Washington, September 18, 1961.

SUBJECT
Meeting with the President on the Military Build-Up and Possible Action in Europe/2/

1. Prior to the meeting of the principals, I gave the President the attached memorandum/3/ outlining the probable course of the discussion. Mr. Bundy argued against any call-up at this time because of the adverse impact on the negotiating attitude of the USSR. After some debate, the President indicated a readiness to approve calling up two divisions at this time, withholding a decision on the other two to a later date.

2. When the main meeting began, Mr. McNamara presented his paper, subject: "Military Build-Up and Possible Action in Europe,"/4/ and explained the general content. The President then went over the entire paper, which included General Norstad's cable. He noted General Norstad's statement that NATO intelligence credited the Soviets with a capability of committing 100 divisions in the central front, whereas DoD estimate was 55 divisions.

3. General LeMay reported the split in the Joint Chiefs to the effect that the Chairman and the Army favored sending up [to?] six divisions to Europe, whereas the other Chiefs opposed a decision to send any divisions now. They would support, however, some call-up of Guard divisions. Specifically, they would recommend calling up two divisions.

4. The President indicated his hope that any divisions called up would be converted rapidly to AUS, hopefully within 6 months. Mr. McNamara indicated that the Army was very keen to convert these divisions, but he was doubtful at this time. He is not sure that the permanent establishment needs two additional divisions, and is particularly impressed by the probable magnitude of the '63 budget which, on the first go-round, amounts to $64 billion. He indicated satisfaction with a decision to call up a two-division package now amounting to 75,000 individuals.

5. Secretary Rusk, via Mr. Kohler, indicated complete support for the Defense recommendations (i.e., four divisions now, one division to Europe). He indicated no concern over the impact of such action on current negotiations.

6. In the end, the President approved the call-up of an infantry and an armored division with supporting forces, the effective date being somewhere from October 1st to October 15th. He directed Secretary McNamara to prepare a press release explaining the need for these divisions based upon world-wide requirements. He indicated a willingness to reconsider the need for an additional call-up in a few weeks.

M.D.T./5/

Washington, September 20, 1961.

SUBJECT
Your meeting with the Secretary of State at 6 o'clock

You have the Secretary of State at 6 o'clock./2/ Many interesting problems may come up: the situation at the UN--your speech--the Congo--trouble at NATO. But the main business should be the Rusk-Gromyko talk. The first serious meeting is at lunch tomorrow. The Secretary will undoubtedly indicate his own sense of the scenario, but the following check list is an effort to summarize what you have spoken of in recent days as your own sense of the agenda.

1. Serious negotiation is difficult, if not impossible, while the air is full of threats. On the other hand, if the atmosphere can be improved, we are quite ready for businesslike and constructive discussion.

2. Our basic objection is to the Soviet threat to end our rights in West Berlin. The Secretary plans to spell out the three fundamental rights and their detailed meaning. He plans to make it clear that we will surely fight for these rights. This he will state as a fact, not as a threat.

3. The proposal for Soviet troops in West Berlin is flatly not negotiable.

4. East Berlin and East Germany are the real root of danger; this danger is not permanently removed by barbed wire and concrete. What is the Soviet view of the future here?

5. Our presence in West Berlin rests fundamentally not only on occupation rights but on the will of the people of that city. We are for what they are for. West Berlin and its people are not a part of the GDR but a part of our fundamental international commitments.

1. That the forum of negotiation which we would prefer is serious bilateral talks, to begin as soon as they can be promising. We are not inflexible on the place and parties of such talks: Thompson in Moscow, Kennan and Yepishev in Belgrade, or any other reliable channel will serve our purpose (this point in particular needs to be discussed with the Secretary).

2. That we are not hostile to some form of peace conference leading to an internationally recognized end of the war, if a real basis for understanding can be reached beforehand (this is a most sensitive point, and probably not appropriate for early discussion, but because you and the Secretary have talked about it before, it may be important for you to know his current view).

3. That in any process of negotiation we do not mean to begin with a restatement of the Western Peace Plan.

This is not for statement to Gromyko, but for clear understanding with Mr. Rusk. Thompson has just added his thoughtful voice against any such restatement, and your own position has been clearly stated before, but the Western Foreign Ministers last week continued to talk about using the revised Western Peace Plan as a starting point.

4. That a Foreign Ministers' meeting is not a good negotiating forum to aim at now. This is the obverse of point 1., and I list it because, again, I think you and the Secretary may not be on the same wave length. A 4-Power meeting, given French attitudes, is a means of having no negotiation at all, and is the opposite of the process of serious exploration which I believe you have wanted.

McG. B./3/

Washington, September 22, 1961, 9:25 p.m.

1691. Paris pass Finletter 9:00 a.m. Sept 23. Also pass Stoessel and McGuire. During post-luncheon conversation September 21 lasting nearly three hours both Secretary and Gromyko formulated at some length respective positions on Germany and Berlin./2/ Atmosphere was reasonably relaxed but Gromyko's presentation did not deviate from standard version of main Soviet themes as developed at Vienna and thereafter.

Emphasizing that these were bilateral conversations since he did not have mandate to speak for other governments, Secretary stressed that current Berlin crisis was essentially of Soviet creation. Threatened effect of peace treaty would move against vital interests and fundamental commitments of US. We did not want arms race but would not draw away from it if Soviet threats executed. We did not want conflict but would have to prepare and be ready to face one if it forced upon us. Both sides must know clearly what are vital interests of other so that there can be no mistake. We believed, Secretary continued, and thought Soviets believed that two countries shared common interests in preventing war. Soviet proposals however did not seem to be put forward in spirit of discussion and negotiation but rather as kind of unilateral edict.

Mr. Gromyko noted Soviet Government had expressed readiness to have exchange of views between Secretary and himself in order to discuss question of peace treaty with Germany and settlement of West Berlin problem on basis of such treaty. Success of this exchange of views would be measured by extent to which two Governments would succeed in drawing line under World War II by signing peace treaty with Germany. Gromyko then launched into lengthy exposition of Soviet position on peace treaty, alleged FedRep revanchism and militarism and need to recognize fact of existence two German states. If unification at all possible it can be achieved not by heating situation between two German states but rather by peace treaty which would also solve problem of West Berlin. Gromyko reiterated that peace treaty would terminate occupation status and would proclaim West Berlin a free city. However, he argued, idea of free demilitarized city of West Berlin did not signify desire on part Soviets and GDR to gain hold over that city. Soviet Union prepared to accept strictest international guarantees and to have forces of all four powers in West Berlin to ensure what Secretary had called US presence in city. Added another possibility would be to have neutral forces stationed in West Berlin and a third possibility to have UN forces in the city.

Turning to access question Gromyko stated access linked to number of temporary (with stress on word "temporary") agreements concluded as result of unconditional surrender of Germany. Peace treaty would change this situation and would necessitate solution of access problem on different basis. Intention was not to sever communications between West Berlin and outside world or to blockade city, but rule had to be observed that once peace treaty signed access would have to be based on arrangements with GDR through whose territory all communications lines ran including air. Both Soviet Union and GDR have repeatedly stated such arrangements would be respected. Soviet Union wished to reach agreement with US and Allies on peace treaty and West Berlin solution on basis of peace treaty. Only as last resort would Soviet Union sign peace treaty unilaterally. As to timing Soviet Union believed peace treaty should be concluded this year.

In answering Gromyko Secretary said that, while post-war agreements were temporary in sense they were intended to end when it became possible to conclude peace treaty with single German Government, it was not intended that one side would unilaterally terminate them before that time. He stressed that rearmament of FedRep was in non-aggressive framework of NATO and had been preceded by East German action same field. As far as Soviet proposals on Berlin were concerned, East Berlin had simply disappeared from scene and we were told that this is a non-negotiable subject. Thus, having disposed of East Berlin with regard to their four-power responsibility Soviets were now turning to West Berlin which our area of responsibility under four-power agreements. If Soviets wished to have troops in Berlin it could propose their stationing in East Berlin. Best guarantee of integrity of West Berlin and freedom of its population were proposals of three Western Occupying Powers. Moreover our access rights were not available to Soviet Government to be over to East German regime since Soviets cannot turn over to someone else what it does not have itself. Secretary expressed concern that from what he knew of Soviet position two countries were on collision course. It was important not to let situation get out of hand and develop into direct clash. It was for such a reason that he had recently called in Soviet Chargé on Soviet threats to Western air access since unilateral action in this field could seriously impede peaceful discussion.

Discussion of subject terminated with effort by Secretary to obtain indication from Gromyko as to whether latter conceived terms of reference present talks to be as narrow as described his opening statement. Gromyko fuzzed response and Secretary commented that he supposed he could take it that Gromyko did not exclude broader approach than discussion limited to peace treaty and settlement West Berlin problem on basis such treaty.

For Finletter: You may draw on foregoing in presentation to NAC Sept. 23./3/

Bowles

Paris, September 22, 1961, 9 p.m.

Polto 375. Dept pass Defense. USUN for Kohler. At NAC meeting September 22 to consider deep dissatisfaction of NAC at relationship between four power Washington group and NAC, skillful and constructive presentation by Stikker held Council in line with hope for increased consultation in immediate future. Stikker told of work that has been going on preparing directive to Norstad and engaged to submit paper to NAC next week, if needs be expressing disagreements. He said political consultation on right track and economic consultation needs improvement. He concluded on basis of point made in Polto 354,/2/ which I had given him and three Perm Reps yesterday, per your welcome Topol 391./3/ Canada took lead in criticizing past errors to live up to commitments, seriousness of issues involved, and making constructive suggestion, including insistence better information, particularly on NATO-wide plans. Canada stressed any plan to use nuclear weapons re Berlin even by three is responsibility of NAC. Italy, Netherlands, Turkey and Belgium supported Canada complaints and Stikker's approach, strongly pressing for IS observer or representative with Ambassadorial Steering Group. UK and US opposed, and Stikker said would study further.

UK explained role of Ambassadorial Group, and I agreed with Stikker's principles (Polto 354) and suggested he study matter and make recommendations.

It is clear there is still dissatisfaction, and proof of the pudding is going to lie in the eating of how we deal full NAC into our operations on full partnership basis.

There were continued and pointed requests for prompt reports of Rusk-Gromyko talks./4/

Full report follows by airgram./5/

Finletter

Belgrade, September 22, 1961.

Dear Chet: Time is very short this afternoon and this will have to be a sketchy note; but I wish without further delay to express my bewilderment over the Department's circular telegram 543, September 21,/2/ to NATO country Ambassadors on the decisions of the Foreign Ministers' meeting concerning Berlin. Let me quickly cite the points that give me this feeling.

A. It is said that Soviet action since early August make it more apparent than ever that the Soviets are willing to pursue the hard line to the very brink in order to intimidate and divide the West.

I should think it would be clear to everyone now that unless the West shows some disposition to negotiate in the sense of coming forward with some ideas and proposals of its own, the hard line is going to be pursued in Moscow not only to the very brink but to the full point of a world catastrophe. I fail to understand what seems to me to be our complacency in the face of this trend of events.

B. It is said that so far there is no indication that the Soviets are prepared to negotiate a reasonable settlement.

I am at a loss to know how anyone could form any judgment of what the Soviets are or are not willing to do in the absence of any negotiations, either private or public, and in the absence of any proposals or suggestions or ideas from our side. I have said publicly, and I can only repeat it now, that there is no way to find out what the Russians will do in negotiations except to negotiate. In the absence of negotiations I am unable to imagine the basis on which we consider ourselves justified in making assumptions about what they would or would not offer.

C. The Ministers, it is said, have reviewed "practically all previous negotiating positions on both sides including the 1959 Western peace plan."

I would not know what negotiating positions we had ever taken outside of the 1959 Western peace plan.

D. It is said that the Soviet "free city" proposal provides no basis for a settlement since a new settlement would have to safeguard three vital interests: freedom and viability of western Berlin; the presence and security of allied forces there; and free access to the city from Western Germany.

Aside from the fact that it is impossible, as stated above, to know, in the absence of negotiations, what the Soviets would or would not propose, I am not aware that there has been any statement made from the Soviet side which would specifically preclude the achievement of any of these objectives. So far as that is concerned, all would seem to have been conceded on principle in Khrushchev's various statements. I do not mean from this that I think his statements represent, as they stand, an adequate basis for an agreement. Agreements are not reached by public statements presented unilaterally and exchanged over a great distance. I am simply at a loss to know why the fact that these three vital interests have to be safeguarded is taken as meaning that the Soviet "free city" proposal provides no basis for settlement.

I write this note from very real anguish of spirit, for the view of the problem reflected in the Department's telegram seems to me little short of frivolous; yet the stakes, as we all know, are total. It is quite clear that the Russians suspect us simply of stalling; and so long as they suspect that this is our game, and that we have no intention of negotiating in the sense of making any proposals of our own, things are going to continue to get worse. Proposals for self-determination and reunification of Germany (or rather, for unification on the basis of self-determination and in the absence of any agreement on Germany's military future), however justified in the moral terms, represent--as everyone knows--a demand for a unilateral Soviet military and political withdrawal from central Europe. Obviously, this is not a realistic demand, and if this is the only alternative presented to the Russians, it is clear that they would prefer to make war.

Can it really be that it is not realized in Washington that our present course of a sullen and passive refusal to discuss Berlin represents a collision course with relation to very powerful and basic compulsions within the Soviet system? I do not mean by this to voice any certainty that successful negotiations with the Russians are possible. I mean only to say that I cannot understand, in the circumstances, why they should not be given a try.

Sincerely yours,
George F. Kennan/3/

Berlin, September 26, 1961, 1 p.m.

601. Bonn for Ambassador. From Clay to Rusk. It is clear to me now that the action of Aug 13 was put on sooner than its probable planned date to prevent collapse of Ulbricht's regime. The internal security measures to save it could be applied only with a sealed border. Soviet representatives apprehensive of Allied reaction stayed in the background to have greater freedom of action. They remain further back than usual but, in general, behave correctly when called to the scene of an incident. Unfortunately, the East German police apprehensive initially in exercising authority over Allied personnel are emboldened by success and trying now to increase their authority.

Harassments not in direct conflict with our basic rights do not worry me although I think they should be checked as they occur to the extent possible without show of force. To show force when we do not intend to use it is one thing we must avoid. However, I cannot accept the escalation theory that any reaction on our part leads to further actions and possible war. The complete acceptance of this policy would lead to the continuing erosion of an already eroded position.

Harassments which are in direct conflict with our basic rights concern me very much. Our right of access to East Berlin had not been questioned since our arrival until recently when our personnel in properly licensed cars were denied permission to enter by the East German police who refused to call a Soviet officer. Our right of access on the highway between Berlin and West Germany reconfirmed in the 1949 agreement lifting the blockade/2/ had never been subject to attempted East German control of identification until the last several days. These incidents have not been repeated enough to constitute a pattern and the formal protests being made locally and to Marshal Konev may prove effective. However, I think we should consider now our position if they do become a pattern.

I recognize that negotiations may result in the transfer of Soviet rights to East German Government or that such transfer might occur without negotiations. However, I do not believe we should be governed in the interim by what we would do if such a transfer took place. If we accept the increasing authority of the East German police, we may have little left to negotiate. Further, it seems most important that in the period in which we are seeking a negotiating base as well as during negotiations we are at a material disadvantage if the procedures for the exercise of our rights have already been established.

Also, if incidents increase we could soon find Allied personnel unwilling to use the highway freely which in itself would be a partial blockade. To provide some protection, the army has increased its administrative patrols which is certainly not a show of force. They do have telephone contact with our check points to demand the appearance of Soviet officers. However, they cannot be sufficient in number to really accomplish this purpose. Obviously, there is no way in which we can patrol this long highway to protect our people and a show of force would be of no value whatsoever.

I hope that no pattern is developing from these incidents but I believe that we should plan for it to develop. If it does, we can be sure the East Germans will make it known. I would urge strongly that consideration be given to advising Gromyko that we cannot develop a basis for negotiating unless we are assured of normal conditions governing our access to Berlin from West Germany and to East Berlin.

If the pattern does develop, I would also be apprehensive of the closure of our one entry point to East Berlin. I shall submit a separate report on this soon.

Lightner

Washington, September 28, 1961, 9:53 p.m.

1836. Paris pass USRO Stoessel, McGuire. Deliver Finletter 9:00 a.m. Sept. 29. Although second discussion between Secretary and Gromyko on Sept. 27 involved more probing re specific details of positions of both sides, Soviet thinking showed little actual movement and no conclusions could be drawn as to basic Soviet position behind conventional formulations on peace treaty and free city./2/

Gromyko opened on subject of "European security" and "Strategic matters" saying that in speaking of strengthening European security Soviets mean conclusion of peace treaty with Germany and drawing a line under World War II.

Secretary said both US and USSR had interest in European security but Soviet proposals provide too narrow framework. Soviets requested proposals but only within their narrow framework. Suggested agenda might be "Germany, Berlin, and European Security" with each side free to say what it wishes.

Gromyko said peace treaty not conjured up by Soviets but brought to fore by life itself. Sixteen years etc., etc. Added since Soviets located in Europe they especially interested European security. US-USSR agreement could prevent major nuclear war and this was most important thing. Therefore both countries must do utmost to bring positions closer together. Developments in field of military technology made matter urgent. Soviets of course seeking nothing for selves in peace treaty. Had made own proposals now waiting for West's on a peaceful settlement--on a peace treaty. Things moving too slowly.

Secretary agreed US and USSR have common interest in preventing major conflict. US would not be drawn by others into doing anything not of vital interest to US. Believed Soviet position analogous. Situation re Germany and Berlin not entirely satisfactory to either side but peaceful modus vivendi exists. West not seeking to change by force. Soviets had protected their presumed vital interest in refugee question by unilateral action. US not concerned re peace treaty per se but re consequences which Soviets say would flow therefrom. These challenge vital Western interests. We prepared discuss access with Soviets but not with Ulbricht whose statements not always in accord with Khrushchev's.

Secretary said "state of war" in Berlin legal fiction not actual fact. GDR "sovereignty" also legal concept. We find no vital Soviet interest affected by continuance existing situation. Ulbricht clearly wished affect West Berlin by control of traffic.

Gromyko said useful that Secretary recognized situation in Germany and Berlin not satisfactory. However, US must go further and say how situation should be corrected. Said he not prepared believe state of war legal fiction. Soviet Union regarded situation quite differently. Unsettled German borders, including that between two German states, revanchism, militarism not theory to Soviets. Peace treaty not theory or legal fiction to Soviets but rather what West calls vital interests.

Turning to Western rights in West Berlin Gromyko said peace treaty ending state of war would end rights. Soviets could not permit West prevent conclusion peace treaty. After treaty, all relationships with West Berlin would have to be on basis agreement with GDR. Soviets can be involved in guaranteeing access to West Berlin only if there is agreed solution among West, USSR, GDR, and other parties concerned. However, if treaty concluded with only one German state, Soviet Union could assume no such obligation. Ulbricht's statements confirm that GDR would respect its obligations. If two sides did not rely on effectiveness their own guarantees, agreement difficult to conceive.

Secretary had unfortunately failed answer some Gromyko questions, Soviet Foreign Minister continued. Soviets prepared listen any proposals re broadening framework. Said Soviets trying bring two sides closer together but if Western press correct in hinting that Secretary merely trying create appearance of negotiations obviously could be no agreement.

Peace conference should be convened. Soviets trying convince US satisfactory access arrangements could be made but its statements designed to meet Western needs were ignored.

Secretary replied that press reports Gromyko cited do not represent real situation. True Germany divided but Berlin not part of East Germany. Soviet peace treaty could not dispose of US rights. US has access rights which except for short period of difficulty have been fully acknowledged by Soviets since 1945. Soviets have obligations toward US rights and US fails see how Soviets plan discharge obligations. Secretary then read Gromyko two statements by Ulbricht--first made on June 15, 1961, to effect "What is or is not to be permitted in West Berlin will be specified in the peace treaty"--second, made same date, to effect "There are people in West Germany who would like us to mobilize building workers of GDR capital to put up a wall . . . nobody intends to put up a wall."/3/

Secretary said since Soviets want change, up to them not us to demonstrate how our rights would be guaranteed.

If there were clear understanding Western rights in and access to Berlin, we could look into broader questions relating to Germany and security arrangements in order to improve stability in Central Europe. However, we hesitant to go into broader questions when our basic rights being questioned. Secretary emphasized could not leave impression in any way that arrangement between Soviets and GDR can in any respect affect our rights in Berlin. We have examined carefully what Soviets say re access but main impression we received was one of uncertainty. Since these vital matters for us naturally our attention focuses on them.

Re Gromyko's question at previous meeting as to peace conference, Secretary said success of any conference clearly not possible unless governments of primary interest get together first to see how might work out and whether common views could be found. If views of powers primarily concerned are brought closer together, then we could see how any agreement we might be able to reach could be formalized.

Next meeting scheduled September 30, 10:30 a.m.

For Finletter: You may draw on foregoing for NAC presentation.

Bowles

Berlin, September 28, 1961, 4 p.m.

624. From Clay for Rusk only.

Dear Mr. Secretary: The President's speech/2/ has greatly encouraged the thinking Germans in Berlin, although the extreme nationalistic political element will argue that it is not enough. To me, it was exactly what needed to be said and clearly proved that our policy is strong and determined. With full confidence in this policy, I must report that it is being vitiated in Berlin by undue caution verging on timidity. We are fighting a political battle here, not a war. Of course, we cannot win a war in Berlin but we can win the political battle. To do so we must convince the Russians on the ground what our rights are, and not let them lapse one by one. We cannot expect them to believe us otherwise.

It seems to me we have reached a point where various levels of command accept too many incidents in Berlin as routine and thus not urgently importance to our position here. I would like to take our exclave at Steinstucken as an example. As it is within the area in which I have a responsibility, I considered it my immediate duty to pay it a visit. Finding refugees there, I asked for a small patrol to be sent in by helicopter for their protection. The State Department immediately approved the removal of the refugees by helicopter. However, this approval asked that the removal be done as much as possible under cover. We did not have to undertake this operation as the refugees made their own way into Berlin. I suggested then replacing the helicopter service by a truck moving on the ground. This action was turned down even though there had been no Soviet reaction to our helicopter service. In addition, the local commander was told to get permission each time a helicopter was sent into Steinstucken. Additional refugees succeeded in breaking through the police cordon to enter Steinstucken. When permission was requested to remove them by helicopter it required discussion between three commands with a lapse of approximately twenty hours before any action was taken. When the refugees were brought out it was still done as much under cover as possible.

Steinstucken is a recognized part of our responsibility and if we fail to meet this responsibility the repercussion in Berlin would be serious indeed. We can argue with some validity that since we cannot protect Steinstucken by force we must not endanger its people. The same argument applies to our entire responsibility. The right to use the air and our responsibility to protect the people in our sector are the basic rights to which we are committed. We should have moved our helicopters openly but not ostentatiously into Steinstucken and brought whoever we wanted to out openly and proudly. Of course, we would not announce them to be refugees. We would be irresponsible if we played any part in helping refugees get through the cordon but if the Soviet and German police cannot keep them from doing so and they come into the areas for which we are responsible we must provide them protection. Otherwise I cannot see why we are in Berlin. I am sure too that this issue is one which would be clearly understood by the people of West Berlin and by our people at home.

There is no longer time for either caution or timidity when our basic rights are threatened. The Russians are not going to war to stop us from taking refugees out of Steinstucken. They may well take the acts which would cause war if we fail to exercise our rights at Steinstucken in the belief that we have given up these rights. I know of no better opportunity that we have had to have shown our determination, and unfortunately we do not have enough such opportunities to fail to utilize those which do arise.

I am sure that I was not sent here to live in vacuum, nor to see our strong national policy eroded by our failures to act promptly in Berlin. I managed to live here through some critical years without getting involved in the use of force. And I recognize that the use of force in Berlin is not an answer to our problem. However, we must be prepared to force the East German police to use force or to call up their Soviet forces to show our determination. We must be bold without truculence, quietly and not ostentatiously determined, and completely sure of those rights to which we are committed. This requires a greater reliance on those who are responsible in Berlin as they alone have the knowledge and experience to know when reaction is essential. This is not a reorientation of policy but it does imply that now our national policy is firmly established we must support it fully on the ground. If we do this I doubt if we will be pushed into war as we can well be if the East German police and Soviet forces have underestimated our determination. I am sure that there is determination in Washington and that we must make it clear to the people of West Berlin and to the East German and Soviet forces that it exists here, too. This requires no sudden or major change in our immediate posture. It does require a change in thinking in the long channel which comes from you. I believe it a matter of urgency./3/

Lightner

Moscow, September 29, 1961.

Dear Mr. President: At present I am on the shore of the Black Sea. When they write in the press that Khrushchev is resting on the Black Sea it may be said that this is correct and at the same time incorrect. This is indeed a wonderful place. As a former Naval officer you would surely appreciate the merits of these surroundings, the beauty of the sea and the grandeur of the Caucasian mountains. Under this bright Southern sun it is even somehow hard to believe that there still exist problems in the world which, due to lack of solutions, cast a sinister shadow on peaceful life, on the future of millions of people.

But as you will fully understand, I cannot at this time permit myself any relaxation. I am working, and here I work more fruitfully because my attention is not diverted to routine matters of which I have plenty, probably like you yourself do. Here I can concentrate on the main things.

I have given much thought of late to the development of international events since our meeting in Vienna, and I have decided to approach you with this letter. The whole world hopefully expected that our meeting and a frank exchange of views would have a soothing effect, would turn relations between our countries into the correct channel and promote the adoption of decisions which would give the peoples confidence that at last peace on earth will be secured. To my regret--and, I believe, to yours--this did not happen.

I listened with great interest to the account which our journalists Adjubei and Kharlamov gave of the meeting they had with you in Washington./2/ They gave me many interesting details and I questioned them most thoroughly. You prepossessed them by your informality, modesty and frankness which are not to be found very often in men who occupy such a high position.

My thoughts have more than once returned to our meetings in Vienna. I remember you emphasized that you did not want to proceed towards war and favoured living in peace with our country while competing in the peaceful domain. And though subsequent events did not proceed in the way that could be desired, I thought it might be useful in a purely informal and personal way to approach you and share some of my ideas. If you do not agree with me you can consider that this letter did not exist while naturally I, for my part, will not use this correspondence in my public statements. After all only in confidential correspondence can you say what you think without a backward glance at the press, at the journalists.

As you see, I started out by describing the delights of the Black Sea coast, but then I nevertheless turned to politics. But that cannot be helped. They say that you sometimes cast politics out through the door but it climbs back through the window, particularly when the windows are open.

I have given careful thought to what you told our journalists in your personal talk with them and to the difficulties to which you referred. Of course, I fully understand that the questions which have now matured and require solution are not of the kind that easily lend themselves to solution. But they have a vitally important significance for our countries and for all the countries of the world. And therefore we cannot escape them. We cannot shift the burden of solving those questions on the shoulders of others. And who else but the leaders of the two most influential and mighty States--the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.--can the nations expect to work out solutions which could form the basis for the consolidation of peace. After your meeting with Adjubei and Kharlamov I was about to write you a letter right then and, I admit, even drafted one. However, your television address in July,/3/ unfortunately, made it impossible for me to send that letter. After that speech which, putting it bluntly, was belligerent in its nature, my letter would not have been understood by you since it completely differed in spirit, content and tone from what you said. After that we not only made speeches and exchanged statements but, unfortunately, also proceeded to an exchange of actions which will not, and indeed cannot, yield any moral satisfaction either to you as President of the United States or to me as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. Evidently both one side and the other are compelled to undertake their actions under the pressure of the various factors and conditions which exist and which--unless we exert a restraining influence--will propel the development of events in a direction in which you and I, and the more so the peoples of all countries, would not like them to be propelled. It would be most of all unwise from the standpoint of peace to enter into such a vicious circle when some would be responding with counter-measures to the measures of others, and vice versa. The whole world could bog down in such measures and counter-measures.

Lately I have had not a few meetings with eminent statesmen and political leaders of Western countries. I have talked with Mr. Fanfani, the Prime Minister of Italy. I shall not describe that talk of which I suppose he, as a representative of a State allied with you, had informed you. Recently I had a conversation with the former Prime Minister of France Mr. Paul Reynaud. He raised a number of questions to which I frankly replied. After Paul Reynaud I received Mr. Spaak, the Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister of Belgium, who for a number of years was the Secretary General of NATO. I listened to him with attention and tried to reply to his questions as exhaustively as possible, to expound our position and explain how we consider it best to solve those questions. I must say that in my opinion understanding can be reached on those questions which were touched upon in my talk with Mr. Spaak. To this end it is only necessary that both sides should display equal interest in settling the problems at issue on a mutually acceptable basis.

The statesmen of many countries are presently displaying great concern for the destinies of peace, they are seriously troubled by the tense situation that has taken shape and they sincerely fear that some rash actions might bring the world to disaster and to the unleashing of nuclear war. These feelings are dear to me and I understand them because, like many Soviet people, I spent the war years at the front and lived through all the horrors of war. I am against war. The Soviet Government is against war. The peoples of the Soviet Union are against war. I say this to you because I believe that you--a direct participant in the battles of the last war--take the same position.

I should like in this connection to dwell upon some of the basic problems which now preoccupy the whole world since the future of mankind depends on their solution. It can be said that in the disarmament question which is the major question of our time there have now appeared certain gleams. I would like to see those gleams in the fact that we have reached agreement on submitting to the United Nations General Assembly a "Statement of Principles"/4/ as a joint proposal of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. so that in subsequent negotiations a treaty on general and complete disarmament can be elaborated on its basis. Certainly it must not be forgotten that so far this is an agreement in regard to the principles of disarmament. This is as yet far from the achievement of the actual agreement on general and complete disarmament, and the more so this is not the practical start of such disarmament. But it is precisely the conclusion of such an agreement and its implementation within the shortest possible time that all the nations are expecting of us. For them and for all of us that would mean great joy.

It is important to note that even understanding on the principles of disarmament which we have succeeded in reaching after protracted and intense effort and only after you came to the White House, is a good thing too. Naturally such understanding is not an end in itself. It must, so to say, be the harbinger, the first successful step on the road to general and complete disarmament. That is what we would like to hope.

If, Mr. President, you are striving towards that noble goal--and I believe that is the case--if agreement of the United States on the principles of disarmament is not merely a diplomatic or tactical manoeuvre, you will find complete understanding on our part and we shall stint no effort in order to find a common language and reach the required agreement together with you.

The Soviet Union, as you are well aware, has always advocated the prompt implementation of general and complete disarmament. The solution of that question would, in our profound conviction, radically promote the settlement of other major international problems as well. Our position in that respect is still unchanged.

But you will agree with me, Mr. President, that the present international situation and its tension can hardly be assessed as a simple arithmetical sum total of unsolved issues. After all, the series of measures and counter-measures aimed at strengthening the armaments of both sides which have already been put into effect by our Governments in connection with the aggravation of the German question cannot be disregarded. I do not want here to engage in an argument as to who is right or wrong in this matter. Let us leave this aside for the time being. The main thing is that events are unfortunately continuing to develop in the same unfavourable direction. Instead of confidence we are turning to an even greater aggravation. Far from bringing the possibility of agreement between us on disarmament closer, we are, on the contrary, worsening the situation still further. That is another important reason why the Soviet Union is now attaching such exclusive significance to the German question. We cannot escape the fact that there has been a Second World War and that the problems we have inherited from the last war--first and foremost the conclusion of a German peace treaty--require their solution.

History will not be reversed and West Berlin will not be moved to the other side of the Elbe. In that war the peoples of our two countries fought shoulder to shoulder. But if we fought together, we should indeed keep the peace together.

If you were to come to the Soviet Union now--and this incidentally is something I am hoping for--you would surely convince yourself that not a single Soviet citizen will ever reconcile himself to the peace, which was won at such great cost, being under constant threat. But that will be the case until the countries that participated in the war recognize and formalize the results of the war in a German peace treaty. Yes, that is what our people are demanding, and they are right. That is demanded by the Poles, that is demanded by the people of Czechoslovakia, that is demanded by other nations as well. They are right too. The position of the Soviet Union is shared by many. The impression is formed that understanding of the need to conclude a German peace treaty is growing in the world. I have already told you, Mr. President, that in striving for the conclusion of a German peace treaty we do not want somehow to prejudice the interests of the United States and their bloc allies. Neither are we interested in exacerbating the situation in connection with the conclusion of a German peace treaty. What need have we of such exacerbation? It is in the Western countries that they create all sorts of fears and allege that the socialist States intend well-nigh to swallow up West Berlin. You may believe my word, the word of the Soviet Government that neither we nor our allies need West Berlin.

I do not doubt that, given good will and desire, the Governments of our countries could find a common language in the question of a German peace treaty too. Naturally in the solution of that question it is necessary to proceed from the obvious fact, which even a blind man cannot fail to see, that there exist two sovereign German States.

I was gratified to familiarize myself with the statement which, according to press reports, was made by your representative in Berlin Mr. Clay on the need to recognize that there now actually exist two Germanies./5/ It is impossible not to appreciate such a reasonable and sober pronouncement. I recall Senator Mansfield made some statements in the same spirit. All this warrants the hope that evidently the process has started of a quest for a solution of the German question on the basis of a realistic appraisal of the obtaining situation, a solution in which the Soviet Union and the United States of America must, above all, play their part. Naturally this solution must be such as not to inflict any harm to the prestige of one side or the other.

If we fail to agree on the conclusion of one peace treaty for both German States we also have at our disposal such a course as the drafting of two treaties which would be similar in content--one for the German Democratic Republic and the other for the Federal Republic of Germany. In that case the States that were parties to the anti-Hitler coalition would have the opportunity of signing one or two peace treaties depending on their choice. Such an approach would allow of circumventing the difficulties that appear owing to the fact that not all the possible participants in a peace settlement are ready to recognize both existing German States legally and establish diplomatic relations with them.

In any event the contracting parties could assume moral obligations to assist in the unification into one entity of both German States if the Germans so desire. It goes without saying that such obligations would find reflection in the peace treaty itself. As for the achievement of agreement on the unification of Germany, that is the concern of the Governments of the two German States. I believe such a solution would be reasonable and understandable for everyone. It would be understood by the German people as well.

In signing a German peace treaty the States that participated in the war will have to unconditionally recognize the presently constituted frontiers of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany. Under the peace treaty those frontiers would be legally formalized, I stress legally, because de facto they already exist and cannot be changed without a war.

We cannot turn our back on the facts and fail to see that until the existing borders of Germany are finally formalized the sluice-gates which release the West German revanchard desires remain open. The followers of Hitler and his policy who, unfortunately, still exist in no small numbers in the Federal Republic of Germany are dreaming of the long-awaited day when, exploiting the lack of a post-war settlement, they will succeed in bringing about a collision between the U.S.S.R., the U.S. and the other former opponents of Hitlerite Germany. Why then should we leave any ground for the activities of those forces which are fraught with the threat of a world conflict? I would think that the legal formalization of the State borders which have taken shape after World War Two equally meets the interests of both the U.S.S.R. and the United States. Thus the borders that have taken shape and presently exist between the two German States would be formalized as well.

There remains the question of West Berlin which must also be solved when a German peace treaty is concluded. From whatever side we approach the matter, we probably will not be able to find a better solution than the transformation of West Berlin into a free city. And we shall proceed towards that goal. If, to our regret, the Western Powers will not wish to participate in a German peace settlement and the Soviet Union, together with the other countries that will be prepared to do so, has to sign a treaty with the German Democratic Republic we shall nonetheless provide a free city status for West Berlin.

Your statements, Mr. President, as well as the statements of other representatives of Western Powers not infrequently show signs of concern as to whether freedom for the population of West Berlin will be preserved, whether it will be able to live under the social and political system of its own choosing, whether West Berlin will be safeguarded against interference and outside pressure. I must say we see no difficulties in creating such conditions, the more so since the assurance of the freedom and complete independence of West Berlin is also our desire, is also our concern. I declare this on behalf of the Soviet Government, and on behalf of the socialist countries allied with us which are interested in the solution of the German question. I wish to emphasize in particular that the German Democratic Republic and the Head of that State Walter Ulbricht are of the same opinion. I say this with full knowledge and in all responsibility.

Voices can also be heard contending that it is not enough to codify in a German peace treaty the guarantees of the freedom and independence of West Berlin since--so it is said--there is no certainty that those guarantees will be honored. The statesmen and political leaders of the Western Powers with whom I have had occasion to meet, sometimes plainly expressed the wish that such guarantees should not only be given under a peace treaty but should also be specially reinforced by the Soviet Union.

Frankly speaking it is hard to understand what such apprehensions are based on. I am convinced that the guarantees established under a peace treaty will be honored and observed by all the States which will have signed the treaty. Furthermore the Soviet Union as a party to the German peace treaty will feel itself responsible for the fulfillment of all the clauses of that treaty, including the guarantees in respect to West Berlin.

But if it is the common desire that responsibility for the observance of the status of West Berlin should be entrusted to the Soviet Union we shall be ready to assume such a responsibility. I and my colleagues in the Government have not infrequently given thought to the way in which the role of the Soviet Union in guarantees for West Berlin could be implemented in practice. If we were simply to make a statement that the Soviet Union will in some special way guarantee the immunity of West Berlin, you will agree that this could prejudice the sovereign rights of the German Democratic Republic and the other countries parties to the peace treaty. In order to prevent that, in order not to prejudice the prestige of any State--whether your ally or ours--I believe the question should be solved in the way we have already proposed, namely that token contingents of troops of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union, the four great Powers which participated in the war against Hitlerite Germany, should be left in West Berlin. In my view that is the sole possibility. Naturally such a system should be introduced not for all time but for a specific period. Evidently an appropriate status for the deployment of the troops of the four Powers in West Berlin would then have to be devised which would be subject to the approval of the other countries signatories of the peace treaty.

Given every desire, we could find no other solution which to any greater degree would strengthen confidence in the reliability of guarantees for West Berlin. If you have any ideas of your own on this score we are ready to consider them.

Of course, such alternatives are also conceivable as the deployment in West Berlin of troops from neutral countries or United Nations troops. I have repeatedly expressed and now reaffirm our agreement to such a solution. We also agree to the establishment of the United Nations Headquarters in West Berlin which would in that case become an international city.

It goes without saying that the occupation regime in West Berlin must be eliminated. Under the allied agreements occupation is a temporary measure and, indeed, never in history has there been a case of occupation becoming a permanent institution. But sixteen years have already elapsed since the surrender of Germany. For how long then is the occupation regime to be preserved?

A more stable status should be created for West Berlin than existed under the occupation. If the occupation regime has lived out its time and has become a source of strife among States it means the time has come to discard it. It has completely exhausted itself, has become a burden in relationships among nations and does not meet the interests of the population of West Berlin itself. The transformation of West Berlin into a free city will create a far more durable basis for its independent existence than the regime of occupation. Furthermore the grounds for collisions among States which are generated by the preservation of the occupation regime will disappear.

Of course, no one can be satisfied with half-measures which superficially would seem to erase from the surface differences among States while in effect they would be preserving them under cover and driving them in deeper. What use would there be if we barely covered up this delayed action landmine with earth and waited for it to explode. Indeed, no, the countries which are interested in consolidating peace must render that landmine completely harmless and tear it out of the heart of Europe.

The representatives of the United States sometimes declare that the American side is not advancing its concrete proposals on the German question because the Soviet Union allegedly is not striving for agreed solutions and wants to do everything by itself regardless of what other States may say. It is hard for me to judge how far such ideas really tell on the actions of the United States Government, but they are based on a profoundly mistaken assessment of the position of the Soviet Union. The United States Government can easily verify that, if it wishes to introduce its own constructive proposals at the negotiations on a peaceful settlement with Germany incorporating the question of West Berlin.

I am closely following the meetings of our Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei A. Gromyko with the Secretary of State of the United States Mr. Dean Rusk. I do not know how you will react to this idea, but it seems to me that it would be useful to broaden contacts between our Governments on the German question. If the United States Government, like the Soviet Government, is searching for understanding and is ready to devise conditions for peace with Germany which would be acceptable for both sides and would not affect the interests or the prestige of any State I believe it could be arranged that you and I would appoint appropriate representatives for private meetings and talks. Those representatives would elaborate for us the contours of an agreement which we could discuss before coming to a peace conference where a decision on the question of a peace treaty with Germany will be taken.

Your wish, Mr. President, that perhaps our Ambassadors in Belgrade should be entrusted with an informal exchange of views, was communicated to me. In fact such meetings have already started. Unfortunately, however, I see from the dispatches of our Ambassador that they are spending too much time in, figuratively speaking, sniffing each other. If this goes on the business will not move forward, whereas it should be tackled with more energy./6/

I have never met Mr. Kennan but, so far as I can judge by the press, he is, to my mind, a man with whom preparatory work could be done, and we would accordingly authorize our Ambassador. But evidently in that case our Ambassadors would have to be given firm instructions to start talks on concrete questions without needless procrastination and not merely indulge in tea-drinking, not walk round and about mooing at each other when they should talk on the substance.

The following alternative is also possible. You, let us say, could send someone in your confidence to Moscow under some plausible pretext and the necessary contacts could be established there. This method might possibly even expedite the solution of the questions. However, let the final choice be up to you. You might perhaps prefer to charge Mr. Thompson, your Ambassador in Moscow, with that mission. Personally I have had a number of conversations with him and he gives the impression of being a man who can represent you in dealing with the problems that face us. But naturally it is not for me to give you advise in such matters. Please excuse me for intruding in the sphere of questions which are entirely within your own personal competence.

The non-aligned countries addressed messages to you, Mr. President, and to myself. They suggested that we meet to discuss outstanding problems. You gave a positive reply to that appeal./7/ We too reacted favourably to the initiative of the neutrals.

I believe a meeting between us could be useful and, given the desire of both sides, could culminate in the adoption of positive decisions. Naturally such a meeting would have to be well prepared through diplomatic or other confidential channels. And when preliminary understanding is reached, you and I could meet at any place in order to develop and formalize the results of such an understanding. This would undoubtedly be met with great satisfaction by all nations. They would see in that step an important contribution to the settlement of existing differences, to the consolidation of peace. The positive results of such a meeting would generate confidence that all issues can be solved peacefully by negotiation.

We are proposing that a German peace treaty be signed not only to eliminate the vestiges of World War Two, but also to clear the way for the elimination of the state of "cold war" which can at any moment bring our countries to the brink of a military collision. We want to clear the way for the strengthening of friendly relations with you and with all the countries of the world which espouse peaceful coexistence.

You, yourself, understand that we are a rich country, our expanse is boundless, our economy is on the upgrade, our culture and science are in their efflorescence. Acquaint yourself with the Program of our Party which determines our economic development for twenty years to come. This is indeed a grand and thrilling Program. What need have we of war? What need have we of acquisitions? And yet it is said that we want to seize West Berlin! It is ridiculous even to think of that. What would that give us? What would that change in the ratio of forces in the world arena? It gives nothing to anyone.

I often think how necessary it is for men who are vested with trust and great power to be inspired with the understanding of what seems to be an obvious truism, which is that we live on one planet and it is not in man's power--at least in the foreseeable future--to change that. In a certain sense there is an analogy here--I like this comparison--with Noah's Ark where both the "clean" and the "unclean" found sanctuary. But regardless of who lists himself with the "clean" and who is considered to be "unclean," they are all equally interested in one thing and that is that the Ark should successfully continue its cruise. And we have no other alternative: either we should live in peace and cooperation so that the Ark maintains its buoyancy, or else it sinks. Therefore we must display concern for all of mankind, not to mention our own advantages, and find every possibility leading to peaceful solutions of problems.

When I was already closing this letter I was given the text of your address before the United Nations General Assembly./8/ It has long since become my habit, when reading statements by responsible statesmen, in the first instance to search for and find--even a grain at a time--ideas and propositions which could be useful for the building up of peaceful cooperation among States. Almost involuntarily you sift away all the accretions, all that has been said in a fit of temper, under the influence of unduly inflamed passions. If everything is replied to in the same vein such battles of words would have to be entered into that the voice of reason would be drowned out and the shoots of all that is good and hope-giving in relations among States would be nipped in the bud.

Of course, if one were to attune himself to an aggravation of relations between our countries, your speech before the Assembly could easily be evaluated as a challenge to an embittered dispute in the "cold war" spirit and no one could reproach us as being partial. That speech contains no few points in which homage is plainly felt to those who oppose the normalization of the international situation and seek to whip up a military psychosis by spreading all sorts of fables about the intentions of the Soviet Government and ascribing to it what does not even exist. Hence, evidently, the crude sallies tinted with ideological intolerance which are made against the social and public foundations of socialist society and which look to me, if the consolidation of peace is seriously contemplated, like a square peg in a round hole.

If you are fighting for the preservation of capitalism and consider it to be a more just society, we have our own opinion on that score. You speak of communism with disrespect, but I could reply in kind with regard to capitalism. But can we change each other's mind in questions affecting our outlooks? No, to carry ideological differences into relations among States is tantamount to an out-of-hand renunciation of hopes of living in peace and friendship with each other and we should certainly not take that road.

We can argue, we can disagree with one another but weapons must not be brought into play. I recall our conversation in Vienna about peaceful coexistence. I trust you will remember it and agree now, as you agreed then, that the question of the choice of a social system is for the people of each country to decide. Each one of us submits to his own principles, his own system but this should not lead to a collision between our countries. Let us allow history to judge the advantages of this or that social system.

A few words on Laos.

[Here follow 7 paragraphs on Laos.]

I am now working on the preparation of two reports which I shall deliver at the Congress of our Communist Party: a progress report and a report on the Program of the Party. Naturally, in those reports I cannot pass over such questions as disarmament and the German question. These are the major questions of the day because on their solution depends the course which relations between our countries take in their development, and consequently the course world events take: that is whether they will develop towards the consolidation of peace and cooperation among States or whether they will proceed in a different direction, a dangerous one for mankind. We want to find the solutions of both these questions, we want to clear the road for an improvement of relations between our countries, for the assurance of peaceful coexistence and peace on earth.

Please convey my best wishes to your wife. I wish you and your entire family good health.

I should like to believe that by joint effort we shall succeed in surmounting the existing difficulties and in making our contribution to the solution of the international problems which preoccupy the nations. And then together with you we shall be able to celebrate the successes achieved in the strengthening of peace, and this is something that the peoples of our countries, as well as all men on earth, are awaiting impatiently.

Accept my respects,
N. Khrushchev/9/

On September 30, 1961, Vice President Johnson, who had been in Sweden to attend the funeral of Dag Hammarskjold, discussed the Berlin situation with General Norstad and Ambassadors Gavin and Finletter at Paris. Norstad outlined his authority to take countermeasures including the provision of military crews to pilot civilian aircraft in the event air access to Berlin was denied. Norstad also expressed his great concern over the situation in Steinstuecken and said that the "Communist intentions in regard to the territory presented very high risks of launching a war." The Vice President then reported that there was widespread feeling in the United States that America's allies had not fulfilled their defense commitment completely. Finletter agreed with this assessment stating that most of the progress on defense was in commitments rather than performance, but concluded the discussion by saying that "in his judgment the NATO alliance itself is more important than the buildup."

For a 3-page memorandum of this conversation, see Declassified Documents, 1984, 232; for a draft of the memorandum of conversation and a 2-page memorandum containing recommendations based on the discussion, see ibid., 1978, 144B and C.

Washington, October 2, 1961, 6:40 p.m.

1893. Paris pass USRO Stoessel, McGuire. Paris deliver Finletter 9 am October 3.

Summary At third and final New York meeting,/2/ Gromyko again indicated importance Soviets attach to fixing border between "two Germanies" and displayed interest in discussion of European security and avoidance spread national nuclear weapons. Held access question could be resolved on basis acceptable to all but not by recognizing or reaffirming occupation status or rights. Said willing sign separate agreement guaranteeing access. Did not deny Secretary's statement that not impossible that two sides with different theoretical understanding of situation may have similar understanding of facts which might permit them to live in peace. End Summary.

Secretary opened by recalling that at last meeting/3/ he posed concrete questions re access to West Berlin to which Gromyko might now wish respond. Reviewing at Gromyko's request said West had basic rights not at disposition of Soviets. Latter had obligations to West. Soviets contend these rights and obligations can be intended confirm and assure our rights.

Secretary added he had no mandate to negotiate but was to ascertain whether basis for serious negotiation existed. Soviet framework, "conclusion of peace treaty and solution problem West Berlin on this basis," inadequate.

Gromyko said Soviets believe peace treaty with West best basis but flexible on this question. Agreeable one treaty with "two Germanies" or two separate treaties.

Secretary observed Soviet-East German treaty not critical issue. Treaty's effect on our rights is critical.

Gromyko continued US could avoid difficulties it saw by signing treaty with only FRG although Soviets do not believe this correct approach. In any case basic principles would remain same, i.e. recognition German borders including that between "two Germanies," erection barriers against revanchists and militarists, and number other problems.

Treaty or treaties would also resolve question West Berlin on basis free demilitarized city. Soviets and East Germans of course don't need West Berlin. Solution would meet needs all concerned. Access question would also be resolved on basis acceptable to all but not by recognizing or reaffirming occupation status or rights.

Gromyko noted one of most important requirements is respect of sovereignty of "GDR" but does not mean diplomatic relations. However interests of peace best served by de jure as well as de facto recognition "both Germanies" with both admitted UN. West would have to respect sovereignty of "GDR" and reach understanding with it on pertinent matters. Hardly necessary reiterate Soviet willingness give strictest guarantees re access. Willing sign separate agreement on this aspect. Also willing for token forces Four Powers be stationed West Berlin. If treaty signed only between Soviets, East Germans, and other interested states, West Berlin will be declared free, demilitarized city and access will have be resolved with "GDR" on this basis. However wished emphasize vigorously that agreement re status West Berlin and access can be worked out satisfactorily for all if "GDR" sovereignty respected, even if West persists in refusal sign peace treaty with GDR.

Gromyko then said wished turn to question of broadening basis of negotiation. Soviets want clarification of US thoughts re strategic situation and security in Europe. Would not rule out of peace treaty discussions although treaty most important problem. Perhaps what US has in mind would interest Soviet Union.

Secretary said thought some constructive elements in what Gromyko had just said. However, he wished make another point clear. We asked ourselves how many times we were going to be asked buy same horse. We in Berlin by right and in accordance with wartime and post-war arrangements. Soviets had taken steps in East Berlin which they say not negotiable.

Gromyko said Secretary avoided most important question of how long state of war to go on. Soviets cannot accept right of others veto peace treaty. Soviets not pursuing selfish interests only lessening of tensions and peaceful interests all parties. Re Secretary's query on meaning "sovereignty GDR", Gromyko said Soviet proposals envisage West Berlin as "separate and independent entity."

Secretary said he thus understood Gromyko phrase "sovereignty of GDR" does not include West Berlin. Also failed see how present access procedures infringe on what Gromyko calls "sovereignty of GDR."

Gromyko responded two possible variants of situation: 1) US would not sign treaty with "GDR" but an understanding would be reached separately with "GDR" re "free city" and access; or 2) US would not sign and no understanding would be reached. In first "GDR" would undertake certain obligations and this would solve question re "respect for sovereignty of GDR." In second West would have to negotiate with "GDR." No one knew what results would be.

Secretary said "sovereignty of GDR" appeared imply no factual change in manner of access.

Gromyko said possible reach understanding satisfactory to all but substance and form would have to be negotiated.

Secretary said thought elimination factors which might produce World War III more important than termination World War II. West Berlin is free today. US does not believe Soviet forces in West Berlin would help stabilize situation. Could imagine that some sort of UN presence in Berlin could. Also thought cooperation East and West Berlin municipal governments on transportation, power, etc. could. Facts of stable situation should be of greater interest than theory. Not impossible that two sides with different theoretical understanding of situation may have similar understanding of facts which might permit them to live in peace.

Secretary said re Gromyko's two alternatives absolutely basic that there be clear understanding between West and Soviets re access and could not see why Ulbricht could not accept such understanding as part of his arrangements.

Turning to European security Secretary strongly emphasized speaking only for US. Could not make specific proposals since many other countries involved. US does not believe in peacetime US and USSR should be so heavily involved in an area. Should see what can be done to stabilize situation. Disengagement not profitable because would create vacuum. However US takes disarmament very seriously and prepared see what progress could be made in that field. Useful to see how confrontation in Central Europe could be reduced. In interest both sides prevent spread national nuclear weapons. Might also be profitable for NATO and Warsaw Pact to exchange assurances re how could live peacefully. Surprise attack could be studied. Secretary deeply convinced in common interest keep peace. US will study Soviet memorandum to UN on initial disarmament/4/ steps carefully to see whether it is linked in any way to what we have in mind.

Gromyko referred to Secretary's remark re Ulbricht acceptance US-USSR understanding. Said US and USSR could make great contribution but Soviets cannot ignore "GDR" and reach understanding detrimental to its interests. Does not however rule out agreement re status of a free city including access in event West fails sign any treaty. Must be based on: 1) recognition German borders which would create barrier to revanchists and militarists; 2) respect for "GDR" sovereignty; 3) prevention of spread national nuclear weapons and of transfer possession or control such weapons to West Germany; 4) status of free city of West Berlin. Form would be matter for negotiation.

Gromyko said very interested in European security. Soviets would study US views most carefully and US should study Soviet views. Soviets firmly reject making peace treaty contingent upon questions of European security.

Secretary said time element alone would preclude this. Said two problems linked in a sense but not of necessity.

Secretary said he wished now to discuss results of talks with President and Allies. He wanted reiterate that in order prevent mounting tension door should not be closed on German reunification although not immediate prospect. Added each side should avoid actions inflaming public opinion.

Gromyko agreed with latter point and said re reunification Soviets proceed from basis that existence two separate German states must be accepted as inexorable indubitable immutable fact. Unity of Germany only possible through arrangements between the two German governments.

For Finletter: You may draw on foregoing for NAC presentation./5/

Rusk

Washington, October 2, 1961.

SUBJECT
Things you may want to know for your meeting with the Secretary of State this afternoon/2/

1. The Secretary is encouraged by his last Gromyko conversation, which makes it clear that the Soviet Union is willing to settle the access problem by new guarantees if appropriate additional arrangements can be made on the following four points:

a. Recognition of German border (both national and zonal), together with some undefined barriers to revanchists and militarists;

b. Respect for the sovereignty of the GDR;

c. Prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons in Europe; and

d. An agreed status of a free city of West Berlin.

2. The Secretary has now asked his staff to prepare recommendations for a substantive U.S. policy line on these matters. So I think we can now say that a real and urgent effort is being made to reach a U.S. negotiating position.

3. The only trouble with the discussions so far is that they appear to imply significant U.S. concessions in return for nothing more than a reassertion of rights that in our view are not open to discussion or concession. Unless something more is put into the record before these conversations close, I think we are on a dangerous slope of appeasement, and I am certain that this will be the view of the Germans, the Frenchmen and the Republicans. Thus I think it urgent that you should ask the Secretary what we can say to Gromyko before he goes back to Moscow which will indicate that in any serious negotiation we should have to make gains of our own. The following are possible proposals:

a. That our access rights should be improved by careful and detailed description of all of them in papers subscribed and guaranteed by all concerned.

b. That international supervision of some appropriate sort be arranged, to make clear that these agreements do not depend upon any supposed sovereign consent of the GDR.

c. That some one route of access, preferably the Autobahn, be fully internationalized and placed under the immediate control of some other body than the GDR. There is an interesting proposal to this effect from Berlin which might well be the subject of further study.

In short, if we do not get strengthened access or some other important advantage from possible negotiations, I think we will be exactly in the danger that the Secretary of State has suggested: namely, that we may be buying the same horse twice.

4. There are other important tactical questions about negotiations, but this is, I think, the most urgent one and the one on which it is most important that you and the Secretary should reach a common view.

5. Nothing in this note should be construed as criticism of the Rusk-Gromyko negotiations so far. It has been a virtuoso performance on both sides, and the Secretary deserves all sorts of praise for what he has accomplished.

McG. B./3/

General Lauris Norstad returned to Washington October 2-3, 1961, for consultations on Berlin and NATO. In a meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff the morning of October 2 Norstad stressed the need for a statement of policy on Berlin which would show the Allies exactly where the United States stood. In an afternoon session, which included Secretary of Defense McNamara, Norstad suggested that the Oder-Neisse line, Berlin as a capital for West Germany, access procedures, and control and inspection areas were all points that might be negotiable regarding Berlin. (Draft Memorandum for the Record, October 6; Eisenhower Library, Norstad Papers, Subject File)

On October 3 McGeorge Bundy, in a memorandum to the President, outlined the points which he should raise with Norstad including what military actions should be taken if access were blocked and how to get the Allies to share political risks and responsibilities for Berlin. (Memorandum for the President, October 3; Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Norstad Meetings)

At 4:30 p.m. on October 3 the President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, Taylor, Bundy, Lemnitzer, Dulles, Nitze, and Kohler met with Norstad for an hour for a wide-ranging discussion of NATO and Berlin. The President asked Norstad several questions about the escalation of military responses to the closing of access to Berlin, the need for additional conventional forces in Europe, and the state of contingency planning. Norstad responded that no one response fit every situation, that he wanted three divisions ready in 10-14 days, and admitted that there were no contingency plans that had been agreed with the Allies. Bundy's memorandum of this meeting is ibid.; a shorter record by Taylor with the discussion arranged by topic is in the National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 37, 109 Norstad. Lemnitzer's handwritten notes on the meeting are ibid., Lemnitzer Papers, Box 29.

At 6:20 p.m. on October 4 Rusk, McNamara, Nitze, Bundy, Kohler, and Taylor met at the Department of State to assess the meetings with Norstad. In Taylor's summary of the discussion, he stressed the need for the Departments of State and Defense to submit a paper to the President stating what the best courses of action would be "in response to broad contingencies of harassment within Berlin, interference with ground access, interference with air access, and any other broad contingencies which could arise" from the derogation of vital U.S. interests in Berlin. (Talking Paper, October 4; ibid., Taylor Papers, Box 34, Berlin Planning)

Washington, October 3, 1961, 8:53 p.m.

460. Bonn for Ambassador. For Clay from Rusk. Ref: Berlin's 601./2/ I have carefully considered points you make in your message. With regard non-vital interests, I agree that we should take whatever measures are feasible, short of use of force, to check encroachments on them. I agree too that we cannot in such cases operate on the premise that any Allied reaction will necessarily escalate to the point where war is possible. This is an area in which no single operating principle can be used for all cases. Each encroachment must be dealt with in manner that puts pressure on Soviets/GDR to maximum degree possible without, in circumstances, involving real danger unacceptable escalation.

We are alive to problems presented by GDR harassment at crossing point and on autobahn. Latter particularly disturbing since touches Allied vital interest, and manner dealing with possible pattern such encroachments being considered in Quadripartite contingency planning. We shall look to you and our Mission in Berlin to detect any such pattern as it begins to emerge. We shall also welcome any suggestions for particular measures to forestall or retaliate for harassment.

With respect transfer Soviet rights to East German Government, (I assume you refer specifically to transfer by Soviets to GDR personnel of checkpoint operations involving Allied access) I entirely agree our willingness ultimately accept such transfer under specified conditions should not govern our actions now. Indeed, we should make every effort mask what is in effect our fall-back position on this point, and should not acquiesce in increase East German police authority beyond that already exercised until transfer actually occurs.

I shall keep in mind, in any further talks with Gromyko, your suggestion for raising with him the maintenance of normal access conditions.

Rusk

Washington, October 3, 1961.

SUBJECT
Soviet position on Germany and Berlin as indicated by Gromyko

It can be deduced from the three conversations which you have held with Gromyko that the Soviet Government is thinking along the lines of an agreement on the question of Germany and Berlin. This position can only be deduced and is admittedly a somewhat optimistic reading of the evidence and contains a number of aspects of the problem which will require further clarification and elaboration before any definite conclusion could be reached. A few remarks about general Soviet attitude in this connection might well be in order.

It is at least a tenable thesis that Khrushchev's purpose in accentuating the crisis over Berlin and Germany was based in part, at least, on his belief that only through some shock treatment would the Western Powers be brought to consider seriously the problems of Germany and Berlin. It was, in all probability, never his intention that this shock treatment would lead to such acceleration of tension that war was a distinct possibility. There is considerable evidence to indicate that Khrushchev made a major misjudgment, particularly in regard to the reaction of the United States, and, to a somewhat lesser extent, of the European reaction to his shock treatment. He was undoubtedly surprised and angered by the actions of the United States, as expressed in the President's July twenty-fifth speech.

After a series of militant and belligerent utterances which followed the President's speech in early August, it seems very likely that the Soviet Government came to realize that continuance on the same path was extremely dangerous and might well lead to general war. Accordingly, since the end of August there has been a noticeable softening of the Soviet line and a number of indications of a desire to find some acceptable, peaceful solution of the problem.

The sealing-off of Berlin on August thirteenth and subsequent Soviet positions in regard to the immediate Berlin situation would seem to have been motivated largely by local situations (i.e., surge of refugees) and certain Soviet moves as part of the war of nerves and, in part, Soviet riposte to the Vice President's visit and the reinforcement of the Berlin garrison by fifteen hundred men (i.e., Soviet notes threatening action in regard to the air traffic to Berlin). However, leaving these local actions aside, despite their immediate importance, there has been since the beginning of September a noticeable softening of the Soviet line, and all Soviet public utterances as well as private conversations that Khrushchev has had with visitors since this date have stressed the possibilities of negotiation rather than the militant threats of a Soviet intention to force upon the West a Soviet-dictated solution. (The Soviet resumption of tests, although in timing related to German crisis, was basically done for military reasons.)

This change may merely be one of tactics, and may be followed at the Party Congress by resumption of the hard militant line. It is noticeable, however, that no serious attempt has been made either in the talks you have had with Gromyko or in any of the conversations which Khrushchev has had with Western visitors to attempt to exercise any pressure on the Western Powers in regard to our measures of military preparations. It is therefore a possible conclusion that the Soviet Union is genuinely seeking a peaceful solution of the present crisis through the mechanism of discussion and negotiation rather than threat and demand. This form of variation of pressures is a classic Bolshevik method and it should be noted as merely an intimation of willingness to reduce original demands, which is not concessions in any sense of the word. Following this tactic, the Soviet Government will continue to attempt during this process to obtain the largest satisfaction of its original position, modified only by the necessity of avoiding war.

Against the foregoing background, it would appear from your conversations with Gromyko that the Soviet Union is tentatively offering the following solution of the problem of Berlin and Germany, which, in essence, involves concessions by the Western Powers in regard to certain all-German matters in return for a Soviet agreement on Berlin which apparently is to be worked out with the USSR for incorporation either in the peace treaty between the Soviet Union and the GDR or, possibly, a "separate" arrangement. The Western concessions in the all-German field are as follows:

1. Recognition of the German frontiers to include the demarcation line between the two Germanys,

2. Respect for the sovereignty of the GDR,

3. Prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons and of transfer of such weapons to West Germany, and

4. Status of a free city of West Berlin.

In return for this, the Soviet Government is offering an arrangement in regard to the status of West Berlin as a free city with agreed guarantees as to access. There are many questions that require clarification before these intimations could form a basis of serious negotiations with the Soviet Union. In respect to the arrangement for West Berlin, these are:

1. Would this arrangement be negotiated directly with the Soviet Union without the direct participation of the GDR?

2. What would be the actual content of such an arrangement assuming it would be negotiated directly with the Soviet Union? Would it constitute a spelling-out of existing arrangements, in particular in regard to civilian air traffic, or would the Soviets insist upon a completely new agreement taking account of "the sovereignty of the GDR?" Would it attempt to include certain prohibitions on the life of West Berlin, or would it leave the current situation there unchanged?

3. Would the agreement be included in the Soviet-GDR peace treaty as obligations between the Soviet Union and the GDR or would it be a separate Four Power arrangement accepted and possibly adhered to by the GDR?

In regard to the Western concessions on Germany, the following points should be elaborated:

1. In what form would the recognition of German borders take place? Would a declaration not to use force in regard to these borders be sufficient? Could a distinction be made between the actual frontiers of Germany and the demarcation line between them?

2. What is meant by "respect for the sovereignty of the GDR?" Would this require direct dealings with officials of that regime in the handling of the implementation of the agreement on access, and in what capacity would they act? Gromyko has intimated that this does not involve any form of recognition.

3. Would a reiteration of the existing limitations on West Germany as regard to nuclear weapons be sufficient or does the Soviet Union envisage some new quadripartite agreement on this point?

4. Would the status of a free city of West Berlin involve any impairment or limitation on the present freedom of activity in that city?

It is extremely important that these and other questions be thoroughly clarified with the Soviet Government before the conclusion can be reached that there is any basis for formal negotiations. They might well be asked of Mr. Gromyko by the President, or possibly preferably by the Secretary, during Gromyko's visit to Washington, and I would venture to recommend that these questions should be phrased in such a manner as to make it plain to Mr. Gromyko that we are not disposed to accept any diminution in existing rights, both in regard to the freedom of the city of West Berlin and a guaranteed access, which the West and the West Berliners now have. In fact, my reading of the shift in Soviet position, backed up by the Intelligence conclusions on Soviet capability, reveals a large area of bluff in the public Soviet stand on Germany and Berlin, and that while if pressed too hard they might go through with their announced intentions, there is still a very large area of Soviet give which must be fully exploited. The essential difficulty in any negotiated settlement with the Soviet Union is that, in effect, the Western Powers will be asked to make what appear to American and world opinion to be genuine concessions in return for a maintenance of the status quo. It is therefore essential that our position in Berlin and the rights of the West Berliners would be somewhat improved in any agreement if we were to avoid dangerous and possibly disastrous psychological consequences.

Note: This paper has omitted entirely the question of the preservation of the occupation statute. In the conversations with Gromyko there was no reference to our intention of preserving this statute, and the Soviets appear to be quite adamant on this point.

Washington, October 4, 1961, 9:27 p.m.

469. Bonn for Ambassador. For Clay from Rusk. Ref. Berlin's 640./2/ Question of importance our access to East Berlin is one which deserves and has received most careful consideration. It is not vital interest for which we would fight, as we have defined such interests. However it is clearly important element in our relations with Soviets on Berlin issue. Denial of such access is one of last significant encroachments on our position we can permit. Our reaction to attempt at closing crossing point must therefore be such as to make clear to Soviets they approaching very close to point of great danger. Moreover, as you point out, access to East Berlin is of negotiating value and should be preserved if at all possible for this purpose.

On the other hand, as you also note, we have troublesome problem of not committing ourselves so heavily that ultimate acquiescence in closing is interpreted as serious defeat.

Policy we have devised for dealing with situation is best resolution we can see for this dilemma. In approving this policy, including specifically decision not to use force in removing barrier, President had before him above considerations including substantially same argumentation you advance. A principal factor in our reluctance to use force in this manner is problem of followup after barrier destroyed. Our study has led us believe likelihood embarrassment to Allies, in absence willingness enter into combat on issue, greater than that of discomfiture to communists. You have not pursued in your message question of dealing with situations likely to face us after barrier removed forcibly. Since this is a key factor, any thought you might have on it would be welcome.

Regarding method protest you suggest as alternative, this seems reasonable in any case and we suggest it be discussed among Commandants in review we have asked them undertake of general question countermeasures for harassment in Berlin (Deptel 417)./3/

Rusk

Washington, October 6, 1961, 5 p.m.

SUBJECT
Germany and Berlin

PARTICIPANTS

United States
The President
The Secretary
Mr. Kohler—EUR
Mr. Akalovsky--D/P (interpreting)

U.S.S.R.
Foreign Minister Gromyko
Ambassador Menshikov
Mr. Semenov
Mr. Sukhodrev (interpreter)

The President opened the conversation by welcoming Mr. Gromyko back in Washington and by saying that he appreciated the fact that Mr. Gromyko and the Secretary had met on several occasions and had had useful talks. He said it was important to determine the meaning of the respective positions of the two sides. Statements by both sides had to be translated into the other language, and, at least in the beginning of the talks, it was never precise what each side exactly meant. The President said that he hoped that over the next few days the U.S. would consult with its Allies, just as Mr. Gromyko had indicated that the Soviet Union also had Allies and consulted with them. The talks could then perhaps be resumed in Moscow by Ambassador Thompson, who is now coming to Washington, but who would then return to Moscow in the hope to meet with Mr. Gromyko and perhaps Mr. Khrushchev. The President stressed that what was of interest to him in Mr. Gromyko's talks with the Secretary was this question of definition. The U.S. is speaking of Western presence in Berlin, of its rights of access to that city, and of the viability of that city. On the other hand, the Soviet Union has been speaking about the freedom of West Berlin, of guaranteed access to that city, of respect for the sovereignty of the GDR, and of the general matter of frontiers. The problem now is to analyze with our Allies these words in more precise terms, so as to see what assurance there is that our present rights would be maintained and to get a clearer meaning of these terms freedom and guaranteed access. Thus, it would be helpful if Mr. Gromyko could say how the freedom of West Berlin would be guaranteed and how access could be assured jointly in a satisfactory manner. Likewise, it would be helpful if Mr. Gromyko could clarify what he means when he says that the U.S. should respect the sovereignty of the GDR.

Mr. Gromyko said that in view of the fact that he had something to say he would like first to inquire, for the purpose of orientation, how much time the President could allot for this meeting.

The President replied that he was free until six or seven, whatever was useful.

Mr. Gromyko then said that he had certain considerations to voice on the part of the Soviet Government in development of and in addition to the Soviet position as discussed in his talks with the Secretary. He said he wanted to state the Soviet position in principle as well as on the specific questions the President had touched upon. Reading from a prepared text, he went on to say that the U.S. Government and the President personally are aware of what guides the Soviet Government when it advocates a prompt solution of the question of a German peace treaty and of normalizing the West Berlin situation on the basis of such a treaty. As Mr. Khrushchev had told the President in Vienna, the Soviet Government is convinced that the fact that World War II had occurred cannot be escaped. That war had indeed taken place and the problems remaining after it require solution. Sixteen years have passed since the end of the war and the unsettled state of war causes increased tensions in Europe, and not only in Europe, but also throughout the world at large. This situation will remain unchanged until all participants in the World War II anti-Hitler coalition have recognized and formalized the results of World War II. The peoples of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. had fought shoulder to shoulder in the war and should now jointly write finis to World War II. The Soviet Government attaches great importance to the conclusion of a German peace treaty. If the U.S. does not find it possible to take part in a peace conference, the Soviet Union will call a peace conference and conclude a peace treaty without U.S. participation. However, Mr. Gromyko said, he wished to emphasize that the Soviet Government's choice No. 1 is the conclusion of a joint treaty. At the same time, it does not wish the signing of a peace treaty with the GDR, without U.S. participation, to lead to an aggravation of its relations with U.S. and this also applies to the West Berlin problem. Therefore, as had been stressed in the conversations with the Secretary, the Soviet Government is prepared to work out jointly and before a peace treaty is signed the status for a free city of West Berlin and to reach an understanding on other questions relating to the normalization of the situation in West Berlin. The Soviet Government proceeds on the premise that such an understanding would be reflected in the peace treaty, which would have been signed between the U.S.S.R. and the GDR, or that it would be formalized in special documents appended to the peace treaty. These are the two alternative possibilities. Thus agreement with respect to West Berlin would acquire international authority from the standpoint of scope and would also acquire legal recognition on the part of the states which would have signed one or two peace treaties. The Soviet Government is concerned about finding common language with the states which had fought together in the World War II anti-Hitler coalition. Frequently the U.S. makes statements to the effect that any solution should not affect its or its Allies prestige. The Soviet Union is seeking such a solution, but it cannot injure its own prestige or that of its Allies.

Mr. Gromyko continued by saying that in the eyes of world public opinion both sides are deeply involved in this question of a German peace treaty. Therefore, the Soviet Government believes that the best thing to do is to see a way out of this situation on the basis of compromise. That is precisely the kind of solution the Soviet Government is now proposing. It is not difficult to see that a separate agreement on West Berlin would benefit the West more than the U.S.S.R. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union is prepared to have such a separate agreement, and is stating that quite formally.

The Soviet Government does not wish to follow the example of the U.S., where the latter had signed a peace treaty with Japan without the Soviet Union and counter to Soviet interests. At that time the U.S. simply signed the treaty and stated that Soviet rights were terminated. The U.S. disregarded Soviet interests and the Soviet Union was unilaterally deprived of its rights to which it was entitled on the basis of international agreements. Incidentally, the Japanese Peace Treaty is another example of the fact that a peace treaty means that there can be no occupation rights.

The President interjected at this point that Secretary Rusk was the only one present who had had to do with the Japanese Peace Treaty.

The Secretary, indicating his disagreement with Mr. Gromyko's remarks, said this was a question which might take two hours to discuss with him.

Mr. Gromyko then referred to the question of the timing for the signing of a German peace treaty and said he wished to state that the Soviet Government sees no fatal date in this respect. This had been communicated by Mr. Khrushchev in his conversation with Mr. Spaak./2/ If negotiations start all parties will be obliged to do their utmost to have the negotiations take place in the best possible atmosphere and lead to the best solution contributing to consolidation of peace. For its part, the Soviet Union would act in this manner. It is natural, however, that negotiations must not be artificially protracted. Nor should the solution of this problem be delayed.

Of course if the U.S. declines to participate in the signing of a German peace treaty, then in addition to the solution of the West Berlin problem an understanding would have to be reached on other questions important to peace and European security. Some such questions had been mentioned by the Secretary, but the Soviet Union had been placing particular stress on them. Mr. Gromyko clarified that what he had in mind was: 1) legal formalization of German borders as they now exist; and 2) non-transfer to the two Germanies of nuclear and rocket weapons, as well as prohibition of the manufacture of such weapons in the two states. Mr. Gromyko stated that the Soviet Government placed utmost emphasis on this question. As to the question of borders, states must take a clear-cut and unequivocal position on this question so as to deprive West German revanchists of any hope for possible revision of the borders. The Soviet Government sees no reason why the great powers should not make their position on the question of borders, including the border between West Germany and the GDR, absolutely clear and formal, whatever their attitude on the question of a peace treaty. As far as the question of preventing nuclear and rocket weapons from being transferred to, or manufactured by, the two German states, is concerned, it appears that the President's proposal at the 16th General Assembly and the Secretary's remarks on September 30--at the third meeting/3/--provide for a possibility of reaching an understanding on this problem. It is in the interests of both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. not to speak of the smaller states in Europe, to prevent the two Germanies from acquiring nuclear and rocket weapons.

Mr. Gromyko then said that the Soviet Union also hoped to meet with understanding on the part of the U.S. Government in other matters he had mentioned to the Secretary. He also expressed hope that the U.S. Government, like the Soviet Government, is serious with respect to these problems.

Mr. Gromyko continued that the Soviet Government believes that an agreement on a free city of West Berlin should provide for strict guarantees with regard to the observance of the city's status and to non-interference in its internal affairs. He also said that he was not sure that the West, including the U.S., completely and accurately understood the Soviet position in this matter. Therefore, he wished to reiterate that the Soviet Government had always advocated the strictest guarantees to ensure the status of a free city of West Berlin. The U.S. Government is aware of the Soviet proposals concerning guarantees, namely, that token contingents of the Four Powers--the U.S.S.R., the U.S., France, and the U.K.--be stationed in West Berlin. In proposing a solution of this problem on the basis of stationing token contingents, the Soviet Union is making that suggestion, not on the basis that such contingents would constitute a military factor, but as a political solution of the problem. Mr. Khrushchev had talked about this aspect of the problem in his meeting with the President in Vienna. Such a political solution should be acceptable to both sides as a way out and it would not affect U.S. prestige. Other conceivable alternatives could be the stationing in West Berlin of neutral troops or of UN troops.

Mr. Gromyko then said that in view of the desire expressed by the Western powers that these guarantees be given not only under a peace treaty, but should be specifically reinforced by the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union is prepared to assume such responsibility. Of course, that should not prejudice the rights of the GDR and should not be detrimental to the interests of any country, be it a Soviet or U.S. Ally. Taking this into account, the Soviet Government believes that the objective of ensuring the rights and the interests of a free city of West Berlin would be best served by a status guaranteed by the four great powers, i.e., by stationing specified contingents of troops of the Four Powers in West Berlin. Naturally, such contingents would be stationed there for a specified period of time. The Soviet Government believes that this is the best solution. In spite of its efforts the Soviet Government has been unable to find another, better solution. The Soviet Government has weighed the situation and has come to the conclusion that this solution is the best one possible. If Four Power contingents are stationed in Berlin and if there is agreement on this question, then the U.S.S.R. would have the same role of guarantor as the Western powers. Such a solution would be understood both by U.S. Allies and by Soviet Allies. It would not prejudice the interests of the U.S., the U.S.S.R., or their respective Allies, including the GDR. Of course, token contingents should not be regarded as occupation troops and should not carry out any occupation functions.

Turning to the question of access, Mr. Gromyko stated that the Soviet Government does not intend to establish any restrictions on West Berlin's ties with the outside world or on access to West Berlin--by land, water, and air--for any outside state. The only thing the Soviet Union proposes is that the procedure for the exercise of such ties and the use of communications running through the GDR be the same as that applied in any other state, whether socialist or capitalist. There should be no discrimination against the GDR. Even today most passenger and commercial freight traffic to and from West Berlin runs by agreement with the GDR and this creates no difficulties for or interference with West Berlin's ties with the outside world.

Mr. Gromyko then said he wished to state what the Soviet Union could not agree to. First, the Soviet Union could not agree to any claims tendered by the FRG to West Berlin. Some West German figures have been making statements to that effect, but such statements are totally unfounded and the Soviet Union rejects them resolutely. The Soviet Union is firmly convinced that such claims have no legal grounds and that West Germany has no relation to West Berlin. Since West Germany has no legal relation to West Berlin, all ties between the FRG and West Berlin must be on the same basis as with any other sovereign state, whether such state is recognized de jure or de facto or not at all.

Referring to his talks with the Secretary, Mr. Gromyko then said that it appeared that the U.S. Government believed the Soviet proposals to provide too narrow a framework for negotiations and would wish that framework to be expanded through inclusion of certain questions pertaining to European security. The Soviet Government could agree to this, but it is not clear as to what questions, apart from a German peace treaty, the U.S. would like to consider in negotiations. True, the Secretary had made hints as to the general trend in which the U.S. believed our thinking should go, but no specific questions had been listed or formulated. On its part, the Soviet Government could name several questions aimed at strengthening European security. First, a non-aggression pact between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries could be meaningfully discussed. It is quite clear that so long as relations between the two opposing military groupings are not channeled into a calm river bed, there can be no strengthening of European security. Secondly, it would be of great significance, for the cause of an international détente, if an understanding were reached to eliminate foreign military bases on the soil of other states. Third, withdrawal or at least reduction of foreign troops stationed in the territories of NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. Agreement on this question would be regarded as a proof of the desire of these countries to establish a peace-time situation in Europe. Fourth, it would be very useful for the purpose of strengthening European security if, to start, agreement could be reached on an outline for a withdrawal of foreign troops from foreign territories by stages. Fifth, European security would be protected best of all from aggression if German militarism were prevented from developing, with Western assistance, a powerful army equipped with modern weapons. Of course under the present conditions the GDR must also strengthen its forces to ensure its security. It would be far more useful for the cause of peace if the FRG and the GDR were to have only militia armed with small arms for the purpose of maintaining internal order. Sixth, the Soviet Government believes that it would be useful to delineate a geographic zone in Europe, including both German states, in which no state would be permitted to deploy or manufacture nuclear and rocket weapons. The proposal of the Polish Government on this subject is well known, but until this day our two Governments have not discussed this question seriously. The zone would include the Polish People's Republic, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the GDR, and the FRG. The Soviet Government firmly believes that agreement on this question would have the most positive effect not only in Europe but also throughout the world. Thus life itself brings up a number of questions related to European security, and the Soviet Government advocates their promptest solution. However, it would be incorrect to tie all these questions in one knot or package, and it was this point, Mr. Gromyko said, that he had tried to impress on the Secretary. The Soviet Government believes that it would be better to solve these questions in stages, with main attention being given to the questions that are most important and which are capable of being resolved without delay. Such a question is that of writing finis to World War II by signing a German peace treaty and settling on that basis the status of West Berlin. Then, at the second stage, other questions could be resolved. This is the sequence the Soviet Government believes to be proper. However, if the West cannot accept such a sequence and insists on an inter-related discussion of the German problem and the questions of European security, the Soviet Union could agree to a discussion of a German peace treaty and of such European security problems as lend themselves to a prompt solution, namely: 1) conclusion of a non-aggression pact between NATO and Warsaw Pact members; and 2) agreement to prevent transfer to both Germanies of nuclear and rocket weapons and manufacture of such weapons in the FRG and the GDR. It is quite evident that it would be much more difficult to reach agreement on other issues related to European security. Those issues are more involved and would require more time, and the Soviet Government firmly believes they should not be linked to the question of a German peace treaty and of normalizing the situation of West Berlin on the basis of such a treaty.

Mr. Gromyko then turned to the question of the future course with regard to the exchange of views and to negotiations. He noted that as of now a bi-lateral exchange of views between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. is taking place. However, the Soviet Union does not object in principle to a Four-Power conference, which would consider the question of a German peace treaty and normalization on that basis of the West Berlin situation, as well as questions of European security. At the same time, however, the Soviet Union believes that the bi-lateral exchange of views between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., which has already begun, is extremely useful. Mr. Gromyko then said he understood the President to say that he wished this bi-lateral exchange of views to continue. If this understanding is correct, then the President's wish corresponds to the desires of the Soviet Government and of Mr. Khrushchev personally.

Mr. Gromyko concluded by saying that by concluding a German peace treaty, whether on the basis of joint action or of the signing of a peace treaty with the GDR only by certain states, including the U.S.S.R., the Soviet Union wishes to clear the road for an improvement in U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations and for peaceful co-existence between states irrespective of their social systems. He said that on behalf of the Soviet Government and of Mr. Khrushchev personally he wished to express the hope that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R would succeed, by joint effort, in overcoming in the interest of peace the existing difficulties and in resolving the questions which had been brought about by life itself and which are preoccupying the peoples of the U.S., of the U.S.S.R., of their Allies, and throughout the world. He said he had attempted to clarify the general Soviet position on the question of a German peace treaty and also to reply to specific questions that the President had raised. He said he did not know what the President's reaction would be and reiterated that he had attempted to cover the points the President had referred to at the beginning of the conversation.

The President thanked Mr. Gromyko for outlining his views and stated that as far as future course was concerned he believed bi-lateral discussions would be valuable from the standpoint of our attempting to secure precise definitions of U.S. and Soviet positions. Mr. Gromyko had clarified the views of the Soviet Government today and after we have considered this statement and after Ambassador Thompson returns to Moscow, we could proceed with bi-lateral discussions. Then we could continue on a quadripartite basis because the U.K. and the French are involved in this matter. Mr. Gromyko had said that the Soviet Government had Allies whose interests are involved. The President expressed appreciation for Mr. Gromyko's reference to "compromise" and said that he understood that this word was the same in both Russian and English. However, the meaning of the word in Latin is that both sides are first, i.e., that neither side is lessened by agreement. It is in this spirit that the U.S. approaches the U.S.S.R. The President then said that he wished to say how he understood the Soviet proposal. First, our view on the Berlin question is that as a result of agreements reached at the end of World War II we have a status in Berlin, a status which has been exercised for the most part in West Berlin, and with that status go our rights of access. If both sides should come to agreement--and, the President said, he hoped they would--then the U.S. would wish to make sure that its position is not lessened. On the contrary, it would hope that both sides would come out with improved positions and that they would emerge from that agreement on the basis of equality. This is what we regard as a compromise. The President went on to say that what made it difficult for him to believe that the Soviet proposal was a compromise was Mr. Gromyko's statement that, while the Soviet Union was willing to protect the status of West Berlin in an agreement, in the event that the U.S. did not sign a peace treaty, it proposed that it be done by stationing Soviet troops on an equal basis with Western troops, not in East Berlin, but in West Berlin, which is our responsibility. Thus after turning over East Berlin to East Germany, the Soviet Union wishes to acquire equal status in West Berlin. Furthermore, the Soviet Union proposes that the stationing of these token contingents be only for a certain period of time. So, as a result of such a "compromise" U.S. position would be diminished because: 1) our rights would be negotiated rights, and what is more serious and important; 2) we would share our rights in West Berlin with the Soviet Union; and 3) our rights would be there only for a limited period of time. Thus, at some distance there would have to be new negotiations for new rights. In the light of all this, our rights would be lessened rather than improved. Nothing in the Soviet proposal suggests that our access would be strengthened and would not be exposed to hazards and dangers.

The President then stated that, as he understood these "concessions," the Soviet Union seemed to be prepared to make them to us in return for our willingness to make at least a decision on the following questions: 1) acceptance of the boundaries of the two Germanies, i.e., the Eastern boundary and the boundary between the two zones; thus, this would establish in effect (a) a line for all of Germany on a basis that is different from what we had adhered to so far; in other words, that would be a concession on our part; and (b) respect for the division between the zones, a degree of status of the two Germanies, and the concept of the sovereignty of East Germany; 2) abandonment by West Germany of all claims to East Germany, which is tantamount to abandonment of the concept of a reunited or unified Germany. In addition, Mr. Gromyko had mentioned the question of nuclear weapons, etc. Thus at least three changes are required in the concepts the U.S. has been holding so far. The President stressed that in his view this was not a compromise, but rather meant trading an apple for an orchard. It would result in a decline of our position in West Berlin and would require our acceptance of other changes which are in the interest of the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Union wishes us to accept all this without accepting on its part our rights and interests. That, the President stressed, would be not a compromise but a retreat.

The President then observed that of course it would be impossible to settle this matter this afternoon. However, it is important that we discuss these matters with our Allies, so that Ambassador Thompson could then have a further exchange of views. The President said he recognized, and he was sure Mr. Gromyko recognized too, that there was no desire to protract these discussions month after month. We should move with dispatch and attempt to obtain the most precise definitions we can as to what kind of agreement and what kind of guarantees are being talked about.

Referring to Mr. Gromyko's remark that the Soviet Union is prepared to guarantee the status of West Berlin if agreement is reached on such status, the President said that the stationing of token Soviet troops is not a militarily vital issue; what we are interested in is the freedom of West Berlin. This is not a military matter and Berlin is not a military outpost. The President then reiterated his belief that bi-lateral discussions are important and said that a number of questions could be clarified in the course of such discussions, e.g., how access to Berlin could be guaranteed more satisfactorily than it is today, and noted that perhaps Soviet interests could also be advanced in certain areas. If bi-lateral discussions prove to be useful, and the U.S. hopes that they will be, we could then move to a Four-Power discussion so that eventually all of them could express their views at the same time.

Mr. Gromyko replied that he wanted to comment on what the President had said. He stated that the Soviet Government believed the proposals he had outlined to the President to be a compromise acceptable to both sides. These proposals are a way out for both sides and they do not infringe upon their prestige. Mr. Gromyko reiterated that the Soviet Government did not believe these proposals affected U.S. prestige by one iota. Nor did they affect the prestige of the U.S.S.R., which--as Mr. Khrushchev had stated in Vienna--does not need West Berlin.

Mr. Gromyko went on to say that on the basis of repeated statements by the U.S. and the other Western powers, it appeared that the Western powers were primarily interested in preserving the existing social system in West Berlin, or what the West called freedom of that city, and also in preserving freedom of access to West Berlin. The Soviet Government has given a positive reply on both of these important issues. Therefore it is difficult to understand why the U.S. or the other Western powers should not be satisfied. The Soviet Government has given a positive reply with respect to guarantees concerning the status of the free city of West Berlin, i.e., preservation of the existing social system or, to use Western terminology, the freedom of that city. As to access, the Soviet Union is prepared to reach agreement on freedom of access by land, water, and air. Thus the Soviet Union is prepared to reach an understanding on these two cardinal points.

The President said he appreciated this and noted that this was why definitions were important. Mr. Gromyko had said that the Soviet Government is prepared to guarantee the freedom of West Berlin and free access to that city. These are important points and if this is our objective, then the problem is to determine the exact meaning of how we propose to achieve it. Referring again to the question of guarantees, the President said that the stationing of Soviet troops in West Berlin was not a military or political necessity. As to guarantees with respect to access, that should be explored further in later discussions. Thus if our objective is the same and if we recognize that West Berlin is in an extraordinary geographic position, it is very important to have further, more detailed discussions.

The President then remarked that he had to leave soon for the State dinner given by the President of Sudan. However, he wished to make a few comments on the problem of Laos. (See separate memorandum of conversation.)/4/

Mr. Gromyko referred to the President's statement to the effect that he believed the U.S. would lose in three areas as a result of the Soviet proposal on Berlin. Mr. Gromyko said that such an appraisal was not correct and that the Soviet Union was deeply convinced that the U.S. would lose nothing.

The President interjected that he had actually listed five points on which our position would be changed and lessened if we accepted the Soviet proposal. These points are: 1) time limit on our rights; 2) stationing of Soviet troops in West Berlin; 3) recognition of Germany's frontiers; 4) recognition of the division between East and West Germany; and 5) abandonment by West Germany of the concept of a united Germany. This, the President stated, caused concern to us.

Mr. Gromyko went on to say that on the two points the Western powers had always emphasized the Soviet Government had given a positive reply, namely, on the question of: 1) guarantees with respect to the status of West Berlin and to the social system elected by the population of that city; and 2) guaranteed access. This is a positive reply which should be appreciated, but the President failed to pay due attention to it.

As to the question of Soviet token contingents, Mr. Gromyko said this was a way out of the problem. It had been the U.S. which had raised the question of Soviet guarantees with respect to the freedom of West Berlin, and this is a solution of that problem. The President had said that no military factor was involved in this matter and the Soviet Union had said the same. The presence of token contingents from the Four Powers is a political solution and it is a way for the Soviet Union to take responsibility on its shoulders. As to the question of time limit (on a West Berlin arrangement), Mr. Gromyko stated that if agreement could be reached now on the general status of West Berlin and on access to that city, then he believed that the great powers, including the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., would be able to reach agreement in the future as well. Referring to the question of borders, Mr. Gromyko said that the Soviet Union believed our respective positions on this question, to which the Soviet Government attaches great significance, to be close. The Soviet Government believes that it should not be difficult to reach an understanding on this problem.

The President stated there was no need to say that the difficulty lay in the geographic location of that city. Both President Eisenhower and Mr. Khrushchev had called this situation abnormal, but neither Mr. Khrushchev nor he, President Kennedy, had made the decision on this matter in 1945. The erection of the wall in Berlin has caused alarm in the city and, therefore, the question is how we can ensure the viability of West Berlin with all the problems and tensions surrounding it and how we can make sure that access to that city will be free. If the U.S. is to participate in an agreement, it believes it important that there be real guarantees so that the city will not become a shell in three or four months. The President expressed the hope that both sides were in agreement on this question of freedoms. He said that now we should see how this objective could be achieved and then we could examine the question of boundaries.

At the end of the conversation Mr. Gromyko sought to speak alone with the President, and the two went out on the terrace for about ten minutes. After Gromyko's departure the President reported that their private conversation had not reflected anything substantially different on either side than what had been said at the meeting. Gromyko had taken the line of stressing the importance of agreement between the United States and the U.S.S.R., reiterating his version of the Soviet "concessions" designed to facilitate this result. The President had replied also along the lines of his previous remarks, emphasizing that the Soviet Government could not expect the United States to come to an understanding which would obviously be regarded as a major setback. In this connection he cited particularly the unacceptability of the Soviet proposal to station "token" Soviet forces in West Berlin.

The meeting ended at 7:00 P.M./5/