Washington, November 22, 1961, 10:30 a.m.

SUBJECT
Meeting in the Cabinet Room

PARTICIPANTS

Germany
Chancellor Adenauer
Foreign Minister Schroeder
Defense Minister Strauss
Dr. Carstens
Ambassador Grewe
Mr. Krapf
General Schnez
Dr. Schnippenkoetter
Mr. Weber (interpreter)

United States
President Kennedy
Secretary Rusk
Mr. Kohler
Mr. Bohlen
Ambassador Dowling
Mr. Nitze
Mr. Bundy
Mr. Hillenbrand
Mrs. Lejins (interpreter)

The Secretary indicated that it was the intention to release a joint communiqué at 2:30 this afternoon,/2/ whereupon the German Foreign Minister pointed out that no German translation had as yet been made of the communiqué and therefore there would be no possibility to compare the two texts until at least a rough translation was received.

The President pointed out that in view of the importance which everyone attached to these meetings with the Chancellor, he wanted to be sure that the communiqué conveyed the meaning clearly that these present meetings had been preparatory meetings only, and that although agreement had been reached on many points, additional preparations were necessary before negotiations with the Soviets could begin. In effect, he wanted it to be clear that the communiqué would set forth that a series of meetings, for instance with General de Gaulle, Prime Minister Macmillan and by the Foreign Ministers were contemplated before Soviet negotiations could begin. The President also wondered whether the communiqué was explicit enough about the limitations which were being maintained with reference to German armament. He felt that there was still a great deal of suspicion left in some quarters about a reawakening of the German militaristic spirit and therefore wanted to emphasize the fact that West Germany is a peace-loving nation and that the record so indicates. Subsequently, a suggestion was made to change the word "peace-loving" to peaceful as a more preferable term.

The President then suggested that the words "firmly believes and has demonstrated that it" be included in the first line of Point two after "The Federal Republic of Germany".

The Chancellor expressed the opinion that it was important to stress the defensive nature of the Alliance, whereupon the President suggested including a statement to the effect that: the Chancellor, in emphasizing the defensive character of the German military effort pointed out that the Federal Republic is the only large country that has placed all its forces under multinational control. The Chancellor agreed to this.

The Secretary then pointed out that it was the intention to inform the diplomatic representatives of UK and France this afternoon about the general outcome of the meetings.

The President wanted to know how much detail it would be wise to give them concerning the various points on the list of questions on which there had been disagreement prior to these meetings between the US and Germany. He wondered whether this would serve a useful purpose.

The Secretary pointed out that all these matters had been discussed in the Ambassadorial Group before, and everyone was therefore familiar with these problems. To be sure, it was not at all certain whether any of these points would really come up in negotiations with the Soviets. Nevertheless, it was necessary to continue to work on them in the Ambassadorial Group.

The President then turned to Ambassador Grewe and asked him how he felt about the security aspect with reference to the Ambassadorial Group. The Ambassador answered that it would be impossible to conceal these matters from the Ambassadorial Group. The President stated that he agreed, but he was concerned about security nonetheless and asked what could be done to keep this matter out of the press.

The Chancellor expressed concern that if there were a press leak, there would be no purpose in his writing to General de Gaulle. The President thereupon asked whether it might not be possible to withhold any information until Friday, in other words until after the Chancellor had had a chance to get a letter to the General and he himself had written to Prime Minister Macmillan in this matter. Moreover, press pressure would be much less two days hence. The Chancellor agreed and it was so decided.

The President then indicated that Ambassador Bohlen would undertake a background briefing for the American press, and he understood that von Eckhardt would do the same for the German press. He admonished both to steer the briefings very carefully so that nothing definite would come out until after the exchange of letters. If it were agreeable to the Chancellor, the President stated, the briefings should concern themselves primarily with the atmosphere of the discussions rather than with substantive matters.

The Chancellor was in complete agreement, stating that if we wish to win over General de Gaulle the latter must be made to feel that something special is being done for him. Everything would be completely ruined if the General were to read in the papers details about the US-German understandings reached. This information should come to him in the Chancellor's letter. Dr. Carstens is leaving for Paris tonight with the letter, so that the General should have it by tomorrow.

The President thought it would be helpful if the press background briefings dwelled upon the fact that an overall concert was reached between US and Germany on matters discussed, but that the details remain to be worked out.

The German Foreign Minister pointed out that he would soon face this very same problem himself, since he was speaking shortly before the Press Club./3/ He stated that he would also take part in the German press briefings, and he would say as little as possible about details, leaving the atmosphere to be covered by von Eckhardt.

There followed a brief discussion of an Alsop column in this morning's paper which discussed General de Gaulle's reactions to negotiations with the Soviets, and the President stated that we must be very careful lest we damage our chances by unwise action. The German Foreign Minister indicated that he had seen the article and would keep this point in mind.

The President then pointed out that it would be most helpful from the standpoint of the US if the German people were made more aware than they now are of the effort which the US has expended with reference to meeting the Berlin crisis, including the military forces sent over there, the cost thereof, etc. The German Foreign Minister requested that the appropriate figures be made available to him for use in the German press briefings. This might take the pressure off with regard to disclosing other details.

The Secretary then indicated that a number of points had been discussed earlier this morning which would not necessarily come up for discussion during the negotiations with the Soviets./4/ Among these was the topic of boundaries. The Germans are willing to reaffirm with reference to this point that they will refrain from using force to change their boundaries. The Western Allies would be willing to guarantee this. Western Germany would prefer to see mention of the Oder-Neisse line kept out of any formal agreement with the Soviet Union, since they feel that this matter should be left to a later settlement. The US does not believe that it can support any German wish to move this frontier further east. The Secretary invited the German Foreign Minister to comment on this.

The Foreign Minister indicated that West Germany did not consider the question of frontiers a closed question. In general, however, the Germans felt that it was not wise to bring into the discussions with the Soviets all sorts of questions which did not rightfully belong there but should rather be deferred until a final peace treaty. To take these matters up now would weaken the German stand, and Germany felt that frontiers were a matter that was to be decided by a reunited Germany. This had always been the German stand and a joint stand, too. If the Soviets see that the West is willing to discuss all sorts of really unrelated topics in connection with the discussions about Berlin, they will only increase their pressure and try to exploit the Berlin situation as a lever to obtain concessions on almost anything. For this reason, the Foreign Ministers felt that a declaration on the part of Germany such as indicated by the Secretary above should be sufficient and no further negotiations should take place with the Soviets concerning frontiers.

The President then wanted to know, for his information, what the Germans thought the German frontier would be when a peace treaty was signed and Germany reunited. Would it be the present boundaries? In 1959 General de Gaulle had made a statement to that effect. The President doubted that the Federal Republic accepted this. While they agreed not to use force to change the boundaries, they did not necessarily agree on the boundaries as they were, and might use other means to get them changed.

The German Foreign Minister once more indicated that he felt it was better not to include this matter in any negotiations with the Soviets at this time. If, for instance, the question of German frontiers was settled in connection with the Berlin crisis, the interest on the part of other countries in concluding a peace treaty with Germany would considerably decrease, and Germany's bargaining position would be greatly reduced since there would be nothing left for a give-and-take settlement. In 1946 Mr. Byrnes had expressed US opinion on the matter of German frontiers and had indicated that the US would be willing to support efforts to improve Poland's situation with reference to the Western frontier at the time of a peace treaty. No more had been said about this since. It was correct that General de Gaulle had made a statement about German frontiers in 1959 and the Chancellor had subsequently asked the General to refrain from further statements on this subject, which de Gaulle had complied with. The Foreign Minister was afraid that if this matter were now taken up outside of the all-German question, there was danger that the all-German concept would be weakened and gotten away from. Moreover, if these matters were now discussed in connection with Berlin, it meant bringing in issues which could not be treated in a positive manner. The Foreign Minister pointed out that he was well aware of the fact that 16 years after the conclusion of the war might be a good time to discuss some of these points, but this should be done in a peace treaty and it was not the Germans' fault that no peace treaty had been concluded so far. For all these reasons he felt it was of tactical advantage not to include these matters in the Soviet negotiations.

The Chancellor pointed out that if the question of frontiers were to be included in the negotiations, he would find himself in a most embarrassing position vis-à-vis General de Gaulle. Back in 1959 the General had made the statement on frontiers referred to. The Chancellor had asked him to refrain from further statements of this sort and the General had promised to do so and had kept his word. If this matter were now brought up and subscribed to by Western Germany, the Chancellor would feel embarrassed to face de Gaulle again.

The Foreign Minister added that from the German domestic standpoint it was very difficult to discuss this topic in a positive manner, because to the German population it would appear like giving up a position long adhered to by taking the matter out of context. The German people would hardly understand this.

The President indicated that he had only wanted to confirm the German view for his own information, since the Secretary had indicated as much to him. Thus he suggested going on to other questions. He agreed that the question of frontiers should be passed over insofar as possible and should not be made into a major issue in the Soviet negotiations.

The Chancellor then made the statement that it was very clear to him that in an eventual peace settlement the eastern frontier of Germany would look very much like the present line and would be much like what the Poles wanted. In view of past events it was impossible to roll back history.

The President felt that it would be important not to put the topic of frontiers on any list of possible disagreements. Naturally the US did not wish to assume any position which was inimical to Germany. In any event it was not at all positive that the question of frontiers would be raised at all and he again suggested that we go on to other topics.

The President felt very strongly that by the time of the Foreign Ministers' meeting in Paris in December, a definite plan aimed at the wall dividing Berlin should be ready, a realistic plan, which had a chance of Soviet acceptance. He hoped that this plan could be of such nature that it would maintain the morale of the Berlin population and prevent a major exodus.

The Chancellor agreed that this plan was a very serious matter and he wondered whether it should be put forth by the Three Western Powers or by the Federal Republic. He indicated that it would be difficult for Germany to propose such a plan and he proposed discussing the matter with some of the Berliners themselves.

The President agreed that perhaps the US would have to take on the job of presenting the plan, and the German Foreign Minister promised to try to come up with a plan before the Foreign Ministers' meetings by consulting the Berliners in the matter.

The Chancellor then pointed out that the Soviet Ambassador in Bonn had told him in August that if a general improvement in relations were brought about there might be changes in the Berlin wall as well. The President indicated that he did not feel the Soviets would dare take the wall down now, since there would then be a general exodus.

Mr. Kohler pointed out that the topic of nuclear weapons had been discussed. Nothing conclusive had so far been achieved, and Secretary McNamara and Minister Strauss would continue discussions./5/ So far, the Secretary had tried to define exactly what the US was talking about and that anything decided upon would have to be in line with any general disarmament plans, would not interfere with the present NATO stockpiling program, etc.

The President then pointed out that he agreed with what he gathered to be the German view that the German declaration of 1954 concerning ABC weapons should continue in effect for the time being at least. He did not know what conditions might prevail three or four years from now. He also understood that Germany did not want such a declaration mentioned in any agreement with the Soviets, since that would give the Soviets the right to ask for inspections of what the Germans were doing and thus the power to interfere with German sovereignty. Nevertheless, this was an issue that might become important in talks with the Soviets. Would Germany have any objection if it were mentioned in the general context that this declaration remains in effect.

The Foreign Minister reiterated very much the same objections as on the inclusion of the Oder-Neisse line into the framework of Soviet negotiations. If it was inevitable to mention nuclear weapons, Germany would prefer a US declaration on these matters, which might possibly be supported by a German declaration. The matter should not, however, be included from the start. The Chancellor concurred in this.

The President stated that this was understandable and that we did not wish to give away any more than we had to, or before we had to, but it might prove helpful in the final analysis.

The Chancellor then stated that he would like to remind the persons present of the circumstances under which he had made the declaration. He had made it at the time of the founding of the Western European Union, and it had been directed at Germany's partners in this Union for the purpose of removing their fears of a rearmed Germany. The declaration had never been made with any reference to the Soviet Union. Moreover, the Chancellor wished to point out, the declaration spoke of not producing ABC weapons. It made no mention of stockpiling in Germany such weapons made by others, or of Germany not using ABC weapons given her by others. The Chancellor felt that if this matter were now brought into the Soviet negotiations it could have very serious consequences. He also wanted to point out that the German commitment also included a promise not to build certain types and sizes of naval vessels or guns of certain sizes. But possible exceptions were provided for and, in certain instances, such exceptions had been made. He wanted to re-emphasize however, that the declaration had never been intended to have anything to do with the Soviet Union. The President stated that he did not know what all of this might be worth in negotiations with the Soviets. He would certainly like to avoid including anything in the agreement with them that would give the Soviets the right to police or inspect what Germany was doing. But a unilateral statement by Germany in these matters might prove useful.

The Chancellor stated that the Western European Union had inspection provisions through the Brussels Pact. But under this Pact the inspection would be carried out by a friendly power. If these matters were included in the Soviet negotiations, the Soviets would demand the right to inspect and that would be extremely bad.

The Foreign Minister once more pointed out that the important fact was that the Soviets were trying to achieve under the guise of Berlin talks what should rightly be taken up under the peace treaty. In the latter, however, any German concessions or adjustment would result in a unified Germany. If these matters are settled by the Berlin talks, the Germans would risk losing all their bargaining points which they would need in order to achieve a satisfactory peace settlement and would still be left with two Germanies, while all advantage went to the Soviets.

The President agreed in general but felt that we must be thinking in terms of two things: 1. a fallback position, and 2. a basic negotiating position, and he felt that with respect to the latter all these matters should be laid down in as much detail as possible, for example, the international highway and Berlin wall. Mr. Kohler indicated that these matters were being discussed in the Ambassadorial Group. Mr. Kohler then indicated that there was no need to discuss the topic of surprise attack nor the topic of European security; a subgroup was working on the latter topic.

The President then pointed out that the matter of European security appeared to give considerable concern in West Germany, where there existed fear of US disengagement. He wished to assure the Chancellor that there was no sense to the rumors of US disengagement. He himself had not heard anyone suggest any such thing in the course of at least the past two or three years. Nevertheless, he felt that certain non-aggression agreements or declarations might be useful.

The Chancellor stated that he did not know where the bad rumors came from; whether they were traceable to the American press, American correspondents, the German press or German correspondents. He was inclined to suspect certain German journalists. He had spoken to the President about the Springer Press and had expressed his view about it. He advised the President not to worry about these recurring rumors in Europe, since he himself did not feel that they had the effect the President appeared to fear they might have.

The President then asked the Chancellor what he thought about reaching an agreement with the Soviet Union that neither side should have more than 30-35 divisions in either West or East Germany. He based his reasoning on the fact that the West could not hope to have more than about 30 divisions available within the next three or four years. So what did we have to lose by making this the limit for the Soviets as well?

The Chancellor pointed out that in the first place even if the Soviets agreed to such a limitation they would never adhere to it, since they are in the habit of breaking any and all treaties and agreements into which they enter. The German Communists do exactly the same thing he added. The Chancellor advised against giving up anything unless one absolutely had to vis-à-vis the Russians. He warned that it is difficult to foretell at present what developments might take place, so why impose limitations which might become burdensome later on. Moreover, if such a limitation were agreed upon, the Sovs would immediately demand the right to inspect Western compliance, and that would give the Soviets an excuse for coming right into Western Germany. The Chancellor strongly felt that we should take the offensive in the negotiations rather than being on the defensive. That was the only way in which to impress the Russians.

Defense Minister Strauss indicated that he wished to leave aside for the moment the political implications of this matter, but there were certain facts he wished to point out: 1) if such a limitation were agreed upon, then the West could never station more than 30 divisions within a useful distance, even if this should become urgently necessary. All of us knew that France would not agree to having forces stationed there. The Soviets, on the other hand, while keeping only 30 divisions in East Germany, could station as many divisions as they wanted immediately adjacent in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, etc. Moreover, the Soviets had a very fast line of communication between the Soviet Union and East Germany. In the case of need, additional Western forces would have to be shipped all the way across the Atlantic from the US. Secondly, Strauss reminded the group that the military briefings of the day before had stressed the importance of building up conventional forces. For this reason it was altogether likely that the Western Allies would have to increase their divisions to the vicinity of 40, including German, US, Canada, etc., in order to be able successfully to counter Soviet pressure and to make the Soviet Union understand that the West can and is prepared to fight a conventional war if necessary. We must show the Soviets that they cannot hope to beat us in a conventional war. If, however, the limitation is set at 30 or 35, the Russians will immediately take note of that, and if ever the West should station even one additional division anywhere, the Soviets would denounce the West as war-mongers, etc. and we would be playing into their hands propaganda-wise. Moreover, Strauss wished to point out that while the Soviet divisions are generally somewhat smaller than the divisions of the NATO countries, the Soviets had many other independent units additionally and separately (for instance armored units, etc.). The Minister felt that calculations presented at yesterday's military briefing were in error to some extent. They spoke of 20 Soviet divisions in the Soviet Zone of Germany, but German intelligence has very definite information that the Soviets have already moved into Eastern Germany the equivalent of from two to three additional Soviet divisions. By equivalent the Minister implied the manpower and equipment, although not in the form of actual divisions. The same held true of Poland. In other words, Minister Strauss felt very skeptical about the limitation, since it would not really bind the Soviets in any way.

The President reiterated that he was afraid we would never get more than 30 divisions. He had spoken of the gold problem which all this military effort meant to the US, and Germany had, to be sure, been very helpful in this respect. The US certainly could not continue to increase its efforts unless an all-out effort became necessary and there was no indication that Britain would increase her contribution. The French, perhaps, might pull a few more divisions out of the Algerian area, but even this would not appreciably increase the Western potential. Thus, the President did not see how the Western Allied total could get up above 30, unless Germany were to up her contribution substantially. Thus the figure of 30 appeared to be well nigh our limit. Thus, the President reiterated that he was wondering what the value of entering into some kind of a limitation agreement might be, after we calculated carefully what our maximum expectation might be within the next 2-3 years, provided we could keep the Soviets from gaining inspection powers thereby. On the other hand, he felt that the day might come when a nuclear stalemate would be reached, when the Soviet Union would be in a position to destroy the US and the US in a position to destroy the Soviet Union. Then the conventional forces might again become decisive, and in that event any limitation could of course be bad.

Strauss proceeded to point out that there were two over-riding considerations insofar as he could see. One was that for the Soviet Union the divisions in East Germany were not as important as the divisions in West Germany were for the NATO countries. The Soviet Union could send more very quickly at almost any time, while the West would have to bring additional divisions across the Atlantic, thus losing valuable time. Secondly, if in a period of crisis we were to exceed the number stipulated by the agreement, the crisis would be increased and the resulting propaganda effects would play into Soviet hands.

The Chancellor added that he would never agree to any fixed limitation, since it would constitute a confession of weakness and the Soviets would interpret it as such.

The President countered by saying that it is a weakness, since it is a fact that we cannot come up with more.

The Chancellor answered that both in political and military life there was a need for bluffing and one could not do without it.

In conclusion the President brought up the question which he felt would be one of the more subtle ones to handle, namely the degree of recognition to be or not to be accorded East Germany. No doubt, this is one matter the Soviets will push for and it will be a difficult problem and the US is fully aware that the West should not offer more in this respect than Germany is prepared to concede. This is a matter that has to be taken up carefully with some of our Allies, Britain for instance, since certain elements are ready to concede more on this point than Germany can agree to.

The Chancellor stated that Russian tactics are very simple. They are pressure, pressure, and more pressure. Unfortunately the person pressured finally yields, and that is the manner in which the Soviets achieve their successes. If the GDR should emerge from the forthcoming talks with a substantial degree of recognition, what a victory this will constitute for the Soviet Union. The Chancellor will undertake to discuss this matter very carefully with Prime Minister Macmillan and warn him of the consequences of yielding to the Soviets on this point. At the same time the Chancellor has no illusions about achieving German reunification at an early date. He himself is not particularly perturbed about this, citing the historical example of France, which lost Alsace Lorraine in the war of 1870-71. Although France did not regain possession of the territory until 1918, she never abandoned hope nor gave up her claim. What are 10 or 20 years in the course of history after all. It is important however, that the people of East Germany not be deprived of their hope of eventual freedom, and recognition of the GDR would destroy the morale of the people of East Germany. The Chancellor emphasized that he can certainly not be called a nationalist. He would like to say that if he were sure that he could return the people of East Germany to freedom and a life in which they could again determine their own destiny, he would be prepared for any sacrifice, even if this should mean giving up the idea of reunification. But he could not raise his hand to assist any measure that would deprive these people of their hope for eventual freedom. The Chancellor then wished to add one more thing. The entire world was up in arms about colonialism and the need to set the African nations free. Actually, the Chancellor stated, the peoples of Africa, or at least many of them, were eating off golden plates and living much better than the people in the Soviet Zone, who were leading a most deplorable existence, much more so than the Africans of late. It would be inhuman to leave them under the Russian yoke indefinitely. The President then stated that he was most gratified by the amount of understanding the Germans have evidenced for the stand of the US in these matters. The Soviet and US positions, alas, were still very far apart and the President was not very optimistic that any good result would come from the forthcoming negotiations. Gromyko certainly had not made any concessions. The President had noted however, that in his discussions with Ambassador Kroll, Khrushchev had appeared somewhat less adamant than in the talks he had had with President Kennedy. Still there were many points of difference, and there was a good chance that the talks might be unsuccessful. The question to be decided then was what to do in that eventuality. For this reason the President felt that he must insist on all NATO partners keeping up their military commitments. He had recently read about the remarks made by a certain American officer at a reserve meeting to the effect that it was time to recall the troops sent overseas because of the Berlin crisis, now that the crisis was over. This was completely false reasoning and we had to maintain our strength all through the negotiations. Another point the President wanted to mention was that he felt that we were at present in a strong position. While the US no longer had a monopoly on nuclear weapons, he felt we still had the edge on the Soviet Union and therefore he feels we must try to negotiate now. At the same time we must approach these negotiations not feeling that we are being forced into them. It is not as though Khrushchev were taking us to the table. We should appear confident, and we are strong enough to protect our interests. That is the best attitude for achieving success.

The Chancellor stated that the West had made a big error in the past in that it did not know its own values. He understood that Mr. Kennedy was attempting to improve this situation and he wanted to congratulate him on this effort. The Chancellor understood that the President was endeavoring to enlighten the rest of the world on what Communism really is. He wanted to explain the position of the West and place the issue on the level of an intellectual challenge, which is more important than the possession of military divisions. The Chancellor has had a chance to speak with Mr. Lodge who, he understands, is to head up this international effort. The Chancellor hoped that this endeavor will really come about. Then he turned to the matter of Gromyko's making concessions. How could Gromyko make concessions in his talks with the President? The Chancellor recalled his experience with Ambassador Smirnov. On an occasion, when the Chancellor had doubted the Soviet Ambassador's statements, he had told the latter that it was easier to talk to Smirnov's master than to Smirnov himself, and Smirnov had answered that his master is permitted greater freedom of decision. The Chancellor then expressed his opinion that he was convinced that success can be achieved in the negotiations with the Soviets. If, however, too many concessions are made, the affair will register in the eyes of the world as a failure of the Free World under the leadership of the US. But he encouraged the President to be more optimistic about the future, since he himself had seen the change in fortunes in political life, and one must never lose courage. With one thing the Chancellor agrees however. He feels that the President is right in insisting that the other NATO partners must do more and that the Western Allies must remain militarily strong until the Soviet Union has given up its purely aggressive designs.

The President thanked the Chancellor for his visit and expressed his gratification at meeting Minister Strauss. He stated that Khrushchev had frequently mentioned Minister Strauss in their talks in Vienna. Of course, the President smiled, Mr. Khrushchev only says good things about people who are dead and everyone living is bad. Thus Khrushchev mentioned former Secretary of State Dulles as an example of a person with whom it had been possible to reach agreements. The value of the present discussions, the President said, was that there appeared to be mutual understanding between Germany and US of each other's problems and confidence in each other. The President had never had more necessary or more valuable meetings than these since he assumed his office. It was essential and vital for the US and Germany to proceed together. The problem before us is defense of the freedom of Europe and the President had told Khrushchev in Vienna that this is a matter of such vital importance to the US that this country has fought two wars to uphold it. In order to succeed we must have confidence in each other and we must remain in very close contact. In that connection the President reiterated that in view of the Chancellor's fear that it might not always be possible to reach the President in case of emergency, he had explained to him yesterday about the two-minute contact maintained at all times by phone or radio wherever the President went. He again mentioned the direct telephone lines to London and Paris and suggested that a similar arrangement be made with Bonn if it did not now exist.

The Chancellor indicated that he thought this was a good idea. He then thanked the President for his invitation to come to Washington and for taking so much of his time to have such exhaustive talks with him. The President had called these talks valuable, the Chancellor termed them extremely successful from the German point of view. He assured the President that he could always count on Germany to do her duty.

(Note: The German translation of the communiqué never appeared, so that there was no comparison of the texts, or for that matter, agreement on them, at this meeting. The Secretary and Foreign Minister Schroeder and V. Eckhardt left separately prior to the end of the meeting.)

Washington, November 22, 1961.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister: The meeting with the Chancellor has been successful, in the main. He is clearly in favor of negotiation, and he has undertaken to do his best on this with General de Gaulle, to whom he is sending a letter tonight by Carstens. He agrees with the plan for an effort to concert an agreed position at a meeting of Western Foreign Ministers in December in Paris, in preparation for talks with the Soviets early in the New Year, probably at the Foreign Ministers level.

On substantive issues, too, we are closer to agreement, though differences remain. The Chancellor did not support the notion that the status of West Berlin is controlled by the Bonn basic law, and he noted that the offices of West German ministries in West Berlin could be reduced if at the same time the UN should put some offices in. He sees this as a problem of psychology, not principle.

On the Oder-Neisse, we still have differences. The Germans are willing to repeat their assurance that they plan no change by force. But they don't want to settle the Oder-Neisse matter in the context of Berlin. On our side we have indicated our support for de Gaulle's formula, but we have both agreed not to make an issue of it for now. The Chancellor himself is quite realistic on this point, but problems of internal politics weigh heavily here.

On dealings with the GDR we had no real trouble. The Germans quite understand that practical dealings will be necessary; they would rather have us do it; we would rather have them. I think it's not a serious difference. On recognition itself the Chancellor stands firm: I agreed with him.

On atomic weapons we have made clear our strong view that separate national nuclear capabilities on the Continent are bad.

We continue to press for a NATO solution instead. The Germans will stick to the policy stated in 1954, but again they don't want to make new statements in the context of a Berlin negotiation. The Chancellor made very clear his conviction that German unilateral ownership or control over nuclear weapons is undesirable, and Strauss expressed the same view; they agreed that their needs could be met within a multilateral framework.

On one point we strongly agreed: any negotiations must be directed firmly toward strengthened rights of access. The Germans will be quite forthcoming on other points, I am sure, if we can get something worth having on full and free access.

So we have come some distance and have still some distance to go. But the general tone of the meeting was good, and I believe we are now in a good position to work on General de Gaulle. My general impression is that the German Government is now more flexible than it has been in the past.

The Chancellor was very open and friendly, and his associates made a favorable impression on us. It was a much better meeting than my first encounter with him last April./2/

Finally, I should report that we also discussed the military buildup. I was able to give the Chancellor an encouraging picture of our current estimate of the nuclear balance, but at the same time we agreed that the conventional buildup is of very great importance. I know the pressures and problems you face in this area, but I am sure you agree that the prospect of effective negotiation depends heavily on our ability to show unity and resolution on the military side. I know our military advisers are in close touch on technical aspects of these problems, but from the broad political point of view I think it is hard to overstate the value of any further military steps you can take as negotiations become more likely.

Sincerely,
John Kennedy

On November 25, 1961, Aleksei Adzhubei, editor of Izvestiia, interviewed President Kennedy. About half of the interview concerned Berlin, with the President reiterating the U.S. position that Allied rights of access to the city were the basic consideration for the United States. For the transcript of the interview, which was published in Izvestiia on November 28, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pages 741-752.

Moscow, November 27, 1961.

Dear Mr. Secretary: I received your letter of November 15 in the last pouch and have now studied the documents enclosed with it./2/ Khrushchev's letter of November 9 is in substance probably the toughest statement of his position to date although couched in polite language. It certainly destroys any hope that might have been built up by his talks with Spaak and others and Gromyko's talks with you and the President, that a broad settlement of the Berlin-German problems is possible at this time. I find it particularly disturbing that this hard line coincides with the Soviet resumption of testing and the move against Finland. I have no satisfactory explanation but suggest the following factors may have played a role.

1) Khrushchev may have been misled by the Gromyko talks and the fact that some of his statements were not specifically rebutted.

2) Khrushchev may have been over-encouraged by the splits in the Western ranks. Important among these in my opinion is the apparent British tendency to compromise and particularly to accept at least de facto recognition of the GDR. Moreover, Soviet intelligence may have become aware that there are some people in West Germany who would be willing to sacrifice West Berlin by some formula which would obscure the fact that they were doing so. Kroll saw Khrushchev at 11 am on November 9th. Khrushchev's letter was almost certainly written after that interview and he may have gained the impression from Kroll that he could make as good a deal or better with the West Germans as with the Allies. Hence by taking a strong line with the President he has a double shot--one at trying to get a favorable agreement with the Allies and, if that fails, having a go with the Germans. If, in fact, the four point program which was leaked to the press that night came from the Soviets as I believe, Khrushchev has the added possibility of splitting the West by floating a reasonable-sounding plan publicly while being tough with the President privately.

3) Khrushchev is subject to pressures both within the Soviet Union and within the Bloc, and he could certainly use a success in foreign affairs. I am convinced that their agricultural failures are quite serious and that the de-Stalinization campaign will have deep and far-reaching effects.

4) Khrushchev is undoubtedly concerned at the weakness of the East German regime and is unwilling if not unable to assist it by massive economic aid.

5) Despite his disclaimer, the position taken in his letter is no doubt a negotiating one and I cannot believe he seriously would expect us to accept it.

6) Although he does not touch on it in his last letter, the Soviets seem convinced that West Germany will obtain atomic arms and doubtless wish to batten down the hatches before this happens. Along the same line, there are doubtless many Soviets who think that "certain circles" in the United States are bent upon the breakup of the communist empire even at the risk of war.

Turning to another aspect of the matter, I am puzzled by Khrushchev's continued use of this channel. Now that he knows that you and I are informed the logical assumption is that he wishes to keep it from someone in the Soviet Union. This could be from some of his colleagues in the Presidium or it could be the Soviet military. In view of his hard line and the over-all military disadvantages, I should think that of the two, the military is the more likely. Another possible explanation is that he might be using this correspondence to keep Ulbricht quiet while he publicly pursues a more conciliatory line. Along the same order of ideas, he may wish to keep the British persuaded that successful negotiations are possible, and to keep the French from getting ammunition with which to oppose negotiations. This brings up the question as to whether it would be wise to show this exchange secretly to Macmillan and possibly Home. I can see no possible advantage to the British in leaking it and it should have the effect of strengthening their position. It seems to me that unity in the West is the most important factor if we are to be successful in the difficult negotiations that lie ahead.

I should think the President should in reply express his shock at Khrushchev's position, state that evidently there is little hope for a broad agreement at this time but that we should at least make every effort to prevent war and that we are in course of working out our position with our Allies and will be in touch through other channels.

With all best wishes,
Tommy

Washington, November 28, 1961, 6:34 p.m.

1526. Eyes only for Ambassador. If Chancellor's physical condition permits, you should request early appointment to deliver in person following letter from President. If appointment impossible letter should be sent to Chancellor by most expeditious means.

I was very sorry to receive reports from Bonn over the weekend of your having to take to bed with the grippe. I sincerely hope this limitation of your activity is for the most part precaution and that you will soon be free to pick up your full schedule.

The extra strains you underwent during your successful visit to Washington last week no doubt contributed to your present physical difficulties. On the other hand, I cannot but feel, as I hope you do also, that the benefits of the trip offer some compensation for your discomfort. At whatever cost to yourself, you have done a great service for Western unity.

I regret that it will be impossible for you to carry out your original plan for a meeting with President de Gaulle on November 30, but I note that you will now be seeing him on December 9.

I should be less than frank if I did not tell you that I have been disappointed by what I have learned from Prime Minister Macmillan about his talks with President de Gaulle, particularly as to the latter's continuing negative attitude on the subject of negotiations./2/ As you know, we concluded during our conversations in Washington that negotiations with the Soviets, prior to signature of their separate peace treaty and based on a realistic and agreed Western negotiating position, are a necessary part of getting us through the present crisis so that we can pursue the larger common purposes which we discussed and which were reflected in our Joint Communiqué.

As you will recall, my own rationale underlying the approach to negotiations on which we agreed was set forth in some detail in my letter to you of October 13./3/ I continue to regard it as essential that we make an effort to achieve a satisfactory and peaceful resolution before moving on to the greater problem which a failure of diplomacy must bring. It is highly important that President de Gaulle be brought to accept this and that his Government join with us in utilizing all of the available resources of diplomacy. Failure to do this will create severe strains in the Western Alliance and set in motion a chain of causation which can only be detrimental to our common interests.

It seems obvious that President de Gaulle's attitude is significantly influenced by his estimate of what he considers to be German interests and reactions in this matter. He cannot, therefore, but be strongly and perhaps decisively influenced by the position which you and your Government take. You are in the best position to assure him that what we both believe to be the logic of history in the development of the Berlin crisis is not a necessary prelude to defeat but rather a source of strength and unity if the Alliance must meet its ultimate test.

You may wish to consider the desirability, even in advance of your meeting on December 9, of supplementing the letter which you sent President de Gaulle from Washington with a further letter making the point again that your Government does favor early negotiations with the Soviets and the Western initiatives which will be necessary to lead to them. If you see any useful way in which I might follow up on your own presentation to President de Gaulle, please let me know.

I regret that so much time and effort must be consumed in discussions of tactics and procedures within the Alliance, but I regard the present impasse as most serious and one from which we must make strenuous efforts to extricate ourselves. I know you are aware of this and share my concern about the effects on the Alliance which continued division must have. End text.

1. British have informed us that Ambassador Steel has been instructed to see Chancellor as soon as possible to convey to him Macmillan's hope that when Chancellor visits de Gaulle, or in any message he may send should his visit be postponed, he will not fail to impress upon de Gaulle that German Government is definitely in favor of early negotiations with Soviets and that he will do his utmost to persuade him to modify his attitude.

2. British have informed us that French did not give impression that Adenauer letter sent via Carstens had been as positive about negotiations as we had anticipated. Implied Chancellor had not confirmed to French position he had taken in Washington in favor of negotiations and of proposal to concert agreed position at meeting of Western Foreign Ministers in December in Paris in preparation for talks with Soviets early in 1962, possibly at level of Foreign Ministers.

3. In event you are able to deliver letter to Chancellor in person, you should stress seriousness with which we regard continuation of impasse created by negative French attitude in face of unanimous feeling of other NATO countries that talks with Soviets are essential part of process either of resolving Berlin question peacefully or of preparing Alliance for ultimate confrontation.

4. You should also make point that effectiveness of Adenauer approach to de Gaulle will partly depend on degree to which latter convinced Germans not acting primarily because of US pressures but out of own conviction.

5. For further background and argumentation, you may draw on relevant briefing papers prepared for Adenauer visit copies of which pouched Bonn November 22.

Rusk

Washington, November 29, 1961.

TO
The Secretary of State

SUBJECT
Contingency Planning on Berlin

In reviewing the latest reports on the status of contingency planning on Berlin, I do not find any contingency plan for the case of disturbance along the sector border which might lead to riots on both sides and possible rebellion in East Berlin. The recent protests of West Berliners, at a time of relatively low tension, suggest that one of the real possibilities in this situation is that we may have a citizen explosion of some sort at a later stage of the crisis.

I would like to have your recommendation as to possible courses of action in this range of contingencies. I recognize the difficulty of framing precise plans ahead of time for a matter so unpredictable as a civilian uprising, but it does seem to me that we should be thinking ahead on this one.

John F. Kennedy/2/

Washington, December 1, 1961, 7:34 p.m.

769. Eyes only Clay. In reply to your 1056,/2/ the President will want to have your promptest evaluation in any new situation arising in Berlin and your recommendations. Hence you should not hesitate use KY-9 phone to him or to me in such circumstances. President's decisions would be made in light of circumstances and instructions issued to all those responsible for execution. Command and other channels are in high state of readiness for just such purpose.

Reference stories out of Berlin attributing to Soviet sources statement that US troop movements autobahn are provocative, we are taking line that these are routine and normal exercise long established rights to be in Berlin and have free access thereto. Since these rights are utterly fundamental to us and involve issue of war and peace, it is important that we not accept their infringement on the one hand and, on the other, that we ourselves not distort significance their normal exercise. We do not ourselves wish to lend credence to Soviet charges by building up exercise of routine rights as something special. President is concerned to avoid giving Soviets any opportunity to divide Allies by a plausible claim that trouble originated in a US provocation.

Rusk

Washington, December 1, 1961, 8:21 p.m.

3143. For Lyon from Kohler. Re urtel 2864 Dec 1./2/ Besides belaboring Alphand repeatedly in Quadripartite group as you may have noted from reporting telegrams, I had long private talk with him today on dismal prospects Paris meetings unless French loosen up. Recognizing that Adenauer was key to any change in de Gaulle's attitude toward negotiations as such, I said outlook hopeless for any progress or useful work unless French made clear distinction between tactical questions which could be left in abeyance and development of substantive positions on German and Berlin questions. Argued strongly that we had been doing precisely what Couve proposed last August in Paris. We had in effect deferred to French position on negotiations by suspending further explorations and tried to develop substantive positions as Couve himself proposed in Paris Foreign Ministers meeting. However during recent weeks French had apparently spread their disassociation to both aspects. In this connection I cited Tyler's report Laloy had unsuccessfully tried to get instructions to him on substantive paper and Couve de Murville's rueful question to Gavin as to what Foreign Ministers could do. Alphand confirmed inability get replies to his many requests for specific instructions on quadripartite papers. He indicated appreciation distinction between two aspects and intention of trying to get something done but did not seem hopeful. If you can give this line a boost it would help.

Rusk

Bonn, December 2, 1961, noon.

1331. Re Deptel 1526 and mytel 1294./2/ Chancellor still confined to his home, unable to receive visitors, and therefore sent Osterheld to me this morning with letter for the President. Signed copy is being sent by air pouch. Following is our translation:

"My Dear Mr. President,

"Ambassador Dowling sent me your letter on November 29./3/ I thank you for it and especially for your friendly words about my visit to Washington. You may be assured, Mr. President, that I also think back on the days in the United States with happiness and with the greatest satisfaction. Compared to this my illness does not matter at all.

"It did not surprise me that the discussions between President de Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan had no very positive result. I regret this as much as you do. I am also in this regard completely of your view that it is extremely important not to give Khrushchev the impression that the West is disunited. Every indication of divergence on our side confirms Khrushchev in his conviction that the Alliance of the Free World still has no endurance and that it will therefore be possible for him to carry through his plans.

"As you know, I shall meet with President de Gaulle on December 9. I shall present to him your and my opinion and I shall do my best to convince him that we should not strengthen Khrushchev's hopes and that we must at least outwardly present an impression of complete agreement. As soon as I have returned from Paris I shall write to you.

"In the last several days I have thought over all that you said in Washington, among other points also the question of direct communication between Bonn and Washington. I would very much favor it if arrangements could be made so that you could also be reached from Bonn in a few minutes, just as it is already possible to reach you from London and Paris, as you told me.

"The days in Washington were very good.

"With heartfelt greetings, I am as always, Yours."

FYI. Osterheld informs me that for some reason Chancellor has not yet informed FonOff of the President's letter and expressly asked that I handle his reply. Presumably, Chancellor will tell FonOff of exchange in due time but until then Department should keep in mind that neither FonOff nor Grewe are aware of these letters.

Dowling

Washington, December 2, 1961.

Dear Mr. Chairman: I enjoyed very much my talk with your son-in-law, Mr. Adzhubei./2/ His publication of the entire transcript of our interview was, I believe, a useful step in promoting better communications and public understanding among the citizens of our two countries. I was glad to hear from Mr. Adzhubei that you were in good health, having successfully weathered the arduous proceedings of your Party Congress.

Having previously replied to your letter of November 10 on Laos and Vietnam, I want to reply now to your letter of November 9 concerning Germany and Berlin./3/ Let me re-emphasize my strong desire that we not use this private and informal channel of communication to repeat the usual arguments and assertions normally reserved for public debates and propaganda. We should try instead to identify more clearly our areas of disagreement and areas of possible agreement on concrete matters presently before us.

Your son-in-law and I knew that there was little value in arguing over either our different social systems or our different views of history; and thus we largely avoided those subjects. Consequently I will save for a more appropriate time and place my comments in answer to yours as to who armed which party of Germany first, who violated the Potsdam agreements, why you ended the four-power administration of all Berlin, who is now abusing their presence in Berlin, or whether the Japanese Peace treaty is a precedent for a "treaty" with only part of Germany. Nor am I going to engage in a characterization of personalities, a repudiation of what may have appeared in some Western newspaper, or a repetition of the evidence which shows why I believe West Germany to be incapable of threatening your security.

Let us clear aside in this exchange these differences of view that apparently cannot be changed. And let us, to the extent possible, also refrain from using labels or adjectives that each of us may interpret differently--such as "occupation regime" or "free city". Let us talk about our responsibility: the actual situations we face now, and the concrete changes which might be discussed to improve those situations. That is the only way in which this correspondence can be meaningful--the only way in which we can make certain that we understand each other clearly and can prevent the tide of events from slipping beyond our control--and the only way, finally, in which we can achieve the lasting peace we both so devoutly desire.

I was very serious in telling your son-in-law that our two nations have the most to lose from war and the most to gain from peace. The program of development which you outlined at your 22nd Party Congress, which was fully described in our press, must necessarily be carried out, as you state in your letter, under conditions of peace. The same is true of the programs I am seeking from the American Congress--to improve our people's health, education, housing, recreation and welfare, for example, as well as general employment opportunities and economic growth.

So, with peace as our goal, let us examine where we stand in more concrete terms. After reading your letter I think it particularly important that you should have my views on these important matters.

(1) Western forces are in West Berlin now--and they will remain there as long as the people of West Berlin want them to remain. This is in accordance with your own position that they must remain masters of their own fate.

(2) Soviet troops are not now in West Berlin, and would not in the future be needed there to guarantee our access any more than they are needed for that purpose now--and we could not under any circumstances agree to their being stationed there, I gather that you are not insisting on this and there does not seem to me, therefore, to be any need for us to become involved in long discussions in this matter except as a part of an all-Berlin solution.

(3) Western rights of access to West Berlin preceded and are independent of the Soviet Union's creation of the present East German regime. Their free exercise is a solemn obligation of the Soviet Government toward us. Those rights should therefore be confirmed and respected by any subsequent regime or any arrangement it purports to make. In no circumstances can we permit these rights to be subjected to the discretion of East German authorities, which might be subject to change; and surely you can understand how that would only increase the chances of unnecessary conflict.

While you may refer to these rights as "occupation" rights, our presence and access are not being imposed upon the West Berliners contrary to their will, and it is the "vanquished" population which is in a position to protest continuation of an occupation. Also, while these rights may not be consistent with your concept of a "free city", they do mean the city is and will be free in the sense that the West Berliners are free to choose their own future and their own protectors of that future. But whatever those terms may mean in our different languages, these facts remain. And no treaty or other arrangement with the East Germans can alter these facts, inasmuch as West Berlin has never been a part of East German territory.

Consequently, when you propose to conclude with the East Germans a settlement recognizing and consolidating the situation as it actually is, and as it was created as a result of the war, you must surely agree that the present status of West Berlin, including the access and presence of Western forces and the absence of Soviet forces, is one of those situations--and that any realistic settlement must therefore start with these facts.

I am certain that you, as a realist, recognize that we cannot permit West Berlin to be separated involuntarily from the forces of the Western Powers when it is wholly clear that this is what the people of that city want, that these forces constitute a threat to no one, and that you are unwilling, as stated in your letter, to permit East Berlin to be separated from what is now called East Germany.

Let us instead agree on the two principles stated in your letter:

"Let West Berlin live and develop in the way its population wants" without "any restrictions on (its) ties with the outside world or on the access to that city of these or those states by land, sea and air."

If the people of West Berlin should ever decide that the presence of Western forces was no longer necessary or desirable, those forces will leave, without any loss of prestige. But should the people of West Berlin decide to the contrary, that should involve no loss of prestige for you, since you, too, have stated that they should be free to determine their own future. Nor does this "violate the sovereignty" of the East Germans, if any, inasmuch as West Berlin has, as I stated, never been a part of their territory, and therefore our rights in that city, including our rights of access and your responsibility therefor, cannot in any sense be terminated by any unilateral arrangements made with the East Germans.

I do not mean to imply by this that the Three Western Allied Powers and the Soviet Union cannot discuss a clarification and possible improvement of access rights. This is entirely proper, and should, in my opinion, be an important focus of any subsequent negotiations.

So let us avoid the dangers of unilateral actions, of dealing with one part of Germany only, and of abandoning agreements and goals to which both of us are legally committed. Instead let us explore together what we can do together--what joint actions for mutual benefit might be taken to improve the existing situation, without altering those situations that cannot now be altered, and consistent with our joint commitment to ultimate German self-determination. We have, as you point out, renounced force as a means of achieving that goal--but we cannot renounce the goal itself.

You state in your letter that I have not given you any "concrete" suggestions for the settlement of this matter. This is possibly true in a formal sense. But I am actively exploring with our allies our preparations for useful negotiations at the proper time. To enter into negotiations when under threat or pressure is no more feasible for us than for you. In addition, to enter into negotiations that might later collapse for lack of preparation or unity would surely heighten the dangers to the peace. I think you understand moreover, that this is not merely a question of American policy, but also involves the intimate association we have with our Western European Allies.

As you undoubtedly are aware, there has been some divergence of views among the Western Powers on the form and timing of negotiations. There are those who believe, as you have read, that there is such a gap between the positions taken by the Soviet Union and the Western Powers that negotiations would inevitably fail, and thus the situation would become even more unsatisfactory and dangerous than it is today. My own view is that, while there are serious divergences of opinion in regard to those matters before us, they must be considered in serious and responsible discussion--and that we should not permit the present situation, so fraught with the possibility of an explosive incident, to continue without our taking every possible step to ease the matter. I have expressed this view to the other Western Powers.

I am, therefore, hopeful that shortly after the representatives of the Western Powers have met in Paris this month we and you will be in a position to sit down in an agreed and appropriate manner to attempt to reach a solution that is mutually satisfactory to all.

I want to emphasize again that what best serves peace, not merely prestige, must be our chief yard-stick. It is not the effect on Western prestige but the effect on peace in your proposals that causes me concern--and I am anxious, as you are anxious, that we find solutions "on a mutually acceptable basis" which will preserve for years to come the peace we now enjoy. While I regret that this letter cannot now be more precise as to detail, I am hopeful that stating our views clearly on certain matters at issue will help make such steps possible at an early date.

Sincerely,/4/

Washington, December 7, 1961.

This memorandum is in response to National Security Action Memorandum No. 117, November 29, 1961,/2/ in which you raised some questions concerning a possible uprising in East Berlin in connection with the Berlin Crisis.

The Ambassadorial Group on December 1 approved on behalf of their governments an intelligence assessment of the likelihood of disturbances in East Germany and a paper on the Western attitude in the event of an uprising in East Germany or East Berlin, which have been under preparation for some time./3/ Copies of both are enclosed. The key passage in the latter paper says, "Whether any form of assistance might in fact be feasible and desirable could only be determined under circumstances then prevailing. Subject to this proviso, we do not believe that the West should, in the event of a revolt, give the population any encouragement or hold out any hope of material assistance despite the anticipated clamor for a strong reaction in the event of disturbances in East Germany in the immediate future." A key passage of the Rules of Conduct portion of this paper says, "The temptation to cross the border might be very strong especially if the insurgents request assistance. But the only safe course would be for all persons--and especially all troops or uniformed officials--to stay on the Federal German or West Berlin side of the border."

The four delegations of the Ambassadorial Group are now forwarding these papers via capitals to US, UK, and French Missions in Bonn and Berlin and to the Federal Government, for their information and guidance. The Missions in Bonn and Berlin are being requested to implement the Rules of Conduct, in coordination with the German authorities and the Allied military authorities.

Your memorandum also raised the question of possible riots in West Berlin. The West Berlin and Allied military authorities have long had procedures for dealing with civil disturbances. They have recently revised these to take into account the construction of the wall and the particular problems regarding civil disorders which it creates.

If, despite the efforts of the West Berlin police and Allied military forces, disturbances along the wall got out of hand and led to riots in East Berlin, the Rules of Conduct referred to above would apply.

The enclosed papers only apply to uprisings which might occur in the absence of military operations. The Berlin Task Force has also been studying the relationship of unrest in East Germany to possible Allied military operations in connection with the Berlin problem. As soon as this study is completed, we shall examine the problems in the Ambassadorial Group.

Dean Rusk

Washington, December 9, 1961, 7:43 p.m.

3316. Paris for Kohler/2/ With reference to continued military movements over Autobahn, Department considers it essential they be maintained and conducted at fairly frequent intervals. Movements need not be large. In fact they probably should not exceed company size units. But they should be frequent enough so that Communists aware of them but will not feel challenged in such way that they forced take harassing action.

Moreover, in view publicity which preceded present battle group rotation and implied threats to movements of this kind that have come from Communist, particularly East German side during past few days, it would, in our view, be mistake to suspend further movements at this time and give Communists impressions they succeeded in intimidating us.

Department in touch with Defense and JCS this matter with view getting appropriate guidance along above lines to CINCEUR.

Rusk

Paris, December 10, 1961, midnight.

Secto 2. Eyes only for the President. I had a good talk with Lucius Clay this afternoon and reviewed in considerable detail our policies regarding Berlin and Germany. I pointed out that on the one hand some of his concerns were based on local misunderstandings and on the other that he was performing an invaluable service in reporting such matters to us promptly for possible correction. I emphasized the points you made in our last private conversation and he appeared to take them seriously.

He will be in touch with me again this week but I do not believe that he will take any precipitate action which would embarrass the administration. He fully understands that you are carrying the primary load of firmness in Berlin and Germany, as contrasted with the general attitudes of most of our Allies, and that most of the concessions which have resulted in erosion of our position in Berlin were in fact made during the past eight years of a Republican administration. I am certain that he will not act hastily without full opportunity for further consultation.

Rusk

US/MC/11

Paris, December 11, 1961, 3:30 p.m.

QUADRIPARTITE FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING
Paris, December 10-12, 1961

PARTICIPANTS

United States
Secretary Rusk
Mr. Bohlen
Mr. Kohler
Mr. Hillenbrand

United Kingdom
Lord Home
Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh
Sir Anthony Rumbold
Mr. Ledwidge

France
M. Couve de Murville
Ambassador Alphand
M. Lucet
M. Laloy

Germany
Dr. Schroeder
Mr. Carstens
Ambassador Grewe
Mr. Krapf

SUBJECT
Berlin

Lord Home began the discussion by stressing the problem which would be created in the NATO Council unless the Four could clear up their differences prior to Wednesday. He requested information on the de Gaulle-Adenauer talks. Couve asked Schroeder to assess the results. The latter said this was not easy since most of the time on Saturday was spent in private conversations and the Foreign Ministers had participated only in the formal discussion towards the end of the afternoon. He could say that agreement had been reached on basic objectives but not to the same degree on procedure. Chancellor and he had taken the position on negotiations of which the others were aware from the recent Adenauer visit to Washington. The French had presented a number of impressive arguments which he would prefer to leave to Couve.

Couve said he wanted to begin from the beginning. The Berlin problem had been under discussion with the Soviets, directly or indirectly, for the past three years. This was not a question merely of the status of Berlin and the fate of its inhabitants, to the defense of which the three Western Powers were committed, but rather one vital to the future of Germany and therefore of Europe, including France, and important also to the UK and the US. It seemed to the French that the Soviets were moving not just to take Berlin but to change the entire situation in Central Europe and thus one step nearer their constant goal since the end of war of creating a satellite belt and neutralizing the rest of Europe.

This was why the French took the Berlin problem so seriously. Since the cutting of Berlin in two in August, the Soviet stress had been on these broader objectives. The pressure on East Germany caused by the refugee flow has greatly diminished. Hence, the Soviets could abandon the time limit for their peace treaty set for the end of the year. The Soviet offensive continued with growing emphasis on alleged German revanchism and with the Finnish action really aimed at Scandinavia. Moreover, in his talks with the Secretary in New York, Gromyko had linked Berlin to the all-German problems of security and boundaries.

The French recognized, Couve continued, that the essential problem of Europe would eventually have to be discussed with the Soviets in one way or another. They had had the illusion in May 1960 that this kind of discussion, including such related problems as disarmament, might take place. For various reasons the Summit had proved abortive. Nobody could exclude the possibility that such broad talks might be revived and the French were prepared for them, though they would not be easy. It was quite obvious that Berlin was not a question in itself for the Soviets but a means to an end, now that pressure to resolve the refugee problem has been eliminated. There was a tendency, he noted, to admit this might be true but then to argue that our business now was the threat to Berlin and that we must therefore offer the Soviets negotiations. The French position was that negotiations would neither be realistic nor useful. They would be unrealistic because they would not deal with the essence of the problem. He saw little prospect of a limited solution on Berlin. If the Soviet position on Berlin alone were taken--that the Occupation is outmoded and should be replaced by the status of a free and neutralized city, that there would be no relations with the Federal Republic except those agreed between us, thus excluding political relationships, and that the Berlin garrisons must go or be reduced to symbolic status for a certain period with Soviet units added--he could not see the West could gain any advantage. On access, the Soviets spoke both of freedom and also of respect for GDR sovereignty, and nobody knew precisely what the Soviets had in mind. Soviet demands were thus far from the position the West was prepared to discuss. In formal negotiations with Soviets the two sides would thus start far apart. Either the West would not budge and negotiations would rapidly collapse, or the West would find a way to compromise the present situation and accept at least part of the Soviet program. Nobody could say where this would lead. Once negotiations had begun it would be difficult to take the responsibility for a breakdown, and he did not believe the Western Powers would do this. It was very well to say that the West must negotiate from a position near the status quo, but it was clear it would have to deviate from this if talks were to succeed. The French also feared that the Soviets would ask for all-German concessions, especially on the military side, and that the Western Powers would end up discussing proposals leading to that neutralization which the Soviets had in mind.

Couve said he knew the question which the others would put to the French was what alternative they had in mind. He noted that in the August and September Ministerial meetings he had defended the position that the Western Powers had to remain strong and unified. They should say that they would not discuss Berlin under Soviet blackmail and threat. The Soviets were not going to risk war over Berlin any more than we were, and the situation could therefore continue for a long time. Two things had happened in the seven months since Vienna: the splitting of Berlin and the lifting of the time limit for a peace treaty. He could not see from the experience of recent months how anything had been lost by not proposing negotiations. The situation was in fact a little less bad. The Soviets and the GDR were compelled to take the risks involved in splitting Berlin, risks not from the West but from the East Germans. The action taken would have had to come at some point. It had been prepared for a long time in advance like the Soviet nuclear tests.

To sum up, Couve stated the real problem was not Berlin but Germany as a whole, which meant Europe. A severe weakening of the Western position in the world would come from offering negotiations which were tantamount to offering a compromise on Berlin. What Khrushchev had said in his speech on Saturday/2/ confirmed the French position. He had derided the idea of a discussion limited to Berlin. The West should not fool itself. It could not improve the situation in Berlin but only make concessions. The only thing that mattered was the German question and this was the "real and only casus belli." In response to a request by the Secretary that he elaborate, Couve said that, when it finally came to a showdown, this would be the point on which the West must fight because its life would be at stake. In response to a further question by the Secretary, Couve said he was referring not to signature of the peace treaty but to a situation where the Soviets would demand German withdrawal from NATO and removal of nuclear weapons from Germany. This did not mean the Berlin situation was not dangerous. He was aware of Western contingency plans but he did not think it would ever come to that.

Lord Home said it was obviously correct to say that Communist strategy was to weaken the position of the Western world and democracy everywhere, but he did not think we could therefore argue that the West should never try to find areas of agreement with the Soviets or to negotiate on anything. Negotiations were already under way on Laos, nuclear tests, and would begin again on disarmament. The probability of success was another question. Couve was correct in putting Berlin in the context of Germany, Europe, and the entire world. This did not mean it could not be the subject of negotiations. There were compelling reasons for at least beginning them. It might well destroy German morale if negotiations on Berlin led to concessions which would damage Germany in the future, but the deterioration of Berlin as now proceeding could also affect Germany. In August he had argued that the chances of deterioration in Berlin were very real, and the experience since August indicates that the city might simply wither away. He did not see how West Berlin could have an effective life until the current situation of uncertainty was settled. Couve had said Khrushchev might do nothing, but the chances were he would make his peace treaty with the GDR, thus putting additional power in the hands of Ulbricht who had his own interests in nibbling away at West Berlin. This process would begin almost at once and lead inevitably to a loss of confidence in Berlin.

The reason for arriving at an agreement on negotiations in the next two days was that the NATO members regarded the military build-up and negotiations as complementary. They would be unwilling to continue their build-up of strength unless there were a prospect of negotiations. The situation might lead to a serious rift in the Alliance.

Couve had said that the Soviet and Western positions were far apart, Home continued, but this was likewise true of other matters about which the West was willing to negotiate with the Soviets, such as disarmament. How could the West tell whether the Soviets were willing to accept reasonable arrangements on access and the status of West Berlin without negotiations? The subject of Western rights could be left aside. The Soviets could say they were ended and the West could say they were continued. In addition, the Western Powers could say they were there because the West Berliners wanted them. As to contacts between the Federal Republic and Berlin, the Soviets had said they could accept economic and cultural ties. The question of political ties might involve giving up such items as Bundestag meetings and certain other contacts which the Federal Republic might find it possible to relinquish. As to contacts with the East Germans, many of these already existed between East and West Germans. It might be possible to find a formula to express these contacts. Thus the West would eventually be trading facts of life which already exist for some compensation from the Soviets.

As to the nature of negotiations, Home added, the Foreign Ministers might have a wide-ranging global agenda including Germany and Berlin, or they could begin on the narrowest possible basis. If Khrushchev said the latter meant GDR must be recognized, the matter could be referred to deputies. Another possibility was that the Western Ambassadors in Moscow could make further probes with Gromyko. He did not favor this since the Soviets would merely say the Ambassadors did not have enough authority to discuss solutions, and might themselves ask for a Foreign Ministers' meeting. Therefore, he now believed, the West should ask for a Foreign Ministers' meeting either to discuss world affairs, including Germany and Berlin, or to begin on a narrow basis with a broadening out only if compensation were obtained from the Soviets each time a larger question were discussed.

In response to the Secretary's query as to the circumstances under which French might consider a general discussion with the Soviets could profitably be held, Couve pointed to the period at the end of 1959 and beginning of 1960 when an atmosphere of détente was "generated." On this basis a Summit meeting had been agreed. He was not now pleading for a Summit meeting but for the idea that discussion with the Soviets should only be held in that kind of atmosphere if it should be possible one day to create this. This was different from discussions under the present circumstances of threat, blackmail and 100 megaton bombs. He did not see how the West could make any kind of dignified response to the last speech of Khrushchev which brought the situation back to July. Home said this depended on the kind of negotiations which the West obtained. It was better to have the situation stabilized than to have tension continue and Berlin run down.

Schroeder said he understood the French fears that once negotiations began the danger of broadening them to include Europe existed. The best way to diminish this danger was to enter negotiations with a firm Western agreement to keep to the narrowest possible basis. Many had said to the Federal Government that if negotiations had then been under way the events of August 13 would not have happened. This was perhaps incorrect but could not be refuted. The problem existed that, if in the foreseeable time no negotiations were launched offering reasonable prospects, the psychological deterioration in Berlin would increase and the city would disintegrate under the eyes of the West. This was the strongest reason in the German view for seeking negotiation. He also accepted the argument that continuation of the NATO build-up required negotiations. His government, therefore, supported negotiations on a narrow basis with as much agreement in advance as possible to avoid slippage during them.

Couve conceded that a great state of uncertainty existed in Berlin, with many planning to leave. This was almost inevitable in the circumstances, but he did not see how negotiations ending in failure with a big crisis, or in agreement on a change of status of the city would hearten the Berliners and keep them there. Speaking of the Western substantive position, he continued, the Working Group paper contained an ambiguity on the status of Berlin in saying that the source of rights would be maintained. What would be the legal authority of the so-called Occupation powers, who at present are sovereign and on this basis in 1949 opposed certain articles of the Basic Law? In the final analysis Berlin morale depended on the Western guarantee. Any acceptance of the new status which Soviets want would make Berlin morale disappear. This, in his view, was more important than the garrisons themselves. He did not say the occupation could be maintained forever, but it was the essence of the problem.

Home said that, from the viewpoint of West Berliners, if agreement on access underwritten by the West and the Soviets could be obtained, and attached to their peace treaty, this would be an improvement if the occupation status were not dropped on our side. The Soviets could say it was dead, but we could claim it remained. He wondered whether Couve would agree to a Foreign Ministers' meeting with a world-wide agenda which admittedly would quickly get to Berlin but might put the Soviets in a defensive position. Perhaps some compromise between the German and French positions on broad and narrow negotiations might thus be found, or there might be a series of meetings of Foreign Ministers. Couve said his concern was not the question of a broad or narrow agenda but that any negotiation, unless broken off (which the West would not accept the responsibility for), would lead to concessions the Soviet counterparts for which he did not see.

Home said that Gromyko in the New York talks had stressed recognition of the GDR. We could not accept this, but perhaps could use some formula which the GDR might find satisfactory. Gromyko was interested in frontiers. He did not want to say much about this now but he wondered why, in the same way as de Gaulle had previously put it, the Western Powers could not link a commitment on frontiers to eventual reunification, whether or not the Germans felt they could say something on the subject themselves. Such items dealt with the facts of life and did not concede anything if the West obtained an access arrangement which would help Berlin and West German morale. Couve observed that he saw nothing which the other side was willing to give which would be in the Western favor or provide assurance for the future. Facts of life on the Western side were that the Federal Republic is part of the West and a member of NATO and that West Berlin is also a part of the West, but the Soviets did not accept these facts. There must be a balance in acceptance of the facts of life, and the right of the Federal Republic and West Berlin to remain in the West must be the basis of any modus vivendi. Home commented that these were facts of life to which the West would stick through thick and thin. Other facts were also access and freedom of the city. He did not see how the facts of life as the basis of a deal made by the West need put us at a disadvantage.

The Secretary said he thought the Western world was confronted with a crisis in its contest against the Sino-Soviet Bloc of historical proportions. The Communists have made clear that they are serious about world revolution and will press for it where they can. In this sense we will be under pressure for a decade or longer and they from us. We will be exchanging threats and taking action against each other, and there will be periods of greater and lesser tension. Tensions will be reduced prior to negotiations and increased if negotiations fail. A serious problem which the Ministers had to think about was whether a lack of mutual confidence did not exist among themselves. To what extent were their problems not in regard to the Soviet Union but due to a lack of mutual confidence as to intentions and willingness and ability to work together? There was a crisis of the Alliance. He had thought the Western Powers were agreed that their basic position in West Berlin was a vital one, which, if challenged, would be a casus belli. If this were not agreed, we must find it out. The US position started with this premise. We did not look upon negotiations as involving a compromise giving away what otherwise would be a casus belli. We estimate, but do not know for sure, that the Soviets will not wage nuclear war over Berlin, but we could not assume that the Soviets would not risk war over Berlin. The Soviets may very well risk war over Berlin and he had assumed we would likewise. One of the quickest ways to have a nuclear war is to have the two sides persuaded that neither will fight. Precisely because a casus belli is involved in this situation it would be irresponsible for governments that have nuclear weapons under their control not to be in contact with each other even up to the last few seconds before the holocaust. If the West did not come away from these meetings with genuine unity the Soviets will indeed erode our position and the unity of the Alliance is unlikely to be repaired subsequently. He did not equate negotiations with surrender or concessions, the Secretary continued. In a certain sense the status quo is not negotiable and in an equal sense the Soviet proposals are not negotiable. To negotiate with the Soviets and to fail to reach agreement would still leave the status quo which could not be disturbed without war. The fact of negotiations does not commit the West to yield vital aspects of its position. The Western Powers had talked about Solution C. Perhaps there might be some way, in the face of important disagreements, to find a modus vivendi to avoid war. On the question of broad or narrow approach to opening negotiations, we have no strong or complete commitment but would be glad to work with our Allies to obtain a common view. We would be willing to start with narrow position, recognizing that the Soviets will almost inevitably raise broader questions. He wondered, the Secretary repeated, whether the difficulty was with the Soviets or lack of confidence in each other . When security questions arose in his talks with Gromyko, rumors regarding US disengagement intentions began to spread, although he had specifically told Gromyko this was not involved. We were willing to consider the wide-ranging negotiations Home had suggested, including, for example, Communist penetration of Southeast Asia, nuclear weapons, disarmament, and Germany and Berlin. Perhaps such a broad review by Foreign Ministers would be worthwhile. We had thought we could come to quicker agreement by starting on a narrow basis. We also agreed the Soviets could not try to sell us the same horse over and over again. The Jessup-Malik agreement in 1949 had recognized Western rights in Berlin without Western concessions. The situation had changed since then, but with great seriousness he wanted to point out that, apart from the need to keep in responsible contact with the Soviets on more dangerous subjects, we faced the problem of leading the West to maintain its strength and to unify its policies so as to deal effectively both with the Berlin situation and the broader long-run conflict with the Sino-Soviet bloc. He was quite sure that we could not call upon our own people to make a substantially increased effort and to face a great crisis if the impression were given that we were diplomatically sitting on our hands and not trying to find out what the alternatives were. This was also true of the Alliance as a whole which was being asked for extra effort.

He did not want to claim that much was achieved by the Rusk-Gromyko talks but several points emerged: a) Gromyko understood clearly there would be no GDR recognition and appeared to accept this. Their discussion of alternative proposals was based on such an understanding. This discussion was not satisfactory but Gromyko understood there would be no de facto or de jure recognition. b) Gromyko recognized that we are not going to talk with the East Germans but that any arrangement must be between Moscow and the West and the Soviets would impose it upon the GDR. c) The situation was helped by removal of the deadline. Whether or not the talks accomplished this, they did give the Soviets a pretext to explain their postponement of the year-end date. These items were procedural in character, and he must say that on the substance of their free city proposals the Soviet position had not changed. The Soviets know we will not accept their troops in West Berlin or interruption of access. Our problem here is to get Western agreement on a position, then to establish responsible contact with the Soviets to avoid getting beyond the point where governments could lose control of the situation.

Home said he agreed with the points made by the Secretary regarding Russian understanding of the non-negotiable aspects of the Western position. He did not think negotiations necessarily had to collapse or involve major concessions. The West might get something satisfactory out of them. Referring to Couve's citation of Khrushchev, the Secretary said he frankly wondered whether an impartial umpire, examining both recent Soviet and US statements on nuclear strength, particularly our capacity to destroy the Soviets even after a first strike against us, could decide who was being the most threatening.

Couve said he wanted to explain that as to the casus belli the French were in basic agreement with the US. The reason for any confusion was that the French did not think it very likely that the Soviets would go to war on Berlin. If it came to that, it would come to that. It was true to say that France did not want to go to war, and when he said the real casus belli is the future of Germany, that is where our real vital interests lie. He could agree that Berlin was where the Soviets had to be stopped, for this was a question of West Germany. The danger of negotiations is to be drawn into concessions, or if negotiations collapse, the situation would become worse than ever since there would be no further recourse. The Secretary argued that, if we did not talk, our position would be weakened, since we would be seeming to let the crisis develop without clarifying before the world our respective positions. Pressures would build up which, bit by bit would tend to break up the Alliance. Trying to get Allied agreement on contingency plans has proved difficult enough. Soviet salami tactics would further strain Allied unity. If we engage the other side in discussions and explain our position, then we can better maintain unity among us.

In response to a query from the Secretary, which he at first did not completely understand, Schroeder strongly maintained that neutralization is the last thing in the world the Germans want. The Federal Republic started from the viewpoint that it was permanently an integral part of the Western Alliance. This was the consistent policy of present and previous governments. The German attitude on negotiations had nothing to do with any fear that they would lead Germany away from the West which was the known Soviet goal. He indicated that, in revising the official government policy statement, he had in several places stricken the word "neutralization" and substituted "isolation." It was true, of course, that certain proposals in the military field were believed to have a tendency to lead towards neutralization. As to Home's remarks on the Oder-Neisse Line, he added, these did not belong in this context. The occupying powers were bound by their 1954 agreements with the Federal Republic to discuss this question only with an all-German Government. The Secretary commented that the Soviets had as an objective just as much splitting off the US from the rest of Europe as the neutralization of Europe. The decision on these matters is clearly in our hands.

Home said he was glad that Schroeder had made such a strong point on neutralization and he hoped that this would remove one of Couve's fears. He wanted to reiterate again that the four must have agreed proposals to put to the NATO Ministerial Council on Wednesday along with a clear idea of what they hoped to get out of NATO. Otherwise, the Alliance would appear in a state of disarray.

Bonn, December 11, 1961, 11 p.m.

1403. Following (our unofficial translation) message from Chancellor Adenauer to President just received. (Original being air pouched)

"Bonn, 11 Dec 1961

Dear Mr President:

You will have read the communiqué concerning the talks which President de Gaulle and I held in Paris on Dec 9./2/ The press reactions are not very positive, if for no other reason than that our press spokesmen said little; however, the result of the conversations is considerably better.

I spoke in complete privacy with President de Gaulle in the morning and in the afternoon of the 9th on each occasion for about two hours. The first portion, in the morning, was very difficult. In the afternoon we then achieved agreement, and indeed with the result that a conference with the Soviets about Berlin should be held, if it is established--preferably through diplomatic channels--that such a conference offers a prospect for agreement. President de Gaulle also declared himself agreed that France would drop its reserve, which it has hitherto displayed in talks of the Western powers, including talks on Berlin.

I believe that this is a relatively good result, and I am sure that the talks in Paris were very useful and valuable. It was not to be expected that President de Gaulle would publicly agree with our views immediately. His change in opinion should obviously become perceptible to public opinion, including that of his country, without causing sensation.

President de Gaulle and I also spoke about European questions and about NATO affairs. We parted in close understanding.

I believe that we should now for the time being await Khrushchev's reaction to my conversation with Amb Smirnov./3/

I have just received your letter of December 9,/4/ for which I sincerely thank you. From my talks with you, Mr President, and with General de Gaulle, I have become certain that the West will weather the endurance tests which lie before it, as long as we remain aware that Western solidarity is our most powerful weapon.

I shall see Ambassador Dowling tomorrow and I shall inform him about one or more further details of my Paris visit./5/

With kind regards,
As ever,
Yours, K. Adenauer"

Dowling

US/MC/12

Paris, December 12, 1961, 10:30 a.m.

QUADRIPARTITE FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING
Paris, December 10-12, 1961

PARTICIPANTS

French
M. Couve de Murville
M. Lucet
M. Laloy
M. Alphand
M. Mayer (Interpreter)

British
Lord Home
Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh
Sir Anthony Rumbold
Mr. Killick

Germans
Dr. Schroeder
Dr. Carstens
Ambassador Grewe
Mr. Krapf
Mr. Kusterer (Interpreter)

United States
The Secretary
Mr. Bohlen
Mr. Kohler
Mr. Cash

SUBJECT
Negotiations with the Soviets on Berlin

M. Couve de Murville opened the meeting by asking if the group should now resume its discussion on Berlin./2/

Lord Home said he would agree, but after lunch he had a few additional things he wished to say about the Congo.

Couve then asked what the group wished to discuss about Berlin.

The Secretary said he felt it was of the greatest importance that we come out of this meeting and the NATO meeting with obvious unity in the West. Otherwise there would be dangerous discouragements. He felt the differences disclosed in the discussions had not been as wide as it had seemed at first glance or as the press seemed to feel. We, ourselves, have not seen a basis for negotiations in the Soviet statements on Berlin. We are under no illusion that the Western position is negotiable with the Soviets. Khrushchev's proposals are not negotiable from our point of view. We do think it of the greatest importance to continue to discuss the matter with the Soviets, especially two or three specific problems. We have a very important domestic issue in the US, where we have called into service about 300,000 reservists some of whom are not happy. We have increased our military budget by 6 billion dollars and will add more in January. We have disturbed our situation at home to increase our strength, and it is, therefore, of the greatest importance to us to be able to say, as we get ready for war, that we are doing everything possible to avoid it. The American public does not expect concessions that would damage the Western position. The pressure of public opinion in negotiations would be for firmness.

The Berlin issue should be precipitated sooner rather than later in order to get a fresh commitment from the Soviet Union. We believe that they are in the process of improving their military weaponry, which will make it more difficult to deal with them in a year or eighteen months. We should recall the ICBM development. The Soviets very early said that they had a fully operational ICBM, and they seemed to think that this was all that was required. They moved with great confidence and aggressiveness. The ICBM illusion has now been dispelled in both their minds and ours by intelligence activities. Today they don't push political developments on the ICBM basis. However, they are presently saying that they have solved the anti-missile missile problem. We don't believe that these are in production, or that they will be for some time, but just a few anti-missile missiles could set them off on a renewed period of over-confidence and aggressiveness. Their recent tests indicate that there has been some significant technical advance in the nuclear field. Therefore, we don't want to drag out the discussion of Berlin, because in 12 or 18 months it may be more difficult to handle.

Our problem is not to assume that a basis for negotiations is already in existence but to see if a basis can be found. This can be accomplished only by responsible contact and by the participation of all four. The US would be uncomfortable doing this alone or with one or two others, in fact in any way except with the participation of all four. The question is how to be in responsible contact on an agreed basis to discover whether a basis for discussion of Berlin exists. There are many ways this could be done. This is the range of problems we might discuss to see if we can find a basis for agreement.

Lord Home said he was quite certain that our aim must be to come out of NATO united. The basis for negotiations is not apparent and may not be found, but it is just possible that it could be found after much discussion. Therefore, we must find out. The alternative is a possible nuclear war. We cannot break off contact. Maybe the Russians won't make war, but they might. Therefore, we really must find out, and we ought to do it all together. The results will affect all of us alike. This can be done in various ways. First of all, the Foreign Ministers might begin a discussion on a broad basis and proceed to a narrow basis or begin with a narrow basis and proceed to a broad basis. Or secondly, we might continue the discussions in Moscow. It might be most profitable for the Ambassadors to talk with Gromyko to discover whether there is, in fact, a basis for a Foreign Ministers' meeting on Berlin. Meeting through the Ambassadors would be normal diplomatic practice. It is hoped that something like this will be acceptable to all of us. If there is not agreement in NATO, very serious differences will be revealed to the public and do great damage.

Couve said he agreed that we might have difficult discussions in the North Atlantic Council where everyone was anxious to reach a settlement, get rid of the problem, and believe that everything was all right so that they would not have to worry or spend money. However, our difficulties with the Soviet Union are more important than those with our allies. Concerning the substance of the Secretary's remarks, the French had never taken a stand against the principle of negotiations. However, it is really not very useful or good for our position to enter negotiations in a situation where no basis for negotiations exists. We need only think of the recent Russian speeches to produce misgivings. However, there is no difficulty in accepting that explorations can be made to ascertain whether a basis for negotiations exists or not. If a basis appears, the French are quite ready to reconsider concerning formal negotiations. In the past explorations there were some discussions on the procedural aspects of the Berlin problem. Even the question concerning our relationship with the "GDR" remains unclear and might be further explored. There was some exploration of this and there was some mention of other problems, but it is fair to say that the substance of any Berlin status was not fully explored. It seems especially after the most recent Soviet speeches that it would be worth while exploring again with the Soviets the question of the status of Berlin, the garrisons, the question of with whom any agreement on access should be concluded, as well as the question which is so important for the Germans of the relations between the Federal Republic and the West Berliners. If that should be useful and could be done by diplomatic contact, he would not see any objections from the French side.

One thing probably would remain open to controversy, that is how any exploration should be made, by whom, and on whose behalf. That is the difficulty. The French do not wish to take a final position now. If explorations are made officially on behalf of all it is difficult to see how this is different from negotiations because all would be committed. He understood the Secretary's feeling that it was good for one to take the responsibility and not the others. This is quite clear. The French share this view. For the past three years and especially the last six months we have been discussing these matters every day. His idea would be that if there were any kind of approach in the discussion of further explorations on Berlin, it should not be the beginning of negotiations. He would prefer that it be done by one ambassador for reasons of convenience. One of the ambassadors in Moscow might make the exploration. He would not commit anyone not even his own Government. He might see what field should be covered and what questions there were to be raised, and where we needed to have a statement of the Russian position in order to see what we should do. We could then decide on negotiations, or wait, or proceed with explorations, or whatever. The French don't think we can have a systematic view under present circumstances. It is quite evident that the situation has changed since August, and it may be completely different in a month from now.

The Secretary said he thought we were moving in a constructive direction. In looking back to the talks with Gromyko, one of the things that had inhibited further development of an exploration for a possible basis of negotiation was that that kind of discussion tended to become a kind of negotiation. The Secretary had not felt much consensus. He had felt that the flanks and rear were exposed and that he could not explore very far. He didn't think there could be much difference in the degree of responsibility of involvement in exploratory talks and in actual negotiations. He didn't think that the US Ambassador could take a tentative position with the Soviet Union. He could not believe the Soviets would believe the Ambassador was not committing at least the US Government. The basis for negotiations is a long way down the road and can be reached only after further discussions, and there could not be a significant degree in differing responsibilities in exploration and negotiation. For explorations to move on, they would have to be quite precise. We have been categorical on some points, but there are aspects which cannot be developed except on a quadripartite basis.

Couve said he could see it was hard to draw the line.

Lord Home said that the choices were between a Foreign Ministers' meeting when they would be in a position to make commitments, or exploration by the Ambassadors obviously following a coordinated line which would be put to the Soviets without commitment. He would have thought the latter, though difficult, would not be impossible. We could give an indication of how we were thinking without being committed. There could perhaps be a series of Foreign Ministers' conferences with adjournments from time to time. We could work through the three Ambassadors with German support. This would be a laborious process, but it would be possible.

Couve said he did not think it would be inconceivable on the basis of the Khrushchev and Menshikov speeches/3/ to go to Gromyko and say that we have noted them and ask whether this was in fact the Soviet position. We could ask for explanations. We could ask the Soviets if they think any negotiations with the West are possible on that basis. The Soviets would once again state their positions. We could then discuss this among ourselves and agree that it was not possible to negotiate on that basis. We could then say this to the Russians and see the result.

Lord Home said he thought it was possible to move the Soviets in an argument. Of course they could say that our occupation rights could not persist. We would say that they must. This subject might then be left aside with each side maintaining its own position.

Couve said that we had discussed this for two months at Geneva and then passed exclusively to Berlin discussing an interim arrangement. We then had the question of what would be the situation at the end of the interim arrangement. We had said we would start afresh without our rights having been prejudiced. Gromyko had never accepted this. He had never said yes or no. He had wanted to be free to say that all our rights had been abolished and that we would have to start anew with no rights. That was one reason why we had come to no agreement. If we had come to an agreement, we would have been in a bad position now not knowing what our position was in Berlin.

Lord Home said we would certainly know what our position was even though the Soviets denied it. He reiterated that he felt it was possible to argue the Soviets out of certain things.

Couve said it did not appear very encouraging to him and he wondered why it was necessary to make a statement now.

Schroeder said that it was difficult to know if the Soviets were proposing diplomatic negotiations, or if the Soviets felt contact should be through ambassadors, foreign ministers, or the summit. We don't know what lines the Soviets are thinking on, and it may be worth while to exchange views. There have been the Khrushchev and Menshikov speeches, the interviews with Spaak and Lange, and the letter to Fanfani,/4/ all of which were only variations on the opening note the Soviets sent us in November 1958. If, as a matter of fact, a common line is found, for example that the three Ambassadors in Moscow would contact the Soviets, it would be useful to do this in close contact with the Germans, who would send experts to reinforce their Embassy in Moscow.

The Secretary said he felt it was very important to establish demonstrated unity among the Four and NATO in order to prevent the Soviets from getting a sense of disunity and to prevent fishing expeditions with Spaak, Fanfani, Lange, or one of the Four Powers. They will attempt to exploit disunity. Disunity on our part would be a serious political weakness.

Lord Home then said he would like to propose the following formula:

"The NATO Council would approve a proposal that diplomatic contacts with the Soviet Union be undertaken, on the basis of the agreed positions of the Western Powers, in order to ascertain on what basis it might be possible to undertake formal negotiation at Foreign Minister level with the Soviet Government."

If we find a basis we would then have a Foreign Ministers' meeting.

The Secretary said it seemed to him that this was very close to the actual position. There could be negotiations if an adequate basis were found. This would not be found by public speeches but through discussions.

Couve said the NATO position was not the essential thing. The essential thing was our position vis-à-vis the Soviets. He knew there might be some NATO difficulties, but this should not influence us too much. The real issue is between us and the Soviets, not among the NATO allies.

The Secretary said he thought if there were agreement among the Four, there would not be any difficulty with the allies. If the Four disagreed there would be difficulty. It would be difficult to proceed if the rest of the allies seemed dissatisfied. It would weaken us in relation to the Soviet Union. The allies would come along if the Four were in agreement.

Lord Home said there would be real trouble in the Alliance if the Four could not agree. There was a feeling within the Alliance and even within the UK, that the military effort could not be sustained if at the same time we were not trying to find whether or not there was a basis for negotiation. He would have thought this should have been carried through jointly. He would have thought his formula was not far off.

The Secretary said that if there were no further talks in the weeks ahead, there was a real possibility that the Soviets would go ahead with their separate peace treaty. They might call a conference not limited to the Soviet bloc alone and might get the participation of a number of the Belgrade Powers. But if some activities were in the process it would be much more difficult for the Soviets to act.

Lord Home suggested the substitution of the phrase "on the basis of prior consultation" in his formula.

The Secretary said he would prefer the original wording. "Consultation" was too shadowy for the present situation.

The Secretary then read Mr. Kohler's suggestion for the NATO communiqué./5/

Couve said his problem was always that this would be negotiation.

Lord Home said exploration would be all right, but exploration gets near to substance.

Couve said that if the formula were put in this way, it would be more on the side of negotiation than exploration.

Lord Home suggested that the meeting might adjourn for a few moments to consider his formula.

The Secretary said that in any event as much as was covered by the formula would occur and in a most disorderly fashion unless agreement were reached. The Soviets were going to play, and unless the matter were handled responsibly we would all suffer. He had been impressed recently with the large number of people who say they know how to get along with the Soviets. He had to admit he didn't.

The meeting then adjourned to consider the British formula informally.

US/MC/9

Paris, December 12, 1961, 2:15 p.m.

QUADRIPARTITE FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING
Paris, December 10-12, 1961

PARTICIPANTS
Governing Mayor Brandt of Berlin
Dr. Klein
Dr. Lemmer
Dr. Bahr

The Secretary
Mr. Kohler
Mr. Hillenbrand

SUBJECT
Berlin

The Secretary began by extending his condolences on the death yesterday of Senator Lipschitz. He then said he knew that sometimes the line to Berlin seemed a long one from Washington, and that he would be glad to try to answer any questions the Governing Mayor might have.

Brandt said that the most important political and psychological question for the Berliners was the relationship of the City to the Federal Republic. He did not know what the Western position was since he had not yet seen Foreign Minister Schroeder. However, there were reports of proposals for changes in the status of West Berlin which had caused fears. Any transformation of the City into an isolated area with only weak links to the Federal Republic would destroy confidence in the future. The Secretary said that, as a matter of international law, West Berlin was under tripartite occupation. This had led to the suspension of inconsistent articles of the Basic Law in 1949. Thus Berlin was not a Land of the Federal Republic under international law. It was essential to maintain occupation rights as a basis for access rights. The Federal Republic and Berlin could not provide such a basis between them for access rights. Thus the status of the City was intimately linked to access. We recognized that the ties between West Berlin and the Federal Republic were of utmost importance and we did not want to diminish them. The word "contract" had crept into discussions. We did not have in mind that the Federal Republic and Berlin should sit down to negotiate a contract. We would maintain as against the Soviets that West Berlin must have the right to work out its own arrangements with the rest of the world, including the Federal Republic. Many of these arrangements already existed. From an international law point of view these ties rest on consent. We are not suggesting that the constitution of the Federal Republic be changed as long as our position is not affected but vis-à-vis the Soviets we feel that the Occupation status of the City must continue as basis of access rights. Moreover, the Secretary continued, from the point of view of the US people, there was another factor. We had an absolute commitment to the security of West Berlin which was a casus belli all the way to the use of nuclear weapons if necessary. This was a complete commitment. It was easier to justify this as something we had undertaken on our own responsibility rather than as part of a NATO force. We would, therefore, sustain and protect the relationships between Berlin and the Federal Republic, but not on the basis of the Federal Republic's constitutional position.

Brandt pointed out that, even if one could not accept the legal concept of the Federal Republic, many legal and formal links between the two had been established with the consent of the three Occupation Powers, sometimes even at their request. West Berlin should not be regarded as an area with no obligations towards the West German State. The Secretary noted that there might be a difference in what we would say to the Soviets and to the Germans. If the Soviets take the position that East Berlin is not to be discussed, we could respond by saying they have no interest in West Berlin. We want to protect our position with respect to the Soviets. We recognize that intimate links have grown up between Berlin and the Federal Republic and that they are vital to the City. However, we could not expect to translate these into de jure links in any formal agreement with the Soviets.

Brandt said it might strengthen Western tactics if, on certain points, the Western Powers told the Soviets that they also had to take account of the commitments and agreements which they had with their Allies in West Germany and Berlin. The Secretary said he thought it would, in fact, work out this way. Brandt commented that the idea of a new contractual agreement could cause difficulties if the Soviets regarded themselves as silent partners. The Secretary said that, while the relations between the two were not constitutional relations, the Federal Republic and Berlin had links based on the mutual consent of the two. We had to be careful in dealing with the Soviets not to give them a chance to attack our access rights because of such an alleged constitutional relationship. In confidence, the Secretary continued, he wanted to tell Brandt that we wished to reserve the right to put to the Soviets, under certain circumstances, the possibility of making West Berlin the Eleventh Land of the Federal Republic by removing our suspension of the pertinent articles of the Basic Law.

Brandt asked whether the US would demand certain changes in the present situation in Berlin, e.g., removal of the wall. The Secretary said we would put forward an all-Berlin proposal which would cover restoration of free movement in Berlin, but we could not have very much hope that it would be accepted. Brandt agreed with this estimate but thought that it might be possible to get some additional movement between the parts of the City.

In response to the Secretary's inquiry as to whether the Mayor had any doubt as to the US commitment on Berlin, Brandt said he had none but that there were many people in the Federal Republic who had such doubts. He had made this point in a recent memorandum to the Chancellor and to party leaders in Bonn. The Chancellor himself had not been convinced before his visit to Washington. He had returned convinced and perhaps even a little frightened at the extent of the American commitment. Brandt said he also had the impression that the US was now somewhat more convinced that responsible German leaders were prepared to play their part in this serious commitment. The Secretary agreed that some of our doubts had been removed. He also thought that the point had been clarified in Khrushchev's mind, despite his speech on Saturday which did not change much. Khrushchev was perhaps not in the position of strength he had thought he was some eight or nine months ago. Brandt wondered whether he might not come to the same conclusion about his small chances of success in negotiations, as he apparently had prior to his breaking up the Summit meeting in 1960. The Secretary noted that, if the present situation merely dragged on and the Soviets turned over more and more of their responsibilities to the East Germans, this would be followed by a series of erosions. If so, he thought, we should try to pin the Soviets down specifically soon rather than just sit.

In response to Brandt's query as to the talks with Gromyko in New York, the Secretary said that the results had been essentially procedural: (a) the Soviets were aware that we would not recognize the GDR; (b) they were aware we would not negotiate with the GDR on access to West Berlin and that the Soviets would have to take care of any arrangements with us with the GDR; (c) removal of the deadline.

Brandt commented that, in an interview less than two weeks ago, CBS Correspondent Daniel Schorr had asked Ulbricht regarding the peace treaty. The latter had said he was convinced the GDR would get it in 1962 but did not specify when, and in general did not give a very clear impression. On the substantive side, the Secretary continued, Gromyko made no concessions but a certain clarification had been achieved such as his knowing we would not accept the Soviets in West Berlin.

In response to the Secretary's question, Brandt indicated that there had not been much recent discussion in Berlin about a UN role in the City. The Mayor said he had never believed in moving the UN headquarters there, and considered this unrealistic. However, UN agencies would be welcome in Berlin, although he was not "too enthusiastic" about the idea of replacing German agencies with UN agencies. The Secretary commented that we likewise did not believe in moving the UN headquarters to Berlin. This was both a matter of US national interest and prestige. However, movement of certain UN agencies there was another matter. Before his death, Dag Hammarskjold had expressed the view that the ECE might be moved there from Geneva.

Reviewing the current economic situation in Berlin, Brandt said it was better than people thought it would be under the circumstances. Production was increasing despite the heavy manpower losses incurred through the cutting in two of the City. There had been some out-flow of capital to West Germany, but the trend had begun to stabilize early in October and things were now as good as they could be. There was still some movement of people out but people were also starting to come in again. He did not want Berlin to turn into a ghetto and favored free movement of people in and out. Progress was being made on the project to establish West Berlin as a world educational and cultural center, and the efforts of the Federal Republic in this area were being concentrated in West Berlin. The City Government had set up a planning group, with representatives from business, government, trade unions and the universities to assist in this work. He had been fortunate in obtaining the services of Professor Schilling to replace the recently deceased Senator Hertz as Senator for Economics.

The Secretary asked what the other vulnerabilities of West Berlin would be if there were no military action against the City and present access could be maintained. Brandt said these were really negligible. The only weak spot was sewage disposal which is still handled by a common all-Berlin system. If this were disrupted, conditions in West Berlin would be very bad. The City would be forced to dump its sewage into the lake and canal system. This would, however, also badly affect the surrounding GDR areas. Hence there was a strong common interest in maintenance of the present sewage disposal system. As far as water, gas, electricity, and city transport were concerned, West Berlin was self-sufficient. As a matter of fact, Brandt continued, he was convinced that the Berliners could carry on during a certain period of blockade if there were trouble with access.

Brandt explained the various efforts being made to achieve at least a certain measure of movement over the sector boundaries in humane cases. The SED had so far refused permission for family visits over Christmas, but there were indications that General Watson's approach to the Soviet Commandant on this subject had been reported back to Moscow. Brandt favored discussion of this general subject in its broader terms at the Four-Power level to be followed by recommendations to the Germans to take care of the details.

In conclusion, the Secretary returned to the point that Khrushchev also has his worries--not only about the conditions in the Bloc but also in connection with the basic power situation between the Soviet Union and the US. He had been surprised and angered but impressed by the President's speech of July. He did not expect such a vigorous US reaction to his threats.

US/MC/10

Paris, December 12, 1961, 4:15 p.m.

QUADRIPARTITE FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING
Paris, December 10-12, 1961

PARTICIPANTS

Germans
Foreign Minister Schroeder
State Secretary Carstens
Ambassador Grewe
Minister Krapf
Mr. Kusterer (Interpreter)

British
Lord Home
Sir Pierson Dixon
Sir E. Shuckburgh
Mr. W. B. J. Ledwidge

French
Couve de Murville
Ambassador Alphand
M. Lucet
M. Laloy
M. Mayer (Interpreter)

US
The Secretary of State
Assistant Secretary Kohler
Ambassador Bohlen
Mr. Percival

SUBJECT
Berlin and Germany

Foreign Minister Couve de Murville opened the third quadripartite Foreign Ministers' meeting on Berlin and Germany with his apologies for being late to the afternoon meeting. He stated that the French Government did not believe it would be good to accept a statement of some kind or another of willingness to negotiate with the Soviets. Especially in view of recent Soviet statements, i.e. Khrushchev statements before the WFTU and Ambassador Menshikov's speech in Washington on December 11, 1961, the French Government felt that a readiness to negotiate would be interpreted by the Soviets as a sign of Western weakness. He repeated that the French Government was not opposed to Ambassadorial soundings being made in Moscow by one or several Ambassadors. The French, however, did not believe it would be good to state this willingness publicly or have it endorsed by the NATO Council. Such a statement of one kind or another would merely indicate a weakness in the Western position, he repeated.

Lord Home said he would like to pose a question. He believed that Couve had said he did not object to soundings by one or several Ambassadors in Moscow. He wondered whether this statement meant that the French Ambassador in Moscow would be ready to take part in such soundings.

Couve replied that he had not said that the French Ambassador would take part in such soundings. The French Ambassador in Moscow was always in touch with the Soviet Government but he would not now participate in the soundings which were under discussion. By the phrase "one or several Ambassadors", he had meant that soundings could be undertaken by the American Ambassador or by the American Ambassador and the British Ambassador. It was his impression that the British would like to be associated with the American Ambassador's efforts as had been the case in New York with the Rusk-Gromyko talks.

Lord Home commented that Couve's position posed great difficulties for the four powers. He observed that the French indicated a willingness to see exploratory talks take place but it was difficult to understand why the French Ambassador should not take his share in these talks since the three powers were partners in the same alliance system and had similar responsibilities concerning Berlin.

Couve replied there was a very simple reason. The Soviet position was very clear to the French and had been made more so by the recent Soviet statements to which he had earlier referred. Therefore, the French saw no reason for the exploratory talks to take place.

At this point the Secretary asked for a fifteen-minute recess.

After the recess, Lord Home stated that he was very worried indeed. The French were taking the position that exploratory talks might weaken the Western position vis-a-vis the Soviets but it was a fact that within 24 hours the four Foreign Ministers would have to appear before the NATO Council without any position whatsoever with respect to negotiations. The NATO countries, however, insist upon negotiations and the differences which exist would become publicly known. If there were to be Western contacts with the Soviets, they should be based on an agreed Western position. Otherwise the West would be in a terribly weak position. The Soviets would take advantage of this situation to sow confusion in the NATO alliance which was undoubtedly one of their principal objectives. He asked whether the introduction of the adjective "exploratory" before the phrase "diplomatic talks" in the formula under discussion would help the French./2/

The Secretary observed that the four Western powers seemed to be in a very grave position. The US had tried to explain why it believed it was necessary to make an approach to the Soviets to ascertain whether there was a possibility of negotiations due to the potentially grave threat to the peace which the Berlin situation posed. The US had no illusions or false hopes concerning the course of such negotiations which would not be easy. The US was not prepared to make concessions to the Soviets which might be regarded as unacceptable by the US and its allies. At the same time, the US saw the possibility that the crisis might become so acute as to lead to a nuclear war. In such a situation, it was imperative to have the complete support of and unity of views within the NATO alliance. He was obliged to wonder whether there is in fact an alliance. When there are overwhelming necessities in dealing with a given and specific situation and this feeling is completely shared by the alliance, the US feels that each member country should overcome its marginal doubts about a particular move so that the alliance can take unified action. He said he was appalled at the possibility of what might happen if the Foreign Ministers left this and the NATO ministerial meetings in obvious disarray. The Secretary asked how the French Government foresaw the most probable course of events if the four Foreign Ministers adopted the view that: there should be no negotiations with the Soviet Union, no exploratory talks with the Soviet Union, and no contacts with the Soviet Union on an agreed Western basis.

Couve responded that the Secretary had mentioned two matters: the alliance and its attitudes and what should be the appropriate course of action now taken by the four Western powers. As to the first, he did not doubt that most of his NATO colleagues yearn for negotiations. It was quite evident that a majority of the NATO countries desired negotiations with the Soviets over Berlin. I think, he said, that France and the United States are very much in agreement on the substance of their position. He did not think that the US had decided to or envisaged making any concessions, even on the status of Berlin, which would endanger Berlin. The French-US difference was on tactics. I would not, however, he said, say the same thing for all the NATO countries, for many of them at the bottom of their hearts do not share our view of what must be maintained in Berlin. One of the differences is in assessing the importance of NATO country attitudes. Concerning the second matter, he said the problem was what should be the Western course of action. The answer to this mainly depended on the Western estimate of Soviet intentions. He doubted that the Soviets would take a major risk over Berlin. He said the Soviets wished to obtain their objectives by frightening the West. They have already removed their time limit on signing a separate peace treaty. While he did not know the future, he doubted that there was a great risk to be run and that the Soviets would lead the West to war. He asserted that if the West takes no action, the Soviets will be embarrassed and not know what step to take next.

When the Secretary commented that if this was the case, both sides would be in an equal position, Couve replied that this might be the case. Nevertheless, it was the Soviets, not the West, who wished to make changes with respect to Berlin.

Lord Home observed that he did not believe that the NATO nations want negotiations for negotiations' sake. NATO did not favor the "sacrifice" of Berlin. If the NATO nations, however, are to make the sacrifices and great efforts needed to face the Soviet challenge over Berlin and possibly be asked for more sacrifices, then they must be satisfied that every avenue be explored with the Soviets. He wondered if the Foreign Ministers could not agree at least to exploratory talks being undertaken with the Soviet Union so that there would be some position to present to the NATO Council.

Couve replied that all thinking about the situation returned to the same basic thought. What was important to the Foreign Ministers, in his view, was not what the NATO Council might think but what the Soviet Union thinks and intends. He opined that if the West showed a willingness for or a desire for negotiations at a time when the Soviets are acting as they recently have, the Soviets will believe the West is both frightened and weak and is therefore, requesting negotiations. Even an outsider, he said, would then judge that NATO had demonstrated its weakness in the face of Soviet threats.

Lord Home countered that it was clear what the Soviets would think about NATO if the four Western powers could not even talk about exploratory talks with the Soviets. In such a situation the NATO countries would publicly demand negotiations. He could not understand why, if the French did not object to exploratory talks, they did object to exploratory talks on the basis of agreed positions. He noted that the formula considered in the morning merely called for contacts with the Soviets. He wondered if the Foreign Ministers could not take the position that recent Soviet statements indicated that Khrushchev showed no current interest in serious negotiations but that if Gromyko wished serious negotiations, the Western Ambassadors in Moscow would always be available to receive any initiative Gromyko might wish to make. Thereby, the onus for further initiatives could be put on the Soviets.

The Secretary stated he could not accept this concept, for important and vital interests were involved. He was not certain that all the governments participating in the consultation with respect to Berlin and Germany were aware that war might result from the current situation. There was a basic casus belli involved in the situation. The American people, he said, would only go to war with good consciences. They would wish to believe that they were fighting for a just and honorable purpose. He would prefer not to take up Lord Home's concept since the West could not leave to the Soviets alone the decision as to whether or not anything more should be said concerning the problem of Berlin and Germany.

Lord Home replied that he was not particularly taken with his own idea which he had merely advanced in the hope that it might be something with which the French could agree.

Foreign Minister Schroeder stated that he had two particular comments to make. He wanted to emphasize that the German delegation had just learned about the Menshikov speech in Washington during the course of the morning. He had not had an opportunity to read a complete text of what Menshikov had said. From the press accounts, however, he could only conclude that Menshikov had repeated most of the ideas contained in the Soviet November 1958 note with certain minor differences with respect to military matters. Menshikov had also rejected the idea of an international access guarantee. Most of the statements which the Soviets make, in his opinion, seem to repeat the demands of 1958. At the same time, the Soviets are faced with a similarly clear purpose and firm Western position which has rejected most of the Soviet argumentation. There is a great gulf between the positions of the two sides. But nothing obliges the West to believe that it does not have some chance to bring about a shift in the Soviet position which was the purpose of the formula suggested during the morning session. What the West wishes to explore is the possibility of reducing Soviet demands. In his opinion, the West should proceed with further exploratory talks without illusions towards goals on which the West is united. The West was agreed on objectives. The current principal difference was on tactics. If the West is to engage in exploratory conversations with the Soviets, it should be done on the basis of a unified agreed NATO supported position, for only in this manner would the Western effort be impressive to the Soviets. If the Western position was not solid and unified, the Soviets would exploit Western differences. In his opinion, unity of purpose and unity of objectives would be supported and clearly demonstrated if there were procedural unity. The procedure suggested in the formula involved no commitments. Equally decisive was the fact that diplomatic efforts had to be accompanied by the NATO military build-up. He agreed with Secretary Rusk that public acceptance and support were required not only for the military build-up but also for the Western position in general, and that Western public opinion would not be satisfied unless it was certain that the Western governments had fully explored the Soviet position. He did not believe that the procedure suggested was harmful even though the French argued that it was due to the two recent Soviet statements. What was more harmful was that if the West seemed in a state of confusion the Soviets would try to cause more trouble. He opined that the Soviets interpreted unified Western action as a sign of Western strength and thought that it represented an effort on the West's part to nail them down in an effort to come to a solution of the Berlin problem. Therefore he believed that the Foreign Ministers should agree to further exploratory talks with the Soviets to see if a real basis for negotiations might exist.

Couve responded by asking whether anyone thought that, exposed to the current trial of strength, the best reply to the Soviets was an expression of willingness to negotiate. He thought that Western display of anxiety to negotiate would be interpreted by the Soviets as a sign of weakness and as a sign of Western sensitivity to Soviet intimidation. The best response, in his opinion, to Soviet tactics was to say that if the Soviets behaved badly, there would be no negotiations.

Foreign Minister Schroeder reiterated that in his opinion the recent Soviet statements were largely repetitive of previous positions. One of the difficulties is that the Soviets keep publicly answering public statements by Western leaders and thus restrict the area of negotiating flexibility. In his view, it was necessary to let the Soviets know that we could not accept their contentions but that we were willing on the diplomatic level, not in the public arena, to see if there was not some real basis for a negotiated settlement. In some circumstances he might agree with Couve's views but there were two important factors to be borne in mind. In the first place, the Soviet Union was in a position to create changes with respect to Berlin to the West's disadvantage. Either we responded to Soviet salami tactics with protests only or the West had to react more strongly to Soviet moves which might require serious military actions. Serious military steps, however, could not be taken until public opinion was convinced that there was a necessity for such action and was convinced that it was necessary for the West to stand and fight if need be. One cannot, he said, always wait for what appears to be a more propitious time for conversation. The enemy was materially and psychologically in a position to exert strong pressure on the West. He felt it was essential to explore the Soviet position further before the Western area of maneuverability and flexibility was again narrowed.

The Secretary observed that if the Soviets in two different recent speeches on two different days had prevented the West from moving forward together in unity, then these speeches would be two of the most fantastically productive speeches ever made. In a certain sense what the four countries thought was of a major importance was of major significance because of their responsibilities. But it was also important that the NATO alliance display unity. Other countries of the alliance also had their vital interests. An appearance of complete NATO disagreement would make Khrushchev more bold. If he were convinced there was no NATO unity and agreement on how to deal with the Berlin crisis, he might gain the impression that the Western alliance was gravely weakened. This might seriously increase the dangers of miscalculation on his part. In all frankness and good will, he felt obliged to say that he had thought the four Western powers were agreed on the substance of their position. He had to confess, however, that if the most minimum move to develop the substance of the Soviet position was rejected, the U.S. would have to review the whole situation to see if it and its allies were in fact agreed on substance. It would appear that review would be necessary to ascertain whether all four powers had the same objectives. Maybe, he said, Khrushchev is trying to prevent negotiations and will go ahead and sign his separate peace treaty and thus initiate a grave crisis. On the other hand, he may let his threatening campaign peter out. In any case, large risks are involved which must be clarified. The Secretary stated that it would be helpful to him for the four Foreign Ministers to speak alone in private for he was obliged to report to the President and he wanted to clearly understand the French position. After this conversation, he thought it would be possible for the Ministers to determine what might be said in the NATO Council and what should be said to the Press.

Lord Home supported the Secretary's request. He stated that the possibilities of an understanding should be thoroughly exhausted for otherwise "disaster stares us in the face".

A private meeting followed in which the Foreign Ministers agreed to meet again at 9:45 pm, December 12, 1961./3/

December 12, 1961.

PARTICIPANTS
The President of the United States
President de Gaulle
Acting Secretary of State George W. Ball
Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President
Mr. William R. Tyler, Acting Assistant Secretary, EUR

The object of the call, which was placed by the President on the recommendation of Secretary Rusk (who was in Paris at the time), was to try to get de Gaulle to agree to the following text which had been agreed to by the four Foreign Ministers (US, UK, French and German) in Paris, but which de Gaulle had refused to accept:

"The NATO Council would approve a proposal that diplomatic contacts with the Soviet Union be undertaken on the basis of the agreed positions of the Western Powers in order to ascertain on what basis it might be possible to undertake formal negotiation at Foreign Minister level with the Soviet Government."

The President told de Gaulle how important it was that Allied unity be maintained, and that we all together move forward in order to try to find a basis for negotiations with the Soviet Government. The President said he hoped that de Gaulle would find it possible to agree to the foregoing text.

De Gaulle said he had two objections: (1) The text referred to "diplomatic contacts", but did not specify by whom, and (2) it mentioned "on the basis of the agreed positions of the Western Powers", whereas there were no such agreed positions in so far as France was concerned.

The President stressed his concern at the fact that our positions should be different at a time when we may be finding ourselves close to war. He said he felt that every effort should be made to bridge the gap between us, in order to impress Khrushchev with our unity, and to find an acceptable basis for negotiation. In this way, we would have the whole alliance with us and we would be all together. We would see whether a basis for negotiation existed, and if it did not, we would have lost nothing and we would have demonstrated our unity. We could then see what should be done.

De Gaulle said he could not agree to any language which stated or implied that France considered that it was wise to undertake, or to move toward, negotiations with the Russians. He said over and over again in different terms, that Khrushchev does not want war, that therefore he will not start a war, that the thing for the West to do is to stay put and let Khrushchev come forward with his proposals for negotiation. De Gaulle said that he was not opposed to contacts being undertaken if certain countries wanted to do so, but this was up to them, and France did not wish to be drawn into negotiations because of such contacts.

De Gaulle then suggested that the text in question should contain some such words as: "The NATO Council would approve a proposal that certain countries should continue contacts by diplomatic channels with the Soviet Union."

The President objected that the use of the words "certain countries" would emphasize differences of opinion within the NATO Council, and that the word "continue" would imply that such contacts would be bilateral between the United States and the Soviet Union, which was not desirable.

De Gaulle then proposed that the word "undertaken" should be used instead of "continue", and that the language be left vague with regard to what countries should undertake the contacts.

De Gaulle then proceeded to object to the second half of the foregoing text on the grounds that it went too far in implying that France might be prepared to undertake negotiations with the Soviet Union. He reiterated his strong conviction that it was unwise to make any move toward negotiation at this time, and that France would not be a party to any language which implied that it might, even under certain conditions, be prepared to do so. He said again that it was up to Khrushchev to come forward with his proposals.

De Gaulle made several suggestions, from which it proved possible to arrive at the following agreed text:

"The NATO Council would approve a proposal that diplomatic contacts with the Soviet Union be undertaken in the direction which the West is following in order to preserve world peace. The Council hopes that these contacts may serve to ascertain if a basis might be found for negotiations."

The President tried hard to get de Gaulle to accept "on the basis of carefully prepared positions" before the words "in the direction", but de Gaulle was adamant. First of all, he said that diplomatic contacts were usually preceded by careful preparation and that the proposed language was, therefore, redundant; then he said that in any case this language was obnoxious because it implied that there existed agreed positions between France and her Allies, which is not the case.

The President asked whether de Gaulle thought that it might be possible for France ever to reach agreed positions with her Allies on the subject of negotiations with regard to Berlin, to which de Gaulle replied that there could not be agreement on the point at issue, which was that whereas we felt we should move toward negotiations with the Russians, he, de Gaulle, was of the opposite opinion.

In conclusion, the President thanked de Gaulle for his consideration of these matters, and said he was glad to have had this chance of talking to him. He said he proposed that the Foreign Ministers should now discuss the problem further, and that he would like to call de Gaulle again tomorrow or the next day, should he consider it desirable. De Gaulle said he would be glad to talk to the President again at any time./2/

Moscow, December 13, 1961.

Dear Mr. President: Within a short period of time I had an opportunity to read two [of] your messages--one addressed to our country and the other, a confidential one, to me personally./2/

I want to express appreciation for those kind words and wishes which were addressed by you to me in the talk with A.I. Adzhubei. I am satisfied, as you are, that this interesting interview has taken place and would like to hope, together with you, that it will contribute to better understanding between our countries. I think you did not expect that we would agree with all your observations. Nevertheless, I would say that some of the ideas expressed by you sound encouraging.

Yes, the Soviet Union and the United States of America must live in peace with each other. They must build their relations on the basis of reason, of due regard for the real situation, and of mutual respect, on the basis of the establishing of the principle of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems in international affairs. This is the only right and sound basis for cooperation and securing of a lasting and stable peace. It is my most ardent desire that it would not remain only a dream and not become a mirage, that creates nothing but false hopes.

But allow me to return to your letter of December 2. I read with satisfaction the words to the effect that our personal and unofficial exchange should not be used for the repetition of arguments and statements usually resorted to in public debates and propaganda. Being in a complete agreement with that I expected to find in your letter something new, not things which I saw many times on the pages of Western newspapers and magazines which are still afraid of fresh air and prefer a stuffy and poisoned atmosphere of the "cold war" but, frankly, I was disappointed because while reading the letter I was finding exactly what you, yourself, have cautioned against.

In your letter you, Mr. President, found it necessary to formulate flatly the demands which must as one may understand you, be accepted without fail by the Soviet Union as a condition for negotiation on the settlement of the German problem. There is hardly any need to say whether it is proper or improper to put forward to one another any preliminary conditions for negotiations? I think there can be no two opinions here. And therefore, leaving aside this question, I would like to express frankly my opinion on the substance of these conditions.

First of all, you state that the troops of the USA, Great Britain and France "will stay in West Berlin as long as the people of West Berlin want them to stay". It could sound as an ultimatum. But even most die-hard politicians in the West understand now that one cannot speak such language with us. Then, there must be something else in it. Frankly speaking, it is not difficult to understand that an attempt to make the presence of the troops of the three powers in West Berlin dependent on "the will of the population" reflects in effect a desire to create a new basis for their presence there. Evidently, the US Government also has inwardly come to the conclusion that to try now, 16 years after the end of the war, to base its claims upon the right of occupation or the right of a victor, or, as some say in the US, upon the right of the conquest, does not meet either the norms of international law or the spirit of time.

The approach to this question advocated in the letter in all desire cannot be accepted as valid and still less as meeting the aims of the normalization of the situation in West Berlin. As a matter of fact, Mr. President, the troops of the USA, Britain and France came to West Berlin, as known, neither on the request of the population nor for its protection. The purpose of their stationing there--let us be frank with each other--was entirely different from that of which you write in your letter. You want us to recognize now all the changes which have been unilaterally made by the Western powers in West Berlin, and not only in West Berlin, and to stand obediently on guard of the present rights of the USA, Britain and France on which we have never made any agreement with you. For to call a spade a spade we are now acting as traffic cops for the movement of the NATO troops into West Berlin. I emphasize that these are the NATO troops because American, British and French troops stationed in West Berlin are part and parcel of the armed forces of this bloc. And as to the intentions of the NATO with regard to the Soviet Union and our allies we are well informed of them.

You demand that contrary to common sense we continue to be traffic cops on the roads to West Berlin, and your temporary occupational rights become permanent there. How one can count on reaching an agreement on such a basis? This is not the way things happen in life, in any case we cannot agree to this.

You yourself note that it is necessary to avoid "the danger of unilateral actions", to avoid repudiation "of agreements and goals that both of us have legally assumed". But why should this wish concern the Soviet Union only? In your letter unfortunately I couldn't find any signs of recognition of reciprocity.

It seems that it is not necessary for me to repeat what were the major points in our agreements on Germany which now--not through our fault--are actually not exercised.

Occupation of any given territory is a temporary measure--this is exactly how it was written down in the corresponding agreements on Germany. Occupational rights can naturally be valid only till the state of war exists. Strictly speaking already now, occupation ought to have been ended since state of war with Germany was terminated by unilateral statements. In any case there can be no place left for it after a peace treaty has been concluded.

One may think that it is a desire to have at any cost its troops in West Berlin that prevents the US from taking part in a peaceful German settlement. You should understand us, Mr. President--and I believe you do--even if the US threatens us, tests our nerves and will, we cannot and will never agree to the prolongation of occupational order, we will struggle for our rights, for a real normalization of the situation in the center of Europe. We cannot be the guards of anybody's occupational rights forever. Sometimes an end must come to all that. Even enslaving agreements have time provisions, let us say, 99 years. Even matrimonial ties, confirmed by church and law, sometimes weaken with time and break. For example, your countryman Mr. Rockefeller, having lived with his wife for 30 years decided to break up the marriage. No use to go into the reasons that caused this divorce but in all probability there must have been some.

As for you, you do not set any time limit. You mean--forever, though you do not use this word. Do they in Western countries expect that socialist system in the GDR will outlive itself and then the German problem will be solved in the way these countries want? But socialism is a progressive vital system, it has no time limit, it will constantly develop and strengthen.

One cannot count on its liquidation. And if that is the reason for the desire to keep forever the regime of occupation in West Berlin--it is a strange, separated-from-life philosophy.

It can rest--excuse my harsh judgements--only on the megalomania, on an intention to act from the position of strength, though at our meeting in Vienna we, it seems, came to joint conclusion that strength and threats are not the argument which leads to mutual understanding.

True, you say that you denounce force as a means for achieving goals. I understand you did not want to say that you are displaying generosity otherwise it would sound humiliating. It is well known that in politics just as in physics every action causes counteraction, and application of force or repudiation of its use are connected, to speak in broad terms, not with the nature of character of one or another statesman but first of all with the actual state of affairs, with the balance of power which makes peaceful settlement of all disputable questions a pressing necessity now and in the future. We have always deemed it unreasonable to orientate ourselves in politics on strength and we call on other governments to do the same.

In defense of your position you refer to the rights and interests of the population of West Berlin. But you, Mr. President, are certainly aware that no one of the socialist countries is infringing upon these rights and interests. We have always proceeded from the fact that it is an internal affair of the population of one or another state to choose its social, political and economic system.

The Soviet Union is ready to declare solemnly and to confirm in a treaty, in any international act the right of the West Berlin population to be the masters of their destiny, to live without any interference from outside, the right of West Berlin for unimpeded ties with the outside would. But we cannot recognize and will not recognize any right for the West Berlin population to call foreign troops into West Berlin since this affects the security of many states. We are for safeguarding the sovereignty of West Berlin but at the same time one obviously cannot neglect the sovereignty of other countries and first of all the sovereignty of the country in the centre of which West Berlin is situated, through the territory of which all its communications with the outside world run. We do not bring the solution any closer when we are carried away by one side of the matter and do not want to take into consideration the other, if we talk of the rights of the two million citizens of West Berlin and do not want at all to give due regard to the right of the citizens of the GDR.

I like your suggestion to speak of "the real situation we face". I understand it so that, proceeding from the real situation existing in Germany, in Europe and throughout the world, we should try to reach mutual understanding on the most important questions, on which it depends today whether there be peace or war on earth. But the actual situation is not what is to the liking of one side--of the United States or the Soviet Union. It has as its components the whole range of facts, notwithstanding how pleasant or impleasant [sic] they may be. These facts are such that the question of the presence of these or other troops in West Berlin affects many countries, its solution can influence not in a small degree the direction of further development of Soviet-American relations, and all international situations.

Here, like in other questions, one should proceed from the reality of life and to act from the position of reason. In other words, one should see not only his rights and somebody's obligations but also his obligations and somebody's rights, not only defend his own interests but also take into consideration the interests of the other side if one has a desire to sincerely seek a mutually acceptable agreement.

In this connection one cannot but pay attention to the statement in your letter that "under no circumstances", that is even after the conclusion of a peace treaty, the US has no intention to recognize the sovereignty of the GDR over its own territory through which all communications of West Berlin with the outside world run. I will tell you frankly--[that is] a dangerous position for the cause of peace! In previous messages I dwelt upon this question in detail and explained the view of the Soviet Union. Here I would deem it necessary only to emphasize once again the inconsistency and unreality of such approach. It cannot contribute to a speediest finding of a right solution of the problem we face. We would still like to believe that the Western Powers will understand this and will choose another way, the way of respect for international norms and sovereignty of all states, irrespective of their social system.

Allow me now to express my opinion on another condition--on the possibility of presence in West Berlin of Soviet troops as guarantors. You know well from my messages how the Soviet Union formulates this question. We are not seeking to have our troops in West Berlin. The Soviet Government believes that our troops have nothing to do there, just as the troops of the Western Powers. The best thing would be to have no troops in West Berlin. And if you are very interested in placing foreign troops as guarantors let us agree that these will be the UN troops.

If you do not want the Soviet Union to be a guarantor, we are not fishing for any additional obligations: we have enough work of our own. Please deal on all questions of interest to you with the German Democratic Republic. But we believe that in this case also there should be no troops of the Western Powers in West Berlin and if there still have to be some troops there these should be the UN international troops, on mutual agreement.

However, as I understand, the US continues to insist that "responsibility" should lie on the Soviet Union. You should agree, Mr. President, that we can guarantee the interests of West Berlin only on equal conditions with other states and, naturally, not to the detriment of the sovereignty of the GDR.

It is easy to say, of course: in concluding a peace treaty with the GDR make provisions for the securing of such and such rights for the Western Powers and everything will settle by itself. Firstly, I have to say again that the Western Powers cannot expect from us more than they themselves have done and are doing. Secondly, a peace treaty would hardly correspond to its purpose and even to its name if instead of liquidating the vestiges of the war and occupation it confirmed and prolonged them forever.

If there is a desire to limit the subject of the negotiation only to the confirmation of the occupation regime and the occupation rights, to a more accurate definition as to on what kilometer and how many our traffic cops should stand, then I am not sure whether there will be any sense and, which is more important, any use in such negotiation. I would like to think that in the course of our exchange a necessary degree of accord has been established between us to the effect that the purpose of the negotiation is to bring the situation in a certain area--important from the point of view of the preservation of peace--in accordance with radically changed conditions which, of course, could not be precisely anticipated at its time in quadripartite agreements on Germany and Berlin.

I can express my satisfaction with your words to the effect that the main goal of the USSR and the US Governments is to ensure peace and not only care for prestige. Peace and peace treaty, I think you will agree, are extremely close terms. You are inclined to believe that the peace treaty proposed by us will increase tension. This will depend not upon the treaty but upon the actions of Western Powers. Our proposals on peaceful settlement do not contain anything which could objectively cause an aggravation of situation. It is our deep belief that a peace treaty even with one German state is already a great progress since--though on a part of the territory--it draws a line through World War II, removes its vestiges which, like poisonous plants, give shoots of "cold war" every hour. How a peace treaty aimed at establishing peace among states can cause tension! If there are any other suggestions for solving the problem of liquidation of the occupational regime on the basis of a peaceful settlement, we are ready to consider them and will willingly have exchange of views.

In your letter, Mr. President, you raise a question about your troops as the "guarantors". We also know that recently in the US there have been much talk and writing in this connection. To listen to some people in the West, it looks as if only they do really care about West Berlin and its population, though it is well known that nobody threatens this city either with war or an invasion.

But let us objectively analyze the situation in West Berlin. You, of course, know very well that the Soviet Union stands firmly to guarantee to the population of this city the right to live at their own discretion. We deeply believe at the same time that West Berlin--and this is in fact the essence of the matter--must have a perspective, a belief in its future. The population of this city needs most of all a healthy economy that can ensure full employment and high standard of living, flow of orders, inflow of capital into industry, and permanently guaranteed markets. Life in West Berlin can be in full swing only when production able to compete is organized, when the city establishes normal relations with other states, including the GDR.

But is this possible under the conditions of preserving the occupational regime which would continue to be an apple of discord and the cause of tension--is this possible? Is occupation the best way to insure the interests of the city? The more troops there will be in West Berlin, the less confidence and the more doubts about the stability of the situation. Stationing of foreign garrisons could testify only to the abnormality of the situation. Is sitting on the volcano helpful for calming down one's nerves? What practical businessman will invest his money into business where all is shaky and a lot is unknown? Who would give him long-term orders, who would seek to live in such city where real frontline atmosphere is artificially maintained?

Without the normalization of the situation, without confidence in its future West Berlin is a doomed city. But it can have future, good, prosperous future in case it ceases to be the center of "cold war", a base of subversive activities against socialist countries and would not be used to aggravate the situation, which all impedes its life and the life of the neighbouring countries. What the US is proposing now will not cure the present illness of the city but, on the contrary, will make it still worse. Before long everybody will realize that West Berlin cannot exist under the conditions in which it is placed now, its business life will die and the population, deprived of a perspective, will have to seek solutions to all these problems in one way or another.

And not by chance there is even now, as it is evident from reports by Western press, a flight of citizens of West Berlin and "a flight" of capital from West Berlin. This process will inevitably grow if we only do not agree and create a confidence for the city in its future.

If the care should really be taken for the West Berlin population living calmly, without any fear about tomorrow, then it must be firmly acknowledged that the best possible solution is to sign a peace treaty or treaties with two German states and to admit these states to the United Nations. Thus, it will be possible to clean up completely international relations from dangerous and unnecessary layers, which remained as the heritage of World War II. Is it not a tempting and noble aim for the sake of which we together should work?

In treaties or in a solemn proclamation or in a declaration we could express our ideas about the future of Germany--about the restoration of its unity. You propose to proceed in that from the right of Germans for self-determination. You are right. Let us, then--in our positions--proceed from the exact meaning of this word--self-determination. And it means that Germans should self-determine, without an interference from outside. Germans should get together with Germans, one German government--with the other German government and define on what basis and how they will solve the question of the restoration of German unity. Let other powers, on their part, state that they will not create any obstacles for Germans. All must be in the way Germans will agree.

You will probably understand in a different way many things of which I am telling you now. Well, there are reasons for that. The United States of America did not feel all burdens of World War II in such a degree as we did. And you yourself spoke of that. Even today the United States is separated from Europe by the ocean. And everything is felt not so sharp from afar as in proximity. If you really think that you can live without a German peace treaty, it is up to you. We are not going to impose terms of peaceful settlement with Germany upon anybody of our former allies, though we will regret if the US and other Western Powers refuse to sign a German peace treaty.

But let us see what can be done to lessen tension in a situation when one group of states does not consider it necessary to sign a German peace treaty while the other has stated its intention to achieve peaceful settlement even with one of the existing German states.

I have already written to you that the Soviet Government considers it possible to agree, before the conclusion of a peace treaty with the GDR, on basic questions which are of interest to both sides. Thus, it will be possible to avoid an unnecessary aggravation of relations first of all between the USSR and the US and to settle those questions to which each of our governments attaches special importance. It is possible to agree beforehand on a status of a free city of West Berlin as I spoke of that with Mr. Spaak and to make the agreement formal by a special protocol which would be annexed to a peace treaty with the GDR. Other important questions could be solved alongside in due order. If it is accomplished an entirely different situation will come into existence in Europe and especially in West Berlin, and its citizens will undoubtedly sigh with relief. To say nothing of the fact that in this case favorable opportunities for the development of economy and of public and political life will be created in West Berlin.

This is the most wise solution which is expected from the Great Powers by the peoples of the world. It will ensure better conditions for the peaceful life of the peoples of the USSR and the US which they--and I fully support your words--equally need.

I would further like, in the interests of clarity to emphasize once again that the conclusion of a peace treaty is not a theoretical goal but a practical one for us. From the point of view of our national interests it is one of the most important questions and we attach paramount importance to its solution.

You wrote in your recent letter--and this idea was somehow reflected in your interview with A.I. Adzhubei--about the right of the Soviet Union for due ensurance of its national security. This is a fair approach.

You can further ask: what is of particular importance for us in the German question regarding the ensurance of the national security of the Soviet Union? I shall answer in all frankness: our main goal is to exclude a possibility for an outbreak of war in Germany or because of Germany. You maintain that the FRG does not constitute a threat to peace or security of the Soviet Union or other socialist countries. We cannot agree with that because we do not have the right to ignore the hard lessons of the past. To you, Mr. President, our warnings of the revival of German militarism and revanchism look like propaganda. To the peoples of the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia and other European countries German militarism continues to be a real threat, and they must always have this in mind if they do not want the events to take them by surprise again.

Mr. President, is it any use for us to argue whether West Germany is a potential source of a military threat? If one wishes to do so this discussion can be endlessly prolonged for there are no such scales that can precisely weigh the arguments of each side. Wouldn't it be better for us to turn to an objective criteria--historic experience. It binds the statesmen not to dismiss the worst possibility, it demands not to let the events come out of control, and not to make our future and our very existence dependent on the outcome of struggle in Germany between the forces of good and evil. We want to be masters of our destinies. You must agree that after what happened 20 years ago, we have the right to be insured against any historic reverses of fortune.

You think that at present the US has the situation in the FRG under control. Let it be so. And what will the situation be in 5-10 years? Senator Humphrey, for example, believes that soon West Germans may demand that American, British and French troops go because they consider themselves strong enough? And in every probability the Western Powers will have to go. The US would not go to war with Bundeswehr, would it? And what else? Can one be certain that a new lunatic will not appear in the FRG who ignoring real dislocation of forces would want to put into practice what militarists-revanchists are shouting from every roof in West Germany? Then it would probably be too late to think of the creation of security system and the prevention of a threat on the part of German militarism and it might happen we will have to pay for that with millions and millions of lives?

The farther we depart in time and policy from the Allied agreements on Germany, the more difficult it will be to find joint effective guarantees against the threat of German militarism to peace and stability which as it seems have to be our joint aim. If it is difficult now to agree on a German peace treaty because of the differences between the former allies, later on it may turn out to be even more difficult.

I am frankly sharing some thoughts with you and, please, don't understand me that another attempt is made [to] agitate you for a peace treaty. I believe that deep in your heart you will agree with me that the Soviet Union after all it has suffered cannot be indifferent to what is happening in West Germany. Behind every demand of ours to secure lasting peace in Europe and prevent new German aggression--and this is exactly the reason we want to liquidate the vestiges of World War II and to conclude a German peace treaty--are millions of lives of perished Soviet people. We will do everything to have a peace treaty concluded and we cannot act otherwise. Such is our duty before mankind and our right.

With all the wish to have good relations with you personally, to have good relations with your government and the United States of America we must conclude a German peace treaty and we will conclude it even if you do not agree with this. Our most cherished goal is to solve all the problems inherited from World War II in cooperation with the US, in agreement with you. We say this honestly and openly. But I do not want to conceal it either that the USSR will sign a peace treaty with the GDR with all naturally ensuing consequences without the US if there is no other way out.

Of course, in this case too we would try to avoid unnecessary aggravations. I hope that such aggravations will not happen if leading Western Powers defining their position take into consideration multi-sided experience of peaceful settlement with various countries during the post-war period, including those in the Far East.

Of course, we are far from understanding the positive moments that have already begun to show in the course of the exchange of views between the governments of the Soviet Union and the US. But one should not close his eyes to the fact that on main principal questions narrowing the differences in our positions proceeds exceedingly slowly and, may be, sometimes it does not proceed at all.

I would not like you to understand my observations as an expression of desire to argue one or another thesis of your letter only because it comes from the other side. I simply thought that I had the right to state in reply to your frank statements my viewpoint without unnecessary diplomacy in this case.

I believe, Mr. President, that our governments will be able to cooperate to the benefit of all peoples, setting as their supreme goal service to peace and in determining their positions they will always have in mind that we have all the possibilities to live in good harmony and find right solutions of any controversial problems.

The Soviet Union on its part is ready for this. Any journey begins with the first step. We have to make it together and we would like that it will be directed to one and the same goal--the strengthening of peace.

Sincerely,
N. Khrushchev/3/

Bonn, December 18, 1961, 8 p.m.

1451. Eyes only for the Secretary. In my call on him this afternoon, Chancellor began conversation re Paris meeting by saying he simply didn't understand what had happened. He seemed critical of everyone concerned. He mentioned Sov moves since date of his talk with de Gaulle, including Khrushchev's speech to WFTU, Menshikov's speech in Washington, note re General Heusinger,/2/ propaganda attack on Denmark, etc., and commented it was natural that French would want to wait some weeks before we resumed exploratory talks in Moscow. He referred also to his remark in our conversation last week/3/ re de Gaulle's fear of reading in press that he had reversed himself, and went on to say he felt we should have intimated our displeasure to Sovs on their recent moves, sent Amb Thompson out for his holiday, and then delayed soundings until first part of January.

I pointed out completely negative position of French, venturing personal view that had it been merely question of few weeks' delay on talks in Moscow, agreement could undoubtedly have been found. Chancellor rejoined that in light his agreement with de Gaulle, it was impossible that French could have been completely negative, and when I insisted, then said Couve must have been at fault.

I told Chancellor of your statement in telegram to me from Paris/4/ that you would be in further touch with him, endeavored to explain difficulty caused by French unwillingness to join in working out agreed position, and asked if he had any suggestions. His only reply was to say I should tell you he would get in touch with de Gaulle, indicating that he would try to clear up what he seemed to regard as merely unfortunate misunderstanding.

My only comment is that Adenauer must find it impossible to visualize split between himself and de Gaulle, and is endeavoring to rationalize French performance. Reston told me yesterday Chancellor took substantially same line as above in conversation with him on December 16, and with me he seemed careful to avoid any indication of annoyance with de Gaulle himself. I surmise, however, that privately Adenauer will make strong attempt to induce de Gaulle to be more forthcoming.

Dowling