At 10 a.m. on June 28 President Kennedy held his 13th press conference. Among the prepared statements that he made at the beginning of the conference was one on Germany and Berlin in which he stated that the crisis over Berlin was Soviet-manufactured. The President went on to say that there was peace in Germany and Berlin, and if it were disturbed, it would be the direct responsibility of the Soviet Union. In response to questions, the President indicated that the United States would consult with the British and French and that no plans concerning Germany or Berlin had been finalized. For the transcript of this press conference, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pages 476-484.

Washington, June 28, 1961, 9:21 p.m.

2115. Paris deliver Finletter by 8:00 am, June 29. Following guidance for use in replying to Allied Governmental inquiries which may arise from Newsweek story (Depcirtel 2105)/2/ detailing alleged JCS recommendation for possible military action in connection Berlin and similar press stories this subject:

1. The current situation with respect to Berlin is giving rise to a great many highly speculative press stories largely inaccurate.

2. It is an obvious responsibility of military staffs to work continuously on plans covering a broad range of possibilities. This is true with respect to a number of potentially critical areas including but not limited to Berlin.

3. Foregoing does not alter fact that such plans either individually or in combination are implemented only as a result of a political decision which would of course be made only in full consultation with our Allies.

4. Four power talks on Berlin are continuing in Washington and largely deal with tactical aspects of planning. Reports to the full NAC will be made whenever appropriate. Meanwhile any NATO member is free to put forward suggestions for consideration by the four governments.

5. Meanwhile we do not plan take any of the actions listed in the Newsweek story at this time.

Same line except para 4 above may also be taken with friendly press on background basis.

Rusk

Washington, undated.

[Here follows discussion of security control of documents and Kuwait.]

3. Berlin--The Secretary of State gave a summary account of the current state of the Department's work on the aide-mémoire,/2/ on briefing books and on international and other immediate aspects of Berlin planning. He then asked Mr. Acheson to discuss his report./3/ Mr. Acheson did just that. In addition, the following significant comments were made by Mr. Acheson: he gave special emphasis to the idea of the trust of Berlin and the peace which exists there, and argued that the real themes should be that Khrushchev is a false trustee and a war monger, and these themes should be hammered home.

The President asked whether really it was to our advantage to press the argument for unification, feeling that our position lacks appeal. Mr. Acheson argued that this position should not be abandoned but he did not wholly convert the President until the Secretary of State reminded him that self-determination is a better ground than unification, a position Mr. Acheson cheerfully accepted.

The President asked about the value of a plebiscite in Berlin and after general agreement that such a plebiscite would be useful, the Department of State was asked to concert a plan for discussion of such an enterprise with the Germans in appropriate ways, since the initiative ought to come from them.

The President questioned Mr. Acheson about the reciprocal effect of military build-ups on each side. Mr. Acheson agreed that this is a most important point and that planning should be so arranged as to avoid such back and forth challenges as far as possible.

Mr. Acheson made clear his own doubt that interference with civilian traffic will be an early step by the Soviets. Mr. Dillon later noted that in earlier Berlin planning this interference had been rated as a very grave danger and asked what Mr. Acheson's specific recommendation was in such a case. Mr. Acheson, reiterating his feeling that the Russians' own propaganda made such a move difficult now, said that in the event that such an interference did occur, he would propose an attempt at airlift and a prompt resort to other measures described in his report.

Admiral Burke made plain his opposition to the scale of the "probe" recommended by Mr. Acheson and his opposition also to an airlift unconnected with a probe. In reply to the first point, Mr. Acheson emphasized his belief that force must be large enough to carry the clear conviction to the enemy that if the fighting continues, nuclear weapons will be used.

The President noted the difficulty of sustaining a strong political posture and posed the question, as an example, of finding the right answer if Khrushchev proposes a Summit this summer. Mr. Acheson, remarking that it is hard to answer any specific proposal ahead of time, nevertheless believed that it would not be hard to find answers as we go along. In reply to a summit proposal, for example, the President could readily suggest that conversations be undertaken first at a lower level. Mr. Acheson believed that there were plenty of "elderly unemployed" people like himself who could be sent to interminable meetings. He thought it important to understand that we could converse indefinitely without negotiating at all, and he asserted that he could readily do this himself for three months on end.

Mr. Dillon raised the question of possible domestic economic effects of a mounting crisis and of a possible need for legislation to give the President necessary powers. In reply the President asked him to assume the leadership of a study of this problem.

It was decided not to make substantive decisions on the basis of this first discussion, and the President directed Mr. Bundy, in consultation with Mr. Kohler and others, to prepare a list of departmental assignments which might be carried forward in preparation for further discussion and appropriate decision in two weeks.

[Here follows discussion of Laos.]

Washington, June 30, 1961.

MEMORANDUM FOR
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Treasury

The President desires that the National Security Council be able to evaluate various proposals for US approaches to the Berlin problem, in terms of their concrete implications for action. To this end, it is requested that:

I

The Secretary of Defense should submit by Thursday, July 6, his recommendations as to preparatory measures to improve the US capability to conduct the courses of action described in paragraph 1, below, which need to be launched immediately, regardless of decisions about the scale of action that is eventually intended--measures which should not be deferred until after the NSC meeting of July 13 because of the long lead times involved.

II

The following should be submitted in time for an NSC meeting July 13:

1. The Secretary of Defense should prepare recommendations concerning the timing and nature of the preparations to be taken to create a capability for:

(a) a garrison and civilian (QBAL) airlift by October 15;

(b) naval harassment and blockade of Bloc shipping by November 15;

(c) large scale non-nuclear ground action within four months of such time after October 15 as it may be ordered--with tactical air support, as necessary--assuming appropriate use of forces in Europe and assuming reinforcement from the US as necessary to permit the use of two, four, six, and twelve divisions in Europe for the purposes stated in section C of chapter IV of Mr. Acheson's preliminary report to the President, including preparations which will ensure that nuclear weapons now in Europe are not used in the course of such action without direct Presidential authorization;

(d) keeping SAC in a state of maximum readiness for flexible use over a prolonged period of crisis, without degrading its effectiveness.

These preparations should include only steps which are directly related to the four military purposes set forth above, and should not include measures primarily designed for psychological effect which could be considered provocative or measures which run counter to the US policy toward NATO approved by the President on April 26./2/

The cost of these preparations and the number of men who would need to be called up for training or added to the US forces should be estimated. Information should be provided concerning the funds and/or authority which would need to be sought from the Congress. Our concern at this point is with the general magnitude of the preparations required and the public impression they will create, not with the details of these preparations or the manner in which the forces would be used.

2. The Secretary of Defense should submit recommendations as to the magnitude and character of a permanent increase in the size of the US defense establishment which might be executed in the event Soviet actions regarding Berlin appeared to foreshadow a long period of greatly heightened tensions. The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State should submit recommendations concerning the timing and nature of the actions that might be taken to bring the prospect of such an increase to the attention of the Soviets for deterrent effect.

3. The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Treasury and the Secretary of Commerce, should submit, through the Secretary of State, recommendations concerning the timing and nature of the preparations to be taken to create a US and allied capability for applying economic sanctions of progressively increasing severity against the Bloc, beginning October 15.

4. The Secretary of the Treasury and the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers should submit very preliminary recommendations as to the timing and nature of the preparations to be taken to ensure that execution of the above actions would cause minimum dislocation to the US economy and balance of payments. A fuller report will be expected later.

5. The Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence should submit joint recommendations as to the timing and nature of the preparations to be taken to create a capability for inciting progressively increasing instability in East Germany and Eastern Europe, at such time after October 15 as it may be ordered. Recommendations should also be submitted as to the timing and nature of the steps to be taken to bring this capability to the attention of the Soviets before they make their critical decisions about Berlin.

6. The Secretary of State and the Director of USIA should submit recommendations as to the timing and nature of the steps to be taken to place our case regarding Berlin and Germany before the American public and the world and to gain support for the above preparations, as may be necessary.

7. The Secretary of State should submit recommendations concerning the timing and nature of our negotiating positions on Berlin and Germany prior to the signing of a peace treaty, and concerning the posture which the allied powers should adopt toward the appearance of East German personnel along the access routes following a peace treaty. These recommendations need not be submitted by the NSC meeting of July 13, but the Secretary may wish to discuss possible alternatives in a preliminary way at that meeting in order to keep the political framework of the other studies before the Council. Recommendations on this subject will be discussed more fully at a later NSC meeting.

8. The Secretary of State is given general responsibility for coordinating the various studies covered in this directive and for developing an integrated timetable intended to achieve (i) maximum deterrent effect with respect to the Soviets, and (ii) the agreement and maximum cooperation of our Allies. The instrument for this purpose will be the Interdepartmental Group on Berlin Contingency Planning, hereby redesignated as the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin. This group will be under the chairmanship of the Secretary of State or such representative as he may designate in his stead.

McGeorge Bundy/3/

July 4, 1961.

TELEPHONE CALL TO MR. SORENSEN
(HYANNIS PORT) TUES., JULY 4, 1961

10:20 a.m.

The Sec. said we had some real problems./2/ Most of them were not of substance but on procedures, timing and delays in connection with the Four Powers. One real possibility would be to use the substance of the summary statement, revising it somewhat, as a covering press release when the aide-mémoire is made public. This would give the information people something to work on and would draw it all to a more concise point. The aide-mémoire could be shortened without too much difficulty, leaving the aide-mémoire as a document with more traditional aide-mémoire language and leaving the changes suggested by the other governments. The summary statement could be taken care of. The Secretary said in view of all this we were in for a delay. Sorensen wanted to know how long a delay was involved, and asked how serious it would be. The Secretary said it would be another week or ten days before it could be ironed out with the other governments. The Secretary said that the morning press had indicated a restlessness that no action was forthcoming. The Secretary said on the court proposal we had hammered that pretty hard with our allies. Sorensen said the President had indicated this and that the French had objected. The President thought we should try again. The Sec. said that the British had made the strongest point. This was a question of timing. Rather than make the proposal now by throwing out a card, it might be better to do it at a later stage when we might need it. The court question had been discussed at NSC. The Sec. said if this was the only proposal this would perhaps be interpreted as a sign of weakness because it wasn't much of a proposal. The Sec. asked when the Pres. was returning to Washington and Sorensen said around ten thirty tomorrow morning. The Sec. suggested that Sorensen see the President and give him his reaction (1) we ought to try to deal with the summary statement as a covering press release for the aide-mémoire. We would take certain material in the summary statement and put it back into the aide-mémoire, particularly the last portion. Sorensen asked if it would be left in both the summary statement and the aide-mémoire and the Secretary said yes. The Sec. said to tell the Pres. that on the court proposal we could of course talk about it with the other three but we had hit them hard on it. We were a minority of one. The British reasons were on the other side and the French--de Gaulle--don't want anything to do with this sort of machinery these days. The Sec. suggested the Pres. ring him and he could then get our people to work and have something for the Pres. when he got back tomorrow. Sorensen said if the Sec. did not hear, he was to go ahead on the basis discussed. The Sec. said he had a Four Power working party working on this draft without final commitments of their govts. Sec. said it wasn't quite as easy to start over quite as drastically as this. There was no real problem between Washington and Hyannis Port on the substance of policies involved. Sorensen said he thought the only substantive problem involved was the emphasis on German reunification. The Sec. said he and the Pres. had talked about some changes the day before/3/ which were not taken into account in the redraft. The Sec. said if we make the changes and handle the summary press release properly we would be able to accomplish the point the Pres. had in mind.

10:45 a.m.

The Secretary tel. Sorensen back that as he was looking at the summary statement in terms of a press release a real alternative which appealed to him at the moment was that the press release would consist of a covering statement by the President. It would not be an ordinary press release but a covering statement released at the same time. Sorensen said this was what he had thought the Sec. meant.

Washington, July 5, 1961, 4 p.m.

SUBJECT
Meeting of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin

[Here follows an extensive list of participants. Secretary Rusk chaired the meeting.]

The Secretary of State opened the meeting explaining that he thought it would be useful to bring the principals who would be working on the Inter-Departmental Coordinating Group (ICG) together and discuss in a rough outline the actions to arrive at the necessary recommendations to the President. The principals of the group should be the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Treasury, Directors of CIA and USIA and Mr. Bundy from the White House. Ad hoc members would be invited as necessary, such as, for example, the Secretary of Commerce whose participation will be required quite frequently.

A working group under the chairmanship of Mr. Kohler will give full time attention to the problem of Berlin which, undoubtedly, will occupy us all more seriously than any other problem during the next few months. The Secretary then asked his colleagues for comments and whether they envisaged difficulties.

The Secretary of Defense felt that the recommendations requested from his Department would be tentative until coordinated with those of other Departments, particularly State. Defense had a preliminary listing of the necessary actions on the mobilization of men and industrial resources. These, however, must go together with governmental action as a whole.

The Secretary of State suggested that the Interdepartmental working group meet afterwards for a discussion of the problems and for preparation of a briefing of the principals.

The Secretary of Defense said that he thought it would not be wise to submit his recommendations by July 6 without the coordinated views of the Department of State. By July 15, however, the recommendations for action could probably be integrated. Defense felt the buildup of airlift capability by October 15 could be accomplished, as could the capability for naval action by November 15; however, buildup of the capability for ground action four months subsequent to October 15 required decisions shortly although not necessarily before July 15.

Mr. Hillenbrand stated that possible economic counter-measures had been under intensive study for over a year on a tripartite basis, quadripartitely when sanctions against the GDR were involved. NATO was being apprised and asked to cooperate in general sanctions. The member countries are studying the required legislative actions for the effectuation of sanctions. Eventually quadripartite and tripartite groups would merge and the recommendations be shifted to NATO. The legislative problem varied from country to country. The U.K. had fewer problems than anticipated but, nevertheless, it had problems. The French Government had sufficient power; the U.S. had few problems due to Korean War Emergency legislation still on the books. The whole business was a problem of will and policy more than of legislation.

The Secretary then inquired about the various working groups acting on implementation of the instructions and he was informed by Mr. Hillenbrand that they were actively engaged in their tasks. The Secretary then asked that the various Departments turn on the full manpower flow to speed up action.

The Secretary said that he would work out with Mr. Bundy arrangements for a meeting of the principals shortly before the NSC meeting scheduled for July 13 in order to facilitate action at the meeting.

Mr. Bundy said that he and General Taylor had just talked with the President/2/ and that a meeting of the full NSC was less important than agreement by the principals upon the program to be presented to the President.

The Secretary then invited all the principals to come to his office,/3/ turning over the meeting to the working group under the Chairmanship of Deputy Under Secretary Johnson. He pointed out that the meeting would, no doubt, attract press attention and that contents of the meeting must be strictly withheld from the press, but that the press could know that this was one in a series of meetings which had gone on for some time and that Berlin was the subject of the discussion.

The Secretary, before retiring to his office, gave a brief summary of the developments of the Ambassadorial group's drafting effort of the aide-mémoire in answer to Mr. Khrushchev's aide-mémoire of June 4./4/

/4/At the meeting of the Four-Power Working Group at 2:35 p.m. on July 5 Rusk explained that the meeting scheduled for July 3 had been cancelled because of consultations with the President about the U.S. draft reply. Rusk went on to explain that the United States now considered it better to couple the reply with a Presidential statement. The Working Group then undertook a further review of the Western texts. (Memorandum of conversation, July 5; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-561)

After the principals left with the Secretary, Mr. Johnson took the Chair. He said that Assistant Secretary Kohler, who was absent for a few days, would regularly chair the working group. Mr. Hillenbrand, Director of GER, was Secretary of the group and its focal point. It was now the principal task of the working group to get the mechanics of completing the assignments worked out. Mr. Sullivan stated that Treasury's problem was, of course, its dependence in estimates on the magnitude of the requirement and the general position of the economy. Mr. Nitze said he could give the magnitude estimates to Treasury soon in the form of successive approximations. Mr. Johnson thought the matter could be handled in a form similar to the Laos Contingency Planning. It would be necessary to clarify where decisions were required and then to produce an integrated paper.

Mr. Hillenbrand said that State would hope to receive from the other agencies involved at least a rough outline of their final plans by July 10. These could then be drawn together into a coordinated single paper by July 13, with the individual contributions as attachments. He asked that each paper contain a meaty short summary. He would distribute a model format. State would be prepared to assist in reproduction, typing and so on, if required.

Mr. Hillenbrand suggested anyone call on him if there were questions on form or problems of complete understanding of the instructions.

Mr. Nitze brought up the question of the allied stance and thought this was the State Department's responsibility to judge and shepherd. Mr. Hillenbrand said it was necessary to run on two tracks; one maximizing the deterrent effect on the Soviets and one maximizing the convincing of our Allies. The military contribution to be made by our Allies was an obvious planning gap which would have to be filled but at this stage it was still a unilateral exercise.

In conclusion, Mr. Johnson stated that Mr. Kohler would devote himself exclusively to the Berlin problem. All his other duties had been assigned to Mr. Tyler, his Deputy, for the time being.

Washington, July 5, 1961.

NUCLEAR STRATEGY IN THE BERLIN CRISIS

It is widely agreed that if the Berlin crisis leads to military action--particularly to military action that we initiate--nuclear weapons should not be used at the outset. This paper is about the role of nuclears in the event we should have to resort to them in Europe.

The thesis is that the role of nuclears in Europe should not be to win a grand nuclear campaign, but to pose a higher level of risk to the enemy. A large-scale regional nuclear campaign that would run its course without triggering general war is so unlikely that it should receive low priority in our planning. Either it would come to a pause, or it would blow up into general war. If the latter, the regional nuclear campaign serves little purpose, if any.

The important thing in limited nuclear war is to impress the Soviet leadership with the risk of general war--a war that may occur whether we or they intend it or not. If nuclear weapons are introduced the main consequence will not be on the battlefield; the main consequence will be the increased likelihood and expectation of general war. The state of the local battlefield will receive less attention than the state of our strategic forces and the enemy's. Nuclears should therefore be used--if they are used at all in Europe--not mainly to destroy tactical targets but to influence the Soviet command.

Nuclears should be used to impress the Soviets with the fact that they cannot win a regional war--that it is unlikely to remain regional if it is fought with nuclears on the scale that tactical military considerations would dictate. The purpose of nuclears is to convince the Soviets that the risk of general war is great enough to outweigh their original tactical objectives, but not so great as to make it prudent to initiate it pre-emptively.

Limited and localized nuclear war is not, therefore, a "tactical" war. However few the nuclears used, and however selectively they are used, their purpose should not be "tactical" because their consequences will not be tactical. With nuclears, it has become a war of nuclear risks and threats at the highest strategic level. It is a war of nuclear bargaining.

This is the way nuclears should be used if they must be used; this is therefore the way our plans should be drawn. And our requirements for nuclear weapons in Europe--numbers of weapons, their location, state of readiness, and means of delivery--should be derived from this concept of their use.

We should plan for a war of nerve, of demonstration, and of bargaining, not of tactical target destruction. Destroying the target is incidental to the message the detonation conveys to the Soviet leadership. Targets should be picked with a view to what the Soviet leadership perceives about the character of the war and about our intent, not for tactical importance. A target inside the USSR is important because it is inside the USSR, not because of its tactical contribution to the European battlefield. A target in a city is important because a city is destroyed, not because it is a local supply or communication center. The difference between one weapon, a dozen, a hundred, or a thousand, is not in the number of targets destroyed but in the Soviet (and American) perception of risks, intent, precedent, and implied "proposal" for the conduct or termination of war.

Extra targets destroyed by additional weapons are not a local military "bonus"; they are noise that may drown the message. They are a "proposal" that must be responded to. And they are an added catalyst to general war. This is an argument for a selective and threatening use of nuclears rather than large-scale tactical use. (It is an argument for large-scale tactical use only if such use creates the level of risk we wish to create.) Success in the use of nuclears will be measured not by the targets destroyed but by how well we manage the level of risk. The Soviets must be persuaded that the war is getting out of hand but is not yet beyond the point of no return.

The implications for our immediate planning are these:

The adequacy of our nuclear weapons in Europe is not determined by whether we could win a full-scale European nuclear campaign. We should not add nuclear weapons in Europe for that unlikely purpose; we or the Soviets, deliberately or inadvertently, will have shifted the level or locus of war before a regional nuclear war becomes decisive. We should add weapons only if what we have there is insufficient to appear likely to catalyze general war if fully used (or if fully destroyed). Their function is to make the triggering of inadvertent or pre-emptive war a frighteningly probable consequence of their large-scale use or of a massive nuclear effort to destroy them.

The same applies to their range, readiness, and vulnerability to attack. Readiness for instant front-line tactical use is less important if the use of nuclears is not going to be determined by battlefield criteria. Vulnerability of aircraft and medium-range missiles need not be urgently remedied if an attack sufficient to destroy them would almost certainly trigger a strategic response. Range of weapons and means of delivery need to meet the requirements of selective bargaining use, not of tactical support. Targets outside the theater may appear desirable; weapons outside the theater may be called on.

Control over nuclear weapons in Europe must be tight and centralized. Physical safeguards, communications, release procedures, and indoctrination must be designed to permit deliberate, discriminating, selective use for dangerous nuclear bargaining. This means preventing any use, by anyone, not specifically authorized as part of the nuclear bargaining plan. In particular, it means preventing the misinterpretation of any initial bargaining use as authority for general tactical use. Commanders and custodians must be indoctrinated with the recognition that tactical considerations are not determining: This is a controlled strategic exchange.

Procedures, communications, and plans must assure a capability for selective release, and for target selection, timing, coordination, and reconnaissance responsive to the needs of nuclear bargaining. Local commanders who may be called on to fire nuclear weapons must be able to comprehend instructions that reflect the strategic nature of the exchange.

If nuclear weapons should be resorted to, particular weapons will be fired from particular locations to particular targets at particular times. Messages may need to accompany the weapons; if so, they must carry particular language. The concept of selective, strategic bargaining use is not enough; there must be plans for how to do this.

It is not likely that the Soviets would allow a precedent for U.S. unilateral use of nuclears. Because time will be short, there must be imaginative advance exploration of what Soviet responses, nuclear and verbal, to anticipate and how to interpret them. (The possibility of Soviet initial selective use in a bargaining strategy must also be explored, so that we can interpret it and respond appropriately.)

Washington, July 7, 1961.

SUBJECT
Berlin

This memorandum addresses itself to the following questions:

(1) accepting for the moment the premises of the Acheson paper,/2/ what issues are avoided in that paper?

(2) are the Acheson premises adequate? What other premises ought to be brought into the Berlin discussion? What administrative means can help bring about a full exploration of alternative premises and a full consideration of the political issues?

A. The Acheson premise is substantially as follows: Khrushchev's principal purpose in forcing the Berlin question is to humiliate the US on a basic issue by making us back down on a sacred commitment and thus shatter our world power and influence. The Berlin crisis, in this view, has nothing to do with Berlin, Germany, or Europe. From this premise flows the conclusion that we are in a fateful test of wills, that our major task is to demonstrate our unalterable determination, and that Khrushchev will be deterred only by a demonstrated US readiness to go to nuclear war rather than to abandon the status quo. On this theory, negotiation is harmful until the crisis is well developed; then it is useful only for propaganda purposes; and in the end its essential purpose is to provide a formula to cover Khrushchev's defeat. The test of will becomes an end in itself rather than a means to a political end.

This argument avoids a number of major issues.

B. What political moves do we make until the crisis develops? If we sit silent, or confine ourselves to rebutting Soviet contentions (cf. the draft reply to the aide-mémoire), we permit Khrushchev to establish the framework of discussion. As we do this, we in effect invite him to demand from us a definition of the guarantees we would find acceptable. This, of course, casts the US as rigid and unreasonable and puts us on the political defensive.

C. The paper indicates no relationship between the proposed military action and larger political objectives. It defines an immediate casus belli; but it does not state any political objective other than present access procedures for which we are prepared to incinerate the world. It is essential to elaborate the cause for which we are prepared to go to nuclear war. Where do we want to come out if we win the test of wills? German unification, for example: what is our real intention with regard to this traditional objective?

D. The paper covers only one eventuality--that is, the Communist interruption of military access to West Berlin. Actually there is a whole spectrum of harassments, of which a full-scale blockade may well be one of the least likely.

E. The paper hinges on our willingness to face nuclear war. But this option is undefined. Before you are asked to make the decision to go to nuclear war, you are entitled to know what concretely nuclear war is likely to mean. The Pentagon should be required to make an analysis of the possible levels and implications of nuclear warfare and the possible gradations of our own nuclear response.

F. The paper directs itself almost exclusively to the problem of military access. But military traffic is only 5 percent of the whole. 95 percent of the traffic into West Berlin consists of supplies for the civil population. This civilian traffic has been for some time under full GDR control; and in recent weeks the GDR has gone to surprising lengths to facilitate this civilian traffic. Also civilian traffic is far more essential to our professed objective--the preservation of West Berlin. If the military traffic is cut off and the civilian traffic continues, our garrisons could still be effectively supplied. Though the Acheson memorandum states that military planning is also applicable to interruption of civilian access, this raises serious questions about the legal framework and the definition of the casus belli, which are not dealt with.

G. The paper does not define the problem of the relationship of the proposed strategy to the Alliance. What happens if our allies decline to go along? Which of them, for example, will go along with the ground probe? Even de Gaulle has indicated his opposition to sending a column through. What about the United Nations? Whatever happens, this issue will go into the UN. For better or for worse, we have to have a convincing UN position.

A. There are alternative predictions as to the course of events which ought to be examined--e.g., the Russians may sign a treaty with the GDR and make no immediate interference with our access routes.

B. There are alternative premises as to Soviet purposes--e.g., Khrushchev may be seeking to stabilize his own situation and relations in Germany and Eastern Europe; or he may be trying to increase the likelihood of a general recognition of East Germany.

C. There are alternatives to the present US policy toward Germany--e.g., confederation; living indefinitely with a divided Germany; or a comprehensive European solution (such as Gaitskell proposed some years ago).

D. There are alternative conceptions of the role of negotiation--as to timing; and as to framework of negotiations (should negotiations be confined to Berlin? or should they be in an all-German setting? or in an all-European setting?).

E. There are alternative assumptions as to what will change Khrushchev's course--e.g., different kinds of military pressure; different places for military pressure (why Berlin?); possibilities of a political offensive (in East Germany? in East Europe? in United Nations?--why suppose that we are vulnerable to world opinion and Khrushchev isn't?).

F. What procedure can be devised to make sure that alternatives are systematically brought to the surface and canvassed?

a) Mr. Acheson should be asked to fill in deficiencies in his paper and particularly to supply a political dimension.

b) The State Department should be asked to prepare a paper based on the premise that we should go into negotiations well before the crisis. Obviously it would not be fair to ask Mr. Kohler to take this on, since he is committed to the Acheson premises. A State Department group under the aegis of the Policy Planning Staff is presumably ready to prepare such a paper. Abe Chayes is in this group and might well be the State Department man in charge of this operation.

c) The decision withdrawing the Acheson paper from circulation might well be reconsidered. The danger of leaks from restricted circulation is far less than the danger of preventing full discussion of the issues raised in the paper.

d) Some senior non-Achesonians should be brought into the picture. David Bruce, who has an intimate knowledge of the Berlin problem, should be recalled from London for consultation. Averell Harriman might also be asked to come back. In view of the necessity of understanding and defending the US position in the UN, Adlai Stevenson should by all means be brought into the planning discussions.

e) The White House staff should be directed to question all existing proposals, especially from the viewpoint of the effect the pressure of events will have on decisions; and it should be further directed to take an active role in stimulating exploration of the various alternatives listed above (and others which reflection and analysis will bring to mind). In particular, Henry Kissinger should be brought into the center of Berlin planning.

Washington, July 7, 1961.

SUBJECT
Berlin

The President wishes to ensure that any possibilities for exploiting a Berlin crisis to advance our constructive long-term purposes are fully exploited. To this end, studies of the following questions are requested by August 4, in addition to the more immediate studies already underway:

1. Long-Term Military Strength. What steps might be taken to ensure that our preparations for the Berlin crisis have the maximum lasting effect on NATO's military posture consistent with their immediate purpose? The Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the Secretary of State.

2. Greater Atlantic Cohesion. What steps might be taken to exploit the felt need for greater inter-dependence which is likely to characterize a period of Berlin tensions and preparations, in order to hasten progress toward increased Atlantic military, political and economic cohesion? For example:

(a) In the military field, seeking agreement on the concept of a NATO missile force which would be truly multilateral in ownership and control, as outlined in the President's Ottawa speech/2/--possibly beginning with the longest range ballistic missiles already committed for NATO deployment, i.e., Pershings?

(b) In the economic field, instituting arrangements to share the increased burdens likely to be associated with any prolonged Berlin crisis which could point the way toward larger patterns of burden-sharing and constructive joint action in such other economic fields as trade and reserves?

(c) In the political field, taking new steps toward the long-term goal of a wider community?

3. Political Settlements. Are there useful political settlements, which might not ordinarily be feasible but which might conceivably be acceptable to our allies and to the Soviets if a Berlin crisis dramatized the need for drastic measures to render the Berlin and German situation less explosive? For example:

(a) A Central European settlement which would hold some realistic promise of resolving the German problem?

(b) As part of such a settlement, otherwise, a Berlin settlement which would not only get us over the immediate crisis, but also make future crises less likely--by bringing the access routes under some form of Western or international control?

McGeorge Bundy/3/

Paris, July 8, 1961, 3 p.m.

Polto 29. Re Topol 34./2/ We circulated text of US reply this morning, and Stikker, who had privately been approached by some PermReps on timetable, called NAC meeting on timing question for noon. Stikker noted draft French and UK replies not yet received and felt Council and governments would wish to consider three documents. Asked NAC if timetable acceptable, which he personally doubted. He noted that if amendment suggested at July 12 meeting, delivery July 13 not possible. Stressed consultation on Berlin issue of great importance to Alliance, and good deal of policy decision may be involved in replies which might affect serious developments in future. In most countries matter would have to go to cabinets.

Belgium strongly agreed. Belgian Ambassador in Washington had been assured one week's time and Belgium had counted on it. It was in interest of West that consultation be serious. Three working days too short considering all implications. In view July 14 holiday, Belgium proposed NAC consultation Saturday July 15. Noted that NAC already informed that Spaak and many other members of Six would be in Athens re Common Market celebration this weekend and in Rome Monday re Six heads of government meeting. US had had since 4th of June and whole world knew deliberate and serious US staff level consultations and coordination with four that had taken place. Rest of Alliance should be given opportunity to act with same seriousness.

Italy supported Belgium, saying hard to say would be able to reply by 12th, and, with respect to statement in second sentence of US reply, said would be difficult to say other NATO members consulted if in fact their responses not ready.

Netherlands supported previous speakers, adding that if Soviets knew short timetable and absence of many FonMins, they would get impression of rubberstamping by Alliance of US proposal.

France agreed with suggestions. Said French note would only be adopted in Council of Ministers on 12th and could not be circulated to NATO before morning 13th. If minimum two-days consultation needed, NAC consultation could take place 15th, and reply sent on to Moscow for delivery night of 15th or Monday. French note would be very short and US note more important. Greek PermRep thought reply was excellent, but supported plea of time in view mention of NATO agreement in paras 1 and 11 of reply. Luxembourg, Turkey and Canada joined in request for further delay. UK, which circulated its reply at end of meeting, said timetable therefor was same as for US proposal and would report sense of discussion.

US PermRep said he would report unanimous view of Council. Personally, he favored full consultation, which he agreed would be difficult to get in the circumstances, especially as French reply not ready until July 13 and could be important. He would inform Washington to see if delay could not be arranged. He had no information whether there were reasons for the short timetable.

Canada suggested a preliminary exchange of views at Wednesday NAC meeting might be helpful, also noted that if amendments suggested Saturday, further delay in delivery possible.

France pointed out German delivery should be delayed from 10th to about 14th, in view delay other Western replies so as to avoid Russian reply to Germans before other Western replies delivered. German Rep did not know if Kroll yet had date with Khrushchev for 10th but would report.

He agreed it had been intended that German note be delivered two or three days before others. Chair supported French suggestion, noting US and UK support therefor.

Stikker concluded by underlining very strongly necessity for longer period of consultation in light unanimous consensus and his own personal views and noted Council would like to have preliminary exchange of views July 12 with definitive consultation July 15. Agreed press should be told only that NAC consultation on responses to Soviet aide-mémoire had begun.

Recommendation: I strongly urge that we go along with the request of the NAC on timing. I am convinced that it is of importance to give a firm foundation for a posture of Western solidarity, and de Staerke privately tells me that Spaak will state in the Parliament that there has not been adequate consultation unless the proposed timetable is accepted. I think we can use publicly the extended timetable to demonstrate that the Western governments are giving sober and purposeful consideration to the adoption of a firm position on Berlin and that this can be used to our advantage with the Russians and the West. Particularly in light of the factor of delay in the French reply, it simply would not be understood if we did not fall in with this reasonable suggestion of the entire North Atlantic Council.

Please advise.

Finletter

Washington, July 9, 1961, 3:06 p.m.

Topol 38. Eyes only for Finletter from Secretary. I am deeply disturbed by restlessness on part of Stikker and NAC members about consultations on Berlin. A first order of business has been to reply to Soviet aide-mémoire. Obviously, such a reply ought to be made in harmony with those who share occupation rights with us and with Federal Republic. This required time needed for careful preparation US proposed reply plus quadripartite consultation. It was not surprising that three other governments had a considerable number of suggestions and that these suggestions had to be resolved into a single text. The principal aspect of the draft reply is that it basically restates the essential elements of the Western position on the most important issues raised by the Soviet aide-mémoire. It does not purport to offer new proposals since such proposals must be carefully worked out among allied governments, including NATO. Since draft reply generally restates what we have considered to be agreed Western position, we hope that NAC governments can review it promptly. Obviously, new proposals would require more time.

Meanwhile, a far-reaching review has been going on within US government on Germany and Berlin. We cannot begin intergovernmental consultations on courses of action or any proposals until we ourselves are clear about how we see the problem and how we think the West ought to proceed. There has not been intergovernmental consultations on these aspects. Unfortunate press speculations and leaks out of context have apparently been picked up in Europe as evidence that far-reaching decisions have been taken and that intergovernmental consultations have moved into final stages without preliminary consultations with Stikker or NATO members. This is simply not so and repeated indications of this attitude among NATO members in the face of your assurances to contrary amount to wholly unacceptable suggestions of bad faith. If NATO members are impatient about delay, they should reflect upon fact that Berlin crisis involves the gravest possible issues and that problem requires serious and intensive study. US must accept its grave responsibilities with utmost clarity and do everything within its power to ensure that its proposals to its allies and to the Soviet Union fully reflect those responsibilities. We could quickly and automatically simply repeat earlier positions but the new Administration has an obligation to review the matter deeply and bring together political, military, economic, propaganda and other factors in a position which can offer wise, firm and effective leadership to the free world.

Also relevant is the observation I made in Oslo that consultation is a two-way street and that the initiative is available to all parties. Despite the fact that it is well known that Germany and Berlin are very much on our agenda for fundamental policy and action determination, Canada has been the only NATO country (outside the quadripartite group) to furnish us with specific and thought-out suggestions about how the crisis can be handled or what the general nature of Western proposals might be./2/ Needless to say, we would welcome such views at the very time when it is known that we are thinking hard about the US position on future courses of action.

In your private conversations with Stikker and NAC representatives, you should feel free to be frank and direct and need not feel defensive.

If NATO governments feel embarrassed by a reference to them in first paragraph our draft reply, you and British, French and German NAC representatives can consult and agree to eliminate that reference or change word "consult" to the notion that "we have had the benefit of the views of" or some such language.

You will be receiving separate instructions on French points raised in Topol 36./3/

As to timing NATO consultation, we are most anxious to proceed on schedule first indicated./4/ US is under great pressure foreign and domestic opinion about reply. Considerations first paragraph above plus our assumption NATO Governments have also been thinking hard about Berlin seem to us to make original schedule possible. Am sending personal message to foreign ministers this point in effort speed up their response./5/ If we cannot get rapid reaction to reply which largely sets the record straight, it is discouraging to envisage difficulties allied consultations in weeks ahead on basic questions about future course of action. Please do your best on this with individual NAC members.

FYI. President considers timing publication reply most urgent matter and we would have to consider possibility of proceeding unilaterally if proposed schedule cannot be met. End FYI.

Rusk

Washington, July 9, 1961, 5:21 p.m.

25. For action by all recipient posts other than London, Paris, Bonn and Moscow. From the Secretary. Please see Foreign Minister or Acting Foreign Minister urgently and discuss following as personal representation from me about Berlin:

USG is now in midst of intensive review problems Germany and Berlin and formulation its own policy for months ahead as basis for early consultation with allied governments. Press speculation and alleged leaks to contrary, no far-reaching final decisions have been taken without consultation our allies. We consider renewed Soviet pressure on Germany and Berlin as most serious development with far-reaching implications for Western Alliance and believe we can meet our own grave responsibilities only on basis of searching examination political, military, economic and propaganda aspects of problem. We assume that other NATO Governments are giving equally serious and urgent attention to issues posed by latest Soviet actions. We expect to be in position to begin consultations by end July and hope that our allies will have made considerable progress their thinking by that time.

Regarding draft reply to Soviet aide-mémoire on Berlin, we are most anxious to make this public on Friday, July 14. Essential character our draft is that it clarifies the record and states essential agreed positions of West but does not attempt to make fresh proposals. Future courses of action will require intensive study by allied governments and consultations referred to above. We earnestly hope that general nature and purpose of our reply will make speedy consideration NATO Governments possible.

For Ambassador: Please impress on Foreign Minister that we consider timing of reply matter of great urgency and that we do not regard content of reply to foreclose full and detailed consultation re future course of Western handling Berlin problem. If point is raised that draft reply contains reference to consultation made by allies and that time has not been sufficient to support this statement, we could modify such language. But we do attach greatest importance to Western unity and ask help allies in handling this matter with public solidarity.

Despite NAC resistance to our proposed time schedule, please do your utmost with Foreign Minister to obtain cooperation in meeting it.

FYI only: We recognize that time required to obtain quadripartite agreement on proposed reply may stir sensitivities some governments about seeming division NATO allies between those afforded time and those not. Appreciating prestige questions involved, nevertheless US must ensure quadripartite unity and has been disappointed speed of this process. Fast consultation with many allies presents complex problem for USG. If we cannot move promptly on what is essentially a restatement of already agreed positions, it augurs badly for maintenance allied unity through consultations on future courses of action. Please do your best. End FYI.

Polto 29 to Department/2/ giving background of NAC discussion is being repeated all addressee posts which have not yet received.

London, Paris, Bonn--please inform Foreign Offices we are pressing for original schedule.

Rusk

Washington, July 10, 1961.

SUBJECT
Federal Emergency Plan for Berlin

Transmitted herewith in accordance with our conversation this morning is a comprehensive Federal Emergency Plan for Berlin prepared by the staff of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization./2/ You will note that this plan contemplates a series of inter-related actions to attain industrial mobilization, military expansion, and increased readiness in civil defense. Although this document has not received final clearance within the agency, I am providing you with a copy of it to serve as a check list of actions which may need to be considered.

During the first phase of our preparations for Berlin--roughly July through August--we must make a number of important decisions. We must also initiate action on those organizational and preparatory measures which, because of leadtime consideration, cannot be deferred, including legislation and funding requirements.

During Phase I it is vitally important from the standpoint of the national economy and the civilian population that we take the following actions:

1) Actions to strengthen our control over the economy to make it responsive to national needs as they develop, and

2) Actions to prepare the population to the fullest extent possible for the contingencies of limited or general war which may develop.

It is proposed that Congress be asked for standby emergency legislation covering:

1) Priorities and allocations,

2) Authority to requisition,

3) Expansion of productive capacity and supply,

4) Acquisition and disposition of real property,

5) Emergency contracting authority,

6) Plant seizure authority,

7) Emergency foreign assistance,

8) Price, wage, and rent stabilization,

9) Control of consumer and real estate credit,

10) Employment control,

11) Settlement of labor disputes,

12) Censorship of communications, and

13) Other general provisions.

OCDM should also move within existing authorities to:

1) Obtain from Department of Defense phased strength requirements and estimates of production requirements for military build-up.

2) Obtain from State Department information on requirements for foreign economic aid.

3) Establish procedure for determining requirements for the civilian population.

4) Obtain from the Council of Economic Advisers, Department of Treasury, and Federal Reserve Board recommendations for indirect economic controls and fiscal policy proposed to meet the requirements of the mobilization period.

5) Initiate preparation for the establishment and staffing of emergency agencies in the fields of stabilization, transportation, communications, and censorship.

6) Notify selected executive reservists of a possible call up to duty on a selective basis.

7) Establish mechanisms and procedures for determining relative urgency of Federal agency programs and establish program priorities if necessary.

Emergency measures are also needed to effect the maximum degree of civil defense preparedness. These actions should include:

1) An intensive public information program stressing emergency actions to save lives,

2) A six-month program to provide a maximum feasible amount of shelter from radioactive fallout,

3) An emergency program to insure the continuity of government at Federal, state, and local levels, and

4) Preparation of a detailed program for the selective procurement and stockpiling and distribution of radiological instruments, medical supplies, and essential survival items.

The Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization is in a position to provide detailed support for many of the items listed in the preceding paragraphs. In addition, we are prepared to move ahead in the implementation of this program at the direction of the President.

Edward A. McDermott/3/

Washington, July 12, 1961.

SUBJECT
Actions agreed at the discussions at Hyannis Port, 8 July 1961

1. Within ten days (i.e., by 18 July)

a. The Secretary of State will submit a political prospectus on Berlin and related matters with appendices covering political, economic and propaganda actions in support of the U.S. program.

b. The Secretary of Defense will produce the defense plan in support of the U.S. program to include such matters as the ground probe, airlift (garrison and civilian) and measures to improve overall military posture particularly in the field of conventional weapons and forces. For the latter, he will base his recommendations on the assumption that main reliance will not be placed on the use of atomic weapons at the outset of a military engagement with the USSR in Europe.

(Mr. McNamara considers that the papers being prepared by Defense for the NSC meeting on 13 July 1961 respond to the foregoing undertaking.)

c. Based upon the foregoing documents, the Kohler task force will prepare a combined check list of possible actions relating to Berlin which should be considered for implementation in the present and emerging situation. The list will show for each action the lead time of decision.

[Here follows a paragraph on an unrelated subject.]

Maxwell D. Taylor/2/

Washington, July 12, 1961.

SUBJECT
Meeting of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin

[Here follows an extensive list of participants.]

The group met to consider the study assembled by the Department of State in response to NSC Directive No. 58./2/ Mr. Johnson inquired whether members of the group had noted any errors either of omission or commission, or had comments to make concerning the study.

Mr. Fowler/3/ felt that the statements concerning economic countermeasures appearing on page 3 of the memorandum were inaccurate, and should be altered to reflect the fact that the Treasury document as such was not completely responsive to the Directive. He also noted that the timetable indicated that high level negotiations within NATO concerning a total embargo would be deferred until September. He felt that a decision should be taken now to press for high level negotiations within NATO aimed at getting firm governmental commitments for actions which could be taken at later dates.

Mr. Fowler also commented that the wording of the paper suggested that economic sanctions would be directed against East Germany. He felt that sanctions should also be sought covering the Soviet Bloc rather than Germany alone. He would hope for a firm United States position to the effect that countermeasures would be applied directly against the Soviet Bloc. In discussing these points, Mr. Hillenbrand mentioned the tripartite work which has been going forward with the British and French on economic sanctions, and possible difficulties, including undesired leaks, which might arise in taking the matter up prematurely within NATO. He felt that the reservations expressed by the Treasury representatives could be resolved, since the problem seemed mainly one of drafting rather than difference in views.

Mr. Nitze felt that the document lacked an annex on the crucial point of tripartite and quadripartite negotiations in building solidarity and unity among our Allies. He also felt that there would be material changes in our program caused by variations in targets and powers. He mentioned a possible stretchout in our military buildup, such as the capability of sending two divisions to Europe by January 1, two more by February 1, and two more by March 1. He pointed out the time element involved in the problems of training, logistics, and equipment.

Mr. Johnson asked for clarification on the item in the Directive concerning capability for military action. Some confusion had arisen as to whether it was intended that the United States be capable of such action by October 15, or four months after October 15. Mr. Acheson said that he had intended the schedule to be much more flexible, that it had not been expected that the United States should be capable of the proposed military action by October 15. Rather, that we should be increasingly capable of such action after that date, and that he felt it would be good if we were capable of doing what we wanted by early 1962.

General Taylor pointed out that it was illogical to wait until we were challenged to start our buildup. It appeared preferable to start the buildup in the expectation of the likelihood of a challenge. Mr. Nitze said that the Department of Defense was thinking in terms of a declaration of national emergency about August 1, the call-up of a reserve division about August 15, and continuing increase in our military capabilities thereafter. He pointed out that the STRAC divisions were airborne and that the military planners would probably, therefore, prefer to hold them in reserve and commit regular infantry divisions first. Responding to queries from Mr. Johnson, he and General Gray said that the principal difficulty was that of manpower. Reserve divisions were necessary for the projected buildup, and they could not be called up in the absence of the powers conveyed under a declaration of national emergency.

The group discussed briefly the question whether naval blockade was an act of war. The consensus was that, regardless of legalisms, it would be so regarded by the USSR. Mr. Acheson said that the United States should be ready for ground action when naval action was undertaken, though ground action need not be undertaken simultaneously. He mentioned the inability to predict the result of blockades, and in that connection recounted events following our general freezing order against Japan of July 26, 1941.

There was discussion of the dates of the various phases. Mr. Nitze felt that the idea of phases was sound, but that they should not be tied to specific dates. Rather, they should be planned on a schedule of possible Soviet actions. He suggested that Phase I cover the period until the signing of a peace treaty between the USSR and the GDR; that Phase II cover the subsequent period until the GDR took action to control or impede Western access to Berlin; and that Phase III cover subsequent developments. He pointed out that the timing of the first two phases was up to the Russians and the East Germans and that that of the III Phase was ours. In that connection, Mr. Johnson pointed out that the September 17 date for Phase I was tied to the time of the elections in West Germany, and that it would be preferable to plan in terms of four phases, the fourth being subsequent to interference with access.

Mr. Johnson said that the fundamental question before the group was: What should we recommend to our principals to come out of the discussion in the NSC meeting on July 13? He also felt that the group should consider whether the pros and cons of the problem have been sufficiently clearly presented.

Mr. Nitze felt that the two essential first decisions to be taken were those covering a request for additional funds for the military and the declaration of a state of national emergency by the President. He said that the more the Department of Defense examined the problem of building up our strength, the more important the declaration of a national emergency appeared. Our movements after obtaining the authority conferred by such a declaration could be fast or slow, soft or hard, depending upon developments. Mr. Bundy felt that the President might want to have estimates of the effects of a wider group of actions than those covered by the study. Mr. Nitze said that the Department of Defense could have more detailed information along that line available in time for the NSC meeting. He pointed out that Mr. McNamara and others in the Department of Defense were examining that whole question urgently and intensively.

Mr. Acheson felt that the problem of the military buildup had two steps. The first was that of achieving an adequate military level by early 1962; the second that of continuing that level. While we might be able to achieve the level on the basis of a declaration of national emergency, additional legislation would be necessary if it were to be maintained. General Taylor pointed out that an early decision to embark on the buildup was necessary, and that it was possible to leave refinements in the plan for a later date. Mr. Nitze mentioned the difficulty of starting and stopping alterations in our military posture. He said that action in line with the President's Directive was already being taken. This was due partly to uncertainty regarding the situation which the military was expected to achieve by October 15.

Mr. Acheson expressed the view that at the earliest possible moment the President should decide whether a program of the sort contained in this study should be our policy, or whether there would be a "Lippmann-Morgan policy," which he described "as doing it with mirrors." He felt that if the United States were to follow anything like the course covered by the study we would have to approach our Allies almost at once at a very high level. He expressed the view that there would be a revolt in Congress if it was not given strong leadership soon on the Berlin question.

Mr. Acheson felt that the matter had been examined exhaustively over the past several months, and that it would be difficult to prepare additional useful papers at this time. He emphasized that the basic decisions must be taken soon. The collateral decisions, although important, could be firmly agreed upon later. We could refine our information and program, but the basic decisions must be taken with as little delay as possible.

General Taylor agreed that an early decision should be made as to the attitude and determination of our Government; the detailed timetable could be developed later.

Mr. Bundy agreed in general with Mr. Acheson's view. He pointed out, however, that the decision to declare a state of national emergency was a major "quantum jump." In his view, and that of the majority of the group, it was incorrect to think in terms of a "limited" national emergency. He thought the President might wish to know what could be done if the target date were later and no national emergency declared shortly. General Gray and Mr. Nitze reiterated that in the absence of a declaration of a national emergency only limited strengthening of our military posture could be accomplished. This was covered in the first 15 points of the military section of the timetable. Further steps would require national emergency. Responding to Mr. Acheson's query whether there were other legal consequences of a declaration of national emergency, Mr. Nitze said that there were some, but that the most important was that affecting manpower. They agreed that it might be possible for Congress to give the Executive the powers involved in a declaration of national emergency while calling it something else.

Mr. Fowler called attention to the fact that, if a national emergency were declared, the Executive should move to obtain certain other powers and controls at the same time. A declaration of national emergency in itself brings some reactions, and the Executive should ask for the simplest and quickest form of authority in order to control them.

Mr. Johnson said that the discussion indicated there were three major public steps to be taken: (1) a request for additional military appropriations; (2) a declaration of national emergency, with related powers, and (3) economic controls. It was felt that the three steps constituted an integrated whole and that one Presidential decision would cover all three. Not much could be done in the absence of a declared national emergency. Mr. Johnson inquired what could be expected if the declaration of a national emergency were delayed. The Defense representatives felt that the minimum required time for anything approaching the recommended level of military posture was four months from the date of decision to declare the emergency.

Mr. Johnson emphasized to the group the highly sensitive nature of the study, and the extremely limited distribution which would be given to it.

Bonn, July 12, 1961, 7 p.m.

76. As Department aware, indications are mounting of growing uneasiness among Soviet Zone populace. Evidence is found in (1) editorial exhortations of East German press; (2) Ulbricht's attempts to reassure public opinion; (3) rising tide of refugee flow into West Berlin; (4) [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] reports.

While some measure of unrest can be attributed to spreading difficulties in economic field (where basic weaknesses were so clearly evinced at time of IZT denunciation last year), with consequence shortages and even rationing in certain sectors, it appears basic tension has resulted from belligerent tone of Soviet and East German propaganda re separate peace treaty and new status of West Berlin to be determined thereby.

Soviet Zone regime's current attempts to hold popular concern in check will probably succeed for time being, but if Khrushchev and Ulbricht continue to build tension as action on separate treaty approaches, it seems to me most likely that refugee flow may increase to actual flood unless additional, harsher restrictive measures are taken against travel from Zone into East Berlin and thence across sector border. On other hand, if such restrictive measures introduced under existing strained conditions, with probability of further economic dislocations, I can foresee real possibility of explosion, [3 lines of source text not declassified].

It is of course somewhat early to forecast trend of events in Soviet Zone. I do not think it premature, however, to consider attitude we must take up should East German populace rise again. My own view is that for US to remain on sidelines in event another June 17/2/ would mean end of our prestige and influence in Germany, even were FedRep and population in West to follow our precept./3/

Dowling

Washington, July 13, 1961.

SUBJECT
Berlin

The Secretary of State opened the discussion by pointing out that the Khrushchev timetable is not under our control. We might well find that any estimated date of the crisis was too early or too late.

Secretary Rusk pointed out that the essential point in the Acheson paper was that the U.S. was not currently in a good position to negotiate. If Khrushchev were now willing to protect our basic rights, he would not have moved as he has, and willingness to negotiate, on his part, will depend on appropriate steps from our side. The Secretary recommended a decision to proceed immediately in discussion of economic countermeasures in a three or four-power group. After discussion on this particular point, the President indicated his desire to have a precise program framed for us to put forward. There was discussion of the balance of payments problem, the commodity problem, and the very large role which European countries must play in any economic sanctions. The problem was referred for definite recommendations to the Department of State, the President indicating also his desire that the Treasury play a major part in this problem.

The Secretary of Defense presented the Defense Department's recommended program (annex B of the study of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group of July 12, 1961)./2/ There followed discussion of the desirability of a declaration of national emergency. The Secretary of State indicated his view that such a declaration at this time would have a dangerous sound of mobilization, and quoted from the Acheson paper on the need for keeping early steps in a low key. The Secretary of State proposed as an alternative a Congressional resolution or other action authorizing appropriate military call-ups. The Vice President believed that the response to any such proposal in the Congress would be that the President should take the lead.

Mr. Acheson argued that we must do what is sound and necessary in itself, and not act for the sake of appearances. He believed that if we left the call-up of Reserves to the end, we would not affect Khrushchev's judgment of the shape of the crisis any more than we could do so by dropping bombs after he had forced the issue to the limit. He believed that not much later than August we should wish to begin training soldiers, though of course they would not all be called up at once. The Secretary of State agreed that the training process should not be left until too late.

There was discussion of the relation of any military preparation to our Allies, and the President requested preparation of a report showing what contribution we would expect from them, to match our own new efforts.

The Vice President asked whether there was provision for procurement of additional aircraft in the submission of the Department of Defense. The Secretary of Defense answered in the negative and explained that the new airplanes could not be obtained in a short time, and that this program was designed to provide immediately needed new strength.

It was agreed that the impact of the proposed defense program would require a review of other Administration programs and a study of such matters as stand-by controls and new taxes. These questions were to be reviewed by the Treasury Department, the Council of Economic Advisers, and the Special Counsel to the President.

There was further discussion in which Mr. Acheson made clear his belief that the President should decide to support a full program of decisive action. The Vice President agreed. Others felt that we should not take action now which might jeopardize the authorization and appropriation for the foreign aid program. The Secretary of State remarked that it will be a great victory for Khrushchev if by a memorandum and a few speeches he could weaken the foreign aid program.

There was no clear decision on these matters, and it was agreed that alternative programs, at different levels of present expenditure, should be refined for further discussion at the next meeting.

In a smaller meeting with the Steering Group after the NSC meeting, there was discussion of a series of four alternatives. The Vice President favored alternative 1. The Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State preferred alternative 2, and General Taylor preferred alternative 3./3/ The President did not make a choice, nor did the meeting lead to any clear consensus on the "political scenario." The President did answer plainly the statement of the Secretary of State that there are two things which matter: our presence in Berlin, and our access to Berlin.

McG. B./4/

Washington, July 13, 1961, 4:10 p.m.

1. Rusk reviewed actions to date & described timetable--1st phase now to 17 Sept. We have no control over timetable. Sobolof indicated if our reply to aide-mémoire is negative--might move it up.

No chance of successful neg. with K on Berlin. K is too far out on limb.

Any neg would depend on actions of US & allies.

Explained rationale of program, pol, mil, ec, etc.

Consultation with Allies ASAP. Should begin on ec sanctions.

P[resident]--Question is how we should present it. We should present to Allies in strongest terms. What could kick it off?

Rusk--Link it to political paper proposed actions.

P--Do we have any idea of magnitude of Soviet ec. trade? How we approach Italians?

R--Time schedule--Mon or Tues next week? Later NATO.

P--We should put up specifics to them.

R--I propose I go to NATO to discuss it with them.

P--I would like a report at next NSC.

Dillon--Consultation must be done at a high level. Rush discussion on approach re EC, sanctions.

P--Who will head up this effort?

R--Kohler about mid August.

P--We must put it to them as strong as possible.

Dulles--notes ec. measures vs entire Bloc. Is this possible? Poland for example.

Dillon--All, incl China. Initially perhaps vs USSR--later against others shipping to USSR.

P--What would be impact on other European countries?

Rostow--2 effects--Balance of payments and products.

P--It will be a complicated negotiation.

SecDef went over his paper./2/ Stop deactivation now. CVA, CVS; 6B-47 Wings. Assumptions are available for 1 Jan 62.

P--How about earlier?

Rusk--How About a cong res auth Pres to declare emergency.

VP--Pres should do it followed by cong endorsement. (Believes we should declare nat emergency) Adm & Cong should close ranks and

AG (Bolton?)--Pres has auth from Korea. Pres can call 1 million.

P--Get Counsel of Def and AG together & look into emergency laws.

I explained par 10 of JCS paper./3/

P--to Acheson--what do you think?

[A?]--If we wait until last minute--it will not influence K. Sometime in August we should begin training.

Sec Def rec. auth supplement appropriation.

BOB--Haven't seen program.

Acheson--Make decision to go ahead with program or not. If go ahead--next step refine program. Who is going to do it. Hope by week after next. Speech to nation.

JCS will meet with P. next week.

?--Do not go to allies piecemeal. Call Amb. back & acquaint them with program. Decide and do what we need to do. Then go to our allies--not before. General talks with allies not good. They must know we are moving. Then I feel they will come along.

P--We will have to review our other req on the hill.

VP--Rumor on hill is $6.7b.

P--How about our debt limit?

Need for security on figure.

Sec Def--We need to cancel deactivation etc if 7/15 activations.

Legislative probs discussed.

Acheson--As far as troops concerned only 2 weeks difference. Method--early next week decide are we going forward with a program. Indicate points to cabinet. Then prepare finished program. Then authorize carrying out program. Get in touch with allies at a real high level. Amb called back and informed. Consultations with cong leaders. Speech week after next. Then proceed with various steps. This only gives a month before call up. Shows US is moving. JCS will have to prepare by Wed a timetable of mil actions. P will talk about pressing other bills ASAP.

Dillon--P should mention Civil Defense.

Ellis/4/ explained status of CD legislation.

Get an estimate of what.

P--We must avoid scaring off our allies.

Dulles--We may be in for a long siege.

I made point that decision should not be taken on basis K will back down--We must be prepared to move on.

NSC Wed or Thurs next week.

Check latest NIE/5/ on statements re USSR reactions to our increase in strength.

Washington, July 14, 1961.

TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, CIA

SUBJECT
Berlin

In preparation for the National Security Council meeting on Wednesday, July 19, the following are requested:

1. The Secretary of State, as Chairman of the Steering Committee of the Inter-Departmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin, is requested to prepare a report evaluating two alternative courses of action from the standpoint of their effect on our international political objectives, with DOD contributing an evaluation of their military implications:

(a) A request, about 2-3 weeks hence, for $4-5 billion, with necessary taxes, stand-by controls, other legislation, and Declaration of National Emergency.

(b) An immediate request for $1-$1.5 billion, without controls, taxes, etc., and a further request later, if necessary.

This evaluation should include an estimate of the effect of each course of action upon (i) our fighting capabilities (to be supplied by DOD), (ii) Soviet intentions, (iii) allied unity, (iv) prospects for foreign aid. It should also include a discussion of the tactics vis-a-vis our allies that would be appropriate to each of these courses of action.

2. The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury, is requested to prepare a report on:

(a) The economic sanctions that we will now ask our allies to be ready to apply if access is blocked, and the tactics that we will now use in seeking allied agreement to these preparations.

(b) Likely allied reactions to this U.S. approach and the compensatory measures that we should be prepared to adopt in order to secure allied agreement.

The Director, CIA is requested to provide an estimate of the likely effect of each sanction upon the Bloc, from both an economic and a strategic standpoint, and the probable impact on Soviet intentions. The estimate will include three alternatives: sanctions against East Germany only, the Soviet Bloc, and all of the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

3. The Secretary of Defense is requested to present a report concerning:

(a) A military operations plan for use in event our access to Berlin is blocked.

(b) The force contributions that we would need from our allies and the preparations that they would have to mount beforehand in order to make these contributions. The Department of State is requested to provide, as part of this DOD report or separately, an evaluation of the likelihood of these allied military contributions and preparations.

4. The Secretary of State is requested to prepare a political timetable which will suggest:

(a) What the timing of various deterrent measures should be before the signing of a treaty;

(b) What further measures should be adopted after the signing of a treaty and before any blocking of our access, what posture the Western powers should adopt toward the signing of a treaty, and what dealings they should have with East German personnel who may appear along the access routes after the signing of a treaty;

(c) What the timing should be of economic, political, and military pressures on the Bloc after blocking of our access;

(d) The timing and nature of our negotiating positions at each of the stages indicated above.

5. The Special Counsel to the President will supervise the preparation of a report on necessary orders, proclamations, and legislation for program 1(a).

McGeorge Bundy/2/

Washington, July 14, 1961./2/

SUBJECT
Meeting of the Inter-Departmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin to Discuss Compliance with NSC Directive No. 59/3/

[Here follows an extensive list of participants.]

Mr. Johnson said that the group should decide on the papers to be prepared for the President by the afternoon of Tuesday, July 18, for perusal before the NSC meeting called for July 19, in line with NSC Directive No. 59. He suggested that the economic papers be prepared under a few general divisions, showing:

(1) What we propose ourselves.

(2) The effects on our economy.

(3) The effects of economic sanctions on:

(a) The GDR.

(b) The Soviet Bloc.

(c) The Sino-Soviet Bloc.

(4) What we expect our Allies to do, in specific terms.

(5) The limitations and conditions which our Allies might impose, and what they will probably ask in return.

Finally, the CIA should estimate the results of the foregoing actions on the Bloc in terms of:

(1) Economic effects.

(2) Strategic effects.

(3) Probable reactions.

Mr. Amory/4/ felt that the economic papers might include the following sections:

(1) Unilateral actions by the United States.

(2) Actions by NATO and Japan.

(3) The effects if there was total agreement by NATO and Japan. He suggested that perhaps on July 18 the group could discuss the effects if there was only partial success with NATO and Japan.

Mr. Johnson said that the Departments of State and the Treasury would work jointly on the paper called for in paragraph 2. There was much material available which would be useful. He understood that the actions contemplated were to take place after the stoppage of access, and hence were to be the strongest possible measures. The actions considered were to be those handled by the civilian agencies of our government--that is, they were to stop short of a total blockade. He hoped that the economic paper could be a maximum of 7 or 8 pages, and be a qualitative statement rather than statistical tables.

Mr. Fowler raised the point whether the measures were being thought of in terms of short or long duration. It was the consensus of the group that some effort should be made to estimate the results in terms of time, and that we should be prepared to continue the measures for some time. Mr. Fowler added that he thought we should also look into the possibilities of alternative sources of supplies for our Allies.

Mr. Johnson asked that the Department of Defense prepare an evaluation of the courses of action under paragraphs 3(a) and (b) in Directive 59. This should include an estimate of the military capabilities of our Allies.

Mr. Fowler wondered about spelling out the tax and stand-by controls program of paragraph 1 (a) of the Directive. It was felt that this was within the purview of Mr. Sorensen, under paragraph 5, and that if he prepared a paper on the matter a copy would be supplied to State.

There was discussion of the term "military operations" as used in the Directive. Those who had been present at the NSC meeting/5/ agreed that it meant "concept of operations", and should include consideration of such things as the nature of the probe to be undertaken, the possibility of escalation, reactions to interference with ground access and air access, the possibility of access after stoppage, and the quality or our maximum readiness by January 15, 1962, and of troops being deployed by January 1, 1962, with and without a declaration of national emergency.

Mr. Johnson said that target dates should not become fixed, but should rather be used as points of reference since our actions must be related to Soviet moves.

Mr. Nitze raised several exemplary questions which he felt had to be posed to the President: If access to Berlin is blocked, do we undertake an airlift? Do we immediately probe? What if the probe is turned back? What is the capability of the military force available? In that connection, if our Allies contribute all they are supposed to, our capabilities will be increased accordingly. There was discussion of the help we could expect from the Allies. It was agreed that we should endeavor to have them make efforts at least comparable to ours, and that their contributions would be greater as our efforts increased. Mr. Hillenbrand pointed out that the German contribution might vary depending on the election results. General Gray/6/ noted that it was not clear whether the Allied contributions would be scheduled for January 1, 1962, or for March 1, 1962. It was agreed that there was a difference between what the military needed, and what it might be possible to get from our Allies. Mr. Johnson felt it best to establish our needs, and use that as a point of departure. "Needs" was perhaps not the best word. It should be the expected effort on the part of our Allies comparable to our own. There was considerable, though preliminary and inconclusive, discussion of the size and efficiency of the military forces which we might realistically expect from our Allies by January 1, 1962 and by March 1, 1962, and of the objectives which might be assigned to those forces.

Mr. Hillenbrand raised the question whether the Allied contribution was related directly to the operation under paragraph 3(a). Mr. Nitze said he understood Mr. Acheson's view to be that a probe should be undertaken consisting of 2 American divisions moving down the Autobahn to a location a few miles inside the East German border, and there establishing a defensive position and waiting to determine the Soviet reaction. If negotiations were not forthcoming, and they were not attacked, they should proceed further. If attacked, war would result. The immediate ground actions would depend on the forces available at the time. Others felt that the existing probe plan, envisaging a tripartite combat team of the three Allied powers, should be adhered to. The inclusion of West German forces would pose a legal problem. It was felt that anything more than a probe along the Autobahn by forces legally entitled to use it would be an act of war. But if the probing forces were so constituted, the action of the Soviets and East Germans in throwing it back would be the act of war, since we have the right to use the road within certain procedural limitations.

General Gray said the effort has to be related to timing. Obviously one could not commit all of NATO to the Berlin probe. This had to be readjusted in Europe within NATO's strategic planning. NATO powers were very far behind in fulfillment of their commitments. The picture was that in the case of all-out war we were only expecting to hold out for a few days East of the Rhine, with nuclear weapons. Without nuclear use, our capability was even lower.

Mr. Johnson underscored that all this needed saying.

The political timetable called for in paragraph 4 of the Directive would be supplied by State.

Mr. Johnson then asked the agencies to contribute their papers in 40 copies in time so that the whole package could be presented to the President by 4:30 Tuesday afternoon, the 18th. The Secretary would be at work on Sunday, July 16th, and would appreciate seeing rough drafts of the contributions.

At the conclusion of the meeting, General Gray distributed copies of a draft outline for a "United States Operational Plan on Berlin"/7/ which officers of the Department of Defense concerned with the problem felt it might be desirable to prepare.

Washington, July 15, 1961.

PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Menshikov
Assistant Secretary Nitze

Ambassador Menshikov began the conversation by saying that he was returning to Russia for a vacation. He would have four weeks net not including travel time. I said I envied him. It looked to me as though people worked less hard in the Communists' world than here. He said that I would see from their twenty-year plan that fifteen years from now, the Communists would have to work very little indeed, but they would have to do some work.

The conversation then turned to the question of relative loyalties to the nation or to the party. He said his responsibilities were almost entirely to the state; and, though a member of the party, that he did not even invite members of the American Communist party to his receptions. I said I could well understand that this might present no conflict with his instructions. He then said that there was much disagreement and arguing within the Communist system between factory managers, Government officials, etc., and that in most of these arguments the question of whether or not one was a member of the party did not enter in. He agreed, however, that the general line was set by the party and governed policies in other areas such as the Government.

He then turned the subject to Berlin and said he hoped we did not misunderstand his Government's position on Berlin. In reply, I said I thought Mr. Khrushchev had made himself eminently clear. My concern was that a basic miscalculation had already been made by him.

Menshikov said that the important thing was for the USSR and the U.S. to understand each other and to agree. In the Geneva negotiations about a test ban, we were proposing an administrator who would impose our will upon the Soviet Union. This they couldn't agree to. Now we were proposing to veto any proposal in the UN to adapt the UN administration to the Troika principle. I said I thought our differences went back to a basic philosophical point--it was our belief that one could find people who could objectively interpret facts and the provisions of a treaty or agreement. We thought people could be found who would place this obligation above loyalty to the interests of a particular nation or a particular party. Evidently, Mr. Khrushchev did not believe this possible.

The Ambassador referred to Hammarskjold and the Congo as an example of a so-called neutral administrator who had gone beyond the terms of his authority. I said we did not consider that Hammarskjold had gone beyond the terms of his authority. We had been cross with Hammarskjold because he had not more forcefully executed the authority which he had. Any objective administrator would undoubtedly cause both of us to be unhappy with him, but we were prepared for neutral administrators to be in control of agreed functions. Evidently the Soviet Union did not agree to this. If so, it was hard to see how one could get away from what would amount to self-inspection.

I then asked the Ambassador what he thought it was we didn't understand about their Berlin proposal. The Ambassador said that Mr. Khrushchev had offered to discuss with us a German peace treaty. He had said that they had their proposals for a treaty, we should present ours. It was only if we refused negotiations or could not agree upon a treaty that they would be forced to go ahead with theirs. I said that I had carefully read the Soviet proposal and was aware of these provisions, but what in effect they were proposing was that we sit down and negotiate under threat that if we could not agree with the Soviet Union, they would sign a unilateral treaty with their puppet Ulbricht and then cut off our rights in Berlin. This threat had now been coupled with threats of nuclear destruction if we attempted thereafter to exercise those rights. Mr. Khrushchev had pointed out to Ambassador Roberts that six nuclear weapons could destroy the U.K. and eight could destroy France./2/ We can't agree to negotiating under such threats. The similarity to Hitler's actions in 1938 has been drawn by some.

I went on to say that I had supervised 500 engineers and technicians in assessing the effects of the atomic weapons dropped at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. I had followed studies on nuclear effects since that time. The computations were not difficult to make of what would happen to Russia if a thousand megatons were dropped, if 7,000 megatons were dropped, if 10,000 megatons, or even if 20,000 megatons were dropped. It was easy to refer to such facts, but dangerous. It could lead to a point of no return in our relations.

The Ambassador said that he believed we misinterpreted what they have said about Berlin. They propose no action against a free city of Berlin. I said this is not what Mr. Khrushchev has indicated and certainly not what Ulbricht has said. We quite recognize that they may delay such action but the threat would still be there. The Ambassador then said that we must realize that they firmly intend to sign the peace treaty. I said I fully understood that this was their intention, but they should realize what this may mean before they do it.

The Ambassador said the reason they thought a peace treaty now was essential because things were going on in Germany which must be stopped. There was a revanchist group in Germany which was arming Germany and seeking thermonuclear weapons. I said that the Germans were by and large interested in their tremendous economic prosperity, and that there was little drive to build up military strength in Germany. It was Soviet recurrent threats to Berlin which was forcing German rearmament. If they signed a peace treaty, this would push the NATO alliance closer together and would have the effect of increasing the pace of German armament. They would be forcing the U.S. and Germany closer together and, not only the U.S. and Germany, but also all other NATO allies. The similarity of Khrushchev's threats to those of Hitler would not be lost. I pointed out that it was the Soviet Union that was responsible for having taken the initiative in the Berlin situation. I recalled that I had already said that I believed they had miscalculated. There was, however, still time for them to change. It is they who have increased their defense budget by one-third. They talk of countering de Gaulle's one division being returned from Algeria with ten divisions of tanks deployed across the Autobahn. Certainly this can be done but it won't protect the heart land of Russia.

I recalled that Mr. Khrushchev in his speech of denunciation of Stalin/3/ had accused Stalin in the later thirties of having mishandled the German problem so as to bring a threat to the physical base of Communism. I said I should think Mr. Khrushchev would worry about similarities to today's situation.

The Ambassador said he was present when Mr. Khrushchev made his speech. He did not remember that Mr. Khrushchev had emphasized the points I was making. In any case, the situation was now different than that which existed in the late thirties.

I went back to the point that the initiative on Berlin was theirs, and it was time for their side to reconsider. They know what our requirements are in regard to Berlin and Germany, if they want to negotiate seriously about Germany, they could withdraw their threat of unilateral action to terminate our rights and send a special emissary to negotiate with us. It is hard to see how we could very well negotiate under Hitler-like threats of nuclear destruction. The Ambassador said that we would have to shoot first in a Berlin crisis. I said, no, we will exercise our rights. If you shoot to prevent that, we will have to shoot back.

The Ambassador said what is it you want in Germany. I said we want an all German solution based on the right of self-determination. The Ambassador said there are many ways of exercising self-determination. Popular support can be shown in other ways than by free elections. He said, "Did Syngman Rhee really have popular support?" I said, yes, in my opinion, he did for a long period have popular support. I said I thought President Ayub in Pakistan had popular support despite the fact Mr. Khrushchev had called him and the Shah "rotten". I said Ayub is not rotten; on the other hand, Ulbricht is rotten. He has the support of hardly 15% of his people.

The Ambassador said that this was all very pessimistic with my talk of miscalculation and points of no return. I said to the contrary, it is you who have taken the initiative with respect to Berlin and there is still time for Mr. Khrushchev to change his course. I had always thought the Communists made a virtue of being realists. If, as you say, Mr. Khrushchev is worried about Germany, he must see that what he is doing is driving the West together including Germany. If he signs a unilateral peace treaty with his puppet, he will merely accelerate that process. By that time he may have started a process that neither he nor we will subsequently be able fully to control. His initiative is obviously not working out the way you say he hoped it would. Now is the time to change. When you go back to Moscow, I hope you do all you can to get this straightened out.

At one point I said that one of the principal lines of policy in the early months of the Kennedy Administration had been to cool down East-West tensions and to create a situation in which meaningful talks with the Soviet Union would be possible. Menshikov said he recognized that this had been true and noted that the proposal for a meeting between President Kennedy and Mr. Khrushchev had been Mr. Kennedy's initiative. He said he thought that talk had been useful but that further talks were necessary. One could not accomplish everything in one or two days. I reiterated the point that it was Mr. Khrushchev who had taken the initiative in renewing the crisis over Berlin, and that this had not been our initiative. Menshikov replied that there had been various developments, including our mistake over Cuba, but that the principal factor which had caused Mr. Khrushchev to take the position that he had taken on Berlin was our indication of an unwillingness to negotiate a German peace treaty with them.

At another point in the discussion, Mr. Menshikov discussed their ideas of a free city of Berlin. He said that the East Germans would guarantee rights of access to Berlin and that the Russians would also guarantee them. They would not object to the presence of token Western military forces in Berlin. The question at issue was what the purpose of these forces in Berlin was to be. If they were to be the symbol of a continuation of occupation rights, the Soviet Union could not agree. The occupation had lasted for 16 years and must be terminated. If the purpose of the continued presence of the troops was to symbolize the guarantees that Berlin would remain a free city, that would be alright, but under those circumstances Russian troops should participate. I pointed out that there originally had been a special regime for the entire city of Berlin; that the Soviet Union having turned over its sector to the East Germans now proposed a regime to be applicable only to the Western sectors similar to the one which they had violated for the whole city. I said that we could not agree to this.

Mr. Menshikov referred to the subversive activities which were being conducted from West Berlin. I pointed out that subversive activities were being conducted by the Communists in many areas of the world. If they wanted to negotiate about the general problem, this would be possible, but they had made it clear in previous discussions how difficult it would be for them to put a general halt to such activities.

Mr. Menshikov also referred to the importance of settling boundary questions once and for all. I indicated that the problem of the Oder-Neisse line might be soluble if part of a more general settlement. Menshikov indicated that more was involved than that.

Menshikov said the East Germans should talk with the West Germans. Two regimes existed. The problem of a German settlement was their problem. I replied that I had read Ulbricht's proposals for a settlement some two years ago, and that it was evident that what he wished to negotiate was a division of East and West Germany, not a reunification.

Menshikov repeatedly drew the analogy between our having signed a Japanese peace treaty without Soviet agreement and their proposal for a German peace treaty without our agreement. He said that at that time we had felt a Japanese peace treaty to be necessary. Now they felt a German peace treaty to be necessary. He said we had gotten away with our unilateral Japanese peace treaty because we then had a monopoly of atomic weapons. I pointed out that the two situations were not analagous, and furthermore that even though they now had atomic weapons, they did not have a monopoly--there were now all the dangers of a two-sided situation.

The Ambassador thanked me for having invited him to lunch. I wished him success on his mission.

Paul H. Nitze/4/

Washington, July 17, 1961.

OUTLINE ON GERMANY AND BERLIN

A. The vital interests of the U.S. (i.e. interests which involve decisions as to war) are engaged in the German-Berlin problem at the following points:

1. Presence and security of Western forces in West Berlin

2. The security and viability of West Berlin

3. Physical access to West Berlin

4. The security of the Federal Republic of Germany against attacks from the East

B. The U.S. also has important political interests and aims in Germany which have not yet been realized. These may be summarized as the application to all of Germany of the principle of self-determination and the intimate association of a unified Germany with the West. If there must be, on practical grounds, a choice between a unified Germany and a Western Germany integrated into Western Europe, the U.S. interests lie with the latter choice.

C. There are aspects of the German-Berlin situation which are not politically acceptable and are not likely to be changed in the near future, aspects which are not the occasion for a resort to force by the West. Among these are: (a) the de facto division of Germany, and (b) the de facto absorption of East Berlin into East Germany.

D. Certain elements of the German-Berlin problem are of little national interest to the U.S. and could be conceded if it becomes valuable to do so, for example, the recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as a German-Polish frontier.

While precise Soviet objectives within any specific time period must be somewhat speculative, the resumption of Soviet pressures against the status quo in Germany and Berlin appear to be aimed at:

A. The actual and formal consolidation of the Communist position in Eastern Europe and East Germany: Khrushchev has reason to be anxious about his situation in East Germany and the longer run prospect in such countries as Poland.

B. A permanent freezing of the division of Germany.

C. Political steps to meet what might be a growing Russian concern about the revival and rearming of the Federal Republic of Germany.

D. A significant dilution of the Western position in West Berlin, looking toward its absorption into a Communist East Germany.

E. The weakening or dissolution of NATO.

F. A blow to Western, and, more particularly, U.S. prestige as a part of the general strategy of the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

Note: The priorities Khrushchev might attach to the above are also related to factors of timing, for example, he may be seriously concerned with A., B., C. and D. as matters for immediate attention, but may look upon E. and F. as useful by-products if they could be achieved.

The central political problem is to protect U.S. vital interests, I. A. above, without war if possible and to put the U.S. and the West in the best possible position if war should become necessary. This will require:

A. Action on a broad front to convince Khrushchev of U.S. and Western determination to defend these vital interests at all costs.

B. National unity based not only upon a clear public recognition of the issues involved but also upon confidence that every reasonable step has been taken to defend vital interests by measures short of war.

C. Allied unity, based upon allied recognition of their own vital interests--reaching beyond a readiness to follow the leader. Further, allied unity must also rest upon confidence that the allied position is reasonable and that the aggressor is forcing the issue beyond a tolerable point.

D. Maximum support of world public opinion to make aggressive moves by Khrushchev as costly as possible in other areas in which he is interested.

Washington, July 17, 1961.

PRESENT WERE
The President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Treasury, Attorney General, General Taylor, Mr. Sorensen, Mr. Bundy

The Secretary of State opened the meeting by stating the general view of his Department that we should begin on a low key, if possible. At the same time, necessary military strength should be built up and the Department would concur in a budgetary increase of $4.3 billion and a call of National Guard and Reserve units if needed.

Secretary McNamara made it clear that a declaration of national emergency was not needed before September 1st or October 1st, although there would be a probable need for a call of air units before the end of the year. After prolonged discussion of the components of the $4.3 billion requested, it appeared that immediately needed actions, for procurement, for Civil Defense, for the build-up of the three STRAF divisions, the possible provision of 64,000 additional men to fill out U.S. NATO forces, and other similar missions, would produce a budgetary request of $3 billion, while the cost of large-scale troop calls under a declaration of national emergency would amount to about a billion and a half more (the difference between this total of $4.5 billion and the total of $4.3 billion with which the discussion began is explained by $200 million for Civil Defense). There appeared to be general agreement that there need be no present request for a declaration of national emergency, and it appeared to be the dominant judgment that a budgetary request for $3 billion would be preferable to a request for $4.5 billion, since the additional money for Reserve units could undoubtedly be obtained after they were called up. Secretary McNamara's preference went the other way, and it was agreed that this question might usefully be discussed by the President with certain leaders of the Armed Forces committees of the Congress. It was also agreed that the President would review these questions of military policy with the Joint Chiefs of Staff before final decision was made.

The Secretary of State said that the second large item for discussion on Wednesday would be the planning of the negotiating position of the U.S., preparatory to discussion with our Allies. What negotiating position should we have, and how should its development be timed? On this point, discussion was inconclusive, and it was agreed that decision should await presentation of the "political scenario" on Wednesday. The Secretary indicated his view that the opening posture of the West should be an emphasis upon self-determination, and that probably we would wish to spin out the discussion in order to make it difficult for Mr. Khrushchev to proceed with concrete steps at an early stage.

The third point which the Secretary brought forward was the question of our eventual position toward the DDR. The President made plain his belief that since we shall have to talk with representatives of that regime at some stage, we should not now take so strong a line that these later talks will look like a defeat. Our rights in Berlin certainly cannot be discussed, but there can at an appropriate stage be a discussion of the way in which our rights are to be maintained without impairment. The Secretary mentioned the possibility of proceeding first through conversations in which the West and East Germans talk together (a notion which has echoes in Khrushchev's Vienna Aide-Memoire),/2/ but no decisions, even of a preliminary sort, were reached, except that discussion of the "political scenario" might be lengthy and should be continued after the NSC meeting of the steering group if necessary.

Secretary McNamara made clear that the Defense Department would not be able to present a military operations plan on July 19. It would, on the other hand, have a shopping list of desired allied military actions. The State Department will present a similar paper on U.S. and allied steps in a campaign of economic warfare. The President made clear his concern for a strong U.S. team on this subject, mentioning among others the name of Milo Perkins, a name which Secretary Dillon agreed to check up on.

General Taylor asked about propaganda proposals, and it was agreed that concrete plans in this area should be developed by USIA and submitted through the Department of State. One fairly desirable event is a plebiscite in West Berlin, probably after the German election--though the President was not convinced on this matter of timing.

The President's speech had initially been planned for Monday, July 24, but Mr. Sorensen indicated that this seemed somewhat too early, and it was agreed that he would suggest a definite date at the NSC meeting on Wednesday, July 19.

It was agreed that many items of political, economic and military negotiation should be ready for serious discussion at the meeting of Foreign Ministers in early August./3/ State Department will send an expert team sometime in the week of July 24, and on this team Defense and Treasury will be represented. Meanwhile, Secretary McNamara proposes to see General Norstad in Paris over the coming week end, in order to get his views and to work out a strong agreed position if possible.

/3/At a meeting on July 13 with Alphand and Caccia, Rusk had proposed a tripartite Foreign Ministers meeting to take place in Paris at the beginning of August. (Memorandum of conversation; Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/7-1361) At another meeting on July 17 the British and French agreed to the meeting. (Memorandum of conversation; ibid., 396.1/7-1761)

The President ended the meeting with a discussion of organizational framework of work on Berlin. At the lower level is the interdepartmental coordinating group under Mr. Foy Kohler. This committee will be responsible for day-to-day operations and detailed planning. It will report to the President through a steering group under the Secretary of State as Chairman, with the following additional membership:

Secretary of Defense

Secretary of the Treasury

The Attorney General

Director, CIA

Director, USIA

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

General Taylor

Mr. Bundy

The President's desire is that this group should meet once a week on Monday afternoons. Among its duties will be the clarification of items to be discussed at the fortnightly Thursday meetings of the National Security Council.

The President asked the Secretary of State whether there could be a similar interdepartmental working coordinating group for Laos and Viet-Nam reporting through the same steering committee. The Secretary replied that there were real difficulties here in the internal organization of the Department of State, but it was agreed that he would present a recommendation on this organizational question at the NSC meeting on Wednesday, July 19. It was agreed that fundamental responsibility for supervision and follow-up would rest with the steering group, initially with respect to Berlin, and if assignment is later given, with respect to Southeast Asia as well.

McGeorge Bundy

Despite Secretary of State Rusk's personal appeal to the NATO Allies for a quick discussion of the draft replies to the June 4, 1961, Soviet aide-mémoire, the North Atlantic Council was unable to consider them until July 12, and the United States therefore, agreed to delay delivery of the notes. Following NAC discussion (summarized in Polto 48 from Paris, July 12; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-1261), the United States, France, and the United Kingdom resolved some remaining textual differences and delivered their notes on July 17. For text of the French note, see La Documentation Francaise: Articles et Documents, July 25, 1961; for text of the British note, see Selected Documents on Germany and the Question of Berlin, 1944-1961, Cmd. 1552, London, 1961, pages 448 ff.; for text of the U.S. note, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pages 753-760.

Five days earlier, on July 12, the German Embassy in Moscow had delivered the Federal Republic's reply to the February 17 Soviet aide-mémoire. For the text in English, see ibid., pages 750-753. For the German text and German texts of all the documents mentioned above, see Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, Band 6, Zweiter Halbband, pages 1277-1230, 1248-1260, and 1262-1264. On July 18 the four Western Ambassadors in Moscow met to compare notes on Gromyko's response at the time of the delivery of the replies. In each case Gromyko ended the conversation by saying that it was up to the West whether the Berlin problem was exacerbated or settled by agreement, and all four Ambassadors agreed that in the absence of some settlement, Khrushchev would conclude a separate treaty. (Telegram 179 from Moscow, July 18; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-1861)

On July 19 President Kennedy, at the beginning of his press conference, read parts of the statement which had been agreed on July 4 (see footnote 3, Document 55), and released the full text. For a transcript of the press conference and text of the statement, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pages 513-523. The statement is also printed in Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pages 760-762.