242. Memorandum From the Legal Adviser (Chayes) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, December 19, 1961.

SUBJECT
Next Steps on Berlin

1. Time is not on our side in Berlin. The Western position there is disappearing--not with a bang but with a whimper. Unless we take affirmative steps, the process will continue. The Communists will both publicize and accelerate it with an abundant repertory of harassing tactics.

2. For the moment, the West continues to have a limited power of initiative. A sufficiently positive move towards negotiations would stabilize the situation for the time being. However, the Soviets could eliminate this remaining room for maneuver by minor unilateral action (e.g., inviting delegates to a peace conference). We could not act in response to the direct pressure of a unilateral change in the status quo.

3. The French should not have a veto over this initiative. We have consulted openly and frankly over a period of more than four months in a more than conscientious effort to meet French objections. Our obligation as an ally is fully discharged. It does not require us to permit the French to block a course suggested by our own appraisal of our national interest and in which the rest of the alliance unanimously concurs.

4. Further probing by Ambassador Thompson in Moscow is not an effective initiative. Unless he moves into the range of outright negotiation, the talks will be unproductive. Even so negotiations at the ambassadorial level pursued quietly and as a matter of routine leave considerable latitude for unilateral pressures by the Soviets. Thus, they do not effectively stabilize the situation.

5. Bilateral negotiations at the foreign ministers level would be an effective alternative. In calling for such a meeting we should put forward our proposals for improving access and securing Western presence in Berlin, without necessarily responding to any of the Soviet demands. We would undertake to secure the adherence of our allies if the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. could reach agreement. In practice, we would consult very fully during the negotiations with the Germans and the British and, to the extent they permit it, the French.

6. Rusk-Gromyko negotiations would have the following advantages:

a. They would be overt enough to stabilize the situation, but small enough to be relatively private.

b. They would be at a level which would satisfy both our own public and the allies that we had made a serious try for a negotiated solution.

c. The British would be spared the need to join up with us against the French.

d. We could smoke out the Russians without being fully committed on our side thus retaining some of the characteristics of probe.

e. Although there are disadvantages for the Russians, the prospects of engaging us in bilateral talks may be sufficiently attractive to bring them along.

7. If such a course is to be followed an announcement should be made soon to pre-empt any Soviet initiative. The forthcoming consultations with Prime Minister Macmillan afford a good opportunity for discussing the possibilities. A decision could be made at the end of the talks, permitting a Christmas announcement which might have certain psychological advantages. In order not to give the appearance of an Anglo-American plot, both the French and the Germans should be notified in advance if we plan to discuss this kind of initiative in the Bermuda talks./2/

Bermuda, December 21, 1961, 4-5:30 p.m.

SUBJECT
Berlin

PARTICIPANTS

United States
The President
The Secretary of State
Mr. Bohlen
Ambassador Bruce
Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Mr. William R. Tyler

United Kingdom
Prime Minister Macmillan
The Foreign Secretary, Lord Home
Ambassador Ormsby-Gore
Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh
Sir Norman Brook
Mr. Ian Samuel

In answer to Lord Home, who asked what the next move should be on Berlin, the President said that instructions to Ambassador Thompson had been drafted, as guidance for a first talk with Gromyko. The British were then given the text of the draft instructions./2/

The Secretary commented that after the probes, there might be a meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers. In the first talk, Ambassador Thompson could raise two points: (1) access, (2) the idea of an International Authority. Should the Soviet response hold out some promise, these subjects could be taken up again in the next talk.

Lord Home said there seemed to be four major points, on which we should draw out Soviet attitudes and intentions:

(1) De facto dealings with the GDR--some formula short of de jure recognition.

(2) The question of the frontiers of Germany.

(3) The question of allied rights: Can we find an agreed formula whereby we would not drop our rights, but superimpose on them a practical agreement? We might say to Khrushchev that we want to get away from a war basis for our position, and assume the role of a kind of trustee for West Berlin.

(4) The links between West Berlin and the Federal Republic needs. Was it necessary to hold Bundestag meetings in West Berlin "and that kind of thing"?

The Secretary said the Soviets have repeatedly stressed "existing facts". Our presence in Berlin is one such fact, and we are not going to be driven out. On the other hand we recognize certain facts pertaining to the other side.

The President asked the Prime Minister whether there was anything he would wish to add to the instructions. He commented that there was one idea which we were considering with regard to access: that the international access route might start deep inside West Berlin, cross GDR territory, and continue into Federal Republic territory to a roughly equivalent extent, thus involving three territorial jurisdictions.

The President went on to say that we could not accept the Soviet claim to have the right to be present in West Berlin, nor the imposition of a time limit on any agreement.

The Secretary referred to certain remarks by Lord Home during the NATO meeting, in which he said we should stick to facts, allowing our respective theories, underlying these facts, to diverge. He went on to say that at some appropriate stage we might say that we considered that the Oder-Neisse line constituted the Eastern border of Germany. Lord Home suggested the formulation might be that "If Germany is reunited, the Oder-Neisse line would be the Eastern border of Germany." The Secretary said that the issue of the frontiers is one of the few cards the Germans feel they have to buy something with. (There was general agreement that the Germans wouldn't be able to buy much anyway.)

The Prime Minister asked if we expect the probe to be successful. Ambassador Bohlen said he expected there would not be much success at first, and that the Soviets would probably adopt a tough position to start with.

Sir David Ormsby-Gore asked whether we expected the French to be swayed. The Secretary pointed out that the primary target of our endeavors was not the French but the Russians, at whom we should direct our efforts. Sir David Ormsby-Gore said that the probe should be a first move leading toward negotiations. Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh repeated this thought with some emphasis.

At this point there was a general discussion on whether Ambassador Thompson should report the substance of his talk to the French and the Germans (as well as to the British Ambassador). Lord Home said that Sir Frank Roberts would give Ambassador Thompson whatever support he could. He added that the German Ambassador, Herr Kroll, would probably want to play a role. Ambassador Bohlen said that so long as Ambassador Thompson talked to Gromyko within the framework of the draft instructions, he would not be exposed, as he would be operating on an agreed four-power basis. Lord Home said there were certain other matters within the Ambassadorial working group report on which we are not agreed quadripartitely, i.e., recognition. Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh said the thing to do was to try to reach a possible area of agreement on a practical basis, and then only go to the Germans on specific points which would complete the picture.

Ambassador Bohlen pointed out that if negotiations were conducted on matters relating only to Berlin (i.e., on a narrow basis), this would exclude the Germans from playing a direct role, since they do not have responsibility for Berlin. The Secretary said it would be useful to retain the Ambassadorial group as a base, to which to refer the progress of the talks for consideration, rather than to use the Ambassadors in Moscow for this purpose. He added that it would not be desirable to create too much of an impression of Anglo-Saxon direction of the talks, as this might make the continental powers feel they were being ignored. In particular the French and Germans must not be made to feel left out.

Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh asked whether we were thinking of moving forward to a Foreign Ministers meeting. The Secretary said it would be necessary to take the temperature of the French. We might find ourselves moving toward a Deputy Foreign Ministers meeting, and eventually a full Foreign Ministers meeting. Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh at this point pressed hard on the necessity of holding out a prospect of forward movement. The Secretary said it might be that our present position (as set forth on the bottom of page 3 in the Working Group paper)/3/ was too negative with regard to the possibility of an all-Berlin proposal.

The President asked whether it would not be useful to take a look at the working group paper overnight and see what changes might usefully be introduced. Lord Home raised the question of the timing of the probe. He said he thought it was agreed it should be conducted by "one chap", who should be the American Ambassador. The Secretary said we should not delay too long before moving. Lord Home said he thought that the German Ambassador in Moscow might play a useful role, and Ambassador Bohlen commented that we should be rather careful about any role to be played by Ambassador Kroll, who had gone somewhat far on his own with Khrushchev. Sir David Ormsby-Gore said that it was important to commit the Germans to any steps which it might be desirable to take.

At this point, the Prime Minister, who had been sitting very quiet in an atmosphere of brooding, said with some vehemence that "all this was very confusing." The point was: do we want to reach an agreement with the Russians or don't we? The UK would never go to war unless there had been negotiations first. He didn't like the idea of long drawn out preliminary stages. The question to be answered was: do we want to bring the Russians to negotiate? What were the facts? East Germany exists. It is nonsense for the West Germans to talk as though it doesn't exist when they are conducting trade with East Germany to the tune of 300 million pounds yearly. This business about not recognizing the existence of East Germany was pure fiction. The thing to do was to recognize East Germany, not too much and not too little. It is obvious that the GDR could not be elected to the United Nations ("happy country!") because it was part of a divided country like South Viet-nam or South Korea. The French don't want Germany reunited, the Russians don't, and he wasn't sure the Germans themselves wanted it very much. All we had to do was to start by saying that there will one day be a reunited Germany and the Russians might accept this so long as they felt sure it won't happen. He said the thing to do was to find some suitable phraseology "in a Pickwickian sense". We were going to stay in Berlin by the de jure right of conquest, which we had translated into our de facto presence in that city. After all, 6000 Normans had conquered England in 1066, and they rapidly became absorbed into the legal framework of local laws and customs. They rapidly stopped giving up the tenure of their possessions by mere right of conquest, and similarly we were in a position where we should become in a sense trustees for the continued existence of West Berlin. Then there was the matter of an agreement of access to go in or come out, he said. We should have guarantees that we should be able to do this. So what remained? There was the question of the frontiers, which might be the last item which would be settled by our saying to the Russians: in asking you to come to an agreement with us, we are prepared to give you assurances on the question of frontiers. The thing we must be clear about is what was to be the purpose of our undertaking a probe. The Prime Minister said that he himself had often suffered, in the period of his life when he was engaged in diplomacy, from lengthy instructions of twenty pages or more. It was very hard on an Ambassador to have to cope with this kind of thing. It was difficult to remember all the points which were so carefully balanced in the text. If the purpose of the probe was to lead to a four-power conference, then the Russians would be influenced in the direction of moving toward us. Unless it was clear to them that we wanted a conference, they wouldn't move. If all this was right, the question was how can we bring the allies to agree. The Prime Minister said that he would like at this point to use an American expression, and to say that probably somebody would have to be the fall guy. If that was to be the U.S., the U.K. would be glad to be the "extra fall guy". The point was that the probes must be a preliminary to negotiations.

Lord Home asked whether we could say to Gromyko that our desire is to have a Foreign Ministers meeting. We would want to make sure that there is a basis for such a meeting so that it won't fail.

The Secretary said that it was clear that we are looking forward to the possibility eventually of a Foreign Ministers meeting. In Paris, Couve de Murville had accepted language which had been proposed by Lord Home incorporating this idea, but General de Gaulle had been adamant. The President raised the question of whether we should move together, or with the Germans, or possibly without the French. He pointed out that the French rights in Berlin had only been derived from the rights which the British and we enjoyed and it was not inconceivable that we might move without them if necessary. Ambassador Bohlen said that it would not be a good idea to start off by proposing a conference to Gromyko. We should find some way of indicating that we would be prepared to hold a conference if the Russians made it possible to reach a basis for holding one.

Lord Home turned to the subject of the presence of Soviet troops in West Berlin. He pointed out that certain Soviet troops are already accepted in West Berlin for certain purposes, such as the guard for the Soviet War Memorial, and the troops required for Spandau prison. Would it be possible to devise some way of admitting Soviet troops on the basis of a token presence? He thought that there was a good deal of face-saving involved in this particular matter. The important thing was that if there were the presence of Soviet troops it should be without their having an unacceptable function.

Lord Home referred to Khrushchev's recent letter/4/ to the Prime Minister and said that the UK was considering a reply. There was a draft text, which he would like us to see which contained suggestions for a possible opening of discussions.

/4/A copy of this letter is ibid., Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. It is also described in Macmillan, At the End of the Day, pp. 143-144.

The Prime Minister asked whether the United States thought that the Russians really wanted negotiations. The Secretary said that we had at first thought so, but that we were no longer sure since the erection of the wall in Berlin. Lord Home said that the recent tactics of the Russians had been curious, and appeared to suggest that they might be desirous of disengaging. Mr. Bohlen said that another interpretation of their present attitude would suggest that they might be preparing to sign a separate peace treaty.

Lord Home commented that in spite of what Mayor Brandt was saying, evidence was coming in to suggest that the morale of West Berlin was "in a pretty dicky state". He added that Adenauer certainly is of this opinion. The Secretary remarked that in Paris Couve de Murville had said that the real question was whether it was better to lose Berlin by default, or de facto by its withering away. Ambassador Bruce said that the only comment he had to make was that he thought it was not necessary to try to decide now whether we would move eventually without the French. It might be better to see how things go and take a decision in the light of later developments. Mr. Bohlen said he thought we should first do all we can to ascertain whether a basis really exists for negotiations.

The President said that we should think about a forum for negotiation with the Germans present in the room. He felt that our experience this summer with the Germans had been instructive. Whereas the German Ambassador in Washington had raised all kinds of difficulties in the Ambassadorial group, it turned out, in the course of Adenauer's visit in November, that the Chancellor was much nearer our point of view than he had seemed to be at "arms length". The Secretary and Mr. Bohlen commented that we should show the French the instructions that we were sending to Ambassador Thompson.

Bermuda, December 22, 1961, 9:45-10:30 a.m.

SUBJECT
Berlin (see previous memorandum on same subject dated December 21, 1961)/2/

PARTICIPANTS

U.S., The President, The Secretary of State, Ambassador Bruce, Mr. Bohlen, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. William R. Tyler

U.K., The Prime Minister, The Foreign Secretary, Lord Home, Ambassador Ormsby Gore, Sir Norman Brook, Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh, Mr. Ian Samuel

The modified instructions to Ambassador Thompson were discussed.

The Secretary said we thought it would be good to make a move in the direction of an all-Berlin solution in the first talk, and not foreclose this possibility to the same degree as in the British draft./3/ The Secretary also said that the British proposal envisages a series of talks, while we feel that it would be preferable to move toward a meeting, should this prove possible.

The Prime Minister asked what we would do if we don't find a basis for negotiation. The Secretary said we would try to achieve a practical solution on the basis of recognizing facts on either side. It was important to keep the situation from deteriorating further. Lord Home asked how much latitude Ambassador Thompson would have. Mr. Bohlen said he would not have much, since the probe would be conducted within the framework of the quadripartite talks in Paris.

The Secretary said the West Germans preferred that we should deal with the East Germans on matters relating to traffic and access, rather than that they should do so themselves. The Prime Minister said that we must move toward negotiations. If the reply from the Russians was very bad and they won't budge, what should we then do? The Secretary said we should ask the Soviets what their intentions are after they have signed a peace treaty with the GDR. The President said that if the Russians are unreasonable and unyielding the question was how do we dramatize the fact that we have done everything we could. He felt that, in such a situation, the Ambassadorial level was not high enough. The Secretary suggested that Gromyko might be asked to come to the UN, where we would turn to the Uniting for Peace resolution./4/ The President commented that the United States should not have to carry the whole burden. The Prime Minister said that should Ambassador Thompson fail to arrange a meeting, we must take some action ourselves. In any case, we must justify ourselves to Western opinion. We must not allow ourselves to drift into war. Had appropriate action been taken at the time, World War I could have been avoided. Sir David Ormsby Gore said it was important to distinguish between the Foreign Ministers meeting to negotiate a settlement on the one hand, and a Foreign Ministers meeting to discuss a very serious situation on the other. Lord Home wondered whether Ambassador Thompson would have enough latitude. Would it be desirable to go back to the Ambassadorial group in case he got nowhere? Mr. Bundy commented that Chancellor Adenauer had shown himself to be more flexible than the German position had seemed to be according to Ambassador Grewe. The Prime Minister emphasized the advantages of working out some kind of trusteeship function for the West in West Berlin. The Secretary said he was somewhat leary of the word "trusteeship" but was rather in favor of superimposing an arrangement on top of our rights, which we would not give up.

At this point the Prime Minister raised the question whether it would be a good thing for the UK to send a reply to Khrushchev's recent long letter, and it was agreed that a reply would be desirable.

There followed some discussion of the British draft reply/5/ and certain amendments in the text were proposed. It was agreed that a final paragraph would be added relating the reply to the Ambassadorial talks in Moscow. There should also be some reference to the allies.

The President and the Secretary both said that Ambassador Thompson should, before the end of the year, ask for an appointment. Lord Home asked how it might be possible to use German Ambassador Kroll, and would this be a good thing. The Secretary said he thought it was more important to keep Foreign Minister Schroeder and Grewe informed. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] The Prime Minister said that it seemed to him that Kroll had all the qualifications for reaching an agreement with the Russians and that he would much rather have the Germans bear the load rather than us.

The President said he did not want the coordination of instructions to rest with the Ambassadorial group, which had proved too slow and obstructive. The Prime Minister said he welcomed the President's comment. The situation was that Ambassador Thompson might succeed in the first talk, or that the Russians might say no and go ahead with a separate peace treaty, or they might call for a Foreign Ministers meeting. If the Russians were to say no, what do we do? Just sit around? Lord Home said he thought Gromyko would say that what we had to talk to him about was "very thin." We should be in a position to move further. The Prime Minister said that what we were doing was rather like inviting someone to dinner without telling him just what there would be to eat. We would be saying that there would be soup, probably fish and perhaps a little meat, although the latter was not certain. Lord Home said it might be rather a good thing to let Gromyko take a look at the meat through the kitchen door. The Prime Minister added that Ambassador Kroll might be the person to say to the Russians "By Jove, there's a pretty good stew in there. Of course I'm not supposed to know about it." The President raised the question of how we get the Germans to move. He observed that Adenauer was much more forthcoming when he discussed these matters himself. We might have a discussion with the Germans on the subject of relations with the GDR and access, also West Berlin's ties with the Federal Republic. The President felt we should talk to the Germans about what arrangements might be reached. It was subsequently agreed that it might be best for such discussions to be held in Bonn, rather than in the Ambassadorial group, and that Ambassadors Steel and Dowling could talk with Foreign Minister Schroeder.

On December 23, 1961, Major General Watson, U.S. Commandant for Berlin, who was going to Karlshorst to keep an appointment with Colonel Solovyev, his Soviet counterpart, was refused access to the Eastern sector of Berlin when he refused to show identity cards for his civilian advisers. Watson immediately protested this action and Ambassador Dowling sent a similar protest to Soviet Ambassador Pervukhin. (Telegrams 1232 and 1233 from Berlin, December 23; Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/12-2361) The next day the Mission at Berlin suggested that this was a deliberate affront that demanded counteraction, and proposed that the Soviet Commandant be barred from the U.S. Sector unless corrective measures were taken. (Telegram 1236 from Berlin; ibid., 862.181/12-2461)

On the same day Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Bundy called Secretary of State Rusk and told him that the President believed the United States "should do something but not something excessive" about the situation. (Ibid., Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations) When no remedial action was forthcoming by December 27, Watson sent Solovyev a second letter prohibiting him and his Political Adviser from entering the U.S. Sector until corrective measures had been taken. (Telegram 1243 from Berlin, December 27; ibid., Central Files, 762.0221/12-2761)

Belgrade, December 26, 1961.

Dear Tommy: I have long been meaning to write you; but, as always in the case of letters in which I myself have the greater interest, I have put it off, hoping to find a moment of proper leisure. Now, I realize time has slipped up on me. We are leaving tonight for a few days skiing in Switzerland, with the two younger children. I am reduced, therefore, to the following brief comments on several matters.

First, my thanks for your telegram of November 3, to the Department, commenting on my 622 of October 14./2/ Since that time, a good deal of water has gone over the dam, and the situation, of course, is somewhat different. The impression here (and it is one which, on the limited evidence available, I share) is that Khrushchev's success at the Congress was more apparent than real; that it was limited largely to taking the Congress by storm with the attacks on Albania and on the symbols of Stalinism; that it is indeed having effects in the foreign communist parties, particularly some of those not in power, which may well be far-reaching; but that in Russia it has not been followed by any extensive personnel changes and has not effectively changed the situation within the Party; that there continues, accordingly, to be a strong admixture of dogmatist sentiment spread throughout the senior echelons of the apparat: a sentiment which does not express itself in any organized factional form, and which for this reason cannot be dealt with by methods of administrative reprisal, but which finds its expression, quite properly and correctly, in the Central Committee voting on important ideological pronouncements and in the normal day-to-day work of the Section for Propaganda and Agitation (or whatever it is now called) and the various sub-organs concerned with ideological matters. My impression is that it is this which accounts for the continued protrusion of unmistakeably dogmatist notes in some of the ideological and political material being put out by the Party organs (see, for example, the editorial in Pravda of December 6, with its underplaying of the XXII Congress and its strong tendency to relate current policy not to the Congress itself but to the declarations of the meetings of the Communist Parties in 1957 and 1960, in which the dogmatist view found strong reflection).

On the other hand (I am now giving you purely my own impression, though I think that the Yugoslavs who follow these matters would agree), the Khrushchevian and dogmatist hands are not the only ones which appear now to be involved in Soviet policy. It seems to me still that there is a third hand which also plays a part: a hand which is not concerned with ideology but is very strongly concerned with military readiness, which has considerable power over decisions on the governmental level, and which, as I have said before, appears to place considerations of readiness for war ahead of the concern for its avoidance. I note your contrary opinion, as expressed in your telegram of November 3, and I earnestly hope you are right; but the violence of various Soviet reactions to NATO policies, the incredible arrogance of the position taken on nuclear testing, and the sinister implications of the Finnish gambit, all continue to make me feel that there is an influence at work in Soviet policy which has nothing to do with ideology and to which Khrushchev finds himself obliged to defer, even though it is often in conflict with the political purposes to which he himself is devoted. I sometimes wonder whether if it could be that the deference he pays to these purely military considerations could be in effect, though probably on the basis of a wholly unspoken understanding, the price required of him for the support of certain elements in the Central Committee who have military interests at heart. However, that is only a speculation.

As I write these lines, I suppose that you will be approaching the first of your formal consultations with the Soviet Government on the Berlin problem. I must confess that so far as these matters are concerned, I have long since fallen by the wayside and am unable to follow what is occurring. I can only assume that I am the victim of some major misapprehension.

In the first place, I fail to understand how we could ever have gotten ourselves in a position where it takes a series of summit meetings with our allies to make it possible for us to conduct perfectly normal diplomatic exchanges which, so far as I can see, need not have been at any time omitted or interrupted. I feel there is something badly wrong with the diplomacy which gives to our allies the power to tell us with whom and when we may have the privilege of normal diplomatic discussion about matters which are not only of mutual interest but of greatest importance to world peace.

Secondly, I regret the wide publicity that has attended the inauguration of such consultations, and feel that, in the circumstances, it will be practically impossible to preserve the confidential character that would be necessary if they were to make real progress. In particular, I think it important, if we are ever to arrive at any tolerable agreement with the Russians over German matters, that we afford to the Russians some possibility of communication with ourselves through channels on which our allies would not listen in. I think it in the interests of these allies themselves that we should have the privilege of such confidential communication. Obviously this will not be the case in the exchanges you are about to inaugurate.

Finally, I am at a loss to understand what it is that we think we are going to discuss with the Russians. So far as I can see we have already undertaken, in the talks with Adenauer, not to discuss anything which could be of interest in Moscow. Laboriously, we have persuaded the French and Germans to permit us to go down for a swim, and even to hang our clothes upon a limb, but we have carefully assured mother Adenauer that we would not go near the water.

I cannot understand, in the face of these circumstances, what it is that we think we are going to explore with the Russians. It would appear to me that if all we propose to offer is in effect a continuation of the present situation--if, that is, there is no concession of any consequence which we contemplate making at any stage of the game--then I fail to see why we think the Russians should have any interest in arriving at any agreement with us at all. If this is all that is involved, the Russians do not need to sit down at a table with us in order to assure its realization: they need only let things go on as they are.

My bewilderment is completed by our repeated statements that we are determined to find out whether the Russians are seriously interested in negotiating. It is now well over three years since Khrushchev began his efforts to get us to the negotiating table. I should have thought their interest in negotiation had been far more liberally documented than our own. And if the answer to this is that the proposals they have put forward in this connection were not acceptable to us, I would like to ask at what point, and why, we began to take the Soviet asking-price, publicly stated before negotiations were even begun, as a firm criterion of what Moscow would finally agree to and to draw our conclusions accordingly about the usefulness of negotiation. You yourself could judge how far we would have got with the Austrian peace treaty or the Trieste problem if we had taken the initial Soviet demands as the final evidence of their position in these problems and had therefore thrown up our hands and said we cannot go to the negotiating table because these demands were not acceptable from our point of view.

Actually, I suspect that we have now delayed too long; that things have changed in Moscow; that the possibilities for negotiation, to which we are now making so laborious and unpromising an approach, may actually have ceased to exist. Had we done last summer, quietly and without the fanfare of publicity, what we are now about to do, I think there might still have been a chance, although even then to preclude such things as the Oder-Neisse line and the recognition of the GDR from the scope of negotiation, and to do this on the basis of a widely publicized agreement with our allies, would always have represented a heavy burden on negotiation. Today, I strongly suspect that the moment is past for even these slender possibilities. The Russians have solved half their problem by the construction of the wall; a measure which need never have been taken had we, instead of shillyshallying with this problem for three years, gone into negotiations at a much earlier date with imaginative and constructive proposals. And whatever may have been the nature of the internal political considerations which moved Khrushchev to push this matter so insistently in the three years beginning with the early autumn of 1958, it seems fairly evident that they are no longer operable. He appears to have absorbed whatever humiliation this failure may have brought him and to have paid whatever price it involved. I should be much surprised, therefore, though pleasantly so, if the initiative you are about to undertake should meet with any very positive response. I should think it more likely that we might soon be confronted with unpleasant unilateral manifestations of Soviet policy reflecting a complete absence of interest in discussing the Berlin problem with us at all.

Forgive me for putting these thoughts to you with such frankness. There may, as I say, be something very basic that I have missed.

I was grateful for your comments on my recent piece about Yugoslav-Soviet relations and find them well taken.

Subject to your own frank judgment, I am thinking of paying a visit to Moscow at some time in the next two or three months. My thought would be simply to go in by train from here and spend four or five days, to get a smell of the atmosphere of Moscow in the 1960s. During recent years, the Russians have sent one person after another to me with the question: "Why don't you come to Moscow?" A year or so ago the Soviet Embassy in Washington demonstratively invited me all the way from Princeton to be present at the reception for Kozlov. Khrushchev has made it clear that he has no grudge against me, and only four days ago the Soviet Chargé took occasion to give me the last of many assurances that Khrushchev had a high opinion of me personally. All these gestures I take as reflecting a desire on Moscow's part to stress that the unpleasantness of 1952 was purely Stalin's doing, and is not to be regarded as constituting a proper source of discussion today.

Annelise joins me in affectionate regards to you all for the New Year.

Sincerely,
George K.

P.S. We shall be skiing at Crans-sur-Sierre until about January 10.

On December 27, 1961, the Head of the German Section of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, I. I. Il'ichev, handed German Ambassador Kroll a long memorandum, apparently written by Khrushchev, outlining the Soviet position on the world situation and Soviet-German relations in particular. The memorandum broke no new ground on the question of Berlin, although it did allow economic, cultural, and political contacts between the Federal Republic and West Berlin. For text of the memorandum, which Kohler described as "obviously divisive in intent" (memorandum to Rusk, January 1, 1962; Department of State, Central Files, 661.62A/1-862), see Europa Archiv, Folge 3/1962, pages D59-70, or Moskau Bonn, pages 876-877. A translation of the memorandum is attached to Kohler's memorandum to Rusk. For Kroll's account of receiving the memorandum, see Lebenserinnerungen eines Botschafters, pages 537 ff.

Washington, December 28, 1961./2/

1520. Eyes only for Ambassadors. (Verbatim text) FYI: Following are your instructions for your meeting with Gromyko which have been discussed and agreed with the British and Germans and a copy for information will be given to the French. You should request now an appointment for early next week.

We regret that we did not get a draft of these instructions to you sooner and that you saw the first draft from the British./3/ You will very shortly receive a personal message in regard to these discussions from me./4/ End FYI.

You should seek early meeting with Gromyko and make presentation along following lines:

FYI: Your purpose is to engage in a series of discussions with Mr. Gromyko with the object of finding out whether and in what area a basis for negotiations can be found. In your first conversation your main object should be to show the Soviet Government that the US Government and their allies desire to deal with the Berlin question by agreement. Of the three aspects, access, status of Berlin, and larger questions, it is our feeling that in first talk you should concentrate on access and merely listen to Soviet proposals on other two aspects rather than advance proposals of own. In making suitable responses on other two aspects you should use December 10 Working Group Report/5/ as guide. You should convey idea that suggestions can be put forward by both sides without commitment and without prejudice to our position of principle. End FYI.

1. Soviet Foreign Minister will have gathered from wording of recent NATO communiqué,/5/ and from fact of continuing consultation among Western leaders, that my Government would wish to review where we stand on Berlin situation. My Government assumes that this is an issue we would both want to settle by peaceful means if possible, although great differences in our respective viewpoints admittedly exist.

2. You should say that you have been authorized to go through the various aspects of the problem in order to clarify the attitudes of the two sides. At all these talks ideas and suggestions could be put forward without formal commitment.

3. We recognize that at present time great differences in our respective viewpoints exist. We have on one side well-known Soviet position that peace treaty or treaties with two Germanies are necessary, and that if Western Powers are unwilling to join with them Soviets will proceed unilaterally to sign peace treaty with GDR, alleging that this will have certain drastic effects on position of Western Powers in Berlin. At same time Soviets maintain that necessary solution for Berlin question is establishment of Free City of West Berlin. On other side, we have well-known position of Western Powers concerning peace treaty with unified Germany and that they cannot unilaterally be deprived of their rights in West Berlin and with respect free access thereto. They are committed to defend freedom of West Berliners and have in this connection defined their vital interests in Berlin situation.

You should make it clear that we do not accept the validity in international law of the Soviet contention that they can abolish Western rights in Berlin by a treaty to which the Western Powers are not parties. The Soviets have never attempted to justify this contention except by fallacious comparison with the Japanese Peace Treaty and it is an argument which you could use to force Gromyko on the defensive. It is on this point that the Soviets are threatening the West with physical interference with their position in West Berlin and they ought to be strongly challenged on it.

4. The preferred Western position is that Berlin should be considered as a whole. It seems to us illogical and contrary to basic agreement on Berlin that we should be asked to deal with only a part of the city. We would be prepared to consider a number of arrangements affecting the City of Berlin as a whole.

FYI: In event that Gromyko reaffirms previous Soviet position that Eastern sector of Berlin is a non-negotiable subject and refuses to discuss possibility of any all-Berlin solution you should then take following lines. End FYI.

5. Erection of wall through Berlin and subsequent GDR action in sealing off city have made it clear that purpose has been permanent division of city. It is also apparent from Soviet unwillingness to discuss any all-Berlin solution that this is indeed the case. This division of the city in itself has considerably narrowed possible area of negotiation. Question inevitably arises how, in view of Soviet assertion of right to make complete disposition of East Berlin regardless of views of Western allies, they can claim to assert interest in West Berlin. We are being asked to discuss our interests while Soviets claim immunity from any discussion of East Berlin or Eastern Germany.

6. Following additional fact relevant. Soviets have permitted series of unilateral actions in and about Berlin which have changed facts of situation to detriment of Western position. In this connection might be cited unacceptable GDR requirements for showing of identification by official allied personnel at sector-sector boundaries, harassment by Vopos of Allied vehicles in East Berlin and continual threat of further restrictive measures. In addition erection by GDR of baffles near Autobahn checkpoints, rerouting of trains, and threats contained in statements by GDR leaders and in so-called note directed at legitimate US military traffic on Autobahn, appears to threaten further action against vital Allied access rights. Each one of these restrictive actions and threats to allied rights does not help create necessary atmosphere for negotiation.

7. Soviets seem to maintain that Western Powers must start from assumption that existing arrangements will end in West Berlin and that, unless this accepted, agreement is impossible. This amounts basically to demand that we give up our position while Soviets maintain and improve essentials of their position. This is clearly unacceptable. Western Powers have never negotiated with Soviets on occupation rights but on exercise and implementation of their rights. They cannot accept that basis for negotiations must be their prior willingness to renounce such rights.

8. If, therefore, there is to be any progress towards mutually tolerable agreement, neither side can claim in advance that essential condition to such agreement must be full acceptance of its negotiating position. This is incompatible with concept of free negotiations between equal states. Systematic effort must be made to find points on which there is some possibility of progress. Situation is undoubtedly a serious one. Question confronting us is whether basis can be found for negotiations in usual sense, or in event of serious and continuing disagreement, whether factual situation can be handled without war which would be devastating to both sides.

9. Out of earlier discussions with Soviet Foreign Minister there emerged, if not substance of a possible arrangement on Berlin, at least possible outlines of a procedural formula or framework within which possibility of such an arrangement could be further explored. At same time Soviet Foreign Minister seemed to understand that Western Powers could not recognize so-called GDR either de jure or de facto. He also seemed to recognize, therefore, that basic arrangements must be between Soviets and Western Powers and not between latter and GDR. Secretary of State, however, stressed that Western Powers have certain vital interests in Berlin which must be respected. On other hand, Soviet Foreign Minister placed emphasis on end of occupation and creation new status in Berlin. Question arises whether against the background of these substantive positions any acceptable arrangement can be reached.

10. It might be noted that a number of positions which Soviet Foreign Minister put forward in New York and Washington talks, or which have subsequently been expressed in Soviet statements, have raised questions in minds of our Allies as they have in ours. We have noted suggestion that Soviets might be willing to enter into a Four Power arrangement and set forth the essentials of an understanding on Berlin and access thereto which might be reached in Four Power negotiations. We would be willing to consider this as a possible procedure, but more important than procedure would be content of such a prior Four Power understanding. As Soviet Foreign Minister knows, we have defined with some precision our vital interests in Berlin situation, and we must know with some precision how any intended arrangements which would affect exercise of these vital interests would be spelled out.

11. A key point in this context is question of Berlin access. Therefore, suggest that first talk be devoted to this. This is point at which danger seems to threaten and on which unilateral action by one side could have far-reaching results. For this reason it would be interesting to know precisely how Soviet Foreign Minister envisages access arrangements. In spelling out our views you may draw on appropriate portions of Annex III to December 10 Working Group Report./7/

We understand that the Soviet Government wishes to introduce some changes in the present position with regard to access. In response to the Soviet request, we are prepared to consider propositions. Naturally the result must not lead to a deterioration in the Western position, and since it is the Soviets who wish the changes the burden of proof that the changes accord with the Western interests rests with them. We have been considering what Soviet proposition on access would be acceptable to us. You might put forward the suggestion that we would readily accept the proposition at paragraph 8 of Annex III to December 10 Working Group Report. You should point to the advantages that this would have for reassuring Western opinion and for avoiding possible friction and misunderstanding with the East German authorities. You could portray the addition of air access functions to a possible international authority as an "improvement" which could benefit both sides. To show that we take this scheme seriously you may illustrate it with details from the Draft Charter of the International Access Authority for Berlin (BQD-37) (revised) of November 30)./8/ In further spelling out of our views you may draw on appropriate portions of Annex III to December 10 Working Group Report. If Mr. Gromyko should intimate that there are other questions in regard to Berlin, you should, bearing in mind Annex III, tell him that these could be considered depending largely upon what access arrangements the Soviet Government is prepared to make. Consequently it is up to the Soviet Government to indicate whether the propositions in paragraph 8 of Annex III are broadly acceptable.

FYI: Although Soviets have already made several public repudiations of International Authority concept, we have two recent intelligence reports ([2 document numbers not declassified]) giving instances of Soviet officials privately taking a more positive line. One suggested a "corridor" to a "free city" of West Berlin and other an International Access Authority. End FYI.

Rusk

Washington, December 29, 1961, 12:37 p.m.

1523. Eyes only for Ambassador from the Secretary. Instructions sent you yesterday/2/ have been coordinated with the British and the Germans. The French have been given a copy for information.

While admittedly these instructions do not offer you much field of discussion we feel that it is important to be able to demonstrate to public opinion here and elsewhere that every effort has been made to explore with Soviets the possibility of finding some basis for negotiation. We do not feel that matters could be allowed to proceed to point where danger of war became acute while Western Powers remained completely inactive. We anticipate that the exploratory conversations which you will undertake may go on for at least two or three meetings and could go on longer if first talks show promise. Although we assume that neither Soviet nor Allied side would wish to use this method for negotiations at final stages, we do not look upon your "probes" as play acting but rather as serious effort to move ahead on questions of substance if possible. You should, therefore, be as alert to any possible leads which might come from Soviet side as would be the case in "negotiation." The purpose as indicated in the instruction is to explore with Gromyko the possibility of identifying a reasonable basis of negotiation which would justify and permit the calling of a more formal conference probably at Foreign Ministers level.

Your instructions are not intended to preclude the issue of narrow versus broad negotiations, even though they are obviously based upon a narrow beginning. Despite German nervousness about linkage broader questions with specific issues of Berlin, Western governments realize that Soviets will almost certainly inject other issues. Indeed, there are other of these questions such as boundaries, on which West is unlikely to reach unity on hypothetical basis in advance as distinct from need for dealing with specific issues raised by Soviets. If such issues brought up by Soviets during first talk, suggest you tell Gromyko, as instructed, you will report his inquiry or observations to your Government and press for further exploration access problem which, as Western vital interest, could not but affect Western attitude other issues.

Reference your 1801,/3/ I would see no objection to your suggesting to Gromyko in the event that he knocks down international control autobahn, the possibility of extension of international authority into West Germany but not as a formal Western proposal but as a suggestion coming personally from you which you would submit to your Government. It would be preferable if this suggestion could come from Gromyko which would give us a better basis for discussion with our Allies. A suggestion of this nature however would fall within the last sentence of the FYI portion on page one of your instructions.

You also should know that immediately prior to my departure for Paris on December ninth Menshikov called to convey an invitation from Gromyko that I should visit Moscow during my European trip./4/ I asked Menshikov to express to Gromyko my appreciation for this invitation but to tell him that my schedule was such it would not be possible for me to come at this time. There are of course powerful arguments against any meeting between me and Gromyko at this stage of developments but invitation in principle was not completely rejected by me and may conceivably be useful at later stage.

Re your 1797/5/ we would leave to your discretion how to handle any conversation Berlin and Germany initiated by Khrushchev at the New Year's Eve dinner. We think it would be wiser not to make any specific reference to your instructions in order to avoid vitiating the value of your presentation to Gromyko and should rely rather on standard Western positions and if possible avoid entering into any detailed discussion which might affect your subsequent meeting with Gromyko.

The President has asked me to tell you of his confidence in your ability to carry out this difficult and delicate assignment.

Rusk

Washington, January 1, 1962./2/

3655. Verbatim text. Eyes only for Ambassador. Embassy requested deliver following letter from the President to President de Gaulle./3/ Letter should be dated December 31. Delivery should be made to Elysee immediately if possible even though de Gaulle may be at Colombey. Inform date, time, delivery.

"Dear Mr. President: I feel the need to write you at some length about two of the problems that we have before us. The very fact that in important matters we have differences makes me think it needful for us to keep in close contact. Moreover, both of us have had recent conversations with Prime Minister Macmillan and Chancellor Adenauer on matters which we can well consider also together.

Let me talk first about Berlin. Here, as we know from our exchange of letters in October,/4/ we have a serious tactical difference--though our basic goals are the same. We on our side believe that further diplomatic efforts are essential, for the exploration of Soviet intentions and to give clearer understanding to the Soviets of what we can and cannot consider in the settlement of the problems of Berlin and Germany. We do not believe that our people--and still less the people in many allied countries--will face a possible war with the necessary unity and determination unless they are confident that every honorable possibility of a peaceful settlement has been explored. We have taken note of the very strong and general sentiment in favor of negotiation among most of our Allies; we note also that the Soviets seem to have recognized the dangers of forcing the issue, in their postponement, once again, of the deadline for what you have accurately called Khrushchev's treaty with himself. We believe, in these circumstances, that it is important for us to leave no doubt anywhere that if satisfactory negotiations turn out to be impossible, it will not be our fault. Moreover, the possibility does exist, in our view, that an improved arrangement can be made. I do not believe that it would be safe to stand immobile in face of the present situation in Germany and Berlin.

You have powerfully argued a different view, and your Minister sustained it strongly at Paris in December. You believe that K does not want war--and I agree./5/ You believe that concessions are therefore unnecessary, and I agree again. I believe that nothing should be granted in this case except in return for a genuine improvement in our own position and that of the people of Berlin. But there is room for such improvement, and so I do not want to stand still where we are. Moreover, we must measure our course not only against where we are, but against what may happen if we take a different road. I believe that if Khrushchev takes the path of his separate treaty, and if no prior settlement is made, there will be a further deterioration of the whole situation in Europe, even if he avoids war, as I am sure he will wish to do. Yet he must sign the treaty sooner or later; he is too far in to turn back now. And so we must make clear to him, by all available means, that a prior settlement is in his interest as well as ours.

We cannot tell how the present discussions may go. I myself suppose that in some fashion they could lead to more serious and formal negotiations. Those negotiations may be in the framework of an improved hope of agreement, or they may come in the shadow of imminent war. But I think they may come. We must conduct ourselves, in either case, so that our strength, our determination, and the intrinsic values of our position are as clear to the Soviets as to our Allies and our own peoples. And we must be ready for the day when negotiations may break down.

In the current explorations we are proceeding without the help of direct French participation. I continue to hope, however, that if and when serious negotiations take place, France will join us again. Your presence would add strength and influence to our course.

I recognize of course that in any difference of this sort, when unity is so desirable for all, either party--and perhaps both--may be responsible for the divergence. I have hoped in this long discussion to show you as clearly as I can the reasons for the position I am taking.

I want to take this opportunity also to consult you frankly on the question of nuclear weapons. Here again we may have differences, and I think it will be helpful to be candid.

The root of the problem, to me, is the need for reconciling two great objectives. On the one hand, the nuclear arms race is a terrible danger in itself, so that means to limit it must be sought with constant energy. On the other hand, the free nations require effective protection against the danger of Soviet nuclear blackmail. Prime Minister Macmillan and I discussed this problem particularly in connection with the possibility of American atmospheric testing of advanced thermonuclear designs. Such tests would continue the thermonuclear arms race renewed by the Soviets in September--but they may be necessary for the protection of all. I have ordered that preparations be undertaken, but I shall make no final decision for the time being. In any case the preparations will not be completed until spring.

I am conscious of the real divergence between your views and ours in another part of this problem. You believe that France requires the protection of a national nuclear capability, and you have undertaken a determined and extensive effort in this direction. We for our part, while we are fully committed to the defense of Europe, have not been able to believe that a national nuclear force for France is something we should assist. Your country is faced with heavy efforts in this area, and I wonder if there is not some way in which, in a wider framework, our support might not be helpful in providing the kind of protection France needs and must have, in the coming years.

What troubles us, decisively, in the case of a specifically French nuclear capability, is that if we should join in that effort, we would have no ground on which to resist certain and heavy pressure from the Germans for parallel treatment. Yet it is imperative that the Germans not have nuclear weapons of their own; memory is too strong, and fear too real, for that.

Moreover, on technical grounds, we have grave doubts that a truly effective deterrent can be developed and maintained even by nations as strong and far advanced as France, over time. We believe that more space and larger resources are going to be necessary for the deployment of up-to-date weapons systems that will effectively neutralize the blackmailer's threat, especially when his new and highly sophisticated weapons of great strength are taken into account. This may be especially true if progress is made in the antimissile missile field.

Indeed, we have the same doubt about Great Britain. We have cooperated with the British on atomic energy since early in World War II, and we cannot now break a connection so long developed in mutual trust. But we do not believe that as the nuclear age advances the United Kingdom will be able to sustain an effective deterrent of a national type alone. I believe this view is shared by some of our most knowledgeable British friends. If Great Britain were today in the position of France, and if we did not have existing commitments on the exchange of information, I can assure you that our policy toward her would not differ from our present policy toward France.

At present, and I believe for some time to come, the deterrent force of the United States protects Europe too. This is so because of the clarity of our commitment, the superiority of our overall force, and, if I may say so, my personal determination. But I must recognize that as the years pass and the intercontinental capabilities of the USSR increase, the countries of Europe will feel increasingly that they must have ways and means of providing nuclear strength which will clearly and specifically respond to any attack on Europe. I do not believe that the preliminary discussions of this problem in NATO have been prosecuted as strongly and constructively as is necessary, nor do I suppose that NATO in exactly its present form is the only conceivable framework for a new solution. What I do believe is that this problem cannot be solved while France and the United States pursue widely different courses. I have directed an intensive analysis of the problem of the nuclear defense of Europe in the coming age of the effective second-generation thermonuclear missile, in order that I may review the premises of American policy. Is there, do you think, sufficient prospect of a modification in your position to make it useful for us to consult further on this problem?

These two great topics, Berlin and nuclear policy, are perhaps enough for one letter. But I do not wish to close without a more general comment. When I think in larger terms of France and the United States--and of your policies and mine--I do not find it right to emphasize our differences above our agreements. Not only do we share the same fundamental purposes--as we found so clearly in our happy meeting in Paris--we also assess the real lines of force and policy in very similar ways. Even when we differ on tactics--as in the Congo, I fear--we can be helpful from different positions for a common end. And in many cases we do not have such differences. I have heard from Secretary Dillon, for example, of the excellent cooperation between our Governments on the problem of the International Monetary Fund. I have also heard from Averell Harriman of the growing understanding between our two countries on the problem of Laos. And finally, if I may speak of a matter which concerns France alone in direct responsibility, I have greatly admired your statesmanship in the infinitely difficult and important conduct of your affairs in Algeria. Your service here is first to France, of course, but not to France alone.

This letter comes with great personal esteem, and with the warmest good wishes for the New Year, to Mme. de Gaulle and to you from Mrs. Kennedy and me. Sincerely yours, John F. Kennedy."

Rusk

Moscow, January 2, 1962, 7 p.m.

1840. I made almost literal presentation my instructions/2/ para 1 through first part para 11 except I did not stop after para 4 and made appropriate change in para 9 in order be certain opportunity get in remarks about developments in Berlin.

Gromyko prefaced response with statement my presentation required serious thought and consideration, but he was prepared to give preliminary reaction. Referred to my statement emphasizing importance access as main problem and disagreed stating main question is conclusion German peace treaty in order write finish to World War II. He agreed access important but only as part of general question peace treaty, it is not possible, therefore, discuss access in isolation. He added that to agree discuss access without linking it with other relevant questions and primary question peace treaty would be tantamount accepting viewpoint other side as prerequisite to discussions, at least as far as order of points is concerned.

Gromyko then referred to his discussions with Secretary and President pointing to "complicated formulations" used by them in referring to results these talks and their suggestion procedure and not substance was center of these discussions. However, he stated, conversations covered many important questions all related to drawing a line under World War II. He continued that it follows from these statements Soviet Govt wants agreement on peace treaty which would be signed with both German states which would be in common interest all sides and in support of peace. In these conversations, he stated, it was made clear if no agreement possible, Soviet Union together with other states is prepared sign unilateral treaty with all ensuing consequences for West Berlin and Allied access thereto. If no agreement possible and unilateral treaty signed, Allied powers would bear responsibility make arrangements for access in agreement with GDR.

Gromyko stressed that at same time USSR has declared more than once that they do not rule out agreement on basis four-power agreement, to be concluded prior to signature of a peace treaty, which would establish status for West Berlin. After that Soviet Union would conclude peace treaty with GDR to which prior West Berlin agreement could be appended. Soviet Govt agrees such an agreement reached prior to a peace treaty would include Allied access to West Berlin. "This would not as far as I could determine in my New York and Washington talks be contradictory to Western position and wishes regarding access. Best resolution would of course be conclusion peace treaty or peace treaties with both German states but other courses possible. Gromyko emphasized if understanding reached on status West Berlin, would be possible resolve access question on basis satisfactory to all parties, i.e. West, Soviet Union and GDR. However when understanding devised, arrangements would be necessary to reflect and ensure respect for sovereign rights of GDR." Gromyko reiterated his desire emphasize that prior agreement on status would open possibility for access agreement. "Therefore it would seem prospects now open for satisfactory solution access question which is of primary interest to Western powers".

Gromyko stated he considers it possible reach agreement on this as well as on other questions which were touched on in discussions with Secretary and President and with which he was sure I was familiar. He wished to emphasize, however, access question could not be isolated from resolution other questions. We knew very well they were in favor strict guarantee for access. Other questions to be resolved concern both Berlin and Germany and wider question European security which was raised by Secretary Rusk himself.

Gromyko then addressed himself question recognition GDR stating apprehensions raised in his mind by my statement that during New York talks he had seemed recognize fact US cannot recognize GDR de jure or de facto. In actual fact, he stated, you already recognize GDR de facto. He cited Khrushchev that most correct solution this question would be UN membership and diplomatic recognition both German states but Soviet Govt recognizes this is question for each govt to decide itself. However he stated it is impossible resist fact of existence of GDR. Pointed to fact Soviets do not have relations with Portugal or Ireland but do not deny their existence. "We urge US take more sober position more in line actual situation." Stressed that objectively it is possible reach agreement on questions of interest to both sides on basis satisfactory to both sides, but it is essential realistic position be adopted on these issues.

Gromyko then commented on my statements regarding developments in Berlin including construction of the wall. Stated would not dwell at length on this question since Soviet and GDR positions well publicized. "So-called wall" and other GDR measures were taken in response to threats emanating from West Berlin and US desire use West Berlin as center of diversion against GDR and other socialist countries. Regarding checking documents US personnel desiring enter East Berlin, this stems from GDR sovereignty. "Our appropriate personnel are willing present documents in order enter West Berlin," and it is only logical both sides have similar procedures. We do not consider that any of these measures such as checking identification should lead to complications in Berlin. There exist more important questions to resolve "in order avoid any collision".

Gromyko continued it would be wrong to draw conclusion they are prepared to leave West Berlin situation unchanged. This is quite impossible in view threat present situation in Central Europe. "It was announced at Party Congress that we decided not to look upon Dec 31 as fatalistic date. This so-called deadline is now behind us and we took this decision in order to facilitate understanding with the Western powers."

Gromyko expressed surprise over my references to possibility all-Berlin solution. He stated if plan exists to raise question in this manner, no discussion will be possible. "I have to repeat, this question cannot be discussed." He continued, East Berlin is completely integrated into GDR. West Berlin is the problem precisely because its social system is different. "Western powers recognize this when you speak of desire to preserve freedom West Berlin, in other words, special social system in West Berlin." Gromyko stressed contention Soviet position obviously designed facilitate agreement with Western powers.

I then discussed question sector controls imposed on Allied personnel, pointing out actions by East German authorities amount to effort to force us to recognize GDR sovereignty in East Berlin. As Gromyko aware in latest development, even our Commandant has been prevented from visiting his Soviet counterpart. This is a serious problem although separate from the one we are talking about today. Regarding peace treaties, our position is well known. We believe there should be one treaty with one Germany. As far as access question is concerned, I recognize one could not reach complete and final agreement without knowledge prospects other aspects of problem.

However, I continued, access question important whether or not we reach agreement on Berlin. I stated in his talks with the Secretary, Gromyko had mentioned necessity to respect sovereignty of GDR. We would be interested in knowing what this means. For example, would GDR have right determine who travels from West Berlin to West Germany and back?

I pointed out as Secretary had stated, we do not desire be in position buying same horse over and over again. If Berlin agreement reached and access not secure, arrangement would not be satisfactory in our eyes. One way resolve this question would be to establish corridor under our control. However, we have also given thought to possibility establishing international authority responsible for Berlin access facilities, without exercising sovereign right over territory of FRG or GDR authorities or West Berlin. I quoted from BQD 37,/3/ pointing out authority would include Berlin-Helmstedt Autobahn and traffic in the Berlin air control zone and discussed composition of authority governing body. I stressed such an authority would greatly reduce possibility friction between us and hoped proposal would receive Soviet Govt's serious consideration.

In closing, I pointed out our belief all-Berlin solution preferable and if rejected would naturally have serious effect on our view as to how far arrangements regarding West Berlin could go. I agreed we were, of course, prepared to discuss questions other than access but these would be dependent upon nature access arrangement and that is why issue raised first.

Gromyko responded first to the question regarding GDR sovereignty. What he meant was in course of arrangements GDR would give its consent and become one of parties who would agree to respect obligations of the prior agreement. "I am not speaking of what form this obligation would take, only of the substance. If we reach agreement, GDR by accepting obligations under this agreement would thereby protect its sovereignty." It goes without saying any agreement would have to include specific clauses regarding protection GDR sovereignty.

Regarding corridors, Gromyko stated Soviet position on first alternative suggested well known. Such proposal would be entirely incompatible GDR sovereignty. Regarding second, as he called it, variation, Gromyko stressed he couldn't speak definitively but his impression is it would create a state within a state. However, he added, this is something requiring detailed study and he reserved right make additional comments regarding it. Gromyko then returned to what he termed inacceptability isolating access from rest of West Berlin problem. He stressed that in his talks with Secretary Rusk and the President neither side attempted to limit area conversation. He stressed this question linked with other problems and particularly major problem of writing a finish to World War II. Gromyko asked whether international authority would have to have a specific highway at its disposal. I responded that we had thought of Helmstedt-Berlin Autobahn but had also considered possibility construction new road. I made clear arrangement did not contemplate unauthorized entry or exit East Germany and referred to possibility mixed traffic. I also referred to control air corridors and operation air safety center as coming under such an arrangement.

In response to my question, Gromyko confirmed Soviet position it is possible reach agreement on freedom of access and that this could be respected by GDR along with free city of West Berlin. I then stated I desired to be particularly clear about what Soviets have in mind by "free access." I pointed out if this is what we understand, it would mean people are free to travel back and forth between Berlin and West Germany. It would be very important to us and agreement on it would facilitate our moving ahead on other questions. Gromyko reiterated that proposed prior agreement on West Berlin status would specifically include access question and GDR would recognize this agreement. I pressed for specific understanding that free access would envisage freedom for anyone to travel back and forth. Gromyko responded that in principle it is possible reach agreement on access question provided agreement reached on other points "in which we are interested." He refused to be further pinned down on this.

I concluded with statement that if he rejected question all-Berlin agreement this would greatly restrict possibility for discussion conditions in West Berlin, and I stressed importance reaching an agreement on access, even in the absence of agreement on other matters, if serious collision were to be avoided. I noted Gromyko had referred to West Berlin free city proposal. Although I did not propose go into that aspect today he would doubtless be thinking over our conversation and I did not want him to think that omission indicated their proposal acceptable to us which it was not. Gromyko said that if there was to be no change in the status of West Berlin what was the point of discussion. I replied the point was to avoid a very dangerous situation. Gromyko concluded that Soviet Union certainly opposed seeing further complication of situation and big powers bear heavy responsibility avoid such a course.

Gromyko expressed readiness continue talks today or any time in future stating we have much to discuss./4/

Thompson

Moscow, January 3, 1962, 5 p.m.

1854. Although in our discussion Berlin problem yesterday Gromyko mentioned in passing removal of deadline I was struck by fact that he showed no disposition to be in any hurry or interest in how long present phase might continue. Also notable he did not use abusive language re West Germans.

It is clear he will maintain position he cannot discuss details of access until he has fairly clear idea of what access is to. Question arises as to what I should say about our thinking on status of West Berlin. For example if I am to reveal non-negotiable points in Section 2, Annex 3 of Working Group Report,/2/ particularly point D concerning West Berlin relationship to FRG, I am afraid discussions would be over. Maintenance of present situation would be more advantageous to Soviets than what we propose. As a minimum I believe Soviets will insist upon our willingness to discuss a new status for West Berlin but might accept arrangement whereby they would be free to state occupation status ended by their separate treaty while we would maintain that our occupation rights continued to exist. In any event believe they will insist that it be made clear West Berlin is not part of West Germany. Believe we have strong argument for reserving occupation rights in order to ensure that no future West Berlin regime engage in provocative actions.

Gromyko based objection to all-Berlin solution on grounds different social system. In order keep ball in play on this issue would it be possible for us to suggest willingness consider establishment "Confederation of West and East Berlin" with each side maintaining its own security, economic and currency arrangements, etc., but with some overall body to handle certain common problems such as transportation, sewage disposal, etc. with possibility a few of its functions could be expanded by mutual agreement. Arrangement would provide for freedom of movement within Greater Berlin and presumably wall would have to be built around rather than across Berlin. In view Soviet endorsement Ulbricht's Confederation proposal for Germany might be awkward for them to object and could be useful device for them to have excuse for removing wall. This would also cover their demand for change in status Berlin and they would share occupation rights by occupation their sector. In any case I need something positive to say about our thinking on status West Berlin at next session and would appreciate as precise guidance as Department can give./3/

Thompson

Washington, January 4, 1962.

SUBJECT
Did anyone advise knocking down The Wall?

1. I understand that Higher Authority has asked once or twice if anyone explicitly advised breaching The Wall back in the early days after its erection. The first point to remember is that The Wall did not go up overnight on August 13. What happened on August 13 was the announcement and promulgation of crossing point restrictions and the stationing of VOPOs to see that they were enforced. The physical construction of The Wall began immediately but of course took more than a little time.

2. You will recall that at first everyone thought of the restrictions in terms of shutting off the flow of refugees, and that in some respects this shut-off was not considered to be too bad a development. However, when it became apparent that the restrictions were to be stringently imposed on the Allies, you dictated the comments which are attached at Tab A./2/ Note the pencilled cover note from Miss LaFrance to me which refers to your taking several copies to an 0945 meeting next door. Note further that in paragraph 4 of your comments you explicitly recommend the use of force to cross at some place other than Friedrichstrasse (The Wall was obviously not yet completed), and that in paragraph 5 you summarize your reasons for the recommendation.

3. It is interesting to note that the date on your comments is 24 August because at Tab B/3/ is a copy of a JCS message to USCINCEUR dated 25 August. Basically this is the "We will not shoot our way into East Berlin" policy line and of course the JCS was only reflecting in a military channel the political decisions which the State Department had raised.

Legere/4/

Washington, January 5, 1962, 5:19 p.m.

879. Paris for USRO, Stoessel, McGuire. French Embassy under instructions raised with Department today subject of barring of Soviet Commandant from West Berlin. Stated French understood and shared US concern over insult to US Commandant. They regretted differing situations which had resulted in Western sectors however and attached great importance to reestablishing common procedures. Suggested that Watson reply to Solovyev letter/2/ be accompanied by oral approach referring to thought in Soviet letter regarding maintaining contacts. We could point out that Watson as US Commandant could not be considered in same category as average boundary crosser. His special character should extend to anyone accompanying him, civilian or military.

Department informed French in reply that letter had already been sent Solovyev (Berlin's 1284)./3/ French thought statements in Watson letter regarding value of contacts and return to normal procedures provided peg hang follow-up oral approach. We told French we would consider their proposal. Request comments./4/

Rusk

Washington, January 5, 1962.

Dear George: I was much interested in your letter of December 26/2/ and appreciated a chance to see it. I hope you and your family had some real relaxation in Switzerland.

I do not pretend to be an expert on Soviet affairs but your long paragraph on page 2 reminded me of a Khrushchev remark at Vienna. He told the President, in words that sounded familiar to politicians, that he was under great pressures from his military and scientific people for more and more money because the Americans were doing X, Y, or Z. He then referred to similar pressures on Kennedy and the race goes on. His manner at the time indicated he was just exchanging impressions with a member of the trade union of political leaders and not trying to work up to any particular point. I suppose that he is subject to regular and pressing demands from his military and nuclear people for more resources and that he must think very hard about saying "no" if he is given a lot of information about the Americans "getting ahead". Whether these military demands are more insistent than that, related to his own position and support, I would not know.

I won't go into detail on your comments on Berlin. If this were largely a bilateral problem between the Russians and ourselves, we could largely ignore our allies. But it seems to me that it is, in its most fundamental aspect, a European problem. The Europeans might settle it without us, but I can't see how we can settle it without Europe; this is especially so in a period when Western Europe is recovering its power to act in the European interest. As to what we are going to talk about with the Russians, the clue is in your third paragraph on page 3. If the Russians were ready "to let things go on as they are" there would be no crisis and no need for discussion. They are proposing to change matters, including their own most solemn commitments, in such a way as to injure our vital interests. Any change to our advantage is simply brushed aside as not negotiable. What they want to talk about is a diminution in our position, with every prospect that they will try to charge a very high price merely for leaving us alone. The talks are to find out whether there is any possibility of improving both our positions or, alternatively, of insuring our essential interests without a conflict. Thus far they have not shown "a complete absence of interest in discussing the Berlin problem with us at all." If they do take this line, I suppose it would mean that they have decided either to leave us alone or to take us on at a frightful cost to them as well as to the rest of us. This is terribly oversimplified, for brevity's sake, and I apologize for commenting so inadequately about so serious a matter.

I don't rule out the possibility of your visiting Moscow, but I would suppose it would be better, as your timing suggests, to wait until after Tommy has had this series of talks. Let's take it up a bit later.

All the best to you and your family,
Sincerely,
Dean Rusk/3/

Washington, January 6, 1962.

SUBJECT
Berlin

PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
The Under Secretary
Sir Edward Heath, the Lord Privy Seal
Sir David Ormsby-Gore, the British Ambassador
Richard D. Vine--EUR/RA

The Secretary noted that he was interested by Gromyko's response to a point that we had made of no de facto or de jure recognition of East Germany and its status in East Berlin. Gromyko reacted to this that we had already done so. The Secretary wondered if it would be possible to make progress in this position, brushing aside one point after another.

Another point which had to be tested was whether the Soviets required the four powers signing a peace treaty or whether an agreement among the four powers could be appended to the treaty.

He went on to say that if the Soviets continue to leave unilateral harassments alone, it may be possible to work something out. Gromyko's attitude has certainly not been captious.

Another hopeful sign has been the Soviet reference to political relations between West Berlin and West Germany.

The Secretary also noted that he was beginning to see what was behind the reference to a subsidized Berlin. He had not thought of the Wall in connection with the differential standard of living and the "capitalist enticement" of East German workers, but this seemed to be a great concern to the Soviets.

He also mentioned Brandt's suggestion for control of workers which might be worked out independent of the problem of refugees on the basis of passports, visas, or some such device. This was bogged down, however, on the question of political asylum.

The Secretary thought it nevertheless possible to go on "punching holes in the wall". The Soviet demands that subversion, i.e., intelligence activities should cease, is not a matter that is susceptible to any agreement.

The French, he continued, are showing a great deal more interest in these talks than they are supposed to.

Heath noted that Couve had said as much in Paris in December.

Moscow, January 9, 1962, 5 p.m.

1907. Eyes only Secretary. Believe that before long I should have some idea of what would in US view constitute acceptable basis for negotiations on Berlin problem. Suggest what I should try to work toward could be something along following lines: Soviets know our thinking on problem of access and would be prepared to see whether some arrangement for international control of Autobahn could be worked out provided satisfactory arrangement reached on status West Berlin. We know Soviet thinking on status West Berlin and would be prepared to see how far we could go to meet Soviet preoccupations (it being understood that we are unwilling renounce our presence and occupation rights) if satisfactory access arrangements worked out. We are aware of Soviet concern with other questions and willing discuss them but outcome would depend upon nature arrangements regarding Berlin. On this basis we prepared arrange for formal negotiations.

On status West Berlin believe that if eventual negotiations are to be successful it would be absolutely essential that we at least be prepared agree to prohibition on West Berlin becoming part of West Germany. In this connection I am troubled by para 19 (b) of Annex 3 to Working Group report. While might be desirable to avoid giving Soviets propaganda advantage of being able say their basic idea accepted, it would seem to me far more important for us to win on substance and let them have short lived victory in appearance. What I have in mind is that if occupation rights and presence of Western troops preserved, and if West Berlin free to make arrangements with West Germany along present lines, including application West German laws, provided West Berlin not incorporated in FRG, it would be small price to pay to call such an arrangement a "free city" or something very similar.

I believe Soviets will have in mind both long and short-range aspects of any settlement of Berlin question and in this connection will wish avoid any provisions which would preclude arrangements which they may eventually hope achieve in Europe as a whole. For example, one of their long-range objectives is to get US troops out of Europe, particularly should large-scale disarmament be achieved. In this connection they would desire avoid language in any agreement which would make continued presence of Allied troops in Berlin virtually mandatory.

Thompson

Washington, January 9, 1962.

SUBJECT
Meeting between Vice Chancellor Erhard and Secretary Rusk, January 9, 1962

PARTICIPANTS

Germans
Vice Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, Federal Republic of Germany
Mr. Wolfram Langer, Chief, Economic Policy Division, Ministry of Economics

U.S.
The Secretary
Mr. C. Arnold Freshman, GER, Department of State

The Secretary asked whether there were any special points the Vice Chancellor wished to raise before his visit comes to an end.

Professor Erhard stated he wished to review what was being done for Berlin by the Federal Republic. In addition to special ERP grants and loans, Berlin receives direct budgetary support of DM 1.1 billion; businesses in Berlin receive tax benefits and the people of Berlin are accorded preferential income tax allowances. Since August 13, DM 500 million has also been provided to enable the city to initiate cultural events and improve the economic situation. Sales have risen 7.4 percent over the same period last year and there is no unemployment. The Federal Republic is in constant contact with the Senat. There are plans to make Berlin a pedagogical center through attraction of teachers and creation of broader educational facilities. Particular emphasis will be placed on financial measures to increase the number of students resident at Berlin universities, especially from other countries. Professor Erhard stated that the impression of the wall on visitors, students in particular, is so great as to immunize them from communism.

Berlin's problem is depression, moral and emotional. Here the U.S. can do a great deal, especially in the field of emotional reinforcement. Last week Erhard had talked with Mr. McCloy of the Ford Foundation. The Foundation would like to give some thought to their possible role, particularly looking to stimulating some activity in research, or by setting up a branch office in Berlin to handle cultural activities. President Kennedy's proposals to promote Berlin exports and for U.S. participation in trade fairs would be especially useful. Perhaps export firms should be encouraged to set up branch offices in Berlin. The extent to which U.S. business could be induced now to invest in Berlin would testify to their confidence in that city and would serve to encourage capital from West Germany. The substantial tax benefits accorded firms doing business in Berlin would assist in the write-off of their investment. The morale effect of new U.S. business in Berlin would be tremendous. The West German National Association for Manufacturers (Bundesverband des Deutschen Industrie) might be induced to establish a permanent branch in Berlin. Large projects are not needed, but whatever is done should be visible and publicized. Other measures are also possible, but progress in this direction would be convincing evidence, especially to the Soviet Zone, of U.S. and allied determination not to abandon Berlin.

The Secretary stated that the enormous efforts of the Federal Republic in Berlin were appreciated. He asked whether U.S. banks, for example Chase Manhattan, could establish branches in Berlin, to which the Vice Chancellor responded that this was a good idea, and it would also bring in business.

The Secretary then noted that he had raised the question for immediate consideration whether the Buy American policy could be relaxed to enable our post exchanges to place orders in Berlin.

Secretary Rusk adverted to the passage in the Khrushchev memorandum to Kroll/2/ in which he linked the wall with outside subsidies to Berlin. The Secretary asked Erhard for his opinion on what Khrushchev might have had in mind, noting that Khrushchev had indicated that the wall would continue to exist until Berlin became self-sufficient. The Vice Chancellor responded that to exist Berlin needs about DM 2 billion annually in outside assistance. Converted to the Federal Republic, this would compare to about DM 50 billion. If the economic level in Berlin is thus depressed, Khrushchev would have achieved his objective.

The Secretary stated that thinking ahead to the course of the discussions with the Soviet Union, he wanted to speculate on one point. Khrushchev seems to believe that a rapid erosion of life in Berlin will ensue, even under today's situation. He may delay measures because of this element of erosion. Did the Vice Chancellor believe that in the absence of any accord between Moscow and the West the situation in Berlin is likely to deteriorate rapidly, or is Berlin sustainable by the means which have been discussed? Erhard stated that if Berlin is convinced that time will run against the West, that Berlin is to be nibbled away, then Khrushchev is in a very good position.

Herr Langer then interjected the point that every city draws on its suburbs for its human resources. This being no longer possible for Berlin, the city stands to lose 25,000 to 30,000 in population annually--entirely apart from the situation of Berlin's aging population--which would in ten years mean a loss of 250,000 people or more.

The Secretary asked about possibilities for inducing younger West Berliners now living in West Germany to return to West Berlin. The Vice Chancellor noted that this factor did not begin on August 13. Better opportunities exist for them in West Germany although they retain their intrinsic ties to Berlin. To stimulate the movement of labor to Berlin at this time, the Federal Republic was providing marriage subsidies, non-interest bearing loans and paying moving costs to Berlin, among other benefits. Over 1,000 persons now relocated in Berlin from West Germany under this stimulus had found employment.

Prefacing with the comment that his query should not be construed as representing or indicating U.S. policy, the Secretary observed that during the period of the airlift the performance of the Berliners had been fantastic, but that they were then inured to situations of crisis. He wondered whether subsequent prosperity of the city might have had an undermining effect on Berlin morale so that they may not now be as disposed today to face a similar situation. The Vice Chancellor stated that the inner moral fortitude of the Berliners is unchanged; they will be all right so long as they continue to believe in the Federal Republic and the West.

The Secretary said that this point is very important. We are determined to stand fast on Berlin, but it is important that the Berliners be equally prepared. He added that the Vice Chancellor's views on this point accorded with those of General Clay.

The Secretary asked if Minister Erhard felt that the GDR was attempting to reduce the extent of its economic dependence on the West. Erhard replied in the negative. He stated that interzonal trade flows without a hitch. This is not due to GDR love or sympathy for the Federal Republic; interzonal trade is more important to the GDR than to the Federal Republic. While there are certain signs that the GDR is drawing on countries other than the Federal Republic for some of its industrial needs, they would have difficulty switching to new sources since their capital equipment is primarily of West German origin. Erhard then noted that it would be desirable if talks (with the Russians) could begin as soon as possible. A nervous reaction could develop if the feeling arose that talks are being delayed for any reason.

The Secretary said that we will be conferring closely with the Federal Republic on the talks with the Russians. He asked that Professor Erhard convey his regards to Chancellor Adenauer and Foreign Minister Schroeder. The Secretary noted in conclusion that Lord Home would be in Berlin the next day and that this would be a tangible sign of our interest.

Professor Erhard expressed his strong interest in the matters discussed with the Secretary yesterday and during this meeting./3/ He felt that everything that could now be done for Berlin--whether of a social, cultural or economic nature--would be a great help and would have considerable effect without necessarily entailing large expenditures.

Washington, January 10, 1962, 6:02 p.m.

1615. Paris pass Finletter--eyes only. Eyes only for Ambassadors. Following are your instructions for next meeting with Gromyko (which you should request for early date) containing minor amendments to take account of points made by Germans and British.

You should seek further appointment with Gromyko and conduct discussion along following lines:

1. US Government considers that initial exchange of views with Soviet Foreign Minister on January 2/2/ was useful in helping further to clarify positions of both parties and in providing occasion for each to stress certain questions which considered of particular importance. There also seemed to be agreement that both wanted to settle issues involved by peaceful means, though it is obvious that real substantive differences continue to exist.

2. In first discussion number of principles were stated which we believe are essential for progress towards an acceptable agreement. There is no need to repeat these at length but they should not be overlooked. We particularly stressed that key practical point in Berlin situation is access, for it is on this point that unilateral action by one side could have highly dangerous results.

3. While Soviet Foreign Minister gave his preliminary reactions to presentation of US position, he also indicated that US statements would require serious thought and consideration. We will therefore be interested in hearing his further views on various points raised.

4. In this connection it might be well to begin by eliminating one subject on which it obvious from outset that no meeting of minds is possible, and from what Gromyko has said can be set aside. Proposal for single peace treaty with both GDR and Federal Republic or for a separate peace treaty with GDR is not acceptable to West. We believe that any action which attempts formally to legalize division of Germany would be serious mistake, even regarded from Soviet viewpoint. However, we know that Soviet Union holds other views, and it is clear from our present actions that we are living with this situation and do not contemplate any use of force to change it. Entire NATO posture is based on this approach.

5. In referring to possibility of all-Berlin solution, Soviet Foreign Minister took position that this question could not be discussed and that East Berlin is completely integrated into GDR. He also stated that construction of wall was necessary to combat threats emanating from West Berlin. To take latter point first, it is not purpose of present discussion to analyze motivations for action which took place on August 13. Even Ulbricht in his December 30 Pravda article virtually admitted that wall was directed not so much at outer world but at inhabitants of GDR, who continued to evidence desire to leave. Be that as it may, fact of wall and of ensuing actions directed towards sealing off East Berlin from rest of city has, in practice, constituted considerable unilateral change of status quo in further disregard of Soviet obligations. While US Government, therefore, continues to consider that all-Berlin solution based upon recognition of continuing Four-Power responsibilities, is best and most logical approach to problem, it cannot help but draw certain conclusions from fact that these unilateral actions have been taken. One of these conclusions is that Soviets, having attempted to dispose of their sector of city without consent of West, now claim right to have determining voice in disposition of Western sectors of city. Not only is there lack of logic in Soviet approach, but pressure which is being brought on Western Powers to consent to modifications of situation is in the form of threat of further unilateral abandonment of its responsibilities by Soviets to GDR--in this case those relating to Berlin access.

6. A noteworthy example of such lack of logic is what Soviets say regarding alleged effect of peace treaty on occupation rights in West Berlin. West Berlin has never been part of GDR. No treaty between Soviet Union and GDR can, therefore, terminate occupation rights of Western Powers. Question may further be asked why, if Soviet Union has in mind agreement with respect to Western position in West Berlin, so much importance is attached to distinction between such agreement and occupation rights. Conclusion might be drawn that this is because Soviets believe that, in some way, rights under agreement would be less securely based than occupation rights. It is our suggestion, therefore, that since Soviets understand we are not prepared to abandon our rights in and access to West Berlin, discussion of basis these rights is unnecessary and need not cause difficulties.

7. Given these considerations, we would be particularly interested in further explanation of what in the Soviet view the situation in West Berlin would look like. Soviets continually attack Western occupation as obsolete. The presence of Western troops might be undesirable if they remain in face of opposition of civilian population and if they no longer serve a function which we and that population consider essential. There can be no question but that, in both respects, Western forces are far from obsolete. If there is any question--and we do not believe Soviets really seriously doubt this--about desires of West Berlin population, Western Powers would be glad at any time to have properly supervised plebiscite held in West Berlin. Moreover, experience of Berliners over years has confirmed their conviction that presence of Western forces is necessary guarantee of continuing freedom. Experience of blockade and of continual harassments, pressures and threats from GDR since then could have no other effect. Western Powers do not consider, therefore, that their continuing presence is negotiable. As pointed out in January 2 conversation, Western Powers have never negotiated with Soviets on occupation rights but only on exercise and implementation of those rights. They do not expect that Soviet Union will specifically reaffirm continuation of occupation rights, but they do expect that it will conduct itself in such a way as to take practical cognizance of the facts of life as they exist in West Berlin--including presence of Western protective forces.

8. After you have made statement along foregoing lines, we assume Gromyko will be prepared make further comments on your presentation of January 2. These may merely repeat points made in his "preliminary reaction" or may provide basis for further probing on your part. This is matter which we leave largely to your judgment. You are still both exchanging views and putting forward suggestions which do not commit either side. Essential purpose is still to find out whether and in what area basis for negotiations can be found.

9. Two points on which Soviet have insisted in past which particularly require clarification are changed status for West Berlin and "respect for GDR sovereignty". Going back to Gromyko's remarks on these subjects during January 2 conversation, you should if this seems appropriate, attempt to draw him out further on his statement to you that it would be wrong to conclude that Soviets are prepared to leave West Berlin situation unchanged in view of threat present situation in Central Europe. We do not understand what threat present situation in West Berlin poses to Eastern Europe unless Soviets consider very existence of a free West Berlin to be such a threat. In putting questions, impression must, of course, be avoided that Western presence is in any way negotiable beyond points in para 3 of Annex III to Working Group Report of December 10, 1961.

10. As to "respect for GDR sovereignty", your efforts should be directed towards attempting to nail down whether this criterion can be met largely in procedural terms by having GDR concur in arrangements on access made by Four Power agreement or whether some GDR role in access is what Soviets have in mind. You might refer to fact that Soviet Union has frequently used expression "respect for sovereignty of GDR" which we hope can be clarified. In this connection, on January 2 Soviet Foreign Minister took exception to what American Ambassador said regarding de jure and de facto recognition of GDR by citing Soviet acceptance of existence of certain countries with which it does not have relations. Similarly, Soviet Foreign Minister claimed that in actual fact US has already recognized GDR de facto. This suggests to us that what Soviet Foreign Minister has in mind is that we not act as if we deny existence of East Germany, as indeed we do not. Since Soviet Foreign Minister and Chairman Khrushchev have emphasized factual situation, we see no problem arising from our inability to accord some kind of formal de jure or de facto recognition which would go beyond that factual situation. On "respect for sovereignty of GDR" as it relates to Berlin access, we understand Soviets wish to ensure that access rights do not in fact interfere with authority or life in East Germany. This creates no problems for us because we do not wish so to interfere; what we want is access which is not interfered with by East Germany. There are numerous cases in which means of transit across territory or through air space are used without any interference in the affairs of the territory transited. We suggest that Soviet Foreign Minister accept as point of departure concept that guaranteed access would not interfere with affairs of East Germany and that East Germany would not interfere with freedom of access.

11. Although your efforts to pin down Gromyko specifically on whether "free access" would envisage freedom for anyone to travel back and forth were not successful you should make further effort towards this end. You might make point that we assume Soviet Government is sincere in its stated intention of permitting a viable and supportable existence for West Berliners. Soviets must realize as well as we do that this requires continuation of their relations with outer world on really free basis not subject to control of any third party.

12. If in your judgment you need to say more about status of West Berlin than contained above in order to accomplish objective, you may find it useful to set forth present US understanding of legal status of Western sectors of Berlin. These sectors are an area in which supreme authority continues to be exercised by three Western Powers. Relationship which has grown up between Federal Republic and Berlin in various areas of activity has been on permissive basis subject to this authority. While Constitution of Federal Republic provides that West Berlin is Land of Federal Republic by virtue of suspension of pertinent articles of Bonn Basic Law in 1949 this portion of Constitution is inoperative in Berlin. If you deem it desirable further to spell out US understanding of present status West Berlin you may draw on BTF-34/3/ as appropriate (copies pouched to you January 4--Registry No. 526272). It may be worth pointing out that one of effects of termination of Western occupation would automatically be to end suspension those articles of Bonn Basic Law referred to above. You might remind Gromyko logical response to Soviet unilateral action directed towards incorporation of East Berlin into GDR would have been incorporation of West Berlin in Federal Republic. However, Western Powers have refrained from considering this action as not contributing to achievement of mutually acceptable arrangement under present circumstances.

13. Should Gromyko insist that Berlin cannot be discussed in isolation but must be related to broader questions aimed at "drawing line under World War II", you should state that, in our view creation of barriers against World War III is more important than drawing purely technical line under World War II. We must, therefore, consider issues in light of what is possible now in terms of vital interests of each side. If Gromyko responds to this by repeating usual charges against alleged West German militarism and revanchism, you might take line that, while Soviet leaders have placed great stress in recent years on rejection of Stalinism, it must nevertheless be pointed out that the Soviets first began postwar rearmament of Germany by rearming East Germans over Western protests. Western actions have been defensive and designed purely for nonaggressive purposes. You may also find it useful in this context to draw on relevant points made by President in his interview of November 25 with Adzhubei/4/ and emphasize conviction of US that present Germany is thoroughly peaceful.

14. If Gromyko continues to insist on discussion of "broader questions" you might observe that every subject can obviously not be discussed simultaneously. We have placed initial stress on Berlin access which we believe critical issue for reasons indicated. He should understand, however, that what US would be prepared to say on other subjects will depend to great extent on reasonableness of Soviet position on Berlin access which we consider to be most appropriate question on which to focus at outset.

15. Re International Access Authority, we are sending in separate message summary of proposal/5/ which you may find useful in further discussion with Gromyko. Do not believe, however, that specific language of formal agreement should be tabled pending further explorations. To degree necessary, however, you may also draw for details on draft charter in BQD-37 revised November 30, 1961. In view of German reserve on Board of Governors, you should be cautious in discussing this aspect of Authority not to give impression that composition represents agreed Western position and should indicate that other formulae may be possible.

Rusk

Washington, January 10, 1962, 6:07 p.m.

1616. Eyes only for Ambassador from Secretary.

1. Separate cable containing your basic instructions/2/ as discussed with British and Germans and passed to French for information suggests line of approach for your next meeting with Gromyko in considerable detail. At same time you are left sufficient latitude to probe Soviets should favorable openings appear, and I am, of course, fully confident that, within broad framework of these instructions and our objectives as you know them, you will feel free to exercise your good judgment.

2. From studying results of your first talk, it appears to us, in essence, that what is involved in this discussion is Western desire for an improved access arrangement with Berlin on one hand, as against Soviet desire for change in (1) status of West Berlin, and (2) other questions relating to Germany as a whole. This may be too simplified a formulation of the problem, since it does not include questions such as "respect for GDR sovereignty", but its formulation in these terms will help to clarify essence of these talks. As you are fully aware, we have no interest in any change in status of West Berlin and would not advance any of the questions affecting Germany as a whole. We are, however, interested in an improved access arrangement which would reinforce our position in Berlin and safeguard communications between West Berlin and West Germany, and we consider, therefore, that you should be prepared to express, without commitment, our views on improved access agreement, leaving, however, to Soviets to put forward their desiderata in regard to status of West Berlin and more general questions affecting Germany.

3. In spelling out arguments in basic instruction, point should emerge that we have put forward a view on possibility of an international authority covering access and that the Soviets, for their part, should put forth specifically what they have in mind in regard to status of Berlin and other questions. You should stress that until we know Soviet views on these latter two questions, we will not have complete picture which would enable us to judge whether or not a reasonable basis for more formal negotiations exists.

4. If Gromyko, as is possible, spells out "free city" concept for West Berlin, you should not hesitate to use argument of previous instruction/3/ that, since Soviets reject completely all-Berlin solution and insist that Eastern sectors of city are integral parts of GDR, this, in our view, deprives them of right to voice in future status of West Berlin. You might emphasize that in these circumstances, there would appear to be no need for any revision of existing status which, as Soviets are aware, is desired and fully supported by West Berlin population. Your purpose in this part of conversation would be to endeavor to obtain a full statement of Soviet position in regard to future of West Berlin without, however, entering into any detailed discussion of Soviet proposal.

5. In regard to other questions, you should pursue identical tactics, that is, endeavor to obtain from Soviets without commitment on our part precise statement of what other questions affecting Germany as a whole Soviets desire to discuss.

6. What we would be after at this stage in talks would be some clear indication of totality of Soviet position. We recognize that at this stage Soviets would probably only indicate first negotiating positions and not, in any sense, final positions, but your judgment as to depth of Soviet feeling in regard to any of these positions would be most valuable. We feel it important to ascertain in relatively near future whether or not there would be any grounds for contemplating more formal negotiations. It is not, however, our intention to bring the talks you are presently conducting to a breaking point since we consider that the very fact of the existence of these talks operates as an inhibition on Soviet action in Berlin itself. On other hand, we have to, at some point, consider alternatives open to us, i.e., movement towards formal negotiations or prospect of breakdown of these exploratory talks.

7. In this connection, Germans have indicated to us their view that tempo of conversations should be adapted to Soviet tempo which they now interpret as relatively relaxed. In their view, more accelerated pace might give impression West feels its position is weak. Our estimate of degree of Soviet urgency on Berlin differs from line which Germans are now spreading, but we certainly wish to avoid giving any impression of undue anxiety. I would appreciate having your impressions on this general point.

Our further comments on specific points in basic instructions or raised in your cables follow:

8. While we do not believe it desirable to go beyond language in final sentence of paragraph 7 of instructions at present time, you should be aware that British have raised with us possibility of finding formula which, without danger to legal basis of Western presence in Berlin, would go some way to meet Soviet position that West Berlin should no longer be under "an occupation regime". (Text of British memorandum on this subject pouched Moscow January 8--Registry No. 1506239.)/4/

9. In discussing British suggestion with Ormsby Gore, I said I hoped some way could be found to deal with question without necessity of any formal steps by West Berliners or by us to set up trusteeship which would give Berliners impression that basis of their rights had been radically changed. I suggested that there were perhaps two ways of achieving this: (a) Four-Power agreement which was silent on question of Western occupation rights. This would be superimposed on existing system rather than superseding it. We would say we were prepared to operate on basis of such agreement but if anything happened to agreement, direct application of occupation rights would be restored. Soviets could concentrate on agreement itself. (b) Western Powers could themselves declare that they consider their position in Berlin would be based on more than occupation rights, and that they are holding Western sectors in trusteeship for German people and at desire of West Berliners. This would combine elements of trusteeship and self-determination.

10. While final sentence of paragraph 9 is, therefore, valid at this stage, we may wish at later point to consider interpreting it along lines I suggested.

11. On discussion of "broader questions" raised paragraph 14 of instructions, our basic position remains as set forth in Deptel 1523./5/

12. Should Gromyko raise question of "subversive activities" you may take line suggested Moscow's 1886./6/ Should he inquire whether West still ready to consider prohibition on atomic arms in Berlin, you should indicate point not covered specifically in your instructions but you will inquire. As to troop levels in Berlin, you should be guided by footnote b on page 2 of Annex III to Working Group Report of December 10, 1961./7/

13. Confusion regarding German reserve on composition Board of Governors in BQD-37 due to fact that Embassy representative belatedly came in on January 2 with supplementary request for modifications of instructions to which Ambassador Grewe had previously agreed./8/ In most respects these merely attempted reinforcement of positions which were fully covered in original instructions. They did call particular attention, however, to German reserve on composition Board of Governors. This was not shown in November 3 document since reserve only made later and overlooked by German Foreign Office in sending instructions to Grewe on basis of which he concurred contents Deptel 1520./9/

14. Regarding your 1847,/10/ as you aware, bracketed language in subparagraph 3 of Article X of BQD-37 represents fallback position. Is it your judgment that failure to include this point in formal text when put forward as proposal would be determining factor in Soviet acceptance or rejection? Regarding elimination of reference to military forces, believe it would be dangerous in light of our previous experience with Soviet interpretation of agreements not to mention this subject, but we are considering possible reformulations. Suggest that question need not be dealt with directly until specific draft agreement put forward.

15. We have not yet explored with Allies confederation concept as applied East and West Berlin suggested Moscow's 1854 and 1874./11/ Agree idea worth considering further but do not feel it should be put forward in your next discussion with Gromyko. We are not certain of proposed scope of proposal but would presumably have no objection to advancing suggestion for body to handle such matters as transportation, sewage disposal, and other public utilities on common basis. Establishment of body with such limited functions would not require any change in present status of Berlin, however, as only essential action would be delegation of authority to body by respective municipal governments. Seems dubious Soviets would view such proposal as offering any basis for removal of wall and acceptance continuation of occupation. On other hand, if authority of confederation Board expanded so as to make it real substitute for supreme authority held by Western Allies, this would, given nature of confederal system, mean giving East Berlin a veto respecting variety of matters of substantial and possibly vital importance to West Berlin. Alternative to this would be some form of weighted authority but this would seem amount to essentials of all-Berlin proposal which clearly unacceptable to Soviets.

16. Regarding your 1906,/12/ no objection to modification of Gromyko quote along lines indicated. I am also giving consideration to questions raised your 1907./13/ As you are aware, basic problem on Western side is finding formula which French would consider as constituting acceptable basis for negotiations.

Rusk

Berlin, January 11, 1962, 7 p.m.

1322. Eyes only from Clay for Rusk only. For very limited distribution. I am distressed at Norstad's report on Stockwell complaints and even more at Stoessel's letter to Hillenbrand./2/ This is certainly a back door approach which makes me wonder as to how it originated and, made to Watson's superior, indeed a blow below the belt. More surprising is that the American Commander did not support his subordinate as every action complained about had governmental approval. I am thus surprised to find Stoessel reporting that Norstad believed complaints to have a sound basis. This I reject completely.

Of course, it is obvious that neither British nor French will ever react in Berlin, but fortunately failure on their part to react is taken for granted in West Berlin. Failure on our part could be disastrous. We shall try hard to reconcile actions we believe essential to our position here with extreme British and French resistance to any reaction, but complete success is impossible.

I hope that report receives little attention but I could not let it be in the record as such back door reporting is most unfair to a highly conscientious and competent soldier who deserves full support from his superiors. I recognize it to be aimed at me.

In my opinion, Watson's actions were taken in his capacity as Assistant Chief of Mission in which his responsibility is direct to State Department. I accept full responsibility for them being within approved policies and within such discretionary authority as we have here, as General Watson properly seeks and acts with my advice. I cannot permit him to be blamed for such actions. As I promised, we will do our utmost to keep things quiet here during probing period, but we may not always be able to operate on the do-nothing-in-Berlin policy of French and British and maintain our prestige.

Have sent no copies elsewhere although have no objection copies being sent Norstad and Stoessel if you desire.

Trivers

Washington, January 11, 1962.

SUBJECT
Taylor-Clay Telephone Conversation re Density of Military Traffic on the Autobahn, January 11, 1962

At the direction of the President, General Taylor telephoned General Clay in Berlin at 10 A.M. EST, Thursday, January 11, 1962, to discuss the volume of US military traffic on the autobahn. General Taylor told General Clay that the President during the past few days had learned of the current volume of such traffic and, although he realized it was basically in accord with approved policy, was inclined to ask that the measures in implementation of that policy be reviewed so as to avoid an impression of artificiality in the traffic. Before requesting that review, however, the President wanted to know General Clay's views.

In response General Clay said he felt there should be no sudden cut-back in the volume of traffic. Instead, he felt that the volume could be gradually tapered off to some lower level. In answer to a question from General Taylor, General Clay stated that he needed no directive from Washington on this matter but could and would handle the necessary action informally at his end.

At the end of the conversation General Clay referred to the recent so-called "pressure" from various British sources on this subject. General Taylor assured General Clay that this so-called "pressure" had had no effect here.

L. J. Legere/2/
Colonel, USA
Assistant to the Military
Representative of the President

Paris, January 11, 1961.

Dear Mr. President: Your letter of December 31/2/ discusses frankly two of the principal problems we have to face. I owe it to the friendly relations between our two countries to reply to you with the same cordial frankness.

First of all, you took up the problem of Berlin. On that point, our respective positions are established. You believe that every effort should be made to obtain from the Russians, if possible, an acceptable arrangement for the status of Berlin and the matter of access to Berlin. You consider it desirable that your Ambassador in Moscow sound out the Soviets regarding their intentions on this point. It appears, however, that the Soviets have already on several occasions made their intentions known regarding the fate of both Berlin and Germany, the two matters being, according to them, closely related. These demands, as made known and as, moreover, supported by demonstrations of force, such as the construction of the Berlin wall, atomic explosions, etc., do not make it possible for France to enter into effective negotiations. It does not wish to, nor can it, of course, object to your making contacts with the Soviets on your own account. But unless the Soviets change their position, I do not see how these contacts could enable us to discover a basis for negotiation acceptable to the West. I even fear that, on the contrary, the mere fact that conversations are held under the conditions and in the atmosphere created at present by the Soviets is liable to confirm them in their demands.

You tell me that, although these soundings are made without French participation, it would be well, in the event that negotiations are actually initiated, if France could join the United States and Great Britain. Often in the past, and again very recently, I have expressed the hope that the day might come when, in an atmosphere of relaxation of tension and good will, that is to say, in a completely different atmosphere from the one in which we are now living, real negotiations might be possible between the great Western powers and Russia to endeavor to settle the great world problems, particularly, the problem of Germany. In that event, France would undoubtedly, and very willingly, take part in them. But if it should appear likely, in the light of the present circumstances, that such negotiations would consist in preparing a setback for the West with respect to Germany, France would not participate in them, even though the United States and Great Britain should be willing to proceed without it.

It is true that one of the reasons impelling you to enter into talks with Moscow now is--you have told me this several times--the reaction of the American public. In order to accept the increase in the military burden and, a fortiori, the possibility of an armed conflict, the American public is anxious to have the assurance that everything has been done to settle the dispute by an agreement with those making demands and threats. I have taken note of that tendency, and I know that it is, to a very large extent, the tendency of our Allies. But how can we conceal from ourselves the fact that in view, on the one hand, of the known demands of the Soviets and, on the other hand, of the tendency shown by the West to compromise because of their anxiety, negotiations will lead us inevitably toward successive concessions?

Khrushchev's aim is obviously the neutralization of Germany. Now, as the German people become aware that the Western Allies--essentially the United States--do not intend maintaining everywhere, in all cases and by all means, the situation that was created for it since the war, and that even the Allies are inclined to seek, with respect to Germany, a new arrangement with a threatening bloc, there is reason to believe that, under the pressure of fear, rancor, and self-interest, the German people will gradually come to the point of considering neutralization a way out of their distress and of endeavoring to draw from such neutralization whatever it may appear to offer them in the way of apparent and temporary advantages. And the Kremlin will not fail to facilitate matters for them. However, dear Mr. President, you must understand that the neutralization of Germany would almost certainly lead to the progressive neutralization of Europe. What then would be the fate of the United States, isolated before a strengthened and triumphant Soviet Union and surrounded by the bloc of uncommitted, underdeveloped nations, which because of its very weakness is merciless to the strong when they have given ground. I cannot better explain to you the reasons why France, which is directly concerned through Germany, considers with distrust and uneasiness the policy of negotiation.

You then bring up the matter of atomic weapons and the differences of opinion between us on this matter. In particular, while stating that the United States is concerned over the fact that France is providing itself with atomic weapons, you tell me once more that it does not intend to help France build them. But, as you know, France is not asking the United States to do so. I consider it natural, indeed, that a power which, like yours, has such resources should not want to share its secrets with a foreign State, even though it is its ally. However, without questioning the reason you have given me for this attitude, that is to say, that you could not refuse to give Germany any aid you give France in this field, I do not believe that after what has happened during the last fifty years or so, you could have, with respect to France, the same "memories that are too vivid" and the same "fears that are too real" which cause you to refuse your aid to the Germans.

However, I do not dispute the validity of your opinion regarding the difficulty France is going to have, because of the lack of space and resources, in providing itself with anything at all like the deterrent force of the Soviets. But how can one evaluate the degree of destructive power required to constitute a deterrent? Even if your enemy is armed in such a manner that he can kill you ten times, the fact that you have the means with which to kill him once or even merely tear off his arms may give him pause. Moreover, in the West France is not alone. Its atomic force will certainly add something to the power of the Free World. But, when the time comes, it will doubtless be advisable to organize the combined use of Western nuclear weapons.

And so, in conclusion, I feel compelled to tell you once more how sorry I am that the three great Western powers, which are bound by an alliance that was operative, by force of circumstances, during the two world wars and which, moreover, are very close, in so many respects, in the way of concepts, sentiments, and ideals, do not decide to form among themselves an organized "concert", independent of the various world or Atlantic organizations in which their responsibilities are engulfed. If, for example, at this time, the United States, Great Britain, and France, should decide to have periodic meetings of their Chiefs of State or Government, of their Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and of their Ministers of Defense, in order to reach political decisions and, if necessary, joint strategic decisions; if they should designate officials and delegate officers to form a permanent tripartite political commission and military general staff to prepare such decisions and follow up the implementation thereof; if they should affirm together that they will oppose by every possible means any attempt by the Soviets to alter by force the present status of Germany, including Berlin, I, personally, am convinced that the West's faith in itself, the confidence it inspires in the outside world, the cause of liberty and, in short, world peace, would be much better assured than they now are. It is my intention, at some later date, to take the opportunity to write to you along the same line of thought about what I believe should be done jointly by our three States regarding the development of the bloc of emergent, uncommitted nations.

I should like to renew to you and Mrs. Kennedy my best wishes and those of Mrs. de Gaulle and also to tell you how happy we were to learn of the improvement in your father's health, I remain, Mr. President,

Sincerely yours,
C. de Gaulle/3/