Washington, August 26, 1961.

SUBJECT
Berlin

PARTICIPANTS
German Ambassador Wilhelm G. Grewe
The Secretary
Assistant Secretary Foy D. Kohler
Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand, GER

Ambassador Grewe saw the Secretary just prior to his departure for Bonn, and again stressed the anxiety of his Government that something further be done to assist West Berlin and West German morale. He also said he would stress urgently in Bonn the need for accelerated German military build-up despite the electoral campaign. The Ambassador indicated that some thought had been given in Bonn to advancing the elections to September 3 but this had proved technically impossible.

In considering what might further be done along the lines of the Vice-President's visit to Berlin and the US garrison increase, the Federal Government had thought of the possibility of a bilateral exchange of messages between the President and the Chancellor. The Federal Republic would much appreciate some gesture of this kind in the near future.

The Secretary said we would give thought to this problem, the solution to which must start from a clear concept of what the Berlin morale question is about. Unfortunately the West Berliners seemed to have focused on the situation in East Berlin and were tending to permit this to undermine those important components of West Berlin morale to which the West is completely committed. Ambassador Grewe indicated that one of the facts specifically weakening morale in Berlin and the Federal Republic was the fear that a too precise definition of Western vital interests which might warrant military action could undermine the essential basis of West Berlin by providing a dangerous area for Soviet nibbling. The West Berliners could not distinguish between Western acceptance of the closing of sector borders and other rights which we had also stressed. The Secretary commented that stress on vital interests over which we would be prepared to fight obviously did not mean abandonment of the broad range of other political objectives which the West would continue to seek but which we could not realistically expect to be achieved in practice under present circumstances. The Federal Republic obviously also had an important role to play in the maintenance of Berlin morale. The Ambassador indicated that Chancellor Adenauer had just written a dozen letters to the heads of governments of the uncommitted nations stating the Western case on Berlin./2/ The Germans had also given thought to the preparatory action regarding UN countries which the West might take in advance of the UNGA session on September 17 and would be putting a paper on this subject into the Ambassadorial Group.

The Secretary stressed the problem of timing in regard to any possible Adenauer intervention with de Gaulle in order to obtain French concurrence to the operative paragraph on negotiations contained in the proposed reply to the Soviet note of August 3. Perhaps the Chancellor could make a telephone call to de Gaulle. If the weekend passed and the French were unwilling to accept tripartitely this agreed language, we would have to think of doing something ourselves. One possibility was to put the draft before NATO as a US text and to say we were prepared to take the initiative at UNGA in approaching the Soviets along the lines indicated, thus bypassing the French.

Ambassador Grewe said one problem in an approach by the Chancellor was that he might get the same reply from de Gaulle that Alphand had given him (Grewe) yesterday to the effect that, if the Germans favor negotiations, do they know where they will lead. While this was not the proper stage at which to define a new negotiating position, the Chancellor must have some idea of what the West has in mind in initiating negotiations. The Secretary observed there was time to work this out before the UNGA. He thought it important to say that the broad policies of the West on these matters, based on our strategic commitments, agreements and obligations of the Soviets, and our definition of our vital interests, were pretty well established. What was involved in formulating a negotiating position was more than a question of detail. As the Secretary had stated to the North Atlantic Council early this month,/3/ Khrushchev had made certain unacceptable proposals. The West would presumably counter these with proposals that would be unacceptable to Khrushchev. Talks would go on for a while and the question would then become one of what both sides would do in the face of de facto disagreement in lieu of war. The Secretary thought that our offering to provide a peaceful solution to the problem of Central Europe was important in gaining support for reasonableness of our position. It would help to take away from Khrushchev the advantage he is getting from reiteration of such phrases as "peace treaty", "free city" and "guaranteed access". The Secretary said he did not believe it to be true as de Gaulle suggests, that if we look to negotiations we are acting in the dark. The Allies have been working together for fifteen years. While more was required than merely dusting off the Western Peace Plan, we had in mind no major shifts in the direction of our policies. We have frankly tried to stay away from the details of our negotiating position, partly because of the leak problem.

Ambassador Grewe mentioned that the difficulty in Germany was that prominent American columnists frequently reported what they alleged to be authorized thinking of the U.S. Administration. These added up to a comprehensive catalog of concessions which the U.S. reportedly was prepared to make regarding Berlin, the recognition of the GDR, and European security arrangements. It would be helpful if the Presidential message to the Chancellor, referred to previously, could provide a basis to fight this kind of speculative reporting, for example, by saying something to the effect that the 1954 Paris Agreements/4/ were still the basis of U.S. policy. The Secretary said we would consider this, but he did not believe the U.S. should be forced, in effect, to put forward our negotiating position on the basis of newspaper speculation which could not be based on facts. Somewhat facetiously, he added that two things we could not say were that these speculations were not true because we had no thoughts on the subject or that the Federal Republic had gone further towards de facto recognition of the GDR than any other country. Ambassador Grewe commented with respect to the last point that the situation was somewhat different since this was essentially an internal matter of Germans dealing with Germans.

In response to the Secretary's query, Ambassador Grewe said he had received the impression that Khrushchev had definitely speeded up his time-table during the past eight to ten days. However, Ulbricht's speech yesterday/5/ may have been the signal that the process may now be somewhat slowed down. (The German Embassy later telephoned to say that further analysis of the text of Ulbricht's speech indicated this judgment to be overly optimistic.)

Paris, August 26, 1961.

Dear Mr. President: I have carefully reflected on the contents of your message of August 25 [24]./2/ Let me tell you, first of all, that I was not surprised by it. Various reasons, which are those of the United States, make me, indeed, well understand the attitude to which you have been brought in the crisis created by the Soviets concerning Berlin.

You emphasize how much you are concerned with seeking the approval of the States "of the third world", that of the participants in the coming conference at Belgrade, that of certain sections of American public opinion, and that of the average NATO members. However, these various elements, whose opinion is certainly not without importance but who for the most part have already made up their minds, and you know in what way, do not bear real responsibilities in the question which faces the United States, Great Britain, and France. You indicate that you have thus been led, while strengthening your military means of defense, to contemplate for the Three to enter promptly and openly into negotiations with the Soviets, whatever be the threats that they are hurling at us and the actual acts that they are committing in violation of agreements. Moreover, it is only too clear that the geographic situation of Berlin gives them locally many advantages for pressure and action with respect to the population and the Westerners, advantages which they will certainly continue to use as open negotiations unfold. Lastly, in the situation of strength in which they are already placed one cannot see what could be the field, the basis, and the result of negotiations if not the field, the basis, and the result that the Soviets have ceaselessly proclaimed and that they would not fail to demand more and more loudly as soon as conversations were engaged in before the whole world on the subject of Berlin.

As these facts of the situation do not escape anyone, I believe that the opening of negotiations in the present circumstances would be considered immediately as a prelude to the abandonment, at least gradually, of Berlin and as a sort of notice of our surrender. I am convinced that this would be a very grave blow to our Atlantic Alliance and that the consequences as concern the possibility of approaches, then of arrangements, between Soviet Russia and a number of our allies of today would rapidly follow.

France, as you know, strongly desires that a broad and real international détente--which can only come from acts of the Soviets just as the present tension comes only from them--would permit one day the opening of objective discussions between the United States, Soviet Russia, Great Britain, and France on all the problems of the world and especially that of Germany. France will reiterate this in the note that it will address to the Government in the Kremlin in reply to the latter's note of August 3. Meanwhile, as a precaution, France is reinforcing its means of defense in Europe. But in the present state of affairs, as it has been created in Berlin by the violation of agreements, acts of violence, threats, and demands of the Soviets, France insists for its part in not engaging in the negotiations which are in fact demanded by Moscow.

As I said on August 8 to Mr. Dean Rusk,/3/ it is up to the United States, if they consider it useful, to try to induce the Soviets to define in a precise manner by the normal diplomatic channel their claims and thus to seek to determine if the elements of a positive and honorable negotiation exist. To this my government could not raise any objections. If it should appear as a result of this exploration that such a negotiation could be possible, France would undoubtedly reconsider its position. However, the reasons that I have set forth to you will make you understand, I am sure, why the French note addressed to Moscow cannot include "a proposal for the examination of the possibilities of negotiations by the foreign ministers at New York at the end of September".

I am, moreover, convinced that you will not see anything in this position which indicates the least separation of my country from yours as to their will to safeguard, together, freedom in the world and to bear, side by side, all the responsibilities that this duty imposes upon them.

With the very cordial assurance of my very high consideration,/4/

C. de Gaulle/5/

Washington, August 28, 1961.

1. I should like to have a meeting of the Berlin Steering Group this week to go over the status of our Berlin contingency planning, in order to see what has been quadripartitely agreed and what is still under discussion. Are there any gaps in our planning which need to be covered? I am particularly interested in knowing what we are doing with regard to the following situations:

a. Interference with the civil air traffic into Berlin. This is very much in my mind.

b. Contingencies arising from the partitioning of Berlin (for example, conflicts between the West Berlin population and the East German police).

c. The extension of Live Oak planning to take into account a greater reliance on conventional forces.

d. Actions to be taken in the case of an East German revolt.

2. Please let me know when you will be ready to have this meeting.

John Kennedy

Washington, August 30, 1961, noon-12:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
The President
Wilhelm G. Grewe, German Ambassador
Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary

Ambassador Grewe called on the President at the request of the German Embassy to present a letter addressed to the President by Chancellor Adenauer (translation attached)./2/ The President commented, as the Ambassador handed over the communication, that he had read about it in the press that morning in an article by New York Times correspondent Sydney Gruson from Bonn. The Ambassador protested that this was a very partial and inaccurate account, as the President would see.

After reading the letter, the President commented that he had great difficulty understanding reports of trends towards neutralism in Europe particularly in contrast to the tremendous military preparedness effort which the United States is making. He said he appreciated of course that there had been some disenchantment at the inability of the Allies to hit back vigorously after the Soviet sealing off of East Berlin. This feeling was of course shared in the United States. However, even the counter measures which had been proposed by Mayor Brandt were wholly inadequate responses. The President said he had discussed this question with Secretary Rusk this morning and was very apprehensive about possible Soviet and East German harassment of civil air access to Berlin./3/ He felt it urgent that appropriate counter measures for any such move be readied.

The Ambassador said there were some people who had not been satisfied with the Allied response and there were some criticisms of the continuance of interzonal trade despite the Soviet/GDR action. If further measures were taken against us by the other side without strong reactions there was a possibility of serious discouragement in West Berlin and the Federal Republic.

The President said he was inclined to agree with the Ambassador's remarks and with the observations in the Chancellor's letter. He asked, however, what the Germans expected in the way of Soviet moves and what they expected as counter measures. The Ambassador replied that the Federal Government felt the counter measures might be more timely and might be taken earlier with respect to a whole range of Soviet harassments which fell short of touching what we described as vital interests. The President then asked the Ambassador whether there were any differences between the Germans and others in the Ambassadorial Group. The Ambassador replied that there had been some difference with respect to the application of counter measures related to interzonal trade. At the President's request, Mr. Kohler then briefly summarized the points of view which had been expressed both in the Paris Foreign Ministers Meeting and in the subsequent Ambassadorial Group discussions, pointing out that it was generally agreed even by the Germans that this was an instrument of considerable importance not to be lightly applied, particularly since the burden of civilian traffic--which constituted 95% of the volume--would then fall on Allied military means of transport. Terminating this discussion, the Ambassador commented that the Federal Government was not complaining about this matter. The President said that he agreed that it was desirable that we be able to respond quickly to Soviet moves and not seem supine. He asked that this question of counter measures be urgently discussed in the Ambassadorial Group and pointed out that he was expecting a report on this subject tomorrow.

The Ambassador then said that the FRG was somewhat bothered by public references made to the definition of the three vital Allied interests involved in the Berlin situation and press comments along this line. He said that the FRG feared that this would constitute an invitation to the Soviets to aggress in the sectors which were not included in this definition, such as the ties between West Berlin and the FRG. The President reiterated that there should be a careful examination of all possible Soviet moves and of non-military counter measures, so that if there were a Soviet attack in non-vital areas there would be an appropriate non-vital response.

The Ambassador then commented on a passage of the Adenauer letter stating that, while the Chancellor agreed on the need for negotiations, he was somewhat worried as to whether Western initiative might not be interpreted by the Soviets as weakness. He said there were some West Germans who were reading into our readiness to negotiate a willingness to make concessions, since there was much speculation in the press and our negotiating positions were not publicly known. The President commented that this was the position of General de Gaulle. He said it was a real problem since it was clearly not desirable to try to develop negotiating positions which might be publicly speculated about before the German elections. The Ambassador said perhaps the immediate problem could be handled by having the Information Subgroup of the Ambassadorial Group consider the problem and take a more aggressive information line.

The President then told the Ambassador about his intention to appoint General Lucius Clay as his personal representative with the rank of Ambassador on temporary assignment in Berlin/4/ which he thought should help to maintain morale and confidence in Berlin and Germany. After indicating he welcomed this news, the Ambassador added that we needed more Western complaints about Soviet actions. In this connection he said the hint in the President's recent statement about self-determination in Eastern Europe had been considered valuable by the FRG./5/ His Government considered that the Soviets were both vulnerable and sensitive on this point (the President noted that he might have an opportunity to say something more on these lines at a press conference).

The President then said that there was obviously no difference of opinion between the Chancellor and himself. He did want to ask, however, the Ambassador's view as to how serious were the tendencies toward neutralism hinted at in the Gruson story. The Ambassador replied that there was some latent neutralism around, some doubt about how far the West would go and some question about whether the Chancellor's Atlantic policy had been right. For the most part these tendencies were on the part of small splinter parties which had been quiet for the past couple of years, but were now speaking up again. The President asked what they saw as an alternative. Did they want Ulbricht? As the Ambassador shook his head to indicate no, the President assured him that it is the very real purpose of the United States Government to maintain solidarity with the FRG. The United States was prepared and he felt that we were going to the brink of nuclear war. If we were willing to face this prospect, there must be good faith on both sides. This was a very serious question. The Ambassador said he could assure the President that there was no fundamental reversal of mood in the FRG. However there were the tendencies he had described and of course in an election campaign the Chancellor was particularly sensitive to them.

The President thanked the Ambassador and told him he would make an early reply to the Chancellor.

134. Editorial Note

On August 30, 1961, Thomas K. Finletter, U.S. Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in response to a request by the President, wrote him a lengthy letter on the attitude of the NATO Allies on the desirability and form of negotiations with the Soviet Union on the Berlin question. After prefacing his remarks by saying the Alliance military response had been inadequate and the first reaction to the U.S. proposals on economic countermeasures had been bad, Finletter stated that there was a universal view (except for the French) that the U.S. military buildup had not been accompanied by sufficient emphasis on the political aspects of the question. Finletter went on to describe some proposals within the Alliance on what to expect from the Soviet Union, how the West might anticipate these moves, and what might be done in the event the Soviet Union signed a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic. For text of this letter, see Declassified Documents, 1986, 1868.

Washington, August 31, 1961.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISIONS PUT TO THE PRESIDENT

The following program was presented to the President for use in the event of interruption of civil air access to West Berlin.

The Soviets may seek to accomplish this interruption in either of two ways: first, by administrative procedures or warnings or threats which would have the consequence of leading the airlines to make their own decisions not to fly, or, second, by a military act such as forcing a plane down in East Germany, which would then be followed by a decision of the civil airlines to stop flying. It was the recommendation to the President that in the former case we should move to military transport without fighter escort, and in the latter case we should move to military transport with fighter escort.

In the event that there is attempted interference with an unescorted military transport, the pilot is to attempt to continue to his assigned landing field in West Berlin, but if the safety of the aircraft requires it, he may make a forced landing under direct threat, in East German territory or in East Berlin. The President wishes to review this recommendation in the light of comments which General Taylor and I made to him after the meeting./2/

In the event that a military aircraft is forced down or shot down, we would proceed at once to the use of air cover, and the fighter aircraft would have instructions to respond by force to any air attack and to drive off any buzzing aircraft by force if necessary. They would not be authorized to engage in deep pursuit or to attack airfields, and the President overruled a recommendation that they should have standing instructions to respond to anti-aircraft attack by counterattack. He wished to review this question after the first such episode had occurred.

In the event of any interference with civil air access, the allies have agreed to block access of Bloc civil aircraft to their own countries, and to all NATO countries if agreement can be reached. The case will also be taken at once to the Security Council.

Finally, it was agreed that the Secretary of State will call in the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires and give him a stern warning against any interference with air access, civil or military, to West Berlin.

McG. B.

Washington, August 31, 1961, 5:45 p.m.

SUBJECT
East German Threats against Air Corridors to Berlin

PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Mr. Mikhail N. Smirnovsky, Chargé of the Soviet Embassy
Mr. Oleg M. Sokolov, employee, Soviet Embassy
Mr. John C. Guthrie, Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs

The Secretary expressed his appreciation to Mr. Smirnovsky for coming in on such short notice. The Secretary stated that he wished to say a few words on behalf of the President concerning the Soviet note of August 23 and our reply thereto concerning air access to Berlin./2/ He noted that our reply to the Soviet note had come from the three Western Powers and he wished to be certain that the Soviets have a copy of the White House statement of August 24,/3/ a copy of which the Secretary thereupon handed Mr. Smirnovsky.

The Secretary continued that he had asked Mr. Smirnovsky to come in because we have noticed a number of East German statements which give rise to a belief that the East German regime may be contemplating some action involving the air corridors connecting West Germany and Berlin. The President, he said, had asked him to point out to the Soviet Government that the United States, under well-established legal authority and procedures, considers the entire air traffic between West Germany and Berlin as an integral whole, a unity. Therefore any attempt by the East Germans or by the Soviets to interfere with this traffic would be considered by the United States an aggressive act and an illegal violation of existing arrangements.

The Secretary directed Mr. Smirnovsky's attention to the final paragraph of our reply to the Soviet note of August 23. He stated that he was at this time reinforcing these statements because of the statements made by East German officials regarding the air corridors. The United States Government, the Secretary said, hopes that the Soviet Union also recognizes our position regarding the legality and propriety of this air traffic and that the Soviet Government and East Germans will avoid any form of action against existing traffic in the corridor. In any such event, the United States reserves to itself the full right to undertake any action which it considers necessary to preserve the freedom of access to Berlin.

The Secretary stated that he wished to add the following general comment. We have supposed that both the Soviet Government and the Western Powers anticipate that at some stage there will be discussions regarding Germany and Berlin. We also understand it to be Mr. Khrushchev's view that such negotiations ought not to be held in any systematic way prior to the West German elections. We are very much concerned, however, that unilateral actions which might be taken or considered prior to such negotiations could greatly increase the tensions and dangers which already exist in regard to the problems of Germany and Berlin. We would find it difficult to understand how a responsible government could permit such actions to increase danger at a time when it is the duty of all of us not to let these matters go beyond control. I would conclude, the Secretary said, by repeating our expectation that no action will be taken to prevent access to Berlin in any form.

Mr. Smirnovsky said that he had no comment to make but would report the Secretary's remarks to his government.

The Secretary told Mr. Smirnovsky that we had inquired through our Embassy in Moscow whether Foreign Minister Gromyko was planning to attend the forthcoming session of the United Nations General Assembly. We have been informed that the composition of the Soviet delegation to the General Assembly has not yet been decided upon and the Secretary asked Mr. Smirnovsky if he knew the answer to his question. Mr. Smirnovsky replied in the negative.

On September 2, 1961, George F. Kennan, Ambassador to Yugoslavia, reported that as a follow-up to a previous conversation, he had discussed Laos and Berlin with his Soviet counterpart. The latter reported that he had received a personal communication from Khrushchev enthusiastically endorsing further conversations between the two Ambassadors. After discussing Laos, Kennan stated that he had no special authority to discuss Berlin, but that he wanted to say "with all earnestness" that recent Soviet moves in Berlin had made the situation very serious. The Soviet Ambassador, who appeared to be acting under instructions, then outlined the Soviet desiderata: 1) recognition of East German borders, 2) recognition of the existence of two German states, and 3) Soviet disinterest in the people of West Berlin. Kennan replied that this seemed reasonable and could be discussed if the right time and atmosphere were found, but that recent Soviet moves in Berlin made this unlikely. He concluded the discussion by stating that Soviet conduct had been so inexplicable that he could not help wondering if forces had come to the fore in the Soviet Union that placed no value on the peaceful resolution of disputes. Kennan then suggested to the Department of State that this contact be continued as a means of private communication with Khrushchev. (Telegram 359 from Belgrade; Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-BE/9-261)

In a cable on September 4 Kennan added that the Soviet Ambassador had left him a 10-page memorandum elaborating the Soviet positions on Berlin and Laos. Kennan suggested how he might reply and stated that he believed the United States was already in a zone of serious danger, should maintain the greatest military and diplomatic vigilance, and "be prepared to act in the great decisions primarily on our conscience and responsibility." (Telegram 400 from Belgrade; ibid., 762.00/9-461)

On September 5 Secretary of State Rusk personally endorsed Kennan's proposed reply on Berlin (telegram 274 to Belgrade; ibid.) and, in a second conversation on September 6, the Ambassador repeated that recent Soviet actions seemed to refute its desire to solve problems peacefully. After a further exchange, Kennan concluded that the Soviet Union had two irreducible demands: 1) signing a peace treaty and 2) de facto recognition of East Germany under a formula recognizing the two Germanies. (Telegram 438 from Belgrade, September 7; ibid., 762.00/9-761)

Washington, September 3, 1961./2/

660. Eyes only for Ambassador from Secretary. Within a reasonable interval after your return you should endeavor to have a conversation with Gromyko if at all possible without any publicity. During this conversation you should inform Gromyko that:

1. While you are not in a position to make suggestions as to arrangements, the United States anticipates that there will be discussion with Soviet representatives in regard to future negotiations. The actual situation in Berlin itself, particularly in regard to Western rights and position there, will of course be a major factor as to whether such negotiations would be feasible. It was the understanding of the United States Government following the meeting between Khrushchev and the President that it was the Soviet intention to leave all matters affecting established allied rights regarding Germany and Berlin unchanged pending consideration of a peace treaty which Khrushchev indicated then and subsequently he hoped to sign by the end of the year. The United States would like to have assurance that allied rights and obligations will not be further affected by any unilateral action either by the Soviet Union or the East German regime.

2. If Gromyko seems willing to discuss negotiations you might endeavor to ascertain from him what the Soviets envisage as a basis for negotiation. He may initially indicate that these would be the consideration of peace treaties with the two Germanies and arrangement for a free city for West Berlin. You should tell him that we could not restrict ourselves to Soviet proposals but would assume that any such negotiations would include Western as well as Soviet views on the subject of Germany and Berlin. You might add if queried that you are not in a position at the moment to be more specific as to what the Western Powers might have in mind.

3. You should endeavor to ascertain from Gromyko without making a major point of it, whether he plans to attend the opening of the UN General Assembly and if so whether he would be prepared to discuss possible arrangements for negotiations with the Secretary.

In the entire conversation you should make plain to Gromyko that the United States takes the situation being created in regard to Berlin with the utmost seriousness involving as it does the entire United States policy in regard to Europe. You should endeavor to convince Gromyko that while we are prepared to negotiate on a reasonable basis, we and our allies are not prepared to accept a Soviet dictated solution. We would expect the Soviet Government not to increase the obvious dangers of this situation and to maintain contact with the United States in the interest of peace which is important to both our countries.

(FYI--I fully realize that this is a delicate task that I have asked you to undertake and will rely upon your judgment as to the manner of conducting these discussions. The points outlined above are for your guidance and you are under no compulsion to abide literally by them.)

Rusk

Washington, September 4, 1961, 6:35 p.m.

560. You are requested to deliver following letter from President to Chancellor Adenauer at earliest opportunity:

My dear Chancellor Adenauer:

I was very glad to receive your letter of August 29, 1961,/2/ which Ambassador Grewe brought me, and I particularly welcome the opportunity to have the benefit of your views at this critical time.

I agree entirely with your estimate of the severity of the crisis we are experiencing, and of the likelihood that worse is yet to come. Thus, I certainly concur that it is most important for us to remain in close touch and to be able to consult so that we may be in a position to respond rapidly and appropriately to any development in the situation.

It is with this in mind that we are undertaking a substantially increased military effort which is intended to impress Khrushchev with our determination, and which we hope will serve to invigorate our Allies and stimulate comparable efforts by them. If ever there was an illustration of the need for NATO and justification of the reasons why it was founded, the issue of Berlin provides it.

Since we are sure of ourselves and firm in our resolution, I do not share the point of view that we should be reluctant to negotiate, on the grounds that to do so might be misinterpreted as a sign of weakness on our part. We have certainly given Khrushchev no cause to indulge in any illusions that we are suing for negotiations as a result of his pressures. At the same time, both public opinion in democratic countries and the sheet logic of a thermonuclear war demand that we exhaust every effort to find a peaceful solution consistent with the preservation of our vital interests. If Western governments are to have the support of their populations in the grave period ahead, should the Soviets carry out their threats to take unilateral action against our position in Berlin, we must have shown them by our words and by our actions that we have made every reasonable effort to seek a peaceful solution of the crisis. This will, of course, also be important if, as seems likely, the Berlin issue should get involved at some stage in the United Nations.

When our Foreign Ministers meet here September 14, they will undoubtedly discuss not only the tactics and procedures leading to negotiation, but also the factors bearing on the substance of our negotiating position. I must share with you my concern as to how we can manage to keep the Russians from being informed about these vital and secret matters by the press of the free world. This question of leaks to the press is a serious one, and I know we agree it behooves all of us to take whatever measures we can to assure the highest possible degree of discretion in the crucial months ahead.

The Foreign Ministers will also review the work which has been going forward here on counter measures which can be taken against further Soviet encroachments. I entirely agree with you as to the danger of creating discouragement as well as an impression of weakness by failing to respond vigorously to Communist harassments directed at aspects of our position which we do not define as vital but which are nevertheless psychologically and politically important. There is, however, a practical problem of finding counter measures in a given situation which will be appropriate and effective. It will require constant vigilance and imaginativeness not only to react to but to anticipate the moves which a resourceful and ruthless opponent, drawing on all the advantages which geography gives him in the Berlin situation, may take. We must carefully prepare a series of selected responses to various harassments. I am encouraged by the careful planning which is being done in this connection.

In addition to preparing for various contingencies, we can and we should ensure that Khrushchev does not make any hazardous move for lack of having been warned about its consequences. In particular, we have made it abundantly clear to Khrushchev that any attempt to block, or to interfere with, our access to Berlin, be it on the ground, or, as more recently hinted by the Soviet Union, in the air, is a vital matter to us and would be taken by us as an act of aggression.

As you know, I informed Ambassador Grewe that I was about to announce the appointment of General Clay as my personal representative in Berlin. Not only will his immense experience in matters relating to Berlin be of great value to me, but I feel sure that his presence there, in the difficult times we face, will be regarded by Germans and people everywhere as an earnest of our resolve to fulfill the commitments to which we have pledged ourselves repeatedly, and which Vice President Johnson reaffirmed in my name in the course of his recent visit to Berlin.

In conclusion, I wish to reiterate to you our intention to maintain our solidarity with the Federal Republic of Germany. I believe our actions, as well as our words, already bear witness to this. We are prepared to do whatever is necessary to meet this challenge, rather than capitulate, or make damaging concessions which would violate our solemn commitments. This is a moment in which the future of the North Atlantic Alliance is at stake, and our collective response may in turn determine whether the world as we know it is to survive.

I am convinced that we will all find within ourselves the resources, the spirit, and the statesmanship necessary to survive this danger and to move on toward our goals of peace, in justice and freedom.

Sincerely, John F. Kennedy

Rusk

Washington, September 4, 1961.

Recent events provide pretty clear evidence that Khrushchev intends using military force, or the threat thereof, to gain his ends in Berlin. He has raised his ante by progressively isolating West Berlin, by retaining in service several hundred thousand men due for discharge, and by reverting to atomic testing.

Thus far our own defense efforts have been deliberately kept in a low key and at a comparatively normal tempo. I have a strong feeling that the moment has come to shift into a higher gear.

On August 31 you sent a memorandum to Secretary McNamara/2/ asking him for recommendations on expansion of our military forces in the light of the events noted above. I understand they will be ready for you on Thursday. The decision which you take will be an extremely important one, and it seems to me that you will, therefore, want to touch all the bases and establish a clear record. You might consider some such scenario as follows:

On Thursday, discuss the Defense recommendations in a small group of principals including Secretary McNamara, Secretary Rusk, General Lemnitzer and perhaps Dean Acheson./3/ When you have decided what you are inclined to approve, ask the Joint Chiefs for a formal recommendation on the military program. As a final wrap-up, obtain the advice of the National Security Council in a regularly convened session at the start of the following week, in which the CIA would lead off with the best available estimate of Soviet intentions and capabilities.

Mr. Bundy rightly points out that the military program should be closely tied in to the political program which still has gaps. It may be possible to fill in these gaps concurrently with the consideration of the Defense program.

Maxwell D. Taylor

Washington, September 5, 1961.

CURRENT UNITED NATIONS MATTERS

PARTICIPANTS
The President
The Secretary of State
Ambassador Adlai Stevenson
White House Staff: McGeorge Bundy, Theodore Sorensen, Arthur Schlesinger
Assistant Secretary Harlan Cleveland

[Here follows item 1 concerning the President's address to the United Nations.]

a. The President asked the State Department to consider the following elements of an eventual negotiation on Berlin, and to consider also the extent to which such elements might be included in public statements prior to or during the General Assembly:

(i) a proposal to take to the International Court of Justice the legal status of Western access rights to West Berlin and abide by the results of Court action;

(ii) a plebiscite, handled by the UN, in West Berlin;

(iii) a move of some UN functions, or the whole Headquarters of the UN, to West Berlin, with appropriate guarantees to make West Berlin really a Free City, make the Autobahn an international highway, etc. (The Secretary of State and Ambassador Stevenson both demurred on this proposal.);

(iv) a limitation or prohibition of nuclear arms in either part of Germany;

(v) a limitation of the number of domestic and foreign troops in West and East Germany; and

(vi) a non-aggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw pact countries.

b. The President asked the Department to consider whether he should make a statement, prior to the visits of the Presidents of Indonesia and Mali next week, emphasizing the willingness of the United States to negotiate about Berlin. Such a statement could be made at a special ad hoc press conference. The possibility was mentioned that the President might announce on this occasion that he intends to go to New York to address the General Assembly.

[Here follow items 3-5 on unrelated U.N. matters.]

Moscow, September 7, 1961, 5 p.m.

814. Eyes only Secretary. I saw Gromyko 4 pm today and carried out instructions contained Deptel 660./2/ In reply Gromyko inquired whether we envisaged substantive discussions during time of General Assembly. I replied timing was one of subjects you would wish discuss with him but I thought our position would be fairly flexible on this. We were aware of date Sov Party Congress and did not know whether they would prefer negotiations before or after Congress. Gromyko said Sov Del had still not been selected but decision expected next few days and we would be informed. (There have been rumors here Kozlov might head Sov Del and I think this possibility although in such case Gromyko would probably also go.)

In reply my remarks about neither side taking actions to complicate situation Gromyko said actions of GDR and SU were not intended to do so but were protective measures. On other hand he considered actions we had taken such as mobilization, increase of mil expenditures etc. had complicated situation.

When he disagreed with my observation this was in nature of chicken or egg argument I pointed out we had not proposed any change in Berlin situation. He replied Sovs had not invented this problem but it existed. Sov Govt thought there were possibilities for settlement but not foll line taken by US Govt in increasing mil preparations and threatening force. Although he had not objected to my use of expression "Berlin and German problems" in discussing possible negotiations, in latter part of conversation he made clear that Sov Govt thought signature of peace treaty was only possible solution. When I disagreed he pressed me to state what other solution could be envisaged. I said I was not in position to discuss possible solutions and pointed out that Western Foreign Ministers were meeting on Sept 14 to discuss problem. I said clearly however that in any negotiations we considered each side must be free to present its views.

I had referred to our particular concern over threats to our use of air corridors and in reply Gromyko referred to transport of West German revanchists and saboteurs and daily provocative speeches which were made in West Berlin. He said this situation must be resolved by signature of a peace treaty. When I said this implied that in their view East Germans would then decide who could go to West Berlin he said that after signature of peace treaty access would be arranged by an agreement between East Germany and appropriate parties. I said we did not agree with this but we would be transmitting in next few days a reply to their note on air corridors and I would not go further into matter at this time./3/

In conclusion Gromyko said he hoped give me reply within a few days.

Thompson

Washington, September 7, 1961, 4 p.m.

Kohler, Rusk, McNamara, Bundy, Gilpatric, Nitze, Lemnitzer, Murrow, Cabell, Acheson, Taylor, Bob Kennedy

Sec Def explained paper./2/

P[resident] asked how divs would be employed. 2-1 each Corps; 2-another Corps; 2-mobile reserve.

I made clear our inc. strength will not enable us to reopen access to Berlin.

P asked Acheson--what would you rec.

A would support program's rec. Looks like Sov accel. schedule prob as result of refugee prob. We must accelerate. Other purposes--restore morale of European allies to stand up to prospective military action. If allies go to pieces--we are taking lead. If allies collapse and won't follow us--only way of stopping a disaster is for us to show Eur. what happens when you are weak. Would rec. 4 permanent divs to US Army--phase out reserves--res. have to go home. We should be creating a permanent larger force. All this to be better prepared for future similar crises. Lead our allies out of weakness. Be prepared for action. Not have onus of failure. Picking up pieces if we have a war. Rec to date does not add divs.

P discussed land, sea & air ops.

Nitze air access may be first blocked total. Described possible action--Schonfeld. Discussed escalation. Discussed ground target attacks.

P what then?

Rusk take it to the UN. Purpose of inc str of ground forces: stronger def w or w/o nuc; be prepared for enemy if he attacked in strength. When no W Ger can get to Berlin--we have lost.

Kohler if our air access stopped, we would stop Soviet civil air traffic; 80% goes in Eur. Most to Germany. They want to break link of civilian traffic between WG and West Berlin.

P we don't seem to be able to impress K.

A we must respond with force.

Nitze explained part I naval blockade table; part II acts of war. Allies think they can win over USSR.

P with conventional?

Sec Def yes.

P what would Sov do? go in Iran?

Cabell prob not.

Rusk trouble will break out in other areas.

A was asked why he thinks K won't want to neg--aren't we done?

A because he thinks he can get what he wants without neg.

P won't our troops (air & ground) upset gold flow?

Gil[patric] dep etc.--No.

Rusk asked if the supplies will permit approx 30 days.

Sec Def Yes--as long as they can fight with.

A will our allies fight over Berlin?

Sec Def No--unless we push them hard now.

A I agree. When will they drop by the wayside?

Rusk they have revitalized interests in Berlin. They want to see what neg produce. Believe in the last analysis they will fight.

P read Finletter msg--concern over too much mil action & too little pol./3/

(Note. Apparently K has told Sulzberger he doesn't want negotiations.)/4/

P How do we get it over to our allies to do something?

Rusk K proposals have not made any headway in Europe. Germans provide a tough problem.

Bundy Sukarno visit--we ought./5/

Murrow little reaction to our dec to resume testing./6/ We should put forth neg proposal.

A we are worrying about much needlessly. Allies will try almost anything to avoid doing anything. We must not appear too eager to negotiate.

Rusk hope Sec Def will be prepared to move up his schedule.

Sec Def rec approval of 3 items on page 1; 2 & 3 could be together./7/

P when do we need to decide to move more than 1 div.

Sec Def later.

P we must insist allies do something more before we send more.

Sec Def our purpose is to insure that K knows we will use nuc.

B Kennedy we should get all this written down step-by-step.

Sec Def 1 2 & 3 informs K of our det.

I emphasized not being able to retake Berlin.

A if we had no troops in E & if we would not use nuc he would do as he pleases. We must est cred. of our det to use nuc. There are not enough div in Eur to retake B. We must show K & others we are not going to sacrifice 5 or more divs without use of nuc. We will be more ready to use nuc with more divs. If we don't, we go from meg [reg?] to nuc war.

Nitze with 30 divs you can man the whole line.

Get down on paper how an additional 10 divs would do. Also naval. Pres is sending a paper to Sec Def.

P 2 & 3 approved. Item 1 is deferred.

A it is spelled out in my 28 June paper./8/

Rusk we have launched a large effort of our own & exhorted allies to a lot--can we get half hearted now.

A this is only chance of making nuc war unnecessary.

Bundy could be the reverse.

Washington, September 8, 1961.

MEMORANDUM TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

The following questions seem to me to emerge from our discussion yesterday,/2/ and I am sending this memorandum to both of you in the knowledge that many of the questions have both a political and a military component. You may prefer to make separate answers, or you may find it possible to produce a single agreed response. On question 10, I am asking separately for the view of the Secretary of the Treasury, who was out of town during our meeting yesterday.

1. What will the presence in Europe of 6 additional U.S. divisions accomplish

a. In meeting the Berlin situation?

b. In vitalizing NATO and strengthening the long-term defense of Western Europe?

2. Will an increase of our conventional forces in Europe convince Khrushchev of our readiness to fight to a finish for West Berlin or will it have the opposite effect? What other steps of all kinds may help to carry conviction on this point?

3. Supposing that we and our allies raise the ground strength of NATO to 30 effective divisions, what have we accomplished? Specifically:

a. Can NATO then defend Western Europe against a massive conventional attack by the Soviet Bloc?

b. Can we safely mount a corps-size probe to reopen access to Berlin and at the same time present an adequate ground shield?

c. How long can 30 divisions be supported logistically in combat?

4. It has been my understanding that we would need to call additional divisions only as we actually decided to send existing divisions to Europe. Since our current plan is to send only one such division, why is it necessary now to call 4 divisions from the Reserve?

5. If we call up 4 additional National Guard divisions now and do not send them to Europe, how can they be usefully employed? How long would it take to convert them to Army of the U.S. divisions? How long would it take to create effective A. U.S. divisions by other means?

6. How much of the 4 division build-up would be justified in view of the overall world situation if Berlin were not an immediate issue?

7. What tactical air support is needed for the planned forces in Europe and what is the plan for providing such support?

8. The reduction in terms of days of combat of the supply backup of U.S. forces in Europe which will result from increasing our forces and from supplying the West Germans has been noted. Would this result in putting U.S. troops in a possible combat situation without adequate supplies?

9. If we add 6 divisions to NATO, may not Khrushchev add 6 or more divisions to the conventional forces facing NATO? Or will logistical problems, fear of attack by atomic weapons and preoccupations in the satellites set a limit on the Soviet conventional forces available for immediate use against NATO?

10. What is the estimated net gold cost per year of the movement of six divisions to Europe and what can be done to reduce it?

John F. Kennedy

Moscow, September 9, 1961, 6 p.m.

848. Re Berlin tel 299./2/

Recognize that in dealing with recent developments in Berlin we have to consider psychology of Germans and particularly West Berliners as well as effect our actions or inaction on Soviet appraisal our intentions. Nevertheless believe we must not be led by events and must keep in mind our long range national interests. In this context desire point out we cannot realistically expect to reach agreement with Soviets on Berlin question without dealing with problem of refugees. I do not believe we could ever formally agree to turn control over to East Germans and therefore if we expect peaceful solution only way this problem could be handled is for us to be able eventually to accept de facto that East Germans will prevent refugees from reaching West Berlin. I therefore believe that in any actions we take we should not preclude this possibility. If UN debate should take place believe emphasis should be on general subject of self-determination for Germany as a whole rather than on problem of Berlin. With regard to reftel while I believe threat to incorporate West Berlin in West Germany can be of utility if used carefully since this is something Soviets very anxious avoid, believe actual taking of this action not in our interest. (German Ambassador is convinced, and I believe rightly, that in any settlement Soviets will demand legal separation West Berlin from West Germany. He indicated his belief that Adenauer would be prepared de facto to put stop to such actions as holding Bundestag meetings in Berlin but implied he could not formally do so.) If we expect Soviets to accept peaceful solution we must be prepared find some way of reducing Berlin's role in cold war along lines of our Geneva proposal. Soviets would have little faith in such proposals if West German politicians, particularly those who may come to power in future, were relatively free to exploit Berlin situation and Khrushchev would certainly not be in position to convince Ulbricht and his other allies that they should accept settlement which would in fact worsen position from his point of view. Believe this card akin to Khrushchev's peace treaty which is more useful as threat than as fact.

While for present we must clearly maintain our own right of free circulation in East Berlin I would go so far as to suggest that with foregoing considerations in mind we should avoid taking position on this matter from which it would be difficult for us later to retreat. In this connection I am somewhat more pessimistic than formerly on possibility reaching agreed settlement and something along lines of Solution "C" may be our only out. In short, while I believe we must take account of psychological factors, we should be very careful not to bar any of few remaining roads to a peaceful settlement.

Thompson

On September 10, 1961, Cyrus L. Sulzberger, a columnist for The New York Times who had been in Moscow to interview Khrushchev, sent a letter to President Kennedy with an enclosed message from the Soviet Chairman. Sulzberger apologized for cutting Ambassador Thompson out of the chain, but stated that he had informed him about the message. Sulzberger told the President that Khrushchev had given him the message on September 5 and adjured him that it was off-the-record. The message reads as follows:

"If you are personally in a position to meet President Kennedy, I wish you would tell him that I would not be loath to establishing some sort of informal contact with him to find a means of settling the crisis without damaging the prestige of the United States--but on the basis of a German peace treaty and a free city of West Berlin.

"The President might say what is in his mind concerning ways of solving the problem--if he agrees in principle with the peace treaty and a free city. Otherwise, there is no use in contacts.

"If he does wish some settlement he could, through informal contacts, voice his opinion on various forms and stages and on how to prepare public opinion and not endanger the prestige of the United States or Mr. Kennedy." (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163; also printed in Sulzberger, The Last of the Giants, pages 801-802)

For Sulzberger's account of the interview with Khrushchev and the transmission of the message to Kennedy, see ibid., pages 788-805.

On September 23 Pierre Salinger met with Mikhail A. Kharlamov, Soviet Foreign Ministry Press Chief, in New York. Kharlamov asked whether Sulzberger had delivered Khrushchev's message, and when Salinger could not confirm delivery, repeated the message. For Salinger's account of this meeting and the subsequent discussion of Khrushchev's correspondence with the President, see With Kennedy, pages 191-194. On September 24 Salinger sent both Kennedy and Secretary of State Rusk a memorandum describing his meeting with Kharlamov. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163)

Washington, September 12, 1961.

SUBJECT
Berlin Negotiations

A. As I see it, we reached the following agreements this morning:/2/

(1) The approach of calling a Peace Conference and working toward Parallel Peace Treaties is agreed between us, and you will proceed to have it developed in detail.

(2) We agree that Thompson should open negotiations on this basis with the Soviet Union, and he is to be called back for intensive discussion early next week.

(3) We shall want to plan a careful approach to the Chancellor as soon as is practicable. We did not talk about the man for the job. McCloy? Acheson? I do not think Dowling would do; he reflects Bonn opinion too much to be the man to bend it.

(4) My speech to the UN will contain a statement on Berlin, and Sorensen will attempt a draft that serves all our purposes without giving anything away prematurely.

B. We did not settle clearly some other points and I think we should talk about them with each other again before you get caught up in the Foreign Ministers Meeting. In particular:

(1) You and I may differ on the appropriate distance between an opening proposal and a serious negotiating posture. I really do not want to see us put forward anything like the Western Peace Plan as a basis for serious negotiation. It just does not make sense for us to propose for negotiation an early reunification of Germany or Berlin on the basis of free elections. These are not negotiable proposals; their emptiness in this sense is generally recognized; and we should have to fall back from them promptly. I believe instead that we should keep these ideas forward as those which we prefer, but without any pretense that we believe them acceptable to the Soviet Union at present. In that sense, I am prepared to accept a statement of principles, but I must say that the British document you showed me this morning/3/ seemed to me still much too much of a detailed discussion of impracticable machinery; it was not so much a statement of principles as an interesting design for the unattainable.

(2) For these reasons, I am strongly opposed to any revised version of the Western Peace Plan. It seems to me the wrong framework for negotiations, and in my own preference for a peace conference with parallel treaties I am talking about a real reconstruction of our negotiating proposals, and not about a modest add-on. I think there may be some diversities between us on this point also.

C. We agreed this morning that we would keep this whole question very close for the present. In the White House only Bundy and Sorensen know about it, and I hope that in the State Department you can keep it restricted to yourself, Kohler, Bohlen, Hillenbrand and Owen. The latter two, as I understand it, are the staff officers who are already familiar with this proposal as one of many, and I think they and all of us should talk about it, when we have to, without reference to the fact that it currently occupies a preferred position./4/

JFK/5/

Washington, September 14, 1961.

TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT
Steinstuecken and Friedrichstrasse Crossing Point

The President decided that the following course of action shall be taken with respect to Steinstuecken./2/

In case of an apparent blocking of access to Steinstuecken or other interference with U.S. rights there, USCOB is authorized to establish the Communists' intention and other pertinent facts by sending to Steinstuecken a vehicular mounted or helicopter borne M.P. patrol. This patrol will not use force in discharging its mission.

If force is considered necessary to reestablish access or other rights, General Norstad will seek authority from Washington.

Helicopter supply of Steinstuecken is authorized, if necessary.

No special overt measures should be taken before the event, without referral to Washington.

With respect to the possible closing of the Friedrichstrasse Crossing Point, the President decided, subject to negotiation among the Four Western Foreign Ministers:

(1) All Soviet personnel would be barred from West Berlin except the Soviet Air Control officer and the Spandau personnel;

(2) Additional military forces may be moved to the sector boundary generally, as the crossing point is first closed, if the U.S. Commandant judges such action useful.

If the crossing point is kept closed for a period longer than 24 hours--or some similarly brief period--countermeasures outside Germany of the sort which clearly represent the early stages of more significant measures would be contemplated. Staff work on such possible measures should go forward urgently.

In addition, it is contemplated that the Czech and Polish missions would be expelled from West Berlin, if the Friedrichstrasse Crossing Point is closed for a protracted period.

WWR

Washington, September 14, 1961, 4 p.m.

SUBJECT
Tripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting

PARTICIPANTS

United Kingdom
Lord Home
Ambassador Caccia
Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh
Mr. John Killick
Lord Hood

France
Couve de Murville
Ambassador Alphand
Mr. Laloy
Mr. Lucet
Mr. Currien

United States
The Secretary
Mr. Bohlen
Mr. Nitze
Mr. Johnson (part of conversation)
Mr. Kohler
Mr. Holloway

[Here follows discussion of air access to Berlin, Steinstuecken, access at Friedrichstrasse, and access to East Berlin and East Germany.]

In the Secretary's absence, Mr. Kohler introduced the Report of the Working Group with particular reference to the paper on Tactics./2/ He gave his understanding of the paper that the Secretary of State would approach Mr. Gromyko at the UNGA meeting in New York on the possibility of fruitful negotiations with the USSR. If such an approach gave promise at that time of leading to substantive talks, it was agreed that the Secretary could then report back to the Foreign Ministers or go on to arrange on behalf of the other three for further negotiations with Mr. Gromyko. On this last point he noted there was a French reserve.

Couve said that his reading of the Tactics paper led him to conclude that there had been a misunderstanding. The French are still of the opinion that this approach is a completely vain effort, as we do not know what it will lead to. In the French view, the USSR has not changed; it will negotiate only over a peace treaty with Germany and a new status for Berlin. This morning's announcement of the Soviet Foreign Ministry confirms this./3/ Therefore, the French are forced to conclude that any approach to negotiations is "not appropriate" in the present circumstances.

The French Foreign Minister then added that if the American and British Governments are not of the same mind and if they wish to approach the Soviets, there would, of course be no disagreement from the French but it must be understood that the French are not asking the Secretary to make this approach. They are merely saying, "We have no objection." To the French, negotiations in the present moment mean only that we are negotiating in the dark and under Soviet threats. Couve concluded that under these conditions, "We have nothing to gain" and "I am sure that there is a complete misunderstanding in the paper (Tactics) and in the press."

Lord Home commented that he felt that it was less a difference in understanding than a difference in approach. It is clear to the British that we must negotiate with the USSR and while it is true the line of the USSR is hard, we must be prepared to a certain extent to accept this or run the risk of becoming "atomic dust." The longer we delay our assent to negotiate, the higher tensions will arise and the less our own people will understand our attitude. As for the Tactics paper, Lord Home said, "I think it right." If there is a basis for negotiations, he felt all should be done now to set up these so that they might begin by late October or early November.

The French Foreign Minister replied that this is not his view of what is in the Tactics paper.

Mr. Kohler demurred that while at the Foreign Ministers' meetings in Paris the difference in the Anglo-American and French positions may have been greater, particularly as applied to the proposed reply to the August 3 note of the Soviets, the de Gaulle-Rusk talks seemed to have reduced these differences, i.e., while France will not be associated with an Anglo-American probe, should such a probe lead to fruitful negotiations, the French are prepared to join. Couve said that while this is true, this is not what the Tactics paper says. Mr. Kohler replied that as he reads the paper, we are probing only to find "if there is basis for serious negotiations." Mr. Bohlen pointed out that under the terms of the Tactics paper the Secretary was in any event committed to return for consultation to the Four Foreign Ministers before proceeding.

Couve then read a translation of a French news report which quoted a State Department spokesman as saying today there was "general agreement" that Secretary Rusk was about to set the time and place for negotiations with the USSR when he talked to Mr. Gromyko in New York. Mr. Kohler replied that there had been no authorization for such an announcement.

Lord Home then reviewed the position he had set forth above and concluded that if we do not now choose negotiations, we will allow ourselves to be forced into them--"a most undesirable position." He would therefore suggest that as the French are not prepared to see if there is a reasonable chance of negotiations, the UK would prefer that the French disassociate themselves now from the probe rather than do so at a later date.

Couve injected that it was only useless negotiations to which the French objected. Lord Home continued pointing out that we have delayed any move from the first of August to the 19th of September and that the situation has deteriorated in those six weeks. There was, he said, no reason to believe that it would not deteriorate further in the next six weeks.

Mr. Bohlen said that his experience has shown that it was necessary in negotiations with the Russians to keep seeking to find out if there was a possibility of a reasonable settlement. Couve replied that nothing has yet been settled with Russians without being agreed upon before, although Mr. Bohlen noted that in matters like Trieste, Austria and the Berlin Blockade the Soviets had changed positions in negotiations. It was the sort of negotiations that had led to the end of the Berlin Blockade (Jessup-Malik talks) which he believed the Secretary would embark upon with Mr. Gromyko.

In response to a question from Mr. Nitze, Couve said that the crux of the negotiating issue is that the Soviets are not prepared to support uncontrolled air traffic to Berlin. Once they had destroyed that, they will have destroyed the basis of West Berlin's political life and, thus, eventually the life of the city. Mr. Bohlen said that he thought there were many facets of negotiations: for one, if we don't negotiate we will leave the Soviets free to act unilaterally; another is that Khrushchev consistently has said in the past that he is prepared to consider Western proposals and we are not going to find out how far he is going to consider them unless we talk to him. Mr. Bohlen added that in his experience dictatorships are most dangerous when they are "allowed to stew in their own juice." Therefore, we should keep the negotiating channel into the Soviets open.

Lord Home said that we must also consider the quest of negotiations in relation to the possibility of a peace treaty with the GDR. It will be extremely difficult for the West to avoid sitting down with Khrushchev before the GDR peace treaty. Therefore, it would seem best to talk to him first. He said frankly that the Western peoples will not allow us to go on as we have under the threat of death, during the next two months. For his part, he is prepared to let the Secretary explore, then meet again, and see what it is practical to do.

Couve said that in his understanding the only purpose in seeing Gromyko is to discuss substantive issues. In such a discussion, he felt it extremely appropriate for the Secretary of State as spokesman for the strongest member of the Allies to have a serious, or even a grave, discussion with Gromyko. There are many things which can be said in a two man conversation which cannot be said among four. To these he would assent, but he would object strongly to any arrangements for a Four-Power meeting which would be in effect on Soviet terms. He concluded: I understood in Paris that there would be exploration--"then let us know more." Mr. Kohler said that we considered the Tactics paper to be consistent with what was said in Paris. Couve objected that there certainly was no mention in Paris of arranging the time and place for a conference. To this, Lord Home objected that we cannot extract Soviet positions without a formal meeting. If this could be arranged, he hoped we could get the "guts" of a settlement behind the scenes in time to be ready for the formal meeting.

Mr. Bohlen said he felt it essential that any communiqué for this meeting reflect no disunity. This was agreed and it was decided that after discussion of Laos and African matters, Allied press officials would be told that the three Foreign Ministers had met as usual in consultation; that current events in Berlin and on the situation in the Congo and Laos were discussed; and, that when they meet with their German colleague tomorrow they will move on to the general problem of Germany.

Washington, September 14, 1961, 6:30 p.m.

SUBJECT
Western Access to Berlin and Related Problems

PARTICIPANTS
His Excellency Mikhail A. Menshikov, Soviet Ambassador
Mr. Mikhail N. Smirnovsky, Minister Counselor, Soviet Embassy

The Secretary
Mr. John C. Guthrie, Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs

After an exchange of pleasantries, Ambassador Menshikov said that he had been instructed to reply to the oral statement which the Secretary had given the Soviet Chargé, Mr. Smirnovsky, August 31./2/ The Ambassador said that the Secretary's statement had been forwarded to Moscow where it had been carefully studied and that he had been instructed by his government to ask what the aims of the Secretary's presentation were and how it should be understood. If the statement meant that the US Government seeks a settlement of the problem of West Berlin on a mutually acceptable basis, and is prepared to sit around a conference table in a businesslike meeting to discuss the problem, then any steps which the US Government might take in this direction will meet the full understanding and support of the Soviet Government. The Soviet Government, the Ambassador said, has always advocated peace and the removal of sources of tension between the USSR and the US and has always sought normal relations between the two.

On the other hand, the Ambassador continued, the Secretary's statement can also be understood as a threat. If this is the aim of the statement, it is appropriate to remind the US that the Soviet Union is not a country against which threats can be used. This has been proved by the entire history of the USSR. Threats are absolutely out of place and do not impress the Soviet Union. Warnings are not needed. The Soviet Government stands for relations between states not on the basis of threats and strength but of mutual respect for the rights of the other.

In reply to the Ambassador's first point, the Secretary observed that the United States is prepared to undertake negotiations which might find a solution of the present crisis. We are interested in businesslike, constructive negotiations which will take into consideration the views of all parties concerned. The Secretary said that he expects to discuss these problems with Foreign Minister Gromyko in New York, if this is agreeable with the latter. However, he does not wish to discuss formulations of the subjects which might be discussed with the Foreign Minister at this time.

With regard to the Ambassador's second point, the Secretary said that he simply wished to remind him that we have received more than one written communication from the Soviet Government and have observed the apparent threats, including some from the East German regime against the air corridors linking West Berlin and West Germany. In his statement of August 31, the Secretary said, his purpose was to underline the position that unilateral actions against Western rights and interests are not only dangerous in themselves but can also impair the prospects for successful negotiations. The Secretary told Ambassador Menshikov that the language he has used does not impress the US. He pointed out that it was not the US which has raised the question of pressures against our right of access to Berlin nor the US which has taken unilateral actions in Berlin. These actions and pressures have come from the other side. It is important, he said, that it be clearly understood that his oral statement of August 31, and written and public statements by the President and others were serious statements and should be taken seriously.

Ambassador Menshikov said that he could not add anything to that which he had already said concerning the air corridors and that the Soviet notes of August 23 and September 2 speak for themselves./3/ As for the Secretary's latest statement, the Ambassador asked the Secretary to review the statements which Ambassador Menshikov had just made.

The Secretary said that he wished to illustrate the kind of unhelpful incidents which could increase tensions and dangers. Just today we have received reports that certain civilian aircraft operated by PAA, and flying in the corridor between West Germany and West Berlin were closely buzzed by fighter aircraft from the other side. We were trying to get further facts on these incidents. However, it is our understanding that these aircraft were flying under normal conditions in the corridor and had the usual clearance from BASC. This type of harassment or close approach without indication of purpose or attitude, the Secretary continued, ought to be avoided at this time. Such incidents raise rather than solve problems and both governments should seek to avoid them.

The Ambassador noted that it was difficult to comment on the incident if the US does not have the full facts. He could only assume that the aircraft had been guilty of some kind of violation of existing regulations.

The Secretary noted the possibility that the problem involved in these latest incidents could be worked out by the appropriate authorities on the spot.

Ambassador Menshikov observed upon departing that he would not be going to the United Nations General Assembly this year and had only gone last year as an exception because Chairman Khrushchev was present at that time.

WFM MC-3

Washington, September 15, 1961, 1 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

United States
The President
The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
Mr. Bowles
Mr. Bohlen
Mr. Kohler
Mr. Nitze

France
M. Couve de Murville
Ambassador Alphand
Mr. Lucet

United Kingdom
Lord Home
Ambassador Caccia
Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh

Germany
Dr. von Brentano
Ambassador Grewe
Dr. Karl Carstens

Toward the end of the luncheon the Secretary gave the President a brief report on the work of the Ambassadorial Steering Group on Berlin and of the four Foreign Ministers./2/ The President responded by speaking of his own interest in the work of the Ambassadorial group. However, he wondered in view of the developing crisis, whether it might not be strengthened, particularly by the reinforcement of the personnel of the Embassies for the purpose, and its methods of work expedited so that the four of us would be capable of prompt and decisive action. In this connection he cited the delay in response to the Soviet/East German clamp-down on the East Berlin sector borders on August 13. He then stressed the basic importance of the build-up of NATO forces. In this connection he referred to US plans and to the difficulties which would be presented for us if we alone in fact seemed to be doing more than all our NATO allies put together. He also emphasized the importance of decisions by the NATO Governments with respect to the application of economic countermeasures, indicating that he had not been encouraged by the NATO discussions of this subject to date. Referring to this latter point, Secretary Rusk said we recognized that problems were raised for some countries in connection with economic countermeasures and that we were prepared to consider these. The President then referred to the question of contingency procedures relating to possible harassment or interruption of ground access to Berlin, indicating that he felt that there should be further work on this and more government decisions as to actions to be taken.

The President called on Secretary McNamara to comment on the contingency planning aspect. Mr. McNamara said that he wanted to stress three points. First of all, he felt it was essential that both national and allied planning be accelerated. He thought that we were far behind the requirements of the situation in this respect. Another critical problem was that of achieving a better balance in available stocks of ammunition and supplies. The third important question was that of planning and reaching decisions with respect to naval actions, particularly the question of blockading Soviet shipping. In response to a question from the Secretary, M. Couve de Murville spoke of the French equipment problem, saying that he believed the French could quickly re-equip their two divisions brought back from Algeria provided they had American help in one or two respects. Continuing on the question of strengthening our military posture, Secretary McNamara said that perhaps work could be expedited if we set new readiness dates. The Secretary asked whether it was better to do this through the military subgroups of the Ambassadorial steering group here or through General Norstad's headquarters. Mr. McNamara replied that he thought the best way to solve the questions connected with the build-up was by rapid unilateral planning on the part of the countries concerned and bilateral discussions in cases where US cooperation and assistance was required. Of course General Norstad should be kept fully informed. There then ensued some general discussion of the question of naval blockade, which Lord Home remarked would be regarded by the Soviets and would in fact be "an act of war." Couve de Murville commented that an economic blockade would also be regarded as "an act of war." In connection with the military planning question it was agreed that both national and Live Oak planning should be pushed forward rapidly. The President concluded this phase of the discussion by commenting that if the Four Powers were themselves so far away from agreement and preparedness on these questions the situation was even more serious as respects the other NATO countries. It was clear to him that better consultation with NATO was needed if we were to bring our allies along. The Secretary pointed out that a related and delicate problem which we faced was the question of direction of NATO forces in case of hostilities. This problem had never really been tackled. It was clearly not feasible to have decisions made and directives given by a Council of fifteen members and some way would accordingly need to be found by which NATO would delegate operational control to a smaller group. The President pointed out that in the case of naval actions, for example, in the Baltic or the Dardanelles, the cooperation of Denmark and Norway and of Greece and Turkey would be very important. Lord Home remarked that perhaps in the event of a crisis it would be necessary for the Foreign Ministers to be in permanent session in Paris near SHAPE headquarters. The President remarked that steps might be taken to strengthen the North Atlantic Council by the appointment of members who could speak more authoritatively for their governments.

The President then raised the question as to what differences existed among the four with respect to the problem of negotiations with the Soviets. The Secretary said that it might be premature really to speak of differences since this was a question which still had to be discussed. M. Couve de Murville commented that he thought the problem of negotiations was the same problem as that involved in the military build-up. The real task was to convince Khrushchev that he was facing a serious risk of war and that he would not be allowed to have his own way. Only the United States, he said, had the strength to speak convincingly to Khrushchev along these lines. The President said it was clear that Khrushchev "hears many voices in the West" which presumably indicate to him a division within NATO, particularly between the United States and the European countries. He asked what more we should do than we are doing to convince Khrushchev of our determination. M. Couve de Murville replied that of course the military build-up must continue. However, a United States private warning to the Soviets was extremely important. Indeed, he regarded this as the preliminary to everything.

Lord Home said that he did not think that a warning to Khrushchev and public speeches were enough. It was necessary that we get into a conference where we could talk things out directly. The French Foreign Minister disagreed with this. He said that it was only in the very smallest forum, two or three or four persons, that it would be possible to speak frankly to Khrushchev and not have press leaks. This, Couve said, could only be done by the United States. Only the United States would be able to say bluntly, "What are you up to? Do you want war?"--etc. Lord Home replied that he felt that even in the conversations that Secretary Rusk would have with Gromyko it was not realistic to think that he could get any farther than some agreement on an agenda and arrangements for a conference. M. Couve de Murville again expressed disagreement, repeating that we must convince Khrushchev before arrangements were made for a conference. Herr von Brentano said that he agreed essentially with Couve de Murville. If we went into a conference without satisfactory preliminaries there was great danger of pressures for disastrous compromises. He also agreed with Couve that it was not just a question of Berlin but of the whole confrontation between the Soviet bloc and the West. It was therefore not enough in the exploratory talks with the Russians simply to seek an agenda.

The President commented that after listening to these views he was not sure there was any real difference. Obviously, if the results of the approaches to Gromyko were negative then there could be no meaningful negotiations; though, even in this case, there might have to be some formal meeting to show that every diplomatic effort had been made before we were faced with the decision actually to go to war. However, if the Gromyko talks revealed some prospects of serious negotiations then we could go ahead. Lord Home repeated that Secretary Rusk could not hope to get far beyond arrangements for a meeting and an agenda with Gromyko, since Gromyko was simply not given enough latitude really to go into substance. Of course while the agenda could not be limited to the Soviet proposal of a "peace treaty," this would clearly have to be included along with our own items.

Secretary Rusk said that perhaps what we were talking about as a difference was essentially only a problem of political leadership. The President of the United States would have the support of all Americans in taking the country to war, if that were necessary, but only if we could do so with a "clear conscience." The United States Government needed to show that it had made every effort to exhaust possibilities of peaceful settlement. What was required in the circumstances was a mixture of firmness, on one hand, and of readiness to negotiate, on the other. However no one need fear that the United States could go to a disastrous "compromise;" indeed this would be opposed by American public opinion. M. Couve de Murville said that the basic problem was how to avoid going to war. What was important now was the necessity of convincing the Russians of our determination and not the timing or an agenda for a conference. Herr von Brentano, addressing himself principally to Lord Home, said that he wanted to clarify that he was warning only against agreeing to a one-sided or purely Soviet version of an agenda. The agenda for a conference must be two-sided. For example the Soviets' "peace treaty" must be counter-balanced by the West's "free elections."

The President indicated his agreement with Herr von Brentano and added that there was a problem of making known a public position. For example he had been shown broadsides which the Soviets were mailing all over the United States in which Khrushchev was propagandizing his proposals, even in our country, while saying the West had made no response or counter proposals of their own.

Terminating the luncheon discussion, the President said he wanted to stress the role of the Federal Republic in this question. This was a matter of the most vital concern to the West Germans. It was therefore essential that we keep closely in step with them and that we not undertake courses of action or proposals which would turn them away from the Alliance. Herr von Brentano indicated his appreciation of the President's statement.

Washington, September 15, 1961, 3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT
Washington Foreign Ministers' Conference (Restricted Session)

PARTICIPANTS

United States
The Secretary
Mr. Bohlen
Mr. Kohler

United Kingdom
Lord Home
Sir Harold Caccia
Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh

France
Couve de Murville
Ambassador Alphand
Mr. Lucet

Germany
Mr. Von Brentano
Ambassador Grewe
Dr. Carstens
(Interpreter--Mr. Kasterer)

The Secretary, after referring to the fact that the luncheon conversation at the White House/2/ had been a good start for this meeting, asked the French Foreign Minister if he could give them the French view as to negotiations and the general courses they should follow, looking down the road. He had in mind that in his conversation with Gromyko, he could say that the Soviet Union and the Western Powers were on a collision course; the Western Powers had rights and obligations and were in Berlin and intended to abide by these rights in which they were supported by NATO; if Khrushchev signed his treaty and as a result considered that these rights were canceled, then they were indeed on a collision course. He asked Couve de Murville to please let his colleagues know what he saw for the future.

Couve de Murville said it was a difficult enterprise to foresee the future. He said the French did not disagree with the idea of any discussions or even negotiations with the Soviets, but rather questioned the type of negotiation. It was clear that the Soviets would certainly not object to a discussion on their proposals for peace treaties and a free city for Berlin, but it was also possible that they might be prepared to consider variations of this in which Western rights were not prejudiced. If, for example, the Soviets renounced their threats then there would be a basis for discussion. (In reply to the question from the Secretary, Couve de Murville outlined what he meant by threats.) The Russians say they will sign a treaty and that as a result the GDR would control access and the Western Powers then must make separate deals with the GDR or possibly the three allies collectively, but if not, there will be no access and any attempt by the Western Powers to go through would be aggression and the Soviet Union, with all its power, would support the GDR against such aggression. This was what he meant as a threat. If there was an indication that the Soviets accept our access rights, this would remove the threat. He was speaking in general terms and there were, of course, many variations on this point, but this is essentially the basis. He continued that if there were to be talks, and repeated that the French did not object to talks, then roughly speaking, the aim should be in the direction of the removal of the Soviet threat. If we are to talk business, this can only be achieved if the real issues are clearly understood by both sides. He said the French fully understand the gravity of the situation and would fight if necessary, but that one aspect was not clear, and that was whether the Soviet Union wants a war or thinks that it can achieve its objectives without war because the West is divided or lacking in determination. Therefore, the aim in any talks with the Soviets should be to convince them of our purpose and determination. The Soviet threats against one country after another must be clarified. He concluded by saying that these talks begun with Gromyko would be protracted as the issues were not simple. He said Gromyko would not be given requisite authority and that they would certainly go on as long as Gromyko is in New York. He concluded that the general idea was to bring the Soviets back to reality unless they want a war, and that as he had said at lunch, he felt the dangers of war lay in misunderstanding.

Lord Home said that he agreed with the objective of bringing the Russians back to reality, and inquired if Couve de Murville would contemplate negotiations if something concerning access came out of the discussions. This, in essence, was the case for probing, but he was not sure that the Secretary would get very far with Gromyko on substance since Gromyko would have no authority. The maximum that might be expected would be an agreement on an agenda for future negotiations.

Couve de Murville replied that the Russians were quite clearly putting their case to the world, saying that they had put forth their views and inquiring what was the position of the Western Powers. In effect, they had put their case in such a way that we could take it or leave it and, in effect, were merely asking for our acceptance. Khrushchev says that access will be guaranteed, but generally, do we know what conditions he had in mind. It was possible that the Secretary could ascertain this from Gromyko. He thought, however, it meant the continuance of the Western right for military access but the suppression of the unlimited right we now enjoy in the air corridors in respect to German travel.

The Secretary agreed that this might be the main purpose, but that he was thinking of what he could say to his colleagues after his talk with Gromyko.

Couve de Murville said it would be difficult to foretell until the conversations had taken place.

The Secretary continued that what he wanted to know was what was the object of the enterprise and specifically what his colleagues would consider a success.

Couve de Murville said he imagined two stages, not necessarily separated by a long term. The first stage, as he had mentioned at the luncheon, would be one of warning the Soviets. No one could tell what Gromyko's reaction would be and, therefore, it was difficult to plan the second stage. But, the second stage would deal with the question of the Soviet attempts against the rights of access in Berlin. For example, an unlikely but good solution would be to transfer to the treaty the Bolz-Zorin agreement./3/ In the second stage he felt that it would be important to find out how rigid the Soviets were on their positions.

The Secretary said he had the impression that what Couve de Murville had in mind would be a successful negotiation and inquired if there was anything that would be satisfactory short of a successful solution.

Couve de Murville said that these talks would take a long time. The Secretary agreed and added that he felt that Khrushchev would wish to participate personally at some stage.

Lord Home remarked that they did not have unlimited time, and pointed out that Khrushchev intended to make his treaty in December and that it would be very awkward for the Western Powers if he got to this point before there were any real negotiations.

Couve de Murville pointed out that the Secretary's talks with Gromyko would constitute real negotiations. He felt that the Secretary would have something to tell them in a week or so regarding Gromyko's reaction and they could then see. He felt that the British idea was that Rusk should see Gromyko and propose a conference in November. In such an event, let us say the twenty-fifth of September to November, everything would be frozen and then in November at the conference it would break down.

Lord Home said he did not see why Couve de Murville saw a breakdown and he thought that the Secretary might go quite a way with Gromyko.

Couve de Murville said that this could be done without fixing a conference date. He said, for example, the military build-up would be affected by the fixing of the conference, there would be general relaxation and people would feel that there was nothing to worry about.

The Secretary inquired how important was it for us to have the situation in Berlin maintained until the conference. He felt that this should be a pre-condition for any conference.

Couve de Murville said that if we fixed a conference, the Soviets would become more confident and would go ahead with whatever plans they had in mind, and that after the conference had failed, the West would be confronted with the choice of capitulation or war.

Lord Home said that he believed that whether you got the conference or not that situation might come when the treaty was signed with the GDR.

Couve de Murville said that if he understood Lord Home correctly there would be a conference in the beginning of November but there would be no conversations with the Soviets. He personally believed in discreet talks rather than a conference.

Lord Home inquired why there should be a stagnation between now and November.

Couve de Murville said that once they had achieved a conference, the Soviets would not be disposed to discuss any subject. He felt the subject of fixing a date for a conference should await the outcome of the Rusk-Gromyko talks. Couve de Murville and the Secretary agreed that the Soviets might discuss substance bilaterally.

The Secretary said that it was obvious that they could not negotiate on Soviet terms for Gemany and Berlin, but that they had in mind a wider agenda under which each side would put forth its proposals. He inquired whether, if the agenda were open to both sides, this would be acceptable to his colleagues or did they feel that they could only accept an agenda which excluded the Soviet item of a peace treaty and a free city for Berlin. In other words, was this a matter of openness of agenda for us or a rejection of the Soviet item.

Lord Home said that in any negotiations both sides have a right to put forward their proposition, a general agenda which seemed to him to be in accord with Khrushchev's. He then read what Khrushchev had said to Nehru./4/

Couve de Murville said that what was of interest to the West was the question of access; that the occupation statute was an academic question provided it had no consequences.

The Secretary said he was anxious to explore his colleagues' thinking since he was not anxious to talk to Gromyko with his flanks or rear exposed.

Couve de Murville said the Secretary would be doing it with the general support of them all.

Lord Home said there was no need to name dates now, but he personally was doubtful if the talks would get that far. He felt that public opinion would sooner or later get them all around the table and the question was how long they could avoid this development.

Couve de Murville remarked that the Rusk-Gromyko talks may show there is no prospect of a conference.

The Secretary inquired whether we would be better off with no conference or a conference that met and failed--that is a Foreign Ministers' conference since a summit was a different matter.

Couve de Murville said it was too soon to speak of a conference.

Lord Home said that we would not be allowed not to have a conference. People who are about to be blown to atomic dust would insist upon a conference. He personally would prefer to do this on our own initiative than be forced into it. He felt that the Secretary's conversation with Gromyko would give us some idea on the subject, adding that if the conference were fixed, it would be more difficult for Khrushchev to undertake unilateral action in regard to Berlin.

The Secretary remarked that it appeared to be Khrushchev's plan to concentrate on our rights rather than on the status of the GDR; since 1955 the GDR had been treated by the Soviets as a sovereign state, and that he felt that a peace treaty would not change this relationship. The chief effect of a peace treaty would be on our rights, although it might have some effect on the Oder-Neisse line. Otherwise, he did not see why Khrushchev would run all the risks merely to achieve something that he already had. He asked Mr. Kohler if there was any consensus in the Working Party as to what kind of status the GDR was expected to get. He went on to say that the Russians did not seem to be thinking in terms of de jure recognition but rather de facto dealings.

Mr. Kohler said that his colleagues in the Working Group felt that the Soviet purpose was to strengthen the GDR internationally, and to afford the GDR some control over the access question, in addition to breaking the ties between the Federal Republic and Berlin. He said he was leaving aside the more general possibilities such as humiliation of the Western Powers and an impressive demonstration of Soviet power. He said they did not know whether the Russians would insist upon the Western Powers' dealing directly with the GDR and that the military buildup might have had some effect on this point.

Mr. Carstens said he felt that there were two points the Soviets were seeking: (1) the recognition of the GDR as an independent state; and (2) GDR authority over Berlin access; and that the second was the more important.

The Secretary said it seemed to him that there would be little reason in establishing the competence of the GDR unless Khrushchev intended to accomplish something specific by utilizing this competence.

Mr. von Brentano said that he thought that Khrushchev's intention was the transfer of the control rights over access to the GDR. This would result in a situation where today you might have something but the day after it would be changed; that Mr. X would be permitted to go to Berlin and Mr. Y not. The same procedures would apply to types of goods. The Soviets would then deny any responsibility. He felt that this path was dangerous, if not fatal.

Lord Home pointed out that the Soviets could virtually do that now in regard to German travel by land, although not by air.

Mr. Kohler mentioned that one thing was certain, that no West German official would be permitted to go to West Berlin if the East Germans controlled the access; that one of their main purposes was to break the ties between West Berlin and West Germany.

Mr. von Brentano said that the removal of the ties with the Federal Republic would be the beginning of the end for West Berlin. He said we should not try to interpret what the Russians really mean, but should read what they say. He mentioned there were people in Germany who lived by interpreting Soviet actions but what they say was very clear. They intend to sign a peace treaty with the GDR and turn over the access to GDR control. The Soviet guarantee would not be a guarantee of the status quo, but merely a guarantee of whatever agreement the GDR might make. There would be no rights left and the West would be in a very difficult position and the Soviets would be completely disengaged.

The Secretary said that while we are all vitally interested in Berlin, it was of greater interest to Germany. He would, therefore, like to inquire of the German Foreign Minister what he saw in the future as to relations between the Federal Republic and East Germany, and between West Berlin and East Germany.

Von Brentano said that this was not an easy question to answer, but, in general, he thought that the division of Germany would become more acute. He said up to now, while traffic had been obstructed by the Soviet Zone, it still continued, but he felt that the travel would now become much more difficult. Trade, he felt, would continue since it was in GDR interest but in September it was made very plain that the negotiators could deal only with trade and with other matters of traffic; they specifically stated they did not have any authority, especially in the financial and currency field. He felt that human contacts would decline and saw little prospect of any improvement in this respect and none whatsoever for any move towards reunification. He mentioned the example of church matters, pointing out that the new bishop of Berlin who lived in the Eastern Sector had not been permitted to come to West Berlin, nor had the Catholic bishops in Eastern Germany been permitted to attend the conference of German bishops. The successor to Dibelius had not been permitted to return to his home in the Eastern zone after a trip to West Berlin. He said the toughness of the East German attitude in regard to the churches indicated what their attitude would be on other matters.

Lord Home said that the revised Western peace plan contained provision for "mixed commissions" and he wondered whether or not one of these commissions might not be a vehicle to make access arrangements.

Mr. von Brentano said that he had agreed to the proposal of mixed commissions with the exception of the third commission on human rights, which he felt was a little perverse. He had agreed to these commissions because he thought possibly the one on freedom of movement might effect some slight improvement despite their basic objection to the commissions where you would have coming into one body two incommensurable elements. He was willing, however, to try in the faint hope that this might improve communications. He felt, however, that any cooperation was impossible in political fields, no matter whether the commission met once or a thousand times. The Communists' ideas in the political field were so different from their own that there was no hope.

Lord Home said that he would agree on the political elements and human rights but felt that technical arrangements might be helpful in regard to access, particularly if these were guaranteed by the Soviets.

Mr. von Brentano felt that this would be a very dangerous idea since if allied rights were considered by this commission, made up as it would be of completely disparate elements, the Communists would try and refer this matter to Bolz, the East German Foreign Minister, with implications of recognition. He felt the three Western allies should not favor this course.

Lord Home explained that he had not had allied rights in mind, but German.

The Secretary said that he felt that at some stage Khrushchev was going to sign a peace treaty, but supposed that in the peace treaty there was a reservation along the lines of the Bolz-Zorin letter. There would be no question in regard to rights themselves but it might involve some dealings with East Germans. In other words, the reservation might contain a reaffirmation of the allied rights but the exercise of the rights would be with the East Germans. He inquired what alternatives there would be to the allies in this event: to endeavor to obtain some UN responsibility; or, have the three allies deal with the East Germans; or transfer such dealing to the West Germans.

Von Brentano said the situation would be different if allied rights were the subject of the reservation and with the East Germans to implement. It would be necessary to negotiate with the East Germans, and he felt that the difference between rights and their implementation was razor-thin. The reservations might be in very general terms, which would have to be spelled out in negotiations with the GDR. An opinion on this would only be possible when they saw the language.

The Secretary agreed and added that we should seek to have as little to do with the East Germans as possible. He said he previously, in a somewhat light vein, had referred to the fact that allied rights were in relation to Germany as a whole and that, therefore, it might be possible to have these rights worked out by Germans, if the rights themselves were not involved.

Von Brentano said they would be prepared to accept this fiction but pointed out by reading from the Bolz-Zorin letter the fact that this had been merely done with a part of Germany, the GDR. He also mentioned that these rights were temporarily handled by the Soviets, pending a subsequent agreement.

The Secretary said the Ministers may have strayed somewhat from the purpose of this meeting, which was primarily the talks with Gromyko. He wished to return to Couve de Murville's remark at the luncheon when Couve had stressed the necessity of warning the Russians. He would like to inquire what his colleagues thought were the casi belli. For example, we had been speaking of the three vital Western interests: (1) the Western presence in Berlin, (2) the freedom and viability of West Berlin, and (3) access. He wondered whether these were sufficiently precise, since Gromyko might say that if we accepted the Soviet propositions these would be taken care of.

Mr. von Brentano said that there was general disagreement between what the Soviets meant and what the Western Powers meant, both on freedom and on access. The Soviets give the term "free city" one meaning, but we have a completely different idea. What we mean is the democratic order with freedom of speech, freedom of political parties, etc. The Soviets have a completely different point of view on ties with the Federal Republic. He mentioned that West Germany paid out 1.2 billion marks a year to the "lost child" of Berlin. He said of course we could say to the Soviets that if they included a definition of our requirements for freedom this might be a possibility, but he felt the incompatibility of ideas was very profound. He continued that it was awkward for a German to talk of these matters but he felt that in this small privileged gathering he could be frank. He said there were many people who said that the situation in Berlin was basically the fault of the Germans but the President had stated at the luncheon that it was not Berlin but our common policy that was at issue. If we started to liquidate the status of Berlin there would be an exodus from Berlin and that this would mean the liquidation of an advanced free world post. He recalled a 1958 conversation at NATO in which it had been said that if Berlin goes, there is no certainty what will go next, and that he felt that in that event there would be more than one Foreign Minister on the way to Moscow to negotiate the circumstances of his country's suicide.

The Secretary said that Mr. von Brentano had graphically stated the problem. He himself felt that with Gromyko the three vital interests were not enough and it might be necessary to go into further detail. He said we were all agreed on the importance of these three vital issues: our presence in Berlin, our protection of Berlin's freedoms, and the right of access, over which we could not accept control or censure, but that he would feel that we should go beyond this and it might be a good idea to draw up a check list.

Mr. von Brentano said he was very grateful for the Secretary's words which had said what he had in mind. He felt it would be dangerous to attempt to stick to the three points since Gromyko might consider that anything not mentioned would not be considered important.

Couve de Murville said he wished to make two points. He said that for life in Berlin it was very important to have links with the outside world, and especially with Western Germany. The Russians have raised the matter of political activity, but there were, in addition, many other kinds of ties--economic, financial, currency. He recalled that in 1959 in Geneva on the subject of political relations the Western delegations had said that Berlin was not a part of the Federal Republic. He was sure that Gromyko would mention this point to the Secretary. He pointed out that political activities in West Berlin, in effect, were part of the question of access of West Germans to West Berlin. He felt that the main idea was, therefore, the uncontrolled nature of the air corridor for German traffic. He summarized that the two questions which he felt that Gromyko would logically raise were, (1) political activities, and (2) air access.

The Secretary said the Ministers should devote a good deal of their time to the consideration of the proposals which might be made to the Russians. He felt they might think about the possibility of telling the Russians that since East Berlin has been made the capital of East Germany, that they did not have any right to go into the question of the ties between West Berlin and the Federal Republic. He said he felt that when we had first said that West Berlin was not part of the Federal Republic, we had, in effect, been reserving our position on all Berlin. He was not suggesting incorporation of West Berlin in the Federal Republic.

He mentioned that tomorrow the Ministers would also discuss the question of a naval blockade.

Washington, September 17, 1961, 3:12 p.m.

735. Paris pass USRO Stoessel, McGuire. Following based on uncleared memorandum of conversation:/2/

Quadripartite Ministerial session morning September 16 opened with US briefing on naval blockade report prepared by US group supplemented by Quadripartite committee./3/ Secretary noted blockade was severe step. Said principal question was whether we should take such measure without bracing for Soviet military action in Europe or Soviet initiation all-out war. Home stated maritime control measures covered by report actually first act of war, and were actions to take when war almost inevitable. Felt they perhaps preferable land war however. Suggested study possible uses naval forces other than maritime control in context Berlin issue. Von Brentano expressed FedRep's approval of report, noting such measures gave West arsenal weapons of varying degree severity which had advantage of being flexible and not irrevocable. It was agreed send study to Military Subcommittee.

Meeting having moved to restricted session, Secretary raised question of dealing with Soviet proposals. Noted certain seductive quality in terms "peace treaty" and "free city." Noted it had been agreed Paris Ministerial Meeting to prepare simplified and attractive Western proposals. He asked Ministers how large gap there should be between initial Western proposals and probable outcome negotiations. Khrushchev had committed himself strongly to signing treaty. Not going be easy prevent this. Asked if we should attempt put treaty into some context in which it would appear as provisional arrangement. Suggested as example declaration reaffirming self-determination German people to provide overriding concept reducing actions of two sides to nature of interim arrangements only. This would open up possibilities of flexibility to be exploited by proposed mixed East-West German technical commissions, European security arrangements, etc.

Couve noted we all agreed treaty would not tough us; we could not prevent it but did not recognize its validity. One thing of importance was consequences Soviets could draw from it re our rights in Berlin. Thus we must concentrate on defending our rights and interests. Secretary agreed heart of our position was insistence on our rights. Feared however Western position would erode after signing of peace treaty as other countries increasingly recognized GDR attempted secure its entry into UN, etc. Thought declaration some overriding principle such as self-determination German people might cast post-peace treaty situation in light of interim status. He had in mind statement such as that of Khrushchev that reunification matter for German people. Home wondered if we could use something like draft opening negotiating proposal suggested by Working Group./4/ We could state certain practical arrangements could be made in interim pending final solution. Von Brentano agreed with Secretary's estimate effects of peace treaty, but argued we could not say Soviets did not want to do what they in fact did want to do. They did not want provisional but final arrangement incorporating GDR in bloc. Suggested using proposal based on Western Peace Plan coupled perhaps with statement of principles worked out in 1959./5/ Idea of mixed East-West German technical commissions might provide rationale for referring to post-peace treaty status as provisional.

Home asked what purpose remained for life of West Berlin now that iron curtain dropped across city. Suggested putting UN into all Berlin or West Berlin. Von Brentano said idea of moving UN to Berlin very questionable. UN would be faced with problems now faced by Allies there; must in any case include all-Berlin; such arrangement could only be interim as division Germany into three separate parts not acceptable permanently (referred to establishment Berlin as international city). Should study possibilities, however. Secretary said US had no formal position on UN aspect but agreed problem of future role for city required hard thought. Believed introduction UN presence of lesser scope than headquarters itself offered possibility. Moving UN headquarters behind iron curtain had prestige value for Soviets. Furthermore, UN guarantee for city could not be as satisfactory as that of Three Powers, while UN would likely feel Three Power guarantee of site of its headquarters inappropriate. Saw other roles for city, such as seat of 4-power and mixed German technical Commissions, etc. It agreed Ambassadorial Group should study question. Secretary also mentioned possibility putting legal aspects Berlin problem before ICJ. Said US experts believed this unwise. Von Brentano agreed.

Von Brentano raised question paragraph 16 Western Peace Plan providing for European security arrangements. Said dangerous take measures in security field without linking them with political solutions. Secretary replied terms of reference of proposed group to study this point very broad. Said he felt political settlement and security arrangements not mutually exclusive in point of time, however. Same question arose in disarmament. Political situation must be taken into account but we should get on with efforts meanwhile reduce effects of confrontation great power systems.

Secretary then raised question FedRep F-84s in Berlin. Couve stated French had talked with pilots and were persuaded of their good faith. He recommended and it was agreed that we remain quiet for the present on the matter.

Ministers were then briefed on Congo situation by Assistant Secretary Cleveland.

Memorandum of conversation will be pouched addressees./6/

Rusk