than in Berlin and continued think suggestion he had put to Khrushchev was promising approach. I said I believed Soviets would pay extra premium for peace treaty with both Germanies but problem was whether under any conditions West Germany could accept procedure which carried strong implications of permanent division of country. Roberts said Soviets had again needled him on failure British play role in current negotiations. In this connection Deputy Chief of British Section Soviet Foreign Ministry had referred to Macmillan letter to Khrushchev of Dec 22./3/ Roberts pointed out British being fully consulted and my talks represented agreed position. Roberts said British correspondent had inquired of British Embassy Bonn re Macmillan letter stating his source was non-German. Assumption is it was Soviet./4/

Thompson