Vienna, June 4, 1961, 10:15 a.m.

SUBJECT
Meeting Between The President and Chairman Khrushchev in Vienna

PARTICIPANTS

US
The President
The Secretary
Ambassador Bohlen
Ambassador Thompson
EUR--Mr. Kohler
D--Mr. Akalovsky (interpreting)

USSR
Chairman Khrushchev
Foreign Minister Gromyko
Mr. Dobrynin, Chief, American Countries Division, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ambassador Menshikov
Mr. Sukhodrev, Interpreter, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs

[Here follows discussion of Laos and disarmament.]

Turning to the question of Germany, Mr. Khrushchev said that he wanted to set forth his position. He said that he understands that this will affect the relations between our two countries to a great extent and even more so if the US were to misunderstand the Soviet position. Conversely, if the US understood the Soviet position correctly our two countries would be brought closer together rather than be divided. Sixteen years have passed since World War II. The USSR lost 20 million people in that War and many of its areas were devastated. Now Germany, the country which unleashed World War II, has again acquired military power and has assumed a predominant position in NATO. Its generals hold high offices in that organization. This constitutes a threat of World War III which would be even more devastating than World War II. The USSR believes that a line should be drawn under World War II. There is no explanation why there is no peace treaty 16 years after the war. This is why the USSR has suggested that a peace conference be convened. In this connection, the USSR proceeds from the actual state of affairs, namely, that two German States exist. Our own wishes or efforts notwithstanding, a united Germany is not practical because the Germans themselves do not want it. No delay in the matter of signing a peace treaty is justifiable and only West German militarists gain from such a delay. A peace treaty would not prejudice the interests of the US, the UK, or France; on the contrary, these interests would be best served by a peace treaty. The present situation looks as if the US opposes a peace treaty while the USSR wants it. Mr. Khrushchev said that he wanted the President to understand him correctly. He would like to reach agreement with the President--and he said he wanted to emphasize the words "with you"--on this question. If the US should fail to understand this desire the USSR will sign a peace treaty alone. The USSR will sign a peace treaty with the GDR and with the FRG if the latter so desires. If not, a peace treaty will be signed with the GDR alone. Then the state of war will cease and all commitments stemming from Germany's surrender will become invalid. This would include all institutions, occupation rights, and access to Berlin, including the corridors. A free city of West Berlin will be established and there will be no blockade or interference in the internal affairs of the city. West Berlin should have a clearly defined status. If the US desires, guarantees could be given to ensure non-interference and the city's ties with the outside world. If the US wants to leave its troops in West Berlin, that would be acceptable under certain conditions; however, the Soviet Union believes that in that case Soviet troops should be there too. Likewise, the USSR would be agreeable to having neutral troops stationed in Berlin. UN guarantees would be acceptable as well. The USSR would be prepared to join the US in ensuring all the conditions necessary for preserving what the West calls West Berlin's freedom. However, if the US rejects this proposal--and the USSR will regard such an action as having been made under the pressure of Adenauer--the USSR will sign a peace treaty unilaterally and all rights of access to Berlin will expire because the state of war will cease to exist.

The President said that first of all he wanted to express his appreciation of the fact that Mr. Khrushchev had set forth his views in such a frank manner. At the same time the discussion here is not only about the legal situation but also about the practical facts which affect very much our national security. Here, we are not talking about Laos. This matter is of greatest concern to the US. We are in Berlin not because of someone's sufferance. We fought our way there, although our casualties may have been not as high as the USSR's. We are in Berlin not by agreement of East Germans but by contractual rights. This is an area where every President of the US since World War II has been committed by treaty and other contractual rights and where every President has reaffirmed his faithfulness to his obligations. If we were expelled from that area and if we accepted the loss of our rights no one would have any confidence in US commitments and pledges. US national security is involved in this matter because if we were to accept the Soviet proposal US commitments would be regarded as a mere scrap of paper. West Europe is vital to our national security and we have supported it in two wars. If we were to leave West Berlin Europe would be abandoned as well. So when we are talking about West Berlin we are also talking about West Europe. The President said he would like to see the relations between our two countries develop in a favorable direction so that some arrangement could be found. Mr. Khrushchev seems to agree that the ratios of power today are equal. Therefore, it is difficult to understand why a country with high achievements in such areas as outer space and economic progress should now suggest that we leave an area where we have vital interests. How can the US agree to East Germany's preventing it from exercising our rights we had won by war? The United States cannot accept an ultimatum. Our leaving West Berlin would result in the US becoming isolated. The President emphasized that he is not President of the US to preside over isolation of his country just as Mr. Khrushchev, as leader of the USSR, would not want to see his own country isolated.

Mr. Khrushchev interjected that he understood this to mean that the President did not want a peace treaty. He said that the President's statement about US national security should mean that the US might wish to go to Moscow because that too would, of course, improve its position.

The President replied that the US was not asking to go anywhere; we were not talking about the US going to Moscow or of the USSR going to New York. What we are talking about is that we are in Berlin and have been there for 15 years. We suggest that we stay there.

The President continued by saying that the US was interested in maintaining its position in Berlin and its rights of access to that city. He said he recognized that the situation there is not a satisfactory one; he also recognized that in the conversations Mr. Khrushchev had had with former President Eisenhower the term "abnormal" had been used to describe that situation./2/ However, because conditions in many areas of the world are not satisfactory today it is not the right time now to change the situation in Berlin and the balance in general. The United States does not wish to effect such a change. The US is not asking the USSR to change its position but it is simply saying that it should not seek to change our position and thus disturb the balance of power. If this balance should change the situation in West Europe as a whole would change and this would be a most serious blow to the US. Mr. Khrushchev would not accept similar loss and we cannot accept it either. The question is not that of a peace treaty with East Germany but rather of other aspects of this proposal which would affect our access to Berlin and our rights there.

Mr. Khrushchev said that he was sorry that he had met with no understanding of the Soviet position. The US is unwilling to normalize the situation in the most dangerous spot in the world. The USSR wants to perform an operation on this sore spot--to eliminate this thorn, this ulcer--without prejudicing the interests of any side, but rather to the satisfaction of all peoples of the world. It wants to do that not by intrigue or threat but by solemnly signing a peace treaty. Now the President says that this action is directed against the interests of the US. Such statement is difficult to understand indeed. No change in existing boundaries is proposed; a peace treaty would only formalize them. The USSR wants a peace treaty because such a treaty would impede those people who want a new war. Revanchists in West Germany will find in a peace treaty a barrier impeding their activities. Today they say that boundaries should be changed. But if a peace treaty is signed there will be no ground for revision of the boundaries. Hitler spoke of Germany's need for Lebensraum to the Urals. Now Hitler's generals, who had helped him in his designs to execute his plans, are high commanders in NATO. This logic cannot be understood and the USSR cannot accept it. Mr. Khrushchev said he was very sorry but he had to assure the President that no force in the world would prevent the USSR from signing a peace treaty. 16 years have passed since World War II and how long should the signing of a peace treaty be delayed? Another 16 years, another 30 years? No further delay is possible or necessary. As far as US losses in the last war are concerned, losses are difficult to measure. Loss of a drop of blood equals the loss of a pint of blood in the minds of those who shed that blood. The US lost thousands and the USSR lost millions, but American mothers mourn their sons just as deeply as Soviet mothers shed tears over the loss of their beloved ones. Mr. Khrushchev said that he himself had lost a son in the last war; Mr. Gromyko lost two brothers, and Mikoyan a son. There is not a single family in the USSR or the leadership of the USSR that did not lose at least one of its members in the war. Mr. Khrushchev continued by saying that he wanted the US to understand correctly the Soviet position. This position is advanced not for the purpose of kindling passions or increasing tensions. The objective is just the opposite--to remove the obstacles that stand in the way of development of our relations and to normalize relations throughout the world. The USSR will sign a peace treaty and the sovereignty of the GDR will be observed. Any violation of that sovereignty will be regarded by the USSR as an act of open aggression against a peace loving country, with all the consequences ensuing therefrom.

The President inquired whether such a peace treaty would block access to Berlin. Mr. Khrushchev said that it would.

The President then said that the US is opposed to a buildup in West Germany that would constitute a threat to the Soviet Union. The decision to sign a peace treaty is a serious one and the USSR should consider it in the light of its national interests. Referring to the question of boundaries, the President said that General de Gaulle had made a statement on this question./3/ This problem has been discussed in the Western world and there is some division of opinion on this matter. However, the US is committed to the defense of Western Europe and has assisted Western Europe in the past. The President said that one of his brothers had been killed in the last war, when the US came to Western Europe's assistance. If the US were driven out of West Berlin by unilateral action, and if we were deprived of our contractual rights by East Germany, then no one would believe the US now or in the future. US commitments would be regarded as a mere scrap of paper. The world situation today is that of change and no one can predict what the evolution will be in such areas as Asia or Africa. Yet what Mr. Khrushchev suggests is to bring about a basic change in the situation overnight and deny us our rights which we share with the other two Western countries. This presents us with a most serious challenge and no one can foresee how serious the consequences might be. The President said it had not been his wish to come here to Vienna to find out not only that a peace treaty would be signed but also that we would be denied our position in West Berlin and our access to that city. In fact, the President said, he had come here in the hope that relations between our two countries could be improved. The President stressed he hoped that Mr. Khrushchev would consider his responsibility toward his country and also consider the responsibility the President of the United States has toward his people. What is discussed here is not only West Berlin; we are talking here about Western Europe and the United States as well.

Mr. Khrushchev replied that he could not understand the President's reference to Western Europe. The USSR does not wish any change; it merely wants to formalize the situation which has resulted from World War II. The fact is that West Germany is in the Western group of nations and the USSR recognizes this. East Germany is an ally of the socialist countries and this should be recognized as a fait accompli. East Germany has new demarcation lines and these lines should become borders. The Polish and Czech borders should be formalized. The position of the GDR should be normalized and her sovereignty ensured. To do all this it is necessary to eliminate the occupation rights in West Berlin. No such rights should exist there. It would be impossible to imagine a situation where the USSR would have signed a peace treaty with the US retaining occupation rights, which are based on the state of war. The US may say that its blood was shed, but the USSR shed blood too and not water.

The President interjected that our rights were based on a four-power agreement. Mr. Khrushchev replied that this was so in the absence of a peace treaty, but said that a peace treaty would end the state of war and those rights would therefore expire.

The President said this meant unilateral abrogation of the four-power agreement by the USSR and emphasized that the US could not accept such an act. Mr. Khrushchev replied that this was not so because the USSR would invite the US to sign a peace treaty and would sign it alone only if the US should refuse to do so. In that event the US could not maintain its rights on the territory of the GDR. The President again referred to the four-power agreement, but Mr. Khrushchev replied that the USSR considered all of Berlin to be GDR territory. The President stated this may be Soviet view but not ours. If the USSR transfers its rights, that is a matter for its own decision; however, it is an altogether different matter for the USSR to give [away?] our rights which we have on contractual basis. He said that the USSR could not break the agreement and give US rights to the GDR. Mr. Khrushchev rejoined by saying that this was a familiar point of view but had no juridical foundation, since the war had ended 16 years ago. In fact, President Roosevelt indicated that troops could be withdrawn after two or two and a half years.

Mr. Khrushchev continued by saying that all the USSR wants is a peace treaty. He could not understand why the US wants Berlin. Does the US want to unleash a war from there? The President as a naval officer and he himself, a civilian although he participated in two wars, know very well that Berlin has no military significance. The President speaks of rights, but what are those rights? They stem from war. If the state of war ends, the rights end too. If a peace treaty is signed US prestige will not be involved, and everybody will understand this. But if the US should maintain its rights after the signing of a peace treaty, that would be a violation of East Germany's sovereignty and of the sovereignty of the socialist camp as a whole. Mr. Khrushchev recalled that President Eisenhower had agreed that the situation in Germany was abnormal. Eisenhower had said that US prestige was involved. Then the possibility of an interim agreement was discussed, an arrangement that would not involve the prestige of our two countries. Perhaps this could serve as a basis for agreement. The USSR is prepared to accept such an arrangement even now. Adenauer says that he wants unification but this is not so. As far as unification in concerned, we should say that the two German governments should meet and decide the question of reunification. A time limit of say 6 months should be set and if there is no agreement we can disavow our responsibilities and then anyone would be free to conclude a peace treaty. This would be a way out and it would resolve this question of prestige, which, Mr. Khrushchev said, he did not really understand. Mr. Khrushchev said that he had hoped that Eisenhower would agree subsequently at the Summit, but the forces which are against improvement of relations between the US and USSR sent the U-2 plane and the USSR decided that in view of the tensions prevailing as a result of that flight this question should not be raised. However, the USSR believes that time for such action is ripe now. Mr. Khrushchev expressed regret on his own behalf and on behalf of his colleagues and allies at not having found understanding on the President's part of the Soviet Union's good intentions and motivations. If only the German question were resolved the road would be clear for the development of our mutual relations. The USSR does not want to infringe upon any-body's interests, but neither would it concede its own interests. Mr. Khrushchev said he believed that the US does not want territorial gains although there is ideological disagreement between the US and the USSR. However, ideological disagreements should not be transferred onto the plane of a devastating war. He said that he was confident that people would be reasonable enough not to act like crusaders in the Middle Ages and would not start cutting each other's throats for ideological reasons. If the United States disagrees with the Soviet proposal it should at least understand the Soviet position. The USSR can no longer delay. It will probably sign a peace treaty at the end of the year, with all the ensuing consequences, i.e., all obligations will come to an end. The status of West Berlin as a free city will be guaranteed and complete non-interference will be ensured. West Berlin will be accessible to all countries with which it will want to maintain ties. However, access will be subject to GDR's control, since communication lines go through its territory. If the US is concerned about what it calls freedom of West Berlin, let us develop guarantees jointly or invite the UN. No nation will understand the US position of perpetuating the state of war with Germany. The USSR will explain its position to the world. It wants to prevent the possibility of war. If the US refuses to sign a peace treaty, the USSR will have no way out other than to sign such a treaty alone. The USSR lost 20 million people in the last war while the US lost 350 thousand.

The President interjected that this was why the US wanted to prevent another war.

Mr. Khrushchev continued by saying that if the US should start a war over Berlin there was nothing the USSR could do about it. However, it would have to be the US to start the war, while the USSR will be defending peace. History will be the judge of our actions. The West has been saying that Khrushchev might miscalculate. But ours is a joint account and each of us must see that there is no miscalculation. If the US wants to start a war over Germany let it be so; perhaps the USSR should sign a peace treaty right away and get over with it. This is what the Pentagon has been wanting. However, Adenauer and Macmillan know very well what war means. If there is any madman who wants war, he should be put in a straight jacket. Nations close to USSR territory know what war will mean for them. The USSR thinks of peace, of friendship, and it is happy with its trade relations with West Germany, France, Great Britain and Italy. It is not by accident that trade between the US and the USSR is still frozen but that is a problem for the US. So this is the Soviet position. The USSR will sign a peace treaty at the end of this year. Mr. Khrushchev concluded by saying that he was confident that common sense would win and peace will prevail.

The President said he recognized that the situation in Germany was abnormal. Germany is divided today. When President Roosevelt talked about the withdrawal of troops he was not able to foresee this situation or the fact that our two countries would be on different sides. The US does not want to precipitate a crisis; it is Mr. Khrushchev who wants to do so by seeking a change in the existing situation. The President then said the US was committed to this area long before he had assumed a position of high government responsibility. Now Mr. Khrushchev suggests a peace treaty at the end of the year, which would deny our rights in that city and our rights of access. Mr. Khrushchev knows very well that Berlin is much more than a city and yet he makes such a suggestion. Is that a way to secure peace?

Mr. Khrushchev replied he did not understand how the signing of a peace treaty could worsen the world situation. Peace is always regarded as something beneficial while the state of war is regarded as something evil.

The President said that the signing of a peace treaty is not a belligerent act. He had not indicated this at all. However, a peace treaty denying us our contractual rights is a belligerent act. The matter of a peace treaty with East Germany is a matter for Mr. Khrushchev's judgment and is not a belligerent act. What is a belligerent act is transfer of our rights to East Germany. West Berlin is not important as a springboard. However, the US is committed to that area and it is so regarded by all the world. If we accepted Mr. Khrushchev's suggestion the world would lose confidence in the US and would not regard it as a serious country. It is an important strategic matter that the world believe the US is a serious country.

Mr. Khrushchev wondered what he should do in these circumstances. He said he believed that US intentions led to nothing good. The USSR would never, under any conditions, accept US rights in West Berlin after a peace treaty had been signed. He said he was absolutely convinced that the peoples of the world would understand such a position. Moreover, the US had deprived the USSR unilaterally of its rights and interests in West Germany, it had deprived the USSR of reparations in West Germany, and it had signed a unilateral peace treaty with Japan. As a result of this latter action the Soviet Union still has no peace treaty with Japan.

The President interjected that Mr. Khrushchev had said to President Eisenhower that he would have signed the treaty. Mr. Khrushchev confirmed this, while Mr. Gromyko said that the fact remained that the US had signed the Japanese peace treaty without the Soviet Union.

Mr. Khrushchev went on to say that the US regarded all this as appropriate, but now it says what the USSR wants to do is immoral. The USSR would like to do it together with the US, but if the US refuses to sign a peace treaty the USSR will do it alone. East Germany will obtain complete sovereignty and all obligations resulting from German surrender will be annulled. The factor of the USSR's prestige should be taken into account. What the US wants is to retain the rights gained after World War II even after a peace treaty has been signed. This is a policy of "I do what I want". The USSR regards East Germany as a completely sovereign state and it will sign a peace treaty with it. Responsibility for violation of that sovereignty will be heavy.

The President said that there is every evidence that our position in Berlin is strongly supported by the people there, and we are committed to that area. Mr. Khrushchev says that we are for a state of war. This is incorrect. It would be well if relations between East Germany and West Germany improved and if the development of US-USSR relations were such as to permit solution of the whole German problem. During his stay in office, Mr. Khrushchev has seen many changes, and changes will go on. But now he wants a peace treaty in six months, an action which would drive us out of Berlin. If we accepted such a proposition we would lose our ties in West Europe and would lose all our friends there. We do not wish to act in a way that would deprive the Soviet Union of its ties in Eastern Europe. Mr. Khrushchev had said that the President was a young man, but, the President continued, he had not assumed office to accept arrangements totally inimical to US interests. The President said he was prepared to discuss any problem but Mr. Khrushchev should take into account our interests just as he says we should take into account his views.

Mr. Khrushchev said that then an interim agreement should be concluded. However, no matter how long a time limit such an agreement were to provide for, the Germans would not agree because no one wishes reunification. An interim agreement would be a formal factor, it would give the semblance of the responsibility for the problem having been turned over to the Germans themselves. If the US does not wish such an arrangement there is no other way but to sign a peace treaty unilaterally. No one can force the US to sign a peace treaty but neither can the US make the Soviet Union accept its claims. Mr. Khrushchev then said that an aide-mémoire on the Berlin question had been prepared so that the US could study the Soviet position and perhaps return to this question at a later date, if it wished to do so./4/

The group then moved to the dining room for lunch.

Vienna, June 4, 1961, 3:15 p.m.

SUBJECT
Vienna Meeting Between The President And Chairman Khrushchev

PARTICIPANTS

The President
D--Mr. Akalovsky (interpreting)

Chairman Khrushchev
Mr. Sukhodrev, Interpreter, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs

After lunch, the President said he wanted to have a few words with the Chairman in private.

The President opened the conversation by saying that he recognized the importance of Berlin and that he hoped that in the interests of the relations between our two countries, which he wanted to improve, Mr. Khrushchev would not present him with a situation so deeply involving our national interest. Of course, he recognized that the decision on East Germany, as far as the USSR was concerned, was with the Chairman. The President continued by saying that evolution is taking place in many areas of the world and no one can predict which course it would take. Therefore, it is most important that decisions be carefully considered. Obviously the Chairman will make his judgment in the light of what he understands to be the best interests of his country. However, the President said, he did want to stress the difference between a peace treaty and the rights of access to Berlin. He reiterated his hope that the relations between the two countries would develop in a way that would avoid direct contact or confrontation between them.

Mr. Khrushchev said he appreciated the frankness of the President's remarks but said that if the President insisted on US rights after the signing of a peace treaty and that if the borders of the GDR--land, air, or sea borders--were violated, they would be defended. The US position is not based on juridical grounds. The US wants to humiliate the USSR and this cannot be accepted. He said that he would not shirk his responsibility and would take any action that he is duty bound to take as Prime Minister. He would be glad if the US were to agree to an interim agreement on Germany and Berlin with a time limit so that the prestige and the interests of the two countries would not be involved or prejudiced. However, he said, he must warn the President that if he envisages any action that might bring about unhappy consequences, force would be met by force. The US should prepare itself for that and the Soviet Union will do the same.

The President inquired whether under an interim arrangement forces in Berlin would remain and access would be free. Mr. Khrushchev replied that would be so for six months. In reply to the President's query whether the forces would then have to be withdrawn, the Chairman replied in the affirmative.

The President then said that either Mr. Khrushchev did not believe that the US was serious or the situation in that area was so unsatisfactory to the Soviet Union that it had to take this drastic action. The President referred to his forthcoming meeting with Macmillan and said the latter would ask what had happened. The President said that he would have to say that he had gained the impression that the USSR was presenting him with the alternative of accepting the Soviet act on Berlin or having a face to face confrontation. He had come here to prevent a confrontation between our two countries and he regretted to leave Vienna with this impression.

Mr. Khrushchev replied that in order to save prestige we could agree that token contingents of troops, including Soviet troops, could be maintained in West Berlin. However, this would be not on the basis of some occupation rights, but on the basis of an agreement registered with the UN. Of course, access would be subject to GDR's control because this is its prerogative. Mr. Khrushchev continued by saying that he wanted peace and that if the US wanted war, that was its problem. It is not the USSR that threatens with war, it is the US.

The President stressed that it was the Chairman, not he, who wanted to force a change.

Mr. Khrushchev replied that a peace treaty would not involve any change in boundaries. In any event, the USSR will have no choice other than to accept the challenge; it must respond and it will respond. The calamities of a war will be shared equally. War will take place only if the US imposes it on the USSR. It is up to the US to decide whether there will be war or peace. This, he said, can be told Macmillan, De Gaulle and Adenauer. The decision to sign a peace treaty is firm and irrevocable and the Soviet Union will sign it in December if the US refuses an interim agreement.

The President concluded the conversation by observing that it would be a cold winter.

London, June 5, 1961, 12:45 p.m.

PRESENT
Prime Minister Macmillan
Foreign Secretary, Mr. de Zulueta
President Kennedy

Lord Home said that the Foreign Office had examined the Soviet Aide-mémoire about Berlin/2/ which Mr. Khrushchev had given to President Kennedy in Vienna. The general effect of this Aide-mémoire on public opinion might be substantial since on the face of it it appeared fairly reasonable. President Kennedy said that this was why he felt it important to consider what answer should be made to the Aide-mémoire. Lord Home suggested that it was desirable to work out as soon as possible an Allied negotiating position. He did not suggest that negotiations should begin at once, but consideration of the Allied position ought to start forthwith. The Prime Minister said that the President was to make a speech in the United States on June 6 and this might be an opportunity for restating the West's moral position as protectors of the people of West Berlin. It would be useful to have such a statement on the record, especially if, as seemed likely, the Aide-mémoire soon became public property. President Kennedy pointed out that any Allied negotiating position should be quadripartitely agreed. The Prime Minister said that the President and he had felt that for the West to offer negotiations now might seem to be a sign of weakness. It might be better to try to get Laos settled first. The Foreign Secretary agreed that this might be a helpful line. The President said that it would be of help to him if the United Kingdom could draft a possible reply to the Aide-mémoire which he could consider together with other suggestions. The Prime Minister agreed that the United Kingdom would try to prepare such a draft and said that he felt that in this a restatement of the West's moral position would be of value. The President pointed out that the West's moral position rested on the defense of the people of West Berlin and he had wondered whether in this connection a suggestion for a plebiscite to determine the wishes of the West Berliners might have some public appeal. Lord Home suggested that the idea of a plebiscite had been used rather frequently in the past and might not be thought to be a serious contribution. This idea should be studied; it would, however, seem unwise for the West to become committed to holding a plebiscite.

The Prime Minister asked if it was the President's impression that Mr. Khrushchev proposed to summon his Peace Conference immediately. President Kennedy said that he could not be sure. His impression was that Mr. Khrushchev was most likely to hold his hand until the Party Congress in October at which time he might say that he had put his proposals for Berlin to President Kennedy in June and had had no answer.

Lord Home suggested that it would be impossible in any case to hold negotiations before the West German elections. He was not sure whether or not it would be wise now to offer to negotiate in the autumn. In any case, negotiations should not be about Berlin only, but should be about "the problem of Germany and Berlin." It would be difficult to make an entirely negative reply to the Soviet Aide-mémoire. The West should perhaps respond in some way; this might involve agreeing to negotiate or putting forward counter proposals about Berlin. The Prime Minister suggested that work should begin at once on the nature of any counter proposals. Lord Home agreed but was not hopeful that any satisfactory counter proposals could be worked out. The Prime Minister said that one possibility might be to try to negotiate something for West Berlin which looked good at least on paper and then to prepare to react against any attempt to overturn such a settlement by physical attack. President Kennedy said that the difficulty about this approach would be to say what the West would gain from such an arrangement. There was a danger of the West appearing to have been defeated. Lord Home suggested that the Soviet proposal that their troops should be stationed in Berlin together with those of the Western powers might not be essential to the Russians. There might also be some possibility of exploiting the Soviet suggestion of a guarantee of "unobstructed contacts" to protect the West Berliners. The idea of a United Nations presence might also be used. The President asked what the real objections would be to such an arrangement. Lord Home said that any guarantees would in fact only be effective if they were given by countries which were prepared to act to uphold them if necessary. But in a sense this was already the position of the Western rights. President Kennedy pointed out that on this basis the West would have lost their rights of occupation in Berlin. He feared that the Russians would insist on their troops being present in West Berlin. In addition, the Soviet plan would involve Western recognition of the D.D.R. The Prime Minister agreed and said that after such a settlement had been reached, the next step might be for the D.D.R. to say that the existence of West Berlin was intolerable to them. West Berlin would then become a Danzig and the West would have to go to war on that. However, the real situation might be no worse than it was already. The difficulty was that meanwhile the West would have seemed to have been weakening. The President agreed and asked what advantages the West could claim from such an arrangement. The Prime Minister suggested that the only possible gain would be in the security of the civilian population of West Berlin. At the moment the Allies had no legal rights to insist on unobstructed access for civilian supplies to West Berlin. This position would be theoretically improved if the freedom of civilian traffic were to be guaranteed by treaty.

The President suggested that in fact civilian supplies only went in freely at the moment because of the presence of Allied troops and the threat of Allied intervention if the supplies were obstructed. It would therefore be very difficult to appear to make a good bargain on the basis of a favorable change in the legal position of civilian supplies. The Prime Minister asked if there would not be great difficulties even now if civilian supplies were to be obstructed. The President agreed that there would indeed be great difficulties. He supposed that supplies for the garrison would have to be flown in together with as much civilian supplies as could be carried. The Foreign Secretary inquired about contingency planning. The Prime Minister said that the President and he had felt there should be political contingency planning as well as military. The President agreed and said that he felt that as a practical measure of preparation, military stock piles in Berlin should now be increased. It might be desirable also to decide on the type of military probe which might be necessary and possibly to agree that if this was turned back, an airlift should be organized. Lord Home pointed out that if there was an airlift the West might well be forced into negotiations if only because in the event of a Western aircraft being shot down by the Russians the situation would be brought to the United Nations by someone. It might be more difficult for the West to negotiate in such circumstances. The President said that he was not sure about this. He could see that the Russians might make propaganda capital out of action to maintain Western troops in Berlin but if they shot down an aircraft, they would not be in a good moral position.

The Prime Minister suggested that it might be worth considering telling Mr. Khrushchev that the West had no objection to his making a treaty with the D.D.R. if he wanted to, but that they could not accept any change in the position of West Berlin. Such a position would at least avoid the need for a negotiation with the Russians which could be represented as an attempt to prevent the signature of a peace treaty. Lord Home said that he had been wondering if the West could tell the Russians that they had no objection to the Soviet treaty with the D.D.R. provided the Russians guaranteed Western access on present terms for a period of time.

The Prime Minister said that all these possibilities certainly ought to be examined. The first point was to decide if and how to reply to the Aide-mémoire. Then the West should work out their real political position together with a military contingency plan to correspond to this. He felt that the contingency plans should include an examination of what the West's political response might be if the Russians signed their treaty but did nothing to interrupt the communications of West Berlin or alternatively did interrupt the military or the civilian supplies or both. As regards the political position, an important question was what the West could be said to gain from an agreement with the Russians; the possible gain in the security of civilian supplies was the only advantage which he could immediately see.

President Kennedy said that he was concerned about what he should say in his speech on June 6. It would be very helpful if he could have any British ideas before he left for Washington. One difficulty was that the Federal German Government would have seen the Russian Aide-mémoire but would not have seen the record of the conversations in Vienna in which he had rebutted Mr. Khrushchev's arguments. He therefore felt that he must state clearly the West's obligations to the people of West Berlin and make it plain that the West could not accept that their rights could be unilaterally abrogated. If such unilateral action were to be permitted, no guarantees for the future would have any value.

The Prime Minister said that the simple position for the West to take would be to say that the Russians could do what they liked about a treaty with the D.D.R., but the West stood on their rights and would meet any attack on these with all the force at their command. The President said that it was certainly this threat which had stopped Soviet action up to now. Unfortunately, there were some grounds for believing that after recent events in Laos and elsewhere, the West seemed to the Russians to be weaker and Mr. Khrushchev might no longer believe in the West's firmness of purpose. After all, even in 1949 when the West had a nuclear monopoly they had not been prepared to force their way into West Berlin, and the Russians knew that they were now relatively stronger than they had been twelve years ago.

Lord Home said that he feared that Mr. Khrushchev was being forced into some action over Berlin by his difficulties with the D.D.R. and with the other satellites. Refugees were still coming to West Germany at the rate of about one million a year. Mr. Khrushchev might feel that he had to find a way of stopping this. The Prime Minister said that the truth of the matter was that whatever might be happening in other parts of the world, in Berlin the West was winning. It was a very poor advertisement for the Soviet system that so many people should seek to leave the communist paradise.

The meeting ended at about 1:25 p.m./3/

/3/Following this meeting, at the President's suggestion, Home, Hoyer Millar, Caccia, Ormsby Gore, Bruce, Bundy, and Sorensen met to consider the contents of the President's speech and to discuss political and military contingency plans. They agreed that the speech should include a reaffirmation of Western rights and responsibilities, a brief statement of Khrushchev's views, and a strong reassertion of the fundamental Western obligation to sustain the right of choice of the people of West Berlin. (Memorandum by Bundy, undated; Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 1907)

While President Kennedy went to London to brief Prime Minister Macmillan on the conversations with de Gaulle and Khrushchev (see Document 34), Secretary of State Rusk went to Paris to brief the North Atlantic Council and the French on the meetings in Vienna. In a conversation at 3 p.m. at the Elysee Palace, Rusk summarized the discussions on Laos, disarmament, Cuba, Africa, and Berlin, noting in particular that Khrushchev had appeared rather relaxed on all the topics except the last. Rusk stressed that Berlin seemed to be the main issue for the Soviet Union, which seemed "to greatly fear a unified and rebuilt Germany which would be an ally of the West." (Memorandum of conversation, June 5, 1961; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, France)

In his briefing of the North Atlantic Council Rusk again stressed the importance of the Berlin question and reported that the Soviet aide-mémoire gave a good picture of Khrushchev's views on the problem. (Polto Circular 7 from Paris, June 5; Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/6-561)

On June 5 Kohler, Hillenbrand, and Dowling briefed Chancellor Adenauer on the meetings at Paris and Vienna. On Berlin Kohler reported that the President had replied strongly to Khrushchev's reiterated determination to go ahead with a peace treaty. He stressed that the President had reaffirmed the vital importance of Berlin to the United States, and concluded that if anything might be drawn from the talks, it was the likelihood of a crisis developing over Berlin, probably after the Communist Party Congress in October. (Memorandum of conversation, June 5; ibid., 611.51/6-561) A summary of the conversation was transmitted in telegram 2027 from Bonn, June 5. (Ibid., 611.62A/6-561)

On June 6 President Kennedy invited 15 congressional leaders to the White House for a report on his trip to Europe. A memorandum of the conversation at this meeting is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings with the President. It is also published in part in Declassified Documents, 1986, 2256. At 7 p.m. on the same day the President addressed the American people on his trip, stating that the visit to Vienna had been "a very sober two days." For text of his address, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pages 441-446.

Bonn, June 8, 1961, 7 p.m.

2054. Embtel 1989./2/ With growing possibility that 1961 may bring Soviet decision to sign separate peace treaty and turn over control of Allied access to so-called GDR, need for urgent review and consolidation of Berlin contingency planning, already begun at the President's direction, is now clearly evident.

Following suggestions, growing out of our local review, are therefore submitted for consideration in overall planning:

1. In my view, work on political moves and economic countermeasures should be pressed forward urgently, so that NATO Alliance will be in position take concerted measures demonstrating to Soviet Union our combined resolve not to accept Soviet action aimed at unilateral termination of our rights in Berlin. There is still a long way to go before Alliance could carry out economic countermeasures currently under study, for example, and while series of diplomatic moves obviously will be necessary and undoubtedly are contemplated at time crisis arises, present plan refers only to public announcement and notes to Soviet Union. I would suggest that agreement be sought on wide range of measures which might be put into effect as and if issue comes up, including economic embargo against entire Soviet bloc. At same time, I would question whether we should attempt to adopt now a rigid, ascending order of measures of mounting pressures, since we might well find it expedient to make a move of some severity, such as military alerts, evacuation of dependents, embargo, closing ports to Soviet shipping, etc., in first stages to create needed impact early in developing situation. Effectiveness of countermeasures taken last autumn was undoubtedly due largely to fact they were prompt response to East Zone restrictions, but experience in Bonn has demonstrated that tripartite agreement is normally long-drawn-out, difficult achievement.

In other words, our present goal should be to obtain governmental agreement now that certain measures, including those global in nature, will be used, and preparations therefore begun at once.

Psychological actions, for use prior to and during crisis, must also be designated to impress world opinion with rightness of our position. Only specific action which I can suggest now is use of Soviet tactic of "confidential" talks with neutrals in which we might stress fact that basis for international relations would be utterly destroyed if rights under agreements are to be invalidated unilaterally.

2. As for military probe in case of interference with Autobahn access, let me say at once that I regard it as an essential element of any contingency planning. But I wonder if it would not be difficult to obtain support of world opinion where it used solely for support of our own access to Berlin. On other hand, use of military means to support survival in freedom of two and one-quarter million Berliners would surely gain wide measures of support. For this reason, among others, including the problem of full Allied agreement, I suggest that further consideration might be given to circumstances under which our contemplated military probe would be maintained. Furthermore, I have grave doubts re wisdom of ourselves instituting new procedures in connection with surface access (i.e., so-called "peel-off" procedure, should Vopos replace Soviet guards at checkpoints) at a time when we would in essence be insisting on maintenance of status quo. Yet present plan seems to contemplate only two basic alternatives: either institution of new procedures, with some degree, at least implied, of East German control of access, or use of military probe. Question in my mind, therefore, is whether it would not be preferable to reject at outset any East German control of our surface movements, and to move at once to garrison airlift for Allied movements when Vopos first appear at checkpoints. This would at least have advantage of preserving freedom of action in further stages of crisis, aside from perhaps arousing sympathetic echoes in world opinion of first Berlin airlift. Moreover, I would surmise that if East German regime were thus frustrated in its desire to assert control over Allied access, it would move fairly rapidly to interference with civil traffic, whereupon we could then (after placing Berlin on ration basis, etc.) move to carry out military probe.

Finally, I feel strongly that contingency planning should include agreed guidance from FedRep to populace of Soviet Zone. It must be expected that they will become increasingly restive as crisis approaches, and we should have decided well in advance what attitude we would want them to take up.

Dowling

Washington, June 9, 1961.

Mac--

1. I agree that taking a philosophic view of the peace treaty will trouble the West Germans.

2. On the other hand: The West Germans will be even more troubled if we keep on building up the peace treaty as a big issue, and then it happens--as it will--despite our protests.

3. Which is worse--

(a) Bothering the Germans now by putting main emphasis on access, rather than the peace treaty?

(b) Bothering them a lot more in six months, by huffing and puffing about the treaty until it occurs--and then laughing it off (which is all we'll be able to do)?

4. I would suggest placing increasing stress on these points (which are not new), in our public posture:

(a) A peace treaty would have no validity; it would change nothing as far as Western rights are concerned.

(b) Access is a critical issue. The U.S. must stand firm on this issue if it is to fulfill its obligations to the people of Berlin.

5. An additional consideration: World opinion will understand the issue of keeping the traffic moving to Berlin; the Soviets lost propaganda-wise from the last blockade. World opinion will not get excited about the treaty issue.

Henry Owen/2/

Washington, June 10, 1961.

SUBJECT
Berlin

I enclose two interesting papers on Berlin. One is a draft of a reply to the Soviet Aide-mémoire,/2/ which has not yet been cleared through the Department of State, but which the Secretary thought you might want to review at this informal stage, because any expression of your opinions would be very helpful to the Department as it works ahead. The draft answer includes a long mimeographed paper (which you will probably not want to read) which is a possible submission to the International Court of Justice. I also enclose the Soviet Aide-mémoire in case you want to refer back to it.

The draft answer is a pretty good document, of its kind. It is right in the tradition of arguments on our side, and it would probably be persuasive to those who have tended to agree with us in the past. It is well worth study. Except for reiteration of the Western peace plan of May 14, 1959, it contains no affirmative proposals, but the exception is a substantial one.

I also enclose a long paper on Berlin from Henry Kissinger./3/ This is a powerful document, setting forth one strong line on Germany. Kissinger's fundamental conclusion is that we should "take the offensive" on German unification. At this moment, the more interesting questions for you are in sections 1 through 5, and perhaps also section 7. The military contingency problem should probably be left open until we hear from Acheson and the Defense Department.

In addition, I have messages for you from both Joe Alsop and Walter Lippmann. You will not be surprised to know that they take different views on Berlin. Alsop is for a strong and essentially unyielding position, carried all the way to war if necessary. Lippmann is for a negotiated solution, and has interesting ideas on what it should be. In essence, he would like to have us propose measures looking toward the genuine neutralization of West Berlin, in return for guarantees spelled out in detail by all parties, along the lines of the Lateran Treaty. Joe Alsop, like Henry Kissinger and most of your advisers, would hold that any neutralization of West Berlin would be a form of surrender, followed by great damage to the whole position of the West. Lippmann's answer is that a real normalization of Berlin would be a gain to us and no real loss to Adenauer or anyone else. He holds that if you take the lead in this direction, the net result would be a gain, not a loss, in U.S. prestige. I find his proposition well worth considering, but I must say that I cannot see any good in accepting a Soviet presence in West Berlin, which Lippmann is prepared to do.

On two or three broad points, however, I am interested to find that Alsop and Lippmann agree. First, they share my view that in extraordinary measure this problem of Berlin is one which you will have to master and manage, under your own personal leadership and authority. This is true because whatever course you determine upon will require a much higher level of understanding and support from the American people than we can now be sure of. It is true also because only your lead can provide the necessary degree of common direction to the West. Four-power parleys will almost surely produce uncertain postures. If you wish to be wholly unbending, you will have to confront the British with your own decision that this is how it must be. If you want to explore a new arrangement, you will have to find ways of making Adenauer accept your decision.

A second point of agreement is that we must avoid what both men call the Cuban error. We must not plan a firm line which runs out of gas with a local defeat. If we do not mean to press the issue right up to war, even Joe would prefer that we now negotiate an accommodation.

I myself think there may be ways of having the best of both Alsop and Lippmann, by making serious military preparations now, while at the same time we strengthen the attractiveness and acceptability of our political posture, both before the world and also before the Russians. This might or might not take us to the particular position which Lippmann advocates, but it would probably have a more open and forward-looking flavor to it than the draft reply which is enclosed.

But these are merely marginal notes. The first order of business, I think, is for you to make sure in your own mind that ways and means of work are established which will put you in immediate, personal, and continuous command of this enormous question. We are preparing recommendations for a procedure on this./4/

Finally, I should report one comment from Dean Rusk. He believes that the draft reply is good as far as it goes, but he believes also that the whole problem should be looked at freshly, "as if by men from Mars." I think this means that he shares the view that I have tried to express above--that you will want to examine every part of the problem yourself, freshly and carefully.

McG. B.

On June 10 McGeorge Bundy asked the Department of State to prepare a Talking Points Paper to brief the National Security Council on the results of the Vienna talks. (Memorandum from S/S to EUR, June 10; Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/6-1061) On June 12 the Department of State transmitted an 8-page list of talking points including the following on Germany and Berlin:

"1. Khrushchev attacked German militarism and said no delay in signature in a peace treaty was justifiable. USSR wanted agreement with U.S. but in its absence would sign a separate peace treaty with GDR, the state of war would cease and all commitments, including occupation rights, institutions and allied access would become invalid. U.S. troops could stay in Berlin under certain conditions; Soviet troops should also be there and neutral troops under UN guarantee would be acceptable.

"2. The President contrasted Berlin with Laos. He said we fought to get to Berlin. Our national security is affected by what happens there, and we have contractual rights to which every President involved has reaffirmed his obligations. If we allowed ourselves to be expelled from Berlin no one could have confidence in our commitments and this deeply involves our national security. He, no more than Khrushchev, is prepared to preside over isolation of his own country.

"3. President rejected Khrushchev's charge that reference to national security signified U.S. wanted to improve its position. The U.S. was not pushing but was interested in maintaining position in and access to Berlin. Situation might be unsatisfactory but situations elsewhere unsatisfactory and this not the right time to change Berlin situation. Neither U.S. nor USSR could accept the change in balance of power that would result from Soviet proposal.

"4. Khrushchev defended peace treaty as restraint on German revanchists. Said no force could prevent USSR signing treaty. GDR sovereignty would then be established and its violation regarded by USSR as open aggression.

"5. In reply to President's question, Khrushchev specifically said allied access to Berlin would be blocked by peace treaty. President reiterated that our views and interests should be carefully considered and said Khrushchev had laid down a most serious challenge with unforeseeable consequences. Expressed hope Khrushchev would consider both his and President's responsibilities toward their own countries.

"6. Khrushchev maintained USSR wished only to formalize existing situation and gain recognition as a fait accompli of the existence of the GDR socialist state. Continuance of U.S. occupation rights after a peace treaty was impossible to imagine.

"7. President said Soviet Union cannot give U.S. rights to the GDR.

"8. Khrushchev said USSR prepared to accept interim agreement not involving prestige of two countries right now. Agreement could set six months time limit for Germans to solve question of reunification. Then U.S. and USSR could disavow responsibilities and anyone would be free to conclude a peace treaty. He expressed confidence that our people would not start cutting each other's throats for ideological reasons. Said USSR can delay no longer, will probably sign peace treaty at the end of the year. He later specifically referred to December.

"9. Later Khrushchev said that USSR would be defending peace if the U.S. started a war in Berlin. U.S. should avoid miscalculation, but if U.S. wants war over Germany let it be so. He was confident common sense would gain the upper hand and peace prevail.

"10. The President denied any wish to precipitate a crisis but stressed our profound commitment in Berlin. It is strategically important that the world believe the U.S. a serious country whose commitments one could rely on. Said signing of a peace treaty not a belligerent act but denial of our contractual rights would be.

"11. Khrushchev said USSR would not accept U.S. rights in Berlin after a peace treaty and was convinced the world would understand the Soviet position.

"12. The President said our position in West Berlin was strongly supported by the people there. President is prepared to discuss any problem between us but we should take carefully into account each other's views and interests. He did not assume office to accept arrangements totally inimical to U.S. interests.

"13. Referring to an interim agreement Khrushchev said it would be a formal factor giving the semblance of turning the problem over to the Germans. He referred to the aide-mémoire (later handed to U.S. officials) and concluded U.S. could study it and perhaps return to the question later if it wished." (Yale University, Bowles Papers, Box 300, Folder 535)

At its June 13 meeting the National Security Council discussed Berlin based on this paper. While no NSC record of the meeting has been found, General Lemnitzer's handwritten notes on the meeting read as follows:

"Vienna--

"Difficult time in store on Berlin.

"Sec State--reviewed pol. situation.

"1st step--answer aide-mémoire, timing is rather vague. Cannot abandon. Western position is difficult.

"Pres--status of supplies.

"Sec reviewed.

"civil defense?

"reorg on CD--costs, $300 m

"$50 m to be used for shelters

"$100 m for new buildings

"Pres--We must get in touch with every American--he must be resp--what can he do--etc." (National Defense University, Lemnitzer Papers, Box 29, L-215-71)

Washington, June 14, 1961.

SUBJECT
Berlin

PARTICIPANTS

U.K.
The Rt. Hon. The Earl of Home, Foreign Secretary
Sir Harold Caccia, British Ambassador
Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh, Deputy Under-Secretary of State, the Foreign Office
Mr. J. E. Killick, Head of Western Department, the Foreign Office
Mr. J. O. Wright, Private Secretary
Mr. Denis Greenhill, Counselor, British Embassy
Mr. John Thomson, First Secretary, British Embassy

U.S.
The Secretary of State
Mr. Dean Acheson
Mr. John J. McCloy
Mr. George C. McGhee, Counselor
Mr. Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary, EUR
Mr. Martin Hillenbrand, Director, GER
Mr. James D. Moffett, U.K. Desk Officer

The Secretary asked Lord Home for his impression of the meaning of the Soviet aide-mémoire about Berlin. Did he think that the document really represented any new approach on the part of the Soviets? Does it confirm that we are now on a collision course? The Secretary added that as he had mentioned in London,/2/ Khrushchev had appeared to attach considerable importance to the problem in Vienna; in fact, he had practically memorized his aide-mémoire.

Lord Home said that he did not believe that the Soviet document represented anything new, that it was merely old material hashed over again for the purpose of propaganda and public opinion. Lord Home referred to a conversation he had had with Gromyko in Geneva just before leaving for Washington. Gromyko had appeared to make two points during that talk: (1) that there would be no row and no blockade over West Berlin and (2) that the Soviets felt that something must happen by October, attaching great importance to this timing. Lord Home did not know whether Gromyko meant that we are now in the midst of a six-months period for action or whether such would commence with October. It would appear clear, however, that if the West offers no acceptable terms on Berlin prior to October the Soviets will sign a peace treaty with East Germany. The Secretary wondered at Gromyko's reference to no row, finding it hard to believe that the Soviets would make such an issue over this problem and still refrain from a blockade or other action if their aims were not achieved. Lord Home confessed that this attitude of Gromyko's was only an impression he had gained but that he felt that Gromyko meant to say that the Soviets expect to make a treaty with the GDR, that the Western allies would have to make terms with the East Germans, but that the GDR would not make very much trouble. The Secretary repeated that he found it hard to conceive of no interference and noted that the aide-mémoire specifically referred to the cancellation of all Western rights on the conclusion of the treaty.

In response to the Secretary's query about the timing of a reply to the aide-mémoire, Lord Home said that British thinking was that a response should (1) take account of world opinion and endeavor to restate Western positions plainly; (2) emphasize inconsistencies in the document itself and (3) gain time, perhaps by posing questions which would carry on the correspondence. Mr. Kohler said that the State Department has prepared a rough draft of a reply to the aide-mémoire./3/ We feel that Khrushchev's message is probably a little stronger than previous statements of the Soviet position. We agree that the communication gives us a chance to restate our position. We also feel that there may be a basis for leading the Soviets into a long series of legal procedures. We have in mind an "injunction-type" operation which could take the form initially of a case before the International Court of Justice. Presuming non-acceptance by the Court, the Security Council and then the General Assembly could be brought into the picture, culminating with perhaps a request by the General Assembly for an advisory opinion from the ICJ. It was realized that all of this would be temporizing, but the prolonged litigation could gain time and favorable publicity. Lord Home asked if we were sure we had a good legal case. Mr. Kohler replied that our lawyers have prepared a brief on the question of our rights in Berlin which they consider fairly water-tight. Mr. Acheson questioned the probable connotation of the legal approach, wondering if we would be prepared to withdraw if our rights were called in question by a legal tribunal. He suggested that for other reasons we would want to maintain our position in Berlin regardless of decisions reached by impartial bodies. Mr. Kohler responded that we are pretty sure of our legal case on Soviet attempts unilaterally to terminate our rights in Berlin.

Lord Home asked if we couldn't consider a counter-suggestion to the Soviets. We might say to Khrushchev in our reply to his aide-mémoire that his ideas are interesting but how about applying them to the whole city of Berlin. The Soviets might find it difficult to respond to such a suggestion. Mr. Kohler noted that, of course, we still have the all-Berlin proposal which was presented to the Soviets at Geneva and which they rejected out of hand. Lord Home said that it would be well to consider our views on an all-Berlin solution since we must anticipate that someone like Krishna Menon might very well come up with the idea in the United Nations, perhaps hoping to win thereby a Nobel Peace Prize.

The Secretary said that he felt that immediately we must determine the nature of our responses to the Soviet aide-mémoire. Subsequently, however, we should be prepared to review the whole question of Germany and Eastern Europe. We might have to look further than the Western Peace Plan put forth at Geneva.

Lord Home said that he had not been thinking of specific counter-proposals to be made in response to the aide-mémoire. Rather, he thought it might be well to put questions to Khrushchev. Perhaps we could reply to the aide-mémoire in another two weeks or so including a question or two followed by subsequent questions later on.

The Secretary asked Mr. Acheson if he saw any advantage to getting a legal decision from the International Court of Justice on our rights in Berlin. Mr. Acheson observed that he thought the chances were very slight that the Court would take such a case. Mr. Kohler said that the Russians have, in fact, acknowledged our legal rights in Berlin. This is not the question. The question is can they legally terminate those rights at this time.

Sir Evelyn expressed the opinion that the political arguments will outweigh in most people's minds the legal side of the question. For instance, many people will feel that the West is being unduly legalistic if it insists on getting a ruling from the Court. Mr. Kohler acknowledged that this might be so but he felt that the purpose of the legal brief is one of propaganda.

Mr. McCloy said that he felt that we are all being too equivocal in our position in Berlin and that we should take a stand firmly on our rights. He had doubts about asking too many questions or seeking decisions on these rights.

Lord Home stated that he didn't see that there was any action open to the West, short of the German elections, but to keep alive our correspondence with the Soviets. He wondered if we might, in replying to Khrushchev, suggest a foreign ministers' talk. The Secretary said that we may get to this at some stage but he saw no advantages to seeking such a meeting at this time.

Mr. McCloy referred to his conversations with Ambassador Menshikov/4/ in which the Ambassador repeatedly urged that we tell the Soviets exactly what we want and what we will insist upon as regards West Berlin after the Soviets conclude a treaty with the GDR. Mr. McCloy asked if we could not make some proposals, such as a corridor arrangement, though he realized this might offend Adenauer. Could we propose a whole city arrangement?

Lord Home responded that he did not think that we should be as specific as this in our reply to the aide-mémoire. He wondered if Menshikov's remarks to Mr. McCloy were not in the context of a free city.

Mr. Acheson asked if it isn't clear that Khrushchev has started on a course which he will not change. If that is so we want to know what to do to gain time to make preparations. The Secretary interjected that we should certainly want to know what to do with the time we save. Mr. Acheson went on to say that we should set about immediately, next week even, to try to change Khrushchev's appraisal of the situation. We should increase our capabilities available for our contingency plans.

The Secretary said that there is a difference between saying that we are on a collision course with the Soviets on this issue and saying that Khrushchev himself thinks that he is on a collision course. Are there things still remaining to be done to let him know that we are ready and that he is on such a collision course? This can be done, for example, by dispositions with our forces. For instance, the U.K. might qualitatively enhance its own forces in Germany. We both might build up stocks in West Germany and in Berlin. These are steps which might make Khrushchev realize the course he is upon. The Secretary said that a probe to be creditable to the Soviets would have to have other things behind it. We need more general preparedness. Lord Home agreed that this was desirable but don't we have to take it to NATO? This is essential. The Secretary replied that we, ourselves, and the British could institute measures of preparedness in our own national forces without reference to NATO. He felt that if this action were dependent on NATO consultation, it might almost amount to a situation where NATO has a veto. Lord Home replied that this cannot be helped, that NATO is involved in the matter and we can't very well leave them out. Mr. Kohler observed that in critical times we have found that the NATO countries will stand firm.

The Secretary asked Mr. Acheson to describe some of our conclusions on national preparations for Berlin contingencies. Mr. Acheson said that actually there is no issue regarding discussions in NATO, the question is only when. There is a vast difference between a theoretical discussion in NATO and recommendations from the United States which are more than theoretical. We must convince Khrushchev that we are starting on a course with its own momentum. Some means of accomplishing this are (1) to begin calling up more troops for intensive training, to include Regular National Guard and Reserve units and to insure that this training would be more than the usual summer maneuvers; (2) we might fly STRAC units to Europe; (3) we might redeploy some SAC units; (4) we could revive our nuclear testing program; (5) increase military budgets; (6) shifting of units in Europe. All of these are dangerous but sometime or other someone has to realize the seriousness of the situation. Lord Home commented that this would involve overt planning and the Secretary replied that we would want it so. Lord Home asked if these preparations might not induce someone like the Indians to bring our "war-like" measures before the UN. Mr. Acheson said that the UN can't move very fast. In any case the measures contemplated would not constitute mobilization. Mr. Kohler commented that we could expect some action from the neutrals whatever steps we took at the time of the crisis. Perhaps our contemplated injunctive type of action could head this off.

With regard to actual shooting, Lord Home asked if we couldn't force the initiative on the other side by our probe. Mr. Acheson said that whether we could induce a shooting by the probe would depend on its nature and the size. The danger is that a small probe would look ridiculous. Mr. Shuckburgh noted that there seemed to be a difference in the British and American use of the term "probe". The British thought of the "probe" as a small scale action aimed only at seeing whether there would be obstruction on the access route. The Secretary said that the purpose would be to get the trucks through. It is conceivable that the Soviets or East Germany might allow a small probe to pass but stop the trucks. In discussing the possibility of an airlift the Secretary said we should also bear in mind that we would at the same time impose severe sanctions on trade, communications and so forth, on both the Soviets and the East Germans. We should really make the Soviets feel the effect of these. Mr. Kohler said that the airlift itself would be sufficient enough for our garrisons, that our JCS had said that it is not now militarily feasible to provision the whole city in view of possible technical counter-measures. Lord Home felt that British military thinking was more optimistic. It was agreed that there might be more comparison of view on this matter between the two military establishments.

Returning to the question of a reply to the aide-mémoire the Secretary said that we might at least go as far as mentioning the Western Peace Plan. Lord Home asked if we could not try to concert on a reply in the next few days, along the lines of restating our position with maybe a tricky question or two. Perhaps we would think out a more complete position carefully before putting it forth. Mr. McCloy and Mr. McGhee felt that we haven't stressed vigorously enough the point that East Berlin should be on the same terms as the Western part of the city.

(Further conversation during lunch)

The Secretary said that we hoped a reply on Berlin could be ready this week. It would be necessary, of course, to line up agreement on this reply on a quadripartite basis and to inform our NATO allies. Mr. Kohler said that he thought we should not dismiss the possibility of going to the ICJ on the whole question. The Secretary agreed that in our reply to the aide-mémoire we might ask the Soviets to agree that the legal issues be referred to the ICJ. If Khrushchev did not consent , this might of itself redound to our advantage. Mr. McCloy commented that he doubted that the case would reach the Court. Mr. Kohler agreed but thought that by making the attempt we might stave off action by the Soviets on Berlin for some time. He felt that if the case did get to the ICJ our position would be sustained.

The Secretary said that he agreed that we should try to counter the Soviet demands and he wondered whether the UN might not agree to undertake the protection of an access corridor to Berlin. This might be combined with an "all-Berlin" idea. He suggested that we might float the idea of a plenary peace conference in, say, November, to be composed of all of the ex-enemies of Germany. This might well take us through the winter months when an airlift would be difficult.

Washington, June 15, 1961.

SUBJECT
Senator Mansfield's Speech on Berlin

PARTICIPANTS
Chester Bowles, Under Secretary
Wilhelm G. Grewe, Ambassador, German Embassy
Alfred G. Vigderman, EUR/GER

Ambassador Grewe called at his request to discuss Senator Mansfield's speech of June 14, 1961 on the Senate floor proposing a solution for Berlin./2/ The Under Secretary pointed out that this was the third time in three years that Senator Mansfield had made a similar speech. He assured the Ambassador that neither he nor the Secretary, nor so far as he knew, the President, had been even aware of what Senator Mansfield intended to say. The Under Secretary remarked that he could understand that there might be some confusion abroad resulting from the fact of Senator Mansfield's position as majority leader. Those who were familiar with the European parliamentary system and who were not as aware of the nature of the American system could easily fall into the misunderstanding of assuming that Senator Mansfield's views necessarily reflected the views of the government in power. Finally, the Under Secretary pointed out that if any consideration were to be given to revision of our policy on Berlin and Germany, the Germans would be the first to be consulted.

Ambassador Grewe pointed out that Senator Mansfield was supported in his views by the remarks of Senators Humphrey and Kefauver. People in Germany were bound to think that a strong tendency seemed to be developing in the majority party in the United States to favor a solution along the lines of the one proposed by Senator Mansfield. It was in the German view necessary that an authoritative statement separating the Administration from the views of Senator Mansfield be issued.

The Under Secretary observed that a formal statement by the Department would only increase the attention being given to the remarks of Senator Mansfield and could only result in further headlines, which was perhaps not what was wanted. To this the Ambassador countered that the German concern was both for the reaction of the German press to the Mansfield statement and the danger of the incorrect assumptions which the Soviets might draw from that statement. Reading from the New York Times, Ambassador Grewe remarked on the isolationist character of the following quotation from the speech:

"The full meaning of the Western commitment, Mr. Mansfield said, carries the `ultimate implication' of American willingness to pledge `the lives and fortunes of every man, woman and child in the nation to Berlin's defense'."

This, Ambassador Grewe said, was precisely what was implied in any military alliance. The Ambassador went on to say that White House Press Assistant Secretary Hatcher when queried about the Mansfield statement had refused any comment, thereby leaving the situation ambiguous. On the basis of the foregoing, Khrushchev could easily think something was in movement in the United States.

The Under Secretary then ascertained from Mr. Roger Tubby, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, that there had been no questions from the press on this subject addressed to the State Department, but told the Ambassador that perhaps his wishes could be accommodated by the State Department press spokesmen at the daily noon briefing tomorrow when comment might be requested by a correspondent on the Mansfield speech./3/

BERCON R-14

Washington, June 16, 1961.

The participants were: White House--Mr. Acheson, Dr. Kissinger; State--EUR--Mr. Kohler (Chairman), Mr. Davis; G--Mr. Kitchen; S/P--Mr. McGhee, Mr. Fuller, Mr. Owen; SOV--Mr. Thompson, Mr. Guthrie, Mr. Anderson, Mr. Turpin; GER--Mr. Hillenbrand, Mr. Vigderman, Mr. Cash, Mr. Day; U--Mr. Rogers; B--Mr. Fluker; L/EUR--Mr. Kearney; B/FAC--Mr. Weiss; IO--Mr. Buffum, Mr. Palmer; RA--Mr. Burns; INR--Mr. Witt; S/S--Mr. Veliotes; Defense--Mr. Nitze, Col. Armstrong, Col. Wolf; JCS--Adm. Farrell, Lt. Col. Cannon; CIA--Mr. Stuart.

Mr. Kohler opened the meeting by saying we were faced with a new crisis, perhaps more serious than any before, which might bring Berlin contingency planning into play. He said that Mr. Acheson had been requested by the President to study Berlin contingency planning and was ready now to give his preliminary views.

Mr. Acheson began by saying that his purpose was not to interfere with any present operation but rather to stimulate further thought and activity. He said Berlin contingency planning was not simply an exercise divorced from reality because we had no choice but to assume that Khrushchev meant what he said. Decisions had to be made, and we had to act resolutely or not act at all.

A fundamental question, he continued, concerned the importance of Berlin. He said he thought Berlin was very, very important indeed, certainly involving deeply the prestige of the United States and perhaps its very survival. He did not believe a political solution was possible. The question was essentially one of US will, and we had to make up our minds and begin to act regardless of the opinions of our allies.

The central problem was that Khrushchev did not believe the risk of acting today was as great as it formerly was. Pressures on him might also have increased. In any event, he was now willing to do what he had not been willing to do before, and this was undoubtedly due to the feeling that we would not oppose him with nuclear weapons. Our problem was to increase his fear that we would use nuclear weapons if necessary.

Mr. Acheson continued by saying he began with the premise that our action depended on our determination to use nuclear weapons if we had to. Otherwise, we should not start. It was absolutely essential to increase the belief that we would use nuclear weapons to oppose Russian advances. Passivity did not increase deterrent credibility. By itself, the threat to use nuclear weapons did not increase the belief that we would use them. Nuclear weapons should not be looked upon as the last and largest weapon to be used, but as the first step in a new policy in protecting the United States from the failure of a policy of deterrence.

Mr. Acheson said that a basic question was what could be done to increase the credibility that we would use nuclear weapons. He said the military experts had to work out the use of force over a period of time beginning around the first of July and timed as an increasingly somber course. Time was a medium in which things happen. The effect of actions was increased when they were spread over a period of time. This also had the effect of excluding panic. The US had to make preparations and act as if it were prepared to use force up to, and including, nuclear force, if necessary. The only alternatives would be to have more luck than could be expected by any stretch of the imagination, or to withdraw from Berlin.

Mr. Acheson said that if he were right in his conclusion that Berlin was vital to the power position of the US, withdrawal would destroy our power position. We had to act so as neither to invite a series of defeats nor precipitate ourselves into the ultimate catastrophe.

He said the present Berlin contingency planning anticipated that at some point (not important for the present discussion) we would refuse to accept the demands made upon us. Our access would be blocked, and the crisis would occur. There would then be a symbolic probe, followed by certain political actions, and then a battalion would go up the Autobahn, be stopped, and we would have demonstrated that a blockage existed. He presumed that present Berlin contingency planning meant that nuclear weapons would be used, but his criticism was that everything would come too late to affect Soviet decisions before they were made. Nothing was planned to increase the belief that we would use nuclear weapons. This would really amount to preemptive war with nothing being done first to increase credibility. It would involve the use of nuclear weapons without getting the benefit of their deterrent effect.

It would be better to build up our preparations toward the use of force in order to put ourselves in the best possible position to act, as well as to make deterrents more credible.

As an illustration of what Mr. Acheson had in mind he cited the following, indicating that it was in very rough order and was entirely a military matter to be decided by the JCS and the Department of Defense. We might begin by intensive training of all reserve units. This would be much more than the usual summer training and would be designed to bring the reserve to battle-worthy condition. We might fly STRAC units to Europe and bring fewer men back, thus increasing our strength in Europe. There might be training exercises in Europe and redeployment of troops to battle stations as if in preparation for an action toward Berlin. The crash programs for Polaris and other missiles and submarines should continue. There should be a resumption of nuclear testing. There should be a resumption of the current equivalent of the U-2 flights. Later on, carriers should be deployed. There should be proclamations of limited and unlimited national emergencies, supporting resolutions in the Congress, and substantial increases in the military budget. There should be a movement of troops to Europe and a general alert of SAC.

If this did not affect Soviet decisions, and they proceeded as indicated, we should go into a garrison airlift for Berlin and continue to present ground traffic at the check points.

This might be followed by a military movement indicating the eventual use of tactical nuclear weapons and then strategic nuclear weapons.

It would be important to bring our allies along, but we should be prepared to go without them unless the Germans buckled. In the latter event, we would at least not have led the way to surrender. We should be prepared to go to the bitter end if the Germans go along with us.

Considerable preparation of the American people and Congress would be required, and a large program of air raid shelter construction might be undertaken.

These ideas should be explored during the next two weeks, a decision should be made, and action begun.

Mr. Acheson concluded by saying this was a very risky course, but it was not foolhardy if the US Government were really prepared to use nuclear weapons for the protection of Berlin on which we had staked our entire prestige. If we were not prepared to go all the way, we should not start. Once having started, backing down would be devastating. If we were not prepared to take all the risks, then we had better begin by attempting to mitigate the eventual disastrous results of our failure to fulfill our commitments.

Mr. Kohler expressed general agreement. He said Mr. Acheson's proposals fully answered the UK objections, since the approach which the British preferred would make no use of the deterrent value of nuclear weapons, but would prematurely lead to the decision on their actual use. The British have also said that the worse course of action militarily would be to expose a division or so to being chewed up on the Autobahn.

Mr. Acheson said that General Norstad had recently stated that it would be undesirable for the allies to use too small a force and be made to look ridiculous, while by contrast it would be highly worthwhile to concentrate strong forces in readiness near the Autobahn.

Mr. Nitze cautioned that General Norstad had seemed less sure that this larger force should actually cross the border, however. He said Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh had made the point that it was essential not to scare people to death with our buildup.

Mr. Acheson said the reactions of our allies were the crux and the hardest part of the whole matter. If our allies had serious inhibitions against action, we had better find it out. We should proceed not by asking them if they would be afraid if we said "boo!". We should, instead, say "boo!" and see how far they jump.

Ambassador Thompson said he agreed a decision was certainly necessary. He said there were three time periods: (1) between now and the German elections in September or the October Communist party congress; (2) the period between then and the ratification of the separate peace treaty; and (3) the period thereafter.

The difficulty he saw was that we would be engaging Khrushchev's prestige to a maximum making it very hard for him to back down. We should leave room for him to back down. The suggested procedure would also develop maximum pressure behind the compromisers.

Ambassador Thompson felt that in the first time period we should take steps that would exert the maximum effect on the Russians and the minimum effect on our allies, e.g., construct air raid shelters, increase military supplies to Berlin, and so forth.

The way out Khrushchev might see might involve signing the separate treaty, thus in his view alleviating the frontier situation, and then seeing that the East Germans handle access to Berlin in a way tolerable to us. The way we act would determine what he thought would be tolerable to us. We must not corner him completely. The idea of the garrison airlift was appealing because it would leave Khrushchev a way out.

As it was important for our effect on the Russians that they not think we were isolated from our allies, it would perhaps be best not to say "boo!" first before getting the British leaders with us.

Mr. Acheson said it was quite a problem to convince Khrushchev we were serious while, at the same time, letting the British know we were not.

Mr. Kohler said the essential problem was to get into a position where we could give Khrushchev a face-saving device rather than have him give us one.

Ambassador Thompson felt that actions known only to the Russians would be the most effective.

Mr. Nitze pointed out that it would be difficult to conceal certain steps, Presidential declarations, justifications to Congress, and so forth.

Mr. Acheson felt that Congress might be persuaded to go along on the basis of the existing emergency legislation to be followed up at some later date with a supporting resolution.

Mr. McGhee asked whether proposing alternative solutions would be considered weakness by the Russians.

Ambassador Thompson replied affirmatively but said while not offering such proposals now, we should leave the way open to do so at a later date. He felt we should explore the possibility of holding a referendum in West Berlin.

Mr. Hillenbrand said that the earlier Adenauer proposal might be useful in this regard.

Mr. Nitze said it would be necessary to mobilize the entire US behind this program and that, therefore, it would certainly be visible. He said there was not a lot of time before a decision had to be made, if we hoped to influence Soviet actions. He estimated one year at the most and said that if the program were going to be implemented it had to be started promptly.

Mr. Kohler felt that Khrushchev would probably not move before the October party congress, but he might very well announce there that he planned to call a peace conference in December.

Ambassador Thompson suggested it might very well be useful now to go ahead with the visits of top-level Soviet air force officers to the US in order to show them the strength we have so that they might exert their influences before a point of no return. He felt putting on an impressive show for them might have a real restraining effect.

Admiral Farrell said the Soviets had a good idea what we have; the important thing was to give them the impression that we were prepared to use it.

Mr. Kohler said the thing that was most urgently needed was a good, clear directive from the President and the Secretaries of State and Defense as to what they wanted done. He asked Mr. Acheson how soon this might be expected.

Mr. Acheson felt that the basic papers should be gotten to the two Secretaries and the President at the earliest possible moment so that they could make their decision.

Mr. Kohler said we had to make up our own minds, and our allies would follow.

Mr. Acheson said the garrison airlift was appealing because to stop it the Soviets would have to shoot a plane down. He was, however, certain that even with the garrison airlift the situation would heat up very quickly.

Ambassador Thompson said that given even the best outcome, we would end up paying a certain price. We should attempt to find out what that price would be and see if we could advance it as a solution. He indicated that British and American statements along the lines of the French statement on the Oder-Neisse Line and other frontiers would form an element in such a price.

Mr. Acheson said that the basis for decision should be before the two Secretaries by the end of next week. It had to be done within ten days at the very outside.

Admiral Farrell said that at the next Ambassadorial Group meeting the British representative should be queried as to the status of progress in CINCBAOR's plan for employment of a tripartite reinforced division to restore ground access to Berlin. In addition, it might also be appropriate to request any recent information on the further plans for conducting training for the tripartite BCT forces.

Mr. Nitze said the Department of Defense felt the British-suggested meeting of the representatives of the Chiefs of Staff was unnecessary, and it would, therefore, be difficult to ask the British for this information having just indicated that our lines of communication with "Live Oak" were good enough so that a meeting was not necessary. Mr. Nitze felt it might not, after all, be unwise to get the representatives of the Chiefs of Staff together.

Admiral Farrell suggested that we explore the feasibility of attempting once again to obtain British and French approval for greater German participation in "Live Oak" planning, as previously recommended by General Norstad and supported by the United States.

It was agreed that this would be raised on June 17 with the British and the French.

Mr. Nitze said June 26 was the target date for getting a full set of answers for Mr. Acheson from JCS./2/

He continued that it might be well for a working group to start soon, perhaps June 19, to list the various kinds of steps necessary to be taken.

Admiral Farrell said his people were working on the basis that a favorable decision would be made.

Mr. Davis said State would undertake the preparation of a paper in conjunction with Defense. He said Mr. Hillenbrand was the logical person and promised that State would contact Defense the week of the 19th.

Washington, June 17, 1961, 7:34 p.m.

2267. Eyes only for Chiefs of Mission, Stoessel, and Norstad. Taking advantage of presence in Washington of Shuckburgh and Laloy, Kohler and other Departmental officers have held series bilateral, tripartite and quadripartite discussions on Berlin over past three days./2/ These understood to be informal and not binding on govts but resulted in useful exchange of views on various current aspects of Berlin question. Principal subjects covered were:

US circulated to British, French and German's working draft of possible US reply to Soviet aide-mémoire received in Vienna./3/ Text deals at some length with standard Soviet arguments and concludes with alternative endings. First alternative proposes that issue re status respective parties in Germany and Berlin and effect any separate peace treaty on such status be submitted to International Court of Justice pursuant to Article 36 of Court Charter. Second alternative advances all-Berlin proposal.

In explaining rationale for Court proposal, Kohler noted that certainty very great that Soviets would never voluntarily submit to jurisdiction of International Court. As exchange with Soviets on this subject taking place, we and Allies would start taking certain measures military preparedness in line with contingency plans which now under active review US Govt. After Soviet rejection US proposal for contentious litigation, we would then consider going into Security Council, as likewise contemplated in contingency plans, seeking both cease and desist order and request by Council for advisory opinion from Court on legal issue involved. If, as anticipated, Soviets veto such request, then consideration would be given to going into General Assembly and repeating same process, except that Soviet veto would not apply. While this taking place Western Powers would have numerous opportunities to make speeches, propagandize and win wide public support for their position on Berlin. Idea would be to keep Soviets on defensive, and on assumption some country bound in any event bring Berlin issue into UN once it begins approach critical point, course of action proposed would enable Western Powers to keep better control of situation by having problem arise in UN on our terms. Kohler stressed that Court would of course not be asked to adjudicate fact of Western rights in Berlin but Soviet claim that by its unilateral action those rights can be extinguished.

Ensuing discussion showed considerable interest in possibility such Western initiative, though agreed this would represent important policy step which would require careful prior consideration by govts. Shuckburgh concurred that Berlin would get into UN whether Western Powers liked it or not and that it was better that it get in on our terms rather than have it dragged in on somebody else's terms. He said possibility would be put by Home to Prime Minister next Tuesday after which British would have more definitive reaction.

Speaking against background of what he admitted was President de Gaulle's "allergy" against anything smacking of UN, Laloy said he could appreciate rationale of suggested approach. He expressed doubt however about possible effect on Khrushchev and wondered whether such action might not precipitate crisis rather than serve to delay it. If present Soviet threats were comparable to those in past, perhaps West should think twice before taking action which might bring about very situation Western Powers trying to avoid. He pointed in this connection to certain hesitancies and ambiguities which he had noted in most recent Khrushchev speech explaining post-Vienna position./4/ It was agreed that speech deserved careful analysis to determine whether any such significance could be read into it.

Grewe likewise expressed personal doubts about course of action. He wondered whether West could actually be sure of case if it should get into Court. He also wondered whether Western ammunition was not being fired too soon. Kohler commented that there was pretty strong feeling in Washington that this time we were moving toward real confrontation with Soviets over Berlin and that Soviet aide-mémoire was opening gun.

We had for obvious reasons maintained relative silence on question since May 1960 while Soviets continued propagate their "peace treaty" and "free city" gambits. However felt that we must now get into more positive general posture with view to developing political, propaganda and deterrent campaign which we would be prepared to sustain from now to end of year.

In response to query by Shuckburgh as to whether all-Berlin alternative should be given equal weight, personal view those present was that, while this subject to further consideration by govts, main attention should be on Court proposal.

After considerable discussion text of reply agreed./5/ Germans noted however that FonOff had indicated it wished propose some additional language which would require meeting of Four Power Working Group next week. It was also agreed that final form of German response could really only be determined when basic decisions made as to content US reply to aide-mémoire of June 4. Grewe observed that there was considerable pressure on German Govt to send long-delayed German reply to Soviets. In discussion related timing of German and US response, despite certain German hesitancies, consensus was that this likewise could only finally be decided in light timing American response. Kohler commented that delivery American reply before July 4 holiday weekend would be desirable in order ensure maximum publicity and suggested there might perhaps be two-day gap between two, with German reply following. Grewe said German reply would lose all impact if it came in wake of American. Shuckburgh and Laloy pointed out that timing envisaged seemed too tight in view importance American reply and need for careful governmental consideration. Kohler observed one merit of early reply was that it would cut off speculation on possible weakening our position.

Only substantive point of importance in discussion German reply was whether specific language should be included in response to Soviet charge of German militarism, as in earlier draft, that FedRep does not seek independent nuclear capability or transfer of nuclear weapons to national jurisdiction. Grewe said that his Govt felt that this was something which should be kept in store for possible later use and not included as commitment vis-à-vis Soviets, who are here giving nothing in return. This argument generally accepted, but inclusion such language in American reply to aide-mémoire, as in draft under discussion, considered desirable as statement of fact which US would be in position to make.

This subject discussed only bilaterally and tripartitely. Kohler noted that subject presently under intensive review in US Govt and that we hoped shortly to come up with some fairly specific proposals to heighten effectiveness of Western deterrent in Berlin situation. He stressed US feeling, which conveyed to both British and French on previous occasions, that US felt probe contemplated on too small a scale to prove anything and that action to reopen access required greater commitment of Western forces as well as firm decisions by govts to planning and execution of courses of action. Shuckburgh noted that one difficulty was that British did not feel present Live Oak exercise represented adequate mechanism, from that point of view, for injection views of British Chiefs of Staff. He claimed that it was impossible for British Govt to make political decisions required when British Chiefs of Staff seem to differ with us in their evaluation basic facts involved, such as feasibility airlift, implications of ground action, etc. He therefore proposed that British and French Chiefs of Staff send high level representation to Washington to discuss directly with US Chiefs of Staff. US suggested that British and French might consider sending higher level officers to participate in Live Oak discussions. British may however continue press for meeting of type indicated.

Shuckburgh, Laloy and Kohler agreed that meeting of three at one of capitals extending for 10-day period might be desirable toward end of July to attempt tie together various strands of allied planning both re contingency planning and tactics and substance for next round with Soviets. No decision taken in this matter, but agreement was general that some sort of working group session as prior to Geneva Conference 1959 and Summit Conference 1960 would probably be necessary, whether or not West attempting move toward negotiations with Soviets prior to threatened peace treaty action. Question of German participation such meeting raised but not decided, although US view is that this essential. Kohler also urged full German participation in Washington Ambassadorial Group and closer association with Live Oak exercise. French and British seemed more responsive than previously and said would take up with their Govts.

Full memoranda of conversation being pouched.

Rusk

Washington, June 19, 1961.

Dear Dean: In this afternoon's discussions in the White House/2/ I mentioned the possibility of Khrushchev using the Berlin Question to gain concessions in Southeast Asia.

Enclosed is a copy of a memorandum which I sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff this morning on the same subject which may be of interest to you.

Sincerely,
Arleigh

Op-61B

Washington, June 19, 1961.

SUBJECT
Berlin (U)

1. Mr. Khrushchev's deliberate initiation and intensification of the Berlin crisis may well be prompted by a conviction that the time is propitious for the removal of the West Berlin enclave. This is his ostensible motivation, and such an interpretation appears to be supported by a degree of logic. However, there are considerations which militate against accepting this rationale completely.

2. Khrushchev is fully aware of the fundamental nature of the Berlin problem to the United States. He knows that we know that a firm U.S. stand is essential to the preservation of the NATO alliance and to the power position of the U.S. in Western Europe and eventually in the world. Understanding this, even if he considers that we have weakened in the strength of our convictions, he must realize that the stark confrontation he has presented us on Berlin is extremely hazardous. Khrushchev has stated that he does not want a war over Berlin. He most certainly does not want an all-out nuclear war. It is probable that he does not even want to hazard current Soviet momentum by any kind of a war.

3. If a Berlin settlement with significant advantage to the USSR appears to Khrushchev to be unattainable, it is quite possible that he would seek a quid pro quo elsewhere in exchange for a deferment of a solution on Berlin. It may be that he has deliberately raised the alarm on Berlin in order to seek concessions elsewhere. One of the most dangerous areas for seeking such a concession would be Southeast Asia. He may envision a relaxation of the Berlin crisis in exchange for an understanding that the U.S. would not forcefully resist further Communist expansion in Southeast Asia.

4. As tension mounts in Europe, there will be an increasingly strong tendency to focus our concern on Berlin. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and others responsible for planning and the formulation of national policy should bear in mind that faced with an impasse on Berlin, the Soviets may seek to obtain advantage elsewhere. U.S. acceptance of such an alternative would perhaps be less dramatic than a Berlin defeat in undermining U.S. leadership of the Free World, but the end result would be no less certain./4/

Washington, June 24, 1961.

SUBJECT
Reply to the Soviet Aide-mémoire of June 4, 1961, on Berlin

PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary of State
Herve Alphand, French Ambassador
Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary of State
Claude Lebel, Minister of French Embassy
Jean-Claude Winckler, Counselor of French Embassy
William R. Tyler, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State

The Ambassador said he had received a message from Foreign Minister Couve de Murville instructing him to inform the Secretary that in the course of his recent conversation with Gromyko in Geneva, the latter informed him from Khrushchev personally that the substance of the aide-mémoire of June 4 on Berlin was intended to apply to the French and UK Governments as well as to that of the United States./2/

In view of this, the French Government felt it would be desirable, in the interest of Western solidarity, for it, and the British also, to send a note to the Soviet Government. He said the British were being approached in London today on this matter. The Ambassador went on to say that his Government felt the three replies should be identical, or at least very similar. At the same time, the French Government felt that the reply should restrict itself entirely to statements of principle, and should not propose any course of action by the West or even hint at any initiative which it might take. He said that his Government felt that any suggestion at this time of going to the ICJ would weaken the public position of the West since it would imply a certain weakening of Western resolve.

In reply to the Ambassador's question the Secretary said that we would be prepared to consider the idea of sending three replies to the Soviet aide-mémoire, but that it would be desirable that these be, if not identical, at least very nearly so. Mr. Kohler recalled that we considered it desirable to propose to the Soviets that we go to the ICJ, and that this should be borne in mind by the Ambassador in advising Paris of our willingness, in principle, to consider the idea of three replies, assuming the British were prepared to go along.

Washington, June 24, 1961.

SUBJECT
Berlin

PARTICIPANTS
German Ambassador Wilhelm C. Grewe
The Secretary
Assistant Secretary Foy D. Kohler
Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand, GER

Ambassador Grewe said he had come under instructions to deliver to the Secretary an aide-mémoire setting forth his Government's views on the role of the Federal Republic in the event of Western military action on carrying out Berlin contingency plans./2/ This, it would be recalled, had been requested during the visit of Chancellor Adenauer to Washington in April. Ambassador Grewe added that he was himself going to Bonn on consultation the following Saturday and would therefore appreciate some indication of the latest American thinking on Berlin.

After thanking the Ambassador for the aide-mémoire, the Secretary stated that the most immediate problem was to move ahead with our reply to the Soviet aide-mémoire handed us at Vienna. After the quadripartite discussion was completed, there had to be consultation with the other NATO countries. We now had a draft to give to the French, British and Germans which represented a governmentally-approved draft./3/ Mr. Kohler observed that we would distribute this at the Four-Power meeting scheduled for June 26./4/ In response to Ambassador Grewe's query, Mr. Kohler indicated that the draft still included the language about submission of the case to the International Court of Justice but that the French had already expressed their opposition. Ambassador Grewe said that he was also under instructions to ask for elimination of the International Court from the present response. The German Government had hesitations about the idea and wanted more time to study it.

The Secretary commented that the problem was that an important legal point is at the heart of the Soviet position, i.e., whether our rights can be terminated by unilateral Soviet action. The Soviets normally try to give a legal cloak to their actions, and the legal point must be dealt with in our reply to the Soviet aide-mémoire. As far as other countries are concerned, it would strengthen our case if we could note that procedures exist for determining legal points of this kind. Ambassador Grewe said he agreed that it was important to refute the Soviet legal argument. Actually most of the Bonn objections were directed at the suggested subsequent action of having the Security Council request an advisory opinion from the Court. In response to the Secretary's query, Ambassador Grewe confirmed that this reflected a general feeling of uncertainty on the part of his Government about the role of the UN in the Berlin question. The Secretary commented that, if the question heated up, others would bring it into the UN whether we liked it or not. Ambassador Grewe agreed that this might happen in a later stage of the development of the crisis. Mr. Kohler noted that in our contingency plans we had agreed to go to the Security Council in a sort of injunction procedure. A country cannot go into the UN just for an advisory opinion but must submit its case. The contingency plans provide for our trying to get a cease and desist order.

The Secretary said that we are trying to bring to an early conclusion certain military studies started shortly after Vienna. We hoped that by the end of this month we would be ready to start talking about these. We believed we must review the existing contingency plans before the next round of discussions with our Allies. We hoped this review would soon be completed. In the meantime, the earlier contingency plans were still there. We hoped, the Secretary continued, that the other Governments were reviewing their positions, but we also wished to create the impression that there was no weakness on our part about West Berlin. This presented somewhat of a dilemma. It was obviously our desire to bring our thinking up-to-date but we must avoid any appearance of weakness. This problem had emerged during his press conference on Thursday,/5/ the Secretary noted.

Ambassador Grewe observed that both Chancellor Adenauer and Foreign Minister von Brentano understood fully the President's remarks in April that the West must improve its contingency planning./6/ The Ambassador pointed out that the question of German participation in this planning was raised in the second part of the aide-mémoire he had just given the Secretary. He had the impression that British and French opposition to this had diminished. The Secretary commented that full consultation with the Federal Republic would obviously be necessary. Other consultations might also be possible arising out of the difference in initial responsibility.

Ambassador Grewe went on to say that the second part of the aide-mémoire also drew attention to the civilian traffic to and from West Berlin. This required urgent study, particularly its relationship to the question of nonmilitary countermeasures. The Ambassador noted that in his presentation in Paris the Secretary had mentioned a tripartite paper on nonmilitary countermeasures. The Federal Republic wanted to participate in and contribute to the discussion of this subject. Mr. Kohler said that the British and French agreed that the Germans should participate in this.

The Secretary observed that failure to consider civilian traffic was not a result of any specific conclusions being drawn from our review of contingency planning. He did not draw any real distinction between military and civilian supplies. The military position would become impossible if the civilian population were starving. We were taking this fully into account. Mr. Kohler commented that the airlift during the Berlin blockade of 1948-49 had dramatically demonstrated how civilian traffic could become military traffic. The Secretary went on to say that some thought that a Soviet blockade would concentrate on military supplies. He had thought that the chances were perhaps greater that the Soviets would focus on civilian traffic so as to be able to say they were not interfering with military traffic. Mr. Kohler said that we had considered that there was a certain balance of interest between the East and West Germans which kept the traffic moving. Since the breakdown of the Summit Meeting in May, 1960, however, we had given much attention to civilian traffic. Ambassador Grewe observed that the legal position of civilian traffic had to be elaborated. There was no agreed formula covering it. Mr. Kohler noted that the two kinds of traffic had been treated differently in practice, and Ambassador Grewe added that the Soviets obviously believed them to be different. Mr. Kohler agreed the precise situation of civilian traffic must be spelled out.

The Secretary asked whether Ambassador Grewe were willing to make any observations about the possible attitude of the East German population in event there were serious trouble in connection with Berlin. The Ambassador said there would certainly not be any popular support for any action taken by Ulbricht. He was actively supported only by party functionaries. The big majority of East Germans wanted to see West Berlin remain as it is. It was important to them as a potential escape hatch, a place where they could visit relatives. Whether these people would cause trouble was another question, however. He did not expect they would do much except perhaps in the event of armed conflict on the access routes with large Allied contingents including Bundeswehr units, penetrating East Germany. This would introduce new factors. This possibility was something to which the West should point one day, making clear to Khrushchev that he could not calculate strength purely in terms of opposing military divisions but must also consider the eventuality of internal trouble in East Germany. [1 line of source text not declassified]

Referring to the aide-mémoire handed the Secretary by Ambassador Grewe, Mr. Kohler observed that it concentrated on the point of military conflict. Could it be assumed to be implicit that, as far as preparations or redeployments which might be desirable in the build-up period were concerned, German backstopping could be counted on? Ambassador Grewe said that Bonn had not commented specifically on this, but his interpretation would be along the lines indicated by Mr. Kohler. The Secretary observed that this also flowed from what was said in the aide-mémoire about contingency planning.

Ambassador Grewe said that his Government felt to an increasing degree that emphasis on nonmilitary countermeasures was important. Khrushchev would concentrate on nonmilitary measures, i.e., on small actions to which the West would find it difficult to counter with military action.

There followed a discussion of the factual situation on the Autobahn to Berlin. Ambassador Grewe concluded that the initial test would most likely apply to military rather than civilian traffic since the procedures covering the former would presumably immediately be affected by a Soviet peace treaty with the GDR.

On June 26, 1961, the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded to Secretary of Defense McNamara, for transmission to the White House, JCSM-431-61, which was their response to Bundy's memorandum of June 12 (see footnote 2, Document 42). Attached to JCSM-431-61 were the three studies that Acheson had requested to form a framework for the review of the Berlin question. Paragraph 3 of JCSM-431-61 reads as follows:

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the immediate concern is to influence Soviet decisions on Berlin before they are taken this summer or fall. United States preparations for the Berlin crisis--in the US, in Europe, and world-wide--should be taken in both nuclear and nonnuclear military areas concurrently. In this connection the requirement for modernizing, strengthening, and improving the US and Allied military posture world-wide has been recognized; however, the basic consideration remains the need for re-establishing the credibility of the nuclear deterrent. Our Allies must have the confidence and the USSR must be made to believe that the United States has the will and determination to use nuclear weapons in the defense of NATO, Berlin or the US position world-wide, as necessary, rather than submit to Soviet abrogation of US and Allied rights or position. Berlin is the immediate concern, and the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the questions posed by Mr. Acheson are contained herein." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin, BQD-CCI Berlin Contingency Planning)

Paris, June 27, 1961, 1:35 p.m.

ALO 565. Personal for Chairman JCS and Director Joint Staff from Gen Norstad.

I was very pleased to participate in the recent meeting with the JCS and Acheson when the subject of Berlin was discussed./2/ Since you were not able to attend, I send herewith a brief summary of my views:

The present threat to the Allied position in Berlin is certainly more serious than other similar crises during the last five years, perhaps even more critical than the blockade in 1948-9; on the political side, this situation demands decisions, policies and plans; certainly the general direction of our course must be established now. Since this is too obvious to require further emphasis here, I will limit my comments to the field of military actions.

In the first place, any military measures should, in their nature and timing, be related directly to political decisions, actions or overtures, they must lead step by step to the establishment of a position, to the achievement of a purpose. They must:

1. Add, in fact, to our strength and improve our posture.

2. Contribute to the credibility of the deterrent by conveying to the Soviet the impression of calm, deliberate preparation for a serious response.

3. Enhance the chances of success of the political measures to which they are related.

4. Leave us at all times in a position of flexibility.

It seems to me that military measures may be divided into three broad categories:

1. The fundamental, including steps to improve national preparedness such as special reserve training, increased emphasis on civil defense, mobilization activity particularly in the logistics fields, etc.

2. The strategic, including movement of troops to Europe ostensibly for training purposes, improvement of supply position in the theater, etc.

3. The tactical, including movement of troops to positions from which actual military action could be launched.

Both the timing and the specific nature of actions must, of course, relate to political steps being considered. In principle, however, I believe certain fundamental actions should be undertaken now, to be followed in due time by activities in the other two categories in the order indicated, as the situation dictates.

It seems to me that we must retain flexibility, freedom of action, whatever we do. Rigid measures would call for opposite but greater reactions and thus quickly lead to hand-over-hand escalation which, even at an early stage could commit us to a road from which there could be no turning except by resort to all-out war or by the acceptance of defeat. To avoid this, I believe that if reserves are called up for training, the call-up should be for a stated period of time after which we would be free to exercise our judgement as to whether they should be retained for an additional period, whether others should be called up to take their place, or whether the whole project should be stopped.

In the strategic category, movement of troops should be conducted under the guise of training. For example, if three battle groups should come over at any given time, perhaps two could return to the U.S. and be replaced by another two or even more.

Similar illustrations could be developed within the tactical category.

At this time, I believe we should avoid announcing that we are taking actions on a "for the duration" basis, since this would quickly establish positions of the utmost rigidity on both sides and would lead to escalation at an accelerating rate.

It seems to me that we must be absolutely firm in support of our rights in Berlin; we must make it absolutely clear that we intend to discharge our obligations to the people of that city.

However, the measures we employ to gain our objectives should, and I believe can, leave us with considerable freedom of action. In the military field our activities must clearly add to our effective strength and general preparedness and, at the same time, leave us in a position of flexibility. Such a position, if coordinated with appropriate political actions, would provide us with the best foundation from which to meet the threat of the next six months. Needless to say, the value of any actions which may be taken by us will be multiplied many times if, at the same time, equivalent or supporting measures are taken by our Allies./3/

Washington, June 28, 1961.

I. Foreword

The issue over Berlin, which Khrushchev is now moving toward a crisis to take place, so he says, toward the end of 1961, is far more than an issue over that city. It is broader and deeper than even the German question as a whole. It has become an issue of resolution between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., the outcome of which will go far to determine the confidence of Europe--indeed, of the world--in the United States. It is not too much to say that the whole position of the United States is in the balance.

Until this conflict of wills is resolved, an attempt to solve the Berlin issue by negotiation is worse than a waste of time and energy. It is dangerous. This is so because what can be accomplished by negotiation depends on the state of mind of Khrushchev and his colleagues.

At present, Khrushchev has demonstrated that he believes his will will prevail because the United States and its allies will not do what is necessary to stop him. He cannot be persuaded by eloquence or logic, or cajoled by friendliness. As Sir William Hayter has written, "The only way of changing [the Russians'] purpose is to demonstrate that . . . what they want to do is not possible."/2/

Until that demonstration is made, no negotiation can accomplish more than to cover with face-saving devices submission to Soviet demands.

Once the demonstration has been made, negotiation can resolve the issue in a number of ways, from face-saving for a Soviet retreat to mutual concessions on non-vital matters. Solutions of this nature are outlined in Chapter III, below.

To offer any concessions now, however, will only result in an appearance of weakness and real impairment of future negotiating position.

Ambassador Thompson has stated the principal objectives of the Berlin offensive:

1. To stabilize the regime in East Germany and prepare the way for the eventual recognition of the East German regime;

2. To legalize the eastern frontiers of Germany;

3. To neutralize Berlin as a first step and prepare for its eventual take-over by the GDR;

4. To weaken if not break up the NATO alliance; and

5. To discredit the United States or at least seriously damage our prestige./3/

It is plain that, if carried to its conclusion, the Berlin offensive strikes at the power and world position of the United States. Even its more limited purposes are gravely damaging to the United States and the Western Alliance. This is the nature of the crisis which confronts us; not the fate of a city, or of its two and one-half million people, or even the integrity of our pledged word.

So long as issues of the magnitude outlined are sought by the U.S.S.R., and believed by them to be within their grasp, real negotiation is impossible. Only by winning the test of will can we change the Soviets' purpose. Only thus can we demonstrate that what they want to do is not possible.

West Berlin has been protected, in the last analysis, by the fear that interference with the city, or with access to it, would result in war between the United States and the Soviet Union. War, as used here, means eventually nuclear war.

If Khrushchev now contemplates embarking on a course of interference, and later does so, it means that his fear of war resulting has declined. He has been quoted as saying as much.

The capability of U.S. nuclear power to devastate the Soviet Union has not declined over the past two years. The decline in the effectiveness of the deterrent, therefore, must lie in a change in Soviet appraisal of U.S. willingness to go to nuclear war over the issue which Khrushchev reiterates his determination to present.

This being so, the problem is how to restore the credibility of the deterrent--that is, how to cause Khrushchev to revise his apparent appraisal of U.S. willingness to resort to nuclear war, rather than to submit to Soviet demands.

Two methods commonly suggested completely miss the nature of the problem.

The first of these is for the United States to threaten to use its nuclear weapons if the Soviet Union should give control of access to Berlin to the East Germans and if they should attempt to exercise it. But, if Khrushchev's belief in U.S. willingness to use nuclear weapons over this issue is not sufficient to deter him from going forward with the plan, the threat to use them would not deter him either. He would not believe that we would carry it out.

The second suggestion is that, if and when the East Germans take over the control points and attempt to exercise control, a small allied military force, e.g., a few vehicles, should brush aside the control officers and proceed towards Berlin. If this force is not stopped by the East Germans, so the argument runs, the latter would have been deterred from exercising control of Berlin traffic. If the force is stopped and turned back, and if protests, military preparations, economic pressures, and diplomatic moves are not effective, the next resort would be use of force on the order of a battalion or somewhat larger. If this force were turned back, eventual resort would presumably be to nuclear war.

There are several conclusive objections to this suggestion.

The principal one is that it is not addressed to the main point--Russian disbelief in U.S. willingness to use nuclear weapons. If this disbelief continues, the East Germans would wave the small force, and then the battalions, on to Berlin and continue to control traffic on unacceptable terms, or they would stop both the force and the traffic. They would not have been deterred. If the U.S. then resorted to nuclear war, it would be doing so not to deter interference with access to Berlin, but because deterrence had failed. The United States would have failed to convince Khrushchev that it would do what, in the end, it did do--and failed largely because it would have made no effort to convince him by its conduct prior to final action.

Thus we would have suffered the worst of both worlds. We would have started nuclear war without having had the benefit of the deterrent effect which our determination to start that war, rather than submit, would--if known--have had on Russian decisions.

The lesson of this reasoning is plain. The resort to nuclear war is not a deterrent; nuclear weapons are not the last and most powerful weapons in the hierarchy of violence to be employed to protect Berlin. Their employment would mark their failure as a deterrent, and would be designed to protect the United States and its allies from the consequences of that failure.

Thus we are continually thrown back on the necessity of devising, and starting quickly, a course of conduct which will change the present apparent Russian disbelief that the United States would go to nuclear war over Berlin, rather than submit. This report submits a plan to do this. Before coming to the plan, an early, secret, and vital decision is necessary.

Nothing could be more dangerous than to embark upon a course of action of the sort described in this paper in the absence of a decision to accept nuclear war rather than accede to the demands which Khrushchev is now making, or their substantial equivalent.

To do so would be a policy of bluff, with disaster as the consequence of the bluff being called. The disaster might even take the form of our receiving a nuclear strike if the impression we made was better than our determination.

To think of the bluff as a "calculated" risk is pure self-deception because there can be no quantitative calculation of that risk in the Berlin situation.

All that can be safely said is that Khrushchev probably would not incur the certainty of nuclear war over Berlin if he could see far enough ahead that war was certain. But, given his background and the inherent obscurity of the situation, we cannot be sure that before events had passed beyond control he would see that war was certain.

To sum up the situation: There is a substantial chance, not subject to evaluation, that the preparations for war and negotiation outlined here would convince Khrushchev that what he wants is not possible without war, and cause him to change his purpose. There is, also, a substantial possibility that war might result.

It is, therefore, essential to make an early decision on accepting the hazard and preparing for it. The "substantial possibility" of the success of the course of action here depends on the existence of a core of hard decision, understood in all its grimness and cost. Furthermore, the condition of the country in the event of war will also depend on an early and deliberate decision. A hasty and improvised decision in the eleventh hour of approaching panic and hysteria could add vastly to the cost of war.

II. Preparations

To convince the Soviets that we are in earnest about defending Berlin we must be in earnest about it.

This means that the military, economic, and political power needed for this defense should be made ready for use. Measures to this end should be begun immediately and should be increased over the time available.

It is not necessary that all military preparations have been completed by the time that East German personnel are expected to replace Soviet personnel along the access routes. The use of force might be deferred for some time after this, while final military preparations are being completed. This would enable us to avoid steps which would prematurely raise tensions, at a time when this might divide the alliance and circumscribe Khrushchev's flexibility in negotiations--thus hindering attainment of our basic purpose. The more drastic of our preparations will be more impressive to Moscow, and perhaps, have a less disturbing effect on our allies if taken later on as the crisis deepens, when they will be more suited to the immediacy of the threat.

The purpose of the preparatory measures will be twofold: (1) to put us in a position, at an appropriate time, to use the power necessary to achieve our purpose; and (2) to convince the Soviets, by the extent of our preparations and of our commitment, that we have determined to go to the use of force, including nuclear war, rather than submit.

If these preparations are to have their full and essential effect, they must be wholly authentic and real. They must not be affected or deflected by alleged psychological considerations designed to impress the Russians. Both to impress the Soviets and, later on, to preserve this nation, the preparations must be as solid and sound as time permits. The phoney is easily recognized and almost surely will be disastrous.

We should neither conceal nor dramatize our preparations. To conceal them would be impossible. To dramatize our preparations would be self-defeating, both in suggesting to the Soviets that these preparations were designed primarily for effect and in frightening our own people, our friends, and neutrals. Announcements should be made in a low key and related to world tensions rather than to Berlin alone, so as to avoid giving the appearance of laying down a direct challenge to Khrushchev on this issue.

Along with these preparations should go constant education as to the real nature of the Berlin issue, assertion of our continued readiness to meet and discuss this issue with the Soviets, and frank elucidation why basic interests are not negotiable.

The preparations, and the subsequent action, suggested here will require the closest consultation and planning with our allies, first with the British and French and then with all our NATO allies. This government should lead the joint planning both in proposals and, more importantly, in action to put them into effect. The British, especially, and perhaps the Germans, too, will be more ready to follow action rather than to accept proposals. The latter can be delayed and frustrated by endless debate and refinement. Our unilateral action should generally be timed so as to spur decision and action by our allies.

We should not argue publicly with our allies if they hesitate to go as far and fast in their preparations as we do; this would only advertise divisions in the Western camp. Nor should we decrease the extent or speed of our preparations, to correspond to theirs.

If it becomes clear that our preparations are causing our allies to defect from the basic Western position regarding Berlin, we should, of course, reconsider the matter. Barring this eventuality, however, we should move forward vigorously and seek to persuade our allies to go as far as possible with us, rather than join those who will be clamoring for a face-saving surrender to Soviet demands.

So far as positive help is concerned, the Germans are probably the most important of our allies and the French, for logistic reasons if nothing else, second. If West Germany should collapse along the way, the Western position would be in bad shape. A "damage control" operation would be in order and should be in the plans. (See Chapter V)

B. The Stages of Preparatory Action/4/

Preparatory action should be taken in three stages, increasing both in seriousness and in being pointed directly at the Berlin crisis.

1. The first stage should be between the Fourth of July and the German elections on September 17th.

2. The second stage should be between September 17th and the signing of a USSR-GDR peace treaty.

3. The third stage should comprise the period between the signing of the peace treaty and the turning over to the GDR of control of access to Berlin.

By the end of the third period the U.S.A. should have its forces in being in improved readiness, with necessary arrangements poised for the final preparations required to be able to use force. It should have completed at home and abroad intensive education on the nature of the issue centering around the Russian demands regarding Berlin. It should have allied economic sanctions in a state of readiness. It should be prepared to conduct political moves and to undertake or resume diplomatic negotiations, should the preparations suggested here have the desired effect on Khrushchev and make negotiations possible (assuming that this has not already occurred).

The military preparations should be of three distinct types:

1. Preparation of non-nuclear forces for substantial use on the ground and in the air in Europe and on the high seas. Examples of the actions to be taken to this end, subject to further military judgment and to questions of order and priority, are:

(a) Seek, by measures initially short of partial mobilization, to compress the time needed to bring necessary units of reserve components to a state of battle-readiness, so that they could be called up in the event force had to be used over Berlin. Encourage our allies similarly to increase the readiness of their reserves, and offer to help supply such equipment as we can and as is needed for this purpose.

(b) Bring US forces in Europe up to full strength. Try to persuade our allies similarly to raise the manning levels of their existing forces on the continent.

(c) Move some STRAC and USAF units to Europe, gradually raising the level of forces there and replacing the forces despatched there from the US by calling up Guard and reserve units.

(d) Improve our ability to transport and deploy additional forces to Europe.

(e) Move equipment needed by our forces in Europe to the continent, and build up stocks of combat supplies on the continent.

(f) Increase US stocks of non-nuclear ammunition.

(g) There is one further step of the utmost importance which should be taken in preparing for substantial use of non-nuclear force in Europe: that is to tighten SACEUR's physical custody and control over nuclear warheads in Europe. The whole purpose of a substantial use of non-nuclear force in Europe would be defeated if it should escalate into general nuclear war by Western action, before this was intended. To prevent this, it is necessary to ensure that NATO nuclear weapons in Europe will not be fired by our allies or by subordinate US units without explicit Presidential and SACEUR directive--even in the midst of substantial violence and great uncertainty as to whether nuclear warfare is not about to start. This will be difficult, at best; present physical arrangements may not be ideal in this respect. The President should direct that whatever steps are needed to improve these arrangements, and thus assist SACEUR in controlling the allied and US nuclear capable units committed to his command, should be taken by the Secretary of Defense as a matter of urgency.

2. The second category of military preparations would be designed to increase our ability to mount counter-measures on the high seas. This might mean preparing our naval forces so that they could readily force Bloc shipping in specified areas to return to Bloc ports, and increasing the over-all readiness of the Navy to engage in the combat operations which might ensue.

3. The third category would include measures to prepare for general nuclear war. This would mean placing SAC in a suitable state of readiness, which could be maintained over the period of a prolonged crisis without degrading SAC capabilities or generating pressures for a pre-emptive strike. It would also mean taking civil defense measures, including possibly construction of fall-out shelters. The world-wide readiness of US armed forces would need to be increased in a variety of ways.

In carrying out these preparations, we should try to avoid actions which are not needed for sound military purposes and which would be considered provocative. Such actions would have a contra-productive effect on the Soviets in two respects--first, in suggesting that the whole operation was for "muscle flexing" and thus degrading the deterrent effect of our other preparations, and second in creating an atmosphere of challenge and counter-challenge which might make it harder for the Soviets to back down, if they should wish to. Such actions would tend to split the alliance, furthermore, by antagonizing our allies.

Allied attitudes also suggest that preparations for a Berlin crisis should not include steps, which would run contrary to Presidentially-approved US policy toward Europe, looking to sharing nuclear weapons capabilities with France or to deployment of land-based MRBM's in Europe. Nuclear sharing with France would trigger German interest in developing a national nuclear capability; preparations for deployment of land-based MRBM's to European (including German) forces would be taken in some quarters to foreshadow de facto creation of such a capability. The British have opposed deployment of land-based MRBM's to Europe, in part, because of their reluctance to see strategic missiles containing powerful warheads placed in German hands. A Berlin crisis would not be the time to take steps that would thus, in the view of some Europeans, raise the prospect of a German nuclear capability; this would excite the very fears of Germany which we will need to dampen down if Western firmness and unity over Berlin is to be preserved. For the same reason, stepping up the arming of German forces with nuclear weapons would not be useful preparation for a Berlin crisis from the political standpoint.

Preparations for non-military pressure on the Soviets are of vital importance. They will probably be more credible than preparations for military action; they may well have a substantial effect on Soviet intentions.

1. Political. The President will need to seek funds and authority from the Congress to carry out the military preparations suggested above. The President might relate these preparations to the rising world-wide Communist threat, of which Berlin is one element, and make clear, therefore, that we have in mind two quite separate programs:

(a) Short-term steps to meet the immediate threat to Berlin.

(b) Long-range steps to increase the size of the US defense establishment which will be needed, if a full-blown Berlin crisis develops, to meet the prolonged period of stepped up Bloc pressures which such a crisis presumably portends. These steps should not be launched now, but should be clearly foreshadowed: The President could direct the Secretary of Defense to prepare plans for a major increase in US force levels; funds for this increase would be requested of the Congress in the event the international situation deteriorated further. The matter might now be discussed with Congressional leaders. The deterrent effect on the Soviets of such planning would probably be substantial. They must even now bitterly regret the lasting jump in US defense expenditures brought on by the Korean war. It would be useful to convince them that a similar increase might result from a Berlin crisis. But they will only be convinced if we have, in fact, decided to mount these increased expenditures in the event a crisis materializes. As a nation, we have little capacity for deceiving others. At best, we can hope to convince the Soviets that we will undertake dangerous or expensive actions if that is our real intention.

2. Economic. Preparations for economic counter-measures should also have considerable deterrent effect. Such measures proved surprisingly effective in response to recent East German pressures on civil access to Berlin.

Again, the crux of the matter is a clear allied decision that the measures will be adopted. If such a decision is taken at the highest level of the governments concerned, it would be incongruous not to make specific and detailed preparations to give it effect. Failing the decision, however, the preparations will not carry conviction.

These economic counter-measures would be designed for execution at the time that East Germany blocked ground access to Berlin. They might include some or all of the following:

(a) Cutting off trade between NATO countries and the Bloc.

(b) Denying Bloc ships the right to stop in NATO ports.

(c) Denying Bloc aircraft the right to touch down in NATO countries.

(d) Denying Bloc nationals and goods the right to transit NATO countries or to be transported aboard carriers of NATO countries.

The US should lay specific plans for carrying out such measures, insofar as US territory and facilities are concerned. It should inform its allies of its intention and propose that they make similar plans. Firm agreement should be sought this summer.

3. Eastern Europe. The Soviets might be deterred from a Berlin crisis if they believed that it would result in greater instability--rather than stability--in Eastern Europe. The US should try to convince the USSR that it would and could, in event of a Berlin crisis, stir up dissidence in East Germany and Eastern Europe.

The steps to be taken to instill this conviction are matters of expert judgment, which lies beyond the competence of this report. There are two points to be emphasized:

(a) We can only convince the Soviets that this is our intention if that is, in fact, the case. As in the military field, bogus preparations will be of little value.

(b) The scale of civil disorder which we set out to stimulate should correspond, progressively, to the intensity of the crisis. Full-scale revolt should only be triggered, if at all, when the crisis reaches a stage which is but a hair's breadth from general war, since such a revolt could well lead directly to such a war.

4. World Opinion. Khrushchev has been trying to present his demands regarding Berlin in such a way as to maintain his peace posture with the neutrals and convince them that his object is to eliminate "hotbeds of war." It is important to frustrate this effort; the Soviets are much more dangerous when they believe that their propaganda has put world opinion upon their side: They are apt to believe that they can take greater risks because we will be inhibited by adverse opinion from taking effective counter-action.

Beginning soon, therefore, a well thought-out, intensive, and continuous campaign should be conducted, both domestically and internationally, to bring out the fact that at the present time there is no threat of any sort to the peace in either Eastern or Western Germany; that peace is a condition and does not depend upon formal documents announcing or proclaiming it; and that Khrushchev is engaged in an operation unique in its cynicism: In the very name of peace, and through the instrumentality of negotiating and putting into effect what he calls a peace treaty, he is taking an action of calculated and far-reaching aggression.

This theme should be developed over and over again and with the most homely and understandable analogies. Speeches by the President, the Secretary of State, other members of the Administration, popular pamphlets (along the lines of one recently put out by the State Department entitled "Berlin: A City Between Two Worlds)", messages to Congress, and all the instrumentalities of the U.S.I.A. should drive home this lesson--adapting it to the conditions and understanding of various countries, both allied and neutral.

As suggested above, all of this should be done at the outset in low key, stressing reason and determination, rather than crisis and alarm. As the crisis deepens, a greater note of urgency can be added. As these statements accompany and explain preparatory actions of increasing seriousness, they will make clear that these Western actions are intended to preserve the peace against those who use the name of peace and the worldwide desire for peace for their own aggressive purposes.

III. The Role of Negotiations

As suggested in the Foreword, Khrushchev now appears to view the balance of power as inclining in his favor; in this climate, negotiations would fail or lead to agreement unacceptable to the West. While this situation continues negotiation should be regarded purely from the propaganda point of view.

Primary emphasis should be placed, in our public posture during this period, on the all-German rather than the Berlin issue. The Western position on this issue is better than that of the Soviets and this fact should be vigorously exploited. We should review the Western Peace Plan to see if it can be made still more forthcoming and attractive to world opinion. The basic principle on which our position is based--self-determination--should have great appeal to most non-Communist countries.

If the preparations proposed in the preceding section should change Khrushchev's view of Western firmness, genuine negotiations will be useful. They would be designed to build a bridge on which Khrushchev could retreat to safety. If he wishes to retreat it will be easier for him to do so by means of negotiations launched after our military preparations and before the crisis has advanced very far, i.e., before the signing of a peace treaty. Some proposals suggested for this purpose do not seem promising.

One would be an agreement which united Germany and thus caused Khrushchev to abandon his project of a peace treaty with East Germany. We could not agree to a form of German unification which left East Germany in Communist hands. And there is no evidence to suggest that Khrushchev would agree to any form of German unification which would assure the people of East Germany free choice by a specified date--however distant. The mere signing of such an agreement (whether it was viewed seriously by the Soviets or not) might tend to demoralize the East German regime and undermine its hold on the East German people.

Ambassador Thompson's suggestion of stretching out, e.g., to seven years, the period for agreement between the two German Governments upon a constitution may not be subject to this infirmity, since there would be no commitment to hold elections at the end of this period unless the parties concerned could agree on that constitution. This stretch-out would, however, be highly objectionable to the West Germans; it seems unlikely that we could gain their consent.

Negotiations restricted to Berlin do not seem to be any more promising, unless Khrushchev should mellow considerably under American preparations. The agreements previously suggested have been:

(a) An "interim" agreement which would temporarily defer a peace treaty, or--

(b) An agreement without any time limit, which would define what the consequences of a peace treaty should be for Berlin.

An "interim" agreement could be either:

(a) An agreement such as Khrushchev suggested in his aide-mémoire: The two Germanies to talk to each other, and the Berlin status quo to be maintained while they do. Or--

(b) An agreement such as was discussed at Geneva in 1959--preserving the present situation in Berlin with some limitations on Western forces and subversive-propaganda activities thrown in.

Neither type of agreement would be acceptable to the West Germans, but they would prefer the second to the first since the last thing they want is to have any political dealings with the GDR. The basic trouble with either of these "interim" agreements, however, is that their temporary nature would imply a term on our presence in Berlin. The offsetting advantage, it can be argued, is that they would buy time. This advantage would only be meaningful, however, if the West should decide, at the same time as a temporary agreement was concluded, to mount a crash program to improve its power position. Failing such a decision, a temporary agreement would not seem useful.

This leaves what seems to be the most promising possibility: an agreement whose purpose would be not to defer a peace treaty, but to preserve the Berlin status quo despite a peace treaty. This purpose might be served by what has come to be known as Solution "C." This would not be a formal agreement but an exchange of Western, Soviet, and East German declarations prior to the signing of a treaty:

(a) The Western powers would declare that their rights and Soviet obligations remained unchanged, that they intended to keep their forces in West Berlin, and that they would deal with East German personnel regarding ground and air access on the same terms as they had previously dealt with Soviet personnel.

(b) The East Germans would declare their intention to respect existing access procedures, except that these would henceforth be performed by German personnel. The Soviets would associate themselves with this East German declaration.

There would not be much in this for the Soviets: Solution "C" would merely give them what they could get anyway by telling the East Germans not to alter existing access procedures after a treaty--plus the slightly heightened status involved in the GDR being permitted to make a declaration. This is probably not enough to make a bare-bones Solution "C" negotiable--even with a chastened Khrushchev.

It may be necessary, therefore, to add on some additional face-saving elements:

(a) A Western declaration that espionage and subversive activities would not be permitted in West Berlin--in return for a comparable East German statement regarding East Berlin. [3 lines of source text not declassified] If restraints on these activities were stated in a unilateral Western declaration, this would give the Communists less of a pretext for interfering in the internal life of West Berlin than if the restraints were stated in a formal agreement.

(b) A Western declaration that no nuclear weapons would be introduced into West Berlin. (This would be harmless, since the Western powers have no intention of introducing such weapons.)

(c) A Western declaration that Western forces in Berlin would not exceed a level approximating their current combat strength.

(d) Stationing UN observers in Berlin and along the access routes to inspect and report on fulfillment of the reciprocal declarations by the Western powers, the GDR, and the USSR indicated above.

An agreement along these lines would still be a major defeat for the Soviets. For it would leave the West Berlin status quo untouched--either physically or conceptually. To call it "face-saving" for the USSR is to use the term loosely.

If our bargaining position is strong enough to save Berlin, but not strong enough to avoid more concessions to save Khrushchev's face, there is one further addition to Solution "C" which might be considered: A declaration by the Western powers recognizing the Oder-Neisse boundary. Such recognition would probably be in the West's interest in any event, as a potential means of eventually weakening Soviet-Polish ties.

This kind of Berlin arrangement would, of course, leave a continuing possibility of trouble, since the access routes would remain in Communist hands. It is sometimes asked whether a more drastic solution is not possible, which would remove these routes from Communist control and thus settle the dispute once and for all.

(a) An all-Berlin non-Communist "Free City" has been proposed. This may have considerable propaganda advantage, but the Soviets would almost [certainly?] not give up Communist control over East Berlin. And any form of Berlin unification which preserved that control would be unacceptable to the West. This proposal thus does not seem negotiable--let alone a means of prying the access routes loose from Communist control.

(b) A special status for West Berlin, alone, has also been suggested: The city to be guarded by UN or other international contingents, and the access routes to come under the city's or the UN's jurisdiction. An international regime for Berlin which would not only deprive the allies of their occupation rights but also deprive the city of Western forces would be disastrous: No international forces could substitute for the Western forces now in Berlin--in maintaining internal order, in deterring Bloc attack, and in convincing the West Berliners that they remain under Western protection.

This chapter must therefore conclude, as it began, by stressing the limited role which negotiations can play in averting a crisis. If other measures have deterred Khrushchev, negotiations can offer him an "out" in the form of optical change in Berlin and thus somewhat increase the chances of peace. If Khrushchev remains as confident and determined as he seems now, however, negotiations cannot solve the problem; the US will have to face up to his physical challenge. The question of how and when to do this is treated in the following chapter.

IV. The Use of Force

If negotiations fail and the Soviets announce their intention of proceeding with a separate peace treaty, we should make clear that we would view the treaty as an exercise in diplomatic ventriloquism--an act without meaning or validity. We should urge non-Communist states not to grace the occasion with their presence and thus seem to ratify the permanent denial to East Germany of the right of self-determination.

At the same time, the Western powers should make clear the post-treaty posture that they would propose to adopt toward East Germans, when they appear along the access routes and claim the right to "control" Western military traffic. (Civil access to and from Berlin is already subject to East German control.) The chances of a physical collision may be minimized if our position regarding East German functions relative to military traffic have been thoroughly defined before they show up.

Present contingency planning contemplates that the Western powers will identify their military traffic to the East Germans, if they take over access functions from the Soviets, but not allow the East Germans to stamp Western papers, as the Soviets now do.

The arguments for thus trying to limit the East Germans' role are impressive:

(a) If the East Germans insist on paper-stamping, the crisis will be brought to a head at a time when the Western powers are fully prepared--physically and psychologically--for counter-action.

(b) If the Germans back away from paper-stamping, the Western position will have been strengthened. For the debate between ourselves and the Soviets as to whether present procedures constitute merely identification of Western military traffic or "control" of that traffic will have been resolved in our favor.

The argument against this course of action is that it may be politically infeasible.

The British have only agreed to present contingency planning under great duress; in an emergency, they would almost certainly propose that the East Germans be allowed to perform the functions which the Soviets now discharge. There would probably be considerable European press and popular support for the British position; there would be a disinclination for seeming to make paper stamping a casus belli, no matter how much we explained the underlying issue.

The alliance would thus be divided over an essentially procedural question, at the very time when maximum allied unity was needed as a basis for possible armed action in defense of Berlin. The situation would be the more difficult since there might be some questioning in the US press, public and Congress as to whether we had really chosen the most suitable issue on which to fight. There would also be grave difficulty in making our position plausible to the uncommitted countries.

All this would be apparent to the Soviets, and they would be encouraged to press ahead to exploit the Western disarray. In the face of Bloc pressures and allied disunity, it seems likely that the allies would eventually accept the same paper-stamping from the East Germans that they now accept from the Soviets. To avoid such a last minute change in our position under fire, it would be better to straighten out this issue beforehand.

This report suggests, therefore, that the Western powers should announce, before a peace treaty is concluded, that they would allow East German personnel to perform the same functions as the Soviets--no more. This would mean holding the same line against a variety of ostensibly minor changes in these functions which we have held for many years. The difference would be that it would be the East Germans, rather than the Soviets, who would be trying to make the changes. Allied unity could probably be more readily secured on defending this existing line than on trying to improve it at the time of a GDR take-over. And parity of treatment for the GDR would be easier for the USSR to accept as an outcome of the crisis, if it had been deterred and wanted a face-saving "out".

The East Germans' initial reaction to a pre-treaty announcement by the Western powers along the lines suggested above (assuming that negotiations with the USSR had already failed) is predictable: They would say that the procedures to be followed could only be determined in post-treaty negotiations between the Western powers and the sovereign East German regime.

The West could not, of course, allow itself to be placed in the position of negotiating to secure rights which it already possessed--least of all with a regime which it does not recognize or hold responsible for those rights' fulfillment. At the same time, the West would not want it to appear that it was breaking with the Communists over the issue of dealings with the GDR, rather than over the issue of Berlin's freedom. This would be falling into a Communist propaganda trap.

The Western powers might, therefore, indicate that they remained willing to negotiate with the USSR about post-treaty Berlin and were willing to inform the GDR of the procedures which they would follow if negotiations did not succeed. The manner of this "informing" could be determined at the time--the main object being to choose a manner which would generate a minimum of divisive doubts and disputes among the Western powers. The proposal for reciprocal declarations contemplated in Solution "C" might be revived for this purpose.

But now suppose that the East Germans reject being "informed" about procedures, and insist that post-treaty procedures be determined through direct inter-governmental negotiation with the GDR. They might announce that, failing such negotiation, they would unilaterally specify the new procedures to be followed, and only allow Western military traffic to pass which conformed to these procedures.

Should these "new" procedures be identical to those hitherto followed by the Soviets, the traffic would continue to move under the policy proposed in this report. Should these procedures differ from present procedures in any respect, however minor, the Western powers could not accede. If these powers should allow the GDR to perform functions which they have hitherto successfully denied to the Soviets, they would be hard put to find a peg on which to arrest their subsequent descent down the slippery slope.

If the Western powers refused to abide by new procedures which the GDR has proposed, their ground military traffic would be turned back. In this circumstance, we should continue the daily presentation of ground military traffic for movement and, upon refusal, move it by air. At the same time, we should begin to apply some of the economic counter-measures discussed in Chapter III. We should also move toward the further build-up of the permanent US defense establishment projected in that Chapter.

While these pressures were being mounted, the relatively small amount of military traffic now going to Berlin could be taken care of by a slight increase in the number of military flights to Berlin. The Communists would, at this point, have to choose between four courses of action:

(a) Negotiating for resumption of access.

(b) Letting the garrison airlift go on indefinitely. This would not permit them to achieve their basic purpose; West Berlin would remain free and under guard of Western forces.

(c) Shooting down the Western aircraft, since passive interference alone would not prevent the small number of flights required to supply the garrison. In this event, we should fight back in the air, with a scale of non-nuclear violence corresponding to that of the Communists. The onus for initial use of force would have been clearly placed on them. If they fired on our aircraft, we would fire on theirs. If their ground batteries tried to interdict our airlift, we would attack those batteries from the air. Such an air war would almost certainly end in Western defeat if the Soviets threw in their full strength. If it became clear that this was the Soviet intention, the Western powers should abandon the air effort and prepare for a large scale use of ground force.

(d) The GDR might cut off civil ground access. In this case, we could move the civil traffic initially by aircraft. There would probably be little political support in Europe for large scale use of force to move goods and persons on the ground, until the option of air movement had been exhausted. The French have recently voiced this view, which has probably always been the British position.

In starting the civil airlift, we should also move to the all-out application of economic counter-measures: cutting off trade with the Bloc, and forbidding Bloc ships and planes from using NATO ports or airfields. The full scale US defense build-up discussed in Chapter III would come into action: X billion would be added to the US defense budget, and US force ceilings would be raised appreciably. Our naval vessels would begin shadowing, delaying, and otherwise harassing Bloc shipping, preparatory to a full-scale blockade. All these pressures would be applied in mounting intensity, if the Communists continued to block civil ground access.

A civil airlift could move enough goods to keep the Berlin economy functioning at full blast, unless the Soviets resorted to passive counter-measures. In this event allied naval forces would immediately begin to blockade the Baltic, the Black Sea, and the Soviet Pacific coast. They would require all Soviet vessels seeking to depart those areas to return to port. Our purpose would be to show Western determination and to apply immediate military pressure on the USSR, even before the substantial use of ground force could be mounted, in order to influence basic Soviet political decisions.

If the Soviets nonetheless continued passive interference, the airlift could be hobbled. For passive measures could restrict us to visual flight; and visual flight would not be sufficient to move the needed goods and supplies to Berlin in the long run, as the stockpiles there became depleted. If passive interference were continued, therefore, we should then resort to substantial ground force to restore our access.

The use of force to restore access should begin with a sizable probe--say a battalion--to establish the fact that access to Berlin is physically blocked. Then resort should be had to an operation involving substantial non-nuclear force. Whether this operation takes place at once or not would depend on the state of preparations.

The purpose of the operation would not be the military one of defeating all the Soviet forces which might oppose our forces; this would not be feasible.

It would be the political purpose of moving the Soviets to negotiate a resumption of access by giving the most convincing demonstration of which the West was capable that the Western Allies were not prepared to submit to Soviet demands and would use whatever force was necessary, up to and including general war, in resisting them.

The Western force should thus be large enough so that the Soviets would appreciate the great risk that conflict involving this force would, if not terminated by early negotiations, get out of control and escalate into nuclear war. This means, among other things, that:

(a) The force should not be susceptible of being stopped by the GDR. The JCS believe that 7 divisions and 4 air wings would achieve this end.

(b) The force, together with the other ground forces available for the battle, should be able to defend itself with non-nuclear weapons until it was plain that the political purpose would not be achieved and that nuclear weapons must be used. An opinion of the JCS leads to the belief that such a force is well within US and allied capability.

The way in which such a ground operation might best serve its political purpose requires much further elaboration by the Defense Department.

The initial force to be deployed across the zonal boundary might, for example, be one division--with one in reserve.

This was the course discussed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their April 28 memorandum to the Secretary of Defense,/5/ which indicated that "the use of substantial non-nuclear ground forces, in the magnitude of two divisions, could facilitate negotiations to restore ground access to Berlin and compel the Soviets to face the imminent possibility of a broadening of the conflict as well as the possibility of general war, should they persist in obstructing access to Berlin." The annex to the JCS April 28 memorandum said: "A division could fight well for several days, long enough to accept reinforcement by another US or Allied division . . . If an enemy force of not more than 3-4 divisions opposes the allied force . . . it is quite likely that we could support a two division force indefinitely in East Germany."/6/

The Soviets might conclude, at this point, that the danger of escalation was getting out of hand and move toward a negotiated settlement. Indeed, they might be impelled to this conclusion by preparations for use of this two division force, which could not fail to be evident to them well in advance.

If, on the contrary, the Soviets threw in more force, the allied operation would need to be reinforced. The seven division force mentioned by the JCS might then come into play.

This force could continue the non-nuclear combat in the face of Soviet/GDR reinforcements and thus provide more time for the Soviets to appreciate the risks of the course on which they were embarked and to seek an acceptable negotiated settlement.

After a period of about 1-2 weeks this allied force would need further reinforcement--depending on the Communist strength thrown against it. At some point, either at the end of this 1-2 weeks or later if the seven division force were to be reinforced, a judgment would have to be reached that we had done all that was feasible to convince Khrushchev that the United States would and, indeed, must--in order to preserve its army, its allies and itself--use nuclear weapons. Thus the last stage of deterrence would have been reached, if previous preparations and uses of force had not produced an acceptable settlement of the issue.

V. The Possibilities and Consequences of Failure

It is essential to consider, not only the possibility of success and the risks and danger involved in any proposal, but also the possibilities and consequences of failure. Failure in the course proposed could arise from at least three sources.

First. Even with the most careful handling, our allies, or important ones of them, might become frightened along the way, decide that the risks and dangers exceeded the advantages, and indicate that they were no longer associated with our position.

This could happen, not only because their people might be less stalwart or because their governments came to a different appraisal of the dangers and advantages but also because, to some extent, their interest may be different from ours in one respect: None of them has the prestige or world position which we do; and, therefore, none of them can have that position and prestige at stake.

It is impracticable for the United States to undertake unilateral action in the Berlin area, if for no other reason than that this action would take off from the territory of the Federal Republic and might require, to some extent, air bases, staging areas, assembly areas, and so forth in both France and Great Britain. If these allies, especially the Federal Republic, were to weaken, the plan here developed would fail: While the United States could still launch nuclear warfare, there is very grave doubt that our own Congress and people would support initiation of a general war which arose over Berlin and was disapproved by the Germans themselves.

What could be done to mitigate the danger to our position and to the alliance which this division among the allies would have caused?

The Soviets' reaction to the division among the Western powers would depend, at least in part, on the point at which it had occurred.

If our allies' negative attitude had become manifest when the course of action outlined in this report was first proposed to them, present military contingency planning would presumably not be changed. The Soviets' view of Western intentions would thus remain a skeptical one. They would not expect our allies to go from the planned battalion-or-larger probe (of which they are probably well aware) to general nuclear war. And they would be right.

In this circumstance, there would probably be little chance of reaching agreement with the Soviets on the kind of Berlin Solution "C" discussed in Chapter III. It would be necessary to move toward an agreement more favorable to the Soviets, if a show-down was to be avoided which would result in a humiliating Western retreat:

(a) The West Germans might have to be persuaded to accept the seven year stretch-out proposed by Ambassador Thompson, if this should prove to hold any interest for the Soviets. Or

(b) An "interim" agreement might be sought, even though it might be taken to imply a term on the Western powers' presence in Berlin and to set the stage for greater Soviet pressure at the expiration of that term. Or

(c) A permanent agreement for Berlin might be sought which would create a new juridical status for the city--perhaps placing it under UN or some other form of international protection. The extent of the resulting damage would depend, in part, on whether Western forces could remain in Berlin as part of the UN or international force.

In the wake of such a settlement, at least one asset would have been preserved: the US posture of firm intent. For it would be clear that this US intent had been hobbled only by allied restraint.

If allied unwillingness to permit the course of action proposed in this report were first masked behind generalized consent, and only unveiled at the height of the crisis, the result would be more disastrous. The terms that could then be negotiated with the Soviets concerning Berlin would be very bad indeed; the alliance would be prey to divisive bitter recriminations about responsibility for this outcome.

The Soviets would have, of course, achieved one of their highest objectives for the Berlin operation: They would have split the alliance. They would not yet, however, have driven the United States out of Europe.

It might be possible in this moment of extreme disaster and Russian triumph to propose and have accepted a very large measure of North Atlantic political unity, but the chances would be heavily against it. The Europeans might believe that we had brought them to the verge of annihilation and be unwilling to trust the United States with the even greater powers which it would gain by Atlantic union. The people of this country might feel that our allies had weakened at the vital moment and that they had no fight in them. Our world position would suffer heavily.

It should, however, be noted on the other side that the loss of our prestige and position of leadership would be much less if our allies showed an unwillingness to fight than if we, as a government and people, led them in that submissive direction.

Second. Failure might come from the precipitation of general war before it was necessary, thus losing the important deterrent effect of the non-nuclear military measures which had been planned to precede it.

Nuclear war could occur from mischance. In a broader sense, this is a risk inherent in human nature, in any period of great tension and crisis. In a more specific sense this risk is intensified by the possibility, which has already been mentioned, of premature and unauthorized local use of nuclear weapons in Europe; this possibility can be diminished by tightening up custody and control.

Nuclear war could also occur from miscalculation as to the imminence of the other side's attack. Understandably, the pressure from those responsible for SAC and its Russian equivalent will be very great to have the first strike, and the tendency will be to resolve all doubts in favor of earlier rather than later action. Steady nerves and firm decision at the highest levels will be required to give the preliminary use of non-nuclear force a full opportunity to have its effect before proceeding to nuclear violence.

Third. We must end this report, as we began it, by stating that there can be no assurance that Moscow may not refuse to be deterred and that its actions may not, therefore, make nuclear war unavoidable. This plan represents an effort to increase the deterrent to the greatest extent we can devise. This, we believe, offers the best hope of avoiding war short of submitting to Moscow's demands.