Washington, August 3, 1961, 4:30 p.m.

PRESENT
The President, the Secretary of State, Mr. Owen

1. The Secretary said that he hoped in Paris to (i) secure allied agreement to the military build-up; (ii) clinch preparations for economic sanctions; (iii) get a coordinated NATO propaganda effort into high gear.

2. The Secretary spoke of the possibility of an early instruction to Thompson to make a quiet approach to Khrushchev. One object would be to get Khrushchev engaged in a discussion of the access question. This object might better be achieved in private rather than in a formal talk.

3. The Secretary said that by the end of this month he thought the Western powers would be in a position to propose a Four Power Foreign Ministers' Conference. That Conference might take place in early October or early November. A meeting of the Heads of Western governments immediately concerned should take place beforehand in Bermuda.

4. The Secretary said that he hoped not to get very far into the content of our negotiating position in discussions at Paris. He did not think this was the time to press the Germans into making concessions on either the German or European security questions--particularly in view of the upcoming elections. The President agreed, suggesting that the French and Germans would have to get the wind up before they were moved to give us the flexibility we will need on some issues in order to get the better guarantee of access we want. He thought that Ambassador Kennan's suggestions/2/ made sense but that this was not the time to push our allies. The Secretary suggested that we might be able to make some progress just by asking our allies the right questions. He reported German Defense Minister Strauss' remark to Mr. Acheson/3/--that the Germans have not yet faced up to the risk of war over Berlin; he thought that they will be more flexible when they do. The President added that our allies' negotiating mood may also mellow when they are asked to undertake costly military preparations.

5. The President asked what our counter-proposal to Khrushchev should be. The Secretary said that our initial proposal should be for a change in the status quo in our favor, to balance the change that Khrushchev is seeking in his favor. This would prepare the way for later hard bargaining.

6. The President asked about Solution "C". The Secretary described it as a series of reciprocal declarations between Western powers and the Communists, in which both sides would reserve their juridical positions and agree to preserve the physical status quo except for replacement of Soviet by East German personnel along the access routes. The Secretary said that we could not prevent Khrushchev from signing a treaty but we might be able to build up enough resistance thus to deter him from blocking our access after a treaty.

7. The Secretary said there was one point on which he wanted to make his position clear to the President before his discussions at Paris. Shooting should be an act of last resort; non-military means (e.g., an airlift and sanctions) should be exhausted first. Even a small probe could quickly get out of control.

8. The President suggested that a Defense Ministers' meeting be held at the end of August. He mentioned, as one of the questions which would require decision at some point, whether aircraft should be maintained in a state of non-nuclear readiness. In this case, a delay of several hours would have to ensue before they could use nuclear weapons, instead of a comparable delay before they could use iron bombs, as at present.

9. The Secretary said that while in Paris he would visit the NATO Council with the Attorney General. After Paris he would go to Italy to see Segni. He would write to the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers from Paris. The President thought well of the British suggestion that the Secretary come home by way of London.

10. The Secretary intended that Ambassadors Bruce, Dowling, Thompson, and Kennan constitute a standing group to provide ideas on Berlin. Kennan would also be keeping in touch with neutrals. The Belgrade meeting of neutral nations was briefly covered./4/

11. Tripartite consultation would take place in Washington. The Secretary would consult with the two Ambassadors; French and British members of the Standing Group would be brought in, as appropriate. This may not satisfy the French; they will have to be convinced that we meant what we said when we suggested that discretion would be needed.

12. The President asked about the possibility of a plebiscite in Berlin. The Secretary said that he would discuss this with the Foreign Ministers in Paris. The President suggested that we might have to indicate our willingness to abide by the results. There was some discussion of how to phrase the question so that it would favor neither side. The President rather liked: "Mr. Khrushchev has made a proposal for changing the status of Berlin. Do you support this?"

13. The President mentioned Senator Case's letter dealing with the possibility of a canal from Czechoslovakia./5/

14. It was agreed that the decision to propose a Four Power Foreign Ministers' meeting in early October should not be firmly taken in Paris, but should be referred to the Heads of Governments. The danger of leaks would thus be minimized.

15. It was agreed that the U.S. would ease off its present position on paper stamping, letting the UK carry the ball with the French and Germans. This allied decision should be made known later in the year, in advance of a treaty, e.g., in November or December. Meantime, we could see if it could be traded for something from the Soviets.

16. The President mentioned the likely difficulty of persuading de Gaulle and Adenauer to our proposed positions at a Western Heads of Government meeting. The Secretary suggested that, in the end, de Gaulle would probably go along with our proposals, if the President indicated that they were essential to preserve our position in Berlin.

17. There was some discussion of propaganda themes. The President did not think much of the "defaulting trustee" theme. The Secretary said that our propaganda would be geared to the main themes in the President's speech,/6/ which was being widely translated and circulated.

18. The Secretary said that we should try now to keep Berlin out of the UN, where we would lack support as a result of Bizerte. We would have to take Berlin to the UN, however, if there were a peace treaty and moves were made against our access.

19. The discussion turned away from Berlin:

[Here follow six paragraphs on other topics.]

On July 27, 1961, a U.S. Delegation, led by Assistant Secretary of State Kohler and including Legal Adviser Chayes, Director of the Office of German Affairs Hillenbrand, Under Secretary of the Treasury Fowler, and Assistant Secretary of Defense Nitze, flew to Paris for a week of meetings with representatives of France, the United Kingdom, and the Federal Republic of Germany to lay the groundwork for the Foreign Ministers meeting beginning August 5. At its first meeting this Four-Power Working Group agreed on the following order of business: 1) Political problems; 2) Politico-military problems; 3) Economic phases of contingency planning; and 4) Information program.

The U.S. memorandum on Berlin, which was distributed to the other Western powers on July 21 (see Document 79), served as the basis for discussion.

By August 2 the Working Group had drafted a report on Soviet motives and intentions; reached general agreement, although the French and Germans had doubts, that negotiations with the Soviet Union should be opened before it signed a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic; and discussed the forum, scope, and substance of the negotiations. Discussion of politico-military problems revealed that the other Western powers had reservations about a large-scale ground probe, while talks on the economic aspects of contingency planning reached a consensus on a total embargo of the Soviet bloc in the event of a "substantial" blockage of access to Berlin. (Memorandum for the Secretary, August 2; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-261)

In commenting on the early meetings of the Working Group, McGeorge Bundy told the President that the U.S. Delegation "was even less ready to think of new positions than the Acheson-McGhee papers recommend," and suggested that the President talk to Secretary Rusk about this rigidity. (Memorandum attached to telegram 588 from Paris, August 2; Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Germany)

On August 4 the Working Group completed its discussions and submitted its report to the four Western governments. Entitled "Report of the Four-Power Working Group on Germany and Berlin, Paris, July 28-August 4, 1961," it consisted of six sections: I) Soviet Motives and Intentions, II) Tactics, III) Substantial Political Questions, IV) Strengthening of the Forces of the Alliance, V) Recommended Minute on Economic Countermeasures, and VI) Review of Berlin Contingency Plans. A copy of the report, with 10 attached U.S. papers on various aspects of the Berlin problem (MCB Memo 3(I)), August 4, is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1945. Kohler's telegrams summarizing the activities of the Working Group are ibid., Central Files, 762.00/7-2861 through 762.00/8-461. For Chayes' recollections of the meetings, see his oral history interview at the Kennedy Library.

US/MC/2

Paris, August 5, 1961, 10:30 a.m.

MINISTERIAL CONSULTATIONS ON BERLIN
Paris, August 4-9, 1961

PARTICIPANTS

United States
The Secretary of State
Mr. Kohler
Mr. Nitze
Mr. Hillenbrand

United Kingdom
Lord Home
Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh
Sir Francis Festing
Mr. John Killick

France
M. Couve de Murville
M. Charles Lucet
M. Charles de Carbonnel
M. Jean Laloy

SUBJECT
Tripartite Meeting on Berlin and Germany

Couve de Murville opened the first Tripartite Meeting by suggesting that, while the Germans should normally participate in discussion of the Berlin question, there were certain aspects of the matter about which the three could perhaps talk more frankly in their absence. After referring to the consultative work accomplished by the Four-Power Working Group, the Secretary stressed the importance of bringing the Germans into future work in the most intimate way. It was necessary to have them participate to the point where the German people could not make the charge that their Government was not fully informed or involved. If a crisis is to come, it would be important that the Germans be involved in the center of the matter rather than at the side. The U.S. hoped that they could be included as full partners in the Ambassadorial Steering Group in Washington. As a result of the present meetings and the subsequent NATO meeting, we hope to achieve a high degree of Allied unity demonstrating that the West is prepared to protect its vital interests. It is important that we confront Khrushchev with an impressive display of unity for this will heighten the chances of a peaceful settlement.

After noting that the Working Group had produced a practical report/2/ for the Ministers, Lord Home agreed to bring the Germans fully in with the possible exception of their participation in early Ambassadorial talks in Moscow. We would not want, he thought, to press the Germans too much before their elections, particularly if such subjects as the de facto recognition of the GDR or UN involvement in the Berlin crisis were to come into the picture. Otherwise we could not bring the Germans in too much. Regarding the military build-up, the British would be prepared to call up the territorial army and to mobilize their reserves if necessary. They hope to join with the U.S., France, and Germany in obtaining the cooperation of the NATO countries, although it would be unrealistic to expect that the latter could produce much more strength on the ground.

Couve said he agreed entirely that the Germans must be completely in the picture. There might be a few things which could best be discussed tripartitely but this would not prejudice full German participation. One thing was certain. The Berlin question was much more a question of the future of the Federal Republic than of Berlin itself. While it was essential to save the liberties of two million Berliners, it was even more important to keep the Federal Republic attached to the West. Our main objective must be to avoid anything which could alter this and lead to German neutralism or an approach to the Soviets. In response to Home's question as to whether there was really any danger of this, Couve emphasized Berlin was really crucial for our relations with Germany and the future of the Atlantic Alliance. If the West suffers a political defeat the work of fifteen years will be undone and the course of the future will be profoundly changed. This is the spirit in which the Allies must consider the problem. Whatever they did, the Federal Republic must be in full agreement.

Home broached the timing question, noting that it seemed certain that the West will have to negotiate with the Soviets and will be pushed into negotiations either by the UN or by other pressures. What would be the best point at which to take the initiative to propose negotiations? Couve responded that there were two aspects: the tactical problem of when to take the initiative and for what date to propose talks, and the substantive problem of the Western negotiating position. Before deciding to have negotiations, he felt the West must decide on its substantive policy. He did not have any question as to what it should be.

The Secretary said he thought there would be considerable value in a Western initiative on negotiations so as not to appear simply to be sitting back with reliance on the status quo until Khrushchev pulls the West into negotiations. The West should have proposals regarding convening negotiations before the meeting of neutrals by the end of this month and certainly before the UNGA session opened on September 19. Unless such negotiations are in prospect, others might take initiatives which would work to the West's disadvantage. UN discussion of Berlin at this time is not likely to be to Western advantage. Therefore we want to discuss an early initiative for a Foreign Ministers meeting to take place in the autumn--perhaps the first week in October, or if the Soviets prefer a later date--the first week in November. Regarding a substantive position, he supposed the West might start with proposals on which we would not necessarily expect to end but which would improve the status quo. From these we might expect to move to some de facto regulation of the situation in conformity with our interests and consistent with the maintenance of something like the status quo.

Over the present weekend, the West could not expect to arrive at a detailed negotiating position and this is not desirable. Probably such a position could not be achieved before the German elections. He agreed that the West must eventually arrive at a unified substantive position but he questioned whether, if we were unable to give the Germans complete details of our proposals now, this should be a barrier to an initiative towards negotiations. In any event and apart from the question of German participation in preparations, there were grave disadvantages in going well into the autumn without such an initiative.

Lord Home queried whether the Secretary was saying that we must move towards negotiations with the Soviets but not yet decide on what we would negotiate except to the extent that the Ambassadorial probe in Moscow might proceed. The Secretary agreed but noted that some Ambassadorial contact in Moscow was in any event inevitable. What he had in mind was that beyond a possible Ambassadorial approach, we should propose a specific Foreign Ministers' meeting to the Soviets and that this would become known publicly--hopefully with Soviet acceptance of such a meeting. If we did not do this, our friends and Allies including those in NATO would be unwilling to support what seemed like a military build-up and the need for related economic and propaganda measures unless these were accompanied by a move towards negotiation. Home mentioned that Nehru was getting restive. If the problem got into the UN now, the position of the West was likely to be weakened thereby. This was the reason for an initiative on a Foreign Ministers' meeting before September 19 without revealing the substance of our position. In preparing the Western substantive position, Couve said there was a case to be made for the absence of the Germans if we actually have negotiations with the Soviets. The West could always advance something along standard lines combating the Soviet peace treaty proposal with proposals for German reunification on the basis of self-determination or for the unification of Berlin. Everyone on both sides knows that these are not practical. The discussion will inevitably move on to the status of Berlin and access thereto. He was not certain that agreement with the Soviets on these subjects was possible. If there is agreement on Berlin, this means that the status quo will not be maintained as such. What the Soviets want is to crystallize the existence of the GDR and to change the Berlin situation in such a way that it is no longer a factual part of the Federal Republic not merely in the economic and financial sense. It was the political absorption of West Berlin into the Federal Republic which particularly worried the Soviets. The West Germans had been "silly enough" to insist on holding Bundestag and other meetings, having visits of the Chancellor and other officials, and other activities there. There was the burning problem of the refugees. If the Soviets accept an agreement on Berlin, Couve continued, for the Allies this would somehow have to involve a guarantee of Western communications even if the continuation of the occupation status was not formally recognized. The Soviets would indubitably insist on the discontinuance of West German political activities in Berlin under cover of the occupation status. This is a fact which we and the Germans must face if there is to be any agreement with the Soviets. However, all purely German communications with Berlin are presently under GDR control. Any agreement would have to stop what the Western Powers are doing to help Federal Republic political activities in West Berlin. The Soviets will insist that GDR control of German traffic between the Federal Republic and Berlin include refugees. This is what a substantive agreement really comes to in the last analysis. As to tactics and the role of public opinion, he frankly did not see the problem in the same light as the Secretary. This was a vital issue. Our life and future depended on what came out of the crisis. It was essentially a test of strength between the Soviet Union and the U.S. He frankly did not see how, if this were the case, you could impress the Soviets by taking the same line on negotiations as the Soviets. Vital Western national interests were at stake. The role of the UN was not an essential fact in this situation. The only essential fact was our relationship to the Soviets and how we do or do not deal with them. If the present situation is a trial of strength, it is essential to show no weakness. Therefore, he could not help but agree with the Secretary in his emphasis on maintaining not only unity in fact, but the appearance of unity. But to take action in the way proposed would merely show what was really at the bottom of our hearts--fear of war. We must not be weak in our position. Khrushchev says this is an issue on which the West will not fight and that we will finally accept his position. Perhaps in the last analysis he is right but it would certainly be wrong to give him the immediate impression that he is right. Here Couve came back to his first point, that the entire future of the Federal Republic and our relationship to it was at stake.

Home said that since the East Germans presently control all civilian traffic to West Berlin except air communications, if we were to get a reasonable de facto arrangement because Khrushchev wants no war, we would not be much worse off than at present except that Allied air access could not be used to move refugees. Couve agreed that 95% of Berlin traffic was now controlled by the GDR but he emphasized that the other 5% is the crucial traffic. It was not really pure military traffic which caused trouble, but a use of military rights as a camouflage for essentially German traffic. It was natural from their viewpoint that the GDR would want to control this. A neutralized West Berlin to the Soviets would mean that no German could enter or leave Berlin except with GDR permission. The result would be a progressive adjustment of the Germans in West Berlin to the factual situation. Home mentioned that the East Germans could achieve this effect now. Couve said the point was that the refugees are transported by air. This was the real issue. He wanted to say this now while von Brentano was not present when it was awkward.

The Secretary commented on the trial of strength to which Couve had referred. We agreed this was involved here but this strength had many components. We should like not to discount too much the value of world reactions and the importance which this has both to Khrushchev and to ourselves. The Sino-Soviet bloc has extensive objectives in other parts of the world and is making large efforts in non-Communist countries. If we can show up their Berlin position before the rest of the world this would be a political factor they must take into account. If we can not convince most UN countries that our position is reasonable and that we are not just being stubborn, the pressure will be towards some position which will be difficult for us. In democratic societies people do not think much of war as an instrument of policy unless they believe war is unavoidable. We believe nuclear war to be possible in the Berlin crisis although we do not say this is inevitable. If we ask our peoples to take a risk of this magnitude, we must make clear that every feasible effort is being made to achieve our objective by other means. Democracies must be led to conflict with clear consciences.

Couve said he did not want to give the impression that he underestimated what the Secretary had said. The support of public opinion and of the noncommitted countries was very important. But when our very lives are at stake, this is not essential. The substance of our vital interests is essential. He also agreed concerning the importance of public opinion within the Western Alliance and the necessity that people be willing to follow their governments. It is essential that we explain and be understood, but this cannot change our basic position because Berlin is linked to our vital interests. It was not impossible that the crisis would lead to nuclear war but we must accept this risk. If what we accept instead weakens our position and our unity, it will be possible to avoid nuclear war in 1961. But this would merely lead to nuclear war in 1962 or 1963. This is not a policy. We have learned that in the past and must evaluate the present situation in that light.

In response to the Secretary's query as to whether Couve detected significant substantive differences between us and the Germans on these matters, Couve said he did not know. They obviously could not accept certain things which the other three might wish to propose. When it came to the real trial, he did not really know what their stand would be and he suspected they likewise did not know.

Home said that he did not think we should press the Germans too hard at this time. However, the fact was that Khrushchev was saying things which seemed reasonable to the rest of the world. A peace treaty did not sound bad and Khrushchev would certainly offer guarantees before he made a peace treaty. If he did this, the West could not avoid negotiations. Therefore, as the Secretary had said, we must consider how we turn negotiations to our best advantage. If they come after a peace treaty is signed, then we must take account of the new position of the GDR. If they come before a peace treaty, Khrushchev might say he will make a peace treaty anyway but it will be subject to prior arrangements with the Allies. Home said he could see that if we surrendered the basic rights of West Berlin this would shake NATO and turn the Germans toward the East. The West must insist on the freedom of West Berliners including their freedom of movement to West Germany, but this inevitably involved some measure of recognition of the GDR. The Secretary noted that the fact that 95 percent of the present traffic to Berlin is controlled by the East Germans in itself is a sort of de facto recognition of their existence and of the need to deal with them. Home said two points on which agreement is necessary with Khrushchev would involve status of the GDR and our position on Berlin. On the second point, if Khrushchev did not want war, he might be willing to accept some compromise for at least sometime ahead. He had no objection to asking for a conference soon on Germany and Berlin without revealing our real negotiating hand. The Secretary said we might do this through diplomatic channels.

When Home repeated that the apparent reasonableness of the Soviet position for the rest of the world would make it impossible for the West to go to war without negotiations, the Secretary said this also had some relation to the "test of firmness". In the past he had sometimes felt the West was too nervous about negotiations as if the Soviets were 12 feet tall. We should have more confidence in ourselves and in our ability to talk to them even if we might never agree. By the first week in October many things which we were undertaking in the military, economic and propaganda fields will have begun to make their impression on Khrushchev in terms of underlining Western seriousness of purpose. By that time, the West should not be in a disadvantageous position to talk. If we did not show willingness to negotiate, our position would be eroded by the feeling that we should have explored every possibility before Allied traffic is actually turned back at the barriers.

In response to Couve's query as to whether to answer the last Soviet note,/3/ Home said that in the last Soviet note Khrushchev had given us an opening by showing sensitivity on self-determination. This suggested a Western offer of a plebiscite. Couve commented that, speaking of tactics, it seemed to him that for some months now Khrushchev had been very self-confident and believed that the Soviet Union would not have to face a real crisis. The U.S. military decisions were good and could not fail to make some impression with the Soviets as evidence of U.S. firmness. If we now went to Khrushchev and said we wanted to negotiate, he would immediately conclude that we were not serious. An Ambassadorial approach in Moscow along the lines envisaged would also lead him to conclude that he could proceed. The minimum the West could do is to let the situation develop a little to see if Khrushchev can come to be persuaded that this is a serious matter. Home disagreed and said that the UNGA was convening on September 19. Someone would undoubtedly come forward and ask for negotiations. If we had to respond, the West would be in a weaker position than if we took an initiative ourselves. Couve commented that he did not think it would be India, Ghana or Indonesia that would be the decisive factor in the Berlin situation.

The Secretary referred to the President's speech to the U.S. people./4/ We recognized that there were several audiences as well as the U.S. people. Not only the U.S. people, but our Allies--more than 40 countries--and not just NATO--they all had a direct interest if we got into war with the Soviets. We felt it important to make two points that we were prepared to fight for our vital interests if necessary but if they could be protected by peaceful means so much the better. The President had strongly emphasized that a Western initiative be taken on negotiations and that we did not have to detract from our position of strength. Instead it was an essential part thereof. We attach more importance to U.N. countries and the effect their attitudes might have on Khrushchev. We also had interests in other parts of the world which we want to further and regarding which we need to think in the Berlin context. By early October the seriousness of the U.S. steps could have impressed Khrushchev that we are facing a war possibility. Khrushchev had certainly read the President's speech in full. A lack of interest in negotiation could scarcely make him feel we were more serious than otherwise. In fact, it might have the opposite effect. In the past, he has recognized that to scare the West he need only suggest negotiations. We are arming, but part of our purpose for this is to support us in negotiation.

Couve said that what Khrushchev says is clear in the Soviet note. He is prepared to talk purely on his own grounds. Our position has always been that we are willing to negotiate but not be subject to preconditions or threats. This had been discussed at great length two and one-half years ago before the Geneva Conference.

Home said he had to agree with the Secretary that the general effect of military measures would be enhanced by an offer to negotiate. Otherwise people would say the West had gone over completely to a military solution. He suggested that in late August or early September we might reply to the latest Soviet notes; in early September we could conduct the Ambassadorial probe in Moscow; following the German elections we could make a proposal just before the UNGA opening and before Khrushchev had reached his own decision on a peace treaty. Couve said that it was clear that Khrushchev had already decided to convene a peace conference after the October 12 Party Congress--perhaps in early November. Home responded that the question was whether he told the GDR whether the peace treaty is to be unconditional or to take account of a prior understanding with the Allies.

The Secretary hoped that we could take political steps to upset Khrushchev's timetable for signature of the peace treaty. If a Foreign Ministers' meeting were scheduled for early in October or November, it would be hard for him to go ahead. It would certainly be more difficult for him to persuade non-Communist countries to attend a peace conference. At this point, there was some inconclusive discussion over which countries might conceivably be invited to a Soviet peace conference.

In response to the Secretary's query as to how, in the absence of negotiations, Couve saw developments for the rest of the year, Couve said he did not exclude negotiations, but he did not like the way they were presently being proposed. This seemed to him to be the way of weakness coming too soon after a show of strength. We should answer Khrushchev's note saying that we are always ready for negotiations but cannot negotiate on his terms but only under reasonable, open conditions. This might go forward in 2 or 3 weeks and the American Ambassador might then emphasize the seriousness of the Berlin situation and whether he has drawn all the conclusions possible from developments he has now in motion.

The Secretary commented that if we try to avoid negotiating on terms Khrushchev has suggested it was all the more important that we initiate negotiations on terms we want. Another factor relating to timing was that precisely because we take the Berlin situation so seriously in terms of our vital interest, we want to ensure to the extent possible that events themselves did not take control. Beyond a certain point, prestige and other elements would assume new proportions. The need for talks with the Soviets grows not only out of the problem of Berlin but out of our approach to it. Talks were not a sign of weakness; but we will talk because we understood what was at the end of the trail.

Home said he always kept coming back to the Soviet position that after the peace treaty, we must arrange access with the GDR. Our position then might well force on us a degree of de facto recognition of the GDR beyond what we want to concede. He agreed with the Secretary, that in the future the longer negotiations are postponed, the more rigid positions will be. Our objective should be to get prior guarantees from Khrushchev, before he signs a peace treaty, regarding the effect of the peace treaty on our position. He agreed, of course, that we must not give away West Berlin and lose West Germany in the process. Couve said that he had not precisely meant that. We obviously had to try to make a deal and this involved giving something away.

Lord Home said such a deal would be much more difficult in the post-treaty situation. He agreed we wanted to wait until September 17 before indicating we wanted a Foreign Ministers meeting. Couve reiterated his proposed timetable for answering the note, saying we should negotiate but only under reasonable conditions. Delivery of the note could be accompanied by a warning from the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow and in September the Western Foreign Ministers might meet again and assess the situation and the steps to be taken. This would still be a month before the Party Congress and we would be rid of the German elections. In any case, a conference with the Soviets could not take place before the end of October or early November. After expressing a lack of enthusiasm for another Western Foreign Ministers meeting, Home said such a meeting could not take place before the German elections. Although Couve had said it should take place before the UNGA session, he hoped agreement could be reached that September 19 would be a good date on which to make the Western offer on negotiations. Another Western Foreign Ministers meeting would make it appear that the Western Powers were running after negotiations. He thought agreement on when to offer negotiations should be reached now. The Secretary asked why it was necessary to wait until September 19. He did not object to answering the Soviet note if we had something quite specific in it about negotiations and if it were to be made public before the UNGA session, but there seemed to be a disadvantage in continuing a note exchange if we just said we were willing to negotiate but showed no sign of doing something specific. Home commented that we did not really need to answer the note until mid-September. The Secretary said the longer we delay in offering negotiation the more we run risk that the Soviets will take an initiative before the Party Congress along the lines intended for after the Party Congress, and then we should be reacting to their terms.

Couve said that this would mark a change in the Soviet position. The Secretary said that the Soviets were making real headway with their proposals on a peace treaty and guarantees. We do not have anything in front of them to counter their proposals and this puts us in a weak position. We would have great difficulty in the U.S. in going ahead with a military build-up including the calling up of reserves, tripling the draft call, and pushing the civil defense program unless people knew diplomacy was at work trying to find out if all this were necessary. It would tend to undermine the present economy at home and in the Alliance unless other members of the UN knew we were exploiting every resource of diplomacy to protect our vital interests. Home noted his agreement. Couve, however, said this argument worked both ways. If you announce the conference at an early date, the world would inevitably relax and say it is all over and the West is going to make a deal with the Soviet. U.S. newspapers were right now commenting on a conference leading to a solution. This was the idea of the NATO allies and had been expressed in the recent WEU meeting. What, however, if the negotiations do not succeed? Then the pressure on the West will be the same as now. What do we do then if the crisis continued? He would hate to propose negotiations without first knowing what the Western substantive positions would be and this is not discussed in the Working Group Report. Home observed that this could be worked out in a later Working Group session and then the Western Foreign Ministers would have to meet and settle policy. If we delay too long and are exposed to pressures, this presumably will weaken our position.

The Secretary said the pressure and eventual disunity arising from a failure to offer negotiations would actually weaken the West in Khrushchev's eyes. He has gambled on Western disunity before. If negotiations are postponed until later, there may be false hopes about their outcome. If they failed there would be too little time left to educate the people regarding the seriousness of the issue which could not be resolved. We should begin to find out sooner rather than later whether negotiations are likely to settle the issue and what the real Soviet position is.

Couve said once again this cuts two ways. There was an obvious way we could get NATO unity and that was to imply that negotiations would settle the problem. This would be applauded. The harder and more realistic way was the better one. Home commented that obviously everybody wished that negotiation would settle the problem. If not, "we shall not have a meeting again".

Regarding contingency planning, Couve said that if it came to a real crisis and our communications were blocked, it was essential that we arrange things so that we were not obliged to be the first to shoot. Here he entirely shared the Secretary's preoccupation. In practice, the only way to do this is to use the air corridors. We should attempt to continue military transport by air and not begin with land operations.

The Secretary said we agreed. Our general attitude has been that since Berlin crisis may be a real one and cannot be eliminated by incantations such as the phrase "nuclear deterrent", we should try to force the other side to take the initiative with military measures. If we get to the situation where we have to fight, gaining time by an airlift to let our troops get into position might be desirable even if we could not sustain the city of Berlin by air for an extended period of time. We would also wish to bring economic sanctions and other measures to bear.

Home said he agreed on airlift question. As to economic sanctions, he also agreed but felt that detailed plans for various situations involving escalation to a total blockade needed to be worked out. We should develop a variety of economic weapons and study their consequences. The Secretary noted that we had just received a cable from Moscow reporting that the Italians had told our Ambassador that the Fanfani-Khrushchev talks/5/ had largely covered the same ground as the Vienna aide-mémoire and the McCloy talks. However, Khrushchev had made the point that, after the conclusion of a separate peace treaty, the Soviets were prepared to use force to prevent unauthorized air access to Berlin. Couve noted that Khrushchev had already said that. The Secretary observed that Ulbricht had said it. Couve said that in any event, an airlift as in 1948 was not possible because of nuclear balance. It would not last more than one day.

Home asked, looking at October 12 as a final date for Soviet decision, and even assuming Khrushchev makes up his mind October 1, when would Couve set a date for the conference? Couve said he was not sure Khrushchev had not now made up his mind. He thought he had. Home commented that if he agreed to make an agreement with us on Berlin, he would have to incorporate its terms in the treaty. Couve said that Khrushchev had already made up his mind and knows we will ask for negotiations. All he has to do is read the newspapers.

Home said if he knows we are going to do it sooner or later, isn't there some reason for doing it sooner?

The Secretary said that he doubted whether we should consider talking about our ultimate substantive position in the near future. It seemed impossible to prevent leaks, and thus our first word would become our last word. There was some merit in postponing discussion of the Western substantive position and not disclosing it too early in advance.

Home said we could, of course, work out a position on the all-German question opposing our self-determination principle to their peace treaty. We would get stuck on this. We would then work out our position on Berlin based on the three essential conditions in the Working Group Report. This would not be too hard to do. Perhaps new ingredients like the frontier question could be added. The Secretary said if we do not establish a substantive framework for negotiations now with the Soviets, the alternatives available to us later might be even worse. He observed that discussions were both frequent and unavoidable in Moscow. It was better to have a unified discussion than to have individual discussions on a non-unified basis initiated through diplomatic channels. Khrushchev might take the initiative or other Governments might do it. He could not guarantee that we would not talk to Khrushchev during the rest of August.

Couve observed that if the Soviets can speak to the U.S. Ambassador that will be enough for them. If this is done, care should be taken that nothing comes out to the German public. Home observed that if we know the Foreign Ministers are going to meet, the Moscow probings need not be started so urgently.

The Secretary ended on the note that if nothing is happening there is always danger of tinkerers and meddlers attempting to intervene.

US/MC/5

Paris, August 5, 1961, 3:30 p.m.

MINISTERIAL CONSULTATIONS ON BERLIN
Paris, August 4-9, 1961

PARTICIPANTS

United States
The Secretary of State
Ambassador Bohlen
Mr. Kohler
Mr. Cash

Germany
Dr. von Brentano
Professor Carstens
General Schnez
Dr. Ritter
Mr. Weber

United Kingdom
Lord Home
Field Marshal Festing
Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh
Mr. Killick

France
M. Couve de Murville
M. Charles de Carbonnel
M. Charles Lucet

SUBJECT
First Quadripartite Ministerial Meeting on Berlin and Germany

At the first quadripartite meeting of the Foreign Ministers, the following portions of the "Report of the Four Power Working Group on Germany and Berlin"/2/ were considered: 1) "Soviet Motives and Intentions"; 2) "Strengthening of the Forces of the Alliance"; 3) "Recommended Minute on Economic Countermeasures"; and 4) "Review of Berlin Contingency Plans" (Ground Access Procedures).

Couve opened the meeting by suggesting a discussion of the Working Group's Report.

In connection with the first section on "Soviet Motives and Intentions," the British asked the Germans to comment on developments in East Germany.

When von Brentano said that he had received a telegram from Governing Mayor Brandt this morning reporting that it looks as if the "GDR" is beginning a program of harassment of intersector Berlin traffic with the first steps being taken against East Berliners working in West Berlin, he mentioned the fact that such workers were now being obliged to pay for many things (for example, their rent and utilities in East Berlin) in DM West. This is a move to eliminate their incentive to work in West Berlin. A check of identity papers is to be initiated. There are reports that S-Bahn traffic is to be halted and the passengers required to get out for inspection although there have been no concrete steps to implement this. All of these measures will affect the refugees who are still coming in record numbers. The Germans are afraid that any additional measures will simply increase these numbers by creating panic. They feel that there is now no danger of the disorders of June 17, 1953, and they are doing nothing to encourage such developments. However, the despair of the people in East Germany is increasing, and this could easily become dangerous if the Berlin door were closed.

The Secretary said it seemed to him that an attempt to seal off refugees would result in a build-up of pressure in East Germany which might lead to an explosion and precipitate the problems under consideration sooner than expected. He suggested that the Four Governments keep their members of the Washington Ambassadorial Steering Group fully informed regarding the situation in East Germany so that information could be exchanged because it is important for us to keep as alert as possible and not be caught by surprise. He thought it would be enough if the Ambassadorial Group would keep the "Soviet Motives and Intentions" section of the Working Group Report current. He felt this section was adequate as of today, but that in coming days certain priorities might emerge.

Lord Home agreed that the "Soviet Motives and Intentions" section was all right and that the Ambassadors in Washington should be the center of an exchange of information regarding East Germany.

Von Brentano said that he agreed because of the necessity of keeping this problem under current review as developments in the Zone might provoke another Hungary. We must decide in advance how we would react. It was his personal opinion that it would be impossible simply to protest. He did not think West German public opinion would acquiesce if the border police and the West German army remained quietly in their barracks in such an event.

Couve said that he agreed with von Brentano that developments in East Germany could lead to a very serious situation.

It was agreed that the Washington Ambassadorial Steering Group should keep East German developments under consideration.

The Secretary asked if it was not correct that the Federal German Government not only did not encourage the refugees to come to West Germany but wished that they would remain in East Germany in order to keep elements there sympathetic to the West. He thought the Ambassadorial Steering Group should begin consultations as to what our attitude should be if trouble really developed. He called attention to Annex A of the "Tactics" section of the report concerning the situation in East Germany and said this subject should be given constant close attention.

Couve said that all we could do now was to refer the matter to the Ambassadorial Steering Group and ask that the Group keep its information on the situation current. Couve then suggested that the Ministers address themselves to the "Tactics" section of the Report.

The Secretary said that he thought this part of the paper came in the wrong place because it was necessary first to consider what the NATO Alliance must do in a serious effort to strengthen itself in order both to create the basis for any future negotiations and to begin to get ready for the contingency of military action. He said that the U.S., after long and careful study, had concluded that negotiations with the Soviets could not be successful under existing circumstances, i.e., until Khrushchev had been influenced by our efforts to strengthen ourselves. He stated that the first step was to consider what measures need to be taken to strengthen the West. Military steps were important not only as a demonstration of our determination but also to make our deterrent credible. Khrushchev had concluded that with the nuclear stand off he could discount the possibility of nuclear war. The U.S. felt that NATO military plans should be realized and other measures taken so that Khrushchev would conclude that the West was indeed serious about Berlin. We also should take economic measures leading to a complete blockade if necessary. Also in the propaganda field actions should be taken to create an atmosphere more likely to lead to more successful negotiations. He suggested, therefore, that the military should first consider steps to strengthen the West and save the more complex matters of "Tactics" and "Substantive Political Questions" for the next meeting.

This was agreed.

Lord Home said that the U.K. has forces all over the world, and that it did not wish to strip one area to reinforce its troops in Germany. He said, however, that the U.K. could get two light anti-aircraft regiments and one other anti-aircraft unit with guided missiles to Germany in late August or September. He said that, in addition to cancelling the withdrawal of three fighter squadrons from Germany, the U.K. will now send one additional fighter squadron and has earmarked another Canberra squadron for this purpose. He said that the British Government could concentrate a division of two brigade groups in the U.K. for reinforcing U.K. troops in Germany. One armored regiment could be brought from Hong Kong and a brigade headquarters from Cyprus. He said that these were all visible moves that would be quickly known to the Soviets. He said that the U.K. was ready to recall reservists and to mobilize territorials which could be put in Germany in about 17 days.

Couve said that the French had problems similar to those of the British, but that their main problem was, of course, Algeria. However, they have already recalled one good division from there and would complete its reconversion for European warfare early in September. He said that they had not yet decided to recall the second division because the situation in Algeria had not developed as they had hoped. They might, however, decide to do so later. They were, however, withdrawing some Air Force personnel now to reinforce their tactical Air Force in Eastern France and in West Germany. He said that further steps would be taken if necessary. This meant the recall of reservists (which could be done in about one week) to complete divisions now in Germany. He added that they would reconsider the deployment in Algeria if this becomes necessary and would recall more reservists. All of this was under serious consideration. Nothing would be announced unless it was decided to withdraw the second division. He said that, by early autumn, the French would be ready to take the necessary steps. Lord Home said that the British steps were not very spectacular but, spread out over a period of time, they would have the desired effect.

Couve said that what the U.S. is doing is of course immense, and the other Allies should also act even if they could not do so on the same scale.

The Secretary said that the U.S. Memorandum on Berlin of July 21st/3/ shows on pages 5 thru 8 the steps we would take. We had considered when we might move into a state of national emergency and call up the Reserve and National Guard and had decided not to do so at this time particularly not to create the psychology of mobilization. We also wished to undertake measures which we could support for some time because we should think of a general strengthening for the long pull. The President can declare a national emergency and call reservists and National Guard units to duty promptly. We attach the greatest possible importance to what the NATO Alliance does. Khrushchev will watch very closely, and if only one, two, or three countries act, he might conclude that there was little support for our program within the Alliance, and this could be a very serious problem. Also if Khrushchev sees troops called up without the necessary production backup, he might conclude that we are not in earnest. Our preparations to increase our strength must be such as to produce a force that could, in fact, fight. Otherwise we might produce neither the effect we wish to on Khrushchev nor the force that we might need to apply at a later date. He asked what we could do to bring about an improvement in the Alliance's readiness to fight. Should our Defense Ministers consult quite soon (that is, all the NATO Defense Ministers, not just the Four)? Other steps should be taken in a NATO-wide context. Not only the troops, but all the essential supporting elements should be ready.

Lord Home felt that a meeting of the NATO Defense Ministers might possibly produce some alarm. He questioned whether or not the NATO Permanent Representatives might not study the problems involved. He remarked that the British Defense Minister had talked with Secretary McNamara just the other day.

Couve suggested that when the Secretary reported to the North Atlantic Council he might raise the problem of what the others could do. He added, however, that he was not opposed to a meeting of the Defense Ministers or the Chiefs of Staff.

The Secretary said that the U.S. was not partial to any particular method but felt strongly that there should be an organized follow-up.

Von Brentano said that he was in full agreement with what the Secretary had said, and he felt that it was exceptionally important. He said that the Germans had been greatly impressed with the actions the U.S. Government was taking and with the necessity that this be a cooperative effort. He said that it was very important for the Soviets to see that the West was ready to create the necessary force and to use it if necessary. With regard to the U.S. Memorandum of July 21st, in which the U.S. had expressed its wishes and expectations concerning contributions from its Allies, the Defense Ministers had already discussed these in Washington. Concerning the German build-up first to 9 and subsequently to 11 divisions by next year, it was necessary that specific measures be taken, but he believed it doubtful that they should take these measures prior to their elections on September 17. He felt this would lay the German Government open to accusations that could markedly affect the outcome of the elections. He felt it might be dangerous to our joint efforts if the Germans tried to move too rapidly before September 17 in that the special measures might be taken, but that in so doing the CDU/CSU might lose the election and a government come to power which would not implement these measures. He felt that the Germans must take the necessary steps, but that they must wait until after September 17. He felt that it was necessary for the Defense Ministers to agree, and perhaps this might be done within the NATO framework. He said that the Netherlands representative had explained just the other day in WEU the steps his Government was undertaking. He thought consultations should perhaps begin with the Three or Four Defense Ministers so that measures would be coordinated. He said that he was convinced that the President was right when he had said that military weakness leads to war. He said that the Germans were prepared to establish the 9 and 11 combat-ready divisions and to assign the necessary Air Force units. The Secretary said that the U.S. understood election problems, but that the next five weeks could be quite important for their effect on Khrushchev. He assumed something could be done short of full mobilization for action. He asked what the Germans could do before September 17.

Von Brentano replied that a few days ago the Chancellor had discussed this problem with representatives of the Defense and Foreign Ministers, and had concluded that certain build-up measures could take place and arming be done. He pointed out that the Germans had had to build their military forces from nothing. He added that relevant statements would be made in election speeches to create the proper psychological basis for the necessary steps. He added that some measures could be taken before the elections such as holding troops scheduled for demobilization, and that other steps would be taken after the elections. He added that the necessary preparation would now be made. He concluded by saying that the Germans were ready to participate.

Lord Home asked whether there were any objections to the reinforcement of tripartite troops in Germany prior to September 17. Von Brentano assured him that there were none.

Couve said that the real problem for all of us is when to call up the reservists.

The Secretary asked whether the Germans could now make known their intentions about the first 9 divisions. Von Brentano said he could not reply because he lacked the technical knowledge, but that he thought the statement that Defense Minister Strauss had made to the press yesterday in Bonn indicated that the Germans would do all that their NATO Allies expected of them.

The Secretary said that it was necessary that the Allies understand what was really in our minds. There are certain elements in the German and Berlin situation which are absolutely vital to our national interests, i.e., the presence of the Western forces in Berlin, the ability of West Berlin to live as a city, and the maintenance of its physical access to the Federal Republic and the rest of the world. He said that these were vital in the sense that we must fight in order to retain them. This was not just because of the West Berliners, Allied rights, or NATO's future (although all of these were involved), but because of the policy of the Sino-Soviet bloc throughout the world. He said that this would be a historical turning point in the great confrontation. Although Khrushchev has not spelled out exactly what he would do, we must face the prospect that he will move against West Berlin. Khrushchev thinks we would not move to nuclear war if necessary. We should, of course, protect our interests without nuclear war if at all possible, but it seems to us that Khrushchev may have made a judgment which we run the risk of not being able to reverse before nuclear bombs fall. He felt that the conventional build-up will help us to engage the Soviets fully and to convince them that if we were prepared to go so far, we would be prepared to go the rest of the way. Otherwise, Khrushchev might persist until too late. We must make Khrushchev fully understand that we will defend our vital interests regardless of the cost, and that thus Khrushchev might eventually have to face nuclear war. Couve said he entirely agreed. Lord Home said that the British felt that the build-up was necessary and probably the only way to defend our vital interests in Berlin. The Secretary wondered whether the Ministers might not have informal consultations over night on how to proceed further, i.e., by a meeting of the Defense Ministers, or other meetings. This was agreed.

The Ministers then turned to Section V of the Report, "Recommended Minute on Economic Countermeasures". Lord Home referred to Paragraph 4 and said he proposed a build-up in the NATO program of a series of different measures progressively mounting toward an economic blockade. He said that he did not want to convey the idea of a blockade from the start and asked if this formula could be agreed. He said a number of economic measures could be taken now and the British would like to take preparatory actions concerning a number of others. He felt it was important to get the program build-up in the right way in the North Atlantic Council.

The Secretary said that he felt that there was no difference in approach. If we could agree on the most severe and the least severe actions a number of measures could be prepared between the first warning measures and a complete embargo.

Couve said that he thought that the word "blockade" was better than the term "embargo". The French had doubts concerning attempts to impress the Soviets by means of preparatory measures on economic countermeasures. Khrushchev had said many times that economic countermeasures were exactly what he anticipated, and that he would not be concerned. He might draw the conclusion that we would do nothing in addition to taking economic countermeasures. He felt that both embargo and blockade were important, but that preliminary measures might make the wrong impression.

Von Brentano, referring to Paragraph 3, said he thought that it was important to consider what type of economic measures should be taken and when. He felt it was important to act when a peace treaty was signed because the signature would be the start of a process. The conclusion of the treaty with the Soviet Zone is not an end in itself, but merely a means of carrying out further Soviet intentions. He could not envisage the continuation of interzonal trade after the conclusion of a separate peace treaty. He said that the Communists did fear economic countermeasures as had been indicated in their reaction to the West German abrogation of the interzonal trade agreement, and Khrushchev's stated willingness to accept economic countermeasures was merely an attempt to forestall them. He wondered if we should not take countermeasures of the character of a blockade when the separate peace treaty is signed.

Couve said he thought Paragraph 3 was in accordance with the German position. He felt that von Brentano had been very convincing. He was convinced that a blockade would be a strong weapon. However, in considering that the signing of a separate treaty would be an aggressive act, it was necessary to consider what should be the casus belli--the signing of the treaty or interference with our access. Von Brentano said that he was not criticizing the economic countermeasures paper which he understood, but that it was necessary to discuss divergent views. The paper was not a decision, but rather a guide line.

Lord Home said that he had looked upon economic reaction, like military reaction, as concerning physical interference with access. He did not think signature of the treaty alone would be a cause for action. He said that he didn't much like Annex B of the "Recommended Minute on Economic Countermeasures." He pointed out that "Temporary Travel Documents" had proved we had another effective weapon. He said that, after signing the treaty, the Soviets may change nothing. He felt that the Allies must react only to actions, not the signing of a treaty. What we really need is a basket of many varied countermeasures from which to choose.

The Secretary said that we should give NATO our thinking on this subject. He suggested that the paper be given to NATO so that they could get busy and take similar action. He said that we were all agreed that economic countermeasures alone would not be decisive, but merely an auxiliary action. Other measures could be taken, for example, breaking off U.S. negotiations with the Soviets on civil air matters and cultural and scientific exchange. Economic countermeasures should be like the console of a pipe organ, on which one could pull out one, several, many, or all stops.

Von Brentano said he did not think it likely that Allied traffic would be blocked and civil traffic continued, but he could not imagine continuation of interzonal trade if Allied access was blocked. He added that the signature of a treaty alone would mean nothing if Berlin were not located where it was. But because it was where it was, the signature of the treaty would be very significant.

The Secretary said we would wish to think about this. We felt that such a treaty could not affect our rights. The real test would be what happened after the treaty was signed.

Von Brentano said this was quite right but that we all knew why Khrushchev wanted to sign this treaty. The Germans thought it would be too much to permit interzonal trade to continue after the signature of the separate treaty. The Secretary said that he doubted that the signature of the treaty alone without some further act would give us a basis on which to move.

Couve said he was not certain that the treaty was directly connected with this section of the report inasmuch as it was not mentioned therein. The convocation of the peace conference is mentioned, but the signing of the peace treaty is not. He added that there would be a psychological consequence of the signing of the separate treaty in Germany that would not occur in the U.S., the U.K., or France.

Von Brentano said that it was right that, if the separate treaty were signed and the situation unchanged, action was not called for, but the case would be quite different if the treaty were signed and followed by cutting off Allied traffic to Berlin with a concurrent continuation of interzonal trade.

The Secretary asked whether we should not get the various economic countermeasures lined up in this paper and decide later when to apply them.

After various suggestions regarding a re-draft of the Minute, it was agreed that the U.S. would undertake this effort before the next meeting. It was also agreed that the next step was to supply the information to the North Atlantic Council. It was agreed that an embargo was essentially an economic measure, while a blockade was military, but that both should be considered by the Ambassadorial Steering Group in Washington.

The Secretary suggested that the next topic for discussion should be Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the paper "Ground Access Procedures", a portion of the Working Group Report entitled "Review of Berlin Contingency Plans". The rest of this paper could be discussed tomorrow. The Secretary said that we had considered the access procedures question in terms of the casus belli. All along we have held that the Soviets have not controlled our rights. Considering East Germans as agents of the Soviets was almost a waste of time when everyone knew that they were merely puppets for whom the Soviets should be responsible. It would be hard to convince anyone that we should go to war simply because of the substitution of East Germans for Russians at the control points. This was somewhat different from the U.S. view taken in the past, but it was felt that it was sound.

Couve said he did not see much difference between Allied acquiescence in East German execution of the procedures presently followed by the Soviets with respect to ground access to Berlin and the so-called "peel-off" procedure.

Von Brentano said he saw no basic change as long as the system would work.

Everyone agreed to A, B and C of Paragraph 2.

Couve said that he was a little at a loss to see what was meant by Paragraph D calling for a study as to whether it might be possible to extend the scope of the arrangements now governing civil traffic by having the East and West Germans at the technical level agree on procedures governing all travel to and from Berlin including Allied military traffic.

The Secretary pointed out that most Berlin traffic was handled in this way. He said that if it became necessary to talk to the East Germans concerning the Allied traffic to Berlin, we would not wish to do so, nor would we wish to go to war in order to avoid doing so. If the Allies talked to them, it would increase their international prestige, which we would not wish to do. On the other hand, no one would understand our going to war simply because no one would talk with the East Germans. In such a situation, it would seem preferable for the West Germans to talk to the East Germans about Allied traffic as they now do about the 95 per cent of the Allied traffic which is civilian.

Von Brentano said he understood the idea, but that it would be a mistake to think it would work. It is true that interzonal traffic and traffic from the Federal Republic to Berlin is continued on a basis of East-West German exchanges at the technical level. He added that he had never thought much of this particular arrangement, and he thought even raising the idea of the Germans handling Allied traffic on this basis would be dangerous. It would be dangerous to broach the subject to the East Germans. The East Germans would undoubtedly say that if the Allies want to talk, they (the Allies) should be the ones to do so. In this process, we would have implied that the East Germans have some right to be consulted about Allied traffic, and this could be dangerous. He said that these were merely his thoughts on the subject and not a definite German reply as no final decision had been made. Couve said that from a practical standpoint Allied traffic moves to Berlin by road, air, and rail, and under the 2 A procedure, there was no problem with road traffic. Allied rail traffic is already handled at the East-West German technical level. This left only the problem of Allied air traffic, which was handled on a purely quadripartite basis in Berlin. He asked if it might not be possible to reverse what we had done in 1948, when we ceased to travel on the ground in favor of the air, by this time ceasing to travel by the air in favor of the ground.

Mr. Kohler explained that the well-worked-out existing contingency plan provides for the operation of the Berlin Air Safety Center on a "tripartite" basis without Soviet or East German participation. There are ample communication channels for making available to the East Germans the information necessary for a continuation of our flights through the corridors without necessarily jeopardizing flight safety. Therefore, no need exists for considering the control of Allied air traffic at the East-West German technical level.

It was agreed that the study proposed in Paragraph 2 D should be undertaken.

It was then agreed that this discussion covered the "Ground Access Procedures" paper, and the Ministers would discuss the "Military Aspects" section of the "Review of Berlin Contingency Plans" on August 6, 1961.

After a brief discussion of a line to be taken with the press, the meeting was adjourned.

US/MC/3

Paris, August 6, 1961, 10:30 a.m.

MINISTERIAL CONSULTATIONS ON BERLIN
Paris, August 4-9, 1961

PARTICIPANTS

United States
The Secretary of State
Mr. Kohler
Mr. Nitze
Mr. Hillenbrand

France
M. Couve de Murville
M. Charles de Carbonnel
M. Charles Lucet
M. Jean Laloy
M. Froment-Meurice

United Kingdom
Lord Home
Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh
Field Marshal Festing
Mr. Buxton

Federal Republic
Dr. von Brentano
Dr. Carstens
Dr. Ritter
Major General Schnez

SUBJECT
Second Quadripartite Ministerial Meeting on Berlin and Germany

Couve began the meeting by reading a cable from Moscow reporting the Fanfani-Khrushchev conversation. He particularly noted that, after the Fanfani statement that the Soviets were raising a threat of general war and were acting dangerously, Khrushchev had claimed that this would not happen but had then added that maybe the Soviets would have to shoot first if the Allies attempted an airlift. Khrushchev said that they had already shot down a U-2 once and would repeat it.

The Secretary reported the contents of Ulbricht's letter to President Kennedy delivered in Prague (reported Tosec 12)/2/ and noted that, in accordance with agreed procedures, we would take no further action with respect to the letter.

Military matters related to contingency planning were then discussed and are separately reported./3/

The Secretary suggested that the Foreign Ministers might meet before leaving Paris after a text is available of Khrushchev's speech scheduled to be made tomorrow night,/4/ since they might wish to consider if it made any difference to what is being said in the present meetings. After some discussion, the question of a further meeting was left open for later decision. All agreed nothing should be said publicly about the possibility.

The Secretary said that the question raised by the Working Group paper on tactics was how the Western Powers should explore a settlement of the Berlin problem by political means. He assumed all could agree that the primary objective must be to settle it by political means rather than by war. There will, at some point, have to be negotiations with the Soviets. The Soviets have made proposals which are before the world. We cannot lead democratic countries and the NATO Alliance into war unless they are convinced that war has been imposed upon us and that every reasonable step has been taken to settle the problem by peaceful means. The Working Group had considered various ways of raising the problem, for example: by convening of a peace conference, by Ambassadorial explorations in Moscow, and by a Foreign Ministers meeting. We were dubious, the Secretary continued, about the value of a peace conference whatever its composition. We were also skeptical about an early raising of the Berlin question in the U.N. which is filled with people not deeply seized with the problem before us and inclined to avoid war at any price. This situation gave considerable advantage to the side willing to press its case most vigorously. Experience had shown that, since the Soviets generally are unwilling to grant concessions, the U.N. countries applied pressure to the Western Powers to make them. Moreover, countries which favored self-determination elsewhere seem disinclined to apply it to Europe. The Bizerte problem also had consolidated the Afro-Asian Bloc and has created a mood antithetical to the Western position on Berlin. We had considered the idea of trying to get a standstill resolution in the Security Council, and we believed that if the crisis reached a critical point it would inevitably get into the U.N. We did not, however, propose to take a U.N. initiative at this time unless this should be necessary to head off U.N. action by someone else, for example Nehru. Despite the discussion of this possibility in the Working Group paper,/5/ we did not see an opportunity for the exploration of the merits of the question through Ambassadorial consultations in Moscow. Since at some stage there must be consultation with the Soviets, we are inclined to feel that a meeting of the Foreign Ministers would be most suitable and most likely to head off U.N. action. The timing of such a meeting is of considerable importance and we assume that it should not occur before the German elections. The Secretary said he had to confess that there were some divergent views on the U.S. side regarding the timing of a conference, but on balance he thought that a meeting scheduled to take place after the Communist Party Congress but publicly known before the Party Congress would be the best solution. If a Foreign Ministers meeting could be held later rather than earlier it might somehow defer Khrushchev's timetable and it might also be followed by a possible Summit meeting or a peace conference.

In the U.S. we had a problem about the timing of public knowledge that such negotiations would occur. The U.S. people as well as the Alliance were waiting for some initiative. There were disadvantages in waiting indefinitely, as if we feared negotiations, until the Soviets presented us with an initiative. This spoke for public knowledge of an offer to negotiate before the Soviet Party Congress, the convening of the UNGA and possibly before the Belgrade neutralist congress. Some had felt that an offer of negotiations could be interpreted as a sign of weakness. He was not sure, the Secretary observed, that the measures being taken in the military field necessarily would become more impressive with the passage of time than at the point of announcement revealing Allied unity in the decision to take them. He felt that some time in early September we should suggest that a meeting of Foreign Ministers take place late in October or early in November. This involved the possibility, of course, that the Soviets would make a counterproposal for a meeting in early October before the Party Congress.

As to substance, the Secretary said that he did not believe we could now write down a complete negotiating position. On the other hand, our Governments were not without many ideas on which they could promptly consult and agree. The Secretary reviewed two basic categories of proposals which the West should consider:

1. Those proposals directed to improving the situation from our viewpoint as opposed to Soviet proposals to their advantage. These might include emphasis on the principle of self-determination in Germany, a simplified Western Peace Plan, and an all-Berlin proposal perhaps with presence of U.N. observers at the critical points of access. Perhaps we could include certain security arrangements in Europe along the lines already discussed.

2. Those proposals for the inevitable point at a conference when it became clear that there was no basis for a meeting of the minds on the proposals noted. We must assume Khrushchev will probably sign a peace treaty with the GDR and will press for some sort of GDR recognition. He could have his peace treaty and his theory of the case, provided he did not put it into practice. This would not be the first time two incompatible theories have lived together if not pressed to their logical conclusions. The question of whether any aspect of general security arrangements would be pertinent at this point should be studied.

Home said he completely agreed with the Secretary's analysis. There will clearly be negotiations with the Soviets, and the question was what kind would be to our best advantage. Unless the West were very careful during the next weeks, the Soviet position would become more plausible to the outside world with its emphasis on a peace treaty and the likely offer of guarantees of access to West Berlin. Since the Western stress was now on the military buildup, the danger was that we shall appear to world opinion as the side moving towards a warlike solution of the Berlin problem. Concerning the substance, he said that he, too, was not sure how far in the next few weeks agreement had to be reached on a negotiating position on Berlin. Our aim was not to weaken Western rights but to improve our situation. He could therefore see an advantage in taking the initiative fairly soon toward negotiations. This might help Khrushchev to postpone a peace treaty or at least to make it conditional on the GDR's acceptance of a Berlin solution agreed by him and the Western Powers. Obviously, the meeting itself could not take place until after September 17./6/ In reply to the latest Soviet note,/7/ the Western Powers could offer negotiations. The reply could go forward in a week or two, or in any event before the UNGA met. He was not too concerned with the meeting of the neutralist countries. Moreover, while he could understand the point that, if a Western offer were made too soon after the President's speech people would relax, the Western presentation could be put in a way to avoid this effect.

Von Brentano acknowledged the danger that the Soviets may achieve some psychological success with their emphasis on a peace treaty and a free city of Berlin with guarantees. Many people believe more in words than in what is behind them. Moreover, the West must not give the impression that it is seeking a purely military solution. He also recognized that some countries might raise the Berlin question in the U.N. and this had to be watched carefully. If such an initiative threatened, the West would have to act promptly, but apart from this he agreed that a Western initiative to raise the Berlin question in the U.N. was not desirable. The U.N. Missions must be instructed to watch developments carefully. He said that he had certain reservations about the report received from the U.N. Missions and the German observer,/8/ particularly respecting the overly optimistic estimates. This report could, however, serve as a basis for further studies.

Von Brentano admitted that public opinion exercised pressures for direct negotiations, and that the idea could not be repudiated. However, as the President had said, we cannot negotiate on the basis of "What's mine is mine and what's yours is negotiable". There was no indication that the Soviets were thinking in any different terms. Negotiations under such conditions could only lead to a worsening of the status quo which is already bad enough. Events were moving swiftly. The receipt of the Soviet notes/9/ had already overtaken the Working Group report in one respect. He did not think that the German elections were an important factor in the timing of a bid for negotiations and the neutralist countries were too divided to make their conference of much relevance. However, he was concerned that an expression of willingness to negotiate under current conditions would be interpreted as a sign of weakness. Khrushchev's statements were getting stronger, not weaker, and he was stating his maximum program in ultimative terms. Accordingly, negotiations should not be proposed but also they should not be refused.

Von Brentano recapitulated the possible substance of Western proposals. A plebiscite on the all-German question emphasizing self-determination was a good idea and will be painful for the Soviets. While he had certain reservations regarding an all-Berlin proposal, he personally did not object in principle. If the Soviets refused it, it might be easier for the West to refuse the discussion of partial solutions. The Western Peace Plan might be revised to eliminate obsolete portions and to simplify it for better public understanding.

Couve repeated essentially the same arguments on negotiations as he had advanced the day before./10/ He argued that while the problem is one of tactics and of substance, substance must command tactics. Khrushchev keeps repeating the same line publicly and privately. Everyone seemed to be prepared to repeat the 1959 Geneva performance/11/ for the first half of the conference, but the West had to be realistic. If it raised the all-German question first, the discussion would not last more than twenty-four hours. The concept of a protracted meeting with the Soviets on a German settlement seemed utterly unrealistic. The only thing that can really be discussed with the Soviets is the problem of Berlin, and this did not mean the reunification of Berlin [Germany?]. He could not be as optimistic as Lord Home and talk in terms of "improving" our position. It was irresponsible to propose negotiations without knowing what the West is prepared to do. This was a difficult and disagreeable responsibility which had to be faced. The first step is to reply to the last Soviet note and to express the view that for the West, negotiation is the proper way to settle this important problem. However, he did not think we should say we are prepared to negotiate on a German settlement since the Soviets would merely say: "Let us call a peace conference." Perhaps the West might indicate that it is prepared to discuss all the problems at issue between us without preconditions. The Western Foreign Ministers should meet again in mid-September before taking any final decision. Meanwhile, however, we must study what is negotiable with the Soviet Union. The Secretary's timetable for actual discussions might be correct, but he did not think that we should now proclaim that we are going to propose negotiations.

Home said that he agreed that we should insist on the absence of preconditions in offering negotiations, but we could not expect Khrushchev to retract publicly. He referred to a cable just received from Ambassador Roberts in Moscow stating that unless the West had definite proposals, any Ambassadorial approach would only bring from Khrushchev a repetition of the standard position in harder terms or persuade him that we were threatening him and he should act. As to substance, Home agreed that a debate on the all-German question would not last long, but it might be of considerable value to the West in exposing Soviet opposition to self-determination. As to Berlin improvements, he was not sure, if Soviet guarantees on presence and access were obtained, that the West would not be better off than it is now.

The Secretary said that, as the first order of business, we would want to work out the details of counterproposals on Germany and Berlin. We had agreement on general principles and these could be put together quickly. It will be more difficult to work out a fall-back position. He did suppose, however, that we could spin out the discussion on public proposals more than twenty-four hours. It would not be a negotiation in the classic sense, but a debate in which we could discuss both their proposals and ours showing the hollowness of Soviet claims compared to their performance since 1944. He hoped that we would not have to leave to a Western Foreign Ministers' meeting just before the UNGA the question of whether there would be negotiations, though the final preparation of proposals might be left for such a meeting. When the West looked down the path leading to a possible nuclear combat (at this point the Secretary suggested that the other Foreign Ministers might usefully be briefed on the implications of this), he doubted that the Soviets are not aware of the true situation, and he could not be worried that they would feel that we were weak. They knew better.

In response to a query from Couve, the Secretary said that, if we responded to the Soviet notes by the end of August or early in September, we might in our reply propose the time and the form of negotiations. This could be followed by a meeting of the Western Foreign Ministers just before the UNGA meeting. This seemed a reasonable combination. He was not enthusiastic about engaging in merely another polemical exchange with the Soviets. This added nothing and was not dignified for the Four Great Powers. The responsible Governments had to move the situation somewhat if they were to preserve the support of Western opinion. Home asked whether it might not be a good idea to propose negotiations for sometime in November and say at the same time that the Western Foreign Ministers would meet after the German elections to consider their position. He suggested that the formula "negotiation on the outstanding problems between us" without preconditions could be suggested. The Secretary said he did not know if the West wanted to get into such matters as the stationing of forces abroad, foreign bases, or Laos or disarmament which is being discussed elsewhere.

Couve continued to oppose the idea of suggesting a date for negotiations. He suggested a short reply to the Soviets, perhaps of one or two pages, avoiding repetitive arguments and ending by saying that the West is always prepared to examine the possibility of coming to an agreement on questions in dispute, taking account of the positions of all concerned and under conditions of equality and mutual respect. If the West made specific all-German proposals in a note, they would certainly be rejected and the Soviets would answer with their peace treaty line. Home said that he did not much like a general reference to the willingness to negotiate. People would question Western sincerity since that has been said so often before.

Couve said he was not certain that the Soviets would accept a conference without conditions. The Secretary responded that Soviet rejection would be a demonstration that the Soviets, after talking about negotiations, were now refusing them. Couve argued that, rather than be rebuffed, it would be better for the West to state its position in a general way not involving questions of prestige or substance. The notes could be sent before the end of the month and the West could then see how the Soviets react.

Von Brentano observed that the West did not have to use the exact words in the Soviet notes but could merely state that the Soviet statements showed great differences to exist on the problems of Germany and Berlin and that, taking account of the general state of tension, the Western Powers thought this should be discussed in negotiations.

The Secretary noted one possibility, which he was not sure he thought well of. The Western replies might end with a statement along the lines suggested by Couve and von Brentano but add that the Western Foreign Ministers are planning to attend the UNGA and would take advantage of the presence of Foreign Minister Gromyko to discuss possible arrangements for negotiations. This might be enough to head off Nehru. Home said he was not sure this was not a good idea. The Foreign Ministers agreed to consider this idea further at the afternoon session.

US/MC/6

Paris, August 6, 1961, 10:30 a.m.

MINISTERIAL CONSULTATIONS ON BERLIN
Paris, August 4-9, 1961

PARTICIPANTS

United States
The Secretary of State
Mr. Kohler
Mr. Nitze
Mr. Hillenbrand

France
M. Couve de Murville
M. Charles de Carbonnel
M. Charles Lucet
M. Jean Laloy
M. Froment-Meurice

United Kingdom
Lord Home
Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh
Field Marshal Festing
Mr. Buxton

Federal Republic
Dr. von Brentano
Dr. Carstens
Dr. Ritter
Major General Schnez

SUBJECT
Second Quadripartite Ministerial Meeting on Berlin and Germany--Military Aspects of Contingency Planning

The Secretary opened the discussion on the "military aspects" part of the section of the Working Group report on contingency planning by saying that the US believed the Ambassadorial Steering Group in Washington should be given broad responsibility for planning for action on a world-wide basis along the lines of para 6(a) and 6(c) of the contingency planning section of the Report./2/ The Ambassadorial Group might need to be strengthened with more military advisers; it should study and see what is required in this respect. The Secretary also stressed the need for better liaison between Live Oak and the Ambassadorial Group involving, for example, full exchange of documents. He also noted the problem raised in the US military papers circulated August 2 and August 3 about whether NATO machinery as now established is suitable for control of operations at a time when we may be moving into the actual military phase./3/ The channel between SACEUR and Governments requires careful thinking out. The Secretary noted that, in World War II, the practice was to designate one government as the executive agent for each theater, for example the US in Europe and the UK in South East Asia. Moreover, in the Korean War, the US was so designated for UN forces. He was not now suggesting a specific solution, but the problem must be given attention. The US supported the recommendations in para 6 of the contingency plans section of the Working Group report and we would welcome views of other Ministers on the two military papers.

Couve asked whether it could be taken for granted that the recommendations in para 6 were approved. There was no dissent.

Lord Home said he agreed with what the Secretary had said. The question does arise of Norstad and the NATO machinery taking control at some point and with respect to channels between SACEUR and Governments. From a preliminary look at the US papers, which are being studied in London on an urgent basis, he could only conclude that they raised certain large and controversial issues which required further thought. Field Marshal Festing suggested that studies might preliminarily be conducted in the Washington Ambassadorial Group appropriately strengthened.

The Secretary observed that we would not expect immediate agreement but would appreciate the preliminary views of others. Home referred to the expression "discreet use of nuclear weapons" as an example of a statement requiring further study. He noted that the problem of a probe in strength was something about which soldiers had strong views.

Couve said the problem always turned around how to distinguish between an operation on the ground and the beginning of war. The more this was discussed, the more difficult it became to distinguish between the two. Von Brentano welcomed the proposal for full German cooperation in the Ambassadorial Group. He noted the control problem raised by the command structure in Berlin context. Even in the case of only 3 or 4 powers there was a problem of who would decide at the crucial time, and this problem is even more complicated in NATO. It was not enough to say that there would be a common decision. The North Atlantic Council was inadequate for the purpose. Its decision would come too late. Couve commented that it had always been envisaged that if there were to be military action on land or air, governmental decisions would be required. This was what the US papers said. The Secretary observed the paper said that under certain contingencies military action would be taken. If shooting starts, management cannot be conducted by a 15-member body. Soldiers must get their orders quickly and without confusion. They could not be put in the position where every question involved elaborate political discussion. They must have clear directives and there must be effective management of the operation. Couve said that the problem arose because of changes in Western planning which started with a small probe and rose through battalion, regiment and division until now even a corps was being considered by United States. More and more this was synonymous with the beginning of war. This was the reason for the difficulty of decision.

Von Brentano said political principles must clearly have NATO approval, but the conduct of military operations must be done in such a way as to insure clear-cut direction in a single body. No matter of what size, once an operation began, soldiers must be able to act with all facility required to carry out operation most effectively. The West had to find an answer to this problem. Home said the question required study by the Ambassadorial Group and by governments. An operation run by all Chiefs of Staff would not be much better than one run by all Governments. We were now dealing with nuclear weapons and ICBMs and it was hard to see how Governments could be kept out of this. We have troops with tactical nuclear weapons, yet no one knew how to use them in the Berlin context. British military judgment re a two division probe seemed to be that you cannot expose two valuable military units in a manner that runs the risk of losing them.

The Secretary said that, without commitment, he wanted to point out that certain political decisions are required:

(a) As opposed to the situation of 6 or 7 years ago, we are agreed that, under present conditions, military action re Berlin is an action of the last resort. We want Khrushchev to desist from interference with our access to Berlin. Measures such as an economic embargo, an air lift, and a "roaring debate" in the UN should all be resorted to prior to shooting. We distrust the idea of an insignificant military probe to test Khrushchev's intentions, either because we will know them or the probe would be too small to test them. We therefore think non-military means must be used to the maximum before we resort to military means. If Khrushchev shoots down an airlift, the move into the second phase may come rapidly.

(b) The US paper proposes to engage East German and Soviet forces with significant Allied conventional forces to confront Khrushchev with the decision before nuclear war. We do not envisage pushing two divisions down the Autobahn but would consider the entire position along the front in terms of actions to be taken.

(c) If Khrushchev is not deterred, then resort to nuclear weapons would follow.

Each of these three decisions would have to be by Governments, but management of operation would be under some executive agency to be an instrument of policy agreed by Governments.

Home said that the Secretary had expressed the sequence of events as he saw it. The question is how to engage Soviet forces. He frankly had not seen any possibilities which made much sense. The Secretary said broadened Live Oak planning should take up the question immediately.

Couve observed that military planning was also needed for an airlift. If it is shot at, then how would the West react? As to ground action, the question was what kind could be envisaged both to be effective and not to waste precious units. This is a very difficult problem. Home said a possibility was that the Soviets would shoot down airlift planes from ground. Then decision would be whether or not to knock out missile sites from the air. The Secretary said we would presumably want to knock them out. It would be hard to ask pilots to carry on under missile fire. This was the sort of problem the military planners would have to get into. Couve said the Ministers should accordingly ask the Live Oak group to study these two problems. At the same time, the Ambassadorial Steering Group should put into precise form the sequence of political decisions, including economic sanctions, airlift, etc. The Secretary noted that the US Secretary of State, under the American Constitution, could not instruct the military authorities. The US paper was still a draft. Governments should study it to see if they could agree or make suggestions for improvements. The Secretary observed that the Ministers were giving the Ambassadorial Steering Group a large basket of tasks and he hoped the Governments would equip it with an adequate staff.

Couve asked whether the Ministers, though they could not agree on a final version of an instructions paper, could not agree that the US draft be the basis for the work of the Ambassadorial Group and Live Oak exercise. Home said he would have to take a further look at it. While the Ministers were here, perhaps the Delegation members could have a crack at writing a more agreed draft. Couve observed that Governments were not committed to the precise words of the paper. Home said there were statements in it to which he would not like to be committed. Once it starts to circulate, a paper tends to govern thinking. The Secretary commented that if we know there are certain things in the draft which are not liked we could attempt to improve it. He said that Assistant Secretary Nitze would be glad to work with his other colleagues without commitment of any one as to the product of the exercise. Home observed that the British Chiefs of Staff were looking at the two US military papers in London and would require a little longer. In principle they were in agreement with the August 3 paper. Von Brentano welcomed para 6 of the Working Group contingency plans paper as a good basis for new and common work in the Ambassadorial Group. The Secretary concluded the discussion of this subject by saying that perhaps all could instruct their Ambassadors in Washington appropriately without delay so that they could get ahead with the planning.

US/MC/4

Paris, August 6, 1961, 4:30 p.m.

MINISTERIAL CONSULTATIONS ON BERLIN
Paris, August 4-9, 1961

PARTICIPANTS

United States
The Secretary of State
Mr. Kohler
Ambassador Bohlen
Mr. Lampson

Germany
Dr. von Brentano
Professor Carstens
General Schnez
Dr. Ritter

United Kingdom
Lord Home
Field-Marshal Festing
Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh
Mr. John Killick

France
M. Couve de Murville
M. Charles de Carbonnel
M. Charles Lucet
M. Jean Laloy
M. Froment-Meurice

SUBJECT
Third Quadripartite Meeting on Berlin and Germany

The French Foreign Minister opened the third quadripartite meeting by referring to the discussion at previous meeting about timing of negotiations./2/ Lord Home asked whether the others had thought over the Secretary's final suggestion at the morning meeting that our answer to the Soviet Note of August 3 might express readiness to meet with Gromyko while he was in New York attending the UN General Assembly to discuss the possibility for arrangements for negotiation. He pointed out that this might give the West a little leeway by postponing the next round until after the German elections.

Brentano said he thought it would be inappropriate to mention German elections in any reply to the Soviets because this would be of little interest to the USSR. He said they should not play a part in the considerations of the West in regard to the timing of the next move. However, he questioned the advisability of proposing to discuss the Berlin question with Gromyko while he was at UNGA. There was danger that such a step might create an unintentional impression that the West was thinking of bringing the Berlin question into the UN.

Couve agreed. He thought that it would be better to speak about negotiations in Western replies without making any specific suggestions as to timing. Substance and tactics were very much mixed up together. They must be careful not to have the Russians misjudge our intentions or give them an opening which might embarrass us. He would prefer not to commit us to talking with Gromyko on Berlin in New York. There would be an opportunity at that time to decide whether this would be a wise thing to do. To commit West in advance to such discussions seemed to be going too far. It would be unwise to make a precise offer to negotiate before we have even discussed substantive positions. It would be premature to send a note between August 20 and the end of the month taking such a step. This would be far ahead of the schedule which we are told Khrushchev is going to follow. In mid-September we still would have time to take any necessary steps. We are not in an easy situation at present time. The Soviet note was the most violent one we have received. We are awaiting Khrushchev speech tomorrow which is likely to be very violent, especially after the new Russian success in space. Couve questioned whether this was the proper time to make such a gesture. No doubt it would be much welcomed by many persons in the West but how would it be judged in the East? The latter question is the one which should mainly concern us.

The Secretary pointed out that more than sixty Foreign Ministers would be at the General Assembly in September. There was bound to be a great deal of talk about Berlin during the session. The Soviet representatives will certainly talk a great deal about it. If we are wise we will do so also. The major matter we will be asked about will be our willingness to negotiate. The Secretary said that he could not add to points he had made in the morning session as to an initiative with the Soviets for negotiation. He did not suppose the Foreign Ministers could reach agreement at this meeting on this point. The question would be taken up through diplomatic channels between Governments. He could not agree to postponing an initiative on proposing negotiations or arrangements for negotiations until September. He then emphasized the importance of having the Ambassadorial Group move on swiftly in the task of defining negotiating positions. He also asked whether it was necessary to answer the Soviet note at present. It might be preferable not to answer it for the time being unless we could put forward a position.

Couve agreed it might not be necessary to answer the note now but thought it useful to send an answer as soon as we could agree on one.

Home pointed out the danger of too many public statements. Statements tended to harden our positions. Meanwhile our military buildup would be progressing. This might make trouble with uncommitted countries who would think we were being bellicose and unreasonable. For example, there might be trouble with Nehru. He said he had been emphasizing in speeches the advantages of pursuing explorations with Soviets through the quiet unobtrusive channels of diplomacy. It might be possible to hold the line in this way until September. He threw out this idea but rather thought that it would not be enough.

Brentano thought that there might be some possibility of arranging for preliminary talks. Our reply to the Soviet note might merely express readiness to discuss the questions of time and place. He thought the strongest argument against proposing talks with Gromyko in New York was the implication regarding action in the UN. However, although he had reservations he was prepared to withdraw his objections if the others agreed this was the right thing to do.

In reply to a direct question from Home whether the matter could be contained in diplomatic channels for the time being, the Secretary replied he was not sure these contacts would deal with enough substance to support this approach for long.

Home then outlined some possible advantages of such a method. By advocating diplomacy through quiet ambassadorial exchanges the Governments might lead people to expect little by way of publicity. He agreed, however, that the line could not be held for long in this way. We would be pressed too hard to explain how we are responding to Soviet offers to negotiate.

The Secretary summarized the discussion by pointing out that the Foreign Ministers had agreed to instruct the Ambassadorial Group to work on possible negotiating positions. As to timing they were really not too far apart. It seemed that negotiations would probably take place in mid-October or early November. They agreed that they should be on the Foreign Minister level. The principal unresolved question was under what conditions and at what time we should publicly seek such negotiations. In an attempt to meet the views of the others he had proposed the idea of telling the Soviets that they would talk about the matter with Gromyko in New York. There is no doubt that Berlin will be intensely discussed in New York. The Secretary said that he would raise the whole question with the President. Then he explained the U.S. Government's concern with the need for maintaining the confidence of the American people, the Alliance and people throughout the world. Possibly others evaluated this matter differently. We looked upon it as a highly important element in the functioning of a large and disparate democracy. The reactions of the American people to world opinion should also not be overlooked. The Secretary ended his recapitulation by repeating that he could not agree to postponing decisions on when to negotiate in the way that had been proposed in their discussions.

Home said he found the Secretary's position sensible. He had very much the same point of view.

The Secretary then said he hoped that the difference of view on this one question would not obscure the very large amount of agreement which had been reached between them. The disagreement was really over rather a narrow point.

Home emphasized that they must all be careful not to give the appearance of serious disagreement. He threw out the suggestion that perhaps people did not ask questions in France or if they did they did not receive answers. Couve replied the French were like everybody else.

The Ministers then discussed the question of whether there should be a communiqué. The Secretary pointed out the difficulty of issuing a communiqué which had any substance in it before he had reported to NATO. The North Atlantic Council was very sensitive to being made to look like a rubber stamp. The Ministers agreed that a formal communiqué should not be issued. They decided to call in the information officers at the end of the meeting to furnish them a common line for giving background information to the press.

Couve then discussed the work of the Ambassadorial Group in Washington. In his view the work in Washington should be carried on by the same persons who had been doing it in Paris--or as nearly so as possible. They had more expertise generally on this subject than Embassy staffs. Brentano agreed this would provide much needed continuity but was not sure how much he could spare Carstens from the Foreign Office. Home was unwilling to promise that Shuckburgh could work without interruption in Washington, but thought the Washington group could be reinforced from time to time. The Secretary commented they did not want anyone who could be spared.

Couve thought that the planning and preparation of an information program could be done in Washington. The Secretary turned attention back to a substantive question--namely a plebiscite in West Berlin which had important information aspects as well. This was quite different from making plebiscite proposals to the Soviets. The aim was to give the Berlin population an opportunity to demonstrate again, as they had in the 1958 Berlin elections, their overwhelming support for Allied presence and Allied rights in Berlin. This would greatly strengthen the Western posture. He thought this would be very helpful. He asked for German views.

Brentano said that he had discussed this with Mayor Brandt. Both thought it an excellent idea. He said that they would be able to make a definite recommendation to the Ambassadorial Working Group in ten days. The Berlin election was now very remote in time and it would be excellent to give the Berliners a chance to vote again. No doubt they would vote overwhelmingly in favor of the present status of the city. The best way to impress world opinion would be to invite observers from all countries to come to watch the plebiscite. It would have a very strong effect.

Home said it would be wise to have the plebiscite supervised by some impartial plebiscite commission in order to convince non-committed people that the vote had been genuinely free. He doubted, however, that the UN would be willing to take on the job of supervision.

Couve raised the problem of the relationship of a plebiscite to Western rights. It was very important to see to it that a plebiscite did not create the impression that our presence in Berlin was based from something other than our rights derived from the defeat and surrender of Germany. The Soviets would try to exploit this possibility. He also questioned whether it would not have to be the Allies who initiated the proposal.

Brentano said it was very important from the public opinion point of view that the initiative seems to come spontaneously from the Berliners. He saw no legal difficulty in this. The Berlin Senate and House of Representatives could propose this to the Berlin Kommandatura which would not exercise its veto and then the plans could go forward. He pointed out the disadvantages of proposing a UN supervision of the plebiscite because this would certainly lead to a UN debate on Berlin. He believed invitations to observe would do the trick. This should create a great impression. Nothing like this had ever been done in the Communist Bloc. Brentano reassured Couve that there could be no question as to the result.

Couve returned to the difficulty of having a plebiscite under an occupation. Brentano said that the Berliners and the Federal Republic would work out a possible question and submit it to the Ambassadorial Group for approval. He then emphasized the importance of keeping secret the fact that the idea had been put forward by the Working Group. It was essential that it appear to be a spontaneous idea of the West Berliners. They must take the first public step. He urged the greatest caution and thought it might be better to wait until he had returned to Germany before the idea was launched in Berlin. Then there would be less danger of it appearing to have been arranged in Paris. Home again urged that some sort of supervision be arranged so that it would not look like a put-up job. The Secretary pointed out it was a question of observation not supervision. Brentano suggested as a possible question: "Do you wish the Western Powers to continue to exercise their rights in Berlin and continue to protect the freedom of the population of Berlin?" He said that he would recommend a question after consultations in Berlin. Couve again warned against casting any doubts on the validity of Western rights.

The Secretary asked whether the Report of the Working Group on Information/3/ could be put before NATO. The Ministers agreed that it could and approved the report. They also agreed to submit to NATO Sections I and V of the Working Group Report (The Soviet Intentions and Economic Countermeasures papers respectively), but Section II Tactics and Section III Substantive Political Questions would not be given to NATO. Section V was approved after amendments to paragraphs 3 through 7 were accepted.

The Ministers agreed that the questions discussed in the section entitled Substantive Political Questions together with the agreed German addendum should be further studied by the Ambassadorial Group. The problems of military preparations should be discussed in NATO. This was NATO business. The Secretary said he hoped other Permanent Representatives of the other Three would tell NAC of their military plans after he had finished speaking on Tuesday. He would be speaking only for his own Government. He was going to give NATO more than was in the President's speech.

The Ministers then called in the information officers and discussed how to handle the press. Brentano argued against a communiqué on the ground that every word would be compared with previous communiqués. Any variations noted would result in endless speculation in the press.

The Ministers agreed to have no formal communiqué. They worked out a common line for background press briefing with emphasis on complete unity of approach. Couve suggested that the answer to questions about what is a reasonable basis for negotiation should be: no preconditions and freedom for each party to discuss his position. The Secretary suggested as a definition of an unacceptable basis for negotiation the phrase in the President's speech, "What is mine is mine and what is yours is negotiable."

The Ministers agreed to say that the possibility of a summit meeting with Khrushchev had not been discussed. If asked whether there would be another Western Foreign Ministers meeting they would reply they would undoubtedly be seeing one another in New York.

The Secretary made the point that this meeting should be treated as part of a process of continuing consultation which had gone on previously and would continue for weeks and months ahead. There was nothing sudden or climactic about it.

Home wondered how questions on preparatory measures should be handled. He did not want to describe them too far in advance of their implementation. The Ministers agreed to use the phrase that they had "agreed on the necessity of certain preparatory measures." The meeting closed with the Secretary stressing the desirability of emphasizing unity. The Ministers agreed to use the phrase "complete unity of approach."

Paris, August 7, 1961, 2 a.m.

Secto 22. Eyes only for the President. We have just completed the brief quadripartite Ministers meeting on Germany and Berlin. There was a gratifying demonstration of unity and a seriousness of purpose to which your recent speech/2/ and initiatives had obviously made a profound contribution. Lord Home was especially helpful in his combination of firmness on the essentials and moderation on lesser questions. Von Brentano was obviously doing his best to contribute to quadripartite unity without exaggerating the special sensitivities which we had reason to expect from the Germans. Couve de Murville showed General de Gaulle's firm approach by a relative insensitivity to problems of public opinion which we can expect within the Western Alliance and in other parts of the world.

I will be able to take a good report to NATO on Tuesday afternoon/3/ and urge them to get specifically into the problems of military build-up in accordance with our approved plan, a NATO-wide preparation of economic countermeasures and NATO coordination of propaganda and political action in support of our position in Berlin. Ed Murrow had a productive meeting of quadripartite Information Ministers and their report/4/ provides a good basis for intensified NATO efforts in that field.

All four of us agreed that formal negotiations with the Russians should come in October or early November, depending upon the effect of the Soviet Party Congress on timing. We also agreed that the Ambassadorial Working Group in Washington should now prepare in detail our negotiating position. The only point of importance on which there was not agreement was the timing of a Western initiative in proposing a Foreign Ministers meeting to the Soviets. Lord Home and I believe that we cannot delay indefinitely a specific step which would be publicly known to make good on our declared readiness to negotiate and that we should encounter increasing public opinion problems both at home and abroad if we defer such an initiative until after the German elections. Couve de Murville was dead set against any such publicly known initiative until Western preparations had produced some ascertainable influence on Khrushchev. Von Brentano was somewhere in between but rather negative about an initiative. In an effort to break the deadlock I suggested that we might reply to the latest Soviet note/5/ before the end of this month and that its conclusion might state that the Foreign Ministers would be in attendance at the United Nations General Assembly and would take up possible arrangements for negotiations on Germany and Berlin. Couve de Murville was unable to agree, perhaps because General de Gaulle has been out of town until Tuesday and Couve seemed to be under specific instructions on this point. It was simply left that we would be in touch with them promptly through normal channels upon my return to Washington.

In briefing the press/6/ we have tried to emphasize that this particular Ministers meeting was a part of a process of consultation which has been and would be going on over a period of weeks and months and that climactic decisions would not be expected. Further, we have tried to play down the Ministers meeting in order not to feed the impression in NATO that we were making big decisions prior to NATO consultation. Both points have the virtue of being true.

Bilateral talks with the French on Bizerte have not been as productive as we had hoped./7/ The General is clearly in the mood of teaching the Arabs a lesson, confident that they will come around after his show of force, and indifferent or contemptuous of any action which might be taken in the United Nations. His attitude has paralyzed his subordinates including Couve de Murville. I think we may have succeeded in getting some sort of talks going between the French Consul General in Bizerte and the Tunisian Governor on an exchange of prisoners and on the beginnings of troop withdrawals but I cannot yet confirm what instructions might have gone to the Consul General. If there has been no motion before General de Gaulle's return I shall try to see him and try to explain that we are not meddling but are pursuing important American interests in trying to get this question resolved.

Kohler, Nitze, Fowler, Murrow and colleagues have worked very effectively and have the confidence of their opposite numbers. Even though Berlin and Germany are in Europe, it is quite apparent that Europe is looking to you to bring the West through the coming crisis. The combination of firmness, military build-up and readiness to search for reasonable and peaceful answers which characterized your speech to the nation was undoubtedly the right exercise of leadership insofar as Europe is concerned.

Since Lord Home and I have had a good deal of time with each other, I do not plan to return via London. I will see Segni on Wednesday evening in Milan and Adenauer on Thursday morning during my day at Lake Como and will arrive Washington about midnight Thursday./8/

Rusk

US/MC/13

Paris, August 8, 1961, 6 p.m.

MINISTERIAL CONSULTATIONS ON BERLIN
Paris, August 4-9, 1961

PARTICIPANTS

United States
The Secretary of State
Ambassador Gavin
Minister Lyon

France
President de Gaulle
M. Andronikoff, Interpreter

SUBJECT
Berlin

President de Gaulle welcomed Secretary Rusk, expressed pleasure at seeing him, said that it was always a pleasure to see him and added that he imagined he would be seeing him frequently in the coming months. He said that M. Couve de Murville had informed him of the meetings, and he would be glad to hear from the Secretary himself how he thought the meetings of the Foreign Ministers had gone.

The Secretary expressed appreciation for the President's remarks and said that he brought the best wishes of President Kennedy to President de Gaulle.

The Secretary continued by saying that President Kennedy had charged him to do all possible to further the matter of consultation which President Kennedy had discussed with President de Gaulle/2/ and said he hoped that President de Gaulle would be satisfied with what had been accomplished in this connection. Obviously the Three Powers would be in close consultation in the coming months. In Washington, he himself met regularly with the British and French Ambassadors, he had asked the Pentagon to furnish such military help as seemed desirable, and we would welcome any military officials that the French cared to send to participate in this work. The Secretary continued that at least three meetings between the three Foreign Ministers were in view, one before the General Assembly, one before any possible Four Power meeting with respect to Berlin, and one before the NATO meeting in December. There would also probably be a Chiefs of Government meeting.

President de Gaulle replied that this type of consultation was all to the good but not exactly what he had had in mind. There was no objection whatsoever to the Ambassadors meeting in Washington but this was not as he had seen it. He had envisaged a special body such as the Allies had maintained in permanent session following the Versailles Treaty for political cooperation between governments to deal with both political and military matters. The United States did not see it that way. That was all right, the President said, and then asked Secretary Rusk how he thought the Ministers' meeting, which had just taken place, which was necessary, and in which Mr. von Brentano participated, had gone.

The Secretary said he thought the meetings had gone well. He said that there had been a large degree of unity insofar as the conversations had proceeded. There were still many points to be formalized with respect to military matters, economic matters, psychological matters, but good progress had been made. Further progress was required on Contingency Planning and certain other matters which effect better solidarity. They had not really attempted to formulate a program. There was one matter, the Secretary continued, which concerned President Kennedy. He felt that by early September we would have to indicate publicly that we would be entering negotiations with the Russians, perhaps at the end of October or early November. He did not feel that we could postpone too long the knowledge that negotiations would take place. Mr. Khrushchev talks of negotiations. We talk of negotiations. We are asking a great deal on the part of our people. They will be anxious for us to carry out negotiations before they are faced with the possibility of war.

President de Gaulle replied that the Foreign Minister had told him of our views on this matter. There were, he said, various ways of handling the question of Berlin. Mr. Khrushchev had created the situation. We could say to him, "No, we will not change the status of Berlin. We will not have our rights interfered with. We are there legitimately. We have been there for sixteen years. If you change the status of Berlin by force, we will reply by force. There is another way, such as you Americans propose. You have your views, the British have a view, we have our view. They are not all the same. It is difficult for us to reach common agreement. I know you are thinking that you must negotiate with the Soviets to satisfy your public opinion. I understand your view. If you see there is something which develops from these negotiations which is worthwhile, we will join you. But you really are doing it on your own account. In fact, you have really begun already. Mr. McCloy has seen Mr. Khrushchev; Mr. Thompson has had conversations too. If you had taken the first course, we would have been with you but this way is not our way. We don't like the idea of commencing negotiations without knowing what we are negotiating about. But it is quite natural for you Americans, you are far away and you are in a hurry with respect to Berlin. You are not Europeans. You are naturally very concerned about Berlin, but not as immediately nor as directly as we are. We here in Europe are much more directly concerned. But we have no objections. Please go on with your probing, we have nothing against it. Tell us if you find some substance in these negotiations and we shall join you."

The Secretary indicated that he would like to comment on two points made by President de Gaulle. In the first place, we did not have in mind negotiating without knowing what we were negotiating about. We don't think we are very far apart from the views of the French and British and we think that the remainder of August can be devoted to working out a common plan. However, we believe that we must have some type of calendar, some sort of schedule, or matters could be delayed indefinitely and we might be faced with a Berlin crisis without having any plan.

A second point, the Secretary said, and he wished to make this extremely clear, was that we had no intention of withdrawing from Berlin. We had no more intention of doing so than had France. We regarded Berlin with the greatest seriousness. The Secretary said he wished to remove any other impression which President de Gaulle might have in this connection.

President de Gaulle said that he was very interested in the Secretary's remarks. However, if one were to engage with Mr. Khrushchev, one would have, as the diplomats say, to reach a conclusion. To reach a conclusion with him, one would have to compromise. Either you reach no result or you give up something. If you give up anything, the situation gets more and more difficult, eventually intolerable. However, if you want to probe, we have no objection.

The Secretary said that we don't envisage that negotiations need lead to a compromise. We have no intention of giving our rights away. In fact, the Secretary said, he recalled one negotiation which led to improvement in our situation; in 1949 the negotiations with respect to the blockade. If we get nowhere in negotiations, we intend to make it clear to Mr. Khrushchev that we stand by our rights. We can't prevent his signing a piece of paper, a peace treaty, but we shall make it clear to him that we won't sign it and we won't be influenced by that piece of paper.

President de Gaulle replied that he understood our desire to make matters less disadvantageous for Berlin but said that if we negotiated, it was because Mr. Khrushchev told us he was going to make a treaty. We might hope to improve Berlin's situation, but our negotiations under the circumstances might lead to something worse for Berlin. We would be negotiating because Mr. Khrushchev asked us to. But anyway, why not try? However, asked President de Gaulle, how can we negotiate when Khrushchev insists on what the results will be? He threatens to crush us. He insists on getting his own way. He says come and talk, but if you don't talk, the result will be the same anyway. He'll have his treaty with East Germany. How can anyone negotiate under these threats?

The Secretary said that what was proposed by Mr. Khrushchev need not be a basis for the proposals of the West.

Still, de Gaulle replied, negotiations will be started because Mr. Khrushchev has whistled.

The Secretary asked President de Gaulle how he saw the Berlin matter developing.

At first President de Gaulle misunderstood the question and said that if nothing from outside occurred, there would be no problem in Berlin, which had lasted now for sixteen years. Mr. Khrushchev had created the problem, otherwise it would not exist. Berlin could have gone on living as it had. The situation in Berlin was not impossible. In fact, the West Berliners were quite well off, but Khrushchev was compelling us to negotiate.

Then President de Gaulle explained that he hadn't quite understood the question and said that he himself had explained to Mr. Khrushchev that it would be impossible to have East-West negotiations under the circumstances of cold war which he was creating. If he was serious about trying to reach an accord with the West, he should not have picked on Berlin. However, if he undertook to threaten and issue "dictats", there could be no serious negotiations. President de Gaulle believed that we should explain this to the people of the world. With Khrushchev behaving the way he was, we should have to either compromise with him and avoid war or not compromise with him and face war. Thus, we should not negotiate because he summons us. But, de Gaulle said, he realized there were sound reasons for the Americans feeling as they did, but the French did not want to negotiate for the sense of negotiating.

The Secretary remarked that if we should reach a crisis over Berlin through some rash act of Mr. Khrushchev's prior to negotiation, we would not be able to aid Europe since the Western Alliance would not allow us to do so. The members of the European Alliance would demand negotiations beforehand.

President de Gaulle replied he understood our position. We were not in Europe. We would have to come to Europe and fight and die in Europe. But the Europeans had a different point of view. They were not in a hurry. If the negotiations went wrong and Berlin were lost, then Germany would be lost and this would be very difficult for France, but again President de Gaulle said there was no objection to our probing. He understood our desire to establish contact with the Soviets but so far he saw no reason for doing so.

The Secretary thanked President de Gaulle for his views and said we would keep in touch with him. He said he must repeat that there was absolutely nothing tentative in our commitments with respect to Berlin. He said it would not be a question of Americans coming to Europe to die but tens of millions would die in the United States for Berlin "as you will die in Europe over Berlin." We are extremely serious in this.

President de Gaulle said he had only remarked what he had because the Secretary had indicated that if there were no negotiations beforehand the United States could not come to Europe.

The Secretary said he wanted to make this very clear because he thought there might be a misunderstanding. He had said that it could not be possible for us to come to Europe because the Western European Alliance would not permit us to defend the Alliance without having tried negotiations first.

President de Gaulle asked what was the Western Alliance? France would want us to come.

The Secretary remarked that this was quite a different question.

President de Gaulle thanked the Secretary for this clear explanation.

Paris, August 8, 1961.

MINISTERIAL DECISIONS ON REPORT OF THE FOUR-POWER WORKING GROUP ON GERMANY AND BERLIN
July 28-August 4, 1961

The following decisions were made by the Four Foreign Ministers on the basis of the Working Group Report.

The Ministers approved this section of the Report and agreed to give it to NATO.

They instructed the quadripartite Ambassadorial Steering Group in Washington to keep the subject of Soviet motives and intentions and the situation in East Germany under constant review.

There was a general discussion of this paper and especially about the question of a Western initiative toward negotiations and its timing. It was agreed to discuss this matter further through diplomatic channels.

The Ministers agreed that the question of replies to the Soviet notes of August 3 should be considered by the Ambassadorial Group.

They agreed not to give this section of the Report to NATO.

The Ministers agreed that the Ambassadorial Steering Group should work on possible negotiating positions along the lines indicated in this section of the Working Group Report.

The Ministers agreed to the addendum concerning the essential conditions for an arrangement for West Berlin.

They agreed not to give this section of the Report to NATO.

The Ministers unanimously endorsed the policy of a progressive buildup of the strength of the Alliance.

They agreed that the buildup should be Alliance-wide and should have an organized follow-up.

They agreed that the problems of military preparations should be discussed in NATO.

The Ministers revised this section of the Report and approved the document entitled "Recommendations on Economic Countermeasures", which they agreed to submit to NATO. The Ministers stressed the importance of prompt action to establish the legal and administrative basis for rapid implementation of these recommended measures.

They agreed that an embargo is essentially an economic measure, while a blockade is essentially military, but that both should be considered by the Ambassadorial Group.

They directed the Ambassadorial Group to follow up on the implementation of these recommendations.

The Ministers discussed and approved this section of the Report of the Working Group and directed the Ambassadorial Group to carry out the recommendations contained in paragraphs 2 and 6 thereof./2/

The Ministers agreed to expedite instructions to their representatives on the Ambassadorial Group to enable the Group to proceed without delay; and in the light of the Ministers' discussion of the subject, to draft new directives for Live Oak and other military authorities.

The Ministers also agreed that the Ambassadorial Steering Group should put into precise form the sequence of governmental decisions required in the course of a developing crisis over Berlin, including economic sanctions, airlift, et cetera.

The Ministers approved the information report and agreed that the annex thereto, covering suggested major publicity themes, should be submitted to NATO.

Paris, August 9, 1961, 10 a.m.

SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH EUROPEAN AMBASSADORS

PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Chiefs of Mission
Senior Advisers USDel
Advisers USDel
Senior US officials, Paris

[Here follows discussion of trade promotion.]

2. Berlin: Turning to Berlin and the German question, the Secretary said that we were in for weeks and months of confusion, tension and danger and that there were several ways in which the various missions in the field could be of help during this critical period. The first thing was for the missions to think about the problem, to read the reports of the Working Group and the Foreign Ministers Conference, and to convey their own views thereon. Khrushchev's moves with respect to the various countries represented at this meeting would, of course, influence the Department's estimate of how to reach a settlement. It was, therefore, important for all the posts to report on this subject, even though what they said might seem obvious from their own vantage points.

The Secretary said he wished to explain that US policy would attempt to draw a line between what was vital to our interests and what was important but not worth risking the precipitation of armed conflict. We must all remember that we have two great blocs opposing one another and that war was now much more possible than it had been in the past. One could no longer take comfort in the easy use of the term "deterrent" since events could take over the situation and we ran a grave risk of nuclear war. It was, therefore, imperative to separate what was vital from what was not.

Our really vital interests, the Secretary said, were (1) the Western presence in West Berlin and (2) our physical access to the city with a view to sustaining not only our military forces but also the life and liberty of the civilian population of the city. In everything that Khrushchev has said so far, one can find a certain vagueness which still justifies us in believing that he may not intend directly to attack the vital interests of the West. It is not too late to assume that he is still open to negotiation on many points which affect those interests. In the nuclear age, war, though it may well occur, can no longer be a deliberate instrument of national policy, and peaceful settlement of issues such as Berlin is now essential.

3. Negotiations on Berlin: The Secretary explained that we had reached the conclusion that negotiations would probably take place during a time span running from early October through early November, with probable soundings being taken before October. We estimated that formal negotiations would probably best be conducted after the German elections, and the likelihood was that these negotiations would be at the Foreign Minister level rather than at the Summit or in a general peace conference or in the framework of the UN. However, the moves of the other side may, of course, push us in these latter directions and especially toward the UN. Nehru had indicated that he was thinking of raising the Berlin question in the UN and if the crisis really heats up, the UN will inevitably be seized of it at some stage.

The United States was therefore now trying to define our negotiating positions, i.e., the point at which we would start and the position to which we might come before the windup. In this connection, advice could be welcomed from all of the posts represented.

4. Organizing For Crisis: Mr. Kohler then explained the measures which were being taken to organize the Department to cope with the Berlin problem. He himself would head an interdepartmental team, supported by the "operations center" on this problem, and including Mr. Nitze and representatives of the Treasury, the CIA and the USIA. Mr. Tyler has been named Acting Assistant Secretary for European Affairs with Mr. Richard Davis as Deputy and Mr. Burdett as his Acting Deputy. The British, the Germans and the French were also reinforcing their Embassies in Washington to provide adequate personnel for the Quadripartite Ambassadorial Steering Group. Mr. Kohler said that the reports of the Working Group which had met here in Paris as well as the USIA report on information activities would be sent to the Ambassadors. Fuller information would be given to all the posts as operations proceeded in Washington.

Mr. Kohler suggested certain lines which should be emphasized in our various missions. For example, in the NATO countries and in Spain it would be well to concentrate on the measures which the US and other Western powers were taking to strengthen their position, while in the Iron Curtain countries it would be well to bring home the consequences to those countries of any armed conflict which might be precipitated by Mr. Khrushchev.

5. Policy Shifts. After discussions, first within the US Government, then the Working Group in Paris and finally the Foreign Ministers, it appeared that the present situation calls for certain changes in our policy reflecting the change in our military plans so as to give us more latitude for action short of nuclear conflict. There would be some duration to this military action, in which we could better probe the intentions of the Soviet Union, and this would naturally affect our political moves. We were now in substantial agreement with our allies that we should maintain our legal position with respect to our rights in Berlin but that we could afford to be less concerned over the question of who actually was responsible for executing the procedures relating to our access rights. For example, the mere turning over of the access procedures to the East Germans was not in itself a casus belli. This posture would give us, we hoped, more time for political maneuver and for the disposition of our military forces. The Allies were also in agreement that air lift should be used as much as possible in the initial stages so as to put the adversary in the position of being the first to commit aggression. Our military plans would have to be changed, and we wanted to leave a wider choice of diplomatic moves and perhaps wider options as to the theater of military operations involving, for example, operations in the Skagerrak or the Dardanelles or even more distant places.

Later in the meeting Ambassador Parsons reported that the Swedes would be extremely sensitive to any operations in the Skagerrak and would probably feel that their neutrality would require them to keep a Baltic channel open through Swedish territorial waters. Ambassador Hare said that the Turks preferred to sublimate their problems with the Soviet Union through NATO and would not welcome a bilateral conflict with the Soviet Union over the Dardanelles. Ambassador Matthews pointed out that the Austrians would object if we were to undertake overflights of Austria in connection with any operations, and he presumed that the Swedes and the Swiss would feel the same way.

The Secretary pointed out that for purposes of contingency planning the degree of escalation which we might expect would vary with our assumption as to the likelihood or unlikelihood of nuclear warfare. The Secretary pointed out that to plan on going from a minor, small-scale military probe directly to all-out nuclear war is a satisfactory policy only if one is sure of never actually reaching that point. We were trying to create a situation where we could gain time through economic and other measures before any shooting actually started. The US no longer anticipated a situation in which interruption of our access rights would be immediately followed by "the big bang" of nuclear warfare, and all the Ambassadors could assure their clients that the United States was not disposed to be rash in this matter. In sum, we have not abandoned hopes for a peaceful settlement.

6. Military Problems: Mr. Nitze then outlined some of the military problems which had arisen from this change of pace. In March and April overall reviews of our military capabilities had led the Administration to take all the measures which seemed sensible to improve and protect the strategic nuclear deterrent. For example, we had accelerated our programs for Polaris, the Minuteman and the early warning systems. When the Berlin crisis arose, these measures were already under way, and the need therefore was to build up our intermediate capabilities. The possibility of calling up National Guard divisions was at once considered, but decided against, since the measures taken had to be ones we could sustain for a long time. Therefore, the United States had decided (1) to strengthen its forces in Europe; (2) to increase our combat ready strength so that by the end of the year we could be capable of deploying six more divisions to Europe; (3) to improve our airlift and sea-lift ties; (4) to cancel several scheduled reductions of our air strength and our aircraft carriers; (5) to expand production of supplies and equipment for non-nuclear warfare; and (6) to build up our anti-submarine capabilities and naval capability for harassment and even blockade. It was important that the Allies should embark on a comparable concurrent buildup, but they also should avoid crash operations which would put them at a peak they could not sustain. They should prepare now for later expansions, if needed.

Mr. Nitze pointed out that each Ally had its own problems in this field. The British were concerned by their balance of payments and by the political repercussions of conscription. The Germans had to keep an eye on their elections and to avoid drawing any accusations of seeking war-like solutions. Nevertheless, it was hoped that the Germans would increase to nine divisions by the end of 1961 and eleven during 1962. The French, of course, had serious domestic problems, principally in connection with Algeria, but they seemed disposed to take very serious risks in Algeria if the crisis got bad enough, in order to bring back their troops. They also contemplated calling up their reserves. The Dutch and others were also taking measures to strengthen their capabilities.

The primary area where military strength was needed seemed to run across the middle of Europe, but, of course, Greece and Turkey were also important and here we had a problem of stretching available money and equipment to help them over the short term. Before any military assistance could be worked out, it would be necessary for EUCOM and the Pentagon to work out plans and in this the help of the various country teams would be important.

Up to now the Ambassadorial group in Washington has been instructing the Tripartite Military Group doing Berlin contingency planning. But if any military action is taken, all NATO should be ready. We are therefore working out a closer relationship for that group with the NATO mechanisms. Good progress is being made in revising the actual plans. The success of the meetings was most encouraging.

The Secretary explained that there had been a real change in American strategic thinking. We were now emphasizing the buildup of conventional forces not because we preferred land war in Europe to hydrogen bombs over the US, but because we were trying to force political decisions before we took military action. We had given up the concept of a "bigger bang for a buck" because it involves too great a danger for all states that their own as well as enemy territory would be subject to complete devastation. Governments were charged during wars not just with inflicting injury on others but with protecting their own populations. Notwithstanding Khrushchev's threats we wanted also to increase his range of choice by not limiting our own choice to the two grim alternatives of nuclear war or complete surrender.

7. Information Activities: Mr. Murrow then explained some of the measures being taken in the field of information. We would shortly be getting out a paper on themes which could be exploited in the propaganda field, and we intended to make maximum use of broadcast time on facilities abroad which were owned or supported by the US. There would also be an interchange among the four Allies in seeking public opinion and conducting information activities in other Allied countries. The themes to be used were simple and subject to repetition. For example, there was the theme that the Berlin crisis is Khrushchev's crisis; there is no need for a Berlin crisis. It is of Soviet manufacture. We would also be emphasizing the question of how many people Khrushchev was willing to kill, in order to have his way with regard to Berlin. Finally, the theme of self-determination could be exploited.

8. Consultations: The Secretary then discussed some of the problems we had with our Allies regarding consultation. In setting up the four-power meeting, for example, the French had insisted that this be preceded by tripartite discussions and these, in turn, had had to be prefaced by a bilateral breakfast with Lord Home. It was important to remember that consultation involves more than just sitting around and waiting to be told what the US plans to do. Those who expect to be consulted should themselves be actively working on the various problems involved and should be ready to put forward ideas of their own, as had been done by only a few of the NATO powers outside the Four. In general, it was much better for the Allies to get their licks in early and to put forward their ideas before the administrative machinery within the US Government had already functioned and had reached decisions which were difficult to modify. Consultation, in short, was a two-way operation.

[Here follows discussion of various national attitudes toward Berlin and topics unrelated to Berlin.]

Washington, August 12, 1961, 6:26 p.m.

339. Re Embtel 286 Aug 7, Deptel 172 July 22, Deptel 311 Aug 8./2/ Situation in East Germany causing us increasing concern. Explosion along 1953 lines at this time would be highly unfortunate. Despite inevitable memories in East Germany of 1953 and Hungary, we assume that not only danger of escape hatch being closed but also rising tension between Moscow and Free World is contributing factor. It would be particularly unfortunate if an explosion in East Germany were based on expectation of immediate Western military assistance. Such an explosion would precipitate crisis before military and political measures now underway for dealing with Berlin problem have become effective.

Please report urgently FRG thinking on likelihood of early explosion, what action it contemplates to prevent one, and what action by US and other Allies it would consider useful. As FRG knows, this subject discussed at Paris Foreign Ministers Meeting which decided unanimously "that as a matter of policy, the Allies should do nothing to exacerbate the situation".

Re Tosec 34 rptd Bonn 311. Subject did not arise during Secretary-Chancellor conversation. Request your views and judgment on apparent divergence.

Rusk