74. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, July 18, 1961, noon.

SUBJECT
Meeting of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin--July 18, 1961

[Here follows a list of participants. Assistant Secretary of State Kohler presided at the meeting.]

The meeting discussed in lively conversational form the various aspects of courses a and b of NSC Directive 59/2/ and the form these aspects were given in the collection of prepared documents for the NSC Meeting of July 19, 1961./3/

The discussion ranged over the merits of a rapid, spectacular build-up versus the slower build-up and the usefulness of a permanent re-enforcement of conventional forces; it ranged over the need for American leadership in order to bring along the allies, over the financial burden the various courses might bring on, the limited effect economic sanctions would have by themselves, the enormous difference in defensive posture even a small type build-up would have in Europe. It also covered the weaknesses of the concept of a tri-partite "probe" along the Autobahn, the merits of declaring a national emergency, the need to modernize outdated equipment of our conventional forces, the timing of troop deployments and troop availability, the Allied attitude, the apparent desire of the President and the Secretary to avoid declaration of a national emergency at this time, the psychological lack of preparation of our country, the views of the "Sovietologists", the danger of the first probe's failure, the airlift capability and other points.

Washington, July 18, 1961, 5 p.m.

PRESENT WERE
The President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Generals Lemnitzer, Eddleman, LeMay and Shoup, and Admiral Russell)

1. The President stated he was considering a further supplement to the Defense Department's budget. He discussed the political and economic considerations affecting the declaration of a National Emergency, and stated he believed it would be wise to postpone the declaration of such an emergency until it was required as a foundation for the mobilization of our reserve forces. The Chiefs agreed such action was not required now, and stated that it could be postponed until at least September 1.

2. The President asked if consideration had been given to the action which should be taken by our allies to complement the force increases proposed in the Defense Department budget supplement./2/ The Secretary and the Chiefs stated a list of actions to be recommended to the NATO nations had been prepared. Further, they stated that if the allies followed the recommended program, and if the United States acted in accordance with the proposed budget supplement, by January 1, 1962, NATO would be prepared to launch non-nuclear warfare on a scale which would indicate our determination and which would provide some additional time for negotiation before resorting to nuclear warfare.

3. The President asked if the NATO air forces would be sufficiently strong to follow the ground probe with non-nuclear air action. General LeMay replied that USAFE was outnumbered by the Soviets 10 or 13 to 1 [this is not true, but I did not dispute the point at the meeting],/3/ but that if USAFE were supported by its allies, and if the NATO forces took the initiative, they could effectively meet the Soviet in non-nuclear air combat.

4. In response to a question from the President as to how we proposed to strengthen our ground forces, General Eddleman replied that he and I were agreed we should add personnel to the three STRAF divisions to make them combat ready by approximately December 1.

5. The President asked if the additional U.S. combat-ready divisions could be effectively employed if our allies took no action to strengthen their forces. General Lemnitzer stated, "No". However, Lemnitzer added that when combined with the increases in forces which we can expect from our allies, the additional U.S. forces will provide NATO with an expanded capability for non-nuclear ground action.

6. The President asked what the Navy could do in the Baltic and Mediterranean to harass Soviet shipping. Admiral Russell replied the Navy had prepared plans for such harassing actions, and, with the force increase provided by the budget supplement, the Navy would be prepared to implement those plans. A copy of the Chiefs' paper, dated July 18, listing the proposed harassing actions was left with the President./4/

Washington, July 19, 1961.

SUBJECT
This Afternoon's Meetings

You will have your Berlin steering group at 3 o'clock and the NSC at 4. The first meeting should allow us to get a clear sense of what we want to review and decide firmly in the second. I suggest the following agenda for the first meeting.

1. A brief review of the military alternatives. You are quite familiar with this, and Annex C of the blue report/2/ gives a good summary of the alternatives as they now stand. The only disappointing element of Annex C is the appendix, which shows the State Department's estimate that there will not be a strong allied response to requests for parallel action on their part. It thus becomes a major diplomatic question whether we want to ask strongly for something we may not get. You should also consider Max Taylor's memo on "the third alternative," in Annex A./2/ (Inked in on the original)

2. Whichever military level you decide on, there is need for additional decisions about a national emergency and about standby controls and taxing authority. I believe there is general agreement in the steering group that the national emergency is not now necessary, but a hard wing of the Kohler group, led by Acheson and Nitze, disagrees. It will be important to decide how to handle this matter in the 4 o'clock meeting so as to have as much harmony and unanimity in the government as possible, once the decision is taken. On standby controls and taxes, Ted Sorenson has a memo;/3/ it's not an easy choice.

3. A third item which deserves discussion at the (inked in on orig.) 3 o'clock meeting is economic sanctions policy. Annex B of the blue book gives a clear-cut recommendation for a general economic embargo against the Sino-Soviet bloc if access to Berlin is blocked. The case is worth reading, and it makes clear that we could do a lot of harm to the Sino-Soviet economy, at a considerable cost to ourselves. The intelligence estimate/4/ indicates that an embargo in itself is not likely to have a decisive effect upon the Soviets. And again, as Annex B indicates, it will be hard to sell sanctions to our allies, and since the immediate cost will fall more on them than on us, we might have to provide several hundreds of millions a year in compensation.

4. But the most important subject for discussion in the first meeting, and the one which you may wish to put first, is the political scenario. The Secretary of State has sent over a talking paper/5/ which indicates his sense of the problem. The first two and one-half pages are a general summary. From IV onward, there is an indicated timetable of activity which carries through pretty clearly to the end of September, and becomes foggy beyond that point--almost inevitably. The paper does not make clear the Secretary's view of two important questions which you may wish to raise with him.

The first is whether we should now make clear that neither the peace treaty nor the substitution of East Germans for Russians along the Autobahn is a fighting matter.

The second is whether we should extend serious feelers to the Soviets with respect to the elements of an eventual settlement of the crisis.

On the basis of the three o'clock meeting, I will try to draft an order of discussion for the four o'clock meeting, and I think you should begin that session by announcing the subjects on which you wish decisions. My guess is that it may make sense to take up the questions at the four o'clock meeting in the order of their urgency, something like this:

1. Level of military build-up

2. Other immediate measures--national emergency? taxes? stand-by controls?

3. (If you choose) Suggestions for the tone and content of your speech.

(From here on the urgency is somewhat less great, and the key problem is preparation for the Foreign Ministers Meeting.)

4. Economic sanctions policy

5. Immediate political steps

a. Early talks with the Soviets? (Acheson against and Rusk undecided)

b. An immediate decision on attitude toward the peace treaty and East German troops on the Autobahn. (The British are pressing hard for this.)

Some other matters which we are concerned with can be discussed at a slower tempo and should probably be explicitly deferred. Among these are the military operations plan in the event that access is blocked, the Defense Department's recommendations for a long-run defense build-up, details of the civil defense program.

This is probably the most important NSC meeting that we have had, and there is no reason why it cannot be continued tomorrow if you wish.

McG. B./6/

Washington, July 19, 1961./2/

Before the meeting of the Council, there was a meeting of the Steering Group in the President's study on the second floor of the Executive Mansion. The Secretary of State opened this meeting with a discussion which covered the first few pages of his "talking paper" on the political scenario./3/ He emphasized in particular that we must not give our allies a veto, although in practical terms both Germany and France have such a veto de facto. He also emphasized that we must have public opinion on our side and that the force of such international opinion on the Soviet leaders is very great.

Mr. Murrow pointed out that the problem of morale and purpose in Western Europe is more serious than Americans ordinarily believe. The people there do not want to fight for Berlin, and it will take time to change their attitude. If at the beginning we seem impetuous, this change will be harder to effect.

The Secretary of State indicated his support for a military program with three characteristics:

1. A present build-up;

2. A capability to stop DDR troops by the end of 1961;

3. An ability to fight conventional war for several weeks against Soviet forces, at the same point in time.

The Secretary of Defense outlined the specific components of the military program in Annex C/4/ and stated his conclusion that there would be no need for a declaration of national emergency before September 1 at the earliest. He believed that Congressional authorization could be obtained for a limited call-up of reserves without such a declaration.

The Cabinet members of the Steering Group indicated their common belief that taxes should be increased in order to give the American public a feeling of participation in the crisis. This belief seemed to be generally shared in the Steering Group.

The President raised the question whether the proposed military build-up would increase the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, and the Secretary of Defense replied that in his judgment this would be the effect, but the argument was not fully developed.

It was agreed that one major purpose of the measures now proposed is to effect preparation for a major build-up of forces in Europe, on short notice. The President asked whether these preparations should go forward even if there were a negative response abroad to our proposals for concurrent allied military preparations. The Secretary of Defense answered that he would be in favor of the present build-up and of the further deployment of major U.S. forces to Europe as long as the Germans were willing to play their role, and he believed they would.

The meeting of the whole National Security Council began shortly after four o'clock in the Cabinet Room. Again the Secretary of State spoke from the first pages of his talking paper, and the Secretary of Defense from Annex C of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group report. The President again emphasized his own view that the outlined U.S. preparations would not be adequate without an effective allied response, especially from the Germans and the French.

There then developed a very important exchange between Mr. Acheson and Secretary McNamara. Mr. Acheson initially appeared to wish for a present definite decision to declare a national emergency and begin the call-up of reserves not later than September. Secretary McNamara argued that it would be better not to make a definite commitment now, but to have the understanding that a declaration of emergency would be declared and larger ground reserves called up when the situation required. The Secretary of Defense was opposed to a fixed target date, on the ground that it would be wrong to accept a rigid time-table in advance. He did not wish to have large reserve forces on hand with no mission. Mr. Acheson initially appeared to believe that the proposed course of action was not sufficiently energetic or definite, but the President kept the discussion going until it became clear that Secretary McNamara's flexible time-table would in fact permit a sufficiently rapid deployment in the event of deepening crisis, to satisfy Mr. Acheson. The essential point was that the present preparations would rapidly create a force in being, in the continental U.S., of six Army and two Marine divisions. In the event of a rapidly developing crisis, appropriate numbers of these divisions could be deployed to Europe and reserve divisions called up to take their place, so that up to six divisions and supporting units could be promptly deployed as needed. The exact way in which this deployment and call-up would be interconnected in time was not spelled out in detail, but the up-shot of the discussion was a general agreement that the plans as presented by Secretary McNamara were satisfactory. Mr. Acheson specifically indicated his own approval.

There was further discussion of the relation between conventional forces and the credibility of the deterrent, and there appeared to be general agreement that in fact conventional forces will add to this credibility, creating a chain of plausible U.S. response in which each stage would believably lead to the next higher chain of force.

There was discussion of taxes. The President indicated his current judgment that it would be unwise to add $3-1/2 billion to the budget without asking for additional taxes. On the other hand, the developing recovery might be adversely affected by immediate taxation. But perhaps it would be done by the passage of a tax bill now with the effective date after the first of the year.

Mr. Murrow restated his conviction that preparatory steps should be taken gradually, in part because each step would give us a chance to restate our views and the reasons for what we are doing. He reminded the Council that the polls show weakness in European opinion. To this the Secretary of State replied that opinion can be changed, and the President remarked that we must keep the issue focused on our common commitment.

The discussion turned to government military assistance, and after considerable discussion it was agreed that the U.S. would not for the present offer additional military assistance to allies facing the problem of increased military effort. This judgment was much affected by the opinion of the Secretary of Defense that Germany will not need military assistance, that the UK will increase its force readiness within its own borders, and that in France the problem is not military assistance but Algeria. The Secretary of Defense did believe that it would be important to urge increased procurement in Great Britain, principally by the Germans.

The reference to the British balance of payments problem led to discussion of the parallel problem which might develop for Americans if large new forces were deployed in Europe for a substantial period of time. The Secretary of the Treasury indicated that he would have a real problem in such a case, in the long run, while the Secretary of Defense indicated that over such a period of time there could be rearrangements that would reduce the drain on our gold.

The President asked whether the Germans were now really helping on the balance of payments problem, and he received answers in the general sense of the memorandum supplied to the White House shortly before by the Department of State./5/ In sum, it was felt that the Germans had in fact been increasingly forthcoming, especially in the area of military procurement. The Secretary of Defense pointed out that part of the problem was in difficulties which the Germans had experienced in the complexities of American military procurement, and he said that in his recent conversations with Defense Minister Strauss he had undertaken to make the Department of Defense a purchasing agent for the Germans./6/ In this connection it was agreed that allied needs should be taken into account in the preparation of the U.S. military build-up and in the activation of new lines of production.

The Secretary of the Treasury pointed out the importance of making clear that the military proposals of the Defense Department implied the preparation of a capability, and not a present decision to deploy troops to Europe on a large scale. The President strongly agreed with this comment, and it was agreed that the decisions of this meeting would be recorded and reported to all concerned, with emphasis on the word "capability."

There was brief discussion between the President and Ambassador Finletter about the state of consultation in NATO, and in response to the President's question, Ambassador Finletter indicated that he was not really happy about this matter. The tendency of other members of NATO was to wait for information from the United States, and he was seeking means to place the problem of consideration and counsel on other shoulders as well.

In a separate memorandum the Presidential decisions developing from these matters have been recorded. (National Security Action Memorandum No. 62.)/7/

McGeorge Bundy/8/

Washington, July 20, 1961, 5 p.m.

1. The meeting discussed the need to inform DeGaulle, Macmillan, and Adenauer of the course U.S. policy is taking. It also reviewed Mr. Bundy's Draft Record of Action covering the NSC meeting of 19 July./2/ The President referred to the scheduled weekly meeting of the Steering Group at 1100, Monday, 24 July 1961,/3/ when possibly the draft of the President's speech set for 25 July will be available.

2. General Taylor is impressed with the apparent dearth of political planning anent the Berlin situation. Nowhere does there seem to have been any review of alternative negotiating positions vis-à-vis the Soviets. Instead, State seems only to have been concerning itself with comments on the various levels of military preparedness measures proposed by Defense.

LJL
Colonel, USA

On July 20, 1961, President Kennedy sent similar letters to Adenauer, de Gaulle, and Macmillan outlining the speech that he would make on July 25 to the American people. In these letters he reviewed the conclusions that the U.S. Government had reached in its examination of the Berlin question, described additional steps that would have to be taken, and expressed the hope that these measures would convince the Soviet Union of the resolution of the West. For texts of the letters to de Gaulle and Macmillan, see Declassified Documents, 1986, 1866, and 1985, 946; the letter to Adenauer was transmitted to Bonn in telegram 154, July 20, for delivery to the Chancellor. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204) On the following day the Department of State transmitted a summary of the points that would be included in the speech to the Ambassadors in the other NATO capitals and Berlin and Tokyo for the purpose of informing the Foreign Ministers of those countries. (Telegram 73 to Ankara, etc.; ibid., Central Files, 762.00/7-2161)

At 4:30 p.m. on July 21 Rusk met with Lebel of France, Hood of the United Kingdom, and Grewe of the Federal Republic of Germany to explain in more detail the particulars of U.S. policy on Berlin. At this meeting Rusk distributed a "Memorandum on Berlin," dated July 21, which consisted of a memorandum on measures for dealing with the Berlin situation and three attachments: 1) an 11-page military program (a summary of Annex C of the document prepared in response to NSAM No. 59 (see footnote 2, Document 74)); 2) a 4-page paper on economic sanctions (Annex B of the document prepared in response to NSAM No. 59); and 3) an 8-page paper on the information program which would support U.S. policy on Berlin (Annex H of the document prepared in response to NSAM No. 59). Rusk told Lebel, Hood, and Grewe that the memorandum spelled out the U.S. decisions and proposals on Berlin. A copy of the memorandum is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1946. A copy of Kohler's memorandum to Rusk in preparation for the meeting is ibid., Central Files, 762.00/7-2161. The Department of State reported on the meeting in telegram 170 to Bonn, July 22. (Ibid., 762.00/7-2261) For Grewe's brief account of the meeting, see Rückblenden, page 484.

Washington, July 24, 1961.

TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
Director, Bureau of the Budget
Director of Central Intelligence
Director, U.S. Information Agency

SUBJECT
Berlin

Following the National Security Council meeting on Wednesday, July 19,/2/ the President approved the following for further guidance and instructions of the heads of the responsible departments and agencies:

The President and the Secretary of State have carefully reviewed together the political situation relating to Berlin, and their position is being stated in Presidential messages to Macmillan, de Gaulle, and Adenauer./3/ The President's views will be further developed in his address to the nation July 25th.

The President has authorized a prompt strengthening of the United States' military position, in the light of the general international situation. While the steps immediately authorized are related to improvement of U.S. capabilities in the next twelve months, the President considers these decisions to be steps in a continuing program for strengthening the armed forces. He expects at a later date to review further proposals from the Secretary of Defense relating to the long-time military position of the U.S.

The President intends that all possible steps be taken, without a present call for major ground units of the reserves or the National Guard, to give the U.S. the capability of deploying as many as six additional divisions and supporting air units to Europe at any time after January 1, 1962, that the international situation may warrant it. In connection with an operating decision to effect such a deployment, further measures will be taken to maintain adequate ground forces in the United States.

In pursuit of this decision, the President has directed the submission to the Congress of proposals for appropriative and other legislative authority necessary for this program, without the present declaration of a National Emergency.

In particular, the President has authorized a request for increases amounting to $3.2 billion in new obligational authority. The measures approved are those listed in Attachment 1 of Annex C of the documents prepared under date of July 18, 1961, by the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group in response to NSC Action Memorandum No. 59 of July 14, 1961, with the exception of Items 8, 18, and 22 of Attachment 1, and one-half of the sum allotted for Items 10A and 10C./4/

The President directed that negotiations be undertaken immediately with our allies looking toward their parallel participation in such a higher level of military readiness. In these discussions there will be no initial indication of any U.S. willingness to increase military assistance to our allies for these purposes.

The President approved the policy set forth in Annex B of the report of July 18 with regard to economic sanctions in the event of interference with access to West Berlin, and authorized immediate negotiations with our major allies on such a policy.

The President directed the preparation of a tax proposal to be presented first in his radio address of July 25th. He decided that a decision on a request for stop-gap control legislation should be deferred until the latter part of August.

The President assigned to the Director of the U.S. Information Agency the responsibility for coordinating the information activities of the U.S. Government capable of advancing international understanding of the U.S. position on Berlin.

McGeorge Bundy

At 10 p.m. on July 25, 1961, President Kennedy addressed the nation on the Berlin crisis. After reviewing the course of events since his meeting with Khrushchev in Vienna June 3-4, and stressing the grave Soviet threat to Berlin, the President stated that the United States could not and would not permit the Soviet Union to drive it "out of Berlin, either gradually or by force." The President then summarized six steps in the military field that he was going to take as well as measures for civilian defense. With regard to negotiations, Kennedy stated his willingness to discuss the question and emphasized the importance of the Soviet challenge to the Atlantic Community. For text of the speech, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pages 533-540. For an account of the drafting of the speech, see Sorensen, Kennedy, pages 590-592.

Washington, July 26, 1961, 5:15 p.m.

PRESENT
The President, the Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Acheson, Mr. Kohler, Mr. Nitze, Under Secretary Fowler, Mr. Hillenbrand, Mr. Owen, Mr. Bundy

The President opened the meeting by asking about progress on our negotiating position. The Secretary responded saying that timing was a major problem. Should we propose a meeting before the 22nd Congress? The Germans might not approve, and he thought the topic should be one for discussion in the Paris working sessions.

The Secretary asked if Mr. Acheson had supplementary comments. Mr. Acheson said the problem was tough. He would advise against calling a peace conference, since that would bring many too many countries into the act. He also believed that it would be wrong at this stage to go to the United Nations.

Mr. Acheson believed that the outlines of any proposal would amount to a dressed-up form of the status quo, that such a dressed-up status quo might eventually include a four-nation agreement that they are not going to fight over Berlin, perhaps endorsed by NATO and by the members of the Warsaw Pact. (This endorsement would give a certain indirect role to the DDR.) At a later stage in the negotiations, Mr. Acheson said later, we might go a little further--(1) there could be a discouragement of movements of population as distinct from acts of genuine political refuge; (2) there might be new trade arrangements; (3) we might give assurances on the Oder-Neisse boundary. Mr. Acheson advised against using this last counter unless it buys agreement, because in the view of the Germans it is a substantial issue. The Secretary of State argued that we might accept something like Solution C, in which each side might maintain its own theory with respect to an agreed factual situation.

The President asked whether, in addition, we could agree to a UN presence and perhaps to token USSR participation in such a UN force. The Secretary of State suggested that we might suggest such a UN force for all of Berlin, but that any USSR participation would have to be miniscule, and thus in all probability unacceptable. In further discussion of timing, the Secretary and Mr. Acheson agreed that sometime after the German election but before the 22nd Congress, the United States should propose a conference to convene after the 22nd Congress. The Secretary of State saw a disadvantage in an earlier meeting in that Khrushchev will not want to spin out such meetings and we might come toward a further stage in the crisis sooner than we wish. (Outside the meeting, other students of the crisis have argued that in order to forestall the Soviets, it may be important to have a public Western proposal for negotiations at a future date not later than the end of the Foreign Ministers meeting in Paris.) In any event, before we prepare a proposal for negotiations, there should be speeches and propaganda papers, and in response to questions from the President, Mr. Kohler stated that there will not be energetic exploitation of the propaganda themes in the President's speeches and the U.S. aide-mémoire. The Department is also completing its White Paper on Berlin./2/ The President asked again about a plebiscite in West Berlin, and the Secretary of State said the matter was under discussion in the Department of State.

In further comment on the timetable of discussions, the Secretary of State remarked upon the need for conversations between Thompson and Khrushchev, in which we might try to find out further what is on the Soviet leader's mind. Mr. Acheson commented upon the later stages of negotiations, remarking that the first round of discussion would certainly fail and that in the second round we might wish to bring up an incomplete proposal which would give us room for a few final concessions at the end. Such an intermediate proposal might include the notion of joint trusteeship of Berlin and of a four-power agreement not to fight.

Discussion then turned to the "paper stamping" issue. Mr. Kohler presented the elements of the argument developed in his memorandum on the subject. The President indicated his own preference for the opposite position, stated in Mr. Acheson's memorandum (attached)./3/ Mr. Nitze indicated that the Defense Department preferred Mr. Acheson's position, on the practical ground that it allowed for a later decision on military action. It emerged from discussion that Mr. Acheson's recommendation is very close to the actual position of the U.S. until the fall of 1958, when Mr. Dulles changed it. In Mr. Acheson's view, we should simply insist that there be no change in present procedures. We could hold to this line sharply, but under the procedures currently approved and supported by Mr. Kohler we should be making a change, in refusing to accept an act of stamping which we had accepted before. Yet we should be doing this for a reason that we had already admitted as invalid until 1958. Mr. Kohler later remarked that after all the fundamental change here is the Soviet withdrawal from participation in the four-power occupation, but Mr. Acheson's argument won the President's approval. Upon inquiry, the President was informed that the act of paper stamping is not in fact an act of approval, but rather one of bureaucratic registration of times of entry and departure, and on this understanding he thought that it would not make sense for us to sustain a position of refusing to permit such stamping.

Mr. Acheson believed that if this new U.S. position were made clear in advance, there would be no question of a concession and the earlier position would simply disappear. Both he and Mr. Nitze were sure that the United Kingdom would not hold to the current position, and the President agreed that we could not press the British on this point. Accordingly, it was agreed that the U.S. would allow the British position to prevail, without making an explicit concession during the working group sessions. The moment of decision will come during the meeting of the Foreign Secretaries. It was recognized that this change might not in fact make any difference in the Soviet position.

During the course of these discussions, Mr. Nitze reported that Brown of the British Labor Party thinks we ought to be prepared to go further than the currently proposed decision and be prepared to talk with the East Germans about the terms and conditions of access to West Berlin./4/ At the President's request, Mr. Acheson stated his objections to this position; it was not a legal objection but a strong opposition to an obvious attempt to humiliate the United States. We should demean ourselves if we talk to these hired men, and he was certain that if the positions were reversed the Soviet Union would certainly not accept any such relationship. The President asked how we distinguished the Chinese Communists from the DDR, and the first answer was that we are not discussing operational issues with the Chinese; the second and more persuasive was that the Chinese Communists do after all represent a very large and powerful de facto political authority and are no man's puppets.

The decision, then, was to change the current United States position, in the course of appropriately managed diplomatic discussions, terminating in the meeting of the Foreign Secretaries; the new decision would be allowed to become public, or at least known to the Soviets, in ways which were not decided at this meeting.

McGeorge Bundy

On July 27, 1961, the President's Military Representative, General Taylor, sent a memorandum on Berlin to President Kennedy and Secretary of Defense McNamara. Entitled "Considerations of the Desirability of New Berlin Airlift" and dated July 27, the memorandum examined the pros and cons of both civilian and military airlifts to Berlin, and concluded that the latter could not be mounted quickly enough for increased support for the Berlin garrison and, for this reason, could be dropped from further discussion. Taylor believed that a civilian airlift should be undertaken only "with the utmost reluctance, and only for compelling reasons at the time of decision. An airlift is something like artificial respiration for West Berlin and should not be applied to the patient unless he is in extremis and no better method of treatment is available." For text of the memorandum, see Declassified Documents, 1978, 68A.

Moscow, July 28, 1961, 11 p.m.

323. McCloy met with Khrushchev at latter's dacha in Putsunda, south of Sochi, July 26 and morning 27th./2/ Most of conversation centered on Berlin although McCloy repeatedly emphasized he not in position discuss officially any subject except disarmament and could express views on Berlin only as private citizen. Khrushchev generally in good humor, displaying fits of temper only when he referred to what he called US threat of war over German peace treaty and to President's speech./3/ Fol highlights discussion both days. Memcon will follow as soon as available./4/

1. Berlin (July 26). Khrushchev raised subject and expounded Sov position essentially in same terms as in Vienna, emphasizing his determination go through with peace treaty under any conditions. Deplored talk in US about possibility war and stressed Sovs did not want war but if war imposed on them they had means destroy all Europe. Said Sovs would match each US division sent Europe with two of their own. Re German reunification claimed no Western power sincere about it; requesting this info be kept confidential, claimed de Gaulle had told him he wanted preserve two Germanies and had confirmed this position last week when he received Amb Vinogradov. Stressed German unification not negotiable and strictly internal matter of Germany. Referred Sov proposal for entering agreement on Germany and contended Sovs wanted no clashes with US but rather friendship and good relations. Lancing West Berlin boil would clear atmosphere since no disputes except Germany exist between two countries. At same time fully realize dangerous moment being approached but peace treaty would still be signed, and nothing could intimidate him. Referred to exchange aides-mémoire on Berlin and said Sovs now preparing reply to ours. Compared this exchange with kicking football back and forth and said this would probably continue until peace treaty signed when US might kick ball different kind and Sovs would do same in return. However, US as well as UK appear willing negotiate; therefore situation should not be inflamed and common sense should be used. Invited West advance its own proposals or [for?] peace treaty and claimed Sovs did not wish impose their own conditions. Negotiations on peace treaty would be open and each side could express its views. Expressed agreement with thesis better have difficult negotiations than war. Pleaded for understanding Sov position and asked McCloy convey best wishes to President. Said believed President displaying restraint and dignity in Berlin matter; true he sometimes engages in polemics but always leaving door open for negotiations. Said if President had proposals Sovs would be happy consider them and perhaps suggest counter proposals. Such exchange might take place on confidential basis. Re-affirmed willingness guarantee freedom and independence West Berlin once peace treaty signed and went so far as to say he thought any Western proposal for such guarantees would be accepted.

McCloy recalled his long background German affairs and stressed danger German problem and need for its solution. Emphasized Berlin symbol US good faith which extended beyond actual territory that city. Said Sov intention sign peace treaty would cause many difficulties and expressed personal view artificial truncation any country fraught with great danger; therefore Germany should be unified and its east borders guaranteed as compensation for damages caused by Germans; this might be followed by non-aggression pact between East and West to prevent Germany from breaking loose. Emphasized US would not go to war if Khrushchev signed peace treaty although we believed such act would be unwise. US concern is over contention that peace treaty would cut off our rights which we had gained by shedding blood and that we and all our commitments would be relegated to whims of East Germany and Ulbricht. Referring to possibility negotiations said anybody prepared negotiate but negotiations should be unrestricted and not on a pre-determined basis as Sovs seemed to suggest. Said horrors modern war obvious to all and inquired why then Sovs disturbing existing situation which no threat to peace. Khrushchev's statement said sign treaty come hell or high water very dangerous. Appealed for statesmanship and expressed hope no situation would be created where weapons would have to be used. Stressed when US public opinion begins to move it has great power behind it which becomes difficult to deflect. Stated President cool and reasonable in this crisis but is also a courageous man who would not surrender vital interests his country.

2. President's speech (July 27 [25]). In strong emotional tone, Khrushchev stated President in effect had declared preliminary war on Sovs because he had presented Sovs with ultimatum and had said if ultimatum not accepted that would mean war. Sovs regretted President took this course, but accepted challenge and would not change policy directed at signing peace treaty and solving West Berlin problem on basis freedom and independence West Berlin. History would judge us if war should occur and would also determine who would survive, but he was quite sure Soviet Union would survive. Said he would talk to General Staff and Defense Minister and ask them to review situation and strengthen Soviet defenses. Said he would be back Moscow Monday and hear their report. If necessary, would publicly inform Soviet people that US presenting Sovs with ultimatum which tantamount to war. US actions confirmed his January 6 thesis that when capitalists and imperialists lost confidence victory on basis peaceful coexistence they would resort to war. Contended war would not be over Berlin but rather war of monopolist imperialists against Socialist countries. US trying assume role international gendarme, something Hitler had aspired to. Reiterated whole Europe would be destroyed in war. As to US, USSR would have to compete with it and probably neither side could wipe out the other. US would survive, but there would be no Wall Street any longer because people would not tolerate system unleashing wars. Said President's intention "mobilize" armed forces and industrial potential might not be followed by similar action on Soviet part because war bound be thermonuclear and Sovs have enough bombs so no need take people away from industry. Said modern war would be decided not by infantry but by rockets and nuclear bombs. Kept emphasizing his rocket commands and implying his great superiority in this field. Reiterated would consult with General Staff and Soviet Govt and draw proper conclusions. Also would inform people US would start war if peace treaty signed because people should know about inevitability of war; war seems inevitable because Sovs will sign peace treaty. Sovs will counter any US action and will respond to war with war. Only a mad man can declare war today. President's statement there was threat to freedom West Berlin fallacious because Sovs proposed guarantee keep freedom that city. Expressed view President reasonable, young man full of energy and wishes display that energy. However, if war should occur he would be last President because no one knows what would happen after war. Said he had made all these statements because it would be strange if, having seen President's speech, he were simply to talk about Soviet willingness disarm while President requesting another $3.5 billion for arms. It would be strange if he should ask McCloy merely convey greetings to President or if he were to "try jump into President's throat without scratching it." Sov prickly and quite difficult to digest. However, he still believes in President's reason. President will have to consult with his allies and uncertain whether they would want war. In any event, Sov proposal for negotiations on peace treaty remains valid and open. Sovs wish resolve this problem peacefully, remove this rotten tooth, and develop US/USSR relations but on basis of peace treaty and not on basis of ultimatum. Said after thunderstorms people cool off, think problems over and resume human shape, casting away threats.

McCloy said had no chance read President's speech but believed President had not threatened war over peace treaty. President believes Khrushchev will sign peace treaty and there is nothing we can do about it if he insists. However, President deeply concerned about our loss of rights and our people firmly convinced soul and honor of our country represented by these rights could not be surrendered in face of threats. It is this aspect that has developed this serious situation and has led to actions President has taken. Stated would convey Mr. Khrushchev's views to President and said that as private citizen he thought there was community of interests between two sides on German problem and that both governments should study this situation. Said on basis of what he had heard about President's speech and of his talks with President believes way could be found avoid this rock in sea. Khrushchev's charge against capitalists unfounded and there no great difference between capitalists and Communists because all of them in first instance human beings. Nobody stupid enough to want war and our people not afraid of competition with Soviet Union. On contrary, our people impressed by Soviet achievements in such areas as industry, space, and sports. However, US people would not lie down and let Sovs walk by US in this peaceful competition. Expressed view US/USSR cooperation peaceful endeavors would be great boon. Stressed American people sure and tenacious. Expressed hope sunshine will follow storm and would show us way past this obstacle.

[Here follows discussion of Laos and disarmament.]

Thompson

Moscow, July 29, 1961, 1 a.m.

324. Eyes only for the Secretary from McCloy. Embassy telegram 323./2/ Both Khrushchev's and my statements abbreviated reftel though I made full use of arguments contained in our note and other material in my hands. In summary, Khrushchev was cordial on Wednesday but firm in reiterating his Vienna position. Really mad on Thursday after digesting President's speech. Used rough war-like language returning to cordiality after the storm had passed. Frequent repetition this formula: will sign peace treaty no matter what; occupation rights thereupon cease, access cut off, and necessary then to make a deal with GDR; if you attempt force way through we will oppose by force; war bound to be thermonuclear and though you and we may survive all your European allies will be completely destroyed. Gathered from Ambassadors here that Soviets were making this argument to our allies hinting that they would not follow US in any war moves. All this followed by offers to negotiate peace terms, guarantee access and settle German problem as the only serious one between us.

My estimate is situation probably not yet ripe for any negotiation proffers by US but too dangerous to permit it drift into a condition where cramped time could well lead to unfortunate action.

Intend to proceed Paris to brief NAC as soon as I close here./3/ Would appreciate instructions how far I may go in briefing them on Khrushchev's comments on Berlin. Thompson and I sense Soviets will be pressing allies with threats of destruction to weaken their determination to go along with us.

Thompson believes it wise to emphasize this in Paris, stressing vital necessity for their firmness at this point. Assume no question propriety my briefing them on disarmament. Lyon hints de Gaulle may wish see me Paris. Assume I can talk freely with him re Khrushchev's comments if interview should take place.

Thompson

Washington, undated.

I.

CONCEPT

1. Continue execution of presently planned measures for strengthening national and NATO defenses.

2. Protracted negotiation: engage the Powers most concerned in a continuing discussion of the unresolved problems not only of Berlin and Germany but of all Central Europe. Keep this discussion going for years if need be, as in the Austrian treaty talks.

3. Develop negotiating positions which genuinely look toward progress in solving those problems, and make possible enough forward movement from time to time to give the USSR an interest in continuing and subject it to serious political losses in the Free World if it breaks off. This should not be a mere ruse to talk the present Berlin crisis to death, but a statesmanlike program for achieving stability through peaceful change where violent change and immobilism would be equally fatal.

4. Mechanism: hold a Foreign Ministers' meeting, explore initial positions, delegate to deputies constituting a Commission on Central European Problems, including Czechs and Poles, with the two Germanies attached as in Geneva.

II.

UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES

1. Solution to the crisis satisfactory from the standpoint of ourselves and our major allies without a war or a permanent increase of tension with the Soviet Union--if possible in such a way as to lay a foundation for eventual decreased tension and even growing cooperation.

2. Continued independence of West Germany and its association with the West, including NATO and the European Community.

3. Continued right of self-government by West Berlin, sufficiently close association with West Germany to make it economically viable, and access under conditions which will not be subject to the arbitrary decisions of either Soviet or East German officials.

4. Increased unity with our three major and our other NATO allies; increased United States and NATO military strength; use of the present crisis to further political integration of the Western World.

5. Creation, through our conduct, of a clear image to the Soviet Union, our allies and the world generally that we are a united people, confident of our own capabilities and realistic in the understanding of German and world problems, and that we have the capacity to act with firmness and a willingness to take whatever reasonable risks are called for.

6. Evolution of an increasingly stable modus vivendi in Central Europe, including the removal or reduction of tensions at the points of East-West contact there and the normalization of relations to the maximum degree possible across the contact. In this connection, to contrive to minimize fear of Soviet and German aggression, to achieve as tolerable a regime in East Germany as is possible during the period of its domination by the Soviets, and to encourage long term progress toward self-determination in Eastern Europe.

7. Unity of the German people in political freedom if desired both by the peoples of East and West Germany at the time the choice is made, but not at the expense of a war with the Soviet Union or creation of a situation which would likely lead to war.

8. Assurance that gains made as a result of negotiations will be of an enduring rather than a purely transitory nature so as to minimize the possibility of recurring crises over the Berlin/German issue.

9. Conviction on the part of the Free World and the peoples of Eastern Europe that the United States and our allies have been reasonable in handling the post-war German question, while remaining faithful to our commitments and to such fundamental principles as self-determination of peoples.

III.

SOVIET OBJECTIVES/2/

1. To stabilize the regime in East Germany and prepare the way for the eventual recognition of the East German regime;

2. To legalize the eastern frontiers of Germany;

3. To neutralize Berlin as a first step and prepare for its eventual take-over by the GDR;

4. To weaken if not break up the NATO alliance; and

5. To discredit the United States or at least seriously damage our prestige.

IV.

INITIAL STEPS

It is desirable for the West to take the diplomatic initiative at a fairly early stage, but only after a clear demonstration of our will, buttressed by concrete acts, to resist any Soviet attempt at a unilateral resolution of the crisis. Such acts are now in train.

Certain political events are significant in the timing of such an initiative, notably the Belgrade "neutrals" conference, Sept. 1; the West German election, Sept. 17; the convening of the UNGA, Sept. 19; meeting of the Soviet Party Congress in October.

The scope of the agenda for negotiations is important. Because of the disadvantages to the West of limiting it too narrowly to Berlin where we are most vulnerable, as demonstrated at Geneva in 1959, we should aim at a fairly broad agenda, with all-German and even European aspects.

Initially the exchanges should be at the Foreign Ministers level. A lower level probably would be futile and a summit should be avoided.

Hence, at the Foreign Ministers meeting scheduled August 5 and the NATO meeting agreement should be sought with the principal allies to propose a Foreign Ministers meeting of the Four Powers having all-German responsibilities to consider the questions of European security, including Germany and Berlin. The agenda would be worked out through normal diplomatic channels. It would be advantageous to issue such an invitation late in August (before the Belgrade meeting) and hopefully well in advance of any Soviet initiative. If couched in general terms it is not believed that such an invitation would cause an unfavorable German reaction. A meeting might be proposed for early November (after the Moscow Party Congress).

If the Soviets issue an invitation for a Foreign Ministers conference in terms comparable to what we would propose, we should accept, subject to the working out of a suitable time and agenda. If the Soviets propose a general Peace Conference, the Western Powers, without foreclosing the possibility of an eventual conference, should counterpropose the Foreign Ministers meeting previously suggested.

V.

NEGOTIATING POSITIONS

The Western Powers would make substantive proposals at a Foreign Ministers' Conference and would suggest that they be considered by a Commission on Central European Problems, which would include the Czechs, the Poles, and German advisers. These proposals are described below, without regard to the tactical questions associated with their presentation. We might initially bring forward proposals which would be less acceptable to the Soviets, and then gradually modify them if and as negotiations showed some signs of being fruitful. It would be essential, however, to be sufficiently forthcoming to attract the Soviets to the protracted negotiations we envisage.

1. German Unity. We would put forward a modified version of the Western Peace Plan, but not so called. It would include essentially the Mixed German Committee of Stage II, with some modifications and with emphasis on its role in all-German relations and in negotiations regarding German unity, but without fixed time limit for all-German elections and with its life being extended to 7 years as proposed by Ambassador Thompson. The Mixed Committee's functions might be expanded to include the promotion of not only contacts and cultural exchanges but also trade and credits between the two parts of Germany, with a clear implication that this might involve an expansion of West German credits to East Germany. Numerous deletions would need to be made from the existing Western Peace Plan, and among these should be the provision for an all-Berlin solution and the security provisions of Stages II and III.

2. European Security. We would suggest that the Commission on Central European Problems develop arrangements to assure European security and to safeguard against surprise attack in Europe. We would indicate our willingness to consider some or all of the following:

(a) The Western Powers going on record as opposed to any forcible change in the existing German frontiers. (Alternatively, we could announce our intention to approve these frontiers substantially unchanged in a final German settlement.)

(b) Guarantees that neither GDR nor FRG armed forces should have independent control of nuclear weapons or delivery systems.

(c) A Four Power non-aggression declaration or pact, to which other NATO and Warsaw Pact countries could declare their adherence (thus avoiding treaty relations with the GDR).

(d) A Central European zone of inspection of armed forces against surprise attack, and possibly eventually their limitation under agreed international arrangements (such zone not to be exclusively German).

(e) A tacit agreement not to deploy MRBM's in Germany. (Such deployment is presently precluded, as far as the US is concerned, by the statement of US policy toward NATO and the Atlantic nations, approved by the President April 21, 1961.)/3/

3. An outline German peace treaty. This should indicate our views as to Germany's position and role in the international community, with broad guarantees of security both for Germany itself and for its neighbors vis-a-vis Germany. It would be adaptable to whatever decision the Mixed German Committee may eventually make as to Germany's unification.

4. Berlin. We should, ourselves, seek to have the question of Berlin put aside while we first discuss Germany and European security. We would raise the question of Berlin only if the Soviets move toward unilateral action affecting Berlin, either by signing a treaty with East Germany or interfering with our access rights. We should, however, make clear that any agreements reached on the questions of Germany and European security will go into effect only if a satisfactory settlement regarding Berlin is reached without a fixed time limit.

When the question of Berlin is discussed--either as the last item on the agenda at our initiative or earlier at Soviet initiative--we should make a determined effort to obtain an arrangement which would put an end, once and for all, to recurring crises over Berlin. We should bring into play all the bargaining power we hope to gain from the German and European Security negotiations. To this end, we should propose placing access to West Berlin under the administration of West Berlin itself or, if this is not possible, of an International Authority, exercising such powers as necessary to assure free, unimpeded access under fair conditions to all nations. In return, we should offer the concessions regarding force levels, subversive activities, etc., offered by the Western Powers at Geneva in 1959, plus possibly a unilateral declaration that all-German political activities (notably meetings of the Bundestag) would not take place in Berlin so long as the agreed arrangement was being fulfilled in all other respects. While the Free City proposal is unacceptable, we can--and do--recognize that West Berlin is not an integral part of West Germany and is subject to certain reservations not applicable to West Germany.

If the Soviets reject our proposals and move toward unilateral action in Berlin, we might propose the reciprocal declarations called for in "Solution C" plan (London Working Group Report, 1959)./4/ This would mean that East German officials could handle access arrangements, provided that they observed the procedures now existing. Some additional features (e.g. of the July 28 proposal re force limitations and "questionable activities")/5/ might be included. There could be a UN presence to give added assurance that agreed arrangements would be fully observed.

The various proposed solutions for the Berlin problem which would depend primarily on UN action, including the proposals that the headquarters of the UN be moved to Berlin and that all-Berlin be placed under UN controls, were considered. Except as mentioned in "Solution C", none are recommended at this stage, because of the current Soviet attitude toward the UN, including their "troika" proposal, and because Ambassador Thompson feels that an all-Berlin solution is so distasteful to the Soviets that they would exact a higher price for it than for a solution covering only Western Berlin. We will continue to study more limited possibilities for UN involvement.

Moscow, July 31, 1961, 1 p.m.

340. Paris for Kohler. In preparation for Western consultations on Berlin problem and possible eventual negotiations with Soviets, may be useful review Soviet aims as well as our own in order ascertain area open to negotiation. Following enumeration of Soviet aims omits more general and distant objectives such as spread of Communism, break-up NATO Alliance, absorption West Berlin by East German regime, etc., although Soviets will so far as possible endeavor that any settlement either advance these aims or at least not make their achievement more difficult.

1. Some change in present situation in West Berlin. Khrushchev personally so far out on limb on this issue now that he could abandon it only at price of concessions in other areas which we clearly could not make. Minimum changes necessary are probably something along lines of what we offered at Geneva. Soviets will make strong effort however end occupation status as well as to stop refugee flow, reduce subversive espionage and propaganda activities based on West Berlin, obtain commitments to reduce or at least freeze numbers of Western troops, limit types of weapons stationed West Berlin, attempt to introduce symbolic Soviet forces, obtain confirmation that West Berlin not part of West Germany, and if possible reduce present legal and financial ties between them.

2. Signature by Soviet Union of peace treaty with East German regime. Khrushchev also personally deeply committed to conclusion treaty which Soviets desire not only as important step toward eventual recognition of East German regime but also to establish better legal basis for recognition present German frontiers. Drafting of separate treaty will probably present difficulties since hard to see how Soviets can impose desired restrictions in military field on GDR alone. Soviet position that signature of treaty must necessarily end Western access rights somewhat inconsistent with their acknowledgment they do not intend molest Allied troops remaining in Berlin although they will of course state they are there illegally. Soviets could of course make provision in treaty for continuance present situation West Berlin pending reunification, and only argument K has advanced against this is that it would hurt Soviet prestige to do so.

3. Stabilization of regime in East Germany through de facto recognition and removal at least some of harmful effects on regime of present Berlin situation, particularly flow of refugees.

4. Measures to increase Soviet security in Eastern Europe. These might include schemes along lines Rapacki Plan,/2/ limitation on German armaments, etc. Soviets profess not to be concerned over any direct military threat to them from West Germans but genuinely fear that West Germany may embroil them in war with US.

5. Steps to improve legal basis of Germany's frontiers. In this question Soviets have much in mind their own acquisition German and Polish territory.

Our own objectives are well-known but for purposes of agreement appears to me that most important considerations are that we must maintain our commitment to people of West Berlin and that any settlement must not violate our major general principles including right of self-determination. This does not mean of course that we could not accept proposal which made no provision for self-determination within any given period of time. In following telegram/3/ I propose to submit suggestions for possible approaches to settlement taking account of foregoing considerations.

Thompson

Moscow, July 31, 1961, 1 p.m.

341. Paris for Kohler. In attempting arrive at possible solution to Berlin and German problems it would be highly desirable for us to make up our own minds as to most favorable approach in order to influence thinking of our Allies and agree with them so far as possible in advance of any discussion with Soviets. Difficulty, apart from danger of leaks, is that in advance of negotiations impossible know what importance Soviets attach to various factors involved. Effort seems worth making, however, and hope following suggestions may be useful. We may for tactical reasons wish to put forward proposals which Soviets likely to reject but following discussion limited to approaches which appear realistic.

1. All-Berlin solution. I do not personally believe there is great mileage in this approach. Soviets would demand extremely high price for including East Berlin and even solution involving only West Berlin will be extremely difficult. Maintenance of security by troops of four powers involves all the headaches we have experienced previously with four-power administration. Reliance on neutral or UN troops highly questionable. All-Berlin solution would not enable us escape problem of refugees although might be easier for East Germans to control refugee flow for whole city than to close internal sector boundary. All-Berlin solution would probably lead to demand for Berlin and GDR UN membership. From Soviet point of view successful amalgamation of socialist and capitalist systems within city would be powerful argument against their contention that this could not be done for all of Germany. Therefore I do not believe they would agree to or carry out such plan.

2. Peace package plan postponing for 7-10 years showdown on German reunification through free elections combined with selection of such measures as Western commitment not support change in present frontiers, NATO-Warsaw non-aggression pact, prohibition of atomic arms to East and West Germany, etc. It would of course have to be combined with some interim solution for Berlin along lines of our Geneva proposals. One reason Soviets might be tempted by such solution is that they could easily find means of evading elections when time came by accusing West of violations. It would also resolve Berlin problem for length of time K likely to be in power. Such solution would probably reduce refugee problem to tolerable proportions. It would not meet K's desire to sign peace treaty but this might be met in part by agreement on principles of peace treaty which we have already drafted and considered advancing earlier. As part of such package we might attempt to get better assurances of West German access to Berlin. Believe K could paint such settlement as victory while we would have avoided dangerous Berlin crisis and not only maintained but strengthened our position on self-determination.

3. Peace treaty approach. We might attempt to negotiate identical peace treaties which West would conclude with West Germany and Soviets and Allies with East Germany. Such treaty would have to make provision for interim arrangement for Berlin pending reunification either on contractual basis or by maintenance present situation. While negotiations would be extremely difficult believe K would pay high price for such arrangement since it would go far to recognize de facto existence East German government and would appear to be in line with his demands except for status of Berlin. Would be far easier to obtain Soviet agreement reasonable peace treaty terms on such basis than would be case of eventual treaty with reunited Germany. For example, difficult for K to insist on onerous military provisions so long as Germany divided. We would have to be firm in excluding any anti-Nazi provisions which would facilitate intervention in internal affairs. Such approach could of course envisage all-Berlin solution although as indicated above I think this unwise. Such proposals could include some of the sweetening measures described in para 2 above. It would be in line with apparent desire most of our Allies continue division of Germany but would of course be difficult for West Germans to accept. For this reason doubt we should advance it now but suggest it be staffed out and kept in reserve in event we reach impasse on other solution.

4. Settlement similar to above which would envisage Communist powers concluding separate peace treaty with East Germany but with some interim arrangement on Berlin. Soviets have shown no interest in such solution and K indicated to Roberts/2/ interim Berlin solution now unacceptable, but cannot be excluded as possibility. Does not appear as attractive to me as foregoing suggestion, since in arriving at it we would have to go far toward recognizing de facto existence GDR and under such settlement Soviets would doubtless insist on arrangements for Berlin that would be more onerous than in foregoing proposal. Disadvantage both these plans is that they would recognize principle of separate treaty which would be awkward if no settlement reached and Soviets proceed with their own plan.

I am still inclined to favor approach set forth in para 2 above./3/

Thompson

Washington, undated.

BERLIN

A POLITICAL PROGRAM

Preface

My earlier report on Berlin, dated June 28, 1961/2/ gave Khrushchev's purposes in pressing to a 1961 year-end crisis his Berlin demands of November, 1958, as:

1. To stabilize the regime in East Germany and prepare the way for the eventual recognition of the East German regime;

2. To legalize the Eastern frontiers of Germany;

3. To neutralize Berlin as a first step and prepare for its eventual take-over by the GDR;

4. To weaken if not break up the NATO alliance; and,

5. To discredit the United States or at least seriously damage our prestige.

The paper further stated that Khrushchev was now going further than the USSR had ventured since 1948, because he believed that the U.S.A. would not use nuclear weapons to stop him, and could not do so otherwise. The paper suggested a method of altering this belief and inducing in the Kremlin a frame of mind conducive to a settlement conformable to the interests of the U.S.A. and its allies. Steps are under way to attain the capabilities necessary to do this.

The political means and end of this endeavor are outlined here.

First, a word as to the end. The immediate end is simple. Since the world position of the U.S.A., the integrity of NATO, and the future of Germany and, perhaps, of Europe are drawn in issue by Khrushchev's demands, the immediate purpose of the U.S.A. is to frustrate them. Another end of very great importance is to do this without precipitating nuclear war.

The more distant end is the one which this Government has sought in Europe since the late 1940s. It is to begin the stabilization of the free world by the stabilization of Europe. This stabilization should ultimately involve (i) the de-Sovietization of East Germany; (ii) the countries of Eastern Europe regaining a substantial national identity; (iii) limiting armaments so that the possibility of successful offensive action, either way, in Europe will be greatly reduced.

This is a long-term aim; there is no sensible short-cut. But progress toward this long-term aim may be facilitated if we can (i) use the Berlin crisis to develop and put forward sensible proposals regarding Germany and European security, (ii) obtain, at the conclusion of that crisis, an acceptance and stabilization of the status quo in Berlin, without sacrifice of Allied rights, with perhaps some machinery for continuing negotiations about Germany and European security. Unless Khrushchev is foolish enough to commit his prestige to forcing the allies to accept his terms, he ought not to find this impossible. We probably cannot attain more, i.e., force him to accept something which is worse for him than the status quo, without war. We should not give him more, i.e., something which would be worse for us than the status quo, "to save his face." As will be seen the status quo can be garnished without sacrifice, if that seems necessary, at the proper time.

Second, a general word about political means in reaching the end just outlined.

Means should be adjusted to the various periods into which the Berlin operation seems likely to fall. While each will merge into the one following it, three phases with distinctive characteristics seem probable:

Phase I: The phase of preliminary jockeying until after the German elections. During this time a forthcoming posture toward negotiations is required, without translating this posture into such specific and novel proposals as would cause alarm and division in Germany. During this period a vigorous effort should be made to lay our case regarding Berlin before the world and to concert with our allies about the specific political steps that will be required after the German elections. A Western call for a Foreign Ministers' Conference will be necessary during this Phase.

Phase II: The phase of open and formal negotiation, between the German elections and the conclusion of any peace treaty between the Soviet Union and East Germany. For the start of this phase what is needed is a counter-proposal to Khrushchev's proposed conference for treaties with either one or both of the two Germanys. The essentials of the counter proposal are that:

(a) as put forward, it should make no major concessions;

(b) it should have something of novelty and more of appeal to allied and neutral opinion; and

(c) it should be capable of being added to later on if the USSR appears willing to negotiate in earnest.

Specific suggestions are made in Section II of this paper as to what the content of this counter-proposal should be and as to how it might be expanded, as the negotiations progress, so as to provide a basis for agreement.

Phase III: The period following the signing of a peace treaty between the USSR and the GDR, if this occurs. In the event an agreement safeguarding the Western position in Berlin has already been achieved, this Phase can be viewed with some equanimity. If not, this Phase will be a dangerous one and the political keynote should be calm constancy--neither retreating under pressure from the bedrock positions which we will have previously developed nor increasing our demands on account of heightened tensions. Such a firm and consistent political posture will hold the best chance of achieving a peaceful settlement in this Phase.

These general principles are given body in succeeding sections of this paper.

Phase I: Until the German Elections

1. Propaganda. This is the time to launch our propaganda campaign regarding Berlin with vigor and effect. If we can move free world opinion to our side, the Soviets will be less likely to expect us to be inhibited by that opinion in resisting their pressures, and they will reckon the political costs of those pressures in determining their future actions. The themes of our propaganda campaign should be simple:

First, Freedom: In the name of creating a Free City, the Soviets are trying to deprive two million West Berliners of the freedom they already possess.

Second, Peace: In the name of creating a peace treaty with Germany, they are threatening the peace that already abounds in Germany.

Third, the Defaulting Trustee: World War II left the Four Powers as trustees of Germany and Berlin. The three Western powers have fulfilled the terms of the trust; the Soviet Union has not only defaulted on those terms but has absconded with the assets.

Fourth, Self-Determination: The principle of self-determination is basically what stands between the Soviets and ourselves. We want the people of Berlin and Germany to have the right of self-determination. They don't.

We have not even begun to exploit those themes.

Imagine what the Communists would do to damage our position in every part of the world, if we mounted as bald and cynical an aggression as they are now undertaking against Berlin. We could expect "save-Berlin" committees to spring up in many countries. Resolutions demanding justice for Berlin would converge on us. Demonstrations against U.S. Embassies in many countries could be expected. Delegations from all sorts of legal and humanitarian organizations would be sent to Berlin, and their reports on the threat to freedom would be widely publicized. It is probable that such a campaign would weaken our alliances and have a real impact on uncommitted opinion throughout the world.

We can hardly be said to have risen to the opportunity which the Communists have thus presented us.

This may be due, in part, to the fact that we have tried to exploit it with the normal resources of the government. They are not adequate to the task. Unusual measures are required in this, as in most other fields of Berlin planning.

There is at present, for example, no person of eminence in the Government whose only task is to arouse the world to Soviet iniquity regarding Berlin and who seeks to spur new and unorthodox activities of the Government to this end. We recommend that such a person be appointed as a special assistant to the Secretary of State. He should have a flair for propaganda and considerable background in the tangled problem of Berlin. Such a person is the late Assistant Secretary for Policy Planning, Gerard C. Smith.

2. Concerting with our Allies. Phase I is also the time for agreement with our allies on the moves following the German elections. Such moves are suggested later in this paper. No time should be lost in agreeing on them with our allies.

The first proposal is the calling of a Four Power Foreign Ministers' Conference to convene in October or November. The call should be made in time to avoid discussing Berlin in the UN General Assembly which opens September 19. UN consideration of the issue would not be in our interest at this stage. The mere fact of that consideration would slow Western military preparations and inhibit serious political moves. To keep the Berlin issue out of the UN, a Four Power negotiation should be pending before the GA convenes. A Western proposal for such negotiation before the German elections would be more likely to strengthen than weaken the Chancellor's position, provided we do not go into premature public detail about the proposals to be advanced at the Conference.

In proposing a Four Power Conference, the Four Powers should suggest that it be so constituted, in view of the gravity of the occasion, as to be an effective forum for negotiation, rather than propaganda. They should, therefore, propose that its sessions be attended only by each Foreign Minister and one adviser. As a fall-back, they might be prepared to accept the 1959 Geneva position--a great claque of attendants, including West and East German "advisers"--on the understanding that the serious business of the Conference would be handled in more restricted sessions.

3. The International Court of Justice. We should make no further proposals to submit our right to be in Berlin--and to stay there--to the World Court. This proposal does not make the same impression abroad as it does in the United States. Many Americans are in the grip of the illusion inherent in the American Bar Association slogan "World peace through world law". No one else is; and we really do not believe it, either. Vital issues are political issues and are not judiciable. As we shall see, there is no "law" on these subjects; and no nation will accept third party adjudication--in effect arbitration--on matters affecting their world position and/or their vital interests. Nehru would not arbitrate Kashmir; or Sukarno, West New Guinea; or Nasser or Eden, Suez; or de Gaulle or the FLN, Algerian independence or their claims to the Sahara; or Khrushchev, Berlin. For us to do so means to the world that if the Court should take jurisdiction and decide that we had no rights in Berlin, we would be willing to accept the decision. This, in turn, means to others that we cannot care very much one way or the other.

To have made the challenge once gets out of the proposal any good there is in it. To push it further will expose its phony aspect. The Court would not accept jurisdiction on our request over Soviet objection. An advisory opinion could only be obtained, if at all, on the request of the Security Council, where the USSR would veto it; or, of the General Assembly, where the requisite majority would be improbable, if the Communist bloc objected and if all the Afro-Asians and Latinos saw, as they would, the implications for them in a court decision being obtainable on some of their shenanigans--Castro's, for instance.

Finally, when we talk about our "legal" rights in Berlin--and when the Russians talk about the "legal" effect of their proposed treaty on our "legal" claims, neither of us means that there are any accepted rules or judicial decisions applicable to the issues raised. What we are doing is to gild our positions with an ethos derived from very general moral principles which have affected legal doctrines. On our side, the gilt is the morally binding effect of agreements. On the Russian side the gilt is that the moral effect of an agreement is affected by time and changed conditions--for instance, upon restrictive covenants not to sell land to persons of color. No "law" determines which of these moral values shall triumph in a specific case.

In the case of Berlin to stress our willingness to accept judge-made law would be either a sign of indifference or a fraud.

4. Quiet Approach to Soviets. Paragraph 10 of the "Memorandum on Measures for Dealing with the Berlin Situation" which was given to the British, French, and German Ambassadors on July 21/3/ suggests the value of an early, informal, and quiet talk with some Soviet official to warn of the dangers of rigid positions, and suggests the advantage of keeping open opportunities to maintain the status quo.

This approach should be made toward the end of the first phase, or the beginning of the second phase, before the Soviets are locked into courses which will be difficult for them to reverse.

We should use a special channel for this purpose, to emphasize the gravity of the matter and to keep the approach out of the normal line of diplomatic fire. This tactic was successfully used in the talks with Malik (then Soviet representative to the UN) which led to ending of the Berlin blockade and to armistice negotiations in Korea.

For instance, Mr. Bohlen might speak to a representative of the Soviet Government along these lines: "We are strengthening our position against the contingency of trouble over Berlin, will continue to do so as the crisis deepens. Do not doubt that our most vital interests and prestige are engaged. But do not doubt also that this course of action is not of our making. It is not we who are attempting to change an existing peaceful situation. Whenever the Soviet Government wishes to end the crisis which it has created, we are prepared to make this possible."

We should go no further unless the Soviet Government responds constructively. If it should do so, we should accept reciprocal Western and Communist declarations that existing access procedures should be maintained after a peace treaty, regardless of who performs them. This is the essence of what has come to be known as "Solution C."

It is barely possible that the Soviets might wish to end the crisis in this way soon. It is more likely that they would not. Even so, the approach would have been useful, since the Soviets would know that serious talks were open to them as the crisis deepened. It is essential that this approach should have all the appearance of informality and privacy, and should thus be kept absolutely secret--even from our allies.

Phase II: Period Between German Elections and a Peace Treaty

1. Four Power Foreign Ministers' Conference. The agenda for a Foreign Ministers' Conference should be brief and non-controversial, e.g., "a peaceful settlement of the questions of Germany and Berlin." Our opening stance at this Conference should meet three requirements:

(a) It should not give away anything of value.

(b) It should have sufficient of the novel to draw favorable comment in the free world.

(c) It should be susceptible of later expansion or contraction, so as to serve as a basis for serious negotiations--if these become possible.

2. Western Peace Plan. These requirements would be best met by changes in three major aspects of the Western Peace Plan:

(a) Berlin: The present proposal for an all-Berlin solution in Stage I should be replaced by a more realistic Berlin proposal: The Four Powers declare that they will maintain the status quo in Berlin pending reunification. In the meantime, Berlin would be the headquarters of the Mixed Committee and the all-German Assembly called for in the Peace Plan.

(b) Mixed German Committee: The functions of the Mixed German Committee, which is designed to promote all-German contacts and unity, should be expanded to include the promotion of mutually beneficial trade and credits between the two parts of Germany, with a clear implication that this would involve increased West German credits to the GDR. Given the present parlous state of East Germany, this would seem a generous and appealing gesture by the West, and might help to slow down the flow of refugees. In addition, the Peace Plan's existing provision that alternative electoral laws must be submitted by the Mixed Committee to the German people for vote after a period of one year, if the Committee cannot agree on a single law during this period, should be deleted--leaving only the provision that if the Mixed Committee cannot agree on a single law in thirty months the Four Powers should then determine its disposition. This would somewhat extend the period within which the Mixed Committee would be a forum for serious negotiation and discussion between West and East German officials, and pave the way for the further extension contemplated by Ambassador Thompson. (See paragraph 4, below.)

(c) European Security: The disarmament and European security provisions of the Western Peace Plan are out of date. They should be replaced by a proposal to create a Standing Four Power Commission (with German advisers, if necessary), which would negotiate about arrangements to maintain security and to safeguard against surprise attack in Europe. These arrangements would come into force at appropriate stages of the Peace Plan, as might be agreed in the Four Power Commission. In making this proposal, we would suggest immediate conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the Four Powers. Considerable emphasis would be placed on this suggestion: Europe is faced with a clear threat of war over the threat of a unilateral change in the status of Berlin; the first item of business is to dispose of these two threats. The non-aggression pact would be coterminous with and contingent on the Berlin arrangement proposed under (a), above. Upon German unity, it would be replaced by more permanent security arrangements agreed to in the Four Power Commission.

3. Negotiation. These changes would not make the Western Peace Plan acceptable to the Kremlin. They would, however, be sufficiently novel and reasonable as to make it difficult for the USSR to dismiss them out of hand. We should try to spin out the negotiations about these proposals, as long as we could.

(a) This would enable us to spell out our position on German unity in sufficient detail as possibly to convince some elements of the Soviet leadership that unification could be secured, if they wished, on a basis that would not injure their security. This might have some long-term influence on Soviet policy.

(b) Our position on the question of German unity is better than that of the Soviets in terms of popular appeal. The longer we can publicly debate this question, the better for us from a propaganda standpoint.

(c) Prolonged negotiations would give us time in which to carry forward our military preparations, which might affect Soviet intentions.

4. Next Steps. When we had strung out this negotiation for all it was worth, we would have to decide whether the Soviet attitude had been sufficiently affected by our political and military posture to make genuine negotiation feasible. If so, we should move toward our real negotiating positions, which would involve the following amplification on each of the three above changes in the Western Peace Plan:

(a) Berlin. The Berlin proposal in the Western Peace Plan should be expanded to provide for declarations that activities which threaten peace or the interests of other parties would--consistent with fundamental human rights and freedoms--be avoided in Berlin, plus perhaps a general undertaking to discourage excessive movements of population, so long as reasonable freedom of movement is permitted within the city, including freedom to live in one part and work in another without economic or other penalty. We should try to bargain for some form of international control over the access routes in return for these and the further concessions indicated below.

(b) Mixed German Committee. The life of the Mixed German Committee should be extended to seven years, as Ambassador Thompson has proposed. The future of the Mixed Committee thereafter, if it had reached no agreement on German unity in the meantime, would be decided by the Four Powers--as in the existing Peace Plan. This would permit West and German official representatives to talk to each other about the electoral law and about increased contacts, trade, etc., for a considerable period, without any irrevocable commitment to unity at the end of this period, and with a consequent enhancement of the stature of the GDR. (While we should not enhance that stature by having US, UK, and French officials talk with the GDR, West German contacts are a different matter--given their long history.)

(c) European Security. The Western powers would indicate that they were prepared to discuss the following measures in connection with the work of the Four Power Commission envisaged in the revised Western Peace Plan: (i) a zone of inspection against surprise attack in Europe, with the possibility of eventual limitations on forces in this zone being left open; (ii) a declaration by the Western Powers recognizing the Oder-Neisse frontier; (iii) a declaration by the Federal Republic indicating its intention not to produce or acquire nuclear warheads; (iv) unilateral declarations by the Four Powers not to deploy MRBM's in Germany (we have no intention of doing this anyway). These or any other measures agreed to in the Four Power Commission would--like the continued evidence of the Mixed German Committee--be dependent on fulfillment of the Berlin arrangements referred to under (a), above.

5. Further Negotiation. Several variants of further negotiations might be envisaged, depending on reactions to these proposals:

(a) Early Agreement. The Foreign Ministers might themselves seek early agreement on the revised Western Peace Plan. If they made good progress, they could persevere and leave to a Summit the task of consummating final agreement on that Plan. Such agreement is not wholly inconceivable; the idea of setting up a Mixed Committee to handle German matters and a Four Power Commission to consider European security might have considerable attraction for the Soviets, even in return for their leaving the Berlin status quo untouched. In this case, of course, no peace treaty between the USSR and East Germany would be concluded--at least for the seven years in which the Mixed Committee would function.

(b) Continuing Negotiation. The Foreign Ministers might conclude that the negotiation was too complex and time-consuming for them, and set up the Four Power Commission to negotiate further about all these aspects of the Western Peace Plan, not merely about European security and safeguards against surprise attack in Europe. This might result in a negotiation as prolonged as that which led to the Treaty of Westphalia; indeed, the Commission might become a standing feature of the international scene and the Berlin crisis might tend to be subsumed in its larger deliberations. Again, no treaty would be concluded between the USSR and East Germany, at least so long as these deliberations continued.

(c) Peace Treaty. The Soviet Union might be indisposed to postpone a peace treaty with the GDR, but indicate a desire to continue negotiating in the Four Power Commission about some of our proposals (e.g., regarding European security and a Mixed German Committee) as separate items, after a treaty is concluded. Our posture, in this case, should be that negotiations about these subjects must hinge on an agreement first being reached which will protect our position in Berlin against the effects of the intended Soviet peace treaty. For this purpose, we should propose the reciprocal declarations which have come to be known as Solution "C". These declarations would leave each side free to reserve its position regarding the juridical status of Berlin; have the East Germans declare that they would maintain existing access procedures; and have the Western powers declare that they would deal with East German personnel on this basis, avoid subversive activities, not increase their forces, etc. (A simplified version is set forth at Tab B.) Once such an agreement had been reached we would be prepared, despite a Soviet-GDR peace treaty, to go ahead with establishment of the Four Power Commission to discuss matters German and European.

6. The Political Side of Military Arrangement. Phase II would also be the time for political discussions with our allies, to persuade them to take the following steps in connection with the Berlin crisis:

(a) To agree to place appropriate forces under NATO command and operational control at an appropriate time before military action, so that SACEUR could order these forces into position.

(b) To agree to the use of these forces by NATO in an agreed military operation which is part of an agreed program of action to preserve allied rights in Berlin and allied security in Europe.

(c) To agree to a political command structure to give the Supreme Commander orders through a military channel.

The negotiations of these steps should not be started in the Phase I for three reasons.

First, the Germans will find it difficult to negotiate before the election.

Second, in all probability, US proposals for the military operation--allowing for the process of JCS preparation, Department of Defense review, and Presidential approval--will not be completed until about the middle of September. Our allies are not likely to be willing to turn substantial forces over to a Supreme Commander, to agree that they may be used in a military operation, and to agree to a political command structure unless they know what the operation is to be and are able to judge of its effect.

Third, our allies will also want to know the larger program for dealing with the whole Berlin crisis in all its phases, negotiation, economic pressure, pressures of other sorts, as well as military action. Development and discussion of this larger program with our allies will take time.

At some point in Phase II, however, these prerequisites will be behind us, and it should be possible usefully to discuss the politico-military proposals indicated under (a)-(c), above, with our allies.

The political command structure will require the most delicate negotiation of all. Only the President, with the efforts of the Secretary of State and Defense, can handle this. What is recommended here is that the NATO Council, with the authorization of their Governments, or at least with the authorization of the governments whose forces are represented in the Central Command, should delegate the direction of the operation to a war council consisting of the United States, France, Germany, and Great Britain, and that this war council delegate the executive command to the President of the United States, who would communicate to the Supreme Commander through his Chiefs of Staff.

If this could be arranged, it would combine the Command procedures which were adopted in World War II and in the Korean War. It will be recalled that in World War II, the basic strategic decisions were made by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, advised by the combined Chiefs of Staff, or, more realistically, each advised by his own Chiefs of Staff, and the resulting decisions then coordinated through the combined Chiefs of Staff. When coordination with the Russians became necessary, Stalin joined the conferences which laid down the basic strategy. But the Russian staff never entered into joint command relations with the combined staffs of the United States and the United Kingdom.

In the Korean War, where there were more participants, although the overwhelming proportion of the force was United States and Korean, the United Nations delegated to the United States the command function for the United Nations. Thereafter, General MacArthur--in theory at least--operated as and under the controls of an American Theatre Commander. The State Department was charged with continuing consultation with the other governments having forces in the United Nations Command through their Ambassadors in Washington.

If our NATO allies could be persuaded to adopt the recommendation made above, the net effect of it would be that President Kennedy would consult, so long as that was possible, with Adenauer, de Gaulle, and Macmillan, on such major strategic questions as when to begin military operations, when to break them off, and when to escalate them. The United States Chiefs of Staff, who would issue the military orders, would consult with the tripartite NATO military Standing Group (General Heusinger is an ex officio member) here in Washington.

If some such arrangements are not worked out, the Supreme Commander in Europe will be put in the position of conferring directly with the Heads of Governments and reaching his own interpretation of their direction. In other words, for practical purposes he would be under no civilian or governmental control. I have no doubt that he, as well as the governments concerned, would believe that this imposed greater responsibility upon him than any field commander should carry.

8. [sic] Allied Attitudes. Negotiation of these politico-military arrangements with our allies will be difficult, but no more difficult than negotiation of some of the political proposals suggested earlier. The Germans and, to a lesser degree, the French will be highly resistant to some of these proposed changes in the Peace Plan. Given the degree in which the Chancellor and General de Gaulle dominate the actions of their governments in the foreign field, it is doubtful whether German and French agreement can be secured except through direct talks between the heads of government. At some point before the Foreign Ministers' Conference such talks will be necessary. Indeed, it may be that two rounds of talks will be required: One to agree on what needs to be done and give directives to the Foreign Ministers to spell out the details, and another to review and approve their work. The amount of time and persuasion which will be required to move the Chancellor and General de Gaulle should not be underestimated. The task may be slightly eased, however, by the fact that we will be concurrently discussing the proposed military operation and command arrangements with them. As the Chancellor, in particular, contemplates the specific alternative to successful negotiations his attitude may mellow.

Phase III: After a Treaty

1. Two alternative assumptions may be made:

(a) That negotiations concerning a Berlin agreement have prospered, but that negotiations concerning the Western Peace Plan have failed and the Soviets therefore proceed to sign a peace treaty. In this case, our attitude toward the treaty should be more one of sorrow than of anger: We should denounce its signature, but keep the denunciation in low key since our basic purpose--preserving the status quo in Berlin--will have been achieved through prior agreement.

(b) An alternative assumption is that the Soviets sign a treaty after failure of negotiations concerning Berlin, as well as concerning the Western Peace Plan. The rest of this section discusses U.S. policy under this assumption.

2. We should prepare well in advance for this contingency:

(a) by discounting the treaty and thus minimizing the damage that its signing will do to our prestige;

(b) by making clear that we will allow East German personnel to perform access functions identical to those which have been performed by the Soviets. This announcement should not be too long delayed, lest it appear a last minute retreat in the face of pressure.

3. If the East German regime insists, after a treaty has been signed, that new access procedures be agreed to in formal negotiations between the GDR and the Western powers, the latter should refuse. They should state that the access procedures are a matter of right which are not subject to negotiation. They have consistently refused to negotiate any change in these procedures with the Soviets, and they see no reason to treat the East Germans differently.

4. The Western powers should also make clear that they remain ready to engage in the exchange of unilateral declarations called for by Solution "C" (which would include a declaration by the East Germans that they intend to continue existing procedures unchanged and reciprocal statements, which take note of that declaration, by the Western powers).

5. If the East Germans should ask to negotiate about the wording of these reciprocal declarations, the Western powers should request the West Germans to serve as intermediaries in bringing GDR views to the attention of the Western powers and in conveying the intentions of the Western powers to the GDR. If this is refused, the Western powers should be willing to receive proposals through the USSR and to reconvene a Four Power Conference to discuss the matter with the USSR.

6. At such a Conference, our position should be governed by the principles and proposal set forth under II, above. To go further would be to concede, under threat, something we would otherwise have refused. This would encourage the Soviets and the GDR to view crisis-promotion as a productive and rewarding occupation.

7. If the East Germans refuse to permit Western military traffic to continue without direct and formal negotiation with them, we should go to a garrison airlift--while continuing each day to present our vehicles for passage on the ground in order to maintain our claim to ground access.

8. The Communists could then either:

(a) let the garrison airlift go on, in which case their objective would not have been achieved;

(b) extend the blockage to civil access, in which case we would mount a civil airlift;

(c) use force against the airlift, in which case we would use counter-force, wherever this could most effectively be applied;

(d) negotiate.

9. Whichever one of these options was chosen, our political posture should remain the same: We should be willing (i) to close out the crisis at any time that the East Germans would permit our traffic to move under pre-treaty procedures; (ii) to exchange reciprocal declarations with the GDR concerning those procedures; (iii) to negotiate with the USSR about the question of Germany and Berlin in a Four Power Foreign Ministers' Conference. We should not raise our asking price because the crisis had deepened; this would vastly increase the chances of war.

10. It is always possible, of course, that the crisis would develop, e.g., by triggering an East German uprising, in a way which would convince both sides that restoration of the status quo ante was unfeasible. In this case, proposals involving more rapid and radical change than those described under II, above, might be required to create a viable situation. We should, in the innermost recesses of the U.S. Government, develop proposals looking to quick, drastic and constructive change in Central Europe, which could be brought forward in this event.

11. Looming over all these events will be the United Nations--interested, agitated, impotent. It is not in our interest to hasten UN consideration of the Berlin issue. If a Foreign Ministers' Conference fails and the Soviets seem disposed to unilateral action, however, UN interest will become uncontrollable.

It would be better for the West if the issue were first raised in the Security Council, rather than the General Assembly, since debate will be more manageable in the Council. If some other country were about to bring the matter before the General Assembly, U.S. action in the Council might be necessary. This might take the form of a proposal that the Council call on the parties concerned not to take unilateral action to alter the status of Berlin or the access routes and to negotiate a peaceful settlement of the issue. If the East Germans nonetheless proceeded to block our access, we might then seek a further resolution calling on the parties concerned to restore the situation which had existed prior to their action.

These resolutions would both command impressive majorities and be vetoed by the USSR. These facts would not be harmful as we prepared for forceful action to fulfill what was clearly the manifest will of a majority of the Council--a will which the Communists would be flagrantly disregarding.

There might at this point be general urging that the U.S. should go from the Council to the Assembly, before using force. If we disregarded that urging some other country might--after Security Council action had been concluded--bring the matter before the Assembly.

Our posture in any Assembly consideration of the issue should be the same as in the Council. Reactions to that posture would be more diverse in the Assembly than in the Council, but Council action would have set a helpful precedent; we should hold to that precedent and urge our friends to do the same. We should not be delayed or deflected by GA debate from courses determined upon to meet GDR blockage of access to Berlin.

Washington, August 2, 1961, 4 p.m.

PRESENT WERE
Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, The Attorney General, Chairman JCS, Director CIA, Mr. Sullivan of the Treasury Department, Mr. Wilson of USIA, General Taylor and Mr. Bundy

The Secretary opened the meeting by circulating a memorandum from the operations center describing the progress of the working group sessions in Paris./2/ The Secretary described his own itinerary for the week of his absence.

He then turned to the question of the timing and form of discussions with the USSR. He expressed his view that Ambassador Thompson, perhaps with associates, might meet with Khrushchev later in August in an attempt to get him to talk and to clarify certain aspects of the Soviet position. The Secretary also expected that there would be discussion in Paris of a four-power meeting of the Foreign Ministers, and that such a possibility and our favorable view of it should be known before the General Assembly opens. It would not be to our advantage to have early discussion of Berlin in the UN, partly because of the Tunisian affair. The Secretary believed that a Western summit would be needed before the Foreign Ministers' meeting.

The immediate and urgent problem was propaganda, and there followed an extensive discussion of ways and means of making our case more strongly all around the world. Mr. Wilson presented a number of ideas which are best summarized in his supplementary memorandum (attached)/3/ of the following day. The Attorney General emphasized the need for a simple slogan or idea or thought which could be continuously emphasized. In response, it was suggested that the main ideas are those already stated in the President's speech; that we should keep the peace and keep Berlin free. A third strong idea is that of self-determination. It was agreed that coordinating and executive responsibility within the Administration would be centered in USIA under the policy guidance of the Secretary of State.

The discussion then turned to military questions, and it was agreed that the Defense Ministers should meet shortly after the Foreign Ministers' meeting and that this should be arranged in Paris. The first urgency on the military side is to get agreement among the major Governments on the basic policy of a strong military build-up. The Secretary of Defense asked for further consideration of the political value of certain military actions that might not be immediately necessary for their own sake. He specifically mentioned the possibility of cutting down on the number of dependents in Europe and the possibility of large-scale temporary troop movements of one or two divisions now based in the U.S. It was agreed, in this context, that the NORAD exercise now planned for the beginning of October would be politically valuable. In response to a question from the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense stated that the program for increases in military production is going forward satisfactorily.

McGeorge Bundy

Washington, August 3, 1961.

SUBJECT
Berlin Negotiations and your Meeting with Mr. Rusk at 4 PM

The Secretary of State yesterday gave you two papers on Berlin negotiations,/2/ and they raise certain questions which you and he need to decide before he goes into the Foreign Ministers Meeting over the week end. The papers have not yet been read by any members of the Steering Group except the Secretary and myself, but some of the issues received preliminary discussion there on Wednesday afternoon./3/ Your last talk with the Secretary will be at four o'clock this afternoon. He leaves at midnight.

The two papers are thoughtful and careful, and in their basic outlines much alike. One comes to the Secretary from Dean Acheson and the other from George McGhee's staff. Both are heavily influenced by the indefatigable staff work of Henry Owen. The issues which need to be decided today are relatively small. Some larger questions may need further planning and thought.

Both papers divide the Berlin problem into three phases:

Phase I. From now to the German elections on September 17th.

Phase II. From the German elections to the possible signing of a separate peace treaty.

Phase III. After the peace treaty.

The immediate questions pertain largely to Phase I, slightly to Phase II, and in only one respect to Phase III.

There is general agreement on the following points in this Phase:

1. There should be no actual negotiations of a formal sort. We need time to concert our military build-up, and public substantive negotiations before the German elections would create turmoil in West Germany.

2. At some time in this period the Western states should make a proposal for negotiations in a four-power Foreign Ministers meeting to be held any time after 1 October--presumably after the 22 Congress, not before. (The Congress opens on October 17th, for approximately ten days.) No one wants a full-scale summit at this stage, but any level below the Foreign Ministers would probably be ineffective.

3. A Foreign Ministers meeting should probably be preceded by a Western Summit for the purpose of concerting a Western negotiating position. The French and German Governments in particular are very rigid, and even modest modifications in the existing Western Peace Plan of 1959 will require direct negotiation among Western Heads of Government.

Undecided questions about Phase I are as follows, and all of them need attention at your meeting this afternoon:

1. Should there be a "quiet approach" to the Soviets before the German elections? The Acheson paper suggests that someone like Chip Bohlen might drop a plainly serious hint to some Soviet colleague suggesting that while we are now strengthening our position, this military course of action is not of our making, and whenever the Soviet Government wishes to end the crisis which it has created, we are prepared to make this possible, in serious discussion. This quiet approach would not be discussed with any of our allies--otherwise it could not remain quiet. My impression is that most of the professionals in the Department approve this approach but the Secretary has not yet indicated his own view. What he does approve and will probably mention to you, is exploratory conversations by Thompson with Khrushchev, designed to find out whether the Soviets have anything further to say yet on their own side at this stage. My own hunch is that unless Thompson is in a position to send up some new signal of his own, all we shall get at present is a repetition of what everyone has been hearing since Vienna. Certainly McCloy got nothing new on the negotiating side.

2. If there is agreement on a Western proposal for a Foreign Ministers meeting, when should this proposal be made? The Acheson paper says not later than the end of August. In the Steering Group yesterday, after the Secretary left, there was a strong preference for moving quickly. This is the view of McNamara, of USIA, of Taylor and myself. The argument is that we gain both at home and abroad by taking the initiative in proposing the negotiations, and that if we do not get a proposal on the table soon, the Soviets will beat us to it. This view is shared by Thompson, and Dowling reports from Bonn that it will not make the Germans nervous, in the light of the general firmness of our position. The Secretary has not yet indicated his own preference.

3. When and how should our position on paper stamping be made clear? Our internal decision is made, and it was agreed last week that the Secretary will make it plain in Paris. It is also agreed that long before Phase III it will be important to have it well known, so that our acceptance of East German paper-stampers would not be a great prestige defeat. But how soon do we clarify this point publicly? This question has not had adequate discussion, and perhaps you should flag it by asking the Secretary for a definite recommendation.

4. The timing and location of a Western summit deserves some thought. The Secretary's current notion is Bermuda in early October. He quite rightly wants it to be far enough from Europe so that Khrushchev cannot wedge himself in. My own question is whether Washington would not be better, or even, conceivably, Hyannis Port if you wanted relative privacy and a really small working group. The hazard of a Western summit is that it will be a big and untidy affair, when the real purpose is to bring your personal authority and leadership to bear on a handful of men.

5. On one further matter there is no disagreement but your own leadership and pressure are important--propaganda. It is agreed that we should use the next two months energetically to advance understanding of our position and of the low character of the Soviet effort. It is also generally agreed that leadership here should be placed in USIA (although the Acheson report suggests a new Special Assistant to the Secretary of State). The real problem is that the center of international sympathy should be directed toward people of West Berlin and not toward the official position of the U.S. Government, and this takes some doing. The Acheson report states well and strongly the four central themes of freedom, peace, faithful trusteeship and self-determination. We are for all four, and the Soviets are currently in fact against them all on Berlin.

The execution of our plan of negotiations would be the main business of Phase II. I do not think you need to go into detail on this with the Secretary this afternoon. In essence the two papers before you suggest that at the beginning we should adopt a slightly modified version of the Western peace plan. The modifications will take some negotiation with our allies, but they should make the program look more forward-looking, while safeguarding our main interests. It is agreed that we should insist upon discussing both Germany and Berlin.

Until you have time to study and master the details of the two proposals, I doubt if you and the Secretary could usefully get very far into this question. It may be best if you simply ask him how far he means to go in the discussion of the substance of negotiating proposals in Paris. My own response to a study of these papers is that they are sensible within their limits. They do not, in my judgment, adequately examine wider alternatives like calling a peace conference, or proposing that the United Nations have a role in Berlin.

In Phase III, the questions all turn around this general problem: what form of interference with access to Berlin triggers what form of response? These questions are very hard ones, and the consensus of the Steering Group yesterday was that they need not have first priority attention for the coming meeting. But as General Taylor points out, it is going to be important to have a clear view on some of these issues fairly soon, and certainly before any Western summit we should have views of our own and they should have been argued in the appropriate forum--possibly that of the Defense Ministers.

McG. B./4/